Hami导弹筒仓田占地约800平方公里，处于建筑的早期阶段。
卫星图像显示，中国正在建造第二个核导弹筒仓场。发现遵循报告本月初，中国似乎在甘努省Yumen附近建造了120枚导弹筒仓。第二枚导弹筒仓场位于Yumen Field的西北380公里（240英里），靠近新疆东部的县级城市Hami。
哈密的导弹发射井字段是在更早的年代tage of development than the Yumen site. Construction began at the start of March 2021 in the southeastern corner of the complex and continues at a rapid pace. Since then, dome shelters have been erected over at least 14 silos and soil cleared in preparation for construction of another 19 silos. The grid-like outline of the entire complex indicates that it may eventually include approximately 110 silos.
圆顶结构已建立在14个孤岛建筑位置上。正在进行19次的准备工作，整个导弹场最终可能包括110个孤岛。
HAMI站点首先是由使用商业卫星图像的美国科学家联合会核信息项目研究助理Matt Korda发现的。随后由行星提供了站点的较高分辨率图像。
The silos at Hami are positioned in an almost perfect grid pattern, roughly three kilometers apart, with adjacent support facilities. Construction and organization of the Hami silos are very similar to the 120 silos at the Yumen site, and are also very similar to the approximately one-dozen silos constructed at theJilantai培训区在内蒙古。这些避难所通常仅在完成更敏感的结构完成后才被删除。就像Yumen网站一样，Hami地点跨越了大约800平方公里的区域。
The Hami missile silo field has a grid-pattern where the silos are located approximately 3 kilometers from each other.
对中国核武库的影响
The silo construction at Yumen and Hami constitutes the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever. China has for decades operated about 20 silos for liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs. With 120 silos under construction at Yumen, another 110 silos at Hami, a dozen silos at Jilantai, and possibly more silos being added in existing DF-5 deployment areas, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) appears to have approximately 250 silos under construction – more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation today.
正在建造的新中国孤岛的数量超过了俄罗斯经营的基于筒仓的洲际弹道导弹的数量，并且构成了整个美国洲际弹道导弹力量的一半以上。自冷战期间美国和苏联导弹筒仓建筑以来，中国导弹筒仓计划构成了最广泛的筒仓结构。
250个新的孤岛正在建设中，除了大约100个道路摩托车ICBM发射器的力量外，这些发射器部署在十几个基地以上。目前尚不清楚中国将如何操作新筒仓，是将所有筒仓都装上导弹，还是将一部分用作空的诱饵。如果它们全部装有单战式导弹，那么中国洲际弹道导弹的弹头数量可能会从今天的185枚弹头增加到多达415枚弹头。如果新的孤岛装有新的Mirved DF-41 ICBM，那么当Yumen和Hami导弹田地完成时，中国洲际弹道队可能会携带875弹头（假设每弹3枚弹头）。
应该强调的是，中国将如何操作新的孤岛以及每个导弹将携带多少弹头是未知的。无论如何，筒仓的建筑代表了中国武器库的显着增加，美国科学家联合会目前estimates包括大约350枚核弹头。五角大楼陈述last year that China had “an operational nuclear warhead stockpile in low-200s,” and STRATCOM commander Adm. Charles Richard said early this year that “China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade.” The new silos could allow China to accomplish this goal, if it is indeed the goal.
尽管重要的是，即使是这样的扩张仍然不会使中国与俄罗斯和美国的核库存几乎存在operate nuclear warhead stockpiles close to 4,000 warheads。
HAMI导弹筒仓圆顶与在Yumen导弹筒仓田和Jilantai训练区看到的筒仓圆顶相同。
Chinese motivations
中国建造新筒仓的原因有几个可能的原因。不管最终有多少孤岛中国打算用洲际弹道导弹填补，这个新的导弹综合体是对动态武器竞争的逻辑反应，其中多个核武器球员 - 包括俄罗斯，印度和美国 - 都在改善他们的两者核和常规力量以及导弹防御能力。尽管中国正式致力于其“最低”核威慑的姿势，但它也正在响应与国家对抗者的竞争关系，以保持其自身的力量能够生存并能够将对抗性目标保持危险。因此，尽管中国不太可能很快放弃这项政策，但随着中国扩大其核武库的发展，威慑的“最低”门槛可能会继续转移。决定建造大量新孤岛的决定可能不是由一个问题引起的，而是由以下以下因素组合造成的，以下是随机顺序列出的：
确保核报复能力的生存能力：China is concerned that its current ICBM silos are too vulnerable to US (or Russian) attack. By increasing the number of silos, more ICBMs could potentially survive a preemptive strike and be able to launch their missiles in retaliation. China’s development of its current road-mobile solid-fuel ICBM force was,根据美国中央情报机构的说法, fueled by the US Navy’s deployment of Trident II D5 missiles in the Pacific. This action-reaction dynamic is most likely a factor in China’s current modernization.
Increasing the readiness of the ICBM force:从液体燃料导弹到孤岛中的固体燃料导弹过渡将增加洲际弹道导体的反应时间。
Protecting ICBMs against non-nuclear attack:All existing DF-5 silos are within range of US conventional cruise missiles. In contrast, the Yumen and Hami missile silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other Chinese ICBM base (see map below) and out of reach of US conventional missiles.
