准备好的Hon。斯蒂芬霍恩如下：] [图文] [TIFF省略] T8230.001 [图文] [TIFF省略] T8230.002 Horn先生。现在，我们将在证人宣誓，并有谢斯先生，我们有吉尔曼先生 - 先生。吉尔曼对致开幕词。吉尔曼先生。谢谢主席号角。我很欣赏今天亮相的机会，我要感谢委员会进行这项重要的审查。我很失望，对于需要举行这类听证会。美国中央情报局和我国政府的情报界的其他元素持有的整体防卫作战计划的需要和安全需要一个很重要的地方。通过情报界就其性质元素占用代表我们整个民族的不寻常的信任的地方。他们有一个特殊的责任，既要妥善保管资料，自己处理，并提供监督国会充分，适当的信息。 While I acknowledge that this is a difficult balancing act, it is important that we protect the freedom and the openness of our Nation, symbolically and literally the leader of the Free World. That kind of responsibility requires accountability, largely achieved through the checks and balances of our three distinct and sometimes competing branches of government. We look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses who are here today. As needed, I want to work for an effective system of oversight that both fully supports the principle of free and open society and yet simultaneously fully protects the elements of information from disclosure that would damage our Nation's safety and security. And I want particularly to welcome the former chairman of our International Relations Committee, Congressman Lee Hamilton, now Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and James Woolsey, the former Director of the CIA, as well as our other distinguished witnesses who are here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you. And now I'll turn to our cochairman for this hearing, Mr. Shays, the gentleman from Connecticut, who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the Government Reform Committee. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Chairman Horn. Like you, the members of the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee would much rather conduct a hearing about constructive oversight findings than about obstructions to our oversight process. But when faced with persistent, institutionalized agency resistance to legitimate inquiries, we're compelled to reassert our authority, under the Rules of the House, to review the operation of government activities at all levels. In 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], adopted a self-described "hard-line" approach to congressional oversight inquiries, particularly General Accounting Office [GAO], reviews not initiated by the Select Intelligence Committees. The policy attempted to draw a bright-line between sharing intelligence products with congressional committees and submitting to any oversight which the agency believes will compromise the sources and methods of intelligence gathering. Based on that dated, distorted concept of oversight, CIA refuses to discuss its approaches to governmentwide management reforms and fiscal accountability practices. Other intelligence agencies share information freely. Blinded by its own bright- line, the CIA often stands alone in refusing routine congressional requests for data, even going so far as attempting to persuade other agencies to resist as well. The CIA position that congressional oversight jurisdiction is limited to the Select Intelligence Committees is not supported by the law, is not supported by House Rules and is not supported by sound public policy. National security will be enhanced, not undermined, by the full exercise of congressional oversight authority. We have no interest in examining the sources and methods of intelligence gathering and analysis. But we do have a keen interest in how effectively and efficiently the CIA and other intelligence agencies manage human capital, manage fiscal resources and meet statutory program objectives. The bottom line: The source of all CIA funding is the American taxpayer and the methods of management efficiency and accountability must be within the purview of this and other committees of Congress. Symptomatic of the CIA's misguided perception of its responsibilities to Congress, the agency would not even cooperate this morning by providing a witness to discuss why they won't cooperate. I find that outrageous. But we do welcome a panel of most distinguished witnesses to discuss the indispensability of broad-based and far-reaching oversight of the intelligence community. Every one of our witnesses is very qualified to speak on this subject, and I, as the chairman of the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee, am grateful to each and every one of you for being here and regret deeply the lack of cooperation of the CIA in even responding to basic questions about cooperation. [The准备好的Hon。Christopher Shays.遵循：] [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.003 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.004 Horn先生。我感谢绅士。我介绍了他的言论，来自中央情报局的两份文件。第一个是约会的1994年7月7日，中央情报总监的备忘录。它来自Stanley M. Moskowitz，国会事务总监，主题是中央情报肯定对普通会计办事处的政策肯定。现在，正如我们所知，他们是调查的大会，方案审计;他们为国会行事，他们为这些委员会和其他小组委员会采取行动。[所提到的信息如下：] [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.005 [TIFF省略] T8230.006 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.007 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.008 [图形]] [tiff略省略] t8230.009 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.010 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.011 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.012 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.013先生喇叭。下一个文件是来自乔治A. Tenet，中央情报总监，向斯蒂芬霍恩，董事长，政府效率，财务管理和政府间关系，2001年7月17日日期为7月17日。[信中提及如下：] [图文] [TIFF省略] T8230.014 [图文] [TIFF省略] T8230.015 [图文] [TIFF省略] T8230.016 Horn先生。现在，我们将在宣誓证人，和我分享谢斯先生和吉尔曼先生的感觉，即我们今天在这里优良的面板，我们很感激你知道很多中央情报局的历史，你们俩有在服务我们的国家，还与国会合作表现出极大的专业知识。所以，如果你起立，举起右手，工作人员背后高。[证人宣誓。] Horn先生。店员会注意到，所有的都肯定，或者是说，现在我们将开始 - 当然第一个，朋友每个人都在国会，这就是尊敬的汉密尔顿，谁是国际关系委员会的很多年董事长，现为伍德罗·威尔逊国际学者中心的主任，是前任主席，在众议院情报常设特别委员会。汉密尔顿先生。 STATEMENT OF LEE H. HAMILTON, DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS; DIRECTOR, CENTER ON CONGRESS AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA Mr. Hamilton. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Shays, Mr. Gilman. It's a pleasure to be with you. I always thought it was a little easier to sit up there and ask the questions than it is to sit down here and answer them, and I'm quite confident of that this morning, but I'm very pleased to be with you. Let me make a few opening comments about the way I approach the question that the chairman has raised, and Mr. Gilman and Mr. Shays. First of all, I think we all agree that good intelligence is essential for the security of the country. U.S. policy has to be based on the most accurate information available, and on correct prediction insofar as that is possible. Good intelligence does not guarantee good policy, but bad or poor intelligence almost certainly guarantees bad policy. A Nation without intelligence is like a person without eyes and ears. Good intelligence is essential. Second, the tasks that we assign to the intelligence community today are simply overwhelming--enormous, varied, expanding. The old proverb says that only a fool would make a prediction, especially about the future. But the problem, of course, is that we ask the CIA to make not just one, but hundreds of predictions, every week; and we want them to be as accurate as possible. And the toughest thing in the world to predict is intentions, and we ask the CIA to predict that all of the time. I believe that our intelligence capabilities are very good--always room for improvement. I believe that the people who work at our intelligence agencies are highly talented and dedicated people. Jim Woolsey was an outstanding Director of the CIA, but he represents many hundreds, thousands of others who do marvelous work for the country. I support the greater openness on the part of the intelligence community. I think the intelligence community should be forthcoming in making available information on its work and the role that it plays in shaping U.S. policy. Let me just say a word about the importance of oversight by the Congress of the intelligence community. My view, I gather your view, is that the intelligence community needs very strong, very vigorous, independent oversight; and the Congress is the only body that can really give independent oversight of the executive branch under our current laws, structures and practices. The intelligence community is enormously large. It's very complicated and it is hugely expensive. In this town, information is power and the intelligence community has tremendous power to influence policy. Intelligence is an area of great temptation for a President. Presidents can be tempted, I should say, to manipulate intelligence to influence the policy debate. I think oftentimes the executive sees intelligence as a tool to make policy look good, rather than a tool for making good policy. Presidents often resort to the intelligence information they have, to the CIA, for covert actions when they're frustrated by obstacles to their policies. So Congress, in a sense, stands between the President and the misuse of intelligence by the intelligence community and by the executive branch. The congressional role in oversight--I'll get down to that more specifically--is limited, but extremely important for some of the reasons I have suggested. Unlike other Federal issues, Federal agencies, the intelligence community does not receive the kind of close scrutiny independent of the President that almost every other policy does. There's very little media coverage of the intelligence community. There are very few academic studies of the intelligence community. There are no, or at least not a large number of lobbying groups for the intelligence community. Most of the meetings they have occur in secret, without public input and isolated from most Members of Congress. There is an Inspector General of the CIA. There is a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Those are appointed by the President, not independent of the President. And intelligence is a very arcane business. So I think oversight is very important. If the Congress fails to identify the problems in intelligence, they may go unspotted. And while they have been a very good agency in many respects, the CIA over a period of years has also been a very troubled agency. At one point, not long ago I think, they had five Directors in 7 years. You can't possibly manage that shop over there with five Directors in 7 years. It's just too big and too complicated. The intelligence community has not, I can assure you, come easily to the idea of congressional oversight, but I believe they have come to that; and that's an important fact. Now, as I understand the law today--and it's quite extraordinary really that you have this massive intelligence community and yet you do not have any fundamental charter or law. We've tried to draft a charter for the intelligence community several times and never succeeded, but there are a number of pieces of legislation. There are a lot of rules and practices that have been put into place over the period of the last few decades that set the framework, if you would, for oversight of the intelligence community. The law provides