Even so, the fundamental standards and criteria around which personnel security policies and procedures are organized remain those set out in an executive order that is now nearly 44 years old. Although President Clinton's Executive Order 12968, issued on August 2, 1995, provides for common investigative and adjudicative standards to improve clearance reciprocity, strengthens appeal procedures, and improves the means of ensuring non-discrimination, it does not supersede Executive Order 10450, issued by President Eisenhower in 1953. Thus, in effect, it simply adds another regulatory layer to the personnel security system.
Personnel security in the future must be better integrated throughout the workplace, with managers and line officers accepting greater responsibility for security. High-profile examples of espionage arrests and poorly-administered procedures reduce confidence in the overall system and reinforce the Commission's view that the existing approach to personnel security is in need of substantial reform.
An updated personnel security system also must allocate more attention and resources to monitor, assess, and assist current employees, in particular those in positions of greatest sensitivity and those who have become at risk as a result of changes or difficulties in their lives. The Commission also believes that the personnel security process must be better understood. Many employees and applicants who have passed through the process have little understanding of what it actually involves. Greater security awareness and understanding should lead to a more secure working environment, as personnel become more knowledgeable about the key security concerns and significant threats, and what mechanisms exist to respond to these challenges.
Top Secret 768,000 Secret 2,299,000 Confidential 154,000
Source: General Accounting Office, Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and Adjudicative Functions, GAO/NSIAD-95-101 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1995), 12.
A security clearance indicates that a person has been investigated and deemed eligible for access to classified information based on established criteria set out in regulations. Although in limited instances agency heads may grant a clearance without an investigation, employees normally receive access to classified information only when they have been "cleared" and a "need-to-know" justification has been provided. In practice, however, the "need-to-know" principle is seldom applied strictly, except in specific areas such as most special access programs (SAPs), which maintain access rosters.
清除过程始于提交个人历史声明,详细介绍了过去的住所,教育和就业背景,犯罪历史,亲戚和其他个人信息。然后,由政府机构(例如国防调查服务局(DIS))(是联邦政府最大的调查机构)或私人承包商代表机构要求进行调查和进行调查。
背景调查的长度和复杂性取决于所需的间隙水平(或访问)。在大多数机构中,个人都经过机密,秘密或最高秘密许可,也可能是获取敏感隔室信息(SCI)的。根据《原子能法》,能源部(DOE)具有单独的系统;它的大多数员工都会获得“ L”许可,这等于机密或秘密许可,或“ Q”清除,这等于最高的机密清除。
When the NAC is supplemented by a credit check and written inquiries, the investigation is termed a NAC with Written Inquiries (NACI). Written inquiries are sent to schools, employers, and local law enforcement agencies to verify information submitted by the person under investigation. This has been the standard procedure required for Confidential and Secret clearances for Federal civilian employees in most agencies, as well as "suitability determinations" for applicants seeking Federal employment in positions not needing a security clearance. (It is notable that applicants for non-national security positions traditionally were subject to investigative steps for a "suitability" determination that exceeded those for military applicants who needed a Secret-level security clearance.) Those requiring access to Secret special access programs, however, usually require a review process similar to that for a Top Secret clearance.
一项单身背景调查(SSBI)(SSBI)纳入了NAC,但使用调查访谈代替书面查询,是最高机密清除所必需的,对于许多指定的秘密或最高机密的SAPS,“ Q”通关,以及访问Sci的许多SAPS所必需数据。作为背景调查过程的一部分,研究人员采访了申请人,现任和前邻居,角色参考,前教育工作者,以前的配偶以及现任和前任雇主;进行地方和国家执法记录检查;并获得信用报告以及军事和医疗记录。ReportsReports此外,一些中央情报局和NSA等机构要求申请人接受测谎仪检查,医学检查和心理评估。
政府雇员和承包商的人员security clearances are also subject to reinvestigations (covering the period beginning with the date of the last investigation) throughout their careers. The timing of reinvestigations can be random, but for Top Secret clearances they must be completed not less than once every five years. While the primary difference between initial investigations and reinvestigations is the period of time covered, some reinvestigation components may vary from the initial investigation. For example, during an initial polygraph examination, the NSA and the CIA cover counterintelligence issues (sabotage, espionage, and foreign intelligence) as well as additional issues such as possible use of drugs and any criminal activity, which are not included in subsequent tests. The Departments of Energy and Defense require regular in-house reviews as part of their "personnel reliability" programs for employees in extremely sensitive positions (such as those having access to nuclear devices); these reviews are conducted annually and consist of an interview, urinalysis, psychological testing, and a credit check.
