在美国,我们通常被告知,为了结束第二次世界大战并挽救了额外的生命,制造和丢弃这些核弹是“必要的”。正如几位著名历史学家广泛详细介绍的那样,这种叙述是简单化和ahistorical: the bombs were never intended to take the place of an invasion, and it is not even clear that they directly brought about the end of the war in the way that is often portrayed.主要文件表明,关于这两个原子爆炸的普遍叙述很容易被解构。此外,这些核爆炸发生在日本城市毁灭性的传统炸弹袭击之后specifically designed to target civilians and infrastructure。
Seventy-five years later, we commemorate the nuclear attacks and the unspeakable human suffering they inflicted, which remind us of the uniquely destructive capability of nuclear weapons and the importance of ensuring that they are never used in anger again.
As we wrote on the 75th anniversary of the Trinity test,我们朝着错误的方向发展。尽管CO以来减少了ld War,世界上还有13,000多个核武器, and every nuclear-armed country is currently in the midst of使他们的核武库现代化。令人不安的是,双边和多边武器控制协议已脱离或目前处于严重压力下。大多数关注的是新的开始,这有效地限制了我们和俄罗斯战略弹头和发射器部署,但在2021年2月到期。正如我们所写的那样,新的开始extension is a no-brainer:俄罗斯和美国可以将新的起点条约延长多达5年。双方都必须采取负责任的行动,并这样做以维护这一基本协议。
On this day 75 years ago, the world entered the nuclear age. The first ever nuclear detonation – known as the Trinity test – took place in New Mexico on July 16th, 1945. Since then, ten countries built more than 134,000 nuclear weapons. More than 13,400 remain today.
在随后的几十年中,核试验污染了土地,海洋和人民,并引发了核武器竞赛,直到今天。这Federation of American Scientists is honored to join our colleagues at the关心科学家联盟和Tularosa盆地往返联盟在a联合声明with five other U.S. organizations on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear testing, endured by victims in the United States and its Pacific territories,from French nuclear testing in French Polynesia and Algeria, Russian nuclear testing in Kazakhstan, British nuclear testing in Australia, and others.
这Federation of American Scientists has tracked the rise and fall of global nuclear arsenals for many years. Despite reductions since the Cold War,世界上还有13,000多个核武器。And we are disappointed to note the emergence of five disturbing trends regarding the current and future state of nuclear weapons:
每个核武器国家目前都处于使他们的核武库现代化。Some countries are actually increasing their stockpiles, while others are swapping out their older weapons with newer, more effective ones that will endure almost until the end of the 21st century.
有核国家基本上不会出现缺点ider nuclear disarmament to be an urgent global security, humanitarian, or environmental imperative. Instead, most states seem to consider disarmament as a type of chore mandated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty – and not one that they are seriously interested in completing in the foreseeable future. It is increasingly rare to hear any officials from nuclear weapon states express a coherent rationale for pursuing disarmament其他than as a result of the obligation to do so under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, they seem increasingly focused on shifting the disarmament responsibility onto the non-nuclear states by arguing they first must create the security conditions that will make nuclear disarmament possible.
这State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance yesterday released its annual“Compliance Report,”which provides a detailed overview of US (and other countries’) adherence to various treaty and agreement commitments.
这report’s publication comes at a critical time, as the Trump administration has spent the past few years––和the past three months in particular- 对美国对国际武器控制制度的承诺的最后遗迹表示敬意。the administration has recently declared that it isunlikely为了扩展新的开始,withdrawnfrom the Open Skies Treaty, has alluded to an intent toresume nuclear testing, and has announced that it will “reinterpret” the Missile Technology Control Regime in order to allow the United States to sell armed drones to previously-forbidden countries.
尽管这种断言在技术上似乎是正确的,并提供了俄罗斯活动的广泛概述,但它缺少一些关键背景。美国和俄罗斯在2019年2月根据《条约》中履行了各自的义务,该条约于2019年8月正式去世。尽管看来俄罗斯一直在违反该条约很多年了,我们争论了that the Trump administration’s decision to finally kill the treaty was the wrong move, for several reasons.
Firstly, withdrawal established a false moral equivalency between the United States, who probably was not violating the treaty, and Russia, who probably was. It also put the United States in conflict with its own key policy documents like the核姿势审查去年的公开声明强调,该声明在该条约中留下来,同时试图通过外交,经济和军事措施使俄罗斯恢复合规。北约更喜欢这种方法,直到特朗普政府改变了主意并决定退出,这时北约遵循了诉讼,以免被认为与华盛顿发生冲突。
2020年的合规报告指出,从《 INF条约》中提取的旨在作为俄罗斯物质违规的“补救措施”。但是,如果最终目标是哄骗或强迫俄罗斯恢复遵守,那么杀害该条约也相反。取而代之的是,在法律上释放了俄罗斯,可以在陆地上部署更多的INIP导弹,该报告明确警告说,俄罗斯可能会通过将SS-N-30A/Sagaris(Kalibr)Sea-Launeed Cruise导弹转换为陆上系统来做到这一点。它还允许美国探索自己正在开发的Inf-ange导弹。条约崩溃仅16天,美国test launcheda crudely-fashioned missile that would have certainly violated the INF treaty––if it had still existed.
