Review of Benjamin E. Schwartz’s Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism (Overlook Press, 2015)
Roadside bombs were devastating to American troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The press has categorized the moment prior to such an explosion as “left of boom,” and that following the explosion as “right of boom.” Defense Department analyst, Benjamin E. Schwartz, has chosen to title his book about nuclear terrorism,Right of Boom。在捕捉武器起源的奥秘时，标题对所解决的问题的巨大或复杂性无济于事。
这种晦涩的参考将委婉语的清单掩盖了读者免受与核恐怖主义的冲击的冲击。国土安全是指恐怖分子制造的核弹IND（即兴核装置）。奥巴马总统在核恐怖主义“核安全峰会”中任命了一系列世界峰会。国际事务分析师和评论员将潜在的核恐怖主义肇事者称为non-state actors。The “T-word” is too often hidden in obfuscation and awkward verbal constructs. It is difficult to come to grips with what is perhaps the world’s most serious threat, when a verbal veil shields us from apocalyptic implications.
For more than forty years, serious commentators have drawn public attention to the possibility that terrorists, a.k.a. non-state actors, might detonate a nuclear weapon in a major American metropolitan location, but few have grappled with the question of what action should be taken by America’s President in response to such an attack by a perpetrator whose identity may not be known. Schwartz shares his thoughts with us on the forces that might drive the President to take dramatic action, knowing that it is predicated on a web of conjectures and guesses, rather than on hard intelligence and evidence. He also explores possible unilateral and multilateral actions that might prevent future additional attacks, as well as new world government initiatives for the control of atomic materials. By introducing these hypothetical situations of extreme complexity, Schwartz has made a valuable contribution to civil discourse. He lifts the rock under which these issues have been addressed by security specialists and government agencies that are out of view of the general public. However, he only provides a peek under the rock, rather than a robust examination of the issues.
Schwartz does grapple with the implications of an existential threat to the nation coming from a non-state entity. The norms of international relations go out the window when it is impossible for a government to protect itself through government-to-government relations. Even when dealing with the drug cartels of Colombia and of Mexico, the United States coordinates its efforts through the governments of those countries; but given the extreme threat of a nuclear weapon, if rogue gangs of nuclear terrorists were operating in Mexico, it is likely that the U.S. government would not hesitate to take unilateral action across international borders, much like the drone attacks in the frontier areas of Pakistan or the military operation that captured and killed Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, alliances needed to confront nuclear terrorism might take the form of collaboration with militias that have only a loose affiliation with nation states. Such new forms of international security liaison are emerging as the United States increasingly relies on the efforts of Kurdish and Shiite militias in combat against ISIS.
Schwartz is strongest when he explores the logical non-traditional opportunities for action and weakest when he seeks to draw wisdom from nineteenth century accounts of dealing with the likes of Comanche warriors of the Great Plains and Pashtun tribes of the Khyber Pass. His efforts of gaining guidance in dealing with unprecedented terrorist groups by learning from experiences in historic guerrilla warfare encounters lack credibility.
Right of Boom通过审查2004年书籍的关键部分，对关于核恐怖主义威胁的论述做出了特别有价值的贡献[1]格雷厄姆·艾莉森（Graham Allison），题为Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe。艾莉森（Allison）博士是约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）政府学院的创始院长，也是克林顿总统的前国防部长。艾莉森（Allison）在2004年写道时，明智地总结了危险和潜在政策倡议：
The centerpiece of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism must be to deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials. To do this we must shape a new international security order according to a doctrine of “Three No’s”:
- No Loose Nukes;
- No New Nascent Nukes; and
- 没有新的核武器国家。
第一个“否”是指可能在武器中引爆的武器或材料。第二个是指开发新的核武器材料的能力，例如富集的铀或纯化的p。第三种超越了裂变材料的开发，用于设计和开发新武器。Schwartz详细介绍了过去十年中这三个障碍中的每个障碍中的每个障碍。朝鲜，巴基斯坦和伊朗已经铺平了这条通往不稳定之路。Schwartz非常清楚地表明，需要对艾莉森描述的灾难的机制进行审查和重新铸造。
Schwartz frames his discussions in the hypothetical context of a Hiroshima-type bomb, known as小男孩, being detonated on the ground by terrorists in Washington, D.C., but with the executive branch of government having been out of harm’s way. The President is, thus, in a position to deal with needed actions of response and restructuring. He argues that the President must take military action, even if he or she is ignorant of the origin of the nuclear attack. While not completely convincing, his exposition is engaging.
施瓦茨（Schwartz）在核恐怖袭击发生了核恐怖袭击之后，猜测了其他预期的结果，这与第二次世界大战后有关国际控制的想法，包括1946年的acheson-lilienthal计划。在发人深省的情况下，这些想法并没有引起当时的牵引力，但仍然没有引起人们的关注今天令人信服。
In order for readers to take the threat of nuclear terrorism seriously, they need to understand how such a cataclysmic event could occur in the first place. For the vast majority of readers, nuclear realities are quite remote and unknown. Most individuals make an implicit assumption that the many layers of security that have evolved since 9/11 adequately protect society from the development of rogue nuclear weapons. Even if there is not full clarity on the issue, there is most likely a vague understanding in the minds of most that the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima required an enterprise, the Manhattan Project, and that it was perhaps the greatest scientific, militaristic, and industrial undertaking in human history. How then, could an equivalent of that Hiroshima bomb arrive in a truck at the corner of 18th and K Streets in Washington, DC, delivered by a team of perpetrators, perhaps no larger than the team of nineteen jihadists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11?
