[DOCID:f: hr687.106]从众议院报告在线通过GPO访问ReportsReports[wais.access.gpo.gov]联盟的日历报告第106届国会众议院386号2 d会话106 - 687 _______________________________________________________________________ 常设情报委员会 __________ R E P O R T雷德蒙面板的改善能源部、洛斯阿拉莫斯、桑迪亚和劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室的反情报能力
2000年6月21日。——向众议院国情咨文委员会承诺，并下令印刷__________美国政府印刷办公室79-006 WASHINGTON: 2000 LETTER of TRANSMITTAL ---------- Permanent Select Committee on the Union, WASHINGTON, DC, June 21, 2000。J. Dennis Hastert，众议院议长，美国国会大厦，华盛顿特区。亲爱的议长先生:按照规则的房子,我很高兴发送此报告提交给常设情报委员会众议院的一组调查人员由著名的反间谍问题,专家保罗·雷德蒙先生。这份文件的名称是“雷德蒙德小组报告:提高能源部和洛斯阿拉莫斯、桑迪亚和劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室的反情报能力”。今天早些时候，委员会以多数票通过，批准将该报告存档供印刷之用。你真诚的，波特·j·戈斯，主席。联盟日历386号第106届国会众议院2 d会议报告106 - 687 ====================================================================== 参议院常设情报委员会报告的雷德蒙面板”改善反间谍功能在能源部洛斯阿拉莫斯,西瓜,劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室" _______ 2000年6月21日。——向众议院国情咨文委员会承诺，并下令将其付印_______ submitted the following R E P O R T Executive Summary In the wake of last year's reports by the Cox Committee \1\ on Chinese nuclear espionage and by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on security lapses at the Department of Energy's (DOE's) nuclear weapons laboratories, and in response to Presidential Decision Directive NSC 61 (PDD- 61),\2\ Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson embarked on a comprehensive reform of counterintelligence (CI) at DOE. This was accelerated and significantly refined in response to legislation proposed by Congress which, among other things, created the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Cox Committee's formal name was the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. \2\ PDD-61 was issued on February 11, 1998 in response to reports from the General Accounting Office and from the Intelligence Community that derided CI and security at DOE and its constituent laboratories. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence established a bipartisan investigative team in the first quarter of FY 2000 to examine the Department of Energy's plan to improve its counterintelligence posture at its headquarters in Washington and its three key weapons laboratories. The purpose of the examination was to review the status of reforms and to examine issues still unresolved or under consideration. The team was comprised of a majority staff member, a minority staff member, and a special staff consultant, Mr. Paul Redmond, one of America's leading experts in CI and a former head of CI at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In general, the review determined that DOE has made a good but inconsistent start in improving its CI capabilities. The most progress has been made in building an operational CI capability to identify and neutralize insider penetrations. The two areas of greatest shortcoming, either of which could derail the whole CI program, are in CI awareness training and in gaining employee acceptance of the polygraph program. Among the specific findings and recommendations from the review are:
美国能源部的现任CI主任是这份工作的最佳人选。此外，他有机会接触并得到国务卿的支持。
Doe未能获得实验室中的测谎仪验收的Modicum。DOE必须涉及实验室管理，决定谁将是转向的。
DOE努力改善CI意识培训的惨重失败。在制定其CI意识培训计划时，DOE应该借鉴其他美国政府机构，特别是CIA和国家安全局（NSA）的积极经验。
DOE在网络CI领域也面临着相当大的挑战，即保护分类和敏感的计算机化媒体数据库和来自敌对渗透的通信。这将需要大量投资防御和对策，并要求其他联邦机构的协助。
DOE CI建立了一个优秀，工作人员，有效的年度CI检查计划，以确保维持CI标准并继续改进该计划。
暂停外国访客和指派项目的“休克疗法”使实验室意识到，如果管理不当，这些项目可以在多大程度上构成反情报威胁。实验室的CI部门现在似乎更好地参与了批准访问和委派人员的过程。
在每个实验室，CI和安全人员之间的合作在很大程度上是非正式的，取决于个人关系。能源部和实验室必须建立更正式的机制，以确保有效的沟通、协调，以及最重要的信息共享。
实验室的CI办事处被他们未被清除妨碍了某些特殊访问计划（SAP）。因此，CI组件无法举行CI监督这些活动。中央情报总监（DCI）应与DOE秘书合作，以补救这种情况。
能源部需要为实验室建立契约性的CI绩效标准，以此对他们进行判断和适当的奖惩。
应当指出的是，该委员会不主张在美国能源部维护所有CI权威的电流集中的在短期，过渡期所采用的微软小组的位置。简介和调查队的调查的范围是，以确定哪些已被美国能源部（DOE）及其主要组成核武器实验室做了改进反情报（CI）的政策和做法，在核间谍活动的调查过后的范围在洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室。该小组是仅限于在洛斯阿拉莫斯，桑迪亚国家实验室和劳伦斯·利弗莫尔，在DOE总部的三个主要的核武器实验室评估CI功能。该小组还提出额外措施，这些设施改善CI如果在团队成员的判断，保证了这些措施。该小组在华盛顿，加利福尼亚和新墨西哥采访能源部官员。它也采访了美国能源部的承包商雇员，包括加州和洛克希德 - 马丁大学的员工，在三个核武器实验室。此外，团队采访了调查的联邦调查局（FBI），无论是在联邦调查局总部和FBI外地办事处在旧金山，加利福尼亚州和新墨西哥州阿尔伯克基的众多官员和中央情报局（CIA）和官员美国国家安全局（NSA）。本报告不挂DOE自己的进度报告，其中援引能源部认为在三个武器实验室中“落实”的CI步骤百分比。ReportsReports The team quickly determined that DOE used imprecise terms in describing the results of its self-evaluation. For example, the word "implemented" is commonly understood to mean that something has actually been accomplished, whereas DOE considers a CI directive as implemented when it has only been promulgated. For instance, in a September 1999 progress report, DOE claimed to have implemented the recommendation that lab CI offices contact all employees and contractors who have met with foreign nationals from sensitive countries. From its on-site visits the team determined that, although the laboratory CI offices are aware of the recommendation, they have yet to carry it out. The team thus does not believe that DOE's evaluative methodology is useful in assessing the true extent to which CI measures have been "implemented." Historical comment: In the course of interviewing numerous laboratory personnel, the team encountered a pervasive, but muted, sentiment that many of the CI and security problems at the laboratories were exacerbated, if not