新起点在不到一年的时间内到期,尽管俄罗斯同意无条件地扩展它,但特朗普政府一直在拖延脚步。这应该是不费吹灰之力的:该条约对双方都是一笔不错的交易,它为俄罗斯的核力量提供了可预测性和透明度的关键来源,并且在全国范围内广泛支持扩展even among Trump voters; in fact, it’s one of the very few两党问题金博宝正规网址英石ill remaining in Congress. Senior military leaders, such as theVice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff和the空军全球罢工司令官,宣布他们对该条约的全力支持,主要是因为它在美俄核关系中提供了透明度和稳定性的关键来源。
具体来说,在2018年参议院听证会当时的军备控制和国际安全事务大臣指出:“美国从该条约的18次年度现场检查,通知和双年度D中受益ATA交流使我们深入了解俄罗斯战略进攻武器的数量受条约以及在任何给定时间所在的位置。”She further noted, “Should the Treaty expire, U.S. inspectors would lose their current access to Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, bases, and infrastructure, as well as the Treaty’s biannual exchange of data and associated updates on the location and status of Russia’s strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty.” However, this fact hasn’t stopped Trump’s new arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea––anardent opponent of arms control他反对美国对1993年化学武器公约和1996年综合测试禁令条约的批准,并在2002年从1972年的《反焊接导弹条约》中撤出––from inexplicably arguing相反。在面试with《华盛顿时报》上个月,他声称“奥巴马政府谈判了俄罗斯人一直在剥削的非常薄弱的验证制度[…]。”该主张的基础尚未得到其他高级政府或军事官员的证实,也没有在合规报告中提出。
In his recent面试Billingslea指出,一项新的或扩展的新开始式交易一定必须包括中国。这没有道理。整个Chinese arsenal被认为包括320弹头- - 在4,000-4,500的一部分US and Russian arsenals- 这就是为什么中国的立场一直保持不变的原因:在这种战略失衡仍然存在的同时,它不会参加三边手臂控制谈判。
这refore, as we have previously argued in福布斯,杀死新的起点,因为它不包括中国无助于解决美国对中国核力量的安全问题。取而代之的是,如果对我们和俄罗斯战略核力量的限制掉落并导致两国增加其核力量,那么中国可能会决定需要进一步增加其库存,以适应更大的核威胁。这将进一步加剧新的开始核危机。
扩展不需要国会批准;它只需要一支总统笔。鉴于两国都从条约中受益,两国都处于遵守状态,并且美国北约盟友强烈赞成扩展, this is a ripe piece of low-hanging fruit.
联合综合行动计划
这JCPOA (commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal), is not mentioned at all in the Compliance Report. This is not necessarily surprising, as the Trump administration officially withdrew from––anD然后违反 - 2018年的交易。但是,最近几周,国务卿迈克·庞培(Mike Pompeo)argued美国仍然是一个政党, and therefore could demand a reimposition of sanctions on Iran if an arms embargo is not extended past October. As Senator Elizabeth Warren correctly推文在response, “This makes no sense.” “To extend this arms embargo,” she noted, “the Trump admin is suddenly arguing that the US is a party to the same Iran Deal it abandoned.”
庞培(Pompeo)的不可信的论点受到他自己的前国务院最高军备控制官员的破坏,他在她身上指出2018年参议院证词美国完成了“从5月8日撤离安排”。此外,if the Secretary of State truly believed that the United States was still party to the treaty, why would it be excluded from his own department’s comprehensive annual assessment of US treaty obligations?
这absence of JCPOA is even more curious because Iran’s nuclear activities are covered extensively over seven full pages in the Compliance Report.
核试验
合规报告未评估任何国家遵守《全面测试禁令条约》(CTBT),因为美国尚未批准该条约。该报告重复了特朗普政府的声明,即它无意批准该条约,但仍评估俄罗斯和中国可能已经进行了核武器测试,这些测试未能达到美国的“零收益”标准。这一主张回应了Dia Dia Director Ashley在他的最初提出的主张评论2019年5月在哈德逊研究所(Hudson Institute)。
On Russia, the report states that the “United States assesses that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments that have created nuclear yield.” But it adds in the next sentence that the “United States does not know how many,if any[重点添加],俄罗斯于2019年进行的超临界或自我维持的核试验。”从罐中释放核能的测试将需要根据俄罗斯尚未提供的阈值测试禁令条约(TTPT)的通知。但是合规性报告没有提供任何证据,但说其他信息包含在分类附件中。
Open source analysistshave not detected “any alarming activity” in this regard. Absent public evidence, both China and Russia have rejected the claims, with the俄罗斯副外交部长“[urging] the United States to abandon the growing practice of misinforming the global community about what is happening,” and theChinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson“ [拒绝]以驳斥来贬低美国毫无根据的指控。”
关于中国和俄罗斯低收益测试的主张并不新鲜,但有时会被anti-arms control hawks除了推动美国恢复核武器测试外,努力炒作俄罗斯或中国威胁。不幸的是,今年的合规报告回应了这些索赔,而没有提供任何公共证据来支持它们,并且可能成为武器控制杀手随后将其用作作弊的“证据”。
总统核计划
A new addition to this year’s Compliance Report is a large section (three and a half pages) on the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). This is an oddball because the PNIs were unilateral declaration, not treaties, without any verification. Apparently, including the PNIs is part of the administration effort to make the case that Russia is cheating and therefore can’t be trusted with other treaties such as the New START treaty.
