Better Understanding North Korea: Q&A with Seven East Asian Experts, Part 2
编者注：This is the secondof two postings of a Q&A conducted primarily by the Federation of American Scientists regarding the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Developed and edited by查尔斯·布莱尔，，，，马克·詹森（Mark Jansson）和德文·埃利斯（Devin H. Ellis），作者的回答尚未被编辑；这些主题专家表达的所有观点都是他们自己的。请注意，其他条款分别用于指朝鲜和韩国，即朝鲜和ROK。
美国科学家联合会（FAS）的研究人员询问了七名在东亚专家的人，以了解最近在朝鲜半岛紧张局势的升级。朝鲜最近通过其核试验和卫星发射证据表明其成熟的证据是否成功？日本是否会因朝鲜用核武器攻击日本的威胁而感到恐惧？朝鲜是否掌握了重新进入车辆（RV）技术？有什么合理的方法可以使朝鲜取消核问题？
This is the second part of the Q&A, featuringDr. Yousaf Butt，，，，Dr. Jacques HymansandMasako Toki女士。在这里阅读第一部分。
Dr. Yousaf Butt
蒙特雷国际研究所的詹姆斯·马丁非扩散研究中心研究教授兼驻地科学家
Q:朝鲜是否有能力使用其导弹击中United States with nuclear weapons? How serious is that threat?
A: There are three main technical hurdles for North Korea in this respect: one is making and testing powerful enough — and sufficiently reliable — long range rockets to be able to send a heavy (~1000 kg) payload to the U.S. mainland. North Korea has not embarked on such a testing program yet. Another is miniaturizing their nuclear devices to be able to mount them on missiles and making the warheads robust enough to withstand the stresses of rocket flight. An ICBM nuclear delivery system also requires a re-entry vehicle (RV) to protect the nuclear device as it re-enters the atmosphere close to its target: during re-entry the RV will heat up tremendously due to the high speed. It is unlikely North Korea has mastered this technology yet.
这se are very challenging problems and, in my view, North Korea is many years from being able to hurl a nuclear device to the U.S. mainland.
要完全清楚：我的观点不是我们不必担心朝鲜核设备多年，而是 - 相反，我们应该担心已经。If the North Koreans wanted to carry out a nuclear first strike they could already do so using small boats containing clunky (un-miniaturized) devices. This delivery method has the benefit – from the North Korean perspective – of being far less attributable, and substantially reduces the chances of an immediate devastating retaliatory strike on their nation.
回到导弹问题：将核装置的小型化意味着数量和质量限制：核装置必须既光线又足够小，足以适合导弹。它还需要承受导弹飞行的严格（高forces，振动，温度偏移，真空等）。ReportsReports上周的报道表明，国防情报局（DIA）具有“温和的信心”，即朝鲜可能可以使核弹头足够微型以将其固定在某些导弹上 - 但即使这样，在他们的判断中，任何此类交付系统都会有”低可靠性”。It should also be noted that the director of national intelligence, James Clapper Jr., released a statement saying that the DIA assessment did not represent a consensus of the nation’s intelligence community and that “North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile.” The State Dept also contested the DIA’s “moderate confidence” finding, with Secretary of State Kerry saying that Pyongyangstill hadn’t developed or fully tested the nuclear capacities这样的步骤需要。
In any case, those are just some of the technical aspects of the problem, but one must also ask if the North Koreans would be foolish enough to launch a nuclear tipped missile at the United States given the fact that the U.S. can trace the origin of long-range missiles using infra-red sensors on our surveillance satellites. Any such attack would invite massive retaliation, and would likely mean the end of the regime.路透社报道金正恩最近表示，朝鲜核装置是为了阻止战争。
Right now, I worry more about the already existing and less attributabledelivery methods such as boats rather than the missiles。
Q:但是《每日野兽》在[4月15日]周一打破了一个故事，称美国从12月开始恢复了朝鲜卫星发射火箭的诺塞酮的残骸，这表明朝鲜人“弄清楚了弹头的碎片。” Do you have any insight into how credible or important this development is? Has North Korea really mastered re-entry vehicle (RV) technology?