国防部$ 183 OPM $ 100其他$ 43Source: General Accounting Office, Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and Adjudicative Functions, GAO/NSIAD-95- 101 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1995).
When an already cleared employee is transferred or detailed to another agency or special access program, that individual's file is reviewed again by an adjudicator at the receiving agency or by a program security officer prior to the acceptance of the employee's clearance. As a result, even though the individual's clearance may be up to date, additional security vetting is usually required before the clearance will be accepted by the receiving agency or special access program.
标准适用于“适用性”和“的安全性y eligibility" determinations today are largely redundant. All civilian Federal Government employees, regardless of whether they need access to national security information, must be found suitable for government service through use of at least a NACI. Those requiring access to national security information must also be found security-eligible as defined by Executive Order 10450. However, the two-step process of determining suitability and security eligibility is not applied uniformly across agencies, frequently involves duplicative steps and long delays, and is poorly understood by applicants and many agency officials alike. In addition, both the responsibilities and the criteria for suitability and personnel security determinations may differ from agency to agency. Some agencies place responsibility for both evaluations in the same office, while others maintain separate offices for making suitability and security determinations, at times with minimal coordination between the offices.
尽管人员安全系统的基本原则仍基于行政命令10450,但许多其他当局已修改了发放安全许可的订单中规定的特定语言,因为多年来所需的命令需要进一步放大,或者因为它不符合特定机构的需求。例如,该订单不会提及“分类信息”,也没有包括“清关”,“访问”或“需要知道”的单词。表2总结了与申请人和雇员有关适用性或安全资格确定的申请人和雇员的调查中的一些法律和法规。
原子能法修订的1954年,出发了the restricted data classification system, with an entirely separate structure from national security clearances. Executive Order 10865 (1960) Established standards governing access for industry employees. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Authorized heads of departments to prescribe regulations for Regulations determining the suitability of applicants for Federal service. Public Law 88-290 (1964) Amended the Internal Security Act of 1950 to specifically address personnel security concerns of the NSA. DoD Directive 5200.2-R Combined all Department of Defense personnel security (1979) programs, including DoD Directive 5210.9, which established the military personnel security program requiring the military to abide by the same loyalty oath as civilians. National Security Directive 63 Established single scope background investigative standards for (1991) access to Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information. Executive Order 12829 Created the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), a (1993) consolidation of Federal industrial security programs and relevant regulations. Director of Central Provided adjudication standards for access to Sensitive Intelligence Compartmented Information. Directive 1/14 (revised 1994) Executive Order 12968 (1995) Updated standards governing access to national security information.
A 1988 RAND Corporation report,To Repair or Rebuild,确定了当前人员安全过程中的一些关键问题。提出的重要问题之一是如何定义人员安全系统金博宝正规网址的基本目的;也就是说,它是否应该集中于通过间谍活动来应对秘密的损失,还是应该更广泛地考虑如何解决清除人员的行为问题,从酒精中毒和毒品使用到财务问题?根据该报告,对人员安全的定义越广,“传统上与人员管理相关的人员安全问题或阻止他们将其覆盖到其他安全领域,例如反扩展或物理安全,就越困难。”报告得出结论:
In the nine years since that report was issued, however, any changes have been modest and any improvements incremental in nature. It is essential that a personnel security system for the post-Cold War era include new guiding principles reflecting updated needs and priorities. These guiding principles must be common across the Government to help officials implement specific personnel security procedures that enhance both national security and the understanding of operational needs, that are sensitive to individual rights, and that are supportive of employees' needs.
