How Presidents Arm and Disarm

汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）[更新]

这是一件有趣的事情：谈论减少核武器的行政部门往往减少最少。

Analysis of the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile shows that the Obama administration so far has had the least effect on the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile of any of the post-Cold War presidencies.

In fact, in terms of warhead numbers, the Obama administration so far has cut the least warheads from the stockpile of any administration ever.

我以前有describedhow Republican presidents historically – at least in the post-Cold War era – have been the biggest nuclear disarmers, in terms of warheads retired from the Pentagon’s nuclear warhead stockpile.

库存数字的其他分析declassified and published奥巴马政府揭示了一些有趣的，有时甚至令人惊讶的事实。

什么地方出了错？奥巴马政府最近采取了a beatingfor its nuclear modernization efforts, so what can President Obama do in his remaining two years in office to improve his nuclear legacy?

对弹头数字的影响

在上图上，我绘制了随着时间的流逝，就每年添加或从库存中撤回的弹头数量而言，库存变化。在图下方显示了各种管理部门，其中弹头的总数在办公室期间添加或从库存中撤出。

The biggest increase in the stockpile occurred during the Eisenhower administration, which added a total of 17,797 warheads – an average of 2,225 warheads per year! Those were clearly crazy times; the all-time peak growth in one year was 1960, when 6,340 warheads were added to the stockpile! That same year, the United Sates produced a staggering 7,178 warheads, rolling them off the assembly line at an average rate of 20 new warheads every single day.

肯尼迪政府在1963年10月约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）总统被暗杀之前的将近三年中增加了9,495枚弹头。约翰逊政府最初继续增加库存，而在1967年，储存量达到了31,255枚狂热狂欢。然而，在其第二任期内，约翰逊政府开始减少股票（美国第一个这样做的美国政府），最终使库存减少了1,428枚弹头。

在尼克松政府期间，军方开始在弹道导弹上加载多个弹头，但由于大量较旧的弹头类型的退休，库存首次下降。继任者福特政府减少了库存，杰拉尔德·福特总统实际上成为了冷战期间的总统，他减少了库存最多的规模：1,956弹头。

卡特政府在第二次冷战中脱颖而出，从库存中撤出了1,810枚弹头。

里根政府在第一任中被许多人认为加剧冷战，最终使总库存减少了近900枚弹头。但是在任职的三年中，政府实际上略微增加了库存，而在战略运输工具上部署的弹头的部分也增加了。

As the first post-Cold War administration, the George H.W. Bush presidency initiated enormous nuclear weapons reductions and ended up shrinking the stockpile by almost 9,500 warheads – almost exactly the number the Kennedy administration increased the stockpile. In one year (1992), Bush cut 5,300 warheads, more than any other president – ever. Much of the Bush cut was related to the retirement of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

克林顿政府执政the Bush reduction wave, so to speak, and in its first term cut approximately 3,000 warheads from the stockpile. But in his second term, President Clinton slowed down significantly and in one year (1996) actually增加储存107种武器 - 自1987年以来首次发生的武器，这是迄今为止冷战后时代唯一的增长。目前尚不清楚是什么原因导致1996年增加。当克林顿政府离开办公室时，库存中仍然有大约10,500枚核弹头。

总统乔治•布什(George w . Bush),我们中的许多人基于“增大化现实”技术ms control community saw as a lightning rod for trying to build new nuclear weapons and advocating more proactive use against so-called “rogue” states, ended up becoming one of the great nuclear disarmers of the post-Cold War era. Between 2004 and 2007 (mainly), the Bush W. administration unilaterally cut the stockpile by more than half to roughly 5,270 warheads, a level not seen since the Eisenhower administration. Yet the remaining Bush arsenal was considerably more capable than the Eisenhower arsenal.

President Barack Obama took office with a strong arms control profile, including a pledge to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons, taking nuclear weapons off “hair-trigger” alert, and “put and end to Cold War thinking.” So far, however, this policy appears to have had only limited effect on the size of the stockpile, with about 500 warheads retired over six years.

Effect On Stockpile Size

Counting warhead numbers is interesting but since the stockpile today is much smaller than during the previous three presidencies, comparing the number of warheads retired doesn’t accurately describe the degree of change inflicted by each president.

A better way is to compare the reductions as a percentage of the size of the stockpile at the beginning of each presidency. That way the data more clearly illustrates how much of an impact on stockpile size each president was responsible for.

