五角大楼的报告表明，自2006年以来，中国核武库增加了25％。

China’s nuclear weapons arsenal has increased by 25 percent since 2006, Pentagon reports indicate, due to deployment of new ballistic and cruise missiles.

By Hans M. Kristensen

2008年4月8日更新

The Pentagon’s 2008年度报告to Congress on China’s military power indicates, when compared with previous versions, that China has increased its nuclear arsenal by 25 percent since 2006. The increase has happened due to deployment of new long-range solid fueled ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Part of the increase can be expected to be offset by retirement of older liquid fueled missiles over the next several years, but the trend is toward a slightly larger arsenal in the future.

As a reminder of the tendency to estimate too much too soon, however, the 2008 report lowers the range estimates for all three types of China’s new long-range ballistic missiles, one of them by as much as 10 percent.

DF-31 and DF-31A Being Deployed

国防部（国防部）首次投射DF-31的十年后，2008年的报告最终得出结论，该导弹“现在被部署到第二个炮兵军中的单位”。该报告列出了不到10（“ <10”）DF-31导弹在许多发射器上部署。Last year’s report列出了DF-31在2007年5月之前实现了“ 2006年的初始威胁可用性”，并可能“操作状态”。

图1： DF-31 Deployment Said to be Underway

The DOD reports says the DF-31 (shown here) and its longer-range DF-31A version are now being deployed to Second Artillery Corps units.

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更令人吃惊的是机动型df - 31 a现在说be deploying. The missile, which is a longer-range version of the DF-31, has not previously been reported flight tested or with “initial threat availability,” but less than 10 missiles are now said to be deploying to Second Artillery Corps units. Like the DF-5, which has been operational since 1981, the DF-31A can target the Continental United States, and much of the intelligence community’s 2001prediction到2015年，“主要针对美国部署的大约75至100枚弹头”在未来八年内是否部署了40-55 DF-31A中国核力量和美国核战争计划，，，，FAS/NRDC, November 2006).

The range estimates for both missiles are lowered. The range for the DF-31 is lowered by 50 km from 7,250+ to 7,200 km (4,505+ to 4,474 miles), after it was thought only a few year ago that the range was 8,000+ km (4,971+). The DF-31 cannot be used to target the Continental United States, and will only be able to reach Hawaii from the most North-Eastern districts of China.

The DF-31A range estimate is lowered from 11,270+ to 11,200 (7,003+ to 6,959+ miles), or to a range 14 percent less than that of the DF-5A.

The Mysterious Growth of the DF-21 Force

阿森纳增长的很大一部分来自五角大楼自2006年以来已部署的其他DF-21（CSS-5）。2008年的报告估计，现在有60-80 df-21现在部署了60个发射器，大大高于该启动器。40-50枚导弹估计在2007年用34-38发射器部署，19-50枚导弹在2006 report。

Previous versions of the DOD report listed two versions of the DF-21 – Mod 1 and Mod 2 – but the 2008 report only lists one nuclear version with no Mod-number.

It is possible, although not clear from the DOD report, that the 60-80 DF-21s include the “conventionally-armed ASBMs [Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles] based on the SS-5 (DF-21) airframe,” that the report also describe. Since the “Nuclear Force Structure” section of the report only describes “upwards of 50 CSS-5 road mobile, solid fueled SRBMs (for regional deterrence missions),” it is possible that the remaining 20, or so, DF-21s refer to the conventional ASBMs. Consequently, I have only counted 60 nuclear DF-21s in this estimate.

In July 2007, Idescribedchanges to the missile launch sites at Delingha, which indicated deployment of DF-21 missiles at the sites (see Figure 2). The DF-21 has been replacing DF-3As since the early 1990s at a slow rate.

图2： 可能在Delingha的DF-21部署

An increase in deployed DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles is reported by the Pentagon. Commercial satellite images in 2007表明的possible DF-21 deployment at Delingha in the northern parts of Central China.

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DF-25，什么DF-25？

The DOD report is quiet on the new missile launcher that appeared on images (see Figure 3) circulating on the Internet in 2007. The images led many to speculate that the earlier DF-25, widely believed to have been canceled, had been revived and deployed with as many as three nuclear warheads.

