NNSA Nuclear Plan Shows More Weapons, Increasing Costs, Less Transparency
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) new库存管理与管理计划（SSMP）doubles the number of new nuclear warhead programs compared with theprevious plan from 2019。The plan shows nuclear weapons advocates taking full advantage of the Trump administration to boost nuclear weapon programs.
The new plan also shows significantly increasing nuclear weapons costs projected for the next two decades. These additional costs reflect the steadily growing ambitions of the nuclear modernization programs in response to the embrace of the Great Power Competition strategy articulated in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review.
Moreover, the 2020 SSMP significantly reduces the information available to the public about NNSA’s nuclear weapons activities by cutting by nearly half the size of the public version of the plan and omitting information that used to be included in previous SSMP reports.
More Nuclear Weapons
The new NNSA report doubles the number of new nuclear weapons modernization programs compared with the previous SSMP plan from 2019. This includes the recently reported W93 navy warhead, a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, and two future warheads that appear to be derived from what was previously called the Reliable Replacement Warheads. “In addition to these warheads,” the SSMP states, “a replacement air-delivered warhead and submarine-launched warhead (for the W76-1/2) will be needed in the 2040s.” Some of these future warheads were indicated in theDOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook, which was published earlier this year.
The 2020 NNSA plan lists twice as many new nuclear weapons as the previous plan from 2019. Click on figure to view full size.
海军4的6个新弹头。的玩家rst of these is the new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) advocated by the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. Congress has funded a study for this weapon and NNSA plans to begin production in 2029, but it remains to be seen if the new Biden administration will continue it. If so, the missile might be equipped with a modified W80 cruise missile warhead (perhaps a W80-5 modification) for deployment on Virginia-class attack submarines.
The second navy warhead is the W93, which wasannounced由NNSA在2月。重要的是，W93没有被列为替代W76或W88弹头的替代品，这些弹头被列出，这些弹头被另外两个弹头代替，而是补充。这符合描述navy’s talking pointson the new warhead.
第三枚海军弹头是弹头发射的潜艇（SLW），以取代W76-1和W76-2。这表明SLW可能具有灵活的收益率设置，以涵盖W76-1的中/高收益任务和W76-2的低收益任务，或者它们将产生两个产量版本，或W76-2任务将简单地掉下来。
第四枚海军弹头是未来战略海上的弹头（FSSW），被列为W88的替代者，W88是最高的弹道导弹弹头，目前正在ALT 370计划下延长生命。
新NNSA计划中列出的六个新核武器计划中有四个是针对美国海军的。（图片：美国海军）
The ICBM force gets one new warhead – known as Future Strategic Land-Based Warhead (FSLW) – to replace the W87. It is unclear from the SSMP if the if the new warhead is intended to replace both versions of the W87 or only the W87-0. The W87-1 will still have a lot of life left in it in the 2040s, so it probably initially means replacing the W87-0. If it replaces both, then the ICBM force would go to a single warhead instead of the two currently arming it.
轰炸机获得了一种新武器，被称为未来的空运弹头（FAW）。该武器以前被称为B61-13。该武器是B61-12的后续武器，该武器将在2021年末开始从投影线滚下来。
新的弹头焦点似乎通过从现有的弹头的简单寿命延伸，而是根据具有重大修改甚至具有新军事能力的新设计生产武器，从而延续了这种趋势，从而逐渐破坏了冷战后的战争方法。2018年的核姿势审查消除了2010年对具有新军事能力的新弹头的核姿势审查中的限制。取而代之的是，2020年SSMP更公开地证明了新要求的合理性，以便能够以“增强的军事能力”和“响应增加威胁的威胁”来快速设计和生产新的核武器。
The W93, for example, will “address the changing strategic environment” and “improve…flexibility to address future threats,” according to the SSMP. And the new future ballistic missile warheads will “support threats anticipated in 2030 and beyond.” Likewise, part of the justification to increase warhead pit production capacity to at least 80 pits per year is “Renewed competition among global powers that may lead to changes in deterrent requirements.”
