Review of NASIC Report 2017: Nuclear Force Developments
Click on image to download copy of report.Note: NASIC later published a corrected version,available here
By Hans M. Kristensen
这National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson AFB has updated and published its periodic弹道和巡航导弹威胁报告. The new report updates theprevious version from 2013.
在限制公共政府情报资源的时候，《鼻报告》提供了一种罕见且非常宝贵的官方资源，用于监视和分析世界各地的弹道和巡航导弹状况。
Having said that, the report obviously comes with the caveat that it does not include descriptions of US, British, French, and most Israeli ballistic and cruise missile forces. As such, the report portrays the international “threat” situation as entirely one-sided as if the US and its allies were innocent bystanders, so it will undoubtedly provide welcoming fuel for those who argue for increasing US defense spending and buying new weapons.
Also, the NASIC report is not a top-level intelligence report that has been sanctioned by the Director of National Intelligence. As such, it represents the assessment of NASIC rather than necessarily the coordinated and combined conclusion of the US Intelligence Community.
Nonetheless, it’s a unique and useful report that everyone who follows international security and ballistic and cruise missile developments should consult.
Overall, the NASIC report concludes: “The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in ballistic missile capabilities to include accuracy, post-boost maneuverability, and combat effectiveness.” During the same period, “there has been a significant increase in worldwide ballistic missile testing.” The countries developing ballistic and cruise missile systems view them “as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power” that “present an asymmetric threat to US forces” and many of the missiles “are armed with weapons of mass destruction.” At the same time, “numerous types of ballistic and cruise missiles have achieved dramatic improvements in accuracy that allow them to be used effectively with conventional warheads.”
Some of the more noteworthy individual findings of the new report include:
- Russia’s nuclear modernization is, despite claims by some, not a “buildup” but the size of the Russian ICBM force will continue to decline.
- 尽管某些人声称它是INF武器，但俄罗斯RS-26“ Short” SS-27 ICBM仍被归类为ICBM（如2013年的报告）。
- 这报告is the first US official document to publicly identify the ground-launched cruise missile that Russia has developed and deployed in violation of the INF treaty: 3M-14. The weapon is assessed to “possibly” have a nuclear option.[Note:NASIC报告的更正版本published in June removed the reference to a “ground” version of the 3M-14.]
- 这Russian SS-N-26 (Oniks or Onix) anti-ship cruise missile that is currently replacing several Soviet-era cruise missiles “possibly” has a nuclear option.
- 双重能力SS-26（Islander）SRBM的范围列为350公里（217英里），而不是在公开辩论中经常声称的500-700公里（310-435英里）。
- 这number of Chinese warheads capable of reaching the United States could increase to well over 100 in the next five years, six years sooner than predicted in the 2013 report. (The count includes warheads that can only reach Alaska and Hawaii, not necessarily all of continental United States.)
- 中国DF-31/DF-31A ICBM的部署似乎已经停滞了。
- China’s long-awaited DF-41 ICBM will “possibly” be capable of carrying multiple warheads but is not yet deployed.
- 已经退休了两种中国中等弹道导弹类型（DF-3A和DF-21 mod 1）。
- 这Chinese ground-launched DH-10 land-attack cruise missile is no longer listed as “conventional or nuclear” but only as “conventional.”
- None of North Korea’s ICBMs are listed as deployed.
下面我详细介绍了有关单个核武国家的更多细节：
Russia
Russia is now more than halfway through its modernization, a generational upgrade that began in the mid/late-1990s and will be completed in the mid-2020s. This includes a complete replacement of the ICBM force (but at lower numbers), transition to a new class of strategic submarines, upgrades of existing bombers, replacement of all dual-capable SRBM units, and replacement of most Soviet-era naval cruise missiles with fewer types.