I doubted that assessment – China is not known to have deployed multiple warheads on any of its ballistic missiles – and asked Air Force Intelligence officials on several occasions last year to comment on the images. They told me that they had seen the photo but were not ready to officially comment yet. Nor is apparently the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the silence of the 2008 report on this development indicates that the “DF-25” instead may be the “conventionally-armed [Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile] based on the CSS-5 (DF-21) airframe.”

Figure 3: Possible Modified DF-21 Launcher

Images circulated on the Internet in 2007 showed what many concluded was a DF-25 launcher. The DOD report does not confirm or comment on the existence of a DF-25, but lists one nuclear and one conventional DF-21.

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DH-10巡航导弹部署了

国防部的报告还指出，中国现在已经部署了DH-10巡航导弹。20-30发射器上的50-250导弹。DH-10似乎是美国战斧巡航导弹的中文版本，可以携带常规或核弹头，并且范围超过2,000公里（1,243英里以上）。据说存在空气和地面版本的版本，H-6轰炸机似乎正在进行升级，最多可以携带6 dh-10s（见图4）。

Figure 4: DH-10巡航导弹部署了

The DOD report says China has deployed 50-250 DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. The H-6 bomber is being upgraded to carry perhaps up to six missiles (see above), which can also be fired from ground-based launchers.sinodefenceforum.com

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The DOD report does not give an estimate for how many nuclear variants of the DH-10 are deployed with ground forces or H-6 wings, and the vague 50-250 total estimate leaves much uncertainty. A medium range estimate (150) might be a reasonable total estimate, of which perhaps only a dozen or so may be nuclear at this stage.

Submarine Force Modernizing But Stable

Curiously, only one Jin-class SSBN is mentioned, although commercial satellite images清楚地显示that at least two are under construction. In contrast to the 2007 report, however, the 2008 version gives a somewhat halfhearted endorsementthe projection由海军情报办公室在2007年制作，说中国“可能”“可能”建立“多达五个Jin-Class SSBN”。这是一个比ONI做出的更确定的预测，该预测说：“大概将建造五个094类SSBN类型的舰队……”。另一方面，尽管ONI避免了一年的设定，但国防部报告预测可能是2010年。但是，鉴于Jin-Class SSBN尚未运行，但这似乎是一个非常不切实际的投影到目前为止推出。

As for sea-launched ballistic missiles, the DOD report no longer lists the JL-1, indicating that the weapon system is not considered fully operational. It has probably never been, but this is the first time the missile chart in the DOD report reflects that reality.

新的JL-2也不是操作,但包括在内in the missile chart. Initial Operational Capability might be achieved in 2009-2010, DOD predicts. The estimate for the JL-2’s range, however, is lowered by 10 percent from 8,000+ to 7,200+ km (4,971+ to 4,474 miles). The 8,000+ km estimate has long been questionable, and the new estimate is the same as for the DF-31 from which the JL-2 is derived. The JL-2 cannot target the Continental United States from Chinese waters, and will have to sail into the Sea of Japan or past the Japan-Okinawa island chain to target Hawaii.

国防部的报告神秘地，从去年为每个中国SSBN分配10-14枚导弹从去年开始的做法，这是一个奇怪的估计，鉴于船上的图像清楚地显示了12个发射管。

As for the SSBN mission, the DOD report echoes我的结论that despite construction of new SSBNs, the lack of deterrent patrols means that China essentially has no experience in operating a sea-based deterrent in a way that would matter strategically. According to the DOD report, “the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing an SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols.”

Overall, despite recent媒体报告ReportsReportsabout “rapid expansion” of the Chinese submarine fleet, the DOD report shows an attack submarine fleet that is relatively stable around 54 diesel submarines and 4-5 nuclear-powered attack submarines. Although new diesel submarines are being commissioned, older types are being retired at the same time. Only 4 of the old Han-class SSNs are left, and the report leaves some confusion about the status of the new Shang-class SSN by including it in the naval forces table but stating elsewhere that it is not expected to be operational until 2010.

Nuclear (Military) Talks Underway

Finally, what the report doesn’t describe, but which the Pentagonannounced本周早些时候,中国和美国圣ates have now “agreed to move forward on our dialogue on nuclear strategy and policy.” A process is “in place now,” DOD says, that over the next couple of months will begin with “a discussion between Chinese military officers and Chinese military academics and counterparts here in the U.S.” An invitation was extended in November 2006 to General Jing Zhiyuan, head of Second Artillery Corps, to meet directly with his counterpart at U.S. Strategic Command.

Read more：中国核力量和美国核战争计划