“Pyongyang portrays nuclear weapons as its most effective way to deter the threat from the United States,” the Department of Defense says in a newly disclosed report to Congress on North Korean security policy.
“朝鲜的主要战略目标是通过同时发展其经济和核武器计划的永久性Kim家族统治，这是一项两管齐下的政策经过ungjin。”看军事和安全发展涉及大韩民国民众共和国，，，，2017, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018.
这DoD assessment presents an uncompromisingly hostile North Korea that is committed to nuclear weapons. The report provides no reason to anticipate a reconsideration or a reorientation of the country’s nuclear policies, though that is the entire premise of the upcomingJune 12特朗普总统与朝鲜领导人金正恩之间的峰会会议。
“North Korea ultimately seeks the capability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear-armed ICBM,”五角大楼报告said. “This pursuit supports North Korea’s strategy of deterring the United States as well as weakening U.S. alliances in the region by casting doubt on the U.S.commitment to extended deterrence. In the long term, North Korea may see nuclear weapons as permitting more frequent coercive behavior and may further increase Kim Jong Un’s tolerance for risk.”
这DoD report, required by statute and reflecting developments only through December 15, 2017, is largely consistent withprevious DoD reports on the subject。It includes some new material on North Korea’s ballistic missile tests, cyber capabilities, special operations forces, and other topics.
空降的基于无人机的拦截器网络能否有效地抵御朝鲜弹道导弹的发射？最近assessment物理学家Richard L. Garwin和Theodore A. Postol得出结论。
“All of the technologies needed to implement the proposed system are proven and no new technologies are needed to realize the system,” they wrote.
这ir concept envisions the deployment of a number of Predator B drones loitering outside of North Korean airspace each bearing two boost-phase intercept missiles.
“从技术上讲，基线系统可以在2020年部署，并且设计为处理多达5个同时发生的ICBM启动。”
“The potential value of this system could be to quickly create an incentive for North Korea to take diplomatic negotiations seriously and to destroy North Korean ICBMs if they are launched at the continental United States.”
A new报告from the Congressional Research Service summarizes the limited successes of past nuclear negotiations between the US and North Korea, including lessons learned. Looking forward, it discusses the features of possible negotiations that would need to be determined, such as the specific goals to be achieved, preconditions for negotiations (if any), the format (bilateral or multilateral), and potential linkage to other policy issues.
A new reportfrom the Congressional Research Service identifies and examines seven possible directions for US policy, none of them risk-free or altogether satisfactory:
* maintaining the military status quo *增强的遏制和威慑 *拒绝朝鲜收购能够威胁美国的交付系统 *消除ICBM设施和发射台 *消除朝鲜核设施 * DPRK regime change * withdrawing U.S. military forces
这National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson AFB has updated and published its periodic弹道和巡航导弹威胁报告。这new report updates theprevious version from 2013。
Also, the NASIC report is not a top-level intelligence report that has been sanctioned by the Director of National Intelligence. As such, it represents the assessment of NASIC rather than necessarily the coordinated and combined conclusion of the US Intelligence Community.
Nonetheless, it’s a unique and useful report that everyone who follows international security and ballistic and cruise missile developments should consult.
Some of the more noteworthy individual findings of the new report include:
尽管有些人声称俄罗斯的核现代化不是“积累”，但俄罗斯洲际弹道导弹的规模将继续下降。
这Russian RS-26 “short” SS-27 ICBM is still categorized as an ICBM (as in the 2013 report) despite claims by some that it’s an INF weapon.
这报告is the first US official document to publicly identify the ground-launched cruise missile that Russia has developed and deployed in violation of the INF treaty: 3M-14. The weapon is assessed to “possibly” have a nuclear option.[Note:A corrected version of the NASIC reportpublished in June removed the reference to a “ground” version of the 3M-14.]
这range of the dual-capable SS-26 (Islander) SRBM is listed as 350 km (217 miles) rather than the 500-700 km (310-435 miles) often claimed in the public debate.
ICBMs:与公开辩论中的许多错误主张相反（请参阅here和here) about a Russia nuclear “build-up,” the NASIC report concludes that “the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints…” This conclusion fits theassessment诺里斯和我多年来一直认为俄罗斯是现代化its nuclear forces but notincreasing阿森纳的大小。
该报告算出约330个ICBM发射器（筒仓和特尔斯），少于400claimed经过the Russian military. The actual number of deployed missiles is probably a little lower because several SS-19 and SS-25 units are in the process of being dismantled.
