US – Russia 123 Agreement on the Hill
On Thursday, June 12 the House Foreign Relations Committee met for over three hours and heard testimony from members of the Committee, a representative of the Bush administration, and expert witnesses regarding the pros and cons of supporting the Agreement Between the United States and Russia for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Agreement) that President Bush submitted to Congress.如在一个中讨论的earlier blog,该协议将不得不坐在国会之前ss for 90 continuous days, and will pass unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval.Such legislation,H.J.Res 85, has already been submitted by Congressman Edward J. Markey (D – MA), a staunch opponent to nuclear power and thus to civilian nuclear cooperation agreements.在听证会上，这些立法者的情绪通常是怀疑主义的一种，因为国会议员寻求支持该协议的理由。
Committee Chairman Berman (D – CA) began the proceedings by identifying the points of contention and concern: is the Agreement necessary for bilateral cooperation to create a nuclear fuel bank and multilateral fuel assurances to reduce incentives for other countries to acquire sensitive nuclear technology; will the reprocessing cooperation under the Agreement help or hinder nonproliferation goals; and will passing the Agreement be more effective in US efforts to pressure Russia to discourage Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability?
国会议员Dana Rohrabacher（R - CA）pointed out that the US has left post-Cold War Russia out of the global economic community while we have embraced other countries with questionable policies and practices.这使俄罗斯边缘化，没有为美国的利益服务，而俄罗斯与该协议保持联系可以使美国对未来的行动和决定产生更大的影响力。This is important, as the US wants to have Russia’s help in pressuring Iran at the same time that Russia is selling conventional weapons and missile technology to Iran, something that is certainly not in the interest of the US.Further, Russia has engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran outside of the safeguarded Bushehr reactor project, although Russia has made assurances to the US “at the highest level” that such cooperation has ceased. [i] Should Russia be “rewarded” with this Agreement while it is unclear if nuclear cooperation outside Bushehr has indeed ceased and while they engage in such arms transfers to Iran?该协议是否有助于或损害我们影响俄罗斯行为的机会？These are the questions the Committee sought to resolve; at the end of the hearing, the answers to these issues were still not clear.
Is the Agreement necessary for bilateral cooperation to create a nuclear fuel bank and multilateral fuel assurances to reduce incentives for other countries to acquire sensitive nuclear technology?
专家证人罗伯特·爱因霍恩（Robert Einhorn）（战略与国际研究中心）向委员会指出，该协议为核合作创建了法律框架，这对于建立核燃料银行或某些多边燃料保证机制的基础是必不可少的。However, there are many such proposals being considered in the international community and by the International Atomic Energy Agency that exist outside of the bilateral parameters of the Agreement.Support for the Agreement should therefore not be judged on the basis of this argument alone.
在军备控制和国际安全的国务卿John C. Rood testified该协议将帮助我们的商业公司，允许他们向俄罗斯出售民用核商品，例如反应堆燃料和组件，并能够建立新的联合商业核电投资。Expert witness Henry Sokolski (Nonproliferation Policy Education Center), however,testified that the promise of joint nuclear ventures would not be fulfilled by the Agreement, as Russia has yet to ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which would provide liability insurance for US firms in case of a nuclear accident.Until Russia ratifies the CSC, no US firms would engage in such a risky venture he argued, and therefore the Agreement should not be supported on the basis that it would generate revenue for our nuclear industry.He also reminded the Committee that certain transfers of sensitive nuclear technology (SNT) could be approved without the Agreement, pursuant to Sec. 57 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. [ii]
Mr. Einhorn submitted that the non-self-executing nature of the Agreement allows the Committee to support it, as each new aspect of nuclear cooperation would need to be accompanied by an export license.他认为，国会可能会否认如果俄罗斯从事行为，美国发现不可接受的行为，例如，如果发现他们仍在与伊朗在布什尔反应堆项目外的伊朗进行核事务合作。Chairman Berman responded by stating that Congress has no authority over export licenses; in fact, these are issued by the Departments of State and Commerce, and the Congress is only empowered to raise questions, concerns, and / or objections about the applications.The Congress should not support the Agreement therefore unless they also support the issuing of export licenses to Russia in general, which brings us right back to our original dilemma.