caused, by the policies of former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary. These policies included the redesign of laboratory identification badges that resulted in the intentional obscuring of distinctions between clearance levels, the collocation of Q- cleared personnel with individuals who held lesser clearances, and the widespread use of "L" clearances--which still require only the most cursory background check for approval. One senior lab official opined that the L clearance program was "the worst idea in government--cursorily clearing people who didn't need access to Q material created new vulnerabilities." The team notes that DOE was not unique in de-emphasizing basic security procedures in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The State Department, for example, embarked on its now infamous "no escort" policy, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued "no escort" badges to Russian military intelligence officers, and even the Central Intelligence Agency precipitously abandoned its policy of aggressively recruiting Russian intelligence officers. The present and future Administrations must ensure that such laxity will never again be encouraged or tolerated. DOE Office of Counterintelligence (DOE CI) Presidential Decision Directive NSC 61 (PDD 61), issued on February 11, 1998, provided for the establishment of a new DOE CI program that reports directly to the Secretary of Energy. In April 1998, DOE's CI office became operational. Under the guidance of the director of DOE CI, Mr. Edward Curran, the Department has made considerable progress towards establishing an effective CI operational capability at DOE Headquarters to do the analytical and investigative work necessary to identify and neutralize insider penetrations. It is the team's opinion that Mr. Curran is ideal for the CI director job because of his extensive CI experience at the FBI, his rotational assignment at the CIA, and his persistence and determination. Mr. Curran appears to have access to and the support of the Secretary of Energy, which is an essential ingredient to an effective CI program. Moreover, he is vigorously attempting to exert DOE CI authority and influence over the laboratories, which, while difficult to accomplish, is critical to the success of the new CI program. In the future, direct access to the Secretary and close working relations with other offices reporting directly to the Secretary, including the Offices of Security Affairs and Intelligence, will be crucial. In addition, DOE CI must establish and maintain a mutually supportive relationship with the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, which performs inspections of DOE programs and policies. This office has an established record \3\ of detecting, documenting and reporting CI and security shortcomings at the laboratories. Regrettably, past findings of this office in the CI realm evidently were rarely acted upon. This office, which is philosophically attuned to CI and security issues, now has a good working relationship with DOE CI and has recently pointed out at least one CI cyber security \4\ vulnerability. In the future, the office will be a natural ally for DOE CI as it tries to assert authority, identify problems and implement new policies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ In 1994, this office discovered a serious vulnerability at Los Alamos--there was no technical or policy impediment to the transfer of classified data from a classified to an unclassified computer system. This finding was apparently duly documented and reported to the requisite DOE offices and to Congress. Disturbingly, no remedial action was taken. \4\ Cyber security is meant to encompass security for all computer systems at DOE and the laboratories. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Curran is hiring and, where necessary, training a good cadre of CI officers to perform investigations from DOE Headquarters. The CI components at the laboratories,\5\ moreover, seem well on the way towards adequate staffing. Laboratory interaction with the FBI appears to be effective, at both the management and CI component level. That said, laboratory CI offices will need to focus for the foreseeable future on (1) gaining the confidence of their laboratory colleagues; (2) crafting CI programs that fit the unique needs of each lab; and (3) conforming to DOE's requirements for more standardized approaches and procedures. The team appreciates that the job of reforming CI at DOE and the laboratories will require steadfast resolve on the part of Mr. Curran and his successors, continued support from the Secretary, and sustained resources from Congress. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ The term "laboratories" will hereinafter include Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congressionally mandated reorganization of DOE Mr. Curran believes that any authority he may have had in his new job as DOE's director of CI will be greatly diluted by the new structure established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. While the team will not attempt to evaluate the restructuring plan, Mr. Curran's views on the matter remain germane to the team's evaluation of how DOE Headquarters is approaching CI reform at the laboratories. Mr. Curran indicated to the team that his initial plan had been to place federal employees rather than contractors as the CI chief at each laboratory. This would, in his view, create a more disciplined line of authority necessary to counter the historical unresponsiveness of the laboratories to DOE Headquarters directives. Mr. Curran ultimately accepted the argument put forth by the laboratories, however, that laboratory employees, i.e., contractors, would be more acceptable locally and would thus be more effective. Mr. Curran believes that given the semi-autonomous status of new National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) under the statutory restructuring, he will have only a policy role and no actual authority over these contractors. In his January 1, 2000 implementation plan, the Secretary proposed that the present director of DOE CI serve concurrently both in that capacity and as Chief of Defense Nuclear CI in the NNSA. Separation of CI and security disciplines at the laboratory level The deliberate separation of CI and security disciplines at the laboratories, as advocated by DOE Headquarters senior management and as legislated by Congress could cause problems both at Headquarters and the laboratories. Management at each of the laboratories has sensibly placed CI and security where the expertise is. For instance, cyber security at all three laboratories resides under information management for organizational purposes. At Lawrence Livermore, the CI component resides under operations. Laboratory management and the CI chiefs appear satisfied with such arrangements. They uniformly indicated that security and CI are connected by what one Lawrence Livermore manager described as "multiple neurons" under such a rubric as an "Operational Security Group." This group ensures that each interested or responsible component is informed and involved as issues arise. Such claims notwithstanding, the team discovered that these "multiple-neuron-type" arrangements are not formalized in any meaningful way at any of the three laboratories. In each case, the communications arrangements appear to depend primarily on personal and working level relationships. It has been the sad experience in many espionage cases that only after the spy is uncovered, does it become clear that a plethora of counterintelligence indicators concerning various facets of the individual's life, performance, and behavior, had been known in different places by different individuals, but never effectively collated or holistically evaluated. DOE must ensure that the CI officers at the laboratories are part of a formal system set up locally to ensure that all relevant CI and security data information is collected, assembled, and analyzed by means that are not solely dependent on personal relationships. Otherwise, theretirement or transfer of one individual in the process could cause the whole system to break down. Without an effective organizational structure, there is no guarantee that all relevant data will become known to the CI office. The team is not satisfied that DOE and the laboratories have completely grasped this concept. Moreover, the DOE Operational Field offices at Albuquerque and Oakland continue to refuse to share relevant information from employee personnel files under their control with DOE CI or laboratory CI components. The team learned that DOE CI is not even informed by these three offices when an employee loses his or her security clearance. Therefore, the team recommends that DOE ensure that a formal communications process for CI information between and within the laboratories and between DOE Operational Field offices and CI personnel be established immediately. CI inspection teams PDD-61 requires an annual inspection of DOE's CI program. DOE CI has hired and deployed a dozen retired FBI, CIA, and military intelligence officers to inspect the CI programs at the three weapons laboratories. This excellent initiative is already yielding promising results by identifying systemic problems and offering solutions. The inspection team consists of highly experienced individuals, who appear to be insulated from the politicization that can yield watered down findings. The team's effectiveness, however, will be largely dependent upon the frequency of its inspections. We recommend that DOE continue annual inspections as stipulated in PDD-61 and add follow-up inspections focusing on specific problem areas. The team judges that there is no DOE CI program that is more useful or efficient than this inspection regime. We recommend, therefore, that resources adequate to expand this inspection program be provided. The inspectors have reasonably noted that since they are just beginning their program, they should focus on establishing a baseline for assessing where the laboratory CI programs should be within a year or so. The reaction at the laboratories to these inspections has been generally favorable, with only minor complaints about repetitious questioning and an over- reliance on the format of a standard FBI internal inspection that is not entirely appropriate for this effort. Some