俄罗斯is cheating on one part of the PNIs, the report says, because Russia hasn’t eliminated all nuclear warheads for Ground Forces as it promised in 1991. The report explicitly identifies the SS-21 and SS-26 short-range ballistic missiles (the SS-26 is replacing the SS-21) as dual-capable. The report does not explicitly say Russian ground-forces have retained nuclear artillery, a frequent rumor on the Internet. Curiously, the SSC-8 GLCM is not mentioned in the PNI section, even though it is a ground-launched dual-capable weapon (it is addressed in the INF section of the report).
One thing completely missing from the Compliance Report’s assessment of the PNI issue is that US planned production of a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile––as recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review––would be in violation of the United States’ own PNI pledge.
Even if Russia is cheating on some agreements, that doesn’t mean they will cheat on all of them, or that it is no longer worth it to retain the ones that are working. Russia has a clear interest in limiting US nuclear forces just as the United States and its allies have an interest in limiting Russian forces.
And even though China is slowly increasing its nuclear arsenal, that doesn’t mean that it is necessarily sprinting to parity. Even if theDIA’s projectionthat China will “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile” over the next decade were to happen, that would still not bring the inventory anywhere near the size of the US or Russian stockpiles, which arecurrently estimated分别为4,310和3,800弹头。
这re is also an expectation that if China increases its arsenal it will inevitably result in the abandonment of its no-first-use policy. In February, the head of US STRATCOM offered Senate testimony that he “可以驾驶卡车through that no-first-use policy.” But others, such as Gregory Kulacki, have不是ed中国的核战略比公众辩论经常假设更受限制。
In sum, the annual Compliance Report should function as a way for the United States and its arms control partners to get on the same page about the status of their respective obligations and anticipate where future compliance issues might arise––not as a way to offer justifications for its own misdeeds. Otherwise, its publication may soon contribute to a breakdown in arms control altogether, rather than function as a mechanism to save it.
十年前的这一天,美国总统巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)和俄罗斯总统德米特里(Dmitri A. Medvedev)签署了新的开始条约during a ceremony in Prague. The treaty capped the number of strategic missiles and heavy bombers the two countries could possess to 800, with no more than 700 launchers and 1,550 warheads deployed. The treaty entered into force in February 2011 and into effect in February 2018.
twice a year, the two countries have exchanged detailed data on their strategic forces. Of that data, the public gets to see three sets of numbers: the so-called aggregate data of deployed launchers, warheads attributed to those launchers, and total launchers. Nine years of published data looks like this:
最新一组数据是released by the U.S. State Department last week和shows the situation as of March 1, 2020. As of that date, the two countries possessed a combined total of 1,554 strategic missiles and heavy bombers, of which
1,140 launchers were deployed with 2,699 warheads (note: the warhead number is actually about 100 too high because each deployed bomber is counted as one weapon even though bombers don’t carry weapons under normal circumstances).
Compared with February 2011, the data shows the two countries combined have cut 435 strategic launchers, reduced deployed strategic launchers by 263, and reduced the number of deployed strategic warheads by 638. While important, it’s important to remind that this warhead reduction is but a fraction (less than 8 percent) of the estimated 8,110 warheads that remain in the two countries combined nuclear weapons stockpiles (less than 6 percent if counting their total combined inventories of 12,170 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).
这美国
这data shows the United States currently possessing 800 strategic launchers, of which 655 are deployed with 1,373 warheads attributed to them. This is a reduction of 13 deployed strategic launchers and 3 deployed strategic warheads over the past 6 months. These are not actual reductions but reflect normal fluctuations caused by launchers moving in and out of maintenance. The United States has not reduced its total inventory of strategic launchers since 2017.
与2011年2月相比,美国将其战略发射器的库存减少了324,部署了227,并在427中部署了战略弹头。虽然重要的是,弹头减少仅代表一小部分(约11%)3,800 warheads that remain在the U.S. stockpile (a little over 7 percent if counting total inventory of 5,800 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).
这俄罗斯n Federation
这新的开始data shows Russia with an inventory of 764 strategic launchers, of which 485 are deployed with 1,326 warheads attributed to them. Compared with six months ago, this is a reduction of 28 deployed launchers and 100 deployed strategic warheads and reflects launcher maintenance and upgrade work to new systems.
