中国核武库Si增加了25%nce 2006, Pentagon Report Indicates

五角大楼的报告显示，由于部署了新的弹道导弹和巡航导弹，中国的核武器阿森纳自2006年以来增长了25％。ReportsReports

经过Hans M. Kristensen

Updated April 8, 2008

The Pentagon’s 2008annual report对于中国军事力量的国会来说，与以前的版本相比，自2006年以来，中国将其核武库增加了25％。由于部署了新的远程固体燃料弹性弹道导弹和巡航导弹的增加而增加。

预计一部分增加将被未来几年的较旧液体燃料导弹退休，但这种趋势是将来的武库稍大。

然而，为了提醒人们估计过早的趋势，2008年的报告降低了所有三种新型新型远程弹道导弹的范围估计，其中之一降低了10％。

DF-31 and DF-31A Being Deployed

A decade after the Department of Defense (DOD) first projected the DF-31 would be deployed, the 2008 report finally concludes that the missile is “now being deployed to units within the Second Artillery Corps.” The report lists less than 10 (“<10”) DF-31 missiles deployed on as many launchers.去年的报告listed the DF-31 as having achieved “initial threat availability in 2006” and possible “operational status” by May 2007.

Figure 1: DF-31部署正在进行

国防部报告说，DReportsReportsF-31（此处显示）及其较长范围的DF-31A版本现在已部署到第二炮兵部队。

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更令人惊讶的是，据说DF-31A正在部署。该导弹是DF-31的长期版本，以前尚未报告过测试或“初始威胁可用性”，但现在据说少于10枚导弹已部署到第二炮兵部队。像1981年以来一直在运营的DF-5一样，DF-31A可以针对美国大陆，以及情报界的2001年。预言of “about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States” by 2015 hinges upon whether China deploys 40-55 DF-31As over the next eight years (see pp. 39-41 inChinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, FAS/NRDC, November 2006).

两枚导弹的范围估计值降低了。DF-31的范围从7,250+降低到7,200公里（4,505++ 4,474英里），此前人们认为仅几年前的范围为8,000 km（4,971+）。DF-31不能用于针对美国大陆，并且只能从中国东北地区到达夏威夷。

DF-31A范围估计值从11,270+降至11,200（7,003++ 6,959英里），或者比DF-5A的范围少14％。

The Mysterious Growth of the DF-21 Force

很大一部分的阿森纳增加s from additional DF-21 (CSS-5) that the Pentagon says have been deployed since 2006. The 2008 report estimates that 60-80 DF-21s are now deployed with 60 launchers, significantly more than the 40-50 missiles estimated to be deployed with 34-38 launchers in 2007, and the 19-50 missiles stated in the2006年报告.

Previous versions of the DOD report listed two versions of the DF-21 – Mod 1 and Mod 2 – but the 2008 report only lists one nuclear version with no Mod-number.

It is possible, although not clear from the DOD report, that the 60-80 DF-21s include the “conventionally-armed ASBMs [Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles] based on the SS-5 (DF-21) airframe,” that the report also describe. Since the “Nuclear Force Structure” section of the report only describes “upwards of 50 CSS-5 road mobile, solid fueled SRBMs (for regional deterrence missions),” it is possible that the remaining 20, or so, DF-21s refer to the conventional ASBMs. Consequently, I have only counted 60 nuclear DF-21s in this estimate.

2007年7月，我描述更改Delingha的导弹发射站点，该地点表明在该地点部署了DF-21导弹（见图2）。自1990年代初以来，DF-21一直以缓慢的速度替换DF-3A。

Figure 2: Possible DF-21 Deployment at Delingha

五角大楼报道了部署的DF-21中等弹道导弹的增加。2007年的商业卫星图像indicatedpossible DF-21 deployment at Delingha in the northern parts of Central China.

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DF-25, What DF-25?

The DOD report is quiet on the new missile launcher that appeared on images (see Figure 3) circulating on the Internet in 2007. The images led many to speculate that the earlier DF-25, widely believed to have been canceled, had been revived and deployed with as many as three nuclear warheads.

I doubted that assessment – China is not known to have deployed multiple warheads on any of its ballistic missiles – and asked Air Force Intelligence officials on several occasions last year to comment on the images. They told me that they had seen the photo but were not ready to officially comment yet. Nor is apparently the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the silence of the 2008 report on this development indicates that the “DF-25” instead may be the “conventionally-armed [Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile] based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe.”