鼻子报告指出：“ 2014年9月，俄罗斯人以能够到达美国的部署弹头超过了美国，”指的是根据《新开始条约》报告的总数。但是，该报告没有提到，自2016年以来，俄罗斯已经开始减少其部署的战略弹头，并有望达到2018年条约限制。
洲际弹道导弹：Contrary to many erroneous claims in the public debate (see这里and这里) about a Russia nuclear “build-up,” the NASIC report concludes that “the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints…” This conclusion fits theassessmentNorris and I have made for years that Russia is现代化its nuclear forces but notincreasing阿森纳的大小。
这报告counts about 330 ICBM launchers (silos and TELs), significantly fewer than the 400claimedby the Russian military. The actual number of deployed missiles is probably a little lower because several SS-19 and SS-25 units are in the process of being dismantled.
这development continues of the heavySarmat (RS-28), which looks very similar to the existing SS-18. The lighter SS-27 known asRS-26 (Rubezh or Yars-M)appears to have been delayed and still in development. Despite claims by some in the public debate that the RS-26 is a violation of the INF treaty, the NASIC report lists the missile with an ICBM range of 5,500+ km (3,417+ miles), the same as listed in the 2013 version. NASIC says the RS-26, which is designated SS-X-28 by the US Intelligence Community, has “at least 2” stages and multiple warheads.
Overall, “Russia retains over 1,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs,” according to NASIC, another assessment that fits我们的估计from the Nuclear Notebook. The NASIC report states that “most” of those missiles “are maintained on alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order.” (In comparison, essentially all US ICBMs are maintained on alert:see here for global alert status）
SLBMs:俄罗斯海军正处于从苏联时代的三角洲SSBN过渡到新的阶段Borei-class SSBN. NASIC lists theBulava (SS-N-32) SLBMas operational on three Boreis (five more are under construction). The report also lists a Typhoon-class SSBN as “not yet deployed” with the Bulava (the same wording as in the 2013 report), but this is thought to refer to the single Typhoon that has been used for test launches of the Bulava and not imply that the submarine is being readied for operational deployment with the missile.
在建造新的Borei SSBN时，六个德尔塔ivs are being upgrade with modifications to theSS-N-23 SLBM. The report also lists 96SS-N-18发射器，对应6Delta-III SSBNs. But that appears to include 3-4 SSBNs that have been retired (but not yet dismantled). Only 2 Delta-IIIs appear to be operational, with a third in overhaul, and all are scheduled to be replaced by Borei-class SSBNs in the near future.
Cruise Missiles:这报告lists five land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability, three of which are Soviet-era weapons. The two new missiles that “possibly” have nuclear capability include the mysterious ground-launched cruise missile that Russia has developed and deployed in violation of the INF treaty. The US first accused Russia of treaty violation in 2014 but has refused to name the missile, yet the NASIC report gives it a name:3M-14. The weapon exists in both “ground, ship & sub” versions and is credited with “conventional, nuclear possible” warhead capability.[Note:NASIC报告的更正版本published in June removed the reference to a “ground” version of the 3M-14.]
3M-14的地面和海上版本具有不同的名称。海军情报办公室（ONI）identifiesthe naval 3M-14 as theSS-N-30land-attack missile, which is part of the larger Kalibr family of missiles that include:
- 这3M-14 (SS-N-30) land-attack cruise missile (the nuclear version might be called SS-N-30A; Pavel Podvig报告ed早在2014年，他就被告知约8米3M-14S导弹“'s显然代表“战略”，这意味着远距离且可能是核能”）；
- 这3M-54 (SS-N-27, Sizzler) anti-ship cruise missile;
- 91R反海洋导弹。
这US Intelligence Community uses a different designation for the GLCM version, whichdifferent sourcessay is called theSSC-8，其他官员私下说是对Iskander-K上使用的SSC-7导弹的修改。（有关令人困惑的名称和名称的公众讨论，请参见这里,这里， 和这里）
该范围一直是猜测的主题，其中包括多达5,472公里（3,400英里）。但是鼻子报告的范围为2,500公里（1,553英里），比俄罗斯国防部在2015年报告的还要多，但接近旧的范围SS-N-21 SLCM.
