任务目标 Operations Security Impact On
1998年2月13日
Declassification Management Within The
Department of DefenseProduced By
Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc.
900 Elkridge Landing Road
Linthicum, MD 21090进行分析研究以确定与第12958号行政命令规定的解密活动相关的任何操作安全性（OPSEC）。
背景
Executive Order 12958effectively changes the way federal agencies manage classified national security information. It is intended to reduce the amount of information that is classified; places limits on the length of time it remains classified and facilitates the declassification of information. It sets in motion a five year time limit (April 1995 - April 2000) within which all classified information more than 25 years old and judged to be of permanent historical value shall be reviewed for declassification and declassified unless it meets certain definitive exemption criteria. All material not meeting the exemption criteria will be automatically declassified�whether or not the records have been reviewed.
方法
To fulfill the task objective the study was to be conducted in the following parts:
gathe隐含在这种方法是信息ring on records management activities within DoD, the actual accession process used by NARA, methods used in agency and NARA declassification, sampling techniques, release dates, etc. A decision was made to first determine if there was an OPSEC problem with the materials prior to expending effort on a detailed review of what could have been a non-problem. Although this initially hampered a clear understanding of the procedures in use, it in fact added more validity to the data collection. The researcher had no special edge or inside knowledge at NARA, and could thus recreate data acquisition activities as experienced by any researcher with limited or no NARA experience. Any understanding of the system would initially be gleaned from publicly available educational materials, general Internet searches and whatever help a researcher could obtain in routine course from NARA personnel.
- 由国家档案馆和记录管理局（NARA）加入的研究DOD记录，已解密并提供给公众。
- Determine what, if any OPSEC concerns the release has caused. For instance, is the release of multiple documents, in one or more than one records group, from multiple agencies, a concern to national security when the review of the compilation of information reveals data that warrants additional protection.
- If there were OPSEC concerns found, evaluate the issues in view of current declassification guidelines, and make recommendations for improving the overall process.
Plan
可以考虑到大量的信息le and the finite number of hours for the task. a structured work plan was constructed. The plan design ensured both completeness and flexibility to deal with issues as they surfaced. Elements of the plan were:
Approach
- 有关解密问题的背景数据获取。金博宝正规网址（政府文件，客户讨论，互联网，图书馆研究）
- 国防部记录中国家档案馆的原始研究已经向公众提供。
- Attendance at Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Meeting.
- Discussions with NARA archival personnel during research.
- Interviews with declassification managers at NARA, Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army.
The underlying principle used in approaching the review of already released material was the application of OPSEC precepts to the problem. Operations security takes a systematic look from the adversary's viewpoint. For purposes of this study the threat chosen was information acquisition to assist proliferators and terrorists in the development/use of weapons of mass destruction (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological). This targeting was selected based on items of interest delineated in EO 12958 and DoD Directive 5200.30.
与模仿对抗性的观点相一致的是，需要保持开放性，以考虑按照美国标准被认为已过时的信息和技术。思考过程是，较新的大规模杀伤性武器的扩散剂通常是第三世界国家，其科学，后勤和管理支持系统是美国系统背后的几代人。但是，通过追求废弃的技术，他们继承了可能在技术上是粗略的东西，但被证明是有效的。在这种方法中，基于基本科学的编辑性科学数据，测试数据，组织和管理信息以及实施技术可以大大降低发展所需能力的成本，时间和技能，以成功获得大规模杀伤性能力的武器。
Records Review
Each agency of the government is assigned a number by NARA for identification purposes. This number is known as a Record Group. A researcher would therefore determine the Record Group of the agency and go about finding all available information on the identity and location of the records of interest in that Record Group. The key to record retrieval is obtaining available寻找辅助工具. The main NARA finding aid is a computer printout which lists the Record Group. the title of the file and the physical location within the archives building. This finding aid is extremely general in nature and one entry could cover hundreds of boxes of records with no clue as to the contents other than "decimal file". (See enclosures #l, 2, 3 and 4).
Approximately 37 cubic feet of records were examined during the review portion of the study. Utilizing the NARA estimate of 2500 pages per cubic foot, over 80,000 individual pages were incorporated in the review. Documents within the following Record Groups were examined. To give an indication of the variety of the examined records, the title of the series as listed in the NARA Master Location Roster and a summary of the types of documents from each are provided.