图3： 可能修改的DF-21发射器

2007年在Internet上发行的图像显示了许多人的结论是DF-25发射器。国防部报告没有确认或评论DF-25的存在，而是列出了一个核和一个常规DF-21。

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DH-10 Cruise Missile Deployed

The DOD report also states that China has now deployed the DH-10 cruise missile; an unspecific 50-250 missiles on 20-30 launchers. The DH-10, which appears to be a Chinese version of the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile, can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead and has a range or more than 2,000 km (1,243+ miles). Both air- and ground-launched versions are said to exist, and the H-6 bomber appears to be undergoing an upgrade to carry up to six DH-10s (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: DH-10 Cruise Missile Deployed

The DOD report says China has deployed 50-250 DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. The H-6 bomber is being upgraded to carry perhaps up to six missiles (see above), which can also be fired from ground-based launchers.sinodefenceforum.com

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国防部的报告没有对DH-10的核变体进行估计，以地面力或H-6机翼部署了多少核变体，而模糊的50-250总估计值却散发出很大的不确定性。中等范围的估计值（150）可能是合理的总估计值，在此阶段，可能只有十几个左右。

Submarine Force Modernizing But Stable

奇怪的是，尽管商业卫星图像，但只提到了一个Jin-Class SSBNclearly show至少有两个正在建设中。然而，与2007年的报告相反，2008年的版本给出了一定的同意认可投影made by the Office of Naval Intelligence in 2007, by saying that China “will likely” build “up to five JIN-class SSBNs.” This is a less certain prediction than the one made by ONI, which said a fleet of “probably five TYPE 094 class SSBNs will be built….” On the other hand, while ONI avoided setting a year, the DOD report predicts that it will likely be 2010. But that seems a highly unrealistic projection, given that none of the Jin-class SSBNs are yet operational and that only two hulls have been launched so far.

至于海底弹道导弹，国防部报告不再列出JL-1，表明该武器系统不被认为是完全运行的。它可能从未有过，但这是国防部报告中第一次反映现实的导弹图。

The new JL-2 is also not operational, but included in the missile chart. Initial Operational Capability might be achieved in 2009-2010, DOD predicts. The estimate for the JL-2’s range, however, is lowered by 10 percent from 8,000+ to 7,200+ km (4,971+ to 4,474 miles). The 8,000+ km estimate has long been questionable, and the new estimate is the same as for the DF-31 from which the JL-2 is derived. The JL-2 cannot target the Continental United States from Chinese waters, and will have to sail into the Sea of Japan or past the Japan-Okinawa island chain to target Hawaii.

Mysteriously, the DOD report continues the practice from last year of assigning 10-14 missiles to each Chinese SSBNs, a curious estimate given that images of the boats clearly show 12 launch tubes.

As for the SSBN mission, the DOD report echoesmy conclusion尽管建造了新的SSBN，但缺乏威慑巡逻意味着，中国本质上没有经验以战略性重要的方式运营基于海洋的威慑力量。根据国防部的报告，“ PLA只能与海上潜艇交流的能力有限，而PLA海军没有经验来管理执行战略巡逻的SSBN舰队。”

总体而言，尽管最近media reportsabout “rapid expansion” of the Chinese submarine fleet, the DOD report shows an attack submarine fleet that is relatively stable around 54 diesel submarines and 4-5 nuclear-powered attack submarines. Although new diesel submarines are being commissioned, older types are being retired at the same time. Only 4 of the old Han-class SSNs are left, and the report leaves some confusion about the status of the new Shang-class SSN by including it in the naval forces table but stating elsewhere that it is not expected to be operational until 2010.

核（军事）谈判正在进行

最后，报告没有描述什么，但是五角大楼宣布本周早些时候，中国和美国现在“同意就我们就核战略和政策进行对话。”国防部说，一个过程“现在已经到位”，在接下来的几个月中，“中国军官与中国军事学者和美国这里的同行之间的讨论”将开始。2006年11月，邀请了第二炮兵团主管吉·齐尤恩将军直接在美国战略司令部会面。

Read more:Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning