Stratcom说,中国比美国拥有更多的洲际弹道导弹发射器 - 我们有疑问
In early-February 2023, theWall Street Journalreportedthat U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) had informed Congress that China now has more launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) than the United States. The report is the latest in a serious of revelations over the past four years about China’s growing nuclear weapons arsenal and the deepening strategic competition between the world’s nuclear weapon states. It is important to monitor China’s developments to understand what it means for Chinese nuclear strategy and intensions, but it is also important to avoid overreactions and exaggerations.
首先,提醒了Stratcomletter说,没有说。它并不是说中国对它们的弹头或弹头比美国更多,或者美国正处于总体劣势。这封信有三个发现(按该顺序):
- 中国活跃库存中的洲际弹道导弹的数量尚未超过美国活跃库存中的洲际弹道导弹的数量。
- 配备中国这样的导弹的核弹头数量并未超过美国此类导弹配备的核弹头数量。
- The number of land-based fixed and mobile ICBM launchers in China exceeds the number of ICBM launchers in the United States.
众所周知,中国正在建造数百个新导弹筒仓。我们记录了其中的许多(请参阅这里,这里和这里),和其他分析师一样(这里和这里). It was expected that sooner or later some of them would be completed and bring China’s total number of ICBM launchers (silo and road-mobile) above the number of US ICBM launchers. That is what STRATCOM says has now happened.
Stratcom ICBM计数
在2022年10月的截止日期中,对国会的Stratcom报告中包含的中国洲际弹道导弹发射器的数量计数。目前尚不清楚Stratcom如何计算中国孤岛,但该数量似乎包括数百个尚未运行的筒仓当时有导弹。因此,Stratcom在其施工过程的什么时候将筒仓作为计数的一部分?除了装载导弹外,是否必须完全准备好所有准备就绪的东西?
我们已经检查了三个新的大型导弹筒仓田(Hami,Julin和Yumen)中每个筒仓的卫星照片。如果筒仓完全完成,则不可能从卫星照片确定,是否装有导弹。但是,可用的图像表明,哈米的大多数孤岛可能已经到2022年10月已经完成,Yumen场的许多筒仓仍在建设中,而Julin(Ordos)的筒仓都没有fields had been completed at the time of STRATCOM’s cutoff date (see image below).

Commercial satellite images help assess STRATCOM claim about China’s missile silos.
五角大楼在过去三年中报道的中国洲际弹道导弹发射器数量从2020年底的100个发射器到2021年底的300个发射器,到截至2022年10月的450多个发射器,这是一个显着增加。在短短三年内增加了350个发射器。
为了超过Stratcom最近报道的美国ICBM发射器的数量,中国必须拥有450多个发射器(Mobile和Silo) - 美国空军有400个带有导弹的孤岛和另外50个空筒仓也可以加载如有必要。我们估计,没有计算正在建造的新筒仓,中国拥有大约140个具有许多导弹的ICBM发射器。据估计,要获得300个带有许多导弹的发射器,据估计,五角大楼必须包括新的筒仓田(所有筒仓中一半)的160个发射器,不仅完成了导弹,而且还包括导弹,还必须包括大约160个发射器。加载。我们尚未在任何卫星照片上看到导弹加载(或其他方式)。为了达到2022年10月的450个发射器,Stratcom必须计算三个新的导弹筒仓田中的几乎所有筒仓(请参见下图)。

