On 2022年10月27日，拜登政府终于发布了其长期延迟的未分类版本Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)。机密NPR被释放给国会March 2022, but its publication was substantially delayed––likely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
与以前的NPR相比，语调和内容最接近奥巴马政府从2010年开始。但是，由于俄罗斯和中国的发展，它包含了重大调整。（（另请参阅我们的全球核武库概述)
尽管俄罗斯提出的挑战和太极拳na, the NPR correctly resists efforts by defense hawks and nuclear lobbyists to add nuclear weapons to the U.S. arsenal and delay the retirement of older types. Instead, the NPR seeks to respond with adjustments in the existing force posture and increase integration of conventional and nuclear planning.
Although Joe Biden during his presidential election campaign spoke strongly in favor of adopting no-first-use and sole-purpose policies, the NPR explicitly rejects both for now.
从武器控制和降低风险的角度来看，NPR令人失望。以前的努力减少核武库以及核武器发挥作用的作用已被国外的战略竞争和国防鹰队在国内的反对派所征服。
即便如此，NPR得出的结论是，仍然有可能减少核武器在核用途可能不可信的情况下的作用。
与以前的NPR不同，2022年版嵌入National Defense Strategydocument alongside the Missile Defense Review.
以下是我们对NPR主要部分的摘要和分析：
核对手
NPR确定了美国核武器计划的四个潜在对手：俄罗斯，中国，朝鲜和伊朗。其中，俄罗斯和中国显然是重点，因为俄罗斯的大型武器库和侵略性行为以及中国迅速增加的武器库。NPR预测：“在2030年代，美国将在其历史上首次面对两个主要的核力量，成为战略竞争对手和潜在的对手。”这回应了美国高级军事领导人的先前声明，包括former和incomingCommanders of US Strategic Command although the NPR appears less “the sky is falling.”
中国：鉴于国防战略主要集中在中国，因此NPR宣布中国是“美国国防计划的整体节奏挑战，并且是评估我们的核威慑力量的越来越多的因素”。
Echoing the findings of the previous year’sChina Military Power ReportNPR建议：“ PRC可能打算在十年末至少拥有1,000枚可交付的弹头。”根据NPR的说法，中国更多样化的核武库“可以在危机或冲突期间和冲突期间为中国提供新的选择，以将核武器用于强制性目的，包括对该地区的美国盟友和合作伙伴的军事挑衅。”
俄罗斯：The NPR presents harsh language about Russia, in particular surrounding its behavior around the invasion of Ukraine. In contrast to the Trump administration’s NPR, the assumptions surrounding a potential low-yield “escalate-to-deescalate” policy have been toned down; instead the NPR simply states that Russia is diversifying its arsenal and that it views its nuclear weapons as “a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against [its] neighbors.”
该审查对俄罗斯非战略核武器的估计“最多2,000 - 与以前的军事声明相匹配。2021年，国防情报机构concluded那个俄罗斯”probably possesses 1,000 to 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads.” The State Department说2022年4月,估计包括退休weapons awaiting dismantlement. The subtle language differences reflect a variance in estimates between the different US military departments and agencies.
NPR还表明，“俄罗斯正在追求几种旨在使美国家园或盟友和合作伙伴处于危险之中的新型核能力系统，其中一些也不在新开始下负责。”鉴于两个都sidesappear to agree that Russia’s new Sarmat ICBM and Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle fit smoothly into the treaty, this statement is likely referring to Russia’s development of its Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, its Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and its Status-6 Poseidon nuclear torpedo.
It appears that Russia and the United States are at odds over whether these three systems are treaty-accountable weapons. In 2019, then-Under Secretary Andrea Thompsonnoted during国会证词这三个“符合美国构成“新型战略进攻武器”的标准，出于新起点的目的。”但是，俄罗斯官员此前曾发送过注意to the United States stating that they “find it inappropriate to characterize new weapons being developed by Russia that do not use ballistic trajectories of flight moving to a target as ‘potential new kinds of Russian strategic offensive arms.’ The arms presented by the President of the Russian Federation on March 1, 2018, have nothing to do with the strategic offensive arms categories covered by the Treaty.”