that the executive keep the House and Senate intelligence community committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, and that judgment, as to whether it's fully informed or currently informed, is a judgment the Congress has to make, not the intelligence community. The law provides that illegal and failed activity be reported in a timely way and, of course, it has a special provision with regard to covert actions. It's an extremely difficult problem of oversight because the intelligence committees are given legislative, investigative, and authorization authority over the intelligence community. They have exclusive jurisdiction of the CIA, but they share jurisdiction with other agencies, for example, the Department of Defense and NSA, DIA, State, Energy. So it's a very complex pattern that you have over oversight of the intelligence community. There are a lot of benefits from oversight. I don't think I need to go into that, because I know very well the chairman's position on that. The Congress conducts that oversight, of course, through the budget process. I think the great task is to strike a balance between the need to ensure accountability and the intelligence community's need to gather and protect information. It's the balance between oversight and secrecy. It is not an easy task. You will never get it right completely, but you have to keep working at it. And sometimes the Congress is a partner of the intelligence community, sometimes it's a critic, sometimes it's an advocate for the intelligence community, sometimes it's a watchdog; and those roles are very hard to keep in balance. My view--and I'll conclude with this, Mr. Chairman--is that the Congress has to get information it needs from the intelligence community. Congress should be the judge of that. We have in place today a structure that has been developed over a period of decades really, where the information from the CIA is provided to the intelligence committees. Then the intelligence committees must decide how that information is made available to other Members of the Congress. This system doesn't work perfectly, but my judgment is, it works reasonably well. And I do feel it is possible there may be a better way to do it, but we ought not to go to another way in an ad hoc manner by this subcommittee or that subcommittee or this committee or that committee demanding information from the CIA. If you really want to change the way you do oversight of the intelligence community, then it has to be approached, it seems to me, in a very coherent, comprehensive way to change the structure that was put in place over the past few decades-- a structure of law, a structure of precedent, a structure of practice. And the question of sharing intelligence information outside of the intelligence committees to other members is always a very sensitive question in this institution and one that has created tensions as long as I can recall. So the bottom line is that I think the system that we have certainly calls out for improvement. It's working reasonably well, but be careful not to throw it out unless you have something to put in its place that has been carefully, comprehensively, coherently thought about. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We appreciate the wisdom you had during the Congress and after Congress. We now have the Honorable James Woolsey, who was a former Director of the CIA from 1993 to 1996 and was, again, highly respected here in both parties for his openness and his willingness to relate to people. Thank you very much. STATEMENT OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY, PARTNER, SHEA & GARDNER, AND FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me today. I was Director of Central Intelligence for 2 years early in the Clinton administration. I also, however, in an earlier incarnation, was General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 3 years. So I have seen this issue from both Capitol Hill and the executive branch; and the views, obviously, that I express today are only those of a private citizen and lawyer who got out the rule book and looked at it and tried to decide what he thought. And I thank you for inviting me. This current issue apparently arose from the question of how this committee could investigate and assess and conduct oversight in connection with the cyberthreat to our government computers; and I would say, first of all, that I can think of no overall issue that is more substantively important to the Government right now than this. It is something that is of absolutely vital importance. It's an area that I've been working on for some time as a private lawyer. I think such issues as whether fire walls, for example, can effectively protect computers is of extraordinary importance. I don't believe they're very effective, and I think that this committee's assessment of the best ways for government computers and government networks to be protected would be extremely important. This procedural question of exactly how and under what circumstances what information should be provided to committees of the Congress other than the House and Senate Select Committees--the Permanent Select Committee and the Select Committee and the two Appropriations Committees is also an important and rather difficult one. First of all, let me say, when I was Director of Central Intelligence, I certainly did not neglect the Congress; and I don't know any Director, really, who can or should. Congress was in session 185 days in calendar 1993, my first year as Director, and I had 195 appointments on the Hill that year, 10 more than the days Congress was in session, so on average, I was up here more than once a day. At one point, for example, I sat beside one of my analysts for 29 hours, before a number of different committees, because his judgment about Haiti had been called into question; and we answered questions from a large number of individual Congressmen, mainly Senators, on precisely what type of judgments we had made about President Aristide and why. Any Director of Central Intelligence should spend a good deal of time on the Hill, and he owes not just his two oversight committees and two appropriations committees, but the Congress as a whole, I think, what information he can provide and what help he can provide from the intelligence community. Now, it's my understanding that a few weeks ago Larry Gershwin, an extraordinarily able national intelligence officer, testified on cyberthreat trends and U.S. network security before, I believe it was, the Joint Economic Committee. Now, this is, of course, the principal way in which the CIA provides information to the Congress; it provides intelligence product. And it is an issue, it seems to me, what the words of the House rules mean with respect to what other information is provided to congressional committees. Rule 10, and in it clause 11, does say, as the chairman noted at the beginning, that nothing in this clause, clause 11, restricts other committees such as this one from reviewing intelligence activities or intelligence products. But I think one has to note that this right is circumscribed, at least as I read the rules, by a provision in clause 3, not clause 11, which limits exclusively to the House Permanent Select Committee the right to oversee sources and methods. The way I read those two clauses is that the exclusive right to oversee sources and methods essentially trumps the right of other committees to review intelligence activities or products. So, in my mind, this whole issue comes down to the question of what is a "method of the CIA" in clause 3, it is a method of the entity, the CIA, that is at issue. Now, some of my colleagues this morning have read this limitation, this word "method" in a quite limited way. Mr. Eland, in his prepared testimony, on pages 8 and 9, says that the CIA's method of protecting its own computers should be regarded no differently by the Congress than its assessment of the foreign threat. And Colonel Smith limits methods to collection methods, that is, whether one is taking photographs or reading lips, for example. I don't read "methods of the CIA" that narrowly. I must say, it seems to me that the method by which the CIA protects its computers from intrusion is a method of the CIA. Now, I fully agree it is up to the House to decide how to interpret its own rules, but I understand the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has a different view than this committee with respect to the breadth, or lack thereof, of the meaning of the word "method." Now, let me say why I believe briefing on the foreign threat, as Mr. Gershwin did before the Joint Economic Committee, rather than reviewing the CIA's method of maintaining its own computer security, is an understandable way for the Congress to operate. If one takes the members of the House Permanent Select Committee and the Senate Select Committee and of the two Appropriations Subcommittees for Defense, which cover intelligence, one has 72 Members of the Congress and 80 staff members, that's 152 people on the Hill who today are charged with intelligence oversight. Those 72 Members constitute 13 percent of the entire membership of the Congress. If one adds this committee's and its parallel committee in the other body, Senate Governmental Affairs members and staff, one adds 58 Members and 193 staff members to the total that would be engaged in overseeing the CIA. That's now a total of 403 people on Capitol Hill, and would constitute 24 percent of the Members of the House and Senate. There are at least two other committees that have an understandable interest in overseeing some aspect of what the CIA does, House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations and House and Senate Armed Services. If one adds the 149 members of those committees and the 219 staff members, one gets an added 368 individuals who would be involved in overseeing the CIA. That would be a total of some 760-770 individuals on Capitol Hill, and if you deduct the Members who are on more than one of those committees, the way my numbers came out is that you would end up with 49.5 percent of the Members of Congress, one-half of the Members of Congress involved in overseeing the CIA if the Government Reform, Government Affairs, International Relations, Armed Services, as well as the Intelligence Committees and Appropriations Committees were involved. Now, there may be some way, there may be some structure whereby a change in the process could be worked out and whereby, as former Chairman Hamilton said, a reform, a systematic reform of the whole process should be undertaken. I don't write off that possibility, but I must say that if one goes at this piecemeal and looks to just each individual committee or subcommittee in Government Reform, Government Affairs, International Relations, Foreign Relations, Armed Services that may have some understandable interest, and if one interprets