of the CI chiefs at the laboratories believe that the inspection teams, employing a narrow FBI focus, put too much emphasis on laboratory investigative capabilities and not enough on the information gathering, non-law enforcement role of the laboratory CI units. Also, the capability of the inspection teams in the difficult, arcane cyber area needs enhancement. Overall, however, this is a fine program. With some minor adjustments, it should become an effective instrument to ensure the continued improvement of CI at the laboratories. Polygraph testing Polygraph testing for "covered" \6\ DOE and laboratory personnel was mandated by Congress, but DOE Headquarters reacted with poorly thought out and inconsistent directions to implement the requirement. As a result, laboratory personnel have a very negative attitude towards the polygraph. Moreover, since the polygraph is a highly visible part of the overall CI effort, the entire CI program has been negatively affected by this development. At the center of this problem is DOE's lack of success in explaining the importance and utility of the polygraph program. Further exacerbating this problem, DOE Headquarters personnel made little effort to consider the views of senior laboratory managers and have not involved them in the planning process for determining who will be polygraphed. In addition, DOE Headquarters efforts to meet with the laboratory employees to explain the polygraph program have been ineffective, if not counterproductive. To make matters even worse, DOE Headquarters, by vacillating and changing the policy over time, appeared inconsistent and unsure where the opposite is essential to instill confidence in the program parameters and professionalism. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Section 3154 of the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act defines "covered" persons as those involved in Special Access Programs, Personnel Security and Assurance Programs, Personnel Assurance Programs, and with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The attitude toward polygraphs at the laboratories runs the gamut from cautiously and rationally negative to emotionally and irrationally negative. Moreover, the attitudes of the lab directors themselves range from acknowledgement of the need (although uncertain as to how to implement it), to frank and open opposition. Scientists at Sandia prepared a scientific paper purporting to debunk the polygraph for a laboratory director's use in a Congressional hearing. Employees at Lawrence Livermore wear buttons reading "JUST SAY NO TO THE POLYGRAPH." Other laboratory employees expressed the sentiment "You trusted me to win the Cold War, now you don't?" The team heard such statements as, "The Country needs us more than we need them" and "The stock options of Silicon Valley beckon." Several expressed a belief that many scientists will quit and that DOE will not be able to maintain the stockpile stewardship program. Still more employees cited an Executive Order that exempted Presidential appointee and "Schedule C" employees from having to take the polygraph as outrageous and unfair. In addition to the emotional reactions, there are rational questions about the polygraph, such as, "What are they going to do with the inevitable number of people who do not pass?" The team shares this concern, and expects that there will be a significant number of so-called "false-positive" polygraph results that will have to be further examined. Another concern voiced to the team by numerous laboratory employees was that "No one has ever tried this before on this scale." The fact is that never before have so many "cleared" employees of a government organization had to have their clearances (and, thus, their livelihoods) threatened by the institution of the polygraph. Compounding the problem further is an attitude among many laboratory employees that they are indispensable and special, and thus, should be exempt from such demeaning and intrusive measures as the polygraph. Scientists do, in fact, represent a particular problem with regard to the administration of polygraphs. They are most comfortable when dealing with techniques that are scientifically precise and reliable. The polygraph, useful as it is as one of several tools in a CI regime, does not meet this standard. Accordingly, many scientists who have had no experience with it are skeptical of its utility. DOE's efforts at explaining the utility of the polygraph as part of a multi-faceted CI program have been ineffectual. Moreover, DOE Headquarters' response to resistance at the laboratories, as unreasonable as that resistance may be, has been dictatorial and preemptory. As one senior DOE official observed, on hearing the complaint by the laboratories that the polygraph will make it difficult to recruit and retain top scientists, "It is already difficult to recruit and retain scientists in this economy, so what's the difference?" In December 1999, the Secretary announced that DOE intends to reduce the number of employees subject to the polygraph to about eight hundred. This change, coupled with theelimination of the exclusion for senior political appointees, indicates that DOE Headquarters is