有关核巡航导弹任务的问题

During a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on March 16, Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the ranking member of the committee,那样美国战略司令部未能说服她，美国需要开发新的核空气发射的巡航导弹。LRSO（远程对峙导弹）。

“我最近会见了有关新核巡航导弹及其翻新弹头的战略司令部主管Haney海军上将。我对这种武器的需要不相信。所谓的这种武器的改进似乎是坦率地设计的，以使其更有用，以帮助我们战斗并赢得有限的核战争。我发现这是一个令人震惊的概念。我认为这确实是不可想象的，尤其是当我们拥有常规武器优势时，这可以满足对手为升级冲突的努力。”

空军部长黛博拉·詹姆斯（Deborah James）仅几个小时就发表了她的声明已经说了LRSO将能够“在任何冲突地区销毁其他无法接近的目标”，在国会大厦另一侧的众议院武装服务委员会。

Lets ignore for a moment that the justification used for most nuclear and advanced conventional weapons also is to destroy otherwise inaccessible targets, what are actually the unique LRSO targets? In theory the missile could be used against anything that is within range but that is not good enough to justify spending $20-$30 billion.

所以空军官员have portrayedLRSO是一种独特的武器，可以进入其他地方。他们描述的任务听起来很像冷战期间战术核武器的角色：“我可以在防空中造成洞和差距”，然后是空军全球罢工指挥官斯蒂芬·威尔逊将军中尉explained in 2014, “to allow a penetrating bomber to get in.”

And last week, shortly before Admiral Haney failed to convince Sen. Feinstein, EUCOM commander General Philip Breedloveadded more detailsabout what they want to use the nuclear LRSO to blow up:

“能够打破反访问区域否认的最大关键之一是能够穿透防空剂，以便我们可以get close to not only destroy the air defenses but to destroy the coastal defense cruise missiles and the land attack missileswhich are the three elements of an A2AD environment. One of the primary and very important tools to busting that A2AD environment is a fifth generation ability to penetrate. In the LRSB you will have a platform and weapons that can penetrate.” (Emphasis added.)

这些A2/AD目标将包括俄罗斯S-400防空，俄罗斯堡垒 - 沿海防御和中国DF-10A陆地攻击导弹发射器（请参阅图像）。

Judging from Sen. Feinstein’s conclusion that the LRSO seems “designed candidly to make it more usable, to help us fight and win a limited nuclear war,” Admiral Haney probably described similar LRSO targets as Lt. Gen. Wilson and Gen. Breedlove.

After hearing these “shocking” descriptions of the LRSO’s warfighting mission, Senator Feinstein asked NNSA’s Gen. Klotz if he could do a better job in persuading her about the need for the new nuclear cruise missile:

参议员费恩斯坦：“因此，也许您可​​以在Haney海军上将没有成功的地方成功。让我问你这个问题：为什么我们需要新的核巡航导弹？”

Gen. Klotz: “My sense at the time, and it still is the case, is that the existing cruise missile, the air-launched cruise missile, is getting rather long in the tooth with the issues that are associated with an aging weapon system. It was first deployed in 1982. And therefore it is well past it service life. In the meantime, as you know from your work on the intelligence committee, there has been an increase in the sophistication and capabilities as well as proliferation of sophisticated air- and missile-defenses around the world. Therefore the ability of the cruise missile to pose the deterrent capability, the capability that is necessary to deter, is under question. Therefore, just based on the ageing and the changing nature of the threat we need to replace a system we’ve had, again, since the early 1980s with an updated variant….I guess I didn’t convince you any more than the Admiral did.”

参议员费恩斯坦：“不，你没有说服我。因为这只是累积战争并累积死亡。即使您去了六到七个的低尔koton，这也是一种巨大的武器。我认为我们应该在这些武器方面有一定的道德。如果这确实是相互威慑的，我看不到这是怎么做的……就像无人机。无人机已发明。它已经武装了。现在每个县都想要一个。因此，他们变得越来越复杂。我认为用核武器做到这一点很糟糕。”

结论和建议

Senator Feinstein has raised some important questions about the scope of nuclear strategy. How useful should nuclear weapons be and for what type of scenarios?

Proponents of the LRSO do not seem to question (or discuss) the implications of developing a nuclear cruise missile intended for shooting holes in air- and coastal-defense systems. Their mindset seems to be that anything that can be used to “bust the A2AD environment” – even a nuclear weapon – must be good for deterrence and therefore also for security and stability.

尽管对于任何总统来说，授权使用核武器的决定都是很难的，但潜在用途的计划似乎并没有受到约束。的确，国防官员描述的核LRSO抗A2AD使命提出了一些严重的问题，即在冲突中可以使用核武器多久。

由于A2AD系统可能是战争中要攻击的第一个目标，因此核LRSO抗A2AD任务似乎将核用途转移到冲突的最前沿，而不是将核武器保留在后台，作为他们的最后一个度假胜地属于。

And the nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission sounds eerily similar to the outrageous threats that Russian officials have made over the past several years to use nuclear weapons against NATO missile defense systems – threats that NATO and US officials have condemned. Of course, they don’t brandish the nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission as a threat – they call it deterrence and reassurance.

Nor do LRSO proponents seem to ask questions about redundancy and which types of weapons are most useful or needed for the anti-A2AD mission. The A2AD targets that the military officials describe are not “otherwise inaccessible targets,” as suggested by Secretary James, butare already being held at risk with conventional cruise missiles例如空军的JASSM-ER（扩展射程联合空气向下导弹）和海军的战术战斧以及其他核武器。空军没有无尽的资源，但必须优先考虑武器系统。

克洛茨将军为LRSO辩护，好像是在具有核威慑剂之间的选择。但是，当然，即使没有核LRSO，美国隐形轰炸机仍将装备新的B61-12引导核弹，美国核威慑力量仍将包括陆地和海上的远程弹道导弹以及F-35A隐形轰炸机也武装着B61-12。

The White House needs to rein in the nuclear warfighters and strategists to ensure that US nuclear strategy and modernization plans are better in tune with US policy to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” and enable non-nuclear weapons to “take on a greater share of the deterrence burden.” Canceling the nuclear LRSO would be a good start.

The research for this publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation, and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.