Compared with February 2011, Russia has cut its inventory of strategic launchers by 111, deployed launchers by 36, and deployed strategic warheads by 211. This modest reduction represents less than 5 percent of the estimated4,310 warheads that remain在俄文sia’s nuclear weapons stockpile (less than 4 percent if counting the total inventory of 6,370 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) Russian warheads).
这俄罗斯n reductions accomplished under New START are smaller than the U.S. reductions because Russia had fewer strategic forces than the United States when the treaty entered into force in 2011.
On the contrary, the New START data shows that Russia now has 170 deployed strategic launchers fewer than the United States, a number that exceeds the size of an entire US Air Force ICBM wing. The Russian launcher deficit has been growing by more than one-third since the lowest point of 125 in February 2018.
这俄罗斯n military is trying to compensate for this launcher disparity by increasing the number of warheads that can be carried on newer missiles replacing older types. Most of these warheads are not deployed on the missiles under normal circumstance but stored and could potentially be uploaded onto launchers in a crisis.美国也具有这样的上传功能对于更大的发射器库存而言,因此并不处于战略劣势。
约翰·D(John D.)和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟(Catherine T.New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
No matter your political orientation, treaty extension is a no-brainer – for at least six primary reasons.
1.新的起点可以控制核武库。如果该条约到期,自1972年以来,我们或俄罗斯战略武器库将不存在任何限制。它将消除双方可以拥有的战略核导弹和轰炸机的帽子,以及其中有多少弹头。这意味着俄罗斯可以将大约一千个新的弹头迅速上传到其部署的导弹阿森纳 -without adding a single new missile.这美国could upload even more because it has more missiles and bombers than Russia (see table below). And both sides could begin to increase their arsenals, risking a new nuclear arms race.
At a time when NATO-Russian relations are at their lowest since the end of the Cold War, when long-term predictability is more important than in the past three decades, allowing New START constraints to expire is obviously not in the US strategic interest or that of its allies. Very simply, New START is a good deal for both the United States and Russia; it cannot be allowed to expire without replacing it with something better.
2.新的起步力量水平是当前核基础设施计划的基础。Both the United States and Russia have structured their nuclear weapons and industry modernization plans on the assumption that the New START force level will continue, or at least not increase. If New START falls away, those assumptions and modernization plans will have to be revised, resulting in significant additional costs that neither Russia nor the United States can afford.
5. We won’t get another chance.If New START expires next year, arms control between Russia and the United States as we know it is effectively over. Given the underlying East-West tensions and upcoming dramatic governance shifts in both the United States and Russia, there appears to be little interest or bandwidth available on either side in negotiating a new and improved treaty.
此外,尽管未来的武器控制必须试图纳入其他核武国家,但这样做的努力不应危害新的起点。
在说明明显的情况下,谈判一项新条约比延长现有条约要困难得多。
6.很容易。延长新起点不需要国会立法或参议院批准。它所需要的只是一支笔总统。并在2019年底Putin offeredto immediately extend the treaty “without any preconditions.” President Trump should immediately take him up on his offer; as of today, he has exactly one year left to do so. But don’t wait till the last minute! Get it done!
约翰·D(John D.)和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟(Catherine T.New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
这US Navy has now deployed the new W76-2 low-yield Trident submarine warhead. The first ballistic missile submarine scheduled to deploy with the new warhead was the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), which deployed from Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia during the final weeks of 2019 for a deterrent patrol in the Atlantic Ocean.
这W76-2 warhead was first announced in the Trump administration’s核姿势审查(NPR) unveiled in February 2018. There, it was described as a capability to “help counter any mistaken perception of an exploitable ‘gap’ in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities,” a reference to Russia. The justification voiced by the administration was that the United States did not have a “prompt” and useable nuclear capability that could counter – and thus deter – Russian use of its own tactical nuclear capabilities.
我们估计,田纳西州号号上的20枚导弹中有一两个,随后的潜艇将以W76-2武装,无论是单独的还是携带多个弹头。据估计,每种W76-2的爆炸产量约为五公斤。像田纳西州(Tennessee)一样,每艘潜艇上的其余18枚导弹携带90 kiloton W76-1或455-kiloton W88。每个导弹can carry up to eight warheadsunder current loading configurations.
这first W76-2 (known as First Production Unit, or FPU) was completed at Pantex in February 2019. At the time,NNSA saidit was “on track to complete the W76-2 Initial Operational Capability warhead quantity and deliver the units to the U.S Navy by the end of Fiscal Year 2019” (30 September 2019). We estimate approximately 50 W76-2 warheads were produced, a low-cost add-on to improved W76 Mod 1 strategic Trident warheads which had just finished their own production run.