沉重的发展继续Sarmat (RS-28)，看起来与现有的SS-18非常相似。较轻的SS-27被称为RS-26 (Rubezh or Yars-M)似乎已经延迟了，仍在开发中。尽管有些人在公开辩论中声称RS-26违反了INF条约，但NASIC报告以5,500多公里（3,417多英里）的ICBM范围列出了导弹，与2013年版中列出的导弹相同。NASIC说，RS-26被美国情报界指定为SS-X-28，具有“至少2个”阶段和多个弹头。
Overall, “Russia retains over 1,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs,” according to NASIC, another assessment that fits我们的估计from the Nuclear Notebook. The NASIC report states that “most” of those missiles “are maintained on alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order.” (In comparison, essentially all US ICBMs are maintained on alert:see here for global alert status）
SLBM：这Russian navy is in the early phase of a transition from the Soviet-era Delta-class SSBNs to the newBorei-class SSBN。NASIC lists theBulava (SS-N-32) SLBMas operational on three Boreis (five more are under construction). The report also lists a Typhoon-class SSBN as “not yet deployed” with the Bulava (the same wording as in the 2013 report), but this is thought to refer to the single Typhoon that has been used for test launches of the Bulava and not imply that the submarine is being readied for operational deployment with the missile.
在建造新的Borei SSBN时，六个delta-ivs are being upgrade with modifications to theSS-N-23 SLBM。这报告also lists 96SS-N-18发射器，对应6Delta-III SSBNs. But that appears to include 3-4 SSBNs that have been retired (but not yet dismantled). Only 2 Delta-IIIs appear to be operational, with a third in overhaul, and all are scheduled to be replaced by Borei-class SSBNs in the near future.
Cruise Missiles:该报告列出了五枚具有核能力的陆战巡航导弹，其中三枚是苏联时代的武器。“可能”具有核能的两种新导弹包括俄罗斯开发和部署的神秘地面发射的巡航导弹。美国首次指控俄罗斯在2014年违反条约，但拒绝命名导弹，但鼻子报告给了它一个名字：3M-14。这weapon exists in both “ground, ship & sub” versions and is credited with “conventional, nuclear possible” warhead capability.[Note:A corrected version of the NASIC reportpublished in June removed the reference to a “ground” version of the 3M-14.]
Ground- and sea-based versions of the 3M-14 have different designations. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)识别海军3M-14作为SS-N-30land-attack missile, which is part of the larger Kalibr family of missiles that include:
3M-14（SS-N-30）陆地攻击导弹（核版本可能称为SS-N-30A； Pavel Podvig报告ed早在2014年，他就被告知约8米3M-14S导弹“'s显然代表“战略”，这意味着远距离且可能是核能”）；
这“conventional, nuclear possible” description connotes some uncertainty about whether the 3M-14 has a nuclear warhead option. But President Vladimir Putin has publicly陈述that it does, and General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of US European Command (EUCOM),told Congress3月，地面发射版本是“常规/核双重能力系统”。
ONI预测that Kalibr-type missiles (remember: Kalibr can refer to land-attack, anti-ship, and/or anti-submarine versions) will be deployed on all larger new surface vessels and submarines and backfitted onto upgraded existing major ships and submarines. But when Russian officials say a ship or submarine will be equipped with the Kalibr, that can potentially refer to one or more of the above missile versions. Of those that receive the land-attack version, for example, presumably only some will be assigned the “nuclear possible” version. For a ship to get nuclear capability is not enough to simply load the missile; it has to be equipped with special launch control equipment, have special personnel onboard, and undergo special nuclear training and certification to be assigned nuclear weapons. That is expensive and an extra operational burden that probably means the nuclear version is only assigned to some of the Kalibr-equipped vessels. The previous nuclear land-attack SLCM (SS-N-21) is only assigned to frontline attack submarines, which will most likely also received the nuclear SS-N-30. It remains to be seen if the nuclear version will also go on major surface combatants such as the nuclear-propelled attack submarines.
这NASIC report also identifies the3M-55 (P-800 Oniks (Onyx), or SS-N-26 Strobile)具有“核可能”能力的巡航导弹。该武器还存在于“地面，船舶和潜艇”版本中，ONI指出，SS-N-26正在替换舰队中较旧的SS-N-7，-9，-12和-19反舰艇巡航导弹。所有这些都具有双重能力。
It is interesting that the NASIC report describes the SS-N-26 as a land-attack missile given its primary role as an anti-ship missile and coastal defense missile. The ground-launched version might be theSSC-5 Stooge它用于取代苏联时代的新堡垒 - 沿海防御导弹系统SSC-1B舰队基地的导弹，例如Kaliningrad。基于船的版本正在取代SS-N-19在核销售的基洛夫级巡洋舰和库兹尼托夫级航空母舰上。大概它也将取代SS-N-12on the Slava-class cruisers and SS-N-9 on smaller corvettes. The submarine version is replacing the SS-N-19 on the Oscar-class nuclear-propelled attack submarine.