See also our Nuclear Notebook on Russian nuclear forces。
North Korea:近年来，朝鲜在美国国防辩论中被中国和俄罗斯掩盖了。尽管如此，NPR将朝鲜描述为美国核武器计划的目标。NPR直言不讳地说：“朝鲜对美国或其盟友和合作伙伴的任何核攻击都是不可接受的，将导致该政权结束。没有场景，金正日政权可以使用核武器并生存。”
See also our Nuclear Notebook on North Korean nuclear forces。
伊朗：NPR也描述了伊朗，即使它没有核武器。有趣的是，尽管伊朗不符合其不应该存的义务，因此不符合美国的负面安全保证，但NPR宣布，美国“依靠非核态度过分匹配来阻止伊朗的地区侵略拥有核武器。”
Nuclear Declaratory Policy
The NPR reaffirms long-standing U.S. policy about the role of nuclear weapons but with slightly modified language. The role is: 1) Deter strategic attacks, 2) Assure allies and partners, and 3) Achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.
NPR重申了2010年NPR的语言，即美国核武器的“基本作用”“是为了阻止核攻击”，仅在“极端情况”中。该战略旨在“维持核就业的高标准”，如果有必要就业核武器，“试图以最低的损害水平来结束对美国及其盟国及其盟友和合作伙伴的最佳损害水平的冲突。”
Deterring “strategic” attacks is a different formulation than the “deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack” language in the 2018 NPR, but the new NPR makes it clear that “strategic” also accounts for existing and emerging non-nuclear attacks: “nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks.”
Indeed, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear weapons can be used against the full spectrum of threats: “While the United States maintains a very high bar for the employment of nuclear weapons, our nuclear posture is intended to complicate an adversary’s entire decision calculus, including whether to instigate a crisis, initiate armed conflict, conduct strategic attacks using non-nuclear capabilities, or escalate to the use of nuclear weapons on any scale.”
During his presidential campaign, Joe Biden spoke repeatedlyin favor of美国核武器的无效和唯一用途的政策。但是NPR在当前条件下明确拒绝这两者。NPR的公开版本并没有解释为什么不可能采取禁止对核攻击的政策，但它似乎在一定程度上修剪了2018年NPR语言，即核武器对非核战略攻击的作用增强。在与盟友和合作伙伴协商时，既定的目标仍然是“朝着唯一的目的声明迈向唯一的目的声明”。
In that context the NPR reiterates previous “negative security assurances” that the United States “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”
NPR警告说：“对于所有其他州，仍然存在着狭窄的意外事件，在这种情况下，美国核武器仍可能在阻止对美国或其盟友和盟友和盟友战略作用的攻击中发挥作用。”这可能包括伊朗，朝鲜和巴基斯坦。
Interestingly, the NPR states that “hedging against an uncertain future” is no longer a stated (formal) role of nuclear weapons. Hedging has been part of a strategy to be able to react to changes in the threat environment, for example by deploying more weapons or modifying capabilities. The change does not mean that the United States is no longer hedging, but that hedging is part of managing the arsenal, rather than acting as a role for nuclear weapons within US military strategy writ large.
The NPR reaffirms, consistent with the 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy, that U.S. use of nuclear weapons must comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and that it is U.S. policy “not to purposely threaten civilian populations or objects, and the United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or objects in violation of LOAC.” That means that U.S. nuclear forces cannot attack cities本身（除非它们包含军事目标）。
Nuclear Force Structure
The NPR reaffirms a commitment to the modernization of its nuclear forces, nuclear command and control and communication systems (NC3), and production and support infrastructure. This is essentially the same nuclear modernization program that has been supported by the previous two administrations.