the word "method" quite narrowly, so that pretty much anything that the CIA does other than a collection source or a collection method is subject to oversight from the other committees of the Congress, you are on a track to having half of the Members of the Congress and some 760 people on Capitol Hill engaged in CIA oversight. I do not think that would be wise. So I would identify myself with Chairman Hamilton's closing words, that I believe the current system works reasonably well and that it should only be reformed if it is reformed in some systematic and thorough and overall way, rather than piecemeal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. Mr. Shays. Thank you Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Hinton, I think what we'll do is wait for Mr. Horn to come back. He left early so we could continue the flow, but I think what we'll do is, we'll go and vote. So we'll recess for a second, but as soon as he gets back he'll start with you. Thank you. So we stand in recess. [Recess.] Mr. Horn. The recess is over. If you don't mind Mr. Woolsey, I heard you put a few details in the record here and I may be, I'd just like it for my benefit to get a repeat on that. Mr. Woolsey. Surely. Do you mean now? Mr. Horn. Sure. Mr. Woolsey. I said several things but let me focus on two. One was that although this is a difficult and complicated issue, and I fully understand the substantive reasons behind the committee's interest in this very important area, I think we come down to a reading of the House rules. And as I read them, and as I said, this is nothing more than a private citizen's reading. The authority for other committees to review intelligence activities and products are the words in clause 11 of rule 10; and nothing in this clause, i.e., clause 11, as the rule states, restricts nonintelligence committees from reviewing intelligence activities and products. But the exclusive basis for the House Permanent Select Committee's jurisdiction over reviewing sources and methods of the CIA occurs in clause 3, not clause 11, and the way I read that interaction is that their exclusive basis with respect to sources and methods essentially trumps the provisions in clause 11. So the question comes, what is a "method?" If an intelligence method is relatively limited, if it is as limited as Colonel Smith says in his testimony that he limits it essentially to collection methods, that is, whether you are learning something through photographs or through lip reading; and Mr. Eland says on pages 8 and 9 of his testimony that there should be no difference between the CIA's way or method of protecting its own computers, then the threat--that is, both of those--should be fully reviewable by other committees. I must say, I read the word "method" more broadly. I believe that it is entirely plausible to contend that a "method of the CIA" includes its method of protecting its data; and under that reading, the way I would read it is that the House Permanent Select Committee's jurisdiction is exclusive with respect to the agency's methods. Now, I agreed with Chairman Hamilton with respect to any reform needing to be--of the process or the oversight process needing to be an overall, systematic reform rather than something that is done piecemeal; and my illustration on that was the following: If one takes the House Permanent Select Committee and the House Appropriations Subcommittee that deals with intelligence together with the sister committees in the other body, you have 72 Members and 80 staff members who are involved in intelligence oversight, now 152 people, and those 72 Members are 13 percent of the membership of the Congress. If one adds the members and the staff of the House Government Reform Committee and Senate Governmental Affairs, you get up to 403 people and 24 percent of the Members of the Congress; and if one adds in the members and staff of House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations and House and Senate Armed Services, which I think have a plausible claim to being interested in perhaps some oversight responsibility for the intelligence community, under a broad reading you get up to right at 50 percent of the Members of the Congress and about 760 individuals, not counting the GAO if it gets into the business, who are involved in overseeing the CIA. And I think those numbers suggest that one should move toward an oversight role for other committees only as part of some overall evaluation rather than a piecemeal step, because, I for one, don't see a way to draw a line between this subcommittee's responsibilities and other committees of Government Reform or Senate Governmental Affairs, or for that matter, many of the interests of House International Relations, Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees. So, anyway, those were the main points, I think, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much. We'll now proceed with the third witness, Mr. Hinton. Henry Hinton is the Managing Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the General Accounting Office. The General Accounting Office works for the Congress of the United States and is a creature of the Congress, and we give a lot of assignments to them on many aspects in the executive branch. And we welcome you here today. STATEMENT OF HENRY L. HINTON, JR., MANAGING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Mr. Hinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to be here to discuss the subject of GAO access to information at the CIA. I will focus my comments this morning on our authority to review CIA programs and the status of our access to CIA information. On the subject of authority, as with all Federal programs, Congress has given us broad authority to evaluate CIA programs. In reality, however, we face both legal and practical limitations on our ability to review these programs. For example, we have no access to certain CIA unvouchered accounts, that is, expenditures of a confidential or emergency nature that are accounted for solely on the certification of the Director. We cannot compel our access to foreign intel and counterintelligence information. In addition, as a practical matter, we are limited by the CIA's level of cooperation, which has varied throughout the years. We have not actively audited the CIA since the early 1960's, when we discontinued such work because the CIA was not providing us with sufficient access to information to perform our mission. The issue has arisen since then, from time to time, as our work has required some level of access to CIA programs and information. Most recently, in 1994, the CIA Director sought to further limit our audit work of intelligence programs, including those at DOD. In doing so, the CIA has maintained that the Congress intended the Select Intelligence Committees to be the exclusive means of oversight of the CIA. This action by the CIA Director has effectively precluded oversight by us. Given a lack of requests from the Congress for us to do work in this area and with our limited resources, we have made a conscious decision not to pursue this issue. On the subject of the status of our current access, today, our dealings with the CIA are mostly limited to requesting information that relates to governmentwide reviews or analyses of threats to the U.S. national security on which the CIA might have some information. The CIA either provides us with the requested information, provides the information with some restrictions or does not provide the information at all. In general, we are most successful at getting access to CIA information when we request threat assessments, and the CIA does not perceive our audits or evaluations as oversight of its activities. For example, in our review of chemical and biological terrorist threats that we did for Chairman Shays, we requested, and the CIA provided us, access into formation on their threat assessments and access to the analysts that prepared them. On the other hand, for our review of classified computer systems in the Federal Government, we requested basic information on the number and nature of such systems. In this case, and as you referred to in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the CIA did not provide us the requested information, claiming that they would not be able to participate in the review because the type of information is under the purview of the congressional entities charged with overseeing the intelligence community. My written statement has other examples in it. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, our access to CIA information and programs has been limited by both legal and practical factors. Today, our access is generally limited to obtaining information on threat assessments when the CIA does not perceive our audits as oversight of its activities. We foresee no major change in our current access without substantial support from Congress. Congressional impetus for change would have to include the support of the Intelligence Committees, who have generally not requested GAO reviews or evaluations of CIA activities. With such support, we could evaluate some of the basic management functions at CIA that we now evaluate throughout the Government. That concludes my statement Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. [The准备了亨先生的声明遵循：] [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.017 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.018 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.019 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.020 [图形] [tiff省略]t8230.021 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.022 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.023 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.024 [图形] [tiff省略] t8230.025 [图形] [tiff省略]T8230.026 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.027 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.028 Horn先生。我们的下一个见证人是CATO学院国防政策研究总监伊凡·埃兰德。伊冯政策研究主任伊万·埃兰德·伊兰科兰先生。谢谢主席和委员会其他成员。很高兴在委员会面前出现在这一重要课题上提出了我的言论。与保障敏感情报信息一样重要，是CIA，智力界和行政部门，宪法共和国存在更高的担忧。