克服美国导弹防御的潜在影响：Concerns that missile defenses might undermine China’s retaliatory capability have always been prominent. China has already decided to equip its DF-5B ICBM with multiple warheads (MIRV); each missile can carry up to five. The new DF-41 ICBM is also capable of MIRV and the future JL-3 SLBM will also be capable of carrying multiple warheads. By increasing the number of silos-based solid-fuel missiles and the number of warheads they carry, China would seek to ensure that they can continue to penetrate missile defense systems.
Transitioning to solid-fuel silo missiles:中国旧的液体燃料DF-5弹药需要花费太长时间才能发射之前，使它们更容易受到攻击。处理液体燃料也很麻烦且危险。通过过渡到固体燃料导弹筒仓，可以改善洲际弹道导弹力的生存能力，操作程序和安全性。
Transitioning to a peacetime missile alert posture:人们认为，中国的导弹是在正常情况下安装的，没有安装的核弹头。美国和俄罗斯洲际弹道导弹已完全准备好并能够在短时间内发射。由于与美国的军事竞争正在增加，因此中国不再确定它将有时间武装导弹，以提高中国威慑的信誉。五角大楼在2020年asserted吉兰泰（Jilantai）的孤岛“提供了进一步的证据中国正在转向低姿势”。
平衡洲际弹道大军：中国大约110次洲际弹道导弹的80％是移动性的，数量增加。到2025年，美国军事项目将达到150个弹头。增加200多个孤岛将更好地平衡中国洲际弹道导弹和固定发射器之间的中国洲际弹道导弹。
提高中国的核罢工能力：China’s “minimum deterrence” posture has historically kept nuclear launchers at a relatively low level. But the Chinese leadership might have decided that it needs more missiles with more warheads to hold more adversarial facilities at risk. Adding nearly 250 new silos appears to move China out of the “minimum deterrence” category.
National prestige:中国变得越来越丰富，越来越强大。大国有更多的导弹，因此中国也需要更多的导弹，以便为其作为强大的地位而言。
The Hami and Yumen missile silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other ICBM base and beyond the reach of conventional cruise missiles. Click on image to view full size. Image: Google Earth.
该怎么办？
China’s construction of nearly 250 new silos has serious implications for international relations and China’s role in the world. The Chinese government has for decades insisted it has a minimum deterrent and that it is not part of any nuclear arms race. Although it remains unclear how many silos will actually be filled with missiles, the massive silo construction and China’s other nuclear modernization programs are on a scale that appears to contradict these polices: the build-up is anything but “minimum” and appears to be part of a race for more nuclear arms to better compete with China’s adversaries. The silo construction will likely further deepen military tension, fuel fear of China’s intensions, embolden arguments that arms control and constraints are naïve, and that US and Russian nuclear arsenals cannot be reduced further but instead must be adjusted to take into account the Chinese nuclear build-up.
在我们和俄罗斯谈判者开会的几天内，第二次中国孤岛导弹场的披露是在讨论战略稳定和潜在的武器控制措施的几天。用更多的核武器回应中国的积累将不太可能产生积极的结果，并可能导致中国更多。此外，即使新的孤岛开始运营，中国核武库仍将比俄罗斯和美国的核武库大得多。
中国核武库中最清晰的途径是通过武器控制，但这具有挑战性。美国已经trying to engage China on nuclear issuessince the late-1990s, but so far with minimal success. Rather than discuss specific limitations on weapon systems, these efforts have been limited to increasing transparency about force structure plans and strategy, and well as discussing nuclear doctrine and intentions.
The Trump administration correctly sought to broaden nuclear arms control to include China, but fumbled the effort by turning it into apublic-relations pressure stuntand insisting that China should be part of a New START treaty extension. Beijing not surprisingly rejected the effort, and Chinese officials have plainly陈述that “it is unrealistic to expect China to join [the United States and Russia] in a negotiation aimed at nuclear arms reduction,” particularly while China’s arsenal remains a fraction of the size.
Bringing China and other nuclear-armed states into a sustained arms control dialogue will require a good-faith effort that will require the United States to clearly articulate what it is willing to trade in return for limits on Chinese forces. In this regard, it is worth noting that the absence of limits on US missile defenses is of particular and longstanding concern to both China and Russia. When the Bush administration decided to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, officials from both countries explicitly陈述该条约的逝世将是高度稳定的，并暗示他们将采取步骤来抵消这一感知到的我们的优势。大约20年后，这一决定的敲门效应很明显。将美国的导弹防御措施放在谈判桌上可以帮助清除制定新的武器控制协议的道路，该协议最终使中国和俄罗斯的核武库受到控制。
But the Chinese nuclear modernization is driven by more than just missile defenses. This includes the nuclear modernization programs of the United States, India, and Russia, the significant enhancements of the conventional forces of those countries and their allies, as well as China’s own ambitions about world power status.
今年晚些时候或明年初双方to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet to review the progress of the treaty. Although the treaty does not explicitly prohibit a country from modernizing or even increasing its nuclear arsenal, reduction and eventually elimination of nuclear weapons are key pillars of the treaty’s goal as reaffirmed by numerous previous NPT conferences. It is difficult to see how adding nearly 250 nuclear missile silos is consistent with China’s obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…”
Background information:
我们的Hami导弹筒仓发现首次出现在New York Times2021年7月26日。
This publication was made possible by generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
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