施瓦茨（Schwartz）在为外行提供了关于核恐怖主义合理性的明确描述方面做得不好。他提供了一些有关核武器发展的历史，随后对武器生产所需的设计和知识的解密以及1966年的案例研究了三位没有核背景的年轻科学家如何成功地设计了劳伦斯国家实验室的长崎型武器作为证明民族脆弱性的练习。
他唯一的参考广岛炸弹设计,which would be the likely objective of a terrorist plot, is inserted as a passing phrase in the commentary about the Lawrence Livermore exercise. He states that the three young scientists “… quickly rejected designing a gun-type bomb like小男孩，这本来可以使用锯齿的榴弹炮将两块裂变材料撞在一起，判断它们太容易和不值得的时间。”（第42-43页）
It is precisely the ease of both designing and building a小男孩model that makes nuclear terrorism so feasible! The trio of young scientists succeeded in designing a Nagasaki bomb, known as胖子, but did not attempt to actually build one. Schwartz neglects to mention that the小男孩design uses enriched uranium for its explosive power (which is only mildly radioactive and easy to fabricate into a weapon) while胖子使用p（非常放射性且难以捏造成武器）。
Schwartz将铀235鉴定为尿液的一种形式，他指出，其核中有三个中子的铀238是该元素的一种更常见的形式。在开采的矿石中，铀235的铀238有99个原子。Schwartz并未清楚地表明，炸弹制造需要富集的铀235，这使该成分的组成从1％到90％。由90％铀235原子组成的铀被称为“高度富集的铀”（HEU）。生产这种炸弹级材料的一种方法是使用离心机。离心机的质量和数量一直是与伊朗谈判的关键问题。
核恐怖主义中的格雷厄姆·艾莉森（Graham Allison）对小男孩设计提供了清晰简洁的解释：
If enough Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is at hand (approximately 140 pounds), a gun-type design is simple to plan, build, and detonate. In its basic form, a “bullet” (about 56 pounds) of HEU is fired down a gun barrel into a hollowed HEU “target” (about 85 pounds) fastened to the other end of the barrel. Fused together, the two pieces of HEU form a supercritical mass and detonate. The gun in the Hiroshima bomb was a 76.2-millimeter antiaircraft barrel, 6.5 inches wide, 6 feet long, and weighing about 1,000 pounds. A smokeless powder called cordite, normally found in conventional artillery pieces, was used to propel the 56-pound HEU bullet into the 85-pound HEU target. The main attractions of the gun-type weapon are simplicity and reliability. Manhattan Project scientists were so confident about this design that they persuaded military authorities to drop the bomb, untested, on Hiroshima. South Africa also used this model in building its covert nuclear arsenal (in 1977) without even conducting a test. If terrorists develop an elementary nuclear weapon of their own, they will almost certainly use this design. (P85-86)
公众还需要了解U235仅是放射性的。它可以安全处理，很难检测到。2002年，美国广播公司（ABC）新闻将铀的酒吧走私到西海岸和东海岸的港口，而没有被发现。此外，武器所需的数量可以在不超过足球大的容器中携带。铀是最密集的元素之一（比铅高约70％）。因此，可以轻松地将140磅藏在进入该国的汽车或一批水管用品中。虽然即兴恐怖炸弹可能会被伪装成发电机或嵌入花岗岩或其他建筑材料石头的国家，但其重量超过一千英镑带来了挑战。将上述足球体积，分布在较小的包裹中，然后将武器组装到非描述的机械车间中，这将容易得多。ABC新闻在12盎司的苏打罐中运送了15磅耗尽的铀。根据定义，枯萎的铀含有比例的U-235少于天然铀，但具有相似的辐射特征。
The largest hurdle for nuclear terrorists is obtaining enriched uranium. Graham Allison does an excellent job of detailing opportunities for terrorists to obtain highly enriched uranium. His book identifies the potential sources of highly-enriched uranium from the many research reactors around the world that were once promoted by President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program. Other sources include the inadequately guarded storage sites found throughout the former Soviet Union. These sites attracted agents from rogue states and terrorist organizations in the 1990s. How much of the material from unsecured facilities that has entered the black market at that time is unknown, however many examples of black market transactions have been discovered and pose as continued challenges for international inspectors today.