A: Unfortunately, theDaily Beaststory does not have any meaningful technical details so it is hard to assess how important a development it is – it would be very useful if the government analysts would release some further information. The article states that the “front of the satellite rocket, according to three U.S. officials who work closely on North Korean proliferation, gave tangible proof that North Korea was building the missile’s cone at dimensions for a nuclear warhead, durable enough to be placed on a long-range missile that could reenter the earth’s atmosphere from space.” This seems to be merely a consistency argument based on spatial dimensions and definitely does not mean North Korea has mastered RV technology. In fact, the Unha rocket’s upper-stage, to which the North Korean satellite was attached,is still in orbit cataloged as NORAD-39027。
What seems to have been recovered is the upper-stage nosecone fairing; its size seems to be consistent with that needed for a nuclear device. But it may also be consistent with the satellite it contained. The fairing may also have been designed prior to the satellite and may have been bigger than it needed to be, but this does not imply the satellite launch was really a weapons test. In fact, Markus Schiller has convincingly argued whythe launcher seemed more consistent with a space launch vehicle rather than an ICBM。
Michael Elleman also has anexcellent technical and historical brief on the North Korean rocket值得一读，并认为尽管这种发射可能令人不安，但它们不是“代替弹道导弹测试”。因此，在开发和测试火箭的同时，无疑为朝鲜具有可用于弹道导弹的技术的体验，但似乎这并不是伪装成卫星发射的弹道导弹测试。
Besides the spatial dimensions of the upper-stage fairing which prove little in themselves, there is the mention of “durable” in theDaily Beastpiece. This could refer to simply over-engineering the nose fairing – something a fledgling space launch state would be apt to do, just to be on the safe side. A nosecone fairing would also not be very useful as an RV test during the fairing’s re-entry because it does not have the right ballistic coefficient (ratio of an object’s mass relative to its cross-sectional area). Also, it does not appear that North Korea even attempted to recover the fairing to check on any such test.
With the information that has been released so far, I do not see any clear connection to RV testing, and no indication that North Korea has mastered RV technology. For that, they would need to conduct real RV tests of objects with the correct ballistic coefficients and materials. Until the North Koreans have mastered RV technology and made miniaturized nuclear weapons that are resistant to high-g’s and vibration etc., and tested the ICBMs’ precision targeting they cannot reliably hurl a functioning nuclear weapon to a given target on the U.S. mainland.
另一方面，如果他们一直想做的是偷偷摸摸的第一罢工，那么大型笨拙的船上核装置不仅足够，而且可能是可取的，因为它比导弹式设备不那么归因。在媒体上，大部分关注导弹式设备似乎是一个宿醉，一些分析师仍在思考冷战。如果人们真的认为朝鲜是非理性的，并且不容易受到报复威慑，那么人们应该更加担心朝鲜人已经可以使用的船上核武器。他们所宣布的政策（对于它的价值）似乎是报复的威慑，而不是首次罢工。
Q: What about the possibility of the North striking South Korea or Japan with nuclear weapons?
A: Although North Korea has missiles — their Nodong and Scuds — which could target Japan and South Korea, there remains the technical challenge of miniaturizing and mounting the nuclear warheads on these missiles and bringing the system up to a reasonable level of reliability, both in terms of a functional robust warhead and a high targeting accuracy. But again, the main issue is not technical: why would the Pyongyang invite national suicide by launching such an attack? As I mentioned earlier, if the North Koreans really wanted to do such a strike, they may have done so already using more primitive delivery vehicles. They do not need to develop a complicated and (at least, initially) unreliable missile-borne delivery system to carry out a nuclear strike.
Q:Does the Aegis midcourse missile defense system provide an effective defense against such missiles?