根据协议的后处理合作有助于或阻碍非扩散目标？
There is debate among experts and officials as to whether the Agreement promotes President Bush’s全球核能伙伴关系（GNEP）, as well as heated debate about the merits of GNEP itself.According to Secretary Rood, the Agreement would enable the US to pursue one of GNEP’s goals: cooperating with other countries to “develop new technologies like advanced reactors that would consume plutonium and new forms of recycling spent fuel that would reduce the risk of proliferation by not separating plutonium that could be diverted for use by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons.” [iii]
俄罗斯操作高级燃烧器反应堆，并使用这些反应器进行实验来开发没有分离纯plut的回收过程比花费时间和金钱在美国为这种实验构建反应堆更为可取。但是，有许多反对GNEP和用过燃料的“回收”的论点，其中此类过程与使用新鲜铀燃料相比在财务上没有吸引力，而核废料的实际增加此类“回收”会不会长期产生。- 期限存储选项。由于重新处理现在不是一种燃料反应堆的一种经济有效的方式，因此寻求获得此类技术的国家（例如伊朗）出于其他原因，大概是出于政治影响力，国家声望或获得潜在的核武器能力。如果存在燃料库或反应堆燃料供应保证将说服各州放弃这种技术，那么通过协议促进这种合作将增强非扩散目标；但是，如前所述，这种连接并不明确。
Sokolski先生作证说，支持该协议可以使能源部绿灯申请并为国内高级燃烧器反应堆获得资金，并在美国花费了燃料后处理设施。根据国际裂变材料小组的说法，这将逆转30年的国内民用核政策，并为全球平民分离的全球股票贡献，据国际裂变材料小组称，已经超过250公吨。In the end, it is not clear that the Agreement is necessary to engage in SNT transfers for the purposes of conducting experiments on Russian advanced burner reactors nor for the establishment of an international fuel bank or uranium enrichment center in Russia. [iv] Positions on reprocessing and GENP are therefore not a sound basis for either supporting or defeating the Agreement.
Will passing the Agreement be more effective in US efforts to pressure Russia to discourage Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability?
This is the million-dollar question, and really the bottom line as far as the Agreement is concerned.While the US pursues missile defenses in Europe, has recognized the independence of Kosovo, and is working to expand NATO, bilateral relations with Russia are arguably at a post-Cold War low.该协议可以帮助与俄罗斯的新总统建立更友好的关系，然后这可以为俄罗斯施加压力，以帮助促进美国利益，尤其是在伊朗。The testimony was mixed on this issue.
Secretary Rood submitted that entering into negotiations with Russia for the Agreement has already had “a definite and positive impact” on how Russia “came to regard certain nonproliferation issues,” which presumably means that it has pressured Russia to take up a more US-friendly position on Iran vis-à-vis their nuclear program.Rood went on to say that he could not go into the details of how this positive impact has manifest itself, but he noted that the classified annex to the Agreement submitted to Congress “covers these matters thoroughly.”Interestingly, Congressman Brad Sherman (D – CA) replied that neither he nor anyone he knows in the Committee had received any classified information to use when weighing the decision of whether or not to support the Agreement.
Mr. Einhorn also proposed supporting the Agreement, and argued that giving Russia a vested interest in US nuclear trade and technology was the only way to gain the influence with Russia that the US needs to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability.Mr. Sokolski countered that the Agreement could be seen as appeasing Russia if it is implemented without first getting Russia to stop selling missile technology and advanced conventional weapons to Iran, and would therefore be against US broader foreign policy interests.In other words, it would become more difficult to press other countries to cease cooperation with Iran if we were seen to be “rewarding” Russia with the Agreement despite their continued arms transfers to Iran, and especially while it is unclear whether or not Russia has actually suspended nuclear cooperation with Iran outside of the Bushehr reactor project.
The hearing was adjourned and the Committee members were left to use the testimony they heard to formulate an opinion on how to advise the Congress on the Agreement.It may have been all for nothing however, as the legislative calendar ends on September 26, leaving less than the 90 continuous days of session required for Congress to consider the Agreement.It seems there was not even agreement on this procedural issue, with Secretary Rood stating thatpro forma可以在9月26日之后举行的会议，这将在90天的时间内计算，尽管这些天没有自动安排。最后，这个问题可能留给下一个政府提交国会，或者暂时让死亡。
的问题,仍是委员会来求解e is whether or not supporting the Agreement will positively influence Russia’s behavior, especially in regard to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.Unfortunately, there is no way know in advance what effect the Agreement will have on the actions of Russia in the future, and it is therefore hard to recommend supporting the Agreement in the hopes that Russia will be a more active and willing partner toward US nonproliferation goals.It is important to consider, however, thatnotsupporting the Agreement will have a negative effect on Russia’s future behavior; this is a separate issue and most likely would be true, as Russia would probably see itself as being shut out once again from being drawn into the mainstream of the international economic community.不支持该协议的可能的负面影响是否大于支持该协议的可能积极影响？If you add to this calculation the known fact that Russia continues to sell missile technology and advanced conventional weapons to Iran (and possibly still engages in nuclear cooperation outside of international safeguards), it does not seem as though supporting the Agreement at this time in its current form would be advisable.What would serve our nonproliferation goals better would be to support the Agreement, with the following conditions: Russia must commit to ending trade with Iran in missile technology and advanced conventional weapons; Russia must reaffirm the commitment not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran outside of the Bushehr reactor project; and the Congress must be able to terminate the Agreement if Russia is found not to be in compliance with these commitments.In this scenario, Congress can hope for the benefits of better bilateral relations with Russia while ensuring bad behavior that threatens our nonproliferation goals is not rewarded.
[i] U.S. Department of State.核扩散评估声明。根据第123条a。在1954年的《原子能法》上，关于美利坚合众国政府与俄罗斯政府在和平使用核能领域的合作联合会之间的拟议协议。2008年5月13日
[ii] U.S.Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as Amended Through P.L. 105-394. Sec. 57(d)
[iii] John C. Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C. June 12, 2008.
[iv] U.S.Atomic Energy Act, op cit秒57（d）
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