世界各地的各种形式都有巨大的HEU。在2012年底，一项权威研究[2]估计有多达1500吨（300万磅）。但是，关于俄罗斯的数量存在很大的不确定性。这种歧义直接转化为盗窃或转移HEU的可能脆弱性。估计的HEU总供应可以为两万万岛型枪支核武器提供燃料。如果只有该材料的十分之一消失了，则可以用来制造20个简易的核武器。
Allison fr描述了一个特别恶劣的情况om Kazakhstan where 1,278 pounds of highly enriched uranium were discovered in an abandoned warehouse that was secured only with a single padlock. That material had been collected for shipment to Russia as fuel for nuclear submarines. During the break-up of the Soviet Union, its existence was overlooked (or so it would appear). It is possible that some material was removed and sold to agents from Iraq, Iran, or elsewhere, but there is no public knowledge of that happening. Action was taken by the United States to purchase the material for use in power reactors. In 1994, removal was accomplished in a secret operation known asProject Sapphire，其中，美国专家团队将材料挤入了田纳西州橡树岭的Y-12工厂。2014年，二十周年Project Sapphirewas celebrated, but the task of securing highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union has yet to be finalized.
Allison further writes that Pakistan (in 2004) was probably producing enough HEU to fuel five to ten new bombs each year. While Allison was concerned with the possibility that some of that material might be diverted, that possibility was exposed as a major U.S. concern in 2010.The Guardianreported on November 30th of that year thatWikileaksrevealed that in early 2010, the American Ambassador in Islamabad, Anne Patterson, had cabled to Washington: “Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.”
Theft or diversion of HEU from production facilities is not unprecedented. Allison describes theft from a Russian enrichment plant in 1992, which was discovered in an unrelated police action. A famous case published in the March 9, 2014 issue of the纽约人magazine and discussed in an excellent article by Eric Schlosser involved suspected diversion, in the 1960s, of hundreds of pounds of HEU from a commercial enrichment facility in Pennsylvania to Israel.
Given that large amounts of material that would fuel a Hiroshima-equivalent gun-type weapon are within reach of potential terrorists and successful acquisition of the material is quite plausible, the question remains as to whom might take such an action. Schwartz makes reference to al-Qaeda and to terrorists in general, but does not try to be specific regarding potential nuclear perpetrators.
艾莉森（Allison）将他的书的一章介绍了潜在的核恐怖分子的标识，其中一些人积极探索了对裂变材料的收购。他的概述包括基地组织，车臣分离主义者和Aum Shinrikyo。AUM集团在尝试购买核弹头的尝试失败后，于1995年3月20日在东京地铁上发起了致命的沙林神经气体攻击。
Another excellent, comprehensive book[3]dealing with nuclear terrorism is核恐怖主义的四个面孔(2005), by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with contributing authors Amy Sands, Leonard Spector, and Fred Wehling. Ferguson and Potter explore a number of these issues in great detail. Their discussion of potential perpetrators has a prescient section on apocalyptic groups. They refer to “…certain Jewish or Islamic extremists or factions of the Christian identity movement, whose faith entails a deep belief in the need to cleanse and purify the world via violent upheaval to eliminate non believers.” Given the success of ISIS in acquiring domination over large cities and vast financial resources, their potential for producing a gun-type Hiroshima bomb exceeds any prior threat from a terrorist organization. While attacks on Europe or the United States by ISIS do not appear to be imminent, the use of nuclear weapons to attack Shiites in Iran or Jews in Israel could easily become priorities on their agenda.
近年来，人们注意到了源自美国的世界末日或其他潜在恐怖分子可能从事核恐怖主义的可能性。美国人最恐怖的轰炸是蒂莫西·麦克维（Timothy McVeigh）在1995年4月19日在俄克拉荷马城的穆拉联邦大楼（Murrah Federal Building）爆炸炸药，造成168人丧生。麦克维（McVeigh）不是由宗教信仰而驱动的，而是出于对德克萨斯州韦科和露比·里奇（Ruby Ridge）的联邦政府的报仇行动的热情。这些武装公民与联邦机构的对抗促进了麦克维坚持的民兵运动。
While predating McVeigh, nuclear weapons designer, Ted Taylor, became obsessed with the possibility of nuclear terrorism being initiated by an American terrorist. Taylor was the quintessential embodiment of an obsessed inventor-scientist. All those around him tolerated Taylor’s idiosyncrasies due to his exceptional brilliance. After receiving an undergraduate degree in physics from Cal Tech, he studied for a PhD at the University of California, Berkeley where J. Robert Oppenheimer had established the first American theoretical physics research group of international prominence. Taylor was unable to complete PhD studies there, because he refused to pursue course work in required fields of physics that did not interest him. However, Oppenheimer recognized his genius for creative thought and facilitated his appointment to the post-war theoretical physics staff at Los Alamos in 1948, where he became the leading designer of nuclear weapons. His accomplishments included the creation of the largest fission bomb that was ever assembled and tested, the500千吨超级oralloy炸弹, which was thirty-five times more powerful than the Hiroshima Bomb.
The design area in which Taylor confounded the experts was in the conceptualization of small nuclear weapons. His ability to model very small nuclear weapons led to the production for use by the U.S. Army in 1961, of a tripod mounted recoilless rifle known as theDavy Crockettthat fired a warhead with the explosive capacity of only 250 tons of TNT (equal to one sixtieth of the Hiroshima bomb). This weapon, which could be deployed and fired by two soldiers on foot, was produced for use against Soviet armored units, but had quite limited distribution.