[审查的记录在外壳上用“ x”表示]。在某些情况下，特定组可能可以使用更具体的发现辅助工具。但是，在实际开始对文档进行物理搜索之前，没有可靠的方法可以预测NARA查找辅助工具的质量。
- RG 330- Office of the Secretary of Defense
=> MLR 160a：秘密文件，1956年（安全分类管理通信）
=> MLR 207A: Reports on Special Investigations conducted by Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, 1948-51.
=> MLR 341A：有关组织，预算和研究开发分配的记录，1946- 1953年。
=> MLR 342: Transcripts of Meetings 1946-51. (Effects of Scientific Research on National Security).
=> Summary: Files on supply and logistics; mobilization and production requirements for U.S. forces (ships, planes, ammunition); consumption rates; cargo handling data; budget estimates; contractor expansion requests; agendas of meetings; verbatim transcripts of advisory board meetings.
- RG 373- 国防情报机构
=> MLR 1B: Edgewood Arsenal Technical Files Relating to Foreign Chemical. Radiological and Biological Warfare, Retired to the Defense Intelligence Agency for Reference Purposes.
=>摘要：基础科学研究的ReportsReports报告；ReportsReports有关传统武器的报告 - 日本武器和炸药；立陶宛瑞典的基础科学基础科学研究的翻译；天气动物血液的化学分析；小型武器，枪支，防毒面具和其他W.W.II ERA材料的技术分析。
- RG 374- Defense Nuclear Agency
=> MLR 3：联合工作队2，1965- 1970年的记录。
=> MLR 22：检查与调查文件（1947-1951） - 武装部队特殊武器项目。
=> MLR 32A: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Logs and Journal, 1947-1954.
=> MLR 34A: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Decimal Files, 1946-52.
=> Summary: IG files (non-classified) - cash counts; assignment and discrimination complaints; personnel administrative matters; medical treatment bills; personal service contracting data; supply inspections; reports of survey; pay vouchers; funding estimates; testing data on Loran and radars; cost data; wiring; annual contractor reports; computer time estimates: mathematical modeling of target acquisition tests for low altitude aircraft penetrations.
- RG 457- 国家安全局
=> MLR 9023：与密码学有关的美国陆军记录，1927- 1985年。
=> Summary: Analysis and summary of reports on W.W.II enemy estimates of allied troop strengths; general articles on cryptography; technical manuals and administrative notes.
General
尺寸
The sheer amount of available text material within NARA is mind boggling. NARA estimates that it currently maintains 21 million cubic feet of material in its facilities. TheMoynihan Report on Secrecy估计，所有国防部（包括组件服务）的所有国防部拥有25年历史的十亿页材料，并受到行政命令12958的约束。此估计不包括图片，录音或电子数据。
Internet
Just as the Internet has entwined itself in our society and altered the flow of information sharing in ways that are still becoming clear, it has also played an equally important role in the government secrecy/declassification arena. This has manifested itself in the following areas:
- 信息的可用性。扫描技术，数字处理和光学特征识别（OCR）的进步可确保全球信息的快速传播。随着材料被解密的速度，它被放置在互联网上，所有人都可以使用。过去仅在一些学术研究人员挖掘纸上的一些学术研究人员中，信息时代是过去的。传播现在是自由而迅速的。
- 副本或信息的多样性。致力于政府保密，敏感的政府计划和解密问题的地点数量是巨大的，而且不断扩大。金博宝正规网址这些站点由美国政府机构，大学，学术研究组织，个人，团体和商业实体托管。外壳＃5是互联网上可用的NARA发现辅助工具。外壳＃6是清理卫星照片的清单，包括任务摘要和定位数据。外壳＃7是一个化学战（CW）网站，充满了CW代理的化合物数据。外壳＃8是核，化学和生物（NBC）站点的热链接列表，该地点是通过网络搜索搜索解密的美国国防信息而产生的。外壳＃9是信息经纪人出售CD-ROM索引和相关摘要辩护文档摘要的网页。具有Internet访问的任何人都可以使用精致的搜索引擎，可以保证相关链接的网站几乎无尽的供应。
