在美国战略司令部和加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥的会谈

经过汉斯·克里森森（Hans M. Kristensen）

It’s been a busy week with two talks; the first to the美国战略司令部的威慑研讨会on August 9, and the second to thePublic Policy and Nuclear Threats “boot camp” workshopat the University of California San Diego on August 10.

Stratcom要求我讨论这个问题：高级常规能力会破坏或增强威慑。我的小组包括前Stratcom司令长詹姆斯·卡特赖特（James Cartwright），前SAC CINC将军拉里·韦尔奇（Larry Welch），全球战略事务助理助理部长玛德琳·克里登（Madelyn Creedon）。该小组由英国国防部的后海军上将约翰·高尔（John Gower）主持。我的讲话在下面复制。面板＃7的视频以后可在Stratcom网站。

UCSD要求我在新的方向上发表讲话，以获取美国核战略。我的小组包括达特茅斯学院政府副教授的达里尔出版社（Daryl Press）和蒙特雷国际研究所的詹姆斯·马丁（James Martin）非扩散研究中心的博士后研究员安妮·哈灵顿（Anne Harrington）。我的简报幻灯片的副本是在这里可用。

演讲：USSTRATCOM威慑研讨会2012

汉斯·克里森森（Hans M. Kristensen）
Federation of American Scientists
August 9, 2012

该小组的问题 - 先进的常规能力会破坏还是增强威慑？- 由于几个原因，是一个很难回答的问题。首先，“先进的常规功能”是一个非常广泛的定义，可以包含比我们去年更好的一切。其次，威慑是一种主观条件，不是一种形状或形式，而取决于演员和场景。

So at the outset, I’ll say: Whether advanced conventional capabilities will undermine or enhance deterrence depends on what kinds of adversary we seek to deter, with what, in what scenario, and for what objective.

不幸的是，“威慑”是最被过度使用和滥用的术语之一。它仍然与核武器广泛相关，核武器通常被称为“威慑力量”或“战略威慑”或SLBM，这些核武器被称为“基于海洋的威慑力量”。冷战结束后，国家领导人一直很忙，提醒我们威慑不仅是核能，而且是更多的能力和场景。

出于这次演讲的目的，我将重点关注先进的常规武器，例如迅速的全球罢工（PG），它们如何影响威慑，它们与核武器有何不同，它们是否可以用作战略威慑力量 - 甚至可以取代核武器？

目前，关于高级传统能力的大部分公开辩论都集中在速度上：需要非常快的罢工来淘汰流氓州或非国家参与者拥有大规模杀伤性武器的目标。该感知的一部分植根于2001年的核姿势审查及其促进新三合会的促进，具有无缝的全球罢工能力，从核，非核，再到非运动效应。

This led to the Global Strike mission assigned to STRATCOM in 2003, at first a designated prompt Global Strike plan known as CONPLAN 8022, but later an integrated plan known as OPLAN 8010-08: Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike, which is currently in effect. The name reflects the dual mission of providing deterrence and, if that fails, Global Strike (or counterforce war fighting).

Compared with the old SIOP, the new plan includes “more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies.” So despite the challenges of tailoring deterrence to today’s world, it would seem that out strategic war plan has already been tailored to a considerable extent.

出于威慑目的，尽管传统武器取得了重大进展，但由于其极大的破坏性能力，核武器仍在完全独立的类别中，并且在可预见的将来仍然如此。

但是对于战争而言，全球罢工任务似乎接受了先进的常规武器可以执行以前仅用于核武器的某些任务。我听说知识渊博的人说，可能有30％的目标基础可能被PGS武器覆盖。但是，尽管关于这项任务的紧迫性和重要性的所有话题，武器的出现缓慢。

但是令我惊讶的是，对PGS武器的追求是，它似乎是由于威慑力量而少的动力，而更多地期望威慑会失败，因此需要新的能力来摧毁时间关键目标而无需诉诸核武器的目标。。

在冷战之后，对手和盟友都在反复愿意在短暂和有限的惩罚性罢工到大量使用武力的情况下，一再愿意利用其不断提高的传统力量，甚至大量使用大型对手，甚至大量使用武力。在所有这些情况下，尽管我们压倒性的能力，威慑显然都失败了。否则就不必罢工。

PGS weapons would add to the toolbox and an adversary would obviously have to work around the capability. But it is much harder to predict whether – or to what extent – that would deter the adversary from taking action more or better than current capabilities would.