A: The Aegis sea-based midcourse missile defense system would not be suitable for defense of South Korea since the attacking North Korean missiles would not reach into space for any substantial length of time if at all — the Aegis SM-3 defense interceptors attempt to strike the incoming missiles in space. The time-line for a North Korean missile to reach South Korea is also very short, on the order of a few minutes so there is very little time to generate a firing solution.South Korea and Japan do have Patriot terminal missile defenses试图在下降或重新进入阶段拦截弹头。
这Achilles’ Heel of the Aegis SM-3 system — indeed of “midcourse” missile defense, in general, is that it is直接击败系统使用廉价的诱饵弹头。系统简单没有强大的能力歧视真实的诱饵和其他对策的弹头。由于截距发生在空间真空中，因此弹头和轻诱饵一起旅行，使系统的传感器混淆。这五角大楼自己在国防科学委员会的科学家said as much in 2011, as did the国家科学院今年早些时候。
Additionally,系统有never在诱饵或其他对策的存在下，在现实的条件下成功测试了。这Aegis system is ship-based and is known to not work beyond a certain sea-state: as you might imagine, it becomes too risky to launch the interceptors if the ship is pitching wildly.
这enormous funds wasted on midcourse missile defense systems could have been much better spent on the coast-guard and port-security.
Q:但是我s there a missile defense system that could provide an effective defense against such missiles?
答：一种比当前所范围的系统（但仍然不完美的系统）更好的导弹防御系统将是一个基于表面的增强相系统。该系统试图在释放任何诱饵或弹头之前拦截燃烧导弹。奇怪的是，我们没有开发它！我们似乎是故意的忽略导弹防御的一个建筑这很有可能与北朝鲜威胁作用，最近的美国国家科学学院的报告对基于表面的Boost阶段导弹辩护提出了，但这仅仅是因为他们认为他们认为是一套“稻草人”的助推器拦截器能力良好。其他基于表面的增强相拦截器将更有能力，并且would provide a better defensethan the midcourse system that is now being irrationally fielded.
However, no matter which missile defense system exists one must consider whether it makes sense to create incentives for our enemy to take their nuclear devices off of missiles and mate them to other delivery systems. e.g. A “functional” missile defense to counter North Korea’s missiles (例如基于表面的增强相系统）可以鼓励平壤更紧急地开发出船舶核装置。由于这种武器更难发现和归因于一个特定国家，因此与易于检测到的导弹相比，我们的对手使用它的抑制作用可能较小，该导弹具有明显的起源点。（美国卫星不断监视全球导弹发射。）因此，如果导弹防御鼓励我们的对手甚至将单个导弹传播的核武器换成船舶，那么我们的安全实际上可能会降低。当然，在任何情况下，对手可能会开发这些替代交付方法，但为他们创造激励措施is probably not in our interest。
这smartest course of action, of course, is to discourage and dissuade our adversaries from obtaining nuclear weapons in the first place. (Once they obtain nuclear weaponswe will be deterred, no matter the type of missiles defenses in play.）
As outlined by Joel Wit, it seems the administration’s“战略耐心”的政策可能失败了在这方面。
Q:但是我S有任何合理的方式来消除朝鲜？
A: It may well be too late already: it is unlikely that the North Koreans would willingly give up their nuclear weapons when they feel threatened, and are under increasingly heavy sanctions which in their eyes amount to economic warfare.正如迈克·埃尔曼（Mike Elleman）所说，，，，the US and allied nations could consider scaling back “their collective reaction to North Korean provocations that do not pose an immediate or significant threat and instead preserve their punitive responses for those activities that are most threatening, such as the February 12 nuclear test or future flight tests of long-range ballistic missiles.” Any future space launches probably ought not be met with further punitive sanctions, because such measures corner the regime and may lead, as we’ve seen, to an escalating spiral of provocations.
这North Koreans may also be reading from our own playbook: for instance, the 1995 US STRATCOM report “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence” states:“将自己描绘成太充分理性和凉爽的人很痛苦。某些要素似乎可能是“失控”的事实可能有益于在对手决策者的心中创造和加剧恐惧和怀疑。这种基本的恐惧感是威慑的工作力量。如果美国的重要利益受到攻击，美国可能会成为我们投射给所有对手的民族角色的一部分，可能会变得不合理和辩护。”看来朝鲜领导人可能将这一特定的段落置于内心。
Also, in my view, it may not have been helpful that our latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) — from 2010 — implicitly qualified states like North Korea and Iran as possible targets of our nuclear weapons. In fact, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was rather explicit: “I actually think that the NPR has a very strong message for both Iran and North Korea, because whether it’s in declaratory policy or in other elements of the NPR, we essentially carve out states like Iran and North Korea that are not in compliance with NPT. And basically, all options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category.”