引用了20世纪领先的理论物理学家弗里曼·戴森（Freeman Dyson）的话说：“泰德（泰勒）教会了我我对炸弹的了解。他是使炸弹小而便宜的人。”
泰勒深入了解核武器的容易性，使他于1956年从洛斯阿拉莫斯辞职，并将他的精力集中在警告社会上的核恐怖主义威胁上。他敏锐地意识到了美国政府如何将富含浓厚的铀的开发，处理和存储给商业供应商。他直接观察到，这些设施的安全性和处理和运输程序极为不安全。在试图通过核设施内的努力来促进保障措施后，他在1960年代后期决定，他应该提醒公众对这些危险并促进公共政策倡议。1972年，他获得了福特基金会的赠款，以彻底研究现有材料，这些材料可能被转移到制造秘密核弹中。他们与社会科学家梅森·威尔里希（Mason Willrich）一起出版了1974年的一本书，题为“核盗窃：风险和保障措施(博林格)。在这同一时期,他旅行throughout the United States speaking about the issue. Taylor’s efforts attracted the writer, John McPhee, who then asked to accompany him. In 1973, McPhee wrote a book[4]about Taylor and his efforts to minimize the risks of nuclear terrorism entitled,结合能的曲线, from which Schwartz quotes a particularly startling prediction:
“’I think we have to live with the expectation,’ remarked a Los Alamos atomic engineer in 1973, “’that once every four or five years a nuclear explosion will take place and kill a lot of people.’ This statement is cited in John McPhee’s The Curve of Binding Energy, which detailed concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors over forty years ago.”
Schwartz then continues with: “While exaggeration may mislead the credulous and offend the perceptive, neither the absence of a precedent for nuclear terrorism nor the intelligence failure regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD program changes the growing threat.”
尽管施瓦茨（Schwartz）对核恐怖主义的“日益严重的威胁”提供了口头服务，但他的书并不能使可爱的人或说服这种威胁的严重性。他对核恐怖袭击发生后对政府政策进行了严肃的分析，这一事实证明了他认为这个问题仅仅是鸡肉小的关注点。当然，他担任国防部分析师的工作借给了他对这个问题的姿势。
值得反映在过去40多年中引起人们注意核恐怖主义的努力的牵引力。最直接的例子就是施瓦茨（Schwartz[5]from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Homeland Security entitled,Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism – the National Capital Region。该报告总结了劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室（Sandia National Laboratories）于2011年实施的研究，并针对民防对恐怖主义核装置爆炸的反应进行了应用研究助理。与大约在1900英尺处引爆的广岛和长崎的炸弹不同，这项研究中假设的即兴核武器将在地面上爆炸。地面爆炸的后果是，将被迫从地面上施加大量致命的放射性碎片，然后将其分散在大约20英里的长度和一两英里或两英里或两英里的范围内。广岛和长崎没有遇到这种放射性碎片的特征“辐射”。
The model that is discussed hypothesizes a 10-kiloton (Hiroshima was 15 kiloton) explosion at ground level at the intersection of K Street NW and 16th Street NW using the actual weather observed at that location on February 14, 2009. This in-depth analysis includes a summary of the effects of the explosion on the infrastructure of the city as well as on the population – including blast, fire, and radiation damage. There are detailed recommendations regarding how, where, and when to shelter from radiation, and assessments of evacuation scenarios. Public health issues are evaluated, including the anticipated post-explosion capacity of hospitals and health care workers to deal with needs of the population. Such a blast would produce nearly total death and destruction for an area about one mile in radius around ground zero and high levels of destruction out to about an area with a three-mile radius. Fallout with serious radiation consequences could impact regions as far as twenty miles from ground zero.
Homeland Security is engaged in studies of major metropolitan areas in the United States and shares these analyses and recommendations with police, firefighters, and other first responders, including emergency medical teams. In this literature, the word “terrorist” is rarely used and the amount of information and advice provided to the public is minimal. The weapon is almost always referred to as an “Improvised Nuclear Device” and its size seems to be standardized at 10 kiloton.
It appears that government agencies are concerned enough about nuclear terrorism to study their impact on physical environments and on human populations. However, theRight of Boom是独特的在解决政治影响和possible retaliatory action. But Schwarz is only addressing the simplest of potential scenarios. What if an explosion in Washington, DC, were accompanied by a blackmail threat that if certain actions were not taken by the United States, other bombs that were already in place would be detonated?
