一项新的空军环境评估表明，它考虑了基于地下铁路隧道中的洲际弹道导弹或可能在水下。
空军2022年7月评估中包含的洲际弹道导弹导弹田的地图。
7月1日，空军发表了环境影响声明草案（EIS）其提议的ICBM替代计划（以前称为基于地面的战略威慑（GBSD），现在以其新名称“ Sentinel”。每当联邦计划可能会破坏当地水供应，运输，社会经济学，地质，空气质量和其他相关因素时，政府通常会进行EIS。
鉴于前哨计划的巨大规模，当然是由目前在科罗拉多州，蒙大拿州，内布拉斯加州，北达科他州，北达科他州，北达科他州部署的所有400枚Minuteman III导弹的替代品，肯定需要进行全面的环境评估。以及怀俄明州，以及升级到发射设施，发射控制中心和其他支持基础设施。
空军2022年7月的GBSD环境影响声明的封面。
The Draft EIS was anxiously awaited by local stakeholders, chambers of commerce, contractors, residents, and…me呢并不是因为我对哨兵的建设是否会打扰怀俄明州的西部大黄蜂（尽管也许我应该！），而是因为EIS也是多汁（且通常是新的联邦计划的细节）的精彩存储库，而Sentinel的EIS草案当然也不例外。
有趣的是，最令人兴奋的新细节不一定是空军目前正在为哨兵计划的计划，而是关于他们的ICBM替换选择之前视为替代当前的程序of record. These alternatives were assessed during in the Air Force’s 2014 Analysis of Alternatives––a key document that weighs the risks and benefits of each proposed action––however, that document remains classified. Therefore, until they were recently referenced in the July 2022 Draft EIS, it was not clear to the public what the Air Force was actually assessing as alternatives to the current Sentinel program.
导弹替代品
The Draft EIS notes that the Air Force assessed four potential missile alternatives to the current plan, which involves designing a completely new ICBM:
- Reproducing Minuteman III ICBMs通过清洗和重新填充第一阶段和第二阶段的火箭助推器来“现有规格”；再制造第三阶段和推进系统火箭发动机 - 洲际弹道导弹的后车辆；并翻新和替换所有其他子系统；
空军似乎最终从考虑中消除了所有这些选择，因为它们不符合其所有“选择标准”，其中包括可持续性，绩效，安全性，安全性，风险和能力纳入现有或拟议的基础设施的能力等标准。
Of particular interest, however, is the Air Force’s note that the Minuteman III reproduction alternative was eliminated in part because it did not “meet the required performance criteria for ICBMs in the context of modern and evolving threats (e.g., range, payload, and effectiveness.” It is highly significant to state that the Minuteman III cannot meet the required performance criteria for ICBMs, given that the Minuteman IIIcurrentlyperforms the ICBM role for the US Air Force and will continue to do so for the next decade.
该声明还表明，“现代和不断发展的威胁”推动了对运营改善的ICBM的需求。但是，目前尚不清楚空军的意思是什么，或者这些威胁一定会证明具有新功能的全新ICBM是合理的。正如我在2021年3月的报告中所写的那样，孤立的思考：仔细观察地面的战略威慑,”
“关于以美国为中心的核威慑，自冷战结束以来发生了什么变化？中国正在缓慢但正在稳步扩大其核武库和交付系统的套件，朝鲜的核武器计划继续成熟。但是，如果他们针对中国或朝鲜的目标，则美国国际洲政府部队的范围和部署地点将迫使导弹飞越俄罗斯领土，从而大大增加了使用ICBMS来针对任何国家的风险。此外，可以使用美国核力量的其他要素（尤其是SSBN），可以用来在修订后的核力量姿势下完成ICBM部队的任务，甚至更快，更灵活。[…]
另外，重要的是要注意，即使对抗导弹的防御能力得到显着改善，逃避导弹防御的能力在于有效载荷，而不是导弹本身。当对手的拦截器能够在其中途飞行阶段与美国洲际弹道导弹交战时，洲际弹道导弹已经放弃了助推器，部署了其渗透艾滋病，仅由其再入车辆来指导。可以根据需要独立升级重新进入的车辆和导弹助推器，这意味着，对对抗导弹防御的任何担忧都可以通过在延长生命的民兵III ICBM上部署更高级的有效载荷来减轻。”
Of additional interest is the passage explaining why the Air Force dismissed the possibility of using the Trident II D5 SLBM as a land-based weapon:
“The D5 is a high-accuracy weapon system capable of engaging many targets simultaneously with overall functionality approaching that of land- based missiles. The D5 represents an existing technology, and substantial design and development cost savings would be realized; but the associated savings would not appreciably offset the infrastructure investment requirements (road and bridge enhancements) necessary to make it a land-based weapon system. In addition, motor performance and explosive safety concerns undermine the feasibility of using the D5 as a land-based weapon system.”
