国会纪录：2000年6月21日（参议院）
Page S5563-S5580修正案提交______外国业务，出口融资和相关方案拨款法案，2001年Kyl（和Domenici）修正案没有。3558 McConnell先生（为kyl先生（为他自己和多米尼西吉先生））提出了对比尔S. 2522，同上的两项修正案;如下：在账单中的适当位置，插入以下内容：秒。。能源部实施安全改革。（a）调查结果.--国会发现 - （1）1999年3月18日，克林顿总统要求主席的外国情报咨询委员会（PFIAB）进行询问，并发出关于“部门安全威胁的报告”能源武器实验室和采取措施的充分性被采取地解决。（2）1999年6月，PFiab发布了一份以“最佳的科学，安全性的科学，”的报告结束了能源“代表了美国的最佳科学才能和成就，但它一直负责本小组成员遇到的保密的最严重的安全记录。”（3）“（3）菲达报告说，”组织混乱，管理层疏忽，以及傲慢的文化 - 两者都在DOE总部和实验室中 - 密谋创造一个间谍丑闻等待发生。“（4）PFIAB报告进一步说：”能源部是一种功能失调的官僚机构验证它是无法安全的F改革自己。* * *重组明确认定，以解决武器实验室安全和违反议题的许多具体问题，也可以解决缺乏整个部门的地方缺乏问责制。 * * * real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture;'' (5) The PFIAB report stated, "Specifically, we recommend that the Congress pass and the President sign legislation that: Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency * * * [to] oversee all nuclear weapons-related matters previously housed in DOE.'' (6) The bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China of the House of Representatives released an unclassified report on May 25, 1999 which concluded that "The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons. These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories enabled the PRC to design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own.'' (7) The report of the Select Committee further concluded that, "Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal standards.'' (8) In response to the findings of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China of the House of Representatives and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Murkowski offered Amendment 446 to the Fiscal Year 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act calling for the creation of a semi- autonomous agency to manage all United States nuclear weapons programs, which was passed by the Senate on July 21, 1999, by a vote of 96 to 1. This amendment called for the semi- autonomous agency to be organized with clear lines of authority and accountability to replace the previous structure with confused, overlapping reporting channels and diffused responsibility that led to earlier security failures. (9) The provisions of Amendment 446 were incorporated in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Conference Report, which was approved by the House of Representatives on September 15, 1999, by a vote of 375 to 45, and the Senate on September 22, 1999, by a vote of 93 to 5. (10) President Clinton signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) on October 5, 1999. (11) Notwithstanding his signing into law the legislation creating the National Nuclear Security Administration headed by a new [[Page S5574]] Under Secretary, on October 5, 1999, President Clinton issued a statement which said, "Until further notice, the Secretary of Energy shall perform all duties and functions of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. The Secretary is instructed to guide and direct all personnel of the National Nuclear Security Administration. . . .'' (12) On May 3, 2000 the nomination of General John Gordon to head the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was received by the Senate from the President. On June 14, 2000, General John Gordon was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 97 to 0. (13) The Secretary of Energy has failed to fully implement the law signed by the President on October 5, 1999. For example, Section 3213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) sates that, with the exception of the Secretary of Energy, NNSA employees, "shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control of, any officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Energy.'' Yet page 16 of the Department of Energy's Implementation Plan for the National Nuclear Security Administration released on January 1, 2000, states that in order to manage the performance of non-weapons related work at NNSA facilities such as the three national labs, "non-NNSA officers or employees of the Department retain the authority to direct NNSA employees and contractor employees with regard to the accomplishment of such work.'' (14) On May 26, 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson stated, "American's can be reassured: Our nation's nuclear secrets are, today, safe and secure.'' (15) In response to a question from Senator Fitzgerald at a joint hearing of the Committees on Energy and Natural Resources, and Governmental Affairs of the Senate on October 19, 1999, that "So if there's a problem, God forbid, with security at our Nation's labs while we have not fulfilled or appointed somebody as Under Secretary in this new agency within an agency, you would be willing to assume full responsibility. . . .'' Secretary Richardson testified that, "I would assume full responsibility.'' (16) The recent security lapses at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrates that security and counterintelligence measures continue to be significantly deficient at United States nuclear facilities. (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that-- (1) The national security of the United States has been significantly harmed due to weak and ineffective security and counterintelligence measures at America's nuclear facilities. (2) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, if implemented, will improve security and counterintelligence measures at United States nuclear facilities by establishing clear lines of authority and accountability to enable lasting reforms to be put in place. (3) The President and the Secretary of Energy should faithfully implement the provisions of Public Law 106-65, which established the National Nuclear Security Administration. (4) The Secretary of Energy should permit the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to manage all aspects of United States nuclear weapons programs without interference. (5) The Secretary of Energy should drop efforts to "dual- hat'' officers or employees of the Department of Energy to serve concurrently in positions within the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy. Such efforts to extensively "dual-hat'' officials are contrary to the intent of Congress when it passed Public Law 106-65. (6) The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the protection of sensitive and classified information becomes the highest priority of the National Nuclear Security Administration. ______