另一种可能性是在几个城市（可能是华盛顿，纽约和洛杉矶）同时引爆炸弹。试图预见这种灾难的挑战是令人难以置信的，但是，如果可能的炸弹可能几乎同样可行。可能是从公众看来进行的。即使在互联网上很容易获得的国土安全研究也没有主动向公众传播。
在冷战的高峰期，核战争的威胁导致了全国范围内的民防演习。尽管这些可能不是完全现实的，但他们确实为核冲突的可能性做好了平民的准备。然而，如今，尽管核恐怖主义的可能性可能很可能与公众分享 - 关于政策考虑或身体现实。
There is at least one instance of important advice that could potentially save many thousands of lives that is known to Homeland Security and FEMA, but is not distributed to the public: in the event of a terrorist nuclear event, the population affected should stay in whatever building they might be located in with positioning away from exterior windows, walls and ceilings. Homeland Security refers to this action as “Sheltering in Place.” The fact is that almost any building structure would shield against the type of radiation that most likely to be present, and that this radiation would dissipate significantly after a few days. By staying indoors for several days, chances of survival would be greatly increased. A practical consequence of this approach is that, following the first days after an attack, parents and children should not seek to be reunited if the children are in school and the parents are elsewhere. A strong concern for this issue was expressed in the 2004 report on terrorism planning after a “dirty bomb” attack issued by the New York Academy of Medicine[6]。
Lack of public dissemination of practical information, such as this, is partially attributed to the fear of alarming the general population, as well as a deep skepticism, among many, that such an event could even happen. Government policy sustains nuclear terrorism as an invisible topic, lying outside of conscious consideration.
While Homeland Security and FEMA are actively engaged in preparations for an act of nuclear terrorism, the scope of their planning is limited to responding to the physical, medical, and radiological impact of an IND. TheRight of Boomcomes close to exploring the larger social and political consequences but ultimately fails to do so. Questions that remain unexplored here and elsewhere are the impact on the nation’s economic, transportation, communications, and other fundamental systems that underpin the functioning of society. When one considers the ways in which 9/11, with the deaths of approximately 3,000 civilians, transformed society, it is difficult to image how the deaths of 30,000 or 300,000 civilians might alter the basic framework of civil order. It is difficult to even frame the questions. The enormity of this threat may be a significant contributing factor that keeps it out of public discourse. Examples of the issue being ducked are all too frequent.
Recently, bothThe Economist和Foreign Policymagazines featured cover stories focused on nuclear weapons (March 7th-13th, 2015 and March-April 2015, respectively).The Economist总结起来,“但是现在最好的can be achieved is to search for ways to restore effective deterrence, bear down on proliferation, and get back to the dogged grind of arms-control negotiations between the main nuclear powers.”Foreign Policy更多地涉及在美国，俄罗斯和中国进行的积极核武器翻新计划，以及这些活动可能会促使现在遵守《非扩散条约》撤回的国家。这些概述报告都没有提到非国家参与者对核恐怖主义的威胁ReportsReports。
即使是核武器问题的长期分析师，耶鲁大学的保罗·布雷肯（Paul Bracken）教授在他金博宝正规网址原本有见识的书中避免了核恐怖主义[7],The Second Nuclear Era: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics(MacMillan, 2012). He bemoans the failure of U.S. strategists to reshape thinking that goes beyond a cold war framework, to grapple with a much more complex, multipolar world. Yet he limits his consideration of terrorists to that of agents for nuclear powers, rather than as independent non-state operatives.
令人惊讶的是，那些担心在美国城市中爆炸的即兴核装置的人是对这个主题最了解的人：西奥多·泰勒（Theodore Taylor），二战后最有能力的核武器设计师；格雷厄姆·艾莉森（Graham Allison），前国防部副部长；美国科学家联合会现任主席查尔斯·弗格森（Charles Ferguson）和美国国防部的分析师本杰明·施瓦茨（Benjamin Schwartz）。遵循知识的痕迹，达到了国家情报的最深层次，我们发现美国总统也许是所有人中最关心的人。迈克尔·克劳利（Michael Crowley）写道[8]in时代杂志on March 26, 2014,是的，奥巴马真的担心曼哈顿核武器。He quotes the president saying, “I continue to be much more concerned, when it comes to our security, with the prospect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan.”
One might wonder if this statement by Obama is an isolated comment or a deeply ingrained belief that underlies his thinking and strategic approach to governance. By examining his record of policy statements and executive actions of the past six years, one sees that this is his core belief.
Obama most likely became educated about nuclear issues during his time in the Senate. He rubbed shoulders with Senator Sam Nunn, who has probably been the most influential publically-elected official concerned with nuclear issues (in general) and nuclear terrorism (in particular), prior to the emergence of Barack Obama. Less than three months after his first inauguration in 2009, he delivered a historic speech[9]on nuclear weapons in Hradcany Square in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic.
讲话在解决主要核国家的库存问题，消除其他州的扩散以及遏制伊朗和朝鲜的发展的必要性方面是金博宝正规网址全面的。但是，值得注意的是，他详细处理了核恐怖主义问题。金博宝正规网址他说：“……我们必须确保恐怖分子永远不会获得核武器。这是对全球安全的最直接和极端威胁。一名使用一种核武器的恐怖分子可以释放大规模的破坏。基地组织说，它正在寻求炸弹，并且使用它没有问题。我们知道全球有无抵押的核材料。为了保护我们的人民，我们必须以目标感地行事。”
奥巴马总统明确表示：“在一个城市中爆炸的一种核武器 - 无论是纽约还是莫斯科，伊斯兰堡或孟买，东京或特拉维夫，巴黎或布拉格 - 都可以杀死数十万人。无论发生在哪里，都不会终结后果 - 对于我们的全球安全，我们的安全，我们的社会，我们的经济，可以实现我们的最终生存。”
He also does not minimize the chances of such an event-taking place: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal one.”