五角大楼估计中国完成的洲际弹道导弹发射器似乎包括三个导弹筒仓田的数百个新筒仓。
装有导弹的筒仓的点不仅取决于筒仓本身,还取决于支持设施,命令和控制系统以及安全外围的操作状态。该基础设施的建设仍在所有三个导弹筒仓场上正在进行中。
五角大楼估算中发射器和导弹的数量也可能不太直接链接。该数字可能是可能指操作发射器的导弹数量以及为发射器生产的导弹,这些导弹或多或少完成但尚未装载导弹。
所有这些都强调了中国洲际弹道导弹的运营状况存在很大的不确定性。
However – in time for the Congressional debate on the FY2024 defense budget – some appear to be using the STRATCOM letter to suggest the United States also needs to increase its nuclear arsenal.
比较完整的武器库
中国洲际弹道导弹力量的迅速增加是重要且前所未有的。然而,保持事物的视角也至关重要。在他对Stratcom信的回应中,众议院武装部队委员会的新保守主义主席众议员迈克·罗杰斯(Mike Rogers) -声称中国在核力量中“与美国迅速接近平等”。那是不准确的。
Even if China ends up with more ICBMs than the United States and increases its nuclear stockpile to 1,500 warheads by 2035, as projected by the Pentagon, that does not give China parity. The United States has 800 launchers for strategic nuclear weapons and a stockpile of 3,700 warheads (see graph below).

即使到2035年中国将IT核武器增加到1,500,它也只会占美国和俄罗斯库存更大的一小部分。
The worst-case projection about China’s nuclear expansion assumes that it will fill everything with missiles with multiple warheads. In reality, it is unknown how many of the new silos will be filled with missiles, how many warheads each missile will carry, and how many warheads China can actually produce over the next decade.
核武库不存在于真空中,而与所有者的总体军事能力以及政策和战略有关。
The Political Dimension
Stratcom最初告知国会其评估,即2022年11月,中国洲际弹道导弹发射器的数量超过了美国的数量。但是这封信已分类,因此参议院和众议院武装服务委员会的四名保守派成员提醒Stratcom,要求Stratcom要求它必须要求其要求。还发布一个未分类的版本。然后他们使用了未分类的字母争论更多的核武器(请参阅下面的委员会网页的屏幕截图):
“我们没有时间浪费调整核力量姿势来阻止俄罗斯和中国。This will have to mean higher numbers and new capabilities.”(添加了重点。)

立法者立即使用Stratcom对中国洲际弹道导弹发射器的评估来呼吁更多的美国核武器。
尽管国防承包商可能会对这一反应感到满意,但尚不清楚为什么“更高数字”是美国核战略所必需的。实际上,增加美国核武器可能会导致中国和俄罗斯进一步增加其武器库,从而加剧问题。正如我们已经看到的那样,这可能会导致对更多美国核武器的需求增加。
在冷战核军事竞赛期间,我们之前已经看过这本剧本。只有这次,不仅在美国和苏联之间,而且与俄罗斯和不断增长的中国之间。
Even before China will reach the force levels projected by the Pentagon, the last remaining arms control treaty with Russia – the New START Treaty – will expire in February 2026. Without a follow-on agreement, Russia可能会加倍the number of warheads it deploys on its strategic launchers.
Even if the defense hawks in Congress have their way, the United States does not seem to be in a position to compete in a nuclear arms race with both Russia and China. The modernization program is already overwhelmed with little room for expansion, and the warhead production capacity will not be able to produce large numbers of additional nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.
What the Chinese nuclear buildup means for Chinese nuclear policy and how the United States should respond to it (as well as to Russia) is much more complicated and important to address than a rush to get more nuclear weapons. It would be more constructive for the United States to focus on engaging with Russia and China on nuclear risk reduction and arms control rather than engage in a build-up of its nuclear forces.
Additional Information:
Status of World Nuclear Forces
This research was carried out with generous contributions from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, the Stewart R. Mott Foundation, the Future of Life Institute, Open Philanthropy, and individual donors.
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A photo in a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) student briefing from 2022 shows four people inspecting what appears to be a damaged B61 nuclear bomb.
In early-February 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) had informed Congress that China now has more launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) than the United States. The report is the latest in a serious of revelations over the past four years about China’s growing nuclear weapons arsenal and the deepening […]
Russian noncompliance with New START Treaty makes retaining limits on strategic nuclear forces even more important.