The Commission recommends five guiding principles as the essential elements of an effective personnel security system. Most already are part of the current system (including under Executive Order 12968), but too often they are not actually practiced throughout the Federal Government. The Commission recommends that these standards be incorporated into a new statute or regulation that would supersede Executive Order 10450.
尽管特定的流程和工具可能会随着时间的流逝而发生变化,但必须有一致的指导标准来支撑整个系统。
The five guiding principles are:
In order to improve clearance reciprocity between government agencies, the interagency Security Policy Board has agreed on minimum investigative standards across the Federal Government; these have been forwarded to the White House for review. However, a significant exception to this policy remains because these are onlyminimum标准。因此,机构仍然允许retain specific additional security requirements, thereby limiting the extent to which there can be genuine reciprocity of clearances.
In addition to this lack of clearance reciprocity, the system is also made less efficient by the failure to standardize the personnel security questionnaires that are used. An April 1995 OMB memorandum prescribed one form, Standard Form 86, for use by Federal agencies in security clearance background investigations.5这个新的需求尚未完全实现ed, however, because the form was written for a background investigation covering seven years, while the standards for investigative components for a Top Secret clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) have since changed and now vary from three to ten years. As a result of these differences, several agencies continue to use agency-specific forms. The longstanding objectives of greater uniformity, reciprocity, and cost effectiveness in the clearance process appear to be a considerable distance from actually being realized.
The Commission recommends that individuals in both Government and industry holding valid clearances be able to move from one agency or special program to another without further investigation or adjudication. The single exception to this true reciprocity of security clearances shall be that agencies may continue to require the polygraph before granting access.
This approach would reduce the "dead time" often facing cleared employees and contractors when they transfer to other agencies or projects. The Government would no longer have to pay for employees to sit idle and there would be less likelihood of losing quality personnel who do not want to wait long periods for the completion of additional clearance procedures.
人员安全调查人员和审判员的标准随时间变化。有一次,司法部的调查局(后来联邦调查局)有权对处于敏感职位的人进行所有调查,并且几乎所有进行调查的代理人都必须在法律或法律上拥有学位会计。第二次世界大战后需要背景调查的人员数量大大增加(根据杜鲁门总统的执行命令9835,于1947年,然后在六年后艾森豪威尔总统的行政命令10450),作为调查的主要责任,转移到公务员服务委员会的主要责任,减轻了调查人员的招聘要求。如今,尽管重点放在背景调查上,但研究人员和裁决者的标准很少。通常,尽管这不是必需的,但通常在任何领域的学士学位就足够了。
此外,没有交易的共同标准ining or continuing education: initial training usually consists of four weeks of classes and is followed by varying periods of on-the-job training. The Defense Investigative Service, for example, has had a hiring freeze since 1991 and only conducts sporadic training for its investigators. Although the DIS is reviewing its continuing education practices, senior DIS officials recognize that they face, as one acknowledged, "a crisis situation because we know our people are not receiving training."6The OPM has no continuing education requirements. And the Federal Government, because it recently privatized its investigations division, must monitor the standards set for hiring qualifications, training, and education by the successor to its Federal Investigations Service, the U.S. Investigation Service, Inc.
Time delays can inconvenience applicants and waste significant resources. Both the Government and private industry can lose qualified applicants who do not have the patience or resources to wait, sometimes up to a year or more, to find out whether or when they can begin work. The GAO has estimated that these processing delays cost the Government $920 million a year in productivity losses;8这些成本只会随着延误恶化而增加。
Minor Derogatory: Information that, by itself, is not of sufficient importance or magnitude to justify an unfavorable administrative security clearance determination.
Moderate Derogatory: Information on the basis of which an unfavorable administrative security clearance determination may not necessarily be made, but which obligates the investigative agent to pursue its development.