Lastly, former Director of Los Alamos National Labs, Dr. Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea seven times over the last decade, including North Korean nuclear facilities,explains how the 1994 Agreed Framework deal with North Korea fell apart：“……商定的框架立即被国会中的许多人反对，他们认为这奖励了不良行为。国会没有为该协议的关键规定提供适当的资金，从而使美国几乎从一开始就落后于其承诺。…[2002年，布什政府出于国内政治原因杀死了商定的框架，因为它怀疑平壤通过秘密地追求铀的丰富来作弊。这样做了一个潜在的威胁，该威胁将花费数年的时间变成炸弹，这花了几个月的时间，大大改变了平壤的外交格局。…我们发现，只有在认为与美国的基本关系正在改善时，平壤才愿意减慢其核武器的动力，但是当该政权受到威胁时不会。” [emphasis added]
In crafting future policy to address the North Korean nuclear threat it may be worth heeding Dr. Hecker’s advice.
Dr. Jacques Hymans
Jacques E.C. Hymans is associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California
Q:Your explanation as to why North Korea decided to pursue nuclear weapons is rooted in the emotional and psychological – that the perceived need for nuclear weapons is not the result of a cost-benefit analysis of the security environment but follows from the kind of national identity to which North Korean leadership ascribes. As North Korea’s “key comparison other,” isn’t there a unique potential for the United States to change North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons, even with the Kim Dynasty remaining for some time? If so, what would this require from the United States?
A: The decision by any state’s leaders to seek nuclear weapons is an emotional decision rooted in the fear of foreign enemies and in nationalist pride. The rulers of North Korea since its founding—father, son, and now grandson—have been under the influence of that explosive psychological cocktail. As a result, they have never given up on their pursuit of the bomb for the past half-century, albeit sometimes pressing the pause button for one reason or another.
美国当然是平壤眼中的敌人。但是我对朝鲜领导人在过去几十年中的言论的分析表明，他们实际上将整个外界视为或多或少是未分化的对手。例如，尽管经常说中国是朝鲜的“best friend,“你不会知道它从朝鲜utterances. For instance, Kim Jong Un’srecent New Year’s Address，超过4,000个字，甚至没有提及一次。由于朝鲜领导人对所有国外都如此僵化，因此我发现双边美国贸易协定的谈判能否带来北朝鲜武士搏击的暂时减少。金正恩可能会让我们感到惊讶，但我没有屏住呼吸。
Q:You have argued that sometimes a state’s inability to organize its resources effectively impedes its ability to fulfill its nuclear weapons aspirations. Is North Korea’s recent success with its nuclear test and satellite launch evidence that it is maturing in this regard, a testament to its determination to overcome its challenges, or something else?
A: Despite the general progress of technology around the world, there has been a major fall-off in the efficiency of nuclear weapons projects since the 1970s. The most important cause of this is the poor organizational and management cultures of the states that have been trying to join the nuclear weapon state club. North Korea is a great example of this general trend. It has had tremendous trouble overcoming various technical hurdles that US experts assumed would not pose any serious difficulties at all. Indeed, it’s quite stunning that a country that the US believed可能已经有核武器way back in the early 1990s still apparently doesn’t have a genuine nuclear military arsenal.
这并不是说朝鲜无力朝着其最终目标取得任何技术进步。它的核和导弹计划并不像利比亚那样可悲。但是，即使是最近的测试，也可以说，仅相对于平壤荒谬的低杠，它是“成功的”。例如，尽管朝鲜人于去年12月成功将一颗卫星放到太空中，但他们在此过程中打破了卫星。并作为前美国国家航空航天局工程师詹姆斯·奥伯格（James Oberg）has explained, this failure would likely be repeated if they tried to send up a nuclear warhead instead. In short, it’s important not to forget whom we’re dealing with here. This is a state thatstill hasn’t been able to open尽管在25年以上的项目中倾注了数亿美元，但在平壤市中心的巨大Ryugyong酒店却倾注了数亿美元，以实现亲爱的领导人金正日的个人愿望。当谈到朝鲜核武器方面，毫无疑问，我们仍然有时间（可能是很多时间）在他们是一个真正的军事威胁之前。
Ms. Masako Toki
Masako Toki is the Education Project Manager and a Research Associate for the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey, CA
Q: In what ways has the recent situation on the Korean Peninsula affected public sentiment in Japan? Specifically, has there been an increase in perceived political support for reconsideration of Japan’s “virtual” nuclear status in favor of moving forward with weaponization of fissile materials – a de facto nuclear-weapon-state status? Or is Japan’s domestic political “nuclear allergy” intact?