令人惊讶的是，这一保罗·韦尔德（Paul Revere）风格的警报和美国总统在世界舞台上发出的行动也可能同样是小鸡的演讲。也许，如果总统本人未能跟进，这可能会解释评论员，智囊团，说话的头脑和轻率的专家所缺乏关注。当然，Right of Boomfails to build on the solid case made by President Obama.
但是总统尚未忽略这个话题。离得很远。在布拉格期间，他布置了一个议程，从那以后就一直坚持下去。他的布拉格讲话呼吁努力扩大与俄罗斯的合作，并寻求新的伙伴关系，以锁定能够实现核武器的裂变材料。他确定了全面关注的领域：
我们还必须基于我们打破黑市，检测和拦截运输材料并使用财务工具破坏这种危险贸易的努力。因为这种威胁将持久，所以我们应该团结起来，努力，例如《扩散安全计划》和全球倡议，将核恐怖主义打击成持久的国际机构。首先，我们应该举行全球核安全峰会，美国将在明年内举办。
奥巴马总统于2010年在华盛顿特区举行了一次峰会会议，该会议由38个国家元首参加。自1945年联合国组织会议以来，这是美国总统召集的最大的国家元首。然后，他于2012年在韩国首尔和2014年在荷兰海牙举行了后续峰会。第四次峰会将于2016年3月31日至4月1日在华盛顿特区的沃尔特·E·华盛顿会议中心举行。这些历史性的大量国家元首的聚会发生在政治家或公众的宣传或评论中。通常，新闻媒体在会议期间报告了新闻媒体，但是几乎没有提及这些峰会所产生的活动。由于该计划被称为“核安全峰会”，因此与“核恐怖主义峰会”的标题相比，它们可能产生的兴趣要低得多（实际上，这是一个更准确的头衔）。
源于这些峰会numerous working groups that pursue targeted goals during the intervals between the meetings. These meetings have been conducted using an innovative approach to international diplomacy that seems to be grounded in a philosophy of achieving what is possible and not being stymied by the usual impediments to negotiated agreements. The working groups bring together countries that have mutual concerns and they work to create implementable policy statements – (but start with no predetermined format, structure, or reporting mechanism). In an attempt to stimulate creativity and new leadership, the participants are not assigned by their governments, specific titles, or rank, but by their relevant expertise. They are given the titles of “Sherpa” and “Sous-Sherpa.” The very title, which is associated with providing assistance to mountain climbers, sets a positive tone. Another innovative break with tradition and creative use of language is to refer to the statements that are produced as “gift baskets.” These gift baskets have resulted in many countries pledging to take further action and applying peer pressure on other countries to take action.
截至2015年4月，有15个小组[10]努力创建这些礼品篮。聚集在一起的国家数量从该小组的四个侧重于将HEU用于生产医疗同位素的使用到三十五个寻求加强核安全实施。后一个集团一直在努力将国际原子能机构核安全政策纳入国家规则和法规。
所解决的其他一些主题包括裂变材料运输的安全性，放射材料的安全性，核安全方面的法医以及促进国家摆脱HEU的安全。自2009年以来，来自12个国家的HEU的淘汰一直是一项重大成就，尤其是从乌克兰撤出所有HEU，该成就于2012年3月宣布。
While Schwartz gives passing mention to the Nuclear Security Summits, he fails to recognize the innovative approach pursued by “gift basket” diplomacy or the successes that have resulted from that approach. Furthermore, the Nuclear Security Summit initiative has created a framework for approaching nuclear terrorism that would have applications following a terrorist nuclear detonation in an American city. Schwartz does not include that framework in his analysis of potential “right of boom” government actions.
More significant than the limited scope of Schwartz’ scenario’s vision regarding retaliation and new international security norms is his complete neglect of the horrific domestic situation that the President and his advisors would need to confront. Certainly the President would need to explain to the American public how he or she would respond to the perpetrators, but it could be argued that the American public’s main concern would be maintenance of civil society. Schwartz presents a hypothetical transcript of an address by the President to the American people in which he notes that he is speaking on his own authority that is enhanced by the advice of the cabinet and the consent of Congress. However, in that address, there is no mention of the deaths, devastation, interruption of commerce, breakdowns in communications, overwhelming strains on transportation systems, medical infrastructure, outbreaks of civil disorder, and general fear and hysteria that must be sweeping the country.
Perhaps it is asking too much forThe Right of Boomto carry that load in addition to introducing the challenges of international actions, plans, and policy. Yet, its scenario – which may leave many readers incredulous regarding the actions that it does address, is rendered more unbelievable by its neglect of these obvious civil society considerations.