NASIC列出了新的常规KH-101 ALCM，但没有提及称为核版本KH-102 ALCM这已经开发了一些时间。这Kh-102 is described in the recentDIA报告俄罗斯军事力量。
短程弹道导弹:Russia is replacing the Soviet-eraSS-21 (Tochka)missile with theSS-26 (Iskander-M)，这一过程预计将在2020年代初完成。在公开辩论中，SS-26的范围通常是500-700公里（310-435英里），但鼻报告列出的范围为350公里（217英里），从300公里（186英里）上升。）在2013年版中报告。
That range change is interesting because 300 km is also the upper range of the new category of close-range ballistic missiles. So as a result of that new range category, the SS-26 is now counted in a different category than the SS-21 it is replacing.
缩短这种缩短的原因之一可能是向DF-5 ICBM力量增加MIRV（Mirved版本被称为DF-5B）。All other Chinese missiles only have one warhead each (although the warheads are widely assumed not to be mated with the missiles under normal circumstances). It is unclear, however, why the timeline has been shortened.
So for NASIC’s projection for the next five years to come true, China would need to take several drastic steps. First, it would have to MIRV all of its DF-5s (about half are currently MIRVed). That would still not provide enough warheads, so it would also have to deploy significantly moreDF-31As和/or new MIRVedDF-41（（see graph below). Deployment of the DF-31A is progressing very slowly, so NASIC’s projection probably relies mainly on the assumption that the DF-41 will be deployed soon in adequate numbers. Whether China will do so remains to be seen.
Click on graph to view full size.
China currently has about 80 ICBM warheads (for 60 ICBMs) that can hit the United States. Of these, about 60 warheads can hit the continental United States (not including Alaska). That’s a doubling of ICBM warheads that can hit the United States (including Guam) over the past 25 years – and a tripling of the number of warheads that can hit the continental United States. The NASIC report does not define what “well over 100” means, but if it’s in the range of 120, and NASIC’s projection actually came true, then it would mean China by the early-2020s would have increased the number of ICBM warheads that can hit the United States threefold since the early 1990s. That a significant increase but obviously but must be seen the context of the much greater number of US warheads that can hit China.
China does not appear to have converted all of itsDF-5ICBMs to MIRV. The report lists both the single-warhead DF-5A and the multiple-warheadDF-5B（（CSS-4 Mod 3)在“大约20”孤岛中。与A-version不同，B version具有后增强的车辆，这是2013年报告中未披露的技术细节。A rumorabout a DF-5C version with 10 MIRVs is not confirmed by the report.
新一代公路摩托车弹道的部署称为DF-31和DF-31AICBMs appears to have stalled; the number of launchers listed in the new report is the same as in the 2013 report: 5-10 DF-31s and “more than 15” DF-31As.
然而，DF-31A程序的描述听起来像部署仍在进行中：“更长的范围CSS-10 mod 2will allowtargeting of most of the continental United States” (emphasis added).
期待已久的（有些神秘）DF-41ICBM is still not deployed. NASIC says the DF-41 is “possibly capable of carrying MIRV,” a less certain determination than the 2017 DOD report, which called the missile “MIRV capable.” The report lists the DF-41 with three stages and a Post-Boost Vehicle, details not provided in the previous report.
One of the two nuclear versions of theDF-21MRBM appears to have been retired. NASIC only lists one: CSS-5 Mod 2. In total, the report lists “fewer than 50” launchers for the nuclear version of the DF-21, which is the same number it listed in the 2013 report (see herefor description of one of the DF-21 launch units. But that was also the number listed back then for the older nuclear DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1). The nuclear MRBM force has probably not been cut in half over the past four years, so perhaps the previous estimate of fewer than 50 launchers was intended to include both versions. The NASIC report does not mention the CSS-5 Mod 6 that was mentioned in the DOD’s annual report from 2016.