Significant Derogatory:可能本身可以证明不利的行政行动或提示审判员寻求额外调查或澄清的信息。
为了缓解延迟清关过程中,adjudicative offices should consider establishing fast-track procedures by handling clean cases first, rather than holding them in line behind cases with derogatory information that require more detailed analysis and processing. If the required level of investigation has been undertaken and no derogatory information has been revealed, the adjudicative office would issue a clearance immediately with only one review.
Establishing fast-track adjudications would eliminate a second adjudicative review, thus saving time and resources, reducing adjudicative backlogs (which are extensive and growing in several agencies), and permitting adjudicators to focus more time on serious derogatory cases. Expedited processing of clean cases would provide a good example of applying risk assessment principles in an era of diminishing personnel security resources. The NRO, for example, already uses this method successfully, contributing to its average processing time of under 60 days.
For example, personnel security officials from one agency reported that approximately 10 percent of applicants withdraw from consideration after having applied for a security clearance--often because they can no longer afford to wait. Contractors also voiced concerns that the system is not accountable to its customers. For example, if the contractor calls to check on the status of an employee, the agency in question often cannot determine where the individual stands in the clearance process. In addition, those subjected to the clearance process often do not understand it. Some assume, for example, that they will be denied a clearance for reasons that are not actually grounds for rejection. Moreover, security officials in many agencies often do not know or understand the investigative or adjudicative processes of other agencies.
While Executive Order 12968 attempts to address other concerns about the fairness of the personnel security process, it does not include provisions that are designed to improve the basic understanding and transparency of the process. Applicants or employees who have their clearances denied, suspended, or revoked, and who are not provided a reason, are effectively denied due process, even though Executive Order 12968 explicitly calls for improvements in this regard.
Data from the PERSEREC and Project SLAMMER, a study of post-World War II espionage cases, confirm that few persons join the Government or begin contractor employment with the intent of committing espionage.10The main threat instead comes from trusted "insiders," those who already hold clearances and only much later in their careers decide to commit espionage. Even so, the personnel security system established under Executive Order 10450 consistently has allocated most resources to the initial clearance process, based on the once-prevailing concerns about the Soviet Union and its allies placing espionage agents inside the U.S. Government.
对初始清算的关注使资源分配和对重新评估和持续评估计划的关注分配。持续的评估计划和重新评估通常是削减预算的第一个领域。例如,DIS在1995年宣布,由于资源的减少,它不再可以日期进行定期重新评估,并将为当前员工的所有反智能委托测谎仪建立年度上限。尽管后来修改了该政策,以作出有关与机构负责人进行重新评估的决定(在NSA高级官员表示关注之后),但有关该政策的问题,但有关该政策的问题quality尚未解决重新评估。
在资源下降的时期,联邦政府还应将其保证金瞄准调查中最有效的要素:那些产生与清算决定相关的最重要信息的人。根据1996年的Perserec报告,最有效的开发贬义信息的总体来源是正在调查的人:报告指出,在发现犯罪信息的81%的案件中,个人受试者通过访谈或人员安全问卷提供了此类信息。11
"The neighbors are never at home unless it is in the evening or on the weekend, and often do not want to talk to strangers, regardless where they say they are from. Single women often will not open their doors for someone they don't know, regardless of whether he or she has a badge. Possibly the biggest problem is that neighbors do not want to say anything that can potentially subject them to a lawsuit." -- Intelligence Community Investigators
初始背景调查的某些要素比其他元素更有生产力。最有生产力的人包括对以前的配偶和雇主,医疗专业人员,亲戚以及列出或发达的角色参考的访谈。12The least productive sources include neighborhood interviews, which are also the most expensive and time consuming.13根据这项研究和其他研究,对教育参考的访谈也不是富有成效的。
The limited utility of neighborhood interviews should not be surprising. The practice of interviewing neighbors is based on a vision of America as it once was--with individuals living in the same geographic areas most of their lives, enabling investigators to glean useful information from local sources with relative ease. Today, this is less often the case, given greater personal mobility, privacy concerns, and the litigiousness of society. When the difficulty of gaining access to neighbors and the time and substantial expense of the procedure are also factored in, the notion that neighborhood interviews should be done routinely as part of every background investigation requires reassessment.
