不，中国没有3,000个核武器

乔治敦大学的一项研究错误地表明，中国有3,000个核武器。估计值取决于数量级。

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汉斯·克里斯汀森（Hans M. Kristensen）

只有中国政府知道中国有多少核武器。与大多数其他核武器国家一样，这个数字是一个密密麻麻的秘密。即使这样，也可以最佳地估计有利于公众辩论的大约规模。

最近的例子notto make an estimate is the study recently published by the Asia Arms Control Project at Georgetown University. The study (中国的地下长城：核武器控制的挑战) suggests that China may have as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons.

Although we don’t know exactly how many nuclear weapons China has, we are pretty sure that it doesn’t have 3,000. In fact, the Georgetown University estimate appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

Fissile Material

3,000-Tearhead估计的最根本问题是，至少在公众中，没有证据表明中国已经生产了足够的裂变材料来建造许多弹头。差远了。

3,000阶段的三阶段热核弹头的武器库为300-500千吨，需要9-12吨武器级p，45-75吨高的铀（HEU）。

Based on what is known about China’s inventory of fissile materials, how many nuclear weapons可以它建立？

According to the国际裂变材料小组，，，，China has produced an estimated 2 tons of plutonium for weapons. Some has been consumed in nuclear tests, leaving roughly 1.8 tons. The estimate is consistent with what the U.S. government has stated and theoretically enough for 450-600 warheads.

HEU的总生产被认为约为20吨。一些已经用于核试验和研究反应堆燃料，剩下约16吨的库存。从理论上讲，这足以容纳大约640-1,060弹头。

另一个关键材料是Tritium，用于热核武器。中国可能只能在其在Jiajiang的高速通量工程反应堆（HFERTOR）中产生足够的tri，以维持大约300种武器的武器库。

The U.S. intelligence community总结2009年，中国可能生产了足够的武器裂变材料，以满足其不久的未来需求。换句话说，没有巨大的弹头扩展。

核弹头

借助这种裂变材料的库存，有多少核武器mightChina currently have?

首先，重要的是要记住，核武器国家不会将其所有裂变材料转换为核武器，而是将其部分用于武器，而将其余的作为未来需求的储备。因此，不能简单地将裂变材料的数量转化为武器。

其次，核弹头需要具有核能力的送货车，导弹和飞机，这可以将弹头带到其预期的目标上。运输车辆可以更好地了解核武库的大小。中国的大多数弹道导弹都是常规或双重能力的，但乔治敦大学的研究包括3,000张战车投影中的所有导弹，包括短距离DF-11和DF-15导弹和中型DF-21C导弹。

考虑到这些因素和其他因素，我们目前的估计is that China has approximately 240 nuclear warheads for delivery by nearly 180 missiles and aircraft. Nearly 140 of the operational missiles are land-based. Less than 50 of those can reach the continental United States.

The 240-warhead estimate also includes warheads produced for China’s ballistic missile submarine force (which is not yet operational), weapons for bombers, and some weapons for spares.

我们的估计与估算得出美国国防情报局在2006年：“中国目前有100多个核弹头。”

现代化

With its ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces, which includes deployment of three new ICBMs, China will be placing a greater portion of its warheads on ICBMs. The portion of those that can strike the continental United States, according to theU.S. Defense Intelligence Agency，“到2025年可能会增加两倍以上。”这并不意味着弹头库存的总库存将“超过两倍”，只有ICBMS上的部分。只有时间会在多大程度上说明发生的情况，但是美国对中国核武器的预测以前是错误的。

的确，直径estimatedin 1984 that China had 360 warheads, including non-strategic warheads, and projected that the arsenal would grow to 592 warheads in 1989 and 818 warheads in 1994. This projection never materialized.

Analysis of projections made by the U.S. intelligence community during the past decade for the growth in Chinese ICBM warheads shows that they have so far been too much too soon (see figure below). The Central Intelligence Agency’s 2001 projection of 75-100 ICBM warheads deployed primarily against the United States by 2015 will not come true unless China increases its production and deployment of the DF-31A missile or begins to deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs. China will probably only do so if the U.S. deploys a ballistic missile defense system that can nullify the Chinese deterrent.

U.S. projections for Chinese ICBM warheads have generally been too much too soon. Click image for larger version.

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卫星图像解释

乔治敦大学研究的另一个问题涉及其对商业卫星图像的一些分析。案例研究之一是中国南部昆明以南的一个山谷中的一系列建筑物，该研究得出结论是DF-31 ICBM的地下部署地点（请参见下图）。

乔治敦大学的研究表明，中国南部昆明附近的山谷是DF-31部署地点。该设施看起来更像是弹药仓库。它位于这些坐标：24.545262°，102.584378°

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没有提供有关此结论的证据，该消息来源似乎是中文网站上的帖子西娜军事论坛(the link to the story no longer works). “Tunnel portals” in the valley apparently are thought to be for use by DF-31 launchers hiding inside the mountain. Yet the facility does not have any of the characteristics of Chinese DF-31 deployment sites and a minimum of analysis indicates that the portals and roads are too narrow to be used by DF-31 launchers (see figure below). Instead, the buildings in the valley look more like a munitions depot.

This image shows two of the so-called “tunnel portals” identified by the Georgetown University report as being part of a DF-31 deployment site near Kunming. An image of a DF-31/DF-31A launcher is superimposed to illustrate the difficulty it would have turning at the site. The dimensions of the roads indicate that the facility is not for DF-31 launchers, but looks more like a munitions depot..

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结论

The Georgetown University study has collected an impressive amount of scattered information from the Internet about Chinese underground facilities. That is obviously interesting in and of itself, but in terms of assessing Chinese nuclear capabilities, it does the public debate a disservice by disseminating exaggerated and poorly analyzed information.

Readers can obviously read into the report what they want, but a quick Google search for news article headlines about the report shows the damage: “China may have 3000 n-warheads;” “China’s nuclear arsenal ‘many times larger’ than previously thought;” “China ‘hiding up to 3,000 nuclear warheads in secret tunnels.” Many people will not remember the details, but they tend to remember the headlines. A misperception will stick in the public consciousness that China has 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels.

但是中国没有3,000个核武器。它都没有生产出构建许多人所需的裂变材料，而不是拥有足够多的送货车，可以发射许多弹头。乔治敦大学的研究弹头估计似乎已被一个数量级的命令删除。

中国正处于重大的军事现代化之中，重要的是不要被夸大或夸大，而是对实际正在发生的事情进行了分析和理解。

纽约卡内基公司和耕种基金会的赠款使该出版物成为可能。所作的陈述和表达的观点仅是作者的责任。