基于海洋的弹道导弹：该报告总共列出了48JL-2SLBM launchers, corresponding to the number of launch tubes on the four Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs based at the Longpo Naval Base on Hainan Island. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the missiles are therefore fully operational or deployed on the submarines under normal circumstances. They might, but it is yet unclear how China operates its SSBN fleet (for a description of the SSBN fleet,see here）。
这2017 report no longer lists the Xia-class (Type 092) SSBN or the JL-1 SLBM, indicating that China’s first (and not very successful) sea-based nuclear capability has been retired from service.
A US Air Force Global Strike Commanddocument2013年列出了另一枚巡航导弹DH-20 (CJ-20)，有核选择。鼻子从来没有将核能力归因于该武器和国防部长办公室最近说that the Chinese Air Force “does not currently have a nuclear mission.”
At the same time, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recentlytold Congress中国巡航导弹furthe升级r, including “with two, new air-launched ballistic [cruise] missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload.”
Pakistan
这NASIC report surprisingly does not list Pakistan’s Babur GLCM as operational.
鼻子描述了Ababeel MRBM，，，，which was first test-launch in January 2017, as as “MIRVed” missile. Although this echoes the announcement made by the Pakistani military at the time, the designation “the MIRVed Abadeel” sounds very confident given the limited flight history and the technological challenges associated with developing reliable MIRV systems.
也不是Ra’ad ALCM也不是Babur GLCMis listed as deployed, which is surprising especially for the Babur after 13 flight tests. Babur launchers have been fitting out at the National Development Complex for years and are在某些军队驻军中可见。Nor does NASIC mention theBabur-2或者Babur-3（海军版）被巴基斯坦军方宣布并宣布的版本。
India
令人惊讶的是，NASIC报告仅列出“少于10”Agni-2 MRBM发射器。这是相同的数量在2013年,which indicates there is still only one operational missile group equipped with the Agni-2 seven years after the Indian government first declared it deployed. The slow introduction might indicate technical problems, or that India is instead focused on fielding the longer-rangeAgni-3 IRBMthat NASIC says is now deployed with “fewer than 10” launchers.
也不是Agni-4norAgni-5IRBMs are listed as deployed, even though the Indian government says the Agni-4 has been “inducted” into the armed forces and has reported three army “user trial” test launches. NASIC says India is developing theAgni-6 ICBM范围为6,000公里（3,728英里）。
For India’s emerging SSBN fleet, the NASIC report lists the short-rangeK-15 SLBMas deployed, which is a surprise given that the Arihant SSBN is not yet considered fully operational. The submarine has been undergoing sea-trials for several years and was rumored to have conducted its first submerged K-15 test launch in November 2016. But a few more are probably needed before the missile can be considered operational. TheK-4 SLBMis in development and NASIC sets the range at 3,500 km (2,175 miles).
As for cruise missiles, it is helpful that the report continue to list theBramosas conventional, which might help discredit rumors about nuclear capability.
这报告states there are now “fewer than 50” launchers for theHwasong-10（Musudan）IRBM。NASIC将范围设置为3,000公里以上（1,864英里），而不是在公开辩论中看到的4,000公里（2,485英里）。
Likewise, while many public sources set the range of the mobile ICBMs (KN-08和KN-14) as 8,000 km (4,970 miles) – some even longer, sufficient to reach parts of the United States, the NASIC report lists a more modest range estimate of 5,500+ km (3,418 miles), the lower end of the ICBM range.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New Land Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
我正在阅读latest Stockpile Stewardship and Management Planfrom the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and wondering what I should pick to critique the Obama administration’s nuclear policy.
毕竟，有很多问题值得解决，包括：金博宝正规网址
– Why NNSA continues to overspend and over-commit and create a spending bow wave in 2021-2026 in excess of the President’s budget in exactly the same time period that excessive Air Force and Navy modernization programs are expected to put the greatest pressure on defense spending?
- 为什么越来越多的弹头类型的库存似乎越来越昂贵？
- 为什么每个弹头寿命延伸计划变得越来越雄心勃勃和昂贵，没有明显的目光？
– And why a policy of reductions, no new nuclear weapons, no pursuit of new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons, restraint, a pledge to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” and the goal of disarmament, instead became a blueprint for nuclear overreach with record funding, across-the-board modernizations, unprecedented warhead modifications, increasing weapons accuracy and effectiveness, reaffirmation of a Triad and non-strategic nuclear weapons, continuation of counterforce strategy, reaffirmation of the importance and salience of nuclear weapons, and an open-ended commitment to retain nuclear weapons further into the future than they have existed so far?