- 节约成本。对于正在进行研究活动的个人或组织而言，进行大量研究的能力而无需离开您的家或营业地点。节省的成本不仅是货币，尽管它们很重要，而且还节省了以前编译数据所需的时间和人力。本质上，互联网现在允许个人在相对较短的时间内进行相对复杂的开源分析。
Finding 1
Information contained in four declassified documents raises OPSEC concerns. The four documents are listed below.所有这些文件均由DOE，DOD和/或NARA审稿人进行了审查。在这些情况下，审阅者对解密参数的看法过高。在这四个文档中，只有12个封面已编辑任何材料。在大多数编辑材料中，这种缺失似乎是吨位或船体压力故障率的一个数字。与文本中的各个信息相反，各种审阅者似乎没有考虑整个文档的影响。从OPSEC或对抗性的角度来看这些文件表明，当在总体中获取这些文件时，这些文件提供了一个名副其实的“如何”组织文件，以建立核武器测试计划。
- 武器效果测试计划，用于操作和诺托尔[外壳＃10]
- A. W. A. W.船舶对策的证明测试[外壳＃11]
- 鹈鹕报告[外壳＃12]
- Proposed Project Summary: Operation CASTLE[Enclosure #13].
大规模杀伤性武器开发的一个主要问题是采购实现成功武器化所需的组织敏锐度。在大多数情况下，拥有实际基本公式的实际知识是通常的。一个衡量标准是非常复杂的后勤，组织和测试基础设施，以及开发大规模杀伤性武器测试计划所需的较长的铅和计划时间。保护为这些测试计划开发提供基础的信息可能会使潜在的扩散剂拒之门外，或者至少延迟了计划开发的时间表。这种延迟允许考虑实施其他保护措施。
除了组织敏锐度之外，这些文件还列出了一个整洁的包装中的特定测试，材料和船舶修改，测量点，测量测量和拟议的实验程序。外壳＃12在一个地方包含大量武器特定的基础研究。此外，它命名了64个其他分类和未分类的文章/相关研究书籍。这里不仅在这里所有适当的研究和公式，而且还有其他报告清单的其他报告清单，既可以提供其他记录组的定位，又提供其他公开研究。ReportsReports尽管不应对基础科学进行分类，但必须以不同的方式评估武器特定材料的汇编。使事实复杂化的是现在可用的计算能力大量可用，当编写围栏12时无法使用。似乎很可能会根据所提供的研究和公式来完成大量的仿真测试。
所有文档广泛引用the code names of other atomic test shots and programs. Simply focusing on these code names, especially in other Record Groups such as Atomic Energy Commission, Defense Nuclear Agency, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, etc. could lead to other reports or perhaps even an unredacted copy or draft input within these other Record Groups. This focus could greatly reduce search parameters and yield viable results in less time. In point of fact, these documents were found in RG 330 (OSD) as a result of just a previous name reference in the files of RG 374 (DNA). Although the reference in the DNA Record Group were of no immediate intelligence value, an OPSEC approach (looking at things in the aggregate from the adversarial view) dictated the use of the code name as a search parameter for other Record Groups. Nothing more sophisticated than a pencil list and some time to conduct the search yielded the result.
Finding 2
The level of organizational effort being applied by OSD and component Defense organizations to the implementation of EO 12958 is encouraging. However, at this stage of the effort it appears that it will be a very difficult task to accomplish the EO directives within the tightly mandated time-frames.考虑到积压的数据，各种执行订单，分类/解密政策的串行以及此积压列表管理中相对原始的记录管理状态，进展非常出色。从1995年晚些时候的零升高开始，各种程序似乎正在迅速关闭可行的方法，以最终完成任务。但是，随着可用的时间，似乎在各个组织面前面临着巨大的挑战，即使符合EO的精神，更不用说符合法律的信。
On-site visits with Army and DIA, coupled with background data on Air Force, reveal an excellent start for the development of lateral relationships, utilization of computer and OCR technology, and innovative use of a mixture of civilian, military, contractor and reservist personnel. Each interviewee (identified at Appendix A) were appreciative of the OSD approach to concentrate on the policy level and to allow the separate agencies to solve the implementation problem from their level.