But there are some differences. The NPR also identifies “current and planned nuclear capabilities that are no longer required to meet our deterrence needs.” This includes retiring the B83-1 megaton gravity bomb and cancelling the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). These decisions were expected and survived opposition from defense hawks and nuclear lobbyists.
Although the NPR has decided to move forward with retirement of the B83-1 bomb due to increasing limitations on its capabilities and rising maintenance costs, the NPR appears to hint at a replacement weapon “for improved defeat” of hard and deeply buried targets. The new weapon is not identified.
The NPR concludes that “SLCM-N was no longer necessary given the deterrence contribution of the W76-2, uncertainty regarding whether SLCM-N on its own would provide leverage to negotiate arms control limits on Russia’s NSNW, and the estimated cost of SLCM-N in light of other nuclear modernization programs and defense priorities.” This language is more subtle than the administration’s recent陈述反驳国会为SLCM-N提供资金的企图，其中指出：
“The Administration strongly opposes continued funding for the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and its associated warhead. The President’s Nuclear PostureReview concluded that the SLCM-N, which would not be delivered before the 2030s, is unnecessary and potentially detrimental to other priorities. […] Further investment in developing SLCM-N would divert resources and focus from higher modernization priorities for the U.S. nuclear enterprise and infrastructure, which is already stretched to capacity after decades of deferred investments. It would also impose operational challenges on the Navy.
In justifying the cancelation of the SLCM-N, the NPR spells out the existing and future capabilities that adequately enable regional deterrence of Russia and China. This includes the W76-2 (the low-yield warhead for the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile proposed and deployed under the Trump administration), globally-deployed strategic bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and dual-capable fighter aircraft such as as the F-35A equipped with the new B61-12 nuclear bomb.
The NPR concludes that the W76-2 “currently provides an important means to deter limited nuclear use.” However, the review leaves the door open for its possible removal from the force structure in the future: “Its deterrence value will be re-evaluated as the F-35A and LRSO are fielded, and in light of the security environment and plausible deterrence scenarios we could face in the future.”
The review also notes that “[t]he United States will work with Allies concerned to ensure that the transition to modern DCA [dual-capable aircraft] and the B61-12 bomb is executed efficiently and with minimal disruption to readiness.” The release of the NPR coincides with the surpriserevelationthat the United States has sped up the deployment of the B61-12 in Europe. Previously scheduled for spring 2023, the first B61-12 gravity bombs will now be delivered in December 2022, likely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s nuclear belligerency. Given that the Biden administration has previously taken care to emphasize that its modernization program and nuclear exercises are scheduled years in advance and are not responses to Russia’s actions, it is odd that the administration would choose to rush the new bombs into Europe at this time.
The NPR appears to link the non-strategic nuclear posture in Europe more explicitly to recent Russian aggression. “Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has taken steps to ensure a modern, ready, and credible NATO nuclear deterrent.” While that is true, some of those steps were already underway before 2014 and would have happened even if Russia had not invaded Ukraine. This includesextensive modernizations at the bases and of the weapons和将英国添加到核存储升级中。But the NPR also states that “Further steps are needed to fully adapt these forces to current and emerging security conditions,” including to “enhance the readiness, survivability and effectiveness of the DCA mission across the conflict spectrum, including through enhanced exercises…”
In the Pacific region, the NPR continues and enhances extended deterrence with U.S. capabilities and deepened consultation with Allies and partners. The role of Australia appears to be increasing. An overall goal is to “better synchronize the nuclear and non-nuclear elements of deterrence” and to “leverage Ally and partner non-nuclear capabilities that can support the nuclear nuclear deterrence mission.” The last part sounds similar to the so-called SNOWCAT mission in NATO where Allies support the nuclear strike mission with non-nuclear capabilities.