The Security Policy Board has implicitly acknowledged the limited usefulness of neighborhood interviews by agreeing to limit their scope to three years for Top Secret/ SCI clearances. The Commission believes that the time has come to go further; in view of the limited resources often available and the need to prioritize, it is important to focus on the most productive elements of the personnel security investigation. The Commission recommends the following steps to reallocate investigative resources and focus on the most productive aspects of the investigation.
The Commission recommends that current requirements for neighborhood interviews and for interviewing educational references in every investigation be eliminated.
Under the above proposal, neighborhood interviews and checks of educational references still would be allowed where personnel security officials believe that the information yielded from these interviews would be productive; they simply would not be required in every investigation. This proposed approach is consistent with the critical objective of achieving increased reciprocity through greater standardization of personnel security procedures; it would promote common standards across the Government that make sense in view of existing resource constraints.
Greater attention needs to be directed toward making continuing evaluation programs more effective. For example, using existing public and private data bases--with the express advance permission of the individual under review--to periodically scan for criminal history, as well as for credit, travel, and business history, normally would provide more accurate information at less cost than standard field reinvestigations.
人员安全专业人员可以连续监测清理人员的行为和活动,以更有效,更具成本效益和非感知方式。鉴于有证据表明,通过当前的标准调查或重新评估过程,捕捉间谍的可能性很小,更好的持续评估计划可能会增加阻止或识别间谍活动的可能性。
委员会建议在最初的清算过程和继续评估被清算员工的计划之间实现更大的平衡。
Most of the information needed is already available on existing databases; private industry experiences suggest that efforts to utilize automation to access such data can be very cost-effective as well as productive. Nevertheless, because some automated tools can be expensive, a cost-benefit assessment should be completed prior to utilizing them.
Resources should be focused on those individuals in the most sensitive positions or where there is some evidence of suspect behavior; in an era of diminishing resources and frequent budget cuts, more effective continuing assessment can be accomplished only by concentrating on the areas of greatest vulnerability. In addition, those holding what are identified as the most sensitive positions could be subjected to more frequent, "in house" reviews similar to the personnel reliability programs used by the Defense and Energy Departments, as described above. These measures provide a cost-effective way to monitor and assess employees with greater regularity and frequency, but without necessarily having to direct additional resources toward the traditional field investigation.
Self-Referred 83% Required Attendance 17% Helped 70% Too Soon to Tell 22% Not Helped 8%
Source: Office of Personnel Management, Fiscal Year 1994: Report to Congress Title VI of Public Law 99-570 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1995), 5-7.
The maintenance of confidentiality is and should remain a key element of such programs. Employees having emotional and financial difficulties are less likely to seek counseling if there is a perception that confidentiality is either nonexistent or poorly maintained, and that reprisals from security officials are possible. For example, convicted spy James Hall reportedly had sought help for his alcoholism from a military EAP, but declined to return after a counselor warned that attending one could damage his career. Confidentiality policies for EAPs should include nondisclosure of files and information garnered during the course of counseling, except in cases where confidentiality is prohibited by law (such as when there is admission of child abuse, intent to do harm, or other criminal activity).
One additional issue with respect to EAPs is whether contractor employees should be eligible. Most government agencies are prevented under the Federal Employee Substance Abuse Education and Treatment Act of 1986 from offering any EAP services to contractor employees and their families. While some larger firms are able to fulfill this function in-house, smaller companies often do not have the resources to create an EAP. Because contractor employees may have access to the same national security information as Federal employees, agencies that work with them should have the option of offering the services of EAPs to contractor employees in certain circumstances (without being required to do so). NSA officials, for example, have said that they would like to be able to provide EAP services to contractor employees from smaller companies, but cannot do so at present because of the legal restriction.