观察
This effort provided a snapshot in time of one aspect of what DoD declassification personnel are facing. Numerous government panels and working groups are attempting to deal with the complex issues of implementation. It was not the purpose of this study to replicate any of those issues. Indeed, the system appears to have adapted within DoD and is moving towards mission completion, albeit not at a pace that will meet the goals of EO 12958.
But there has been a cost. Significant resources, both dollars and manpower, have been pumped into the program. These resources have necessarily been diverted from other activities. The promising news is that the system should begin to self-correct in three to five years as the backlog is whittled away and the new life cycle classification systems begin to take effect. By then a much reduced (resource wise) system should be doing a consistent flow of work. The following observations are provided:
1.正在进行的辩论中的一个问题是公众开放与保密问题。令人不安的方面是一些“利益相关者”，非防卫或多损害机构的趋势，仅作为开放性的问题之一。这不是国防部的选择。这个问题是合法的保密和不再需要分类的问题。美国公民受到任何其他国防部优先事项的不适。为了开放，解密决定主要需要在价值与对抗组织的副公开披露中进行评估。通过建立DOD解密管理的基础，OSD将得到很好的服务。
Recommendations2.为所有解密专家提供适当信息的努力是将OPSEC审查纳入DOD解密指南的基本基础的理想机会。从对手的角度看解密将为解密专家提供审查信息总数的方法。这项OPSEC审查将允许继续保护信息，该信息通过汇编各种可能并不有价值的小型信息来为对手提供关键信息。目前，将解密专家授予可用的分类和解密指南，并倾向于将这些信息视为非常有限的数据。对手的潜在价值需要成为指导的基石。
3.同样，需要评估对特定解密方法的利用（修订和通过/失败审查）。如先前的发现中所述，窄点的修改很容易错过文档总体的真实智能值。尽管在非常具体的情况下，修订具有明确的利基市场 - 即狭窄的FOIA请求，但它可能会因未能考虑骨料的副品而失去其价值。使用通过/失败解密方法，可以使信息的总体更加焦点，并具有更大的成本效益来实施的额外好处。
4. Dodd 5200.30已过时。现在已经15岁了，鉴于新的EO，这可能是修改和重组的理想时机。解密的关键组成部分是代理权股票的问题及其处理方式。随着组件开始巩固，更新和交换其各种程序/活动解密指南，必须将指南具有特定的，并且很容易适用于DOD内外的所有人员。对于NARA和所有解密专家来说，拥有最新的DOD和组件指导尤其重要。
5.国防部需要在整个部门解密策略中研究和评估互联网的使用。如前所述，互联网已成为整个保密/解密问题的组成部分。问题成为如何有效利用此工具来促进DOD解密目标。首先，国防部必须确定一系列明确的特定目标；评估互联网的优势和劣势，然后制定达到这些目标的策略。为了假设模型，假设国防部目标是：
=> Conduct a declassification review of all 25 year old material
基于这些目标，人们将评估互联网的优势和劣势。=> Identify and segregate that material which should remain classified
=> Declassify and make available to the general public that material which no longer needs protection.
=> Manage FOIA reviews in the most cost effective manner
Strengths:
=> The use of the Internet provides a rapid and cost effective method for the dissemination of unclassified information.
Weaknesses:=>使用互联网可以通过提供诚意分心材料来减少对“秘密”的不受限制的公众需求
=>使用互联网可以将公共利益传达给已经适当解密的材料，并可能减少FOIA请求。
=>互联网的使用可能会产生反弹效应，并为更多的材料带来更加繁重的公众需求。通过提供可用材料的购物清单，可以促进更多的FOIA要求。
A strategy could then be devised by DoD and the components, based upon this evaluation, to implement a coherent and complimentary plan to achieve the declassification goals. For example:=> The use of the Internet could overwhelm the administrative system that processes inquiries. By providing documents that have been recently reviewed and declassified, it can magnify imperfections in the declassification system by making available declassified material out of historical context.