答：朝鲜的挑衅和好战的行动不可避免地将日本的国防政策朝着更坚硬的姿势朝向。为了回应朝鲜的核武器测试和导弹发射，日本政府继续试图使其导弹防御更加强大和精致。
Also, the United States reiterated its security assurance for its allies with extended deterrence. U.S. extended deterrence has been the cornerstone of Japan’s security, even in the aftermath of the Cold War. The Japanese government is trying to complement extended deterrence with missile defense, which is widely viewed as consistent with Japan’s “exclusively defensive defense” policy.
与此同时,反核sentiment among the general public in Japan has always outweighed support for developing Japan’s independent nuclear deterrence capability. Of course, Japan’s nuclearization debates once in a while resurface, especially in response to security threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as China’s military modernization.
然而,反核情绪和核llergy among the public is deep-rooted in Japan’s national identity and culture, and this is, to some extent, beyond political debates. However, the threshold of Japan’s nuclearization debate taboo seems to have been lowered as North Korea continues to develop and improve its nuclear and missile capability.
Having said that, in my opinion both external considerations (international treaties, the U.S.-Japan security alliance) and domestic restrictions (the three-non-nuclear principles, asserted by Parliament, that Japan will not possess or manufacture nuclear weapons or allow them on its territory; public opinion against nuclear weapons; and the atomic energy basic law, which limits nuclear activity to peaceful purposes) will keep Japan from ever developing its own nuclear deterrent. The only circumstance under which Japan would really consider going nuclear is a decision to end the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which will not happen at least for the foreseeable future.
总而言之，在我看来，日本不会发展自己的核武器，它将继续依靠美国扩大威慑，它将花费很长时间的资源来改善其导弹辩护，同时主张核裁军和不扩散作为国家政策。即便如此，日本仍将维护其“中等”的核裁军政策，实际上，这并没有努力朝着无核武器的世界努力，超出了言辞。
问：日本在朝鲜袭击日本的核武器袭击日本的威胁对日本的威胁而感到恐惧？
答：很少有人认为朝鲜会用核武器攻击日本。日本对美国扩展的核威慑有着非常强烈的信心，并认为朝鲜会理解，如果它用核武器攻击美国盟友，可能会产生潜在的后果。
这refore, instead of feeling trepidation, the public is more annoyed and upset by North Korea’s repeated and increasing provocative statements. The government cannot take any chances, and the defense minister has announced that the self-defense forces are at their highest level of readiness. Japan has lifted its self-imposed pacifist restrictions gradually, but steadily, to allow for more robust missile defense. So perhaps one of the direct, significant impacts on Japan’s security policy of North Korea’s nuclear threats would be a change in the interpretation of the constitution so that Japan can be allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense.
这government of Japan needs to demonstrate its intention to protect its people. At this stage, deploying its missile defense is the most obvious such demonstration. However, the credibility of the country’s missile defense system is not clear, and the Japanese people’s trust in it is less than complete. So it is unclear whether deployment of missile defenses actually is mitigating civilians concern or fear. Beyond the issue of public support, missile defense opponents think a robust Japanese missile defense capability is not conducive to sustainable peace in East Asia.
