India’s Missile Modernization Beyond Minimum Deterrence

汉斯·克里斯滕森（Hans M. Kristensen）

每次印度测试新的弹道导弹时，国防工业的官员都对下一枚导弹感到头晕，他们说这将变得更大，更准确，飞行更长，并携带更多的核弹头。

Until now, all Indian ballistic missile types have carried only one warhead each, an important feature that has helped constrain India’s so-called minimum deterrence posture.

But the newest missile, the 5000+ kilometer-range Agni V, had not even completed its second test launch last month, before senior officials from India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) declared that the next Agni variant will be equipped to carry multiple warheads.

While the single-warhead Agni V is a major defense weapon, the multiple-warhead Agni VI will be a “force multiplier,” declared the former head of DRDO.

Moreover, the DRDO chief said that all future missiles will be deployed in large canisters on a road- or rail-mobile launchers to get “drastically” shorter response time with an ability to launch in “just a few minutes.“

是否只是激动的武器设计师的梦想，或者印度政府实际授权设计，开发和部署具有多个弹头和快速发射能力的长距离导弹，还有待观察。

If so, it is bad news for South Asia. The combination of multiple warheads, increased accuracy, and drastically reduced launch time would indicate that India is gradually designing its way of out its so-called minimum deterrence doctrine towards a more capable nuclear posture.

几乎可以肯定会触发巴基斯坦和中国的柜台，发展decreaseIndian security. And if China were to deploy multiple warheads on its missiles, it could even impede future reductions of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

MIRVforia

印度国防承包商，工程师，分析师和新闻媒体报道多年来一直描述了为印度弹道导弹开发多个战头能力的努力。ReportsReports有些人甚至声称 - 错误地声称一些目前的弹道导弹能够传递MIRV。几个定义将有所帮助：

• 多个弹头（MRV - 多个重新进入车辆）导弹发射了两次或更多的弹头相同的目标. The warheads all impact within a circle of a few kilometers around the target in order to destroy it more effectively.

• 多个具有独立目标的重新进入车辆（MIRV）导弹发射了两次或更多的弹头different targets. This requires a Post-Boost Vehicle, or bus, that can maneuver in space to release the reentry vehicles individually so that they follow different trajectories, allowing them to hit separate targets. Some MIRVs can hit targets separated by over 1,500 kilometers.

MRV部署相对简单，但MIRV是一项更加复杂和昂贵的技术。新闻报告和ReportsReports私人网站很少区分两者，但自动将多个弹头等同于Mirv。同样，多个有效载荷不一定意味着弹头但可以涉及渗透辅助物，例如诱饵或谷壳。MRV可能涉及2-3枚弹头，但4个或更多的弹头意味着Mirv。

For reasons that are still unclear, Indian defense industry officials have for several years described development of multiple warheads for future Agni variants. In 2007, about a year after Agni III failed its first test launch and before Agni V had even left the launch pad, Avinash Chander, who has since been appointed to head the DRDO,saidthe next Agni variant would have a range of over 5,000 kilometers and “be a multiple warhead missile with a capacity to carry four to 12 warheads.”

So far that hasn’t happened and DRDO leaders have been unclear about what Agni version would receive the MIRV they are so busy working on. Vijay Kumar Saraswat, for example, made the followingstatement至NDTV他于2013年5月退休后不久担任DRDO负责人：

“Saraswat: Agni Series of missiles are in an advanced stage of production. Today, as you remember, we have completed development of Agni I, Agni II, and Agni III. Agni IV and Agni V are in an advanced stage of development. And this year, you will see two more launches of Agni V, which will culminate its complete developmental activity and it will be led to production. Agni IV is already getting into production mode. So with this – Agni I, Agni II, Agni III, Agni IV, Agni V – getting into production mode,the next logical corollary as far as the long-range ballistic missile deterrents capability of this country is concerned, we will switch over to force multiplication.在弹道导弹的情况下，强制乘法将通过多个独立多次manouevreable[sic] re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

NDTV: Meaning one missile which can carry many warheads?

Saraswat: Carry multiple warheads. Our design activity on the development and production of MIRV is at an advanced stage today. We are designing the MIRVs,we are integrating it with Agni IV and Agni V missiles, and that would also give us the capability to cover a vast area plus deliver in the event any activity requires a number of payloads at a required place.

NDTV: So will the next test be with a multiple warheads system or…

Saraswat: No. The present task, as I was mentioning, will be only with the normal configuration of Agni V. But将有一个实验测试，我们将测试MIRV功能。

NDTV: So that would be what? Agni VI or…

Saraswat:No we are not naming it Agni VI… it will be Agni V missile with MIRVs.

NDTV: So Agni V plus?

Saraswat: You can name is Agni V plus or Agni VI, but certainly it is not Agni VI.

NDTV: It is not Agni VI but Agni V will have multiple warheads so we can have a single missile going and hitting several targets at the same time?

Saraswat: Yes it will be in that category.”

But only three months earlier, Saraswat was quoted by numerous newspapers as explicitly crediting the Agni VI, not the Agni V, with multiple warhead capability: “Agni-V is a major strategic defence weapon. Now, we want to make Agni-VI, which will be a force multiplier.” The new Agni variant “will have force multiplier capability by the MIRV approach which would enable us to deliver many payloads at the same time using only one missile. Work is on in this area and designs have been completed. We are now in the hardware realisation phase,” hesaid.