Reacting to European monarchs who ran foreign and military policy, often disastrously and with few constraints imposed by their subjects, the founders of the American Nation enshrined in the U.S. Constitution a vital role for Congress, the arm of the people in foreign and national security policy. James Madison noted that experience showed that checks and balances within the Government were needed to guard against the Founders' greatest fear, the risky accumulation of power in one branch of government. In short, Madison wrote, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." The checks and balances written into the Constitution, which go to the heart of a constitutional republican form of government, ensure that no branch of government can dominate U.S. foreign and defense policy. Thus, Congress has vital oversight responsibilities for executive branch agencies involved in foreign affairs and national security, including CIA and the intelligence community. Even in a constitutional republic, however, some secrecy in foreign affairs and defense is needed, obviously; but when secrecy and accountability clash, which the presumption should be with accountability, accountability should be especially preferred in the lower external threat environment of a postcold war world. Unlike most other government entities, the intelligence agencies get only limited scrutiny from the media, the public, conflicting interest groups and the courts. Also, U.S. Government secrets are not the exclusive property of the executive branch. Congressional committees are entitled to, and also have a duty to examine them to ensure that the secretive intelligence community is acting in the interests of the people it is supposed to be defending. Of course, we have well-known instances where the intelligence agency did not act in this fashion. For those reasons, congressional oversight by more than just the small and too easily co-opted, in my opinion, intelligence committees is especially vital. However, in most cases accountability does not run afoul of secrecy. In fact, in this case, the Government Reform Committee is trying to ensure that the CIA's computer systems adequately secure the sensitive information. In fact, in recent decades, the trend has been to expand the circle of those responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. The expansion of oversight is even more appropriate now that the worldwide Communist menace has collapsed. To help guide the House committees in performing oversight, the Rules of the House delineate special oversight functions for various committees. In that part of the Rules, clause (3)(1), the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "shall review and study on a continuing basis laws, programs and activities of the intelligence community and shall review and study on an exclusive basis the sources and methods," of agencies of the intelligence community, including CIA. The phrase "on an exclusive basis" is very telling because the exclusive purview of the House Intelligence Committees is restricted to examining sources and methods. By implication, the other committees can study laws, programs and activities of the intelligence community, for example, CIA cybersecurity. If "sources and methods" is broadly read as Mr. Woolsey states, then why is the "on an exclusive basis" clause needed at all? The other committees can't review anything under this interpretation anyway, because the CIA method is all-encompassing. My interpretation fits well with another passage in the House Rules that specifically governs the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, clause 11(b)3. It says, "Nothing in this clause shall be construed as prohibiting or otherwise restricting authority of any other committee to study and review an intelligence or intelligence-related activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of that committee." Once again, "sources and methods" is normally taken to mean "collection." If "method" is read broadly, as Mr. Woolsey states, why even put this clause in at all? Everything is a method, and so other committees besides the Intelligence Committees cannot review anything. Those same House Rules give the Government Reform Committee broad oversight over the operation of the executive branch agencies. Clause 3(e) states, "The Committee on Government Reform shall review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels with a view to determining their economy and efficiency." That's a pretty broad purview. So it's been very clear from the time of the creation of the Intelligence Committees in the late 1970's that they did not have exclusive jurisdiction over intelligence and intelligence-related activities or access to intelligence products; the mere name, Select Committee, indicates that. The House Rules seem very clear on that point. But if any dispute over internal House jurisdictions occurs, it should be between the intelligence community and another committee, not between the CIA and the other committee. The CIA should allow congressional committees to interpret rules made by their own Chamber, and in fact, maybe outside experts ought to let the committees work this out as well. In short, the CIA appears to have no basis for its refusal to testify before the Government Reform Committee. The Government Reform Committee's effort to investigate CIA's cybersecurity seems to be well within its constitutional responsibilities and its jurisdiction under the House Rules to review government economy and efficiency. Furthermore, as long as the committee refrains from directly examining the CIA "sources and methods of intelligence"--and I read this to be "collection," which is unlikely in an investigation of the CIA's cybersecurity, the committee seems to have a compelling case under the Rules for examining the agency's intelligence activities and products during its investigation. That concludes my verbal statement. I'll be happy to answer questions at the appropriate time. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. [The伊兰德先生的发言稿遵循：] [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.029 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.030 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.031 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.032 [图形] [TIFF省略]T8230.033 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.034 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.035 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.036 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.037 [图形] [TIFF省略]T8230.038 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.039 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.040 [图形] [TIFF省略] T8230.041 Horn先生。我们在椅子上的最后一个演示者是Daniel M. Smith上校，这是一个西点学员在智力分配中花了很多时间。所以我们欢迎您在这里，史密斯上校，并将欣赏您希望给委员会的任何建议。美国丹尼尔M.史密斯上校的陈述（RET。），研究中心，史密斯的国防信息中心。谢谢主席先生。我的言论将来自信息收集者，完成智能的用户，最后但并非最不重要的是，作为普通公民。作为职业军事情报官，我留下了偏见，支持美国政府保持秘密信息，如果该信息已知，它认为它可能会对对手或竞争对手有所帮助。政府也有利于收集有关其他国家和外国人的资料，以了解谅解，如果可能的话，影响这些国家和个人的行为。 How and on what basis these decisions are made also is information that needs to be protected. On the other hand, as a career citizen of the United States, a status that preceded and postdated my military service, I have a bias in favor of maximum openness in government, including justification of actions taken or not taken on behalf of myself and other citizens. Although there are legitimate security reasons to withhold information from the general public, such as sources and methods used to acquire information on which decisions are based, the threshold for withholding information from the elected representatives of the people must be significantly higher than for the general public. Otherwise, the Congress can never know for sure whether it is carrying out its sworn duty to protect the public's general welfare against potential government intrusion into areas protected by the Constitution, and to properly allocate resources among the various legitimate requirements of the Nation in general and the intelligence agencies in particular. This subcommittee can, I believe, exercise oversight in intelligence activities from the standpoint of efficiency and fiscal management without increasing the possibility that sensitive information inadvertently will be revealed. Considering the size of the intelligence community itself, I am not overwhelmed by the possible numbers cited by Director Woolsey of those with an interest in oversight of intelligence activities. While there is a legitimate security requirement to limit the dissemination of sensitive information and material on a need-to-know basis, such need-to-know restrictions must be carefully evaluated to ensure they do not become an excuse to withhold information arbitrarily or to conceal failures or even misdeeds. Making information usable to different levels of Government, and even to the public, by blending in as many sources and methods as possible and screening out information that could only come from restricted sources is a job of professional intelligence analysts. Judging how well they are doing and whether priorities and expenditures are in line with the perceived threats is the job of Congress, and for that, Congress needs to have access and to hear from--in executive session if necessary--knowledgeable representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you. [The准备史密斯的陈述声明下面是：【图形】【TIFF省略】T8230.042【图形】【TIFF省略】T8230.043【图形】【TIFF省略】T8230.044【图形】【TIFF省略】T8230.045霍恩先生。现在，我们将听取我的同事、政府效率、财务管理和政府间关系小组委员会少数族裔首席成员沙科夫斯基女士的开幕词。沙考斯基女士。谢谢主席先生。我感谢你和谢斯先生召开今天的听证会，强调中情局为进行必要和有效的国会监督而设置的一些障碍。我真的很荣幸能和这个专家小组在一起，我想说的是，特别是对汉密尔顿先生，一个我敬佩了很长时间的人，我感谢你所有知情的证词。我相信在座的每一位成员都至少有一个对中情局感到沮丧和不愿合作的故事。4月20日，一架美国传教飞机在秘鲁上空被击落，机上的美国公民遇害，当中央情报局没有出席刑事司法听证会时，走道两边的成员都感到震惊，毒品政策和人力资源小组委员会审查导致这一悲剧的情况。我特别关注的是，根据与中情局的合同，私人军事人员负责提供导致击落事件的信息，因此我打电话给中情局询问一些问题。在我本人以及我的员工多次打电话之后，该机构的一个人终于打电话通知我，不会向我提供任何信息，该机构也不会确认或否认任何参与。作为负责表决是否允许此类项目存在的国会议员和众议院监督委员会成员，我感到困惑和愤怒。一名美国公民和她的幼女被杀，美国扮演了重要角色，现在我们有一个机构告诉国会不要管闲事。这是我们的事，我想我们需要一些答案。因此，主席先生，我和你一样感到沮丧，并敦促你与伯顿主席合作，传唤你所要求的信息。我仍在等待中情局关于秘鲁上空被击落事件的细节，我相信委员会还应该传唤所有与击落传教士飞机有关的录音带、录像带、成绩单和其他材料。中情局甚至没有遵守最基本的法律原则，这证明了中情局需要更多地遵守调查和调查。中情局不仅拒绝承认国会的权利，而且常常不遵守保护公众的法律。1998年，大赦国际向中央情报局提交了一份《信息自由法》请求，要求提供美国可能与哥伦比亚军事集团Los Pepes有联系的信息。《信息自由法》的要求直到一个多月前——1998年到一个月前——才得到答复，当时大赦国际除了提起诉讼外别无选择。根据《信息自由法》的条款，每个美国机构都有义务在10天内作出回应。中情局花了3年时间，无数的新闻报道和一本关于这个主题的非常成功的书，还有一场诉讼，他们说他们既不能“确认也不能否认记录的存在或不存在”。顺便说一句，大赦国际正试图揭露的是，关于可能与美国机构勾结实施暗杀的贩毒恐怖分子的信息应该成为每个成员最关心的问题。去年秋天，我散发了一封寄给克林顿总统的信，要求对这些令人不安的指控进行调查。我意识到这听起来更像是电影情节而不是现实生活，但不幸的是，这条故事线已经成为公众和国会对该机构看法的特点。很难站在一个拒绝合作、似乎靠拖延来发展的机构后面，因此我非常感谢你提出的更全面的方法的建议，并期待着与主席、两位主席合作，以解决我们的一些关切。非常感谢。霍恩先生。我感谢这位来自伊利诺伊州的女士。现在我要先问汉密尔顿先生一些问题。你提到了独立监督，据我所知，众议院情报人员常设特别委员会包括一些现任和前任中情局人员。我理解这对委员会职责的某些方面如何重要，但这种密切关系是否会妨碍委员会进行独立监督的能力？汉密尔顿先生。