trying to rectify the original overly broad and impractical scale of the polygraph program. Nonetheless, even this well-intentioned step has elicited skepticism. As one senior manager said, "What is to prevent some new Secretary from coming along and hitting us for not polygraphing all thirteen thousand laboratory employees?" The team judges that DOE Headquarters should do more to involve laboratory management in the process of selecting those individuals to be polygraphed. Senior laboratory managers know what secrets need protecting and, thus, could bring their knowledge to bear on this process. Including managers visibly will involve them with the program in the eyes of the workforce. This will both motivate and enable them to sell the program, and, one hopes, give the program more credibility. Their participation, moreover, would make them accountable. To this end, DOE must reinvigorate and revamp its effort to educate the workforce on how polygraphs, while not definitive in their results, are of significant utility in a broader comprehensive CI program. The polygraph is an essential element of the CI program and it will not work until it is accepted by those who are subject to it. Counterintelligence awareness training There has been no discernable, effective effort from DOE Headquarters to establish and support an effective CI training and awareness program. Moreover, the team was unable to identify any real efforts on the part of DOE CI to improve upon existing DOE training and awareness practices for laboratory employees. No organization, governmental or private, can have effective CI without active, visible, and sustained support from management and active "buy-in" by the employees. It is not possible to do CI by diktat, or from a distance. In the words of one DOE officer, the CI program cannot be a success unless each employee "knows the requirements [of the program], his or her own responsibilities, and is trained to carry them out." Historically, the laboratories have--on their own initiative--sponsored CI and security lectures and briefings to supplement the annual security refresher required of each employee. The CI lecture series at Lawrence Livermore is an excellent program. Unfortunately, it has not been replicated by the CI offices at Sandia or Los Alamos, which instead sporadically arrange ad hoc presentations. Moreover, the annual security refresher, which these lectures supplement, is perfunctory and pro forma. It can consist of as little as a brief presentation on a personal computer followed by a short quiz to ensure that the employee has read the material. As a result, the refresher process is not taken seriously by the employees, especially since DOE Headquarters has dictated much of the content in the past without consulting the laboratories. The sample training materials examined by the team were bureaucratic, boring, turgid, and completely insufficient. The poor state of the training program is also reflected in the mistaken belief by CI officials in Washington that a training facility at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is assisting in developing CI teaching materials for DOE's next annual refresher. When contacted by the team, the facility indicated that it was playing no such role. Clearly, DOE CI has yet to turn its attention to improving CI training. In lieu of a department-wide program, the laboratories have taken some uncoordinated initiatives to meet some of their awareness training requirements, if only in response to the uproar caused by events at Los Alamos. Management at all three laboratories appears to have given some thought, at least, to what may be required. Managers have drawn an analogy between their successful occupational safety training and awareness program and how they are to make security and CI an accountable, integral part of each employee's daily work and professional mindset. At Sandia and Los Alamos, specifically, management recognizes that, as in safety management, it should give line managers specific roles and responsibilities for CI and security, and then hold them accountable. This would appear to be a constructive step. The View from the Laboratories Laboratory management made the following comments regarding training and awareness:
“从华盛顿那里收到的一些意识培训材料是如此糟糕，它是令人尴尬的。它是否使用过，它会破坏整个计划的可信度。”
“在整个实验室的CI和安全中断期间，我们不得不匆忙寻找关于CI主题的演讲者。”
“一位经验丰富的前联邦调查局(FBI)特工为实验室听众量身定制了一场讲座，取得了巨大的成功。我们需要更多这样的东西。”
“没有培训的预算项目，每个演讲者的费用约为4000美元，但没有总部制定的项目。”
“能源部总部在培训和意识方面的做法是形式重于实质，以指向性规划和政策为代表。”
“对”现实“意识培训有急性需求，所以人们会意识到这个问题并没有消失冷战，他们仍然是目标。”
“有[实验室]分区，符合量身定制的演示。”
