概括
- Prior to assuming office, President Biden indicated that he would establish that “the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate for—a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies.”
- 唯一的目的应被理解为综合威慑策略的核心组成部分,该战略可以有效地管理有限冲突中的核升级风险以及无核武器的稳定风险上升。
- 唯一的目的可能会大大降低意外升级的风险,并在一系列重要的意外情况下提高更灵活和现实的无核反应选择的信誉。
- In order to attain its intended benefits, declaratory policy must be reflected in force structure and planning.
- 总统现有的关于唯一目的的语言为政府定义该学说提供了相当大的灵活性,但本身并不能为战略,力量结构或相关宣告性政策提供明确的指导,例如“不首次使用”。
- 定义唯一目的是政府的国防政策审查的关键任务。
- 作为一项综合国防政策的核心组成部分,该政策将加强美国的威慑和保证信誉,应在NDS的水平上定义唯一的目的。
- 唯一的类型定义将美国的州States would consider nuclear use in response to a certain type of attack, having modest effects on a narrow set of plans but few effects on force structure.
- 唯一的函数定义将定义什么是威慑的是什么,什么不是威慑的要求,有可能消除核武器的某些战略或非战略作用。
根据其定义的定义,唯一的目的可能对核武器政策的几乎每个方面或相对适度的影响都具有变革性影响。它可以容纳或合并一系列相关的政策选择,例如仅威慑姿势或不首次使用。
- Fully implementing a sole purpose policy is critical to attaining its benefits.
- 一个简单的声明声明不是一个完整的唯一目的政策。由于任何声明都可能是模棱两可的,因此唯一的目的也应包括一组总统指令,这些指令决定该政策将如何影响力结构和计划。
- By eliminating one or more of the requirements that structure US nuclear forces, a sole function definition could potentially have significant effects on a range acquisition decisions and plans.
- If the president concludes that sole purpose has implications for force structure or force posture, the administration should ensure that these changes are made before the presidential term is concluded.
- 在决定采用唯一目的的决定之后,民用官员应审查现有的运营计划和概念,以确保他们与总统对与核武器对手的冲突的升级指南相提并论。
- Embedding the policy in plans, force structure, and allied consultations is critical to achieving its benefits and reducing the risk that it is reversed by a future president, which would be highly risky.
- If defined, implemented, and communicated as a part of an effective integrated deterrence posture, sole purpose could strengthen assurance of allies.
- 可以理解,一些盟友将对当前环境中的美国核武器政策发生任何转变感到担忧。
- 应随着唯一目的的定义,在发布时和实施时,应密切咨询盟友。
2021年1月,拜登总统在做出明确的承诺以减少核武器在美国国家安全战略中的作用后担任职务。比约瑟夫·拜登(Bjoseph R. Biden)在对竞选外交政策的主要表达中,“为什么美国必须再次领导:在特朗普之后拯救美国外交政策”,外交事务99 (2020): 64.iden declared that “the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack.”1自任职以来,拜登(Biden)并没有重复承诺,尽管他的最初的国家安全指导和他的国务卿重申了减少对核武器依赖的目标。2随着五角大楼开始对核武器政策进行审查,拜登和他的国家安全官员将必须确定是否采用唯一目的,如果是的,则意味着什么。唯一目的的既定语言为政府提供了相当大的纬度,以减少对核武器的依赖。根据唯一目的的定义和实施方式,它可能对核力量结构和战略产生变革性的后果,或者最终可能是几乎没有实际影响的修辞承诺。
尽管该语言可以追溯到几十年来,但从来没有对唯一目的的确切或商定的定义。该词组的首次发表是在阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦(Albert EinsteinAtlantic1947年,爱因斯坦(Einstein)辩称,尽管美国必须储存炸弹,但它应该放弃其使用。“威慑应该是炸弹库存的唯一目的。”如果正如杜鲁门总统提出的那样,联合国被授予国际对原子能的控制,那么“应该是为了阻止侵略者或叛逆国家发动原子袭击的唯一目的。3由于这个想法在1960年代得到了普及,因此唯一的目的已成为有关核武器作用的持续辩论的持续主题,但它很少与确切的定义或实施它的计划有关。
Sole purpose is more ambiguous than other declaratory policy proposals (such as no first use) because it purports to define, or constrain, the purpose of nuclear weapons. Depending on how the terms of the statement are defined and how the statement is implemented in practice, its effects could be broad, narrow, restrictive, permissive, or ambiguous. For example, President Biden’s sole purpose language could be construed to proscribe nuclear weapons from performing a wide range of functions or from being used in wide ranges of contingencies. Slight variations in the wording of a sole purpose declaration can produce dramatically different policies and be perceived differently by allies and adversaries, who will examine the policy closely. Depending on how sole purpose is defined and implemented, sole could reduce or eliminate requirements for each piece of the triad or for nuclear use in a variety of different contingency plans.
唯一的目的是声明政策中的一种潜在选择,即核武器政策的一方面,公开传达了美国何时以及为什么考虑使用核武器。它可以与或可以包含一系列其他潜在的声明政策选择。由于总统拥有命令使用核武器的唯一权力,因此只有总统才能对该权力设定限制。尽管声明性政策的变化应考虑平民国家安全官员,统一的军事官员,国会议员,美国盟友和美国公众的观点,但总统应就如何修改美国宣传政策提供明确的指导。像所有总统一样,拜登总统应向官员们提供有关核声明政策的官员的明确指导。
Because sole purpose could potentially be defined in many different ways, some definitions will be better or worse. Advocates or opponents should be clear about what constitutes a better or worse definition. The administration should not accept the argument that a good definition is one that preserves existing force structure or plans, maintains ambiguity for its own sake, or comports with the preferences of certain allies or services. This piece argues that a good definition of sole purpose is one that assists with the development and implementation of a credible, integrated posture by which the United States and its allies deter aggression and nuclear use; reflects the president’s preferences about how to manage escalation in limited conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries as well as his assessment of the requirements of deterring a major strategic attack; reduces the risk of misperception and adversary nuclear first use incentives; and can be implemented in force structure and plans so that it is resilient to leadership changes in the United States. Because the president has expressed a preference to reduce the nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons, a good definition of sole purpose should help to do so in ways consistent with his preferences.
本文研究了为定义唯一目的并减少对核武器的依赖的官员可用的选择范围。它探讨了唯一目的定义的不同定义的实际含义,以及确保它们以负责,有效且最有可能持续时间的方式实施所需的步骤。有两个核心论点。首先,唯一目的不应理解为核声明政策,而应是综合威慑战略中的关键组成部分。以这种方式理解,唯一的目的不仅是降低核升级风险和达到美国对减少对核武器依赖的承诺的宝贵手段与核武器对手的有限冲突。其次,有效的唯一目的政策不能简单地成为核声明政策段落中的句子。If the administration is serious about attaining the benefits of sole purpose, the policy should be comprised of the declaratory statement, additional language to clarify and contextualize the policy, and a set of directives that communicate the president’s guidance for how the policy should affect force structure and plans.
这些论点中的每一个对于获得唯一目的的好处和维持有效的威慑姿势至关重要。在任何情况下,唯一的目的都是一个有争议的想法。可以理解的是,盟军政府,当前核武器政策的各个方面的拥护者以及政治反对者对总统的陈述关注。明确定义政策,表达如何加强综合威慑政策,并继续执行,将有助于说服盟友和许多威慑专家,这些专家唯一目的将增加而不是降低威慑信誉。
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