主席先生，我认为对中央情报局总是有很大的怀疑，当然是美国公众，但也有众议院非议员ReportsReportsof the committee. And I think it's the responsibility of the House Permanent Select Committee to, No. 1, do everything they can to conduct extremely rigorous, vigorous oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency, hold their feet to the fire, make them report on incidents like the Peru airplane incident, in very great detail. Now, the problem has always been to what extent does the select committee share information with other members, and, quite frankly, that's a part of oversight that has never been worked out very well; and it's an internal matter, it seems to me, that has to be worked on and resolved. I think the Intelligence Committee needs to be responsive to Members of Congress who are not members of the Intelligence Committee. You raised the question kind of an incestuous relationship, I guess, between staff and the Intelligence Community. To some extent that may exist, but I think there also are a good many staffers there that are quite independent of it. Let me emphasize again how important I think that independence is, because the President has the Foreign Intelligence Board. He appoints all those members. Very rarely in my experience will that Board step forward and say, Mr. President, the CIA, or some other aspects of our Intelligence Community, is out of bounds. The only independent oversight that this massive Intelligence Community gets is the Congress, and so it is important that oversight be done very rigorously and that it not fall prey to what the chairman is asking here, that it become co-opted by the Intelligence Community. You have to keep working at that. I mean it's something you just have to keep working at. Incidentally, that's one reason you have a limitation on the terms of the members of the House Select Committee, the argument being that if you have a permanent membership, that relationship becomes too cozy. Mr. Horn. Mr. Woolsey, during your tenure, did the CIA provide detailees to the congressional Intelligence Committees, and what was their role? Mr. Woolsey. I remember one to the Senate committee that was requested by the Senate, but I don't remember any others. I'd have to go back and look, Mr. Chairman, but I don't recall more than one at this point. Mr. Horn. Do you recall any other Directors before your position that did that? Mr. Woolsey. I don't know. I got the impression that it was done from time to time but wasn't all that common. I don't remember retired CIA members, officers who were on the committees when I was Director, except, again, one. There might have been more, but certainly most of the staffers were not either detailees or former CIA. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, if I may just observe, an awful lot of the work of the Intelligence Committee is highly technical, and you do need on the staff of that committee people who have detailed knowledge of satellites and all kinds of technological miracles. You don't pick that up on the street. You get it from people that have worked in that area. And so the problem that you raise, I think, is a real one. The flip side of it is that the committee has to have staff that can go head to head with the Intelligence Community experts on all of their technology. Mr. Horn. Would that be your policy also, Mr. Woolsey? Mr. Woolsey. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It's up to the committee chairman who he picks. I've been out of the CIA for 6\1/2\ years. I've testified before both committees, and my experience has been that the occasional staff member who has background in the Intelligence Community, whether it's CIA or otherwise, his loyalty is owed to the chairman of the committee. Also they have always been vigorous in their questioning and the like. Mr. Horn. And you believe you had close relationships with the detailees? Did either your staff director or you sort of keep track of them? Mr. Woolsey. You mean when I was Director? Mr. Horn. Right. Mr. Woolsey. I don't remember who they were, and I certainly didn't keep close track of them. My relations were with the chairman, the members, and occasionally with staff. And I had with my two House committee chairmen, Congressman Glickman and Appropriations Subcommittee chairman, Congressman Murtha, excellent relations with them and the staff. That didn't mean that they didn't question me vigorously, but we got along fine. On the Senate side I got along fine with my appropriations chairman, Senator Inouye. The Senate Select Committee chairman, Senator DeConcini, and I were another matter. But what gave an overall cast to my relations with the four committees I dealt with was not the former status of any of the staff members, but it was dealings with the chairman and the ranking member. Mr. Horn. Did either one of you use the General Accounting Office to conduct reviews in terms of the work of the committee? Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, my recollection is we did not use the General Accounting Office for reasons that I think Mr. Hinton made pretty clear. They just don't feel they have the authority to examine it in great detail; so it was not a useful arm for us. Mr. Woolsey. And back in the days when I was general counsel of Senate Armed Services, Mr. Chairman, which was the early seventies, which was pre-Intelligence Committee days, there were only probably three or four staff members in the Senate who were cleared into the CIA and National Reconnaissance Office programs, and we did not use the GAO at all on those programs. Mr. Horn. Mr. Hinton, is there any record that GAO has contributed to a lot of these oversight groups in terms of CIA? Has it been solely fiscal or---- Mr. Hinton. Well, back in the late fifties and early sixties, Mr. Chairman, we were looking at financial matters, and then we began to expand into some program areas; however, we were not able to get sufficient access to complete our mission, and as we had discussions with the CIA, and at that time it was the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, we stopped doing work, and with the concurrence of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who at that time had jurisdiction over the Intelligence area. Mr. Horn. When did CIA have an Inspector General as part of its---- Mr. Hinton. My recollection is that it was in 1989 when the statute was passed, I believe, 1989. Mr. Woolsey. I think the CIA had an Inspector General before then but after 1989 it was subject to the statutory requirement of all these various independent reporting obligations to the Congress and the like. Mr. Horn. Did you find that was a useful office when you were Director? Mr. Woolsey. Sometimes. Mr. Horn. In terms of what they did, did they look at management processes or just fiscal matters? Mr. Woolsey. Both. I even had them review my own office's operation. Mr. Horn. And you felt they did a good job or---- Mr. Woolsey. Sometimes. Mr. Horn. Sometimes. You're being very cautious here. Mr. Woolsey. Yeah. I have a "on the one hand" this other and that view of my Inspector General during those years, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. And that's the Truman thing about economists. Mr. Woolsey. Yes. Mr. Horn. On the other hand, on the other hand, so forth. Do you think that the current organization has other experts that can look at management? And of course that is what our interest is. We are not interested in methods and Intelligence people. We are interested simply in "is the place put together so it can achieve its mission?" In the case of computers that have been classified, we had that whole problem in the Y2K thing, and we finally got some of the information. Mr. Woolsey. First of all, the Inspector General's Office does now do this sort of thing routinely, look at management practices for different parts of the Agency. And I think from what I've heard from Mr. Tenet, he's quite pleased with the operation of his Inspector General's Office now. Second, the President has, I believe, asked Mr. Tenet and also the White House, I think, operating through the President's Foreign intelligence Advisory Board which I believe will be headed by General Skowcroft, to do two management reviews of the Intelligence Community as a whole, including the CIA, and I think those are underway. And finally, the current No. 3 official at the CIA, who actually manages in a day-to-day sense the Agency, Buzzy Krongard, formerly the chief executive officer of Alex Brown and a very experienced executive, is someone that I think Mr. Tenet looks to for management advice about the operation of the Agency. So my judgment from the outside, and I'm not in this in any detail, would be that currently they are, from both the outside and the inside, reasonably well equipped to look at management issues. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, my view is that the question you raise on efficiency, it's an area that the Intelligence Committees over a period of time have not paid very much attention to. The whole question of cost effectiveness, we spend billions and billions of dollars on Intelligence--we all know the figure roughly, I don't know whether it's public or classified so I won't use it--but billions of dollars, and there's very little attention given to cost effectiveness. The real key in Intelligence is are the right people getting the right information at the right time? That's the key. It doesn't matter how much intelligence you've got. If the commander on the ground is threatened with a car bomb, if he doesn't have the information he needs, your Intelligence is not worth a thing. And I think sometimes we get so captivated with the technology of the collection of intelligence that we take the position, the more the better. The real question is not necessarily the amount of data that you've got. You've got to analyze that data, and then you've got to get it to the right people at the right time for it to be effective. I don't think the Intelligence Committees, and I don't mean in any way to criticize the President's Intelligence Committees because I don't know that much, but over a period of years we simply have not spent enough time on efficiency and cost effectiveness, and to that point I very much concur with your view. Mr. Horn. Mr. Woolsey, any comments on that? Mr. Woolsey. Well, the Director of Central Intelligence really is charged with doing this on a day-to-day basis, and one major aspect of what I call the needs process which-- because I hate the word "requirements." I think it has a lot of the wrong connotations for what one should request and appropriate funds for. Part of the needs process that I instituted had a lot to do with making and trying to institutionalize some of the kinds of judgments that Chairman Hamilton suggested. One of the types of things it tends to point out when you do an end-to-end look on a lot of intelligence product, from collection to its getting to the consumer, is that there are roadblocks of the sort he discussed. One very well-known one is translators. It doesn't do a great deal of good to accumulate a huge amount of data and material in Arabic if you're not willing to hire and train the number of Arabic speakers and readers necessary to make sure you're going through it on a reasonable and timely basis, and some of those types of things do jump out at one if one does a review of the needs during the budget process systematically, and that's the way I tried to do it. I don't know how it's been done since. Mr. Horn. To your knowledge, are CIA's employees able to report allegations of mismanagement or crimes of authorities outside of the CIA, or is there a process inside the CIA where a Director can depend on either a certain group or whatever to see that these things are taken care of? Mr. Woolsey. Inside the CIA they have access, of course, to the Inspector General. They would have access if he's running the place right, to the Director himself. And they certainly have access to the Oversight Committees of the House and Senate. I think