基于所谓的“升级到降低”学说,2018年2月NPR声称,需要W76-2“帮助“帮助反对对美国地区威慑能力中可剥削的“差距”的错误认识”。国家核安全管理局(NNSA)有further explainedthat the “W76-2 will allow for tailored deterrence in the face of evolving threats” and gives the US “an assured ability to respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack.”
Consultants who were involved in producing the NPR have建议“ [俄罗斯总统]普京很可能相信美国不会以可能造成严重附带损害的战略弹头做出反应”,并且“莫斯科可以想象可以在没有过度风险的情况下进行有限的核第一用途……”
没有牢固的证据表明,俄罗斯关于核升级涉及的风险的核决定取决于美国核武器的产量。此外,美国已经在其核武库中拥有大量武器,它们具有低收益的选择 - 约1,000our estimate。this includes nuclear cruise missiles for B-52 bombers and B61 gravity bombs for B-2 bombers and tactical fighter jets.
NPR的作者还看到了暗示更可用的武器的困境。他们因此解释说,W76-2“无意启用,也不是启用'核战争。'也不会降低核阈值。”换句话说,虽然俄罗斯低收益核武器降低了使核使用的可能性更大的阈值,但美国的低收益武器“提高了核阈值”,并使核使用的可能性降低了。政策副副部长约翰·罗德(John Rood)甚至告诉记者that the W76-2 would be “very stabilizing” and in no way supports U.S. early use of nuclear weapons, even though the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly stated the warhead was needed for “prompt response” strike options against Russian early use of nuclear weapons.
“Prompt response” means that strategic Trident submarines in a W76-2 scenario would be used as tactical nuclear weapons, potentially in a first use scenario or immediately after Russia escalated, thus forming the United States’ own “escalate-to-deescalate” capability. The United States has refused to rule out first use of nuclear weapons.
Since the United States ceased分配1980年代后期,其一些导弹潜艇致北约司令部,美国计划者不愿将战略弹道导弹分配给有限的剧院任务。取而代之的是,北约拥有双重能力的飞机以及越来越多的美国在轰炸机保证和威慑行动(BAAD)(现在是轰炸机特遣部队运营)上的远程轰炸机,被视为减缓区域升级方案的最合适方法。提示W76-2任务改变了此策略。
对于W76-2,携带submar在e otherwise part of the strategic nuclear force, amidst a war Russia would have to determine that a tactical launch of one or a few low-yield Tridents was not, in fact, the opening phase of a much larger escalation to strategic nuclear war. Thus, it seems inconceivable that any President would approve employment of the W76-2 against Russia; deployment on the Trident submarine might actually self-deter.
自2018年2月NPR以来,国防部以来的W76-2是合理的,强调生产和部署可以快速完成,很容易做到,而且成本不高。但是弹头在特朗普政府之前出现了。这项目原子报告published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 included recommendations for a broad range of low-yield weapons, including on long-range ballistic missiles. And shortly after the election of President Trump, the Defense Science Board’s国防优先建议for the new administration included “lower yield, primary-only options.” (This refers to the fact that the W76-2 is essentially little different than the strategic W76-1, “turning off” the thermonuclear secondary and thus facilitating rapid production.)
最初,对新武器的军事利益似乎有限。当时Stratcom指挥官John E. Hyten(现为参谋长联席会议副主席)在2017年3月的国会听证会上被问到有关军人需要下产核武器的需求时,他没有以“是或否”的方式回答explained美国阿森纳已经有很多收益率:
Gen. Hyten: So Congressman, that’s a great conversation to tomorrow when I can tell you the details [in closed classified session], but from a — from a big picture perspective in — in a public hearing, I can tell you that our force structure now actually has a number of capabilities that provide the president of the United States a variety of options to respond to any numbers of threats.
Gen. Hyten: …we’re going to look at that in the Nuclear Posture Review over the next six months. I think it’s a valid question to ask, but I’ll just tell you what I’ve said in public up until this point, and as we go into the Nuclear Posture Review.
…in the past and where I am right now is that I’ll just say that the plans that we have right now, one of the things that surprised me most when I took command on November 3 was the flexible options that are in all the plans today. So we actually have very flexible options in our plans. So if something bad happens in the world and there’s a response and I’m on the phone with the Secretary of Defense and the President and the entire staff, which is the Attorney General, Secretary of State and everybody, I actually have a series of very flexible options from conventional all the way up to large-scale nuke that I can advise the President on to give him options on what he would want to do.
While nuclear advocates were quick to take advantage of the new administration to get approval for new nuclear weapons they said were needed to now respond to Russia’s supposed “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy, efforts to engage Moscow to discuss nuclear strategy and their impact on nuclear arsenals are harder to find. See, for example, this书面信件between Representative Susan Davis and General Hyten:
Rep. Davis: Have you ever had a discussion with Russia about their nuclear posture, and in particular an escalate-to-de-escalate (E2D) strategy, which the Nuclear Posture Review claims is part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine? How did they respond? Do you view this doctrine as offensive or defensive in nature?
Gen. Hyten: I would like to have such a discussion, but I have never had a conversation with Russia about their nuclear posture.