这“conventional, nuclear possible” description connotes some uncertainty about whether the 3M-14 has a nuclear warhead option. But President Vladimir Putin has publiclystatedthat it does, and General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of US European Command (EUCOM),told Congress今年3月,ground-launched version is “a conventional/nuclear dual-capable system.”
ONI预测Kalibr-type导弹（记住：Kalibr可以指的是陆地攻击，反舰艇和/或反海洋版本），将部署在所有较大的新型表面船和潜艇上，并将其背部装饰到现有的现有主要的主要船舶和潜艇上。但是，当俄罗斯官员说船或潜艇将配备Kalibr时，可能会指上述一种或多种导弹版本。例如，在接收陆地攻击版本的人中，大概只有一些人会被分配“核可能”版本。要获得核能的核能不足以简单地加载导弹。它必须配备特殊的发射控制设备，在船上有特殊的人员，并接受特殊的核训练和认证才能被分配。这很昂贵，而且额外的运营负担可能意味着核版本仅分配给一些配备Kalibr的船只。先前的核陆地攻击SLCM（SS-N-21）仅分配到前线攻击潜艇，这很可能也将接受核SS-N-30。核版本是否也将进行主要的表面战斗人员，例如核侵袭潜艇，还有待观察。
这NASIC report also identifies the3M-55 (P-800 Oniks (Onyx), or SS-N-26 Strobile)cruise missile with “nuclear possible” capability. This weapon also exists in “ground, ships & sub” versions, and ONI states that the SS-N-26 is replacing older SS-N-7, -9, -12, and -19 anti-ship cruise missiles in the fleet. All of those were also dual-capable.
It is interesting that the NASIC report describes the SS-N-26 as a land-attack missile given its primary role as an anti-ship missile and coastal defense missile. The ground-launched version might be theSSC-5 Stoogethat is used in the new Bastion-P coastal-defense missile system that is replacing the Soviet-eraSSC-1B舰队基地的导弹，例如Kaliningrad。基于船的版本正在取代SS-N-19在核推进Kirov-class巡洋舰和Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier. Presumably it will also replace theSS-N-12on the Slava-class cruisers and SS-N-9 on smaller corvettes. The submarine version is replacing the SS-N-19 on the Oscar-class nuclear-propelled attack submarine.
NASIC lists the new conventional Kh-101 ALCM but does not mention the nuclear version known asKH-102 ALCM这已经开发了一段时间。KH-102在最近的DIA report on Russian Military Power.
Short-range ballistic missiles:Russia is replacing the Soviet-eraSS-21 (Tochka)missile with theSS-26 (Iskander-M), a process that is expected to be completed in the early-2020s. The range of the SS-26 is often said in the public debate to be the 500-700 km (310-435 miles), but the NASIC report lists the range as 350 km (217 miles), up from 300 km (186 miles) reported in the 2013 version.
That range change is interesting because 300 km is also the upper range of the new category of close-range ballistic missiles. So as a result of that new range category, the SS-26 is now counted in a different category than the SS-21 it is replacing.
China
鼻子报告显示，“在未来5年内，能够到达美国的中国洲际弹道机核弹头数量可能会扩大到100多个。”四年前，NASIC预测“未来15年内”可能会达到“超过100”的弹头数字，因此实际上该预测已缩短到2028年至2022年6年。
One of the reasons for this shortening is probably the addition of MIRV to the DF-5 ICBM force (the MIRVed version is know asDF-5B). All other Chinese missiles only have one warhead each (although the warheads are widely assumed not to be mated with the missiles under normal circumstances). It is unclear, however, why the timeline has been shortened.
这US militarydefines“美国”包括“土地区域，内部水域，领土和美国领空，包括a。美国领土；和b。美国政府拥有完整管辖权和控制或具有专有权或辩护责任的其他领域。”
因此，对于纳西奇（NaSic）在未来五年内的预测，中国将需要采取几个艰巨的步骤。首先，它将必须将其所有DF-5（目前大约是一半）进行。那仍然不会提供足够的弹头，因此它也必须大大部署DF-31As和/或新的DF-41s(see graph below). Deployment of the DF-31A is progressing very slowly, so NASIC’s projection probably relies mainly on the assumption that the DF-41 will be deployed soon in adequate numbers. Whether China will do so remains to be seen.