“具体事例、真实事件及其后果需要引起人们的注意。1999年春，国防部长在实验室发布了一系列与安全、CI和网络相关的“停工”通知。这并没有受到实验室员工的欢迎。一些人将此次停摆描述为“蛙式游行”，疏远了大部分员工，使改善CI的整个努力失去了信誉。这一观点的一个例外是在洛斯阿拉莫斯，那里的僵局被视为“统一”的经历——大概是因为核间谍指控后那里存在的围困心态。DOE总部的CI部门有一名新的培训官，该办公室显然打算制定一项计划，以支持实验室的CI意识和培训。一个起点是效仿其他成功的CI培训计划。在奥尔德里希·艾姆斯间谍案之后，中央情报局还设立了一个非常激进的CI课程和演讲节目，并辅以内部电视连续剧。此外，国家安全局有一个长期有效的培训和意识计划，该小组在实地访问实验室之前对该计划进行了详细检查。考虑美国国家安全局的经验，特别是在处理拥有大量世界级数学家和密码学专家的国家安全局的部分方面，这是很有启发性的。这些高技能的劳动力与实验室的劳动力非常相似。NSA在培训和意识领域取得成功的关键因素似乎是其整体综合安全和CI计划已经存在多年，数学家从一开始就进入了一种文化，在他们的日常工作中，安全、CI和测谎仪都是“赠品”。能源部现在几乎从零开始，如果能从国家安全局等机构的积极经验中学习，那将是一件好事。NSA还成功地为每个重要组件指定了一个安全和CI参照物。该人员不是安全专业人员，而是组件的正式员工，其额外职责之一涉及处理安全/CI问题。被推荐人接受了一些额外的安全和CI培训，部分根据其在该角色中的表现进行评分，并负责在最低的官僚级别上销售CI计划。大家都说，这个系统相当成功。洛斯阿拉莫斯有大量员工负责其部门的“安全”。他们在洛斯阿拉莫斯的作用可以按照国家安全局的模式扩大，并可以在其他地方加以调整。该小组还注意到，当它在每个实验室提出NSA的安全性/CI参考概念时，人们对它产生了广泛的兴趣。应提供资源，使实验室能够按照NSA模型制定参考计划。能源部总部必须做更多的工作来支持现场培训和提高认识，建立一个综合课程，供实验室使用，该课程有趣且内容丰富，足以引起实验室困难受众的注意，并具有足够的灵活性，允许单个CI主管满足每个实验室的特定需求。此外，能源部应为管理人员设立CI培训课程。与成功的职业安全管理培训一样，本课程应强调CI是每位经理工作的一个组成部分。最后，国会应支持DOE总部和实验室的广泛CI培训和意识计划。这应包括在2001财政年度专门为此目的提供资金，以确保满足培训和提高认识的需要，并确保资金不会转用于其他方案。国会应仔细监督其资助的项目的实施，以确保培训和意识成为并保持能源部的高度优先事项。赛博CI DOE和武器实验室在赛博CI领域面临着最大的挑战。问题的严重性和复杂性令人望而生畏。实验室里有几千名系统管理员，他们有非常广泛的访问权限。实验室每天有数十万封内部电子邮件，数万封发送到外部地址。此外，还有极为复杂的连接性和系统架构问题。这些实验室在网络事务方面拥有大量的智慧和经验，它们开始合作应对这一挑战，在某些情况下，还得到了其他美国政府机构的协助。一些实验室已经制定了使用“关键词”扫描电子邮件流量以寻找CI指标的计划，但要对其有效性做出任何实质性判断还为时过早。很明显，能源部的CI尚未完成金博宝正规网址y established its authority at DOE Headquarters and at the laboratories in the cyber area. The cyber component of DOE CI is trying to overcome legal obstacles centering largely on privacy issues related to the implementation of a pilot program to determine the size and difficulty of e-mail monitoring using sophisticated "visualization" software. There is another pilot program under development to detect cyber intrusions better. DOE CI is encountering bureaucratic resistance to establishing acceptable minimum standards. For instance, the laboratories are pressing for standards that are acceptable in a more open "academic" environment. Furthermore, a comprehensive intrusion incident reporting mechanism for the computer systems controlled by DOE information management offices and the laboratories is meeting resistance from DOE and laboratory personnel, who cite excessive reporting burdens. There has existed for years at the laboratories an entity called the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) that was responsible for collecting and analyzing computer security incident data. The reporting to this organization has historically been voluntary, and anonymity was permitted to encourage the laboratories to be frank and forthcoming. More recently, the CIAC has begun to provide DOE Headquarters with intrusion incident summaries. The lack of specificity in these summaries, however, makes meaningful analysis impossible. DOE CI, with assistance and support from DOE management, needs to assert its authority in this matter. It appears that DOE CI is very well served by employing detailees from the FBI and NSA. These detailees bring a high- level of expertise to the issue and some independence from DOE's bureaucracy. The practice of assigning them to play a leading role in the cyber CI component should be continued. The DOE CI component believes that it has an effective working relationship with DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. This office conducts "red team attacks" on the computer systems and has helped impose computer security standards at the laboratories. Clearly, the functions of DOE CI and this office are complementary, particularly in the cyber area. This close working relationship will be a key to improving overall cyber CI. In sum, DOE CI, faces in the cyber area, the same very difficult, complicated issues faced everywhere in the national security community. The individuals who create and run computer systems are, by training and motivation, inclined to promote the widest, fastest, most efficient dissemination and transmission of data; hence, the basic and pervasive mutual aversion between "Chief Information Officers" and the security/CI offices. The team believes that adequate resources should be provided for cyber security and CI, and that aggressive oversight should be exercised to ensure that effective programs are developed and implemented. Foreign visits and assignments The team limited its examination of this issue to the role played by DOE CI and the laboratory CI offices in the visitor and assignments approval process, which would lead to the laboratory director seeking a "waiver" to the moratorium on foreign visits from sensitive countries. The team notes that Secretary Richardson announced in December 1999 that he might start seeking such waivers as permitted by the FY 2000 National Defense AuthorizationAct.\7\ All three laboratory CI chiefs stated that they now have an established, integrated role in the approval process leading to a laboratory director seeking a waiver to allow such a visit. For instance, the CI chief at Lawrence Livermore is one of four officers who must sign off before a request goes to the laboratory director for a decision to seek a waiver. The CI chief at Sandia is a member of the Foreign Visits and Assignments Team, which actually controls the approval process. These officials can thus bring to bear a CI perspective on any proposed visit, which the team believes to be a crucial function. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Washington Post, December 3, 1999 "Energy Chief to Allow Foreign Scientist to Visit Labs." --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Obviously, the judgments made by the laboratory CI offices are only as good as data on which they are based. These data includes indices checks, which have often been slow in coming from other Federal agencies. The laboratory CI offices need to have access to broader-based intelligence information. This information, when integrated by the analysts in the CI offices, would give them a much improved basis on which to judge the CI threat that individual visitors and delegations might pose. Access to this information is problematic, and DOE CI needs to work with other relevant entities at DOE Headquarters-- particularly the Office of Intelligence--to arrange appropriate and efficient access in the field. In addition, there are two relevant databases. The Foreign Assignments Records Management System (FARMS) is unclassified and is maintained by DOE security. The Counterintelligence Analytical Research Data System (CARDS) is maintained by DOE CI and is an outstanding repository of classified data on prospective foreign visitors. Laboratory CI offices believe that they need a "bridge" between these databases so they can more effectively use the information they contain. In addition, it appears that the laboratories, which in some cases maintained their own databases, feel less confidence in the quality of DOE-maintained data, and their access has become more cumbersome. DOE CI needs to address these problems. Apparently, the legislatively imposed moratorium on foreign visits and assignment has had the desired effect of making DOE and the laboratories much more conscious of the CI threat posed by visits.\8\ Making the laboratory directors accountable has also had a salutary effect. It now remains for DOE CI and the laboratory CI offices to work together to make sure the CI role in the approval process is made as effective as possible by bringing to bear the maximum amount of data as efficiently as possible. There will also need to be more awareness training to sustain and better improve the presently enhanced levels of interest and attention. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Evaluating the security aspects of the visits and assignments program is beyond the team's remit and is therefore not addressed herein. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CI knowledge of special access programs (SAPs) and other sensitive projects The laboratories do a considerable amount of work for the Intelligence Community under the auspices of the "Work-for- Others" program. This work, administered by DOE, is often highly sensitive and is administratively compartmented within SAPs, which require additional clearances. The laboratory employees who work on these SAPs or other projects technically fall under the CI jurisdiction of the laboratory CI office. The team discovered inconsistencies in this arrangement in two of the laboratories that could lead to potentially dangerous outcomes for CI if not corrected. At Lawrence Livermore, laboratory CI officials are not permitted to become involved in the "Work-for-Others" programs involving Intelligence Community SAPs. They are not substantively or administratively informed of any aspect of the programs. Given that one of the primary functions of the laboratory CI staff is to brief employees on CI threats and to inquire about CI incidents, the CI office at Lawrence Livermore is unable to perform fully this critically important function. Lawrence Livermore's CI chief advised that he learns of "Work for Others" activities only "by mistake" or "by accident." In some instances when he has tried to involve himself in issues related to "Work-for-Others" activities, he has been restrained by his senior management, which presumably is seeking to enforce Intelligence Community requirements. A similar situation prevails at Sandia, where it was evident that the CI component is often unaware of "Work-for-Others" activities.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Due to the communications arrangements between Los Alamos chiefs of intelligence, CI, and security, Los Alamos does not appear to have the same problem as the other two laboratories. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The net result of this situation at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia is that no one appears to be examining CI issues involving personnel engaged in the most sensitive SAPs and other Intelligence Community projects without a formalized reporting mechanism, there is no guarantee that an employee will report a CI incident to the contracting intelligence agency. The contracting agency, may or may not, in turn, report the problem or issue to the DOE Office of Intelligence, DOE CI, or to FBI Headquarters. The team judges this to be an unacceptable process for the transmission of such critical CI information. DOE Headquarters should reach a formal agreement with the Intelligence Community to ensure that the laboratory CI offices are read into the SAPs at least at an administrative level so they can fulfill their CI responsibilities. The team also encourages the Community Management Staff (CMS), which has been tasked by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to examine the protection of Intelligence Community equities by DOE and the laboratories, to work closely with DOE to resolve this issue of the lack of a formalized reporting mechanism. Sensitive unclassified technical information (SUTI) DOE has instituted a new pseudo-classification for material that is deemed sensitive, but