以色列的官方地图用假农场和沙漠取代军事基地2018年12月17日,
以色列通过用假农场,沙漠或油漆剪接来替换其官方地图中删除了几个军事设施。
阅读更多以色列通过用假农场,沙漠或油漆剪接来替换其官方地图中删除了几个军事设施。
阅读更多俄罗斯绘图服务在以色列和土耳其中有选择性地掩盖了政治和军事设施,这具有意外揭示其对世界的确切地点的意外效果。
阅读更多在忙碌的几个星期的核相关新闻中,一个以色列研究人员在雷达下飞行有一个非常令人惊讶的overint overist。
阅读更多由Hans M. Kristensen我正在阅读国家核安全管理局(NNSA)的最新库存管理计划,并想知道我应该选择批评奥巴马政府的核政策。After all, there are plenty of issues that deserve to be addressed, including: - Why NNSA continues to overspend and over-commit and create a spending bow wave in 2021-2026 in excess of the President’s budget in exactly the same time period that excessive Air Force and Navy modernization programs are expected to put the greatest pressure on defense spending? - Why a smaller and smaller nuclear weapons stockpile with fewer warhead types appears to be getting more and more expensive to maintain? - Why each warhead life-extension program is getting ever more ambitious and expensive with no apparent end in sight? - And why a policy of reductions, no new nuclear weapons, no pursuit of new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons, restraint, a pledge to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” and the goal of disarmament, instead became a blueprint for nuclear overreach with record funding, across-the-board modernizations, unprecedented warhead modifications, increasing weapons accuracy and effectiveness, reaffirmation of a Triad and non-strategic nuclear weapons, continuation of counterforce strategy, reaffirmation of the importance and salience of nuclear weapons, and an open-ended commitment to retain nuclear weapons further into the future than they have existed so far? What About The Other Nuclear-Armed States? Despite the contradictions and flaws of the administration’s nuclear policy, however, imagine if the other nuclear-armed states also published summaries of their nuclear weapons plans. Some do disclose a little, but they could do much more. For others, however, the thought of disclosing any information about the size and composition of their nuclear arsenal seems so alien that it is almost inconceivable. Yet that is actually one of the reasons why it is necessary to continue to work for greater (or sufficient) transparency in nuclear forces. Some nuclear-armed states believe their security depends on complete or near-compete nuclear secrecy. And, of course, some nuclear information must be protected from disclosure. But the problem with excessive secrecy is that it tends to fuel uncertainty, rumors, suspicion, exaggerations, mistrust, and worst-case assumptions in other nuclear-armed states – reactions that cause them to shape their own nuclear forces and strategies in ways that undermine security for all. Nuclear-armed states must find a balance between legitimate secrecy and transparency. This can take a long time and it may not necessarily be the same from country to country. The United States also used to keep much more nuclear information secret and there are many institutions that will always resist public access. But maximum responsible disclosure, it turns out, is not only necessary for a healthy public debate about nuclear policy, it is also necessary to communicate to allies and adversaries what that policy is about – and, equally important, to dispel rumors and misunderstandings about what the policy is not. Nuclear transparency is not just about pleasing the arms controllers – it is important for national security. So here are some thoughts about what other nuclear-armed states should (or could) disclose about their nuclear arsenals – not to disclose everything but to improve communication about the role of nuclear weapons and avoid misunderstandings and counterproductive surprises:
阅读更多Mordechai Vanunu, 30年前向媒体揭露了以色列核武器计划的一些方面,结果被判了很长时间的监禁,现在又和以色列纠缠在一起……
阅读更多由Hans M. Kristensen上周我在纽约举行的筹备委员会第三届会议上短暂两个小组......
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