British Defense Review Ends Nuclear Reductions Era
[文章于2021年5月11日更新] The United Kingdomannounced yesterday它已经决定放弃之前的计划reduce it nuclear weapons stockpile to 180 by the mid-2020s and instead “move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”
该决定使英国成为自冷战结束以来，英国首个增加其核武器储存的西方核武器国家。就数量而言，它将英国带回了2000年代初期的库存规模。更改是“转变为安全和威慑的更强大立场的一部分”。
The Review also decided that Britain will “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.” This counterproductive decision follows the earlier decision of the Trump administration to保留核库存数字秘密. By embracing nuclear secrecy, Britain effectively abdicates its ability to criticize Chinese or Russian secrecy about their nuclear arsenals.
决定增加未来库存规模的决定，并可能在英国潜艇上部署更多的弹头 - 只是核武国家激发核武器竞赛并逆转减少世界核武库的进步的最新例子。
The British Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
英国政府从未分解其核武器库存的历史。取而代之的是，它偶尔发表文档或发表的陈述，这些文档给出了总体数字或百分比。政府在2010年宣布，它的弹头将不超过225弹头，后来限制将减少到2020年代中期。尚不清楚这些大约45颗弹头的减少距离已经发展了多远。如果在整个15年中均匀分布，那么到现在，这个数字可能已经略低于200。但这是非常不确定的this articlewe conclude thatthe stockpile did not drop below the 225 ceiling set in 2010 and remains at that level today). The following graph is illustrative and based on previous statements and documents.
注意：此图已更新。英国核武器库存的历史仍被分类，因此提供了该图用于说明目的。单击图表以查看全尺寸。
The timeline for the new stockpile limit of 260 warheads is not entirely clear but appears to be during the 2020s. The Review reflects an assessment out to 2030 but “establishes the Government’s overarching national security and international policy objectives, with priority actions, to 2025.”
The wording of the new warhead level is vague. The Review sets the number at “no more than 260 warheads.” The British government has subsequentlyexplainedthe “260 figure is a ceiling, not a target.” Political damage control is probably part of that statement, but the number could potentially be somewhat lower – or it could be about 260.
Not all of the stockpiled warheads are deployed. The majority is called “operationally available,” which means they’re onboard three of the four SSBNs or can be loaded fairly quickly. The rest are a reserve as spares or undergoing maintenance.Since 2015，“可用的弹头”数量约为120，其中部署在海上单个SSBN上的数量已减少到40。
以前的国防审查不太可能，综合审查不包括有关将有多少库存的弹头可用的任何信息，在部署的潜艇上加载了多少，或者在任何给定时间都将在海上有多少潜艇。这是英国核透明度的退后一步。但是，根据先前政府的陈述，约翰逊姿势下的可用弹头数量可能最终与布莱尔政府期间的弹头相似：也许接近160枚弹头。
不属于“操作上可用”的储存的弹头可能存储在苏格兰的Faslane潜艇基地的Coulport弹药仓库中（请参见下图）。经过维护或升级到MK4A Aeroshell的弹头可能存储在Awe Burghfield或伦敦以西的Awe Aldermaston。退休的弹头被运送到伯格菲尔德进行拆除和处置。
单击图像以查看全尺寸。
In 2013, the UK governmentdescribed the process: warheads “yet to be disassembled” are stored at Coulport or as “work in progress” at Burghfield. “A number of warheads identified in the [stockpile reduction] programme for reduction have been modified to render them unusable whilst others identified as no longer being required for service are currently stored and have not yet been disabled or modified.”
那些尚未“无法使用”的退休弹头很可能是现在增加库存的来源。英国没有能力迅速生产50-60枚新的弹头，因此它只是使弹头退休了。重建这些弹头可能可以在几年内完成。
Nuclear Strategy and Targeting
增加库存会影响英国弹道导弹潜艇的目标需求的程度还有待观察。但是审查指出，库存增加是响应“不断发展的安全环境，包括不断发展的技术和教义威胁”。
Russia is singled out as “the most acute direct threat to the UK” but the Review also contains what appears to be a subtle but clear nuclear threat against Iran (even though it doesn’t have nuclear weapons). After assuring the “UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT),” the Review adds: “This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.”