空军对道路和桥梁质量的关注可能是有道理的 - 徒们非常沉重，美国的桥梁是falling apartat aterrifying rate. However, it is unclear why the Air Force is not confident about the D5’s motor performance, given that even aging Trident SLBMs have performed very well in recent flight tests: in 2015 the Navyconducteda successful Trident flight test using “the oldest 1st stage solid rocket motor flown to date” (over 26 years old), with 2nd and 3rd stage motors that were 22 years old. In January 2021, Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe Jr.––the Navy’s Director for Strategic Systems Programs––评论那个坚实的火箭电动机，我们可以延长一段时间的那些年龄，我们非常了解这一点。”这主要是由于海军的incorporationof nondestructive testing techniques––which involve sending a probe into the bore to measure the elasticity of the propellant––to evaluate the reliability of their missiles.
As a result, the Navy is not currently contemplating the purchase of a brand-new missile to replace its current arsenal of Trident SLBMs, and instead plans to conduct a second life-extension to keep them in service until 2084. However, the Air Force’s comments suggest either a lack of confidence in this approach, or perhaps an institutional preference towards developing an entirely new missile system.[注意：艾米·伍尔夫（Amy Woolf）提供了帮助另一个可能的解释，鉴于这些截然不同的发射条件可能会对导弹系统本身施加更大的压力，因此空军的担忧可能与三叉戟SLBM冷发射系统有效执行的能力有关。]
基于替代方案
The Draft EIS also notes that the Air Force assessed two fascinating––and somewhat familiar––alternatives for basing the new missiles: in地下隧道并在深湖筒仓。”
隧道选项 -取笑在以前的程序化文件中，但从未详细解释过 - 将包括“定位，设计，挖掘，开发，开发和安装关键的支持基础设施，例如铁路系统和[发射设施]，以供一系列可能跨越数百英里的地下隧道”- 这实际上是冷战后期的两个概念的混搭。
The rail concept was strongly considered during the development of the MX missile in the 1980s, although the plan called for missile trains to be分散onto the country’s existing civilian rail network, rather than into newly-built underground tunnels. Both the rail and tunnel concepts were referenced in one of my favourite Pentagon reports––a December 1980 Pentagon study called “ICBM基础选项”，它考虑了30个不同且经常奇异的ICBM基础选项，包括烟斗，驳船，水上飞机，甚至是气垫船！
Illustrations of “Commercial Rail” concept from 1980 Pentagon report, “ICBM Basing Options.”
在1980年12月的研究中也提到了深湖筒仓中的第二种选择 - 跨陆克舰中的洲际弹道导弹。这个概念 - 名称为“ hydra” - 提出了使用浮动筒仓在海洋上分散导弹，“只有导弹前端的不显眼部分[在表面上方可见）。有趣的是，鉴于导弹将在水下，这提出了一个理论上的问题，即空军是否仍将对ICBM任务保持控制。
1980年五角大楼报告的“ Hydra”概念的例证，“ ICBM基础选项”。
When considering alternative basing modes for the Sentinel ICBM, the Air Force eliminated both concepts due to cost prohibitions, and, in the case of underwater basing, a lack of confidence that the missiles would be safe and secure. This concern was also floated in the 1980 study as well, with the Pentagon acknowledging the likelihood that US adversaries and non-state actors “would also be engaged in a hunt for the Hydras. Not under our direct control, any missile can be destroyed or towed away (stolen) at leisure.”
Another potential option?
除了揭示有关前哨计划替代方案的这些迷人的细节外，EIS草案还强调了公众评论，表明“最负责任的选择”将只是减少了民兵III库存。
空军拒绝了该评论，因为它说“法律要求加速基于地面的战略威慑计划的发展，采购和野外；”但是，公众评论者的建议无疑是合理的。目前的400次部署洲际弹道导弹的力量不是 - 从来没有 - 从来没有一个魔术数字，并且由于各种原因，它可以进一步降低，包括与安全，经济学有关的原因或善意努力，以减少部署的部署美国核力量。特别是，正如乔治·珀科维奇（George Perkovich）和普拉纳·瓦迪（Pranay Vaddi）在2021年的卡内基国际和平捐赠中写的那样report, “This assumption that the ICBM force would not be eliminated or reduced before 2075 is difficult to reconcile with U.S. disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
The security environment of the 21st century is already very different than that of the previous century. The greatest threats to Americans’ collective safety are non-militarized, global phenomena like climate change, domestic unrest and inequality, and public health crises. Andrecent polling efforts通过反思媒体,忧思科学家联盟s, and the Federation of American Scientists suggest that Americans overwhelmingly want the government to invest in more proximate social issues, rather than on nuclear weapons. To that end, rather than considering building new missile tunnels, it would likely be much more domestically popular to spend money on domestic priorities––perhaps新的地铁隧道？
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背景信息：
- “孤立的思考：仔细观察地面战略威慑力量，”美国科学家联合会（2021年3月）
- “环境评估揭示了有关空军洲际弹道导弹替代计划的新细节。”美国科学家联合会(Nov. 2020)
- ICBM Information Project, Federation of American Scientists
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