Growing Costs
Underpinning all of these nuclear weapons maintenance and modernization plans is a sprawling nuclear weapons complex that is scheduled to increase significantly with new bomb-making factories and support facilities. This includes boosting the warhead pit production capacity at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and adding a second pit production factory at the Savannah River Site to produce no fewer than 80 new pits per year by 2030. The new pits will feed the W87-1 production and the new future warheads.
The NNSA budget began to increase during the Obama administration and the Trump administration has increased it significantly since and is提议在2021财年预算中额外增长19％。
The trend is that warhead modernization programs are becoming more and more expensive. The current LEPs are twice as expensive as the W76-1 LEP, and the new warheads in the SSMP are projected to cost three-and-a-half times that amount (see figure below). Once the programs get underway, the early estimates will likely prove to be too low. The reason for this dramatic increase is that the nuclear laboratories and the military add more and more bells and whistles and new components to more advanced warhead designs that increase complexity and cost.
核弹头现代化越来越昂贵。
The 2020 SSMP shows increased costs for nuclear weapons life-extensions compared with the previous SSMP (in then-year dollars). A rough comparison of the two reports shows that the cost bow wave peak in 2030 is about $600 million higher than projected last year, the early phase of the bow wave increases faster and sooner, and the future costs are leveling off later and higher than projected in the 2019 report (see figure below).
NNSA cost projection for warhead life-extension programs is increasing. Click on figure to view full size.
同样,成本预估总武器ctivities in the 2020 SSMP shows a significant increase across the board. The peak projected for the early-2040s has increased by approximately $8 billion, the increase in the early 2020s has increased by more than $3 billion, and the annual cost increase is growing faster than projected in the 2019 SSMP.
NNSA projections for weapons activities are increasing and faster. Click image to view full size.
Reducing Nuclear Transparency
2020年SSMP大大减少了向公众提供的核武器信息。与2019 SSMP相反，新报告不是完整的报告，而是计划摘要。它的规模仅是2019 SSMP的一半（192页与364页）。以前提供的重要信息根本不包括在内，也不大大减少。
省略信息的一个例子是美国的核武器库存，新报告完全缺少。2019年的SSMP包括一张图表，显示了库存的历史和大小和库存弹头的平均年龄。遗漏库存数据与特朗普政府的拒绝解密过去两年中的库存数据。
The new NNSA plan no longer includes nuclear weapons stockpile data. Click on image to view full size.
省略信息的另一个示例是有关弹头维持活动的数据。2019年的SSMP包括两个图表，这些图表显示了每个弹头的此类活动数量以及维持测试的总数。这些信息不包括在2020年版中。
Stockpile evaluation data has been removed from the NNSA plan. Click on figure to view full size.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) deserves credit for publishing the 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP). Other nuclear-armed states should follow the example to increase transparency of their nuclear weapons activities to avoid misunderstandings, reduce worst-case planning, and increase trust. That said, the new SSMP shows some concerning trends.
首先，该计划显示了一项核现代化计划，该计划远远超出了现有的核武器的现代化，即增加核武器的类型以及将来的数量，并增强其军事能力，这是与其他核武器国家竞争的一部分。
其次，该计划显示了核武器现代化计划，其中成本不仅在增加，而且更快。该计划表明，NNSA预计未来几年需要大量额外资金。纳税人的成本增加是在美国经济在19009年大流行的压力下屈服的时候。核现代化成本与其他高优先级计划的资金竞争。
Third, the NNSA plan continues a worrisome trend of increased secrecy by significantly reducing the type and amount of information previously made available in SSMP reports about nuclear modernization programs and activities. This reduces the public’s ability to monitor government programs, ask questions, and make informed decisions.
The 2020 SSMP is a timely reminder that the incoming Biden administration must trim and adjust the nuclear weapons modernization program to make it more affordable, sustainable, and justifiable. It must do so in a way that safeguards US national security and that of its allies while reducing international tension and military competition. Some adjustments can be unilateral, others bilateral, while some will require broader international cooperation.
Background information:
2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary
FAS Nuclear Notebook:US nuclear forces, 2020
This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
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