包括Slammer项目在内的研究表明,对经济利益的兴趣是间谍活动和其他犯罪活动的主要动机之一。16主要是由于Aldrich Ames案,国会(通过1995年的情报授权法)和行政部门(通过第12968号行政命令)确定那些能够访问非常敏感信息的人需要一份新的财务披露表。该表格除了信用报告,收集的其他财务信息以及个人签署的同意书外,还将使用该表格,该表格允许访ReportsReports问个人的财务信息,前提是调查人员可以显示原因。
对新财务披露表的要求在负责实施的人之间引起了巨大的辩论。例如,SPB人事安全委员会的几乎所有成员都表明,使用这种表格不会有意义地提高人员安全,并且在过去两年中提出的担忧(包括成本,收集到的数据以及对数据机密性的维护)没有得到充分解决。
While Executive Order 12968 provides fairly specific guidelines to assist agency heads in deciding who is required to fill out a financial disclosure form, agency officials, employees, and contractors have voiced concern over how officials will interpret the Order's provisions. They also are concerned that collecting the financial data by this method will be a costly endeavor with limited returns. The CIA and the Customs Service, two agencies that have been using a financial disclosure form, have not yet quantified the effectiveness of their forms. Furthermore, once the information has been collected, there is continued uncertainty over whether the Government has the resources or technical capability to analyze it in a meaningful way.
Finally, there is still considerable uncertainty concerning whether the financial information collected should be used as an analytical or investigative tool. If investigators use the form simply as an investigative tool, it may provide very little added value to the consent forms that all employees with security clearances already are required to sign. If it is used as an analytical tool, adjudicators would use that information in their security eligibility determinations, as they currently use credit reports and other available information.
The Commission recommends that both the Congress and the Executive Branch reevaluate the requirement to utilize a new financial disclosure form and consider staying its implementation until there is further evaluation concerning how it would be used and whether its benefits exceed its costs. The Congress and the Executive Branch should review alternative approaches to improving data collection, including utilization of the expanded access to certain financial and travel records provided for under Executive Order 12968.
Because disparities exist in the procedural safeguards employed by different agencies for those employees requiring access to highly sensitive information, full reciprocity of security clearances between the agencies cannot be achieved. While the polygraph is used to screen employees at the CIA, NRO, DIA, NSA, and FBI (which resumed screening in 1993), the White House, NSC, State Department, and Congress have traditionally resisted adopting polygraph screening. Even among the agencies that use the polygraph, the scope, methods, and procedural safeguards may diverge.
中央情报局
Defense Intelligence Agency
Drug Enforcement Agency
联邦调查局
National Security Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
Although the polygraph is useful in eliciting admissions, the potential also exists for excessive reliance on the examination itself. A related concern is that too much trust is placed in polygraph examiners' skills, creating a false sense of security within agencies that rely on the polygraph.18The few Government-sponsored scientific research reports on polygraph validity (as opposed to its utility), especially those focusing on the screening of applicants for employment, indicate that the polygraph is neither scientifically valid nor especially effective beyond its ability to generate admissions (some of which may not even be relevant based on current adjudicative criteria).19Many senior intelligence community officials, however, have told Commission members that they believe the polygraph is scientifically valid.
A 1989 Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI) study found that 60 percent of subjects were incorrectly cleared in a test that measured the subject's knowledge or guilt of a crime. The results of this test concluded that the ability to identify those guilty or knowledgeable of a crime "was significantly worse than chance."20The DoDPI study, however, was conducted in a controlled setting, and, therefore, may not accurately reflect the conditions under which a polygraph is normally taken. (Another report, a detailed 1991 FBI study entitled "Polygraph Examinations in Federal Personnel Security Applications," is classified in its entirety, and so the Commission cannot reference any of its substantive findings or recommendations in this unclassified report.)
Past commissions, an internal CIA working group, and several other studies have also called for additional research concerning polygraph accuracy.21然而,综合研究的准确性of the polygraph has not been funded, despite the fact that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1988 recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence fund all future requests for studies on screening accuracy. Moreover, despite DoDPI's efforts to manage an effective research program in recent years, little support for it appears to exist within the broader scientific community, primarily because there is no open and objective peer review of DoDPI's research.