Click on graph to view full size.
目前，中国有大约80枚ICBM弹头（用于60个ICBM），可能袭击美国。其中，大约60枚弹头可能袭击美国大陆（不包括阿拉斯加）。这是过去25年中可能袭击美国（包括关岛）的洲际弹道手弹头的两倍，以及可能袭击美国大陆的弹头数量的三倍。这NASIC report does not define what “well over 100” means, but if it’s in the range of 120, and NASIC’s projection actually came true, then it would mean China by the early-2020s would have increased the number of ICBM warheads that can hit the United States threefold since the early 1990s. That a significant increase but obviously but must be seen the context of the much greater number of US warheads that can hit China.
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles:这报告describes the long and gradual upgrade of the Chinese ballistic missile force. The most significant new development is the fielding of theDF-26intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with 16+ launchers. The missile was first displayed at the 2015 military parade, which showed 16 launchers – potentially the same 16 listed in the report. NASIC sets the DF-26 range at 3,000+ km (1,864 miles), 1,000 km less than the 2017 DOD report.
中国似乎并未转换为所有DF-5ICBMs to MIRV. The report lists both the single-warhead DF-5A and the multiple-warheadDF-5B(CSS-4 Mod 3)在“大约20”孤岛中。与A-version不同，B version具有后增强的车辆，这是2013年报告中未披露的技术细节。A rumor该报告未确认约有10个MIRVS的DF-5C版本。
新一代公路摩托车弹道的部署称为DF-31andDF-31AICBMs appears to have stalled; the number of launchers listed in the new report is the same as in the 2013 report: 5-10 DF-31s and “more than 15” DF-31As.
Yet the description of the DF-31A program sounds like deployment is still in progress: “The longer range CSS-10 Mod 2will allow针对大多数的美国大陆” (emphasis added).
该报告首次包括DF-31和DF-31A并排的图形插图，该图显示了较长的DF-31A的短距离，但尖锐的Nosecone较小，并且是更广泛的第三阶段（请参阅图像）。
期待已久的（有些神秘）DF-41洲际弹道导弹还没有部署。NASIC DF-41我说s “possibly capable of carrying MIRV,” a less certain determination than the 2017 DOD report, which called the missile “MIRV capable.” The report lists the DF-41 with three stages and a Post-Boost Vehicle, details not provided in the previous report.
两个核版本之一DF-21MRBM似乎已退休。NASIC仅列出一个：CSS-5 mod 2.总共，该报告总共列出了DF-21的核版本的“少于50”的发射器，这与2013年报告中列出的数字相同（see herefor description of one of the DF-21 launch units. But that was also the number listed back then for the older nuclear DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1). The nuclear MRBM force has probably not been cut in half over the past four years, so perhaps the previous estimate of fewer than 50 launchers was intended to include both versions. The NASIC report does not mention the CSS-5 Mod 6 that was mentioned in the DOD’s annual report from 2016.
基于海洋的弹道导弹：该报告总共列出了48JL-2SLBM launchers, corresponding to the number of launch tubes on the four Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs based at the Longpo Naval Base on Hainan Island. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the missiles are therefore fully operational or deployed on the submarines under normal circumstances. They might, but it is yet unclear how China operates its SSBN fleet (for a description of the SSBN fleet,see here).
这2017 report no longer lists the Xia-class (Type 092) SSBN or the JL-1 SLBM, indicating that China’s first (and not very successful) sea-based nuclear capability has been retired from service.
Cruise Missiles:新报告从DH-10 (CJ-10)地面发射的陆地攻击导弹。DH-10的可能的核选择在前三个鼻子报告中列出了（ReportsReports2006,2009， 和2013). The DH-10 brigades are organized under the PLA Rocket Force that operates both nuclear and conventional missiles.
