结束核抗议

4月8日，上周三，美国科学家联合会和自然资源国防委员会（NRDC）共同发布FAS偶尔纸编号7，从反向到最小的威慑力 - 消除核武器的新核政策。作为发行版的一部分，我的合着者，NRDC的Stan Norris和FAS的Hans Kristensen，我在卡内基捐赠基金会举行了小组讨论，我们每个人都介绍了本文涵盖的研究结果。本文总结了我对该面板的评论。

我们在本文中描述了三件事。首先，我们提出了一套新的核武器军事任务 - 实际上，“设置”只是一个任务，其次，我们正在描述该任务的外观，第三，我们描述的是一种实际获取该任务的方法单个任务正确实施。

There is much talk these days about reducing numbers of nuclear weapons, and numbers are bandied about, fifteen hundred, or a thousand, or six hundred. There can be a factor of two or more between deployed and total warheads and some discussion distinguishes between the two. When the United States and the Russians obviously have more nuclear weapons than they need, just cutting gross numbers makes sense. But those of us advocating cuts in the United States are already starting to see that we are getting pushback from the military as numbers approach one thousand. The military argues that they cannot go to lower numbers because, if they do, they will not be able to fulfill their missions. And they are right. They can’t. If we want the United States to get to lower numbers, to get close to a thousand and to go below, we have to not just talk about reducing the numbers of weapons but to strip away the missions for nuclear weapons.

What we are proposing here is not particularly novel, we are proposing that the missions for nuclear weapons be reduced to one: to survive a nuclear attack and retaliate, to deter that nuclear attack in the first place. That should be the only mission. What is new in our report is that we have gone into considerable detail to describe exactly what that means and what it requires. And, perhaps even more important, what it does not require.

我不会在这里对威慑的漫长讨论；我已经讨论过别处在我们目前的报告中，简而言之，重要的是要指出核武器总是被描述为威慑。实际上，可以将“威慑”定义为核武器所做的一切。我们甚至将核武器称为“基于海洋的威慑”或“陆基威慑”。我们在报告中所描述的是实际限制其使用仅阻止核使用的后果。

The report describes not only what the mission for nuclear weapons ought to be but also discusses explicitly what missions have to be given up, and what that means. We sometimes tend to think that the missions for nuclear weapons come about naturally because of their unique and extreme nature. But the missions for nuclear weapons do not automatically follow from the laws of physics. We should keep in mind the majority of the missions historically held by nuclear weapons have gone away. We have a debate going on in the United States about missile defense but no one is talking about missile defense as a nuclear mission, but it used to be. Sea control was a nuclear mission, as were antisubmarine warfare, antitank attack, and air defense. These were all once nuclear missions that are no longer assigned to nuclear weapons because of superior conventional alternatives.

虽然我们使用的语言，我们的委婉语，使我们愚弄了我们以为核武器已经局限于这种威慑的东西，无论是什么，这在冷战期间都不是真的，而今天并非如此。今天驱动核数量的一个使命，核武器的日常部署以及所谓的核武器“要求”，例如收益率，响应能力，可靠性，飞行时间以及所有其他苛刻的绩效特征，是反对任务，即在地面敌人（但不是完全）攻击和摧毁地面敌人的能力。在布什政府期间，目标列表扩展到包括非核国家的其他非核目标。正是这种能力是在短时间内进行惊喜，解除首次罢工，这是核武器最苛刻的任务，并为阿森纳设定了最严格的要求。

我们的建议之一是具体并明确放弃了反对任务。值得考虑放弃这一任务的后果是值得的，因为我认为这将是最高的政治障碍之一。我们可以想象，在未来的危机中，甚至可能与俄罗斯进行的常规战争，俄罗斯人将利用其中央核力量以某种方式影响危机的结果。也许俄罗斯人希望通过攻击美国城市来震惊美国。美国现在正在选择首先进攻，试图摧毁地面上尽可能多的俄罗斯力量，以减少他们可能对美国人造成的损害。我们的报告认为，我们应该放弃该任务。从表面上看，这似乎没有意义。我们为什么要从总统那里删除该选项？单方面放弃可以挽救数百万美元生命的能力如何有利？

但是，放弃这种能力将出于三个原因而提高美国的安全性。首先，总统使用此能力的情况极不可能。到目前为止，即使是犯有俄罗斯的核袭击的后果也将是美国历史上最大的灾难。因此，总统将不得不在核战争的确定性（确定他会开始）和首先被俄罗斯人攻击的潜在风险之间做出选择。我们认为，一方面，对军事情报的高度信心必须肯定地知道，俄罗斯人将攻击将与其他任何军事和外交的完全缺乏信心选择仍然是如此罕见，以至于总统不太可能使用这种能力。

即使这样，如果收益可能是巨大的，那么即使不太可能，也可能存在总体优势。但是，总是必须将收益与成本进行比较。而且有成本。美国和世界每天都在反对这种潜在，潜在的，假设的利益，风险冒险。俄罗斯人和中国人知道他们的部队很脆弱。俄罗斯人可以试图以战术措施来反击这一措施，例如发起警告美国袭击，这大大增加了在错误警报时发射的可能性。他们可能还可能在危机期间降低降低权威性的启动权力。美国能力会影响他们的力结构。美国军事和情报领导人在国会证词中表示，他们认为中国现代化的主要动机及其移动系统是他们对美国首次罢工的脆弱感。如果俄罗斯人认为他们需要X武器才能有效威慑，并认为美国的第一次罢工将是90％的有效性，那么他们需要从10次X武器开始才能使威慑力量生存，以至于他们认为他们需要。 So every day, by maintaining this capability that will probably never be used, creates new dangers that go on, day-by-day and, now, decade-after-decade. Finally, now that negotiations with the Russians are back on the table, it will far easier to negotiate limits on Russian weapons if the United States gives up the ability to carry out a first strike. If the Russians think they need X weapons as a deterrent force and have 10 times X because United States is targeting them, then giving up the ability to target the weapons and getting a 90% negotiated reduction in Russian weapons clearly works to the U.S. security advantage. By giving up a first strike capability the United States will increase the likelihood that it can negotiate down to a level that it would have otherwise hoped to get to through a first strike.

减少核任务的反对者将声称美国正在单方面使自己脆弱，从而使这是在政治上销售的最困难步骤之一。我们试图在报告中有力地回答这些反对意见，并展示转移到最小的威慑学说将如何使美国和世界更安全。