The Commission believes that the following would improve understanding of both the polygraph's utility and its scientific validity, thereby promoting better informed decisions concerning its use.
The Commission recommends that: (1) the director of scientific research at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI) establish a committee that includes cleared, outside scientific experts to develop a coherent research agenda on the polygraph; initiate and participate in a small grant program to stimulate independent research outside the Government; and review and comment on scientific progress and the quality of government-sponsored research in this field; and (2) independent, objective, and peer-reviewed scientific research be encouraged as the best means to assess the credibility of the polygraph as a personnel security tool and identify potential technological advances that could make the polygraph more effective in the future.
Recently developed, and potentially very promising, innovations include the pre-screening software program "Military Applicant Screening System" (MASS), developed at the PERSEREC, which leads military applicants through a series of questions to determine whether or not they would be eligible for a clearance. If the applicant would be ineligible for a clearance, military recruiters can direct the applicant to another position for which a clearance is not required, thereby saving scarce investigative resources.
其他新的事态发展包括PerseRec的“审判者桌面参考指南”,该指南存储了一系列准则,法律和统计信息,以帮助裁定者做出最终的许可决策。在安全政策委员会内审查是一个通用的识别徽章,它将允许一个机构的人员前往另一代理机构,而无需经历传统上繁琐的通行过程。
The Commission endorses these and other examples of automation of the personnel security system, and recommends a more coordinated approach to developing additional programs. For example, building on the progress already made, a "Personnel Assurance System" index could be developed to rank employees by the degree of harm they could inflict, based on the sensitivity of their position and an assessment of the relevant threat, as well as on their level of clearance. Those in the most sensitive positions would be subject to more frequent and more detailed adjudication.
In addition, improved computer programs could be created that are capable of continually scanning different databases (e.g., that of the Treasury Department, consumer credit reports, national criminal databases, and other commercially available databases) for suspect behavior or other indicators of potential problems. Existing public databases today include vast amounts of information on all facets of personal finances and holdings. Consistent with applicable privacy requirements, officials should use these databases as valuable open source information to assist in personnel security decisions.
委员会认为,可以使用已经可以使用的技术创建一个更有效,部分自动化的人员调查过程。国防调查局和OPM联邦调查加工中心已经开始了数百万美元的项目,这些项目将为平民,军事和工业承包商雇员提供大部分初始人事安全调查过程;现在的目标是找到一种将这些自动化项目集成到整个人员安全过程中的方法。
A number of problems prevent the personnel security system from operating efficiently and effectively. For example, the authorities governing the clearance process are disjointed and outdated, which leads to confusion both for the administrators and for customers of the process. Attempts to revamp the system have resulted in ad hoc or piecemeal solutions, such as the financial disclosure form inspired by the Aldrich Ames espionage case, that tend to address only the most recent high-profile espionage cases rather than the underlying problems of the system. Fewer government resources have led to a dangerous focus on initial investigations at the expense of reinvestigations, even though recent studies have shown that individuals now typically turn to espionage only after years of government service. Moreover, too many of the remaining resources are being used for less productive investigation elements, such as neighborhood checks or redundant investigations for contractors and Federal employees who transfer between agencies.
The solutions for these problems must come from a fundamental reevaluation of the personnel security system, rather than from temporary fixes. A successful security clearance process commences when an applicant applies for a security clearance, but it must continue with frequent and productive reinvestigations, better employee assistance programs for troubled employees, and improved general security awareness by managers and coworkers. Some recent innovations have demonstrated how automation can improve the system; a coordinated approach to developing further such programs is desirable.
欧盟委员会认为,建议出发了above will move the personnel security system in the desired direction. Guiding principles will lead personnel security officials to a better understanding of their mission and responsibilities. Increased reciprocity will allow employees to transfer more easily between agencies without redundant investigations. Reallocating resources based upon the need for greater balance between the initial clearance process and continuing assessment programs will provide more protection against "trusted" insiders who can cause serious damage to our nation's security. Finally, an evaluation of the tools of the personnel security system, such as the polygraph, will help ensure that they further the aims of the overall process.