that from the point of view of being able to report malfeasance or nonfeasance or just to complain about one's job, that system at least as of early 1995, from my point of view, worked reasonably well. Mr. Horn. Now, did you use GAO for help on any of this? Mr. Woolsey. No, Mr. Chairman, we did not. We operated with our own Inspector General. And with respect to the audit function, the Senate staff has a separate staff that does audit, and in the House it's my understanding they have several members of the staff that do it, although they don't call it a separate section of the committee. Mr. Horn. I see my co-chairman, Mr. Shays and others. I do want you to have some question time here. OK, go ahead, Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to state first that I'm a rookie when it comes to these intelligence questions, and probably the questions that I will ask reflect those that perhaps ordinary citizens would be asking more than someone who has an expertise in this area of intelligence gathering and the rules of the game. I'm wondering, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask you a question first. I feel that our committee has been disrespected to some degree by the CIA in ignoring your request to appear and in ignoring your questions; and while I think we have certainly heard helpful testimony, I'm just wondering why you made a decision, or if you did, to not subpoena the CIA to come. Could you have and, if so, can we maybe in the future? Mr. Horn. Well, we leave that to Chairman Burton. He has that authority as chairman of the full committee. Ms. Schakowsky. I see. There's a threshold question on this issue of secrecy. Who and how are decisions made about what will be classified and what will not, what is important for the public to understand and what is not? It seems to me that questions about computer security certainly are public policy questions, and I don't know--Mr. Woolsey or others may disagree, that seems to me an obviously appropriate thing. When we asked questions about the incident in Peru, not sources and methods but other kinds of questions, these seem appropriate for our committee and for the American people to hear. Chairman Burton said, "why is this information about whether or not the CIA hired private contractors classified?" Why shouldn't everybody understand what their taxpayer dollars are going for? So, how are those decisions made, and then in what way can we appropriately question that threshold decision? Anyone can answer. Mr. Hamilton. Those decisions are made on the basis of officials of government that the Congress has given the power to classify information. You have given power to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State to classify information. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense do not sit there daily going through stacks of paper marking "Secret" on them. What do they do? They delegate that power. And they delegate it to literally hundreds and hundreds of people in this town, who have the authority derived from the secretaries to classify information. And we classify, in my judgment, way more information than we should, and it becomes almost impossible to declassify the information. But it is a power that is derivative, of course, from the President, but the secretaries have the power to classify information, and many of them have it, many of them delegate it to hundreds of people. There are scores and scores of people in a Department of Defense and the Department of State who classify information. And the whole system operates so that the incentive for the person classifying, the safe incentive, is to classify it "Secret" because you won't get into any trouble. The problem becomes if you don't classify something you should have, then you can get into trouble. So the incentives are to classify. As a result we have warehouses of secret information today, huge volumes of secrecy. Mr. Woolsey. Could I add a second to that? Ms. Schakowsky. Absolutely. Mr. Woolsey. The question of classification is a separate question from whether something is a CIA method or not. Presumably, if I am wrong, for example, and Mr. Eland is right, "method" should be read as narrowly as he and Colonel Smith say and it only refers to collection, and that therefore the way the CIA protects its data is not a method and therefore this committee would have jurisdiction to hold hearings on it, I would certainly hope that this committee, if it held such hearings, it would hold executive session hearings, because even though this is a matter of important public policy, I trust we don't want to let Saddam Hussein or Russian hackers know how the CIA protects its data. So this committee I would assume on something of that sensitivity would, if it dealt with those issues, would deal with them in a classified way. There are many very important matters of public policy that are classified--whether to buy one type of satellite or another--that the Government and indeed the Congress deal with routinely. But I just wanted to say that I think there's a difference between whether something is classified or not, on the one hand, and I agree with former Congressman Hamilton that in a lot of cases things are overclassified. But that's a separate question from the one that is before us here about which committee has jurisdiction over understanding for the Congress how the CIA protects its data and its computers. Ms. Schakowsky. Yes, Mr. Eland. Mr. Eland. Yeah. I'd like to make a couple comments on this. I agree with the other two speakers that we have much too much classified information, and I think that has several ill effects. The first one is it undermines the whole system and then you get people saying, well, this is classified; but, you know, it's not really classified, so I can leak it to the press or whatever. So if we only hold the things that we need to hold secret, then I think everybody recognizes that is--you know, I'm saying Secret, Classified, you know, whatever level. The other thing is I think a lot of times the executive branch uses classification to limit access to various programs. The Reagan administration put a lot of defense programs in the special access category which requires special compartments to limit the congressional inquiry that could be done on them. Also, I think throughout this whole hearing there's been this assumption, and I think on the part of the CIA and maybe even some people in Congress, that the Congress is a bigger leak than the executive branch, and I don't think historically that is true. I think the biggest leaks have come out of the executive branch. Officials, for one political purpose or another, leak information. So I really don't think that the implication is if more congressional committees get involved in this that we're going to have secrets all over the place, as Mr. Woolsey was saying. It's just not true. I mean the---- Ms. Schakowsky. That's kind of a second question: What's a secret and what isn't a secret in general? And then once something is legitimately a secret, who gets access to that information, what you're referring to now, and that there may be more in Congress who are entitled to that information. But you also brought up a question of the press. My short experience--I'm in my second term of Congress--has been that I have learned more information from reading the New York Times or the Washington Post than I have in any classified briefings, and certainly more information in regards to this Peruvian incident and the use of private contractors. Does anybody feel that there is a certain responsibility of the CIA or others to explain to Members of Congress information that has appeared in the press about activities which---- Mr. Hamilton. I think under the present regime the way it would operate is an incident occurs, you want to know more about that, you're entitled to know more about it. The CIA has the information or maybe the DOD has the information. The way it would operate today is that they would give that information to the House Select Committee on Intelligence. That's their responsibility. They are fulfilling their obligation under the law when they report to the Intelligence Committees fully and currently on any inquiry. Now, the question of how the Intelligence Committee shares that information with nonmembers of the Intelligence Committee is an internal question that you have to resolve. As a member, you have the right to go to the Intelligence Committee and say I want to know what you know about that information. My recollection is--and this procedure may have been changed--is that the committee then votes on whether or not that information is made available to you. I don't recall, frankly, very often it coming to a vote. I can recall some instances of it. In other words, in most every instance, an arrangement is worked out so that the Member seeking the information can get it. Now, that's only part of the problem. The other part of the problem is once you get it, what can you do with it? You cannot go public with it if it is classified information, unless you do it on the floor of the House; and you can say anything you want to on the floor of the House and you're protected. But there are very strong practical constraints against you from doing that. So the question becomes how you get this flow of information from the Intelligence Committee to the other Members of the House, and it's been very difficult to work out over a period of time. In the end, if a Member is insistent, he or she can get that information but cannot necessarily use it publicly. Mr. Horn. Mr. Tierney. Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the members of the panel for your testimony and enlightenment today. Mr. Hinton, reading your testimony and listening to you, I have to tell you I was going to say "annoyed," but I will say "concerned," for lack of a better word, because of the CIA's actions. You raised two examples, both involving national intelligence estimates, and they are, I think to everybody's understanding, the Intelligence Community's best analysis of the likelihood of different kinds of threats; right? The first example, you said the CIA was cooperative when it came to discussing the national intelligence estimates involving chemical and biological threats. On the national--in the NIE for missile threats, however, you said that the CIA refused even to meet with you. Can you explain the difference in their attitude between those two? Mr. Hinton. I think a lot of that has to do with the issue and what the questions were that we were asking and how they saw the oversight process play out. On the latter, we were seeking information about process, and they saw that falling in within their determination that this was subject to the exclusive oversight of the select committees. Therefore, they did not share the information with us. Mr. Tierney. Did you only ask questions about process, or did you also---- Mr. Hinton. In that case, that was objectives that we were trying to look at on that job. Mr. Tierney. Now, we're all aware that the President proposed huge new missile defense programs. Apparently the more we read, we find out he wants to talk about land, sea, air, and now even space systems. It can cost who knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars by the time he gets through this adventure. I think we risk alienating our allies, we risk some instability issues internationally, and this is a threat that many prominent critics claim does not exist at all or certainly is being greatly exaggerated. If you can't even get a meeting with the CIA to discuss this threat assessment on this issue, how is Congress going to be expected to analyze the President's proposal with respect to national issues of defense and to determine whether or not it properly addresses that threat? Mr. Hinton. I think that's going to have to be a shared responsibility among the Armed Services, the Appropriations, and the Intelligence Committees to pursue that. Mr. Tierney. It is your feeling that this committee, particularly the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, the Government Reform Committee, doesn't have any ability under its responsibilities to look at the economy and efficiency of weapon systems? Mr. Hinton. I think that this committee will probably have to work closely with these other committees in seeking that information. Mr. Tierney. You raised an issue in your testimony also about the CIA actually not only failing or refusing to meet with you, but actually actively encouraging other agencies not to cooperate with you; is that right? Mr. Hinton. Yes. Mr. Tierney. What other agencies were you trying to receive comment from that the CIA interfered with? Mr. Hinton. I think in that case, it was DIA and NSA that we were told that the CIA had asked them not to cooperate with us, and State. Mr. Tierney. I find that a little bit appalling, very much appalling. Given the history of the missile defense debate and the way its gone in this country and the huge waste of money up until this point in time, I don't think that this is the way we ought to proceed. Mr. Chairman, I would strongly urge that the committee investigate this matter further; that we ask Mr. Hinton, if he can, to please provide us with the names of the CIA employees that refused to discuss the missile threat with his office. Could you do that, Mr. Hinton? Mr. Hinton. We have the information of who we asked it of. Mr. Horn. If I might just interject a minute, and I'll go back because, before Mr. Hamilton has to leave, I wanted to have my co-chair ask any questions he has. Mr. Tierney. I just want to wrap-up two questions and he can go all he wants on this. The second thing I want to ask is the names of the employees that tried to tell agencies not to cooperate with you. Do you have those, Mr. Hinton? Mr. Hinton. I don't know that we do, but we'll check, sir. I'll give you what we have. Generally when we have requests, we go through their Office of Congressional Affairs to get things lined up, and they are generally the messenger coming back. I don't know who they got their direction from, but I can give you whatever details our documents have. Mr. Tierney. If we could also have notes or interview summaries from your office regarding both of those issues, I would appreciate that. And, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask that those materials be made a part of the record. Mr. Horn. Without objection, it will be part of the record at this point. The gentleman from Connecticut and the co-chairman of this hearing. Mr. Shays. Thank you. It's nice to have all of you here. Mr. Woolsey, I do want to say, with no disrespect, you commented on the statements of other people in your opening statement, but they didn't have the--I don't think had your opening statement to be able to comment on it. Mr. Woolsey. I did not--I was not asked to submit a written opening statement, Mr. Shays, and I talked from notes that I put together this morning. Mr. Shays. I'm just trying to make the point to you. It's a small point. Mr. Woolsey. Well, Mr. Eland has twice mischaracterized what I said, and if we want to get into this, I'd be delighted to---- Mr. Shays. I'm just making a point that in your opening statement you commented on the opening statements of others, and they didn't get the opportunity to comment on the opening statement of yours because they didn't see it, and you've explained why. Mr. Woolsey. Well, but Mr. Eland did comment on my opening statement in his remarks, and he mischaracterized twice what I said. So I'll be glad to get into this if it's important. Mr. Shays. No. After you made the opening statement, he didn't have your opening statement to look at. I'm just making a point---- Mr. Woolsey. That's correct, because I didn't write one out. I wasn't asked to by---- Mr. Shays. I have a sense that you want the last word. I have just made a point and you've made a point. I'm just making a point that the other gentlemen introduced an opening statement and they did not have the ability to see an opening statement of yours, and you did have an opportunity to comment on the opening statement of theirs, and that's the only point I made. I'd like to know, Mr. Woolsey, why I shouldn't be outraged or at least unhappy that the CIA wouldn't at least come here to explain why they believe on merit they shouldn't have to respond to this committee on other issues? I mean we have you here, and I'm grateful you're here, because otherwise their argument wouldn't be made except in a tangential way. So under what basis--if you were Director, under what basis would you not at least allow someone to explain the logic of why they don't think they should cooperate with these two committees? Mr. Woolsey. Well, I would think generally, Mr. Chairman, that it would be a good idea to show up and explain. I must say, however, I wrote yesterday or 2 days ago to the chairman because I hadn't seen a formal invitation. I'd only spoken with the staff on one occasion until 2 days ago; and then when I got it, the subject of the hearing, quote, The effect of the CIA's unwillingness to Cooperate with most congressional inquiries on Congress' ability to conduct oversight, is, if I may say so, from my perspective a somewhat argumentative statement of the issue. And were I George Tenet, I think I might come back and say we do not refuse to cooperate with most congressional inquiries. We, as the CIA, submit a lot of information to the Congress: briefings, daily; several briefings daily on our product, on the substance, on the output of the Intelligence Community. What is at issue here is oversight of what I believe is reasonably characterized as a CIA method. And Mr. Eland and others say no, it's not a method, it's an activity. But that's---- Mr. Shays. If you weren't here--I am just making the point that if you weren't here, the position wouldn't even be presented to Members of the Congress as to why they shouldn't participate, and I just think---- Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Shays---- Mr. Shays. And I want to get right to you, Mr. Hamilton. I just think it is an affirmation of almost sticking their finger in our eye. I mean the least they could have done was to be here, and it seems dumb to me. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton. I can appreciate your point, but you have to see the Director of Central Intelligence's problem. His problem is that the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has told him not to come. The chairman of this subcommittee has told him to come. Now he's got to make a choice. Mr. Shays. And the question I---- Mr. Hamilton. His responsibility under the law is to keep the House and Senate Intelligence Committees currently and fully informed. I'm not---- Mr. Shays. Let me just explain another part of that story, though. You're not certain, nor am I, that he didn't request that the chairman tell him not to come. You don't know, nor do I. But we do know this: We do know the CIA tells other intelligence committees not to cooperate, which leads to my next question. Why is it OK for other intelligence committees to cooperate but not the Agency? Mr. Hamilton. Well, I'm not here to defend the Central Intelligence Director. He can do that himself. But I think it's important for you to see that he's caught in a bind that the Congress has created. You've created this problem for him. Mr. Shays. No, that's not true. Mr. Hamilton. That is true. Mr. Shays. No. No. In general terms we might have that argument. Whether or not to explain why it's important for him not to only cooperate with the Intelligence Committee, it could be something that he could explain. And I make the point to you, because I know for a fact that the Agency has told other intelligence committees not to cooperate. Mr. Woolsey. Other intelligence agencies of the executive branch? Mr. Shays. Of the executive branch, and told them not to come and testify before our committees, and they have. They've cooperated. And it gets to my point, and I want to know why the CIA shouldn't cooperate and why others do cooperate. And I throw it open to you, to either of you. Tell me why. Mr. Hamilton. Well, I don't want to try to speak for the Director. I can certainly understand your frustration, and it just exemplifies the problem that exists between the Congress and the Intelligence Community. Mr. Shays. Let's get to my real question. My real question is simply to understand if we are talking about sources and methods, and we respect sources and methods with other intelligence agencies, there are 13 of them, and we don't have cooperation with 1. We have cooperation with 12. Why do the others accept that we can recognize that sources and methods-- it shouldn't be the issue, but on other things they should cooperate. Why is the CIA separate? Mr. Hamilton. Well, your original question was why did the Director choose not to appear. Mr. Shays. And---- Mr. Hamilton. I can't answer for the Director, obviously, but I think I do see his problem. Mr. Shays. I understand that. You see his problem, but now I'm on to the next question. Why is it that of 13 intelligence agencies, 1 basically doesn't cooperate, the other 12 recognize that we respect the sources and methods as an issue that shouldn't be discussed, but there are other issues. And the reason why I am here today, I will tell you, if there is any person that the Intelligence Community should respect, it's Mr. Horn and his efforts to deal with efficiencies. It's one of the most boring darn subjects in the world, and he's made more headway than anyone else. And so I just want to understand that question. Mr. Hamilton, I know you have to leave, so I---- Mr. Hamilton. I do. I apologize. Mr. Chairman, may I just make a concluding comment, if I may? I think the questions have brought out the difficulties of this relationship. I've been a little uneasy here this morning because the approach taken to this question, in my judgment, has become too legalistic. This is not a question that can be resolved by the interpretation of section 11(b)(4), section 11(a)(1), or (3)(a). If you want to get yourself into a position of not solving the problem, that's the way to do it in my view. This is a huge, hugely difficult matter. On the one hand, how do you have a strong Intelligence Community that, by definition, has to operate secretly and confidentially or they cannot do their job? On the other hand, in a representative democracy, how do you get accountability of that kind of an operation? That's the overall problem here. I think it's hugely difficult. The questions that Mr. Shays and others have operating simply bring out some of these difficulties, and I don't think there's a simple answer to that. My testimony was that the arrangement that we have today is far from perfect, but it works reasonably well. But it's quite obvious from your questions, it doesn't work, there are plenty of problems with it. Thank you for looking into this. Thank you for letting me come for a few minutes to be with you. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton. I appreciate what you're doing. Mr. Shays. I would love to ask Mr. Hinton a question. Thank you very much. Mr. Horn. I would just like to make a comment on the way I've been thinking. Why, with such a friendly group as this, the Director hasn't taken his wooden chair here that says "Director of CIA" at the table. And I think maybe we need a better ergonomic chair to give the Director, and I'm weighing those two facts there. So, since I was one of the few that voted for ergonomics around this---- Mr. Shays. Mr. Hamilton, I have tremendous respect for you, and I appreciate you being here. I do want to ask Mr. Hinton the question. You work with other intelligence agencies, do you get cooperation from other intelligence agencies? Mr. Hinton. Yes, sir. And it's varied over the years. We did significant work up through the 1980's and the early 1990's. In 1994, the door started closing on us, and it was a memo that the Director of the CIA signed in July 1994 which in effect shut us out of most all of the intelligence work, related work, that we had been doing through the years, and also for some of the key clients up on the Hill, and also that work that we were doing without discretionary resources. Now, this wasn't directly looking at the CIA. I mentioned that in 1962 we stopped the work that we were actively doing at the CIA, but we were working in the other aspects of the Intelligence Community, looking at the national foreign intelligence program, tactical intelligence, some of the systems that were being procured. Our work in that area has essentially dried up. Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this. We found that the intelligence agencies have been cooperative with our committee, National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Are you saying that none of the agencies now are cooperating with GAO? Mr. Hinton. No, I'm not saying that, sir. Where I am on that, it depends on what we are asking to do. You know, if we go out and seek out information around intelligence product like threat assessments, we find that we enjoy very good access. Mr. Shays. Right. Mr. Hinton. However, when we get into looking at particular programs to do the typical evaluations that we do elsewhere in the government, we are being challenged considerably now, given the guidance that came about in 1994 under that directive. Mr. Shays. Mr. Eland or Colonel Smith, do you care to make any comments on these questions? Mr. Eland. Well, I used to work for GAO in the late 1980's, and I was monitoring on the frontlines, intelligence agencies, and my knowledge is dated--excuse me--pre-1984, but I found that the CIA was the only agency that we didn't actually get to go to. We had a site out at NSA. They gave us access. We looked at some even more sensitive intelligence-collecting entities of the U.S. Government which gave us much more access than the CIA. The CIA has always been a problem, and I think we need to separate this discussion from the Intelligence Community and the intelligence information from the CIA. The CIA is the problem here, in my view. Mr. Shays. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Let me just say again. Perhaps you weren't here when I put this memorandum in the record. It's a memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, dated July 7, 1994, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director, the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, from Stanley M. Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs. And here's the blow. Subject: Director of Central Intelligence Affirmation of Policy for Dealing With the General Accounting Office. And it's a clear plan on, you know, you guys are just wasting your time and you're wasting our time and so forth. I regard that as arrogant. And what you noted there, the word was "pipe down" and "sat on" and everything else. They just didn't want to see what you were looking at. And all we care about, in fact, is computer security which is a major problem in the free world. I've talked to four Prime Ministers about it, and they know right now that they've got a problem in their economy where people are going and lousing up their computers, which means people could be out of work and everything else. So---- Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman---- Mr. Horn [continuing]. I want to put this, again without objection, in the record. Mr. Hinton. Mr. Chairman, one thing I'd add to that, without sustained congressional support for us to do work today and to include that on behalf of the select committees, we are essentially not doing any of the work that we used to do. Mr. Horn. Do you want to comment, Ms. Schakowsky? Ms. Schakowsky. I just wanted to comment on the fact that I think the problem is not entirely unique to the CIA. Congressman Tierney led an effort to pry loose a report from the Pentagon regarding the critical report by Phillip Coyle on the missile defense program, and it was promised in this very room that it would be turned over, and it wasn't. And finally after a lot of work it finally happened. But let me just ask one question of Mr. Woolsey, if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman. If you broadly define a method, and looking back on the laws that govern the release of this kind of information, the dissemination of it, what would you define as appropriate? Is there any reason why the CIA Director would come here and talk to us about anything? Mr. Woolsey. Absolutely, Congresswoman. Certainly a product. The two areas at issue here are product and activities. The product of the Intelligence Community is not a method. Sources and methods are used in putting together an intelligence product such as a national intelligence estimate or any other estimate. And as long as sources and methods are effectively dealt with at the appropriate level of classification, intelligence products are provided to the Congress all the time, several times a day, a lot of committees of the Congress. I testified before the Science Committee, I testified before Senate Governmental Affairs, I testified before International Relations, Senate Foreign Relations, sometimes in classified settings, sometimes in unclassified. And I'm sure that intelligence briefings products are provided to individual members of this committee and as far as I know, if the--Mr. Gershwin's briefing, for example, on the cyberthreat that he gave to the Joint Economic Committee--I can't speak for him-- I'm sure that would be available, too. So products are not at issue. What is at issue is activities; is essentially, if I read the rule right, and I think I am reading it correctly with respect to the exclusive authority of the House Permanent Select Committee over methods, the question is when is an activity not a method? Are there some activities of the Intelligence Community that are not exclusively methods under the jurisdiction of the House Permanent Select Committee? To me, a method is something that has a certain regularity and procedure to it, and I think there's room here for this committee and the House Permanent Select Committee to have a dialog and work out some areas in which some things might be able to be provided here. I'm not saying that would not be the case. But certainly intelligence products, whether about ballistic missile threats or anything else, are available to all Members of the Congress, and briefings occur at committees in both bodies all the time from the CIA. Mr. Horn. I just have one last question, Mr. Woolsey. During your recent appearance on C-Span you stated the number of the employees of the CIA is classified. Why is this information so important to keep secret? Mr. Woolsey. Well, the overall total for the Intelligence Community was declassified for a couple of years, back several years ago, and now it's become classified again. The subordinate parts of that budget can relatively easily, not completely, but relatively easily, be calculated from manpower count. And so people generally have avoided declassifying not only the subordinate parts of the intelligence budget, but also the head counts of the agencies, because you can crosswalk relatively easily from one to the other. I might say this is not a very well kept secret, Mr. Chairman, and it's not something that I think any government official ought to fall on his sword over. But the overall intelligence budget was declassified and the reason I was concerned about that when I was Director was I was afraid we would end up having smaller and smaller chunks of the overall intelligence budget made public and CIA head count would be one further step along that path. Mr. Horn. Well, let me thank you, all of you, for the testimony you've given, and we appreciate it. And I want to thank the staff on both the majority and the minority: J. Russell George, staff director/chief counsel, behind me; and Henry Wray, senior counsel; and then Bonnie Heald is director of communications down there; and then the professional staff member for this particular hearing is Darin Chidsey, who is to my left; and Scott Fagan, assistant to the committee. And then we have a wealth of interns: Fred Ephraim; Davidson Hulfish; Fariha Khaliq; Christopher Armato; Samantha Archey. And from the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee, Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; and Jason Chung, clerk; and Lawrence Halloran, staff director. Minority staff, David McMillan, professional staff; and Jean Gosa, clerk. Our court reporters today are Melinda Walker and Lori Chetakian. And with that, we're adjourned. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the joint subcommittee was adjourned.]