Q:日本公众和/或政府是否对居住在日本的韩国族裔持续的恐怖主义和一般社会冲突表示关注（如果是的，则是什么程度）？
答：总的来说，日本公众对朝鲜的最憎恶的问题是1970年代末和1980年代初发生的朝鲜政府特工从日本遭到日本公民的绑架。据信，受害者被绑架在朝鲜间谍学校教日语和文化。尽管朝鲜政府在2002年正式承认绑架事件，并坚持认为，随着五名受害者的返回，该问题已经解决，但日本政府坚决声称该问题尚未得到适当解决。日本政府认为恐怖主义的绑架行为对日本公民造成了严重危险。因此，当美国于2008年10月将朝鲜从恐怖主义的国家赞助商名单中撤离而没有看到绑架问题的任何改善时，东京感到不安。金博宝正规网址东京继续坚持认为绑架问题不应在六方会谈中排除在外。同时，有观点认为应将绑架问题与核和导弹谈判分开。金博宝正规网址
In addition, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (选择的索伦）是一个与朝鲜有同情联系的组织，一直参与从日本到朝鲜的非法出口和与导弹有关的商品和技术的非法出口。但是，由于日本对朝鲜的出口控制和制裁的加强，这项活动已大大减少。仍然，有些选择的索伦members are likely to be involved in procurement networks. Even so, it seems that the recent provocations by the North Korean government is generating discomfort and concerns among Korean people living in Japan. In fact, some news media have reported that many Korean people in Japan (both South and North Koreans) are disgusted by the series of belligerent actions and statements taken and made by the North Korean government.
随着日本仇恨对朝鲜继续s to increase, Korean people in Japan are of course affected, directly and indirectly. Some ultra-right-wing Japanese groups express extreme levels of animosity toward both North and South Korea. In my opinion, the ultra-right-wing’s animosity against Korean people living in Japan does not generally relate to the general Japanese public’s fear of nuclear threats issued by the North Korean government.
Expert Biographies
yousaf屁股是蒙特雷国际研究所的詹姆斯·马丁非扩散研究中心的研究教授兼驻地科学家。以前，Butt博士曾是美国科学家联合会的科学顾问，也是哈佛大学天体物理学中心高能天体物理学部的物理学家。他是1999 - 2004年NASA Orbiting Chandra X射线天文台上的仪器操作团队的仪器操作团队。他还是美国国家科学院国际安全与武器控制委员会的研究员，也是有关科学家联盟的全球安全计划研究员。有关更多信息，请访问CNS工作人员网站。
Jacques E.C. Hymansis Associate Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on international security affairs and on national identity. Hymans’ The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006) received the Edgar S. Furniss Book Award for best first book in national and international security, and the Alexander L. George Book Award for best book in political psychology. His second book, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation was published by Cambridge University Press in 2012. Hymans has also published journal articles in such outlets as Foreign Affairs, International Security, Security Studies, the European Journal of International Relations, the Journal of East Asian Studies, and the Nonproliferation Review. He is an editorial board member of the Nonproliferation Review. He has wide-ranging geographical interests and has conducted in-depth case study research in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, and North America. For more information on Professor Hymans, please consult his网站。
Masako Tokiis Education Project Manager and Research Associate in theNonproliferation Education Program在詹姆斯·马丁（James Martin）非扩散研究中心（CNS），加利福尼亚州蒙特雷。
她的责任包括管理关键问题论坛（CI金博宝正规网址F），，，，nonproliferation education program for high school students and teachers in the United States and Russia. She develops online educational resources, including theNPT tutorial。
She is also a member of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies and the US-Japan Leadership Program (US-Japan Foundation). For more, visit the CNS staff网站。
FAS核笔记本是全球范围内最广泛采购的参考材料之一，以了解有关核武器地位的可靠信息，并已发表在1987年以来的原子科学家公告中。the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: Director Hans […]
2023年4月14日，白俄罗斯国防部发布了一个简短的视频，其中一名SU-25飞行员解释了他在俄罗斯训练后在发表“特别[核]弹药”方面的新作用。视频中看到的功能以及其他几个开源线索都表明，LIDA空军基地 - 距立陶宛边界和[…]仅40公里。
A photo in a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) student briefing from 2022 shows four people inspecting what appears to be a damaged B61 nuclear bomb.
2023年2月初,《华尔街日报》ported that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) had informed Congress that China now has more launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) than the United States. The report is the latest in a serious of revelations over the past four years about China’s growing nuclear weapons arsenal and the deepening […]