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1。General Accounting Office, Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and Adjudicative Functions, GAO/NSIAD-95-101 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1995), 12.
2.Ibid., 11.
3.人事管理办公室,联邦调查通知95-4,1995年8月1日。
4。卡尔建筑商,维克多·杰克逊(Victor Jackson)和雷·史塔尔(Rae Starr)进行维修或重建:分析人员安全研究议程,R-3652-ISDP(圣莫尼卡:兰德:1988年9月),第11页。
5.管理和预算办公室,高级信息资源管理备忘录:标准适用性和背景调查问卷的批准(管理与预算办公室,华盛顿特区,1995年4月11日)。
6.Defense Investigative Service Official, telephone conversation with Commission staff, 20 June 1996.
7.国防人员安全研究中心,《人事安全报告》(华盛顿特区:国防部,1994年),第20页。
8.Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United States: Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid Millions in Losses, GGD-81-105 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 15 September 1981), ii.
9.国防部安全研究所,最近的间谍案件:摘要和消息来源(里士满:国防部安全研究所,1994年7月),第12卷,第15卷。
10。Suzanne Wood and Martin Wiskoff, Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II, PERS-TR-92-005 (Monterey: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, May 1992), 26.
11。拉尔夫·卡尼(Ralph M. Carney),SSBI来源的收益:对SSBI期间联系的来源的检查(蒙特雷:国防人员安全研究中心,1996年),第6页。
12.Ibid., 15.
13.Personnel Security Working Group et al., Evaluation of DCID 1/14 Investigative Require-ments (Washington, D.C.: Director of Central Intelligence, April 1991), 31.
14。人事管理办公室,1994财政年度:向国会报告公法第六章99-570(华盛顿特区:政府印刷办公室,1995年9月),第1期。
15。Ibid., 12-20.
16.Willis Reilly and Paul Joyal, Project SLAMMER: A Critical Look at the Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14 Criteria (Washington, D.C.: Director of Central Intelligence, 1993), 25-28. Project SHADOW is the name given to a current DoD Security Institute project to reinterview the subjects of Project SLAMMER and produce new videotapes for the purpose of developing better security education and awareness information. Department of Defense official, telephone conversation with Commission staff, 12 January 1997. See also Jeff Stein, "Treason on Their Minds: �Project Shadow' Aims to Spot Moles Earlier," Washington Post, 12 January 1997, C2.
17.National Security Agency, letter to Holly Gwin, White House Office of Science and Technology, 4 May 1993.
18.众议院情报永久选择委员会,美国反情报与安全问题的报告(1986年)。
19.See Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation--A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-H-15 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, November 1983); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Counterintelligence and Security Concerns; Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, Study of the Accuracy of Security Screening Polygraph Examinations. For additional information and examples of studies that found the polygraph was scientifically valid in certain applications, see Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, Bootstrap Decision Making for Polygraph Examinations, final report of DOD/PERSEREC Grant No. N00014-92-J-1795 prepared by Charles R. Honts and Mary K. Devitt (Grand Forks: University of North Dakota, 24 August 1992); Charles R. Honts, Theory Development and Psychophysiological Credibility Assessment (Boise: Boise State University, 1996); Charles R. Honts, 1994 Final Report: Field Validity Study of the Canadian Police College Polygraph Technique, Science Branch: Supply and Services Canada, contract #M9010-3-2219/01ST (Grand Forks: C. Honts Consultations, 1994); Christopher J. Patrick and William G. Iscono, "Validity and Reliability of the Control Questions Polygraph Test: A Scientific Investigation," SBR Abstracts, Psychophysiology 24, no. 5 (September 1987):604-05.
20。Gordon Barland, Charles R. Honts, and Steven Barger, Studies of the Accuracy of Security Screening Polygraph Examinations (Fort McClellan: Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, 24 March 1989), iii.
21。Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, 102.
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