在2019财政年度预算案辩论,Democrats argued strongly against the new low-yield W76-2, and opposition increased on Capitol Hill after the 2018 mid-term elections gave Democrats control of the House of Representatives. But given the relatively low cost of the W76-2, and the fact that it was conveyed as merely an “add-on” to an already hot W76 production line, little progress was made by opponents. Reluctantly accepting production of the warhead in the FY 2019 defense budget, opponents again in August 2019 tried to block funding in the FY 2020 defense budgetarguing新的弹头“是美国核武库的危险,昂贵,不必要的和多余的补充”,它“将降低核用途的阈值,并使核升级更有可能。”当共和党参议院多数党拒绝接受众议院的意义时,民主党人屈服了。
Just a few months later, the first W76-2 warheads sailed into the Atlantic Ocean onboard the USS Tennessee.
* William M. Arkin is a journalist and consultant to FAS
For a detailed overview of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, see our latest Nuclear Notebook:美国nuclear forces, 2020
约翰·D(John D.)和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟(Catherine T.New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
During Putin’s annual State of the Nation address, we finally got our first taste of what to expect.
Instead of today’s highly-centralized Presidency, under the拟议的更改总统职位的权力将有所降低,而总理的权力以及杜马和联邦委员会(议会的下层和上议院)将增加政府实体在理论上没有一个足够强大的人来压倒其他实体。普京可能会担任新的“父亲之父”角色(可能是新授权的国会议会的负责人,或者完全是另一个角色)。这个新制度将使他在2024年之后保持权力,并表明自1993年通过该文件以来,俄罗斯宪法权威的最大转变。
this shift in power, however, poses a series of complications for Russia’s system of nuclear launch authority.
UnderArticle 87.1 of the Russian Constitution,总统是武装部队总司令,国防法指出,最高总司令是所有与核有关的问题的最终权威。另外,现任俄罗斯军事学说指出:“使用核武器的决定应由俄罗斯联邦总统做出。”为此,总统拥有cheget公文包,该公文包允许总统监视战略危机并通过卡兹贝克command and control network, using theKavkazspecial communications system.
代理总统普京与Cheget核公文包(Kremlin.ru,1999年)。
除总统外,人们普遍认为,国防部长和总参谋长都拥有Cheget公文包,尽管最终的发射局仍取决于总统。鉴于围绕俄罗斯核发射管理局的巨大保密性,这些额外的公文包构成了一个谜。另外两个公文包可能是一种验证形式,也可能是反对总统核发射决定的形式(在Valery E. Yarynich的核议上暗示了这一点C3:核指挥,控制,合作, in which he states that these three individuals “together prepare the authorization for the use of nuclear weapons”); however, given that neither the Defense Minister nor the Chief of the General Staff are constitutionally or doctrinally designated as nuclear decision-makers, it seems more likely that their briefcases would function as (potentially necessary) links in the chain of command, which would be used to transmit the President’s nuclear launch order down to the relevant launch and warhead custodial units.
有趣的是,总理似乎没有核决策权,也没有chegetbriefcase. This is odd, considering the fact that under the Constitution, if the President is incapacitated then the Prime Minister assumes all presidential duties––which would presumably include the authority to launch nuclear weapons. The apparent absence of the Prime Minister in the nuclear chain of command prompts a question highlighted by Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais in theirrecent overview of nuclear launch authority: “When Dmitry Medvedev held the presidency during 2008–12, and Vladimir Putin was prime minister, was Medvedev authorized to use nuclear weapons without Putin’s approval?”
我们不知道这个问题的答案,但它has significant implications for Putin’s proposed constitutional changes. If Putin was comfortable being formally left out of the nuclear chain of command for those four years, he might be similarly comfortable being kept out of the loop after he vacates the Presidency. If so, then the current nuclear command system could be maintained even after the Constitution is revised, and Putin would have to trust that his Presidential successor would informally follow his direction on nuclear policy.
根据bill拟议的变更将提交俄罗斯议会,将在宪法上授权国务院确定“家庭和外交政策的主要方向”。没有更多的细节,目前尚不清楚这是否包括核发射机构。但是,如果普京成为州议会的负责人,那么analysts are predicting, it is possible that the military doctrine would be revised to empower him––and not the President––as the ultimate nuclear decision-maker. If so, the President’schegetwould either be transferred to Putin’s new position, or else Russia would need to deploy a fourth briefcase.
正如普京还指出的那样,这将是一个有趣的发展在his speech总统仍应负责俄罗斯军队。If the President did remain Commander-in-Chief, but control of nuclear weapons transferred from the Presidency to Putin’s new position, this would mark a new precedent in nuclear policy: the first time that the Commander-in-Chief of a nuclear-armed state was not also the ultimate nuclear decision-maker (the one exception to this rule is the United Kingdom, where the Queen is technically the Commander-in-Chief; however, both the armed forces and Trident nuclear submarines are de facto commanded by the Prime Minister).