库存限制数量和上一次政府陈述中部署的弹头之间的差异表明，最有可能增加的260枚弹头的库存限制也会导致弹头可用的弹头数量增加，并可能增加潜艇上的弹头数量。部署的弹头数量增加意味着瞄准点数量增加。美国与英国分享战略战争计划的详细信息，以支持北约。
In 1998, there were fewer than 200 operationally available warheads. In 2007, that category was reduced to 160 warheads, of which 48 were onboard the submarine at sea. In 2015, that category was reduced to 120 warheads, of which 40 were onboard the single submarine on patrol. The Review states that “at least one [submarine] will always be on a Continuous At Sea Deterrent patrol” (CASD) “at several days’ notice to fire…to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction.”
Perhaps the increased stockpile is intended to facilitate increased targeting of Russia. Perhaps it broadens targeting to other potential adversaries (China, Iran). Perhaps it increases targeting of non-nuclear strategic threats. Perhaps it’s a combination.
The US Connection
现在，英国宣布增加其库存的消息尤其敏感，因为它可以使新的拜登政府即将上映的核姿势审查。鉴于俄罗斯和中国的核发展，拜登似乎已经不太可能比以前计划的更多地减少美国的库存。但是，美国的核支持者必须为之欣喜。英国公告使拜登政府在政治上尴尬地减少。
英国没有自己的弹道导弹，但租赁了美国三叉戟II D5导弹。英国SSBN在卡纳维拉尔港（Port Canaveral）提供服务后，在佛罗里达州进行试飞。
The current British warhead, known as the Holbrook, is thought to closely resemble the U.S. W76-0. The British warhead is so similar that it is part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s “W76 Needs”maintenance schedule. The Holbrook warhead is currently being backfitted with the new Mk4A aeroshell with enhanced targeting capability. Increasing the stockpile presumably will require buying additional Mk4A aeroshells from the United States.
But the Holbrook is getting old, so British officials have been busy lobbying the U.S. government about moving forward with its proposed new W93/Mk7 warhead, which will also form part of Britain’s next warhead design. Although a U.S. defense official hasdescribedthe two programs as “two independent, development systems,” a British defense official subsequentlyexplainedthat although they are “not exactly the same warhead…there is a very close connection in design terms and production terms.” Like the Holbrook, which is contained in the U.S. produced Mk4A reentry body, the new British warhead will be contained in the U.S. produced Mk7 reentry body.
It sounds like we can look forward to another 30 years of discussion about how independent the British deterrent is.
The NPT Context
The decision to increase the nuclear weapons stockpile strongly conflicts with the role Britain has played in nuclear disarmament efforts and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime over the past three decades. All those efforts have been about减少arsenals. The Review breaks with that legacy.
Nonetheless, the Review reiterates long-held British support for the NPT: “We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We continue to work for the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures, taking into account the prevailing security environment. We are strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament…” In fact, the commitment to NPT as an instrument for disarmament is so singular that the Review states that “there is no credible alternative route to nuclear disarmament.”
Although NPT’s Article VI does not explicitly prohibit Britain from increasing its nuclear stockpile, it obligates Britain to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
Increasing the stockpile in response to Russia and other threats certainly seems to conflict with the goal of ending the nuclear arms race. Instead, it seems to embrace a race.
Moreover, British governments have explicitly linked stockpile reductions to its “obligations under Article six.” In 2015, for example, the U.K. delegation to the NPT Review Conferencestatedthat the “United Kingdom remains firmly committed to step-by-step disarmament, and our obligations under Article Six. We announced in January that we have reduced the number of warheads on each of our deployed ballistic missile submarines from 48 to 40, and the number of operational missiles on each of those submarines to no more than eight.”
The decision toincreasethe stockpile clearly contradicts those assurances and obligations. That, and the decision to reduce nuclear transparency, will make it less credible for British diplomats to criticize Russia and China for increasing their stockpiles and hiding behind nuclear secrecy. It might also weaken Britain’s ability to appeal to Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.
结论:约翰逊把Trumpie, will boost Britains nuclear profile but do little to reduce nuclear dangers.
Additional information:英国核武器，2021年
This publication was made possible by generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
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