所有这些问题在“第二天在美金博宝正规网址国城市进行核爆炸后的行动”中解决了，[11]Ashton B. Carter，Michael M. May和William J. Perry发表在2007年秋季发行The Washington Quarterly(P. 19 This trio of authors had deep knowledge about how nuclear terrorism might manifest itself and what the resulting consequences would be. Aston B. Carter is currently the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Michael M. May was a long time director of the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons development laboratory, and William J. Perry served as Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration. These heavyweights wrote:
由于这种情况（美国城市中的恐怖核爆炸）是严峻的前景，因此政策制定者不得不考虑制定全面的应急计划，并在适当的情况下通知美国公众的细节，只会有助于扩大毁灭性的灾难性核攻击对美国城市的影响…
在考虑需要在“第二天”采取的行动时，他们比施瓦茨更加认真地采取实际跟进攻击的可能性以及后续攻击的威胁。他们的简短文章是指爆炸，辐射，疏散，医疗，内乱等问题的身体影响。还有一个简短的部分，涉及报复和威慑。令人惊讶的是，Schwartz没有参考此类权威个人撰写的这篇先驱文章。
A direct extension of the “Day After” article is an essay[12]by Richard L. Garwin entitled, “A Nuclear Explosion in a City or an Attack on a Nuclear Reactor,” that was included in the Summer 2010 issue ofThe Bridge, a publication of the National Academy of Engineering, within a special installment, “Nuclear Dangers.” Garwin has been a senior advisor for many years to the highest levels of the U.S. government on nuclear weapons policy and other technologies that are relevant to U.S. military and security affairs. In 1950, when Garwin was 22 years old, he turned the concepts developed by Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam for the hydrogen bomb into engineering and assembly specifications that produced the first manmade thermonuclear explosion at Enewetak Atoll in the Pacific Ocean in 1952.
加尔文（Garwin）的文章与卡特（Carter），梅（May）和佩里（Perry）的文章平行（他有很长的报价）。加尔文（Garwin）明确表示，他假设使用了富含浓厚的铀和广岛枪设计的恐怖主义核装置。与所有其他想象的武器一样，这一IND的产量在10到15千克之间。值得注意的是，每个解决恐怖核武器问题并了解基础技术的人都选择专注于约10 kt的设备。加尔文还指出，他谈到的情况是：“……是奥巴马总统于2010年4月12日至13日在华盛顿举行的核安全峰会的重点（2010年白宫）。
Garwin also emphasizes a point of great concern, made by the trio, with the following quote from the “Day After” article:
The federal government should stop pretending that state and local officials will be able to control the situation on the Day After. The pretense persists in Washington planning for the Day After that its role is to ‘support’ governors and mayors, who will retain authority and responsibility in the affected area. While this is a reasonable application of our federal system to small and medium-sized emergencies, it is not appropriate for large disasters like a nuclear detonation.
Since we witness the same pretense being operative in 2015, it is unfortunate that Schwartz did not bring this issue to the forefront. The current situation finds Homeland Security engaged in detailed Day After studies for different locations and in providing guidance and training for first responders in major cities, yet there is almost no information being shared, by either federal or local agencies, with the public.
The only exception, known to this reviewer at least, is the extensive efforts of the Ventura County California Department of Public Health. That office published[13]the 243 page, “Ventura County Nuclear Explosion Response Plan,” on August 8, 2011 and has ongoing activities addressing this civil defense challenge. The premise of the Ventura County plan is that the terrorist 10KT explosion would take place in Los Angeles County, that being a more attractive target for terrorists. The population, economic, transportation, port, and other infrastructure targets of Los Angeles County are all more significant than in Ventura County. However, since it is contiguous to Los Angeles County, Ventura County would likely experience significant radioactive fallout. In addition uncontrolled mass evacuation would confront Ventura County. Throughout the region there would likely be hysteria, looting, and civil disorder. Additionally, the support resources of medical, police, and firefighter first responders would be called upon to aid in the response and recovery operations in Los Angeles County. The Ventura County plan examines short term, intermediate term, and long-term coordination issues for first responders, as well as guidelines for the civilian population. The plan calls for education and coordination efforts that are needed in anticipation of a nuclear disaster. It points out that many more lives will be lost and the impact of the attack will be much greater if society is not prepared and well- informed. In spite of this obvious reality, there is almost no attention to informing the American public about these matters.
文图拉县计划中的细节水平令人印象深刻，有些令人震惊。例如，它包括有关需要识别和处置大量尸体的指南。有建议，例如在“至少5英尺深，距离水源至少50码的沟渠中建立临时埋葬地点”。他们建议尸体至少相隔2英尺，并且只有“仅一层”。
The report also outlines the psychological impact of the disaster including anxiety, anger, depression, and lethargy. It notes that the fear, disorientation, and misleading notions will be introduced by the lack of understanding about the ongoing impact of radiation exposure. The report notes that Ventura County has elected to develop a Trauma Response Network to respond to large-scale emotional and psychological needs of the general public.
In its section on rage and hoarding, there is every indication that violence will erupt. The report notes that looting and other violent acts are more likely in settings where there are high crime rates and youth gangs. These conditions are met in Ventura County and among the evacuees arriving from Los Angeles County. While they note that, “The Federal government has a massive food shortage program of canned goods located in salt caves near Kansas City,” supplies will likely run out before federal authorities would be able to transport the stored food to where it would be needed. They also enunciate a likely need for “supervised looting” in which government authorities seize private warehouses and distribute food.