这situation in Russia is shifting quite rapidly, and absent more details about how Putin intends to define the balance of power after 2024, one can only speculate as to how nuclear launch authority will develop under these new constitutional changes. But unless Putin decides to declare himself “President-for-Life”à laXi Jinping, he will have no choice but to redesign Russia’s nuclear launch authorityif他打算将手指放在核按钮上。
this publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, theNew Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Pictures taken recently by Maxar Technologies’ satellites show a large number of launchers for the DF-26 intermediate-range missile operating at a training site approximately 9 kilometers (5.7 miles) south of Qingzhou City in China’s Shandong Province.
this is the first time the DF-26 has been seen operating in the area and marks a new phase in the integration of the missile into the Chinese military. The DF-26 is dual-capable, which means it can deliver both nuclear and conventional warheads and is thought to have a range of approximately 4,000 kilometers (2,490 miles). The DF-26 was first fielded in 2016 and the Pentagon’s 2019 report on Chinese military developments估计的中国has up to 80 DF-26 launchers with 80-160 missiles (each launcher may have one reload).
这DF-26 is an INF-weapons, which means its range puts it in the category of ground-launched missiles that Russia and the United States banned in their arsenals for 32 years until Russia violated the treaty and the United States withdrew in protest.
青木遗址已经活跃了数十年,似乎是人民解放军火箭部队(PLARF)经营的导弹支撑基地的一部分。CIA最初identifiedthe location as I-TU, a misspelling of its former name Yidu County, since changed to Qingzhou. The main base is located in the southwest district of the city [36.6774°, 118.4541°] and includes three large high-bay garages for servicing missile launchers. Over the years, several nuclear missile launchers have been seen operating there: DF-3A IRBM, DF-21 SRBM, DF-31/A ICBM, and now DF-26 IRBM.
DF-26最近出现的设施大约是在Google Earth在Google Earth上标识为Zhuanghanmiaocun的位置附近的南方的9公里(5.7英里)。DF-26发射器于2019年11月首次出现在卫星图像上,当时看到了十二个发射器。在2020年1月初,Google Earth加载了2019年12月11日的Maxar图像(注:Google Earth上显示的图像日期是在某些原因提前一天与拍摄的实际日期相比的),这是第一个描述经过twitter user @DexReloaded. During December, several images taken by Maxar satellites show up to 18 DF-26 launchers, approximately the same number that was displayed at Xinyang in 2018 and at Jilantai in 2019.
As mentioned above, China stood up its first DF-26 unit in 2018.一个图像from the activation ceremony shows 24 trucks parked under a temporary cover: 18 DF-26 TELs and 4 support vehicles. If each brigade has 18 launchers, then the 80 launchers reported by the Pentagon would be sufficient for four brigades. Not all have become operational yet but DF-26s are beginning to appear at various sites across China: Xinyang (Henan), Qingzhou (Shandong), Dengshahe (Liaoning), Korla (Xinjiang), possibly Jinhua (Anhui), and the large training area at Jilantai (Inner Mongolia).
这英石和在g up of the first DF-26 brigade at Xinyang in April 2018 was宣布on Chinese news media with pictures and videos from the ceremony. But even before that, in January 2018, DF-26 launchers showed up at the field training site of the 651英石Brigade near Dengshahe northeast of Dalian (Liaoning).
这n, in January 2019, Chinese media宣布that DF-26s had carried out an exercise in the “Northwest China’s plateau and desert areas.” The operation was latergeo-located到吉兰泰(Inner Mongolia)以西的大型新训练区,他们在那里继续训练在April-May 2019 together with DF-41s, DF-31AGs, and DF-17s before being shipped to Beijing for the parade in September 2019.
DF-26 training at Jilantai has been a favorite propaganda tool for the Chinese government with several test-launches shown on various news media outlets (这里和这里). A propaganda documentary jointly produced by the Political Bureau of the Central Military Commission and the PLA News and Communication Center and broadcast by CCTV by the end of 2019 included a brief clip showing a DF-26 launch. The launch site is geolocated in the figure below:
During those months, DF-26 launchers were also seen operating at the 646 Brigade base in Korla (Ku’erle) in the Xinjiang province in western China. The first launcher was seen in April and two more in August 2019 (see image below).
DF-26生产和数字
这Pentagon estimated in 2019 that China had fielded up to 80 DF-26 launchers. Not all of those are fully operationally deployed; some brigades are still being equipped. Noted China military expert Mark Stokes估计的大概一年前的两三个DF-26旅,每个旅都有6-12个发射器。因此,在Xinyang和Qingzhou的18个发射器的展示显然很有趣:它包括第二旅的6-12个发射器,还是DF-26旅的发射器有更多的发射器?
Eighteen launchers were also the numberseen operatingat Jilantai.
DF-26 launchers are produced at a factory near Fangshan in the outskirt of Beijing. The factory has been expanded significantly during the past decade with several large vehicle assembly halls added. The factory also appears to be involved in the production of DF-21 MRBM launchers as well as various air-defense systems. The main parking area for DF-26 launchers is in the middle of the southern end of the complex (see image below).