Zeenewsquotedan unnamed “top scientists from DRDO” saying “Agni-VI missiles will carry four or six warheads depending upon their weight.”

在将Agni IV和Agni V移交给武装部队之后，DRDO的“两个主要重点区域将是操纵弹头或重新进入车辆，以击败敌方的弹道导弹防御系统和MIRVS（多个独立目标的重新进入车辆），Chander，”said.

Shorter Launch Time

Ignore for the moment that none of India’s potential adversaries have missile defense systems that can intercept Indian missiles, DRDO is also working on making the missiles more mobile and quicker to launch by deploying them in “canistered” Transportable Erector Launchers (TEL).

新的罐发射器“将大大减少反应时间……从“停止到发布”仅几分钟，”according to Chander. “We are committed to making [the missiles] much more agile, much more fast-reacting, much more stable so that the response can be within minutes,” he said. In an面试和今天的印度Chander解释说：“在第二次罢工能力中，最重要的是我们可以做出的速度，”他声称：“所有未来的战略导弹都将被罐装，”scheduled2014年初。

然而，与DRDO负责人的说法相反，第二个姿势中的“最重要的事情”不是印度的反应速度，而是仅仅是因为它可以进行报复。快速发射的能力仅与两种情况有关：一个，如果印度的对手有能够在使用之前摧毁地面上的印度导弹发射器的军队。中国面临着来自美国和俄罗斯的能力，但中国和巴基斯坦都没有能力对印度的核力量进行首次罢工。

第二种情况下，快速撞击能力可能是相关的，即印度计划对其对手进行首次罢工，但前提是对手能够检测到罢工的准备工作。但是，第一次罢工的计划将与印度的无用政策相抵触。

Nor is a quick-launch capability necessarily “more stable,” as Chander asserts. On the contrary, it could significantly decrease stability both in peacetime – by stimulating Chinese and Pakistani planners to further increase the responsiveness of their nuclear missiles – and in a crisis by shortening decision time and increasing risk of overreaction and escalation.

In addition to increasing warhead loading and responsiveness, DRDO is also working on improving the accuracy of warheads delivered by the missiles, although media reports about “pinpoint accuracy” are probably greatly exaggerated. Even thestatement在国防部，最近的AGNI V测试的有效载荷“准确数几米以内”似乎超过了目标区域。相反，早在2007年设计了Agni V时，Chandersaid：“我们试图达到100米的精度水平。”

可能存在一些重叠与传统missions (the Agni missiles are dual-capable), but accuracy of 100 meters (300 feet) would bring Agni V well within range of the accuracy of the best U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles (in itself a reason to be skeptical). But their accuracy was pursued in support of highly offensive counterforce strategies designed to target and destroy each other’s ICBM silos, missions that are incompatible with India’s minimum deterrence doctrine.

Conclusions and Recommendations

在过去的几年中，印度国防官员对增加有效载荷，响应能力和准确性的声明是令人担忧的迹象表明，印度可能正在设计其最小威慑姿势，从而对具有更多的战斗能力的人设计。

This includes development of multiple-warhead capability to move India’s nuclear missiles beyond “a defense weapon” to “a force multiplier” that can strike more targets with each missile. It includes upgrading launchers to “drastically” shorten the launch-time to “minutes.” And it includes increasing the accuracy of the reentry vehicles to more effectively strike their targets.

Where these requirements come from and who sets them is anyone’s guess, but they demonstrate a need for the Indian government to constrain its weapons designers and more clearly reaffirm its adherence to a minimum deterrence doctrine. Not only does the combination of multiple warheads, increased accuracy, and quick-launch capability challenge the credibility of minimum deterrence. It also sends all the wrong signals about India’s intensions and will almost inevitably trigger weapons developments in the nuclear postures of India’s neighbors – developments that would decrease Indian security and that of the whole region.

印度,公平地说,不是一个人在服用worrisome nuclear steps in the region.Pakistanis developing short-range nuclear missiles envisioned for tactical use below the strategic level that appears to envision potential use of nuclear weapons sooner in a conflict.Chinais mixing nuclear and conventional missiles that could trigger misunderstandings in a crisis and researching MIRV capability that may well be motivating Indian planners to follow now rather than catch up later.

印度，巴基斯坦和中国共同开始了广泛的核武器发展和部署计划，没有明显或宣布的目光。他们似乎正在做出许多与美国，俄罗斯，英国和法国在冷战期间所做的相同的决定（和错误）。现在有必要通过核武器控制措施来补充核姿势，以限制部队。

第一步可能是阻止在弹道导弹上部署多个弹头，以防止否则似乎是该地区核武器竞争的危险新阶段。

For its part, the Indian government should make a pledge not to deploy multiple warheads on its missiles a formal part of its minimum deterrence doctrine. Pakistan could easily join such an initiative.

China should join its southern neighbor in a no-multiple-warhead pledge, which would reaffirm its existing minimum deterrence posture and also help reduce India’s interest in multiple warheads. Moreover, a Chinese pledge not to deploy multiple warheads on its missiles would ease U.S. and Russian concerns about China’s potential to “sprint to parity” and therefore help ease the way for further U.S. and Russian reductions – something that both Beijing and Delhi favor.

All sides would seem to benefit from banning multiple warheads on ballistic missiles and India could take the first and honorable step toward a safer future.

[See also additional descriptions of the nuclear forces ofIndia,China, andPakistan。]。

This publication was made possible by grants from the New-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.