So here are some thoughts about what other nuclear-armed states should (or could) disclose about their nuclear arsenals – not to disclose everything but to improve communication about the role of nuclear weapons and avoid misunderstandings and counterproductive surprises:Continue reading→
Ongoing U.S. military action against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria lacks any specific authorization from Congress. A comparative analysis of various proposals for Congress to enact an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State is provided inan updated reportfrom the Congressional Research Service.
“一些ag)认为,政府的行动ainst the IS also fall outside the President’s Article II powers. Concerned with Congress’s constitutional role in the exercise of the war power, perceived presidential overreach in that area of constitutional powers, and the President’s expansion of the use of military force in Iraq and Syria, several Members of Congress have expressed the view that continued use of military force against the Islamic State requires congressional authorization. Members have differed on whether such authorization is needed, given existing authorities, or whether such a measure should be enacted.”
North Korea’s boast on January 5 about having detonated a “hydrogen bomb,” the colloquial name for a thermonuclear explosive, seems highly hyperbolic due to the relatively low estimated explosive yield, as inferred from the reported seismic magnitude of about 4.8 (a small- to moderately-sized event). More important, I think the Korean Central News Agency’s rationale for the test deserves attention and makes logical sense from North Korea’s perspective. That statement was: “This test is a measure for self-defense the D.P.R.K. has taken to firmly protect the sovereignty of the country and the vital right of the nation from the ever-growing nuclear threat and blackmail by the U.S.-led hostile forces and to reliably safeguard the peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional security.” (D.P.R.K. stands for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the official name for North Korea.)
In the case where North Korea does not need to produce a much bigger explosive yield per bomb, but is content with low to moderate yields, it can make much more efficient use of its available fissile material (with a stockpile estimated at a dozen to a few dozen bombs’ worth of material) and have much lower weight bombs. This is the key to understanding why a boosted fission bomb is a serious military concern. It is more apt to fit on ballistic missiles. The lighter the payload (warhead), the farther a ballistic missile with a given amount of thrust can carry the bomb to a target.
从军事角度来看：关注的原因？
So, in my opinion, a boosted fission bomb is even more cause for immediate concern than a thermonuclear bomb. (A thermonuclear “hydrogen” bomb would have the additional technical complication of a fusion fuel stage ignited by a boosted fission bomb. If North Korea eventually develops a true thermonuclear bomb, this type of bomb could, with further development, also likely be made to fit on a ballistic missile.) A boosted fission bomb alone, however, would mean that North Korea is well on its way to making nuclear bombs that are small enough and lightweight enough to fit on ballistic missiles.
Obviously, the uncertainty about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is considerable, and we may never fully find out what was really tested a few days ago, despite the planes that the U.S. has been flying near North Korea to detect any leakage of radioactive elements or other physical evidence from the test site.
Nonetheless, I think it is worthwhile to point out that some confusion has been afoot in several news stories. I have read in a number of press reports that there is doubt as to whether North Korea could produce the tritium that would be needed for a boosted fission device. In September of last year, David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini of the Institute for Science and International Security published a report that the 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon is “not an ideal producer of isotopes, it can be used in this way.” They noted, “As part of the renovation of the reactor, North Korean technicians reportedly installed (or renovated) irradiation channels in the core. These channels would be used to make various types of isotopes, potentially for civilian or military purposes.”[1]这y further observed that tritium could be produced in such irradiation channels, although there is not conclusive evidence of this production.
这New York Times进一步播种了一些混乱，仅提及tri trium用于增强，但被忽略为提及氘。氘和trium融合反应是点燃的“最简单”融合反应，同时仍然非常具有挑战性。[2]这Timesalso gave the impression that boosting was just about increasing the explosive yield but did not discuss the important point about boosting the efficient use of fissile material so as to substantially decrease the overall weight of the bomb.