五角大楼的中国报告如何达到80 DF-26发射器?这report doesn’t explicitly say the 80 are fielded or deployed and the operational brigades and launchers seen at training areas do not add up to 80 – that number is less than 60. It seems likely the DOD estimate includes at least some of the launchers in production at Fangshan. As illustrated above, those launchers include some that are not finished but at various stages of assembly.
这first reason is the growing size and diversity of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. China officially maintains what it calls a minimum deterrent focused on ensuring it has a secure retaliatory capability to respond to a nuclear attack. Compared with Russia and the United States, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is small; but compared with France, Britain, and India, the Chinese arsenal is significant. And it is increasing further with China about to overtake France as the世界第三大核武器国家。在过去的15年中,中国的阿森纳几乎翻了一番,预计未来十年将进一步增长,尽管也许不那么多some say。没有迹象表明中国正在寻求与俄罗斯和美国的数字均衡(或接近公元)或改变其核战略。然而,中国核武库显然开放的增长正在加深邻国和其他核武国家对中国长期意图的不确定性和焦虑。
不断增长的DF-26部署的第二个原因是,它是一种可双重能力的武器,可以提供常规或核弹头。无法清楚地区分这两者对危机稳定和升级情景构成了重大挑战。在紧张的危机或一场战争中,可以轻松地误解了中国武装DF-26发射器的中国准备,因为准备采用核武器,并使对手不必要,不必要地准备其核武器。如果中国推出了传统武装的DF-26,则目标国家可能会假设最糟糕的,过早地升级到核用途。this dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the conventional DF-26 is part of the PLARF’s conventional missile strike force intended to provide pre-nuclear strike options, a force that in a potential war with the United States would likely be subject to focused and intense conventional strikes. If the United States used conventional weapons to target what it perceived was conventional DF-26 launchers, China might conclude that the United States had attacked its nuclear forces and escalate accordingly.
最后,DF-26部署很重要,因为the missile is part of China’s growing inventory of INF-range weapons. Russia’s violation of the INF treaty was probably partially a response to China’s growing inventory of INF-range missiles, and the United States used China as part of its justification for withdrawing from the INF treaty and is developing several INF missiles that it plans to deploy within range of China. Russian and US deployment of INF missiles near China will likely further stimulate China’s production of INF-range weapons and potentially result in a destabilizing INF arms race in the Pacific.
For these reasons, it is important that China provides more information about its future plans for the development of its missile forces and engage in ongoing official discussions about the scope and role of its nuclear deterrent, including INF forces. And although China is unlikely to join US-Russian strategic agreements in the foreseeable future, Beijing should already now begin to develop options for what it could offer and what it would want in return if joining such agreements in the future. This could include articulating which US (and Indian) capabilities China is most concerned about and what Beijing would offer in return for limits on them. As a goodwill gesture, China could also offer unilateral limits on its INF capabilities in return for the US and Russia not deploying new INF systems in the region. Information and limits on the dual-capable DF-26 would be a good start.
this publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, theNew Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
环境和反核群体犯规。“NNSA’s refusal to complete programmatic environmental review before plunging ahead with plans to more than quadruple the production authorization for plutonium bomb cores flies in the face of our country’s foundational environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act, and a standing federal court order mandating that the government conduct such a review,” said Marylia Kelley of Tri-Valley CAREs.
In response to public comments challenging the basis for increased pit production, NNSA said that it is obliged by law to pursue the goal of producing “no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030.” (The exact numbers are classified.)
“These requirements are contained in federal law and national policy,”该机构说。“Contentions that there is no need for new pits are not consistent with federal law, the 2018 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], and national policy.”
that doesn’t mean that the new pit production goal is sensible (or achievable). “The 80 pits/year requirement comes from dividing 4,000 pits by 50 years,” said Frank von Hippel of Princeton University. “We have fewer than 2,000 pits deployed. Do we need to refabricate twice as many?” (See also“为什么80?国防领导人讨论了需要pit坑的必要性。”艾肯标准, December 28).
这September video shows Russian troops uncovering their ICBMs, taking them out for a spin, and eventually tucking them back in under camouflage blankets.
this regiment––along with the other two Novosibirsk bases associated with the 39th Guards Missile Division––recently completed its long-awaited conversion to Yars ICBMs from its older SS-25 Topol ICBMs. These new missiles are clearly visible in both satellite imagery and in the Ministry of Defense video.
在转换期间,该团从以前的基地移动55°19’2.72”N, 83°10’6.70”E) to this temporary location,while the old base was dismantled in preparation for a substantial upgrade to build new missile shelters for the Yars ICBMs, as well as service and administrative buildings. Construction stalled for several years, possibly because of budget cuts, but has recently picked up again. Once completed, the 382nd Guards Missile Regiment presumably will be relocated back to its old base.