is technically unclassified. The team encountered significant confusion at the laboratories about what will actually be captured under the SUTI category, and laboratory managers expressed strong opposition to the whole concept. One principal argument was that scientists who work at the laboratories are already precluded from publishing much of their work because it is classified. The scientists often feel that much of what they must treat as classified is actually publicly available and being discussed by their non- U.S. government peers around the world. Also, given that their scientific reputations are largely dependent upon what they publish and upon their interactions with their non-U.S. government peers, they feel that the SUTI category further prejudices their ability to earn scientific recognition. Moreover, laboratory employees pointed out to the team that the SUTI category is highly subjective, cannot be standardized in any fair way, and will necessarily compel them to look for work outside of government if it is strictly imposed. It appears that the DOE Headquarters policy on SUTI is evolving much like its policy on the polygraph, with similar misinformation, misunderstanding, and general confusion among those who will be affected by it. At Los Alamos, senior managers advised the team that SUTIwas no longer an issue because it had been replaced with a DOE list of sensitive subjects. It is interesting that Lawrence Livermore and Sandia were, at the same time, still laboring under the assumption that they would be subject to SUTI and were making decisions based upon this assumption. In the team's judgment, DOE should proceed very cautiously and openly on SUTI imposition--if it does so at all--so as to avoid repeating the internal public relations mistakes it made with the polygraph program. Moreover, it appears DOE has yet to address the significant legal implications associated with the promulgation and implementation of SUTI. This fact was acknowledged recently byDoe的一般律师发出通知陈述，因为“敏感信息”既不在2000财年的国防授权法案中都没有，也不会在DOE现有的规定中，DOE将不会强加与误操作敏感的未分类信息相关的新法定处罚。因此，直到Doe为Suti制定了明确和思考的理由和实施计划 - 这必须包括与实验室管理和人员的参与，以便有效 - 该团队认为，不应继续执行Suti法规的步骤。执行每个合同DOE与实验室的运营商有需要年度绩效评估。过去，这些评估显然包括无效的Pro Forma审议安全。似乎既不是Doe总部也没有直接负责合同监督的野外办事处，有效地强制执行该地区合同条款。例如，该团队被告知，在某些情况下，加州大学并未有意识地意识到它对某些安全条款合同负责的事实，即使这些在合同中明确说明。该团队建议司司机执行现有的安全性能措施。此外，该团队建议将DOE将可衡量的CI目标和绩效标准纳入其每个实验室合同。然后，DOE可以使用前面提到的CI审计，可能与独立监督和性能保证办公室的调查结果相结合，以评估实验室的表现，并对承包商施加处罚以获得不可接受的表现。该团队了解DOE正在致力于合同的语言，使DOE能够在实验室评估CI表现。 The initiative represents an incentive for the laboratories to perform, and an opportunity to put in place measures to remedy past poor performance by the laboratories in this area. The team believes that Congress should support, encourage, and oversee the initiative, and ensure that DOE rigorously enforces the CI standards that it sets out in its contracts. Conclusions Hostile intelligence threats to DOE and the laboratories will most likely come from problems with trusted employees, cyber penetrations, and visitors or assignees. DOE has made good progress toward establishing effective operational mechanisms to cope with the problems of identifying possible "insider" penetrations and of laying the groundwork for the FBI to investigate. DOE has also set up an excellent inspection system to ensure the continued efficacy of these mechanisms, but it is not yet clear that this system is being evenly applied across all CI and security programs. DOE has not effectively laid the groundwork for acceptance of the polygraph program, an obviously essential part of any CI effort to detect and deter espionage by employees. Moreover, DOE has failed to establish the absolutely key, complementary CI pillar--an effective training and awareness program. No CI program can succeed unless both the operational and training pillars are in place and supporting each other. Further, it is clear from decades of behavior, that the DOE and laboratory culture is profoundly antithetical toward CI and security. Unless changed, this entrenched attitude will doom any attempts at long-term improvements. Effective training and awareness programs are the only way to change this culture. DOE is just beginning to determine the magnitude of CI issues relating to the cyber threat, which includes e-mail and intrusions. The cyber component of DOE CI needs strong support at DOE Headquarters to establish suitable, minimum CI standards in systems controlled by DOE's information management units and the laboratories. Processes are now in place that should ensure that CI concerns will be factored into the waiver approval system for foreign visitors and assignments, questions of security in the approval process, however, were beyond the scope of this study. In spite of progress in some areas, statements from DOE Headquarters, to the effect that all is now well in the CI area are nonsense. Problems and deficiencies caused by decades of nonfeasance and neglect cannot be fixed overnight. Such statements serve only to strengthen the position of those at the laboratories who would wait out the effort to improve CI and thus make the job all that much harder. Our yardstick for assessing the CI program will be their future success in catching spies.