这种类型的比较表明，乔治·W·布什（George W. Bush）改变了库存最多：全额50％。他的父亲H.W.总统布什（Bush）排名强劲，减少了41％。布什总统在12年的任职期间从库存中砍下了惊人的14,801枚弹头 - 每年1,233枚弹头。克林顿总统在任职八年内将股票减少了23％。

Despite his strong rhetoric about reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, however, President Obama so far had the least effect on the size of the stockpile of any of the post-Cold War presidents: a reduction of 10 percent over six years. The remaining two years of the administration will likely see some limited reductions due to force adjustments and management, but nothing on the scale seen during the tree previous post-Cold War presidencies.

What Went Wrong?

There are of course reasons for the Obama administration’s limited success in reducing the number of nuclear weapons compared with the accomplishments of previous post-Cold War administrations.

The first reason is that the Obama administration during all of its tenure has faced a conservative Congress that has openly opposed any attempts to reduce the arsenal significantly. Even the modest New START Treaty was only agreed to in return for commitments to modernize the remaining arsenal. A conservative Congress does not complain when Republican presidents reduce the stockpile, only when Democratic president try to do so. As a result of the opposition, the United States is now stuck with a larger and more expensive nuclear arsenal than had Congress agreed to significant reductions.

第二个原因是俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）拒绝了除了新开始条约之外的额外裁员。由于奥巴马政府以俄罗斯协议的条件进行了额外的减少，因此美国今天部署的核弹头比国家和国际安全承诺所需的核弹头多三分之一。具有讽刺意味的是，由于普京反对额外减少的反对，俄罗斯现在将受到美国核武器更多的“威胁”，而普京同意进一步减少新开始。结果，俄罗斯纳税人将不得不支付更多的费用以维持bigger Russian nuclear forcethan would otherwise have been necessary.

A third reason is that the U.S. nuclear establishment during internal nuclear policy reviews was largely successful in beating back the more drastic disarmament ambitions president Obama may have had. Even before theNuclear Posture Review已于2010年4月完成，已经确定了基于2002年布什政府的指导的新开始条约的未来部队水平。奥巴马总统的指导就业策略from June 2013 could have changed that, but it didn’t. It failed to order additional reductions beyond New START, reaffirmed the need for a Triad, retained the current alert and readiness level, and rejected less ambitious and demanding targeting strategies.

In the long run, some of the Obama administration’s policies are likely to result in additional unilateral reductions to the stockpile. One of these is the decision that fewer non-deployed warheads are needed in the “hedge.” Another effect will come from the decision to reduce the number of missiles on the next-generation ballistic missile submarine from 24 to 16, which will unilaterally reduce the number of warheads needed for the sea-based leg of the Triad. A third effect will come from a decision to phase out most of the gravity bombs in the arsenal. But these decisions depend on modernization of nuclear weapons production facilities and weapons and are unlikely to have a discernible effect on the size of the stockpile or arsenal until well after president Obama has left office.

The Next Two Years

During its last two years in office, the Obama administration’s best change to achieve some of the stockpile reductions it failed to demonstrate in the first six years would be to initiate reductions now that are planned for later. In addition to implementing the reductions planned under the New START Treaty early, potential options include offloading excess Trident II SLBMs and retiring excess W76 warheads above what is needed for arming the future fleet of 12 SSBNX submarines; there are currently nearly 50 Trident II SLBMs部署了太多大约有800个W76中的储存太多，以至于海军要求DOE接受从海军仓库中接受多余的W76的转移速度，比计划释放空间并节省资金的速度要快。它还包括退役弹药导弹和重力炸弹的多余弹头B61-12andLRSOprograms; most, if not all, B61-3, B61-10, B83-1, and W84 warheads could probably be retired right away. Moreover, several hundred W78 and W87 warheads for the Minuteman ICBMs could probably be retired because they’re in excess of what’s needed for the force planned under New START.

But in addition to retiring excess warheads, there are also strong fiscal and operational reasons to work with congressional leaders interested in trimming the planned modernization of the remaining nuclear forces. Options include reducing the SSBNX program from 12 to 10 or 8 operational submarines, reducing the ICBM force to 300 by closing one of the three bases and ending considerations to develop a new mobile or “hybrid” ICBM, delaying the next-generation bomber, canceling the new cruise missile (LRSO), scaling back the B61-12 program to a simple life-extension of the B61-7, canceling nuclear capability for the F-35 fighter-bomber, and work with NATO allies to phase out deployment ofnuclear weapons in Europe. Such reductions would have the added benefit of significantly reducing the capacity needed for warhead life-extension programs and production facilities.

Achieving some or all of these reductions would free up significant resources more urgently needed for maintaining and modernizing non-nuclear forces. The excess nuclear forces provide no discernible benefits to day-to-day national security needs and the remaining forces would still be more than adequate to deter and defeat potential adversaries – even a more assertive Russia.

新的土地基金会和植物基金会的赠款使该出版物成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。