文图拉县计划估计，有200万人将从洛杉矶县带来近700万只宠物狗和猫。宠物放射性污染的问题以及红十字会避难所将不接受宠物的事实。文图拉县计划中还包括大量死动物。虽然该计划量化了撤离者可能携带的宠物数量，但尚无估计宠物的数量，这些宠物的数量会在其主人去世后会变得麻烦。
在灾区中，宠物的少数例子之一是卢旺达的经验，在100天的时间内，有80万人被屠杀了80万人。当保罗·卡加梅（Paul Kagame）带领军事探险队从乌干达驶向卢旺达时，他发现一群狗吃了各处的尸体，并命令他的部队射击所有的狗。
The level of detail in the Ventura County report reinforces the certainty that immediate Federal action will be needed following a nuclear terrorist attack. The problems of medical care, food availability, law enforcement, and general chaos will require federal resources and personnel. Clearly, the issues that will be faced by the President on the Day After will be far more diverse and complex than portrayed in the scenario presented inRight of Boom。
关于核恐怖主义的评论包括在“繁荣的左派”上进行的预防和准备问题，以及对“繁荣权”的反应，金博宝正规网址报复和预防反复攻击的问题。施瓦茨（Schwartz）选择为核恐怖主义的可能性和后攻击行动的报复方面制定一个案例。这样一来，他就很少关注的问题为公共讨论做出了宝贵的贡献。Since the post attack actions of the executive branch of government will be occupied, if not overwhelmed, by the excruciating challenges of coping with domestic challenges and needs, his bland scenario, with its transcript of the President’s first post attack address to the nation, is not plausible. His focus on international initiatives to prevent follow-on nuclear terrorism would have benefited from explicit recognition of President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit diplomacy with the establishment of fifteen working groups that are attempting to deal with precisely these issues. By moving from a laissez faire, “gift basket” form of diplomacy to a more coercive approach of engagement, the outlines of a specific agenda for the “New Order,” that he imagines, might emerge.
尽管很难计算出对美国城市核恐怖袭击的几率，但严峻的现实是，如果发生这种情况，是否会改变我们所知道的生活。看来，那些在问题上最能了解到的人认为概率很高。这是一个威胁，对美国总统，前国防部秘书，前副部长和国防部的高级顾问以及前首席设计师和核武器发展经理提出了严重关注。一个人想知道的是，书籍的结论，希腊人吉米（Jimmy the Greek）将从专家之间达成这一共识。
In the 1950s and 60s the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers stimulated intense discussion and debate. Many books were written, both fiction and non-fiction. Movies were produced, songs and poems were written, and civil defense drills were conducted. Some of this activity was profound and some of it was silly, but we are thankful that nothing happened to threaten our existence. Currently, nuclear terrorism receives little attention and is often viewed with skepticism.Right of Boomby Benjamin E. Schwartz is a welcome addition to the public airing of these issues.
[1]Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe。Graham Allison. Henry Holt and Company, LLC (2004).
[2]International Fissile Material Report(2013).http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr13.pdf。
[3]核恐怖主义的四个面孔。Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter. Rutledge, Taylor and Francis (2005).
[4]结合能的曲线: A Journey into the Awesome and Alarming World of Theodore B. Taylor。John McPhee. Farrar, Straus and Giroux (1973).
[5]National Capital Region Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism(November 2011), FEMA/Homeland Security/et. al./irp/agency/dhs/fema/ncr.pdf。
[6]Dr. Roz D.Lasker,
http://tap.gallaudet.edu/emergency/nov05Conference/emergencyReportsReportsreports/redefininghoreessinessstudy.pdf。
[7]The Second Nuclear Era: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics。Paul Bracken. MacMillan (2012).
[8]“Yes, Obama is Really Worried about a Manhattan Nuke,” Time Magazine (March 26, 2014).
http://time.com/39131/barack-obama-nuke-manhattan-new-york/。
[9]Obama Prague Speech (2009).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered。
[10]The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on Joint Statements。Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security (March 2015).http://www.armscontrol.org/files/aca_nss_report_2015.pdf。
[11]“第二天，在美国城市发生核爆炸之后的行动，”阿什顿·卡特（Ashton B. Carter），迈克尔·M·梅（Michael M.《华盛顿季刊》（2007年秋，第19页）。
[12]“A Nuclear Explosion in a City or an Attack on a Nuclear Reactor,” Richard L. Garwin. The Bridge –核危险问题（2010年夏季），国家工程学院。
[13]Ventura County Nuclear Explosion Response Plan（2011年8月8日）。http://vchca.org/docs/public-health/nuclear-resp-plan_local.pdf?sfvrsn=0。
Edward A. Friedmanis Professor Emeritus of Technology Management at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, NJ. His undergraduate and graduate degrees in physics are from MIT and Columbia University, respectively. He teaches courses at Stevens on nuclear weapons issues. He holds an Honorary Doctor of Science degree in Mathematics from Sofia University in Bulgaria and he received a medal from King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan for his work in educational development at Kabul University in the 1970s.