In the public debate the mission is almost entirely focused on regional and non-state adversary scenarios. Planners spend a lot of time trying to get inside the heads of these adversaries to understand what they value so we can figure out what to hold at risk to deter them. But if they’re already set on taking hostile action and know that they would be turned into rubble, why would PGS matter for deterrence?

区域对手已经掩埋了关键时间的资产。只要看朝鲜，一切似乎都住在地下。为什么伊朗将其弹道导弹姿势集中在移动发射器上？建造筒仓的便宜得多，更简单。中国没有什么不同；很难找到一个不包括地下存储的高优先级基础，他们的整个移动导弹现代化计划是对某人使用更强大的武器更好的风险的人的反应。

All of these adversaries are already trying to work around our targeting capabilities. So why do we think that hitting them a little faster or a little better would strengthen deterrence? It seems more likely that PGS would push them even further toward more prompt launch capabilities. More trigger-happy postures could in fact weaken deterrence and increase the risk of mistaken, inadvertent, or even deliberate escalation. Keir Lieber made a similar argument yesterday.

What if the mission includes holding Chinese ASAT launchers a risk? China’s demonstration of an ASAT capability appears to have triggered a requirement for a quick-strike conventional capability to protect our eyes and ears in the sky.

Targeting ASAT missiles on DF-21 launchers is only a hairbreadth away from targeting other road-mobile launchers, whether for conventional DF-21C medium-range ballistic missiles, DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, or even nuclear DF-31A missiles.

如何使用无人驾驶飞机和地狱火导弹来寻找中国移动发射器？

中国规划者显然必须假设罢工会很快出现，这可能是先发制人的，并且其核发射器的风险正在增加。实际上，他们必须得出结论，对他们的核威慑力量的罢工可能会来前the conflict had escalated to nuclear use.

然后突然威慑问题发生了巨大变化。此外，一些使PG成为可能的推动者将需要改进ISR（智能，监视，侦察）和C3（命令，控制，通信）系统，这些系统可能也可能显着提高核力量的能力。俄罗斯和中国可能会在自己的核计划中检测到这些改进并弥补它们。

Add to that an advanced ballistic missile defense system that could take out some of the surviving weapons, and we could end up significantly exacerbating a budding and counterproductive nuclear competition with Russia and China. Whether we agree or not, Russia is already making this argument in Europe and China has warned against it.

这里的重点不是我们应该简单地屈服并屈服于俄罗斯和中国的关注。关键是，在急于获得更先进的常规能力之前，我们最好仔细考虑这些副作用，无论如何在任何情况下都认为是对针对无法提供生存威胁的小型对手的非常有限的利基任务。这些是非常昂贵的系统。因此，它们最好是必不可少的，而不仅仅是拥有的好。

总之,在一些有限的情况下,如escalation, advanced conventional capabilities might enhance deterrence by providing senior leaders with additional non-nuclear options for signaling or striking. But it is hard to predict, to say the least. In other scenarios they may do exactly the opposite and weaken deterrence by triggering use-it-or-loose-it postures and deepen nuclear competition.

So to answer the panel question of whether advanced conventional capabilities will undermine or enhance deterrence, I’d say the answer is: probably yes.

For additional background on the Global Strike mission, see: Hans M. Kristensen,Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon’s New Offensive Strike Plan，FAS，2006年3月。

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.