None other than Dr. Hans Bethe, leader of the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project and a founder of FAS, stated in a May 28, 1952 memorandum that “by the middle of 1948, [Dr. Edward] Teller had invented the booster, in which a fission bomb initiates a thermonuclear reaction in a moderate volume of a mixture of T [tritium] and D [deuterium], … [and a test in Nevada] demonstrated the practical usefulness of the booster for small-diameter implosion weapons.”[3]请注意，在这种情况下，“小直径”意味着该武器适合弹道导弹。
Just a day before the nuclear test, Joseph Bermudez published an essay for the non-governmental website 38 North (affiliated with the US-Korea Institute at the School for Advanced International Studies) about North Korea’s ballistic missile submarine program. He assessed: “Reports of a North Korean ‘ejection’ test of theBukkeukseong-1（Polaris-1，KN-11）2015年12月21日的潜艇弹性弹道导弹（SLBM）似乎得到了Sinpo South Shipyard的新商业卫星图像的支持。该图像还表明，尽管有报道称2015年11月下旬的测试失败了，朝鲜仍在继续积极地追求ReportsReports其SLBM开发计划。”[4]增强的裂变装置测试（如果在1月5日进行）将与弹道导弹潜艇计划相吻合。
我们从这里去哪里？
I will conclude by underscoring that the United States will have to work even harder to reassure allies such as Japan and South Korea. Early last year, I wrote apaperthat describes how relatively easily South Korea could make nuclear weapons while urging that the United States needs to prevent this from happening. As Prof. Martin Hellman of Stanford University and a member of FAS’s Board of Experts has written in a最近的博客：“就像金正恩政权一样令人讨厌，我们需要学习如何与之生活，而不是继续徒劳地试图使它崩溃。正如[Siegfried] Hecker博士[Los Alamos National Laboratory的前主任]指出的那样，后一种方法为我们提供了一个具有核武库的不稳定国家。精神错乱已被定义为一遍又一遍地重复同样的错误，但期望会产生不同的结果。是时候我们尝试了一个新实验了吗？”
[2]“朝鲜是否引爆了氢弹？这就是我们所知道的。”New York Times，2016年1月6日。
[3]Hans A. Bethe, “Memorandum on the History of Thermonuclear Program,” May 28. 1952, (Assembled on 5/12/90 from 3 different versions by Chuck Hansen, Editor,Swords of Armageddon), available at//www.tumejico.com/nuke/guide/usa/nuclear/bethe-52.htm
这first panel was on “Current Status of Rebuilding and Modernizing the United States Warheads and Nuclear Weapons Complex,” an NGO side event organized on May 1st由核责任联盟和妇女国际和平与自由联盟（WILPF）。在描述美国计划的同时，我获得了组织者的许可，以涵盖全部the nuclear-armed states. Quite a mouthful but it puts the U.S. efforts better in context and shows that nuclear weapon modernization isglobalchallenge for the NPT.
第二小组是“ B61的未来：美国和欧洲的观点”。该GNO方面的活动是由核时代和平基金会于5月2日组织的ND。In my briefing I focused on providing factual information about the status and details of the B61 life-extension program, which more than a simple life-extension will produce the first guided, standoff nuclear bomb in the U.S. inventory, and significantly enhance NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe.
两个非政府组织事件是两个许多由非政府组织组织，除了更多官方的附带事件或者ganized by governments and international organizations.
这2014 PREPCOM is also the event where the United States last weekdisclosed自2009年以来，美国的核武器储存仅缩小了309枚弹头，远远少于许多人预期的，鉴于巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）的讲话”dramatic” and “bold” reductions and promises to “put an end to Cold War thinking。”
For the 185 non-nuclear weapon states that have signed on to the NPT and renounced nuclear weapons in return of thepromise由条约五个核武器国家党（中国，法国，俄罗斯，英国和美国）“以与早期停止核武器竞赛有关的有效措施进行谈判，并核武器的核武器”，那些五个核武器国家对核力量的无尽现代化显然质疑他们的义务，以履行他们45年前的承诺。正式描述的一些核现代化被官方描述为旨在到2080年代 - 比《不合时宜》和《核时代》持续到迄今为止持续的核电。
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
往年的报告已被FAS进行了审查和ReportsReports提供（here，，，，here， 和here), and the new update contains several important developments – and some surprises.
对于有关进一步减少核力量的进一步辩论，最重要的是，新报告几乎直接反驳最近的指控that Russia is violating the INF Treaty by developing an Intermediate-range ballistic missile: “Neither Russia nor the United States produce or retain any MRBM or IRBM systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty, which entered into force in 1988.”
Another new development is a significant number of new conventional short-range ballistic missiles being deployed or developed by China.
最后，最近在一个最近列出的核武器系统美国空军全球罢工司令部简报are not included in the NASIC report at all. This casts doubt on the credibility of the AFGSC briefing and creates confusion about what the U.S. Intelligence Community has actually concluded.Continue reading→
新一代公路摩托车弹道的部署称为DF-31和DF-31AICBMs appears to have stalled; the number of launchers listed in the new report is the same as in the 2013 report: 5-10 DF-31s and “more than 15” DF-31As.
汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）