Nuclear-Conventional Integration
尽管将核和常规能力整合到战略威慑计划中已经进行了多年，但NPR试图进一步加深它。它“强调了集体威慑和防御的常规和核因素之间的联系”，并采用了“一种综合的威慑方法，旨在利用核和非核能力来在特定情况下量身定制威慑力。”
这不仅旨在使威慑力更加灵活，并且在可能的情况下更加集中核，而且还延续了2010年NPR和2013年核就业指南中概述的战略，以通过更多地依赖新的常规能力来减少对核武器的依赖。
根据NPR的说法，“非核能力可能能够以适合其属性的方式与战略威慑计划和行动相辅相成，并符合其雇用方式的政策。”尽管进一步的整合将需要时间，但NPR描述了“联合力量如何以互补的方式结合核和非核能力，以利用多域组的独特属性，以使一系列可靠的威慑选择能够由可信的选择。核威慑。”这种整合的重要部分是“更好地同步核和非核计划，练习和操作”。
超越力量结构问题,这一努力也美联社金博宝正规网址pears to be a way to “raise the nuclear threshold” by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons but still endure in regional scenarios where an adversary escalates to limited nuclear use. In contrast, the 2018 NPR sought low-yield non-strategic “nuclear supplements” for such a scenario, and specifically named a Russian so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” scenario as a potentially possibility for nuclear use.
Moreover, conventional integration can also serve to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear strategic attacks, and could therefore pave the way for a sole-purpose policy in the future (see alsoAn Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture作者：亚当·芒特（Adam Mount）和普拉纳·瓦迪（Pranay Vaddi）。
最后，提高威慑计划中的常规能力还可以使盟友和伙伴更深入，更好地整合盟友和伙伴，而不必依靠更具争议性的核安排。
A significant challenge of deeper nuclear-conventional integration in strategic deterrence is to ensure that it doesn’t blur the line between nuclear and conventional war and inadvertently increase nuclear signaling during conventional operations.
武器控制和不扩散
NPR正确地得出结论，仅威慑不会减少核危险，并重申美国对武器控制，降低风险和不变的承诺。这样做是通过指出美国将采取“一种全面，平衡的方法”，“重点是武器控制，不扩散和降低风险，以增强稳定性，保持昂贵的武器竞赛，并表示我们渴望减少的愿望全球核武器的显着性。”
The Biden administration’s review contains significantly more positive language on arms control than can be found in the Trump administration’s NPR. The NPR concludes that “mutual, verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to achieving a key goal: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy.”
In that vein, the review states a willingness to “expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START,” as well as an expansive recommitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). However, the authors take a negative view of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), stating that the United States does not “consider the TPNW to be an effective tool to resolve the underlying security conflicts that lead states to retain or seek nuclear weapons.”
尽管NPR指出，美国针对俄罗斯和中国的核武器作用的“重大变化”将需要对其核力量进行可验证的减少和限制，但它也得出结论，“有一些机会减少核武器在我们的战略中的作用对于[中国]和俄罗斯来说，在核反应威胁可能不可信的情况下，可能存在或可能开发出适当的非核选择选择。”NPR无法确定这些方案是什么。
Looking Ahead
Many of the activities described in the NPR are already well underway. Now that the NPR has been completed and published, the Pentagon will produce an NPR implementation plan that identifies specific decisions to be carried out.
Flowing from the reviews that were done in preparation of the NPR, the White House will move forward with an update to the nuclear weapons employment guidance. This guidance will potentially include changes to the strike plans and the assumptions and the assumptions and requirements that underpin them.
拜登政府必须利用这一机会对美国战略司令部用来设定核力量结构要求的模拟和分析进行更仔细的审查。
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可以在我们的FAS Nuclear Posture Review Resource Page。
For an overview of global modernization programs, seeour annual contribution to the SIPRI Yearbook和ourStatus of World Nuclear Forceswebpage. Individual country profiles are available in various editions of theFAS核笔记本，由原子科学家公告和is freely available to the public.
This research was carried out with generous contributionsfrom the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, the Stewart R. Mott Foundation, the Future of Life Institute, Open Philanthropy, and individual donors.
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