A US Air Force Global Strike Commanddocumentin 2013 listed another cruise missile, the air-launchedDH-20 (CJ-20)，有核选择。鼻子从来没有将核能力归因于该武器和国防部长办公室最近说中国空军“目前没有核任务”。
At the same time, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recentlytold Congressthat China was upgrading is cruise missiles further, including “with two, new air-launched ballistic [cruise] missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload.”
巴基斯坦
这NASIC report surprisingly does not list Pakistan’s Babur GLCM as operational.
鼻子报告指出：“巴基斯坦通过包括现场导弹射击的训练练习，继续提高其陆军战略力量指挥和个人战略导弹团体的准备和能力。”尽管所有核武器国家都这样做，但可能意味着巴基斯坦正在增加其核弹的反应时间，尤其是短距离武器。
该报告指出Shaheen-2 MRBM自2004年以来已被测试“七次”。尽管这符合公共记录，但NASIC并未提到自2014年以来，出于某种原因的Shaheen-2尚未进行测试，这可能表明技术问题。
这Abdali SRBMnow has a range of 200 km (up from 180 km in the 2013 report). It is now designated as close-range ballistic missile instead of a short-range ballistic missile.
NASIC describes theAbabeel MRBM这是2017年1月首次测试，为“ mirved”导弹。尽管这回应了当时巴基斯坦军方的公告，但鉴于飞行历史有限以及与开发可靠的MIRV系统相关的技术挑战，“ Mirved Abadeel”的名称“ Mirved Abadeel”听起来非常自信。
也不是Ra’ad ALCMnor theBabur GLCM被列为部署，这是令人惊讶的，尤其是在13次飞行测试之后的巴布尔。Babur发射器多年来一直在国家发展综合体中脱颖而出visible at some army garrisons. Nor does NASIC mention theBabur-2orBabur-3（海军版）被巴基斯坦军方宣布并宣布的版本。
India
It is a surprise that the NASIC report only lists “fewer than 10”Agni-2 MRBMlaunchers. This is the same number as in 2013, which indicates there is still only one operational missile group equipped with the Agni-2 seven years after the Indian government first declared it deployed. The slow introduction might indicate technical problems, or that India is instead focused on fielding the longer-rangeAgni-3 IRBMNASIC说现在部署了“少于10”的发射器。
也不是Agni-4norAgni-5IRBMs are listed as deployed, even though the Indian government says the Agni-4 has been “inducted” into the armed forces and has reported three army “user trial” test launches. NASIC says India is developing theAgni-6 ICBM范围为6,000公里（3,728英里）。
For India’s emerging SSBN fleet, the NASIC report lists the short-rangeK-15 SLBM由于部署了，这是一个惊喜，因为Arihant SSBN尚未被认为是完全运行的。该潜艇已经进行了数年的海上审判，有传言称该潜艇是在2016年11月进行的首次淹没K-15测试发射。但是，在将导弹视为运行之前，可能还需要更多。这K-4 SLBMis in development and NASIC sets the range at 3,500 km (2,175 miles).
As for cruise missiles, it is helpful that the report continue to list theBramosas conventional, which might help discredit rumors about nuclear capability.
North Korea
Finally, of the nuclear-armed states, NASIC provides interesting information about North Korea’s missile programs. None of the North Korean ICBMs are listed as deployed.
这报告states there are now “fewer than 50” launchers for theHwasong-10（Musudan）IRBM. NASIC sets the range at 3,000+ km (1,864 miles) instead of the 4,000 km (2,485 miles) sometimes seen in the public debate.
Likewise, while many public sources set the range of the mobile ICBMs (KN-08andKN-14) as 8,000 km (4,970 miles) – some even longer, sufficient to reach parts of the United States, the NASIC report lists a more modest range estimate of 5,500+ km (3,418 miles), the lower end of the ICBM range.
附加信息：
- Full NASIC report:弹道和巡航导弹威胁2017[Note:A corrected NASIC reportwas published in June 2017.]
- Previous versions of this NASIC report:2006,2009,2013
- Status of World Nuclear Forces
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New Land Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
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