=>通过Internet可用的信息放大了解密系统的缺陷。例如，如果文档应以全文出现在网站上，但后来显示为已编辑文档，或者出于从另一个来源的分类原因拒绝发布，则将使整个系统受到质疑。
=> Openness: Discussion of balance between necessary secrecy and openness- i.e., continued classification of old nuclear test data to keep out of terrorist hands.
Central direction by OSD and close coordination with complimentary action by the components could effectively enhance the accomplishment of DoD declassification goals.=>转移：有趣的解密材料列表 - 即肯尼迪暗杀数据。
=>成本效益：在网站中向NARA的可用股份提供推荐。这将为研究人员提供有价值的信息，并有一个研究方向，这可能对他们来说是非常富有成效的，并有可能满足他们的要求，而无需对系统的其他部分征税。
6. NARA的分类RG330记录应由OSD审查。尽管不是本研究的一部分，但应对该小组进行调查，然后进行对解密审查的风险管理方法。优选地，这应该在OSD主持下进行，以确保应用正确的重点和彻底性。
7. Finally, this study seems to confirm that a great deal of material can certainly be declassified within 25 years. Conversely, a small but significant amount may have to remain classified indefinitely. However, periodic reviews driven by viable threat and risk management techniques should be the only determinate for that decision. As shown above, some information, especially in the weapons of mass destruction category, does not lose its value over time. Indeed some of the least sophisticated and oldest material is precisely of more value to a potential proliferator or terrorist. It only has to work. The simpler the better, especially if your resources, scientific and logistical infrastructure is lacking.
1.更新DOD解密指南。包括当前的一般解密说明，其中包含OPSEC流程并促进通过/失败解密系统的应用，并继续强调更新和传播特定组件和项目解密指南，可确保有效的解密计划。
2. Develop a comprehensive plan to utilize the Internet to achieve DoD declassification goals. This plan should be developed in concert with the components to ensure a unified approach.
3. Provide current DoD direction for the declassification of specific subject areas. The directive DoDD 5200.30, provides basic guidelines to the declassification community. Currently the directive is being used to provide a first cut at what subject areas require further review by specific agency/organization declassification specialists. The inclusion of current general instructions into a restructured directive or into the DoD Declassification Plan and the continued emphasis on the various agencies/organizations to ensure current declassification guidance is available for the specific projects and programs is essential for effective declassification of material.
4.对NARA的解密和分类RG330记录进行审查。根据EO 2000年的规定，将对机密记录进行审查。建议对记录进行完整的审查。但是，认识到解密社区内的资源限制，对记录的统计可行采样，并且在整个审查过程中都解决了OPSEC的疑虑，将提供有关当前敏感信息无意间发布给公众的信息。这些知识将提供一种为解密专家提供有关如何在将来审查材料的更具体指导的方法，并允许特定的信息恢复控制，以最大程度地减少可能发生的损害。
概括
Declassification of information that no longer needs to be protected is an excellent objective. Indeed a very large amount of the material reviewed appeared to be of no use - intelligence or otherwise. The 85 to 95% declassification ratio mentioned in my background reading seemed to hold up. However that is to be expected in records that are 45 to 50 years old. This does not mean releasing information solely based on age or extremely narrow review criteria. Some information or collection of information, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, does not lose its value with the passage of time. Indeed some of the least sophisticated and oldest material may be of most value to a potential proliferator. For instance, according to theDOE, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (1997), the Iraqi nuclear program was based on obsolete U.S. 1940's technology.
Given all the above we need to keep certain facts in mind.
- 有些材料，无论多大，都应该受到保护。
- As we come up to the timeline of material to review, the 85 to 95% declassification ratio will probably drop. This is simply a matter of relevancy to the present.
- An OPSEC oriented approach to declassification management will markedly enhance the program. The declassification specialists should review the documents from the view of the adversary and consider what information the adversary needs to effectively advance their objectives.
Appendix A 马里兰州大学公园的国家档案与记录管理局记录解密司司令总监让·舒布尔（Jean Schauble）。Interviews
LTC Gary Moore, Operations Officer, U.S. Army Declassification Activity, Arlington, VA.
[删除了国防情报机构的一名受访者的名字]