Nuclear Transparency and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
By Hans M. Kristensen
I was reading through the最新的库存管理和管理计划from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and wondering what I should pick to critique the Obama administration’s nuclear policy.
毕竟，有很多问题值得解决，包括：金博宝正规网址
– Why NNSA continues to overspend and over-commit and create a spending bow wave in 2021-2026 in excess of the President’s budget in exactly the same time period that excessive Air Force and Navy modernization programs are expected to put the greatest pressure on defense spending?
– Why a smaller and smaller nuclear weapons stockpile with fewer warhead types appears to be getting more and more expensive to maintain?
– Why each warhead life-extension program is getting ever more ambitious and expensive with no apparent end in sight?
– And why a policy of reductions, no new nuclear weapons, no pursuit of new military missions or new capabilities for nuclear weapons, restraint, a pledge to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” and the goal of disarmament, instead became a blueprint for nuclear overreach with record funding, across-the-board modernizations, unprecedented warhead modifications, increasing weapons accuracy and effectiveness, reaffirmation of a Triad and non-strategic nuclear weapons, continuation of counterforce strategy, reaffirmation of the importance and salience of nuclear weapons, and an open-ended commitment to retain nuclear weapons further into the future than they have existed so far?
那其他核武国家呢？
尽管政府的核政策存在矛盾和缺陷，但是可以想象是否其他核武器国家也发布了其核武器计划的摘要。有些确实透露了一点，但他们可以做更多的事情。但是，对于其他人来说，披露有关其核武库规模和组成的任何信息的想法似乎是如此陌生，几乎是不可想象的。
然而，这实际上是为什么有必要继续在核力量中继续工作（或足够）透明度的原因之一。一些核武器国家认为，其安全性取决于完全或近乎竞争的核保密性。当然，必须保护某些核信息免于披露。但是，过度保密的问题在于，它倾向于加剧不确定性，谣言，怀疑，夸张，不信任和最差的假设，这是在其他核武器国家中的假设 - 导致他们以破坏自己的核力量和战略的方式，以破坏自己的核力量和战略。所有人的安全。
核武国家必须在合法的保密和透明度之间找到平衡。这可能需要很长时间，并且不一定在国家到国家 /地区相同。美国还用来保留更多的核信息秘密，许多机构将始终抵制公众访问。但是，事实证明，最大的负责任披露不仅是关于核政策的健康辩论所必需的，还必须与盟友和对手交流该政策的意义 - 同样重要的是要消除有关谣言和误解的内容该政策不是。
Nuclear transparency is not just about pleasing the arms controllers – it is important for national security.
因此，这里有一些关于其他核武国家应该（或可以）透露其核武库的想法 - 不要披露一切，而是要改善有关核武器作用的沟通，并避免误解和适得其反的惊喜：
俄罗斯应该发布：
- 完整的新开始汇总数据编号（这些数字已经与美国共享，它发布了自己的数字）
– Size and history of overall nuclear weapons stockpile
– Number of history of nuclear warhead dismantlement (has made statements about percentage reductions since 1991 but not disclosed numbers or history)
– Basic overview of which nuclear forces are nuclear-capable (has made some statements about strategic forces but not shorter-range forces)
– Plans for future years force levels of long-range nuclear forces (has made occasional statements about modernizations but no detailed plan)
– Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
China should publish:
- 整体核武器的规模和历史库存（2004年指出，它拥有核武器国家中最小的武器库，但尚未披露数字或历史）
– Basic overview of its nuclear-capable forces
– Plans for future years force levels of long-range nuclear forces
– Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
France should publish:
- 整体核武器的历史库存(has disclosed the size of its nuclear stockpile in 2008 and 2015 (300 weapons), but not the history)
- 拆除核弹头的数量和历史（已宣布某些类型的拆除，但不是历史）
（法国已经披露了其整体力量结构，每年都会发布一些核预算信息。）
英国应发表：
- 整体核武器的历史库存(has declared some approximate historic numbers, declared the approximate size in 2010 (no more than 225), and has declared plan for mid-2020s (no more than 180), but has not disclosed history)
– Number and history of nuclear warhead dismantlement (has announced dismantlement of systems but not numbers or history)
（英国已经发布了有关其核力量结构规模和核预算的一部分的信息。）
Pakistan should publish:
- 整体核武器的历史库存
– Basic overview of nuclear-capable forces (occasionally declares that a missile test involves nuclear-capable weapon)
- 未来几年力量长期核力量的计划
– Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
India should publish:
- 整体核武器的历史库存
– Basic overview of nuclear-capable forces (occasionally declares that a missile test involves nuclear-capable weapon)
- 未来几年力量长期核力量的计划
– Overall status and out-year budgets for nuclear weapons and nuclear forces
Israel should publish:
……还是应该？与其他核武国家不同，以色列没有公开确认它具有核武库，并表示它不会是第一个在中东引入核武器的人。有人认为以色列不应确认或宣布任何事情，因为担心会触发其他中东国家的核武器计划。
另一方面，正如美国解密的政府文件所记载的，以色列核武库的存在是其他国家众所周知的。官方确认将在政治上敏感，但本身不会改变该地区的国家安全。此外，保密性促进了猜测，夸张，指控和最坏的计划。而且很难看到中东核武器的未来如何在没有一定程度的官方披露的情况下解决和解决。
North Korea should publish:
好吧，显然，这个核武的国家有些不同（略微说明），因为它巨大的核威胁和陈述及其领导力本身的性质使得很难相信任何官方信息。也许在这种情况下，更多地了解外国情报机构对朝鲜核武库的了解更为有价值。然而，官方披露有可能作为与朝鲜达成未来的退休协议的一部分的重要作用。
附加信息：
世界核力量的地位链接到有关单个核武国家的更多信息。
“核武器Base Visits: Accident and Incident Exercises as Confidence-Building Measures简报:“非战略研讨会核Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 27-28 March 2014.
“核弹头库存和透明度（与罗伯特·诺里斯（Robert Norris）一起），《 2013年全球裂变材料报告》，国际裂变材料小组，2013年10月，第50-58页。
新的土地基金会和植物基金会的赠款使该出版物的研究成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。
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