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**UNCLASSIFIED**

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
 BOOK I -- GENERAL  
 VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

3A #3

**Department of Energy Declassification Review**

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To: Jean O'Leary  
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\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Pls leave Mr. Traynor's  
clips + notes ~~in~~ in  
the attached volumes  
for a few months in  
event Mr. Traynor  
needs to refer to them  
again.

Thank you.

G. Lethe 6/13

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY

BOOK I -- GENERAL

VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

*24  
1/14/2011*

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW-DATE: <u>10-14-05</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <input type="checkbox"/> AOC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DPC <input type="checkbox"/> ADD	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
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2ND REVIEW-DATE: <u>10/20/05</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
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NAME: <u>Deborah K. Harms</u>	3. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
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31 December 1945.

~~CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO  
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H. F. Canall  
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FOREWORD

This account of Intelligence and Security activities of the Manhattan District has been written for two specific purposes: to give the reader an insight into the innumerable and delicate problems relating to the security of a project which, by direction of the President of the United States, has been more drastically guarded than any other highly secret war development; and to provide a permanent record of the development, organization and activities of the Security and Intelligence Division. In order to provide a coherent picture, an attempt has been made to describe activities in a logical order, although it should be realized that many of the policies and functions of the Intelligence and Security Division became established as the result of experience.

The necessary data for this account were drawn from the District Office files and from the recollections of the authors of the various sections, who are persons with long experience in the Intelligence and Security Division. The text has been written as of 31 December 1945. Earlier dates have been selected in some instances because the period to these dates represent a more correct picture of certain activities than would be presented if 31 December were selected.

31 December 1945.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Par. No. Page No.

SUMMARY

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION


1-1	Necessity for Security Program	1.1
1-2	General Purpose of Security Program	1.2
1-3	Scope of Security Program	1.2
	a. Geographic	1.3
	b. Functional	1.3
	(1) Subversive Investigative Program	1.3
	(2) Personnel Security Program	1.3
	(3) Plant Protection Program	1.3
	(4) Visitor Control Program	1.4
	(5) Shipment and Courier System	1.4
	(6) Program to Safeguard Military Information	1.4
	(7) Operation of Comprehensive Security Program at CW	1.4
	(8) Handling of all Administrative Matters	1.5
1-4	Relationship of District Forces to Other Government Agencies	1.5

SECTION 2 - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

2-1	General	2.1
	a. Possible Courses of Enemy Action	2.1
	b. Objective of Counter-Intelligence	2.1
2-2	Counter-Intelligence Investigations	2.2
	a. Personnel Investigations	2.2
	b. Espionage Investigations	2.3
	c. Sabotage Investigations	2.5
	d. General Subversive Investigations	2.7
	e. Safeguarding Military Information Investigations	2.9
	f. Miscellaneous Investigations	2.9
2-3	Volume of Counter-Intelligence Work	2.10

SECTION 3 - PERSONNEL AND COMPANY CLEARANCE

3-1	General Policy	3.1
3-2	Personnel Clearance	3.1
	a. Classification of Employees	3.1
	b. Clearance of Classified Employees	3.2



Par. No.

Page No.

	(1) Original Procedure	3.2
	(2) Changes in Procedure, May 1943	3.3
	(3) Change in Procedure, October 1943	3.6
	(4) Changes in Procedure after October 1943	3.5
	(5) Present Procedure	3.7
	c. Volume of Employee Investigations	3.7
3-5	Company Clearance	3.7

**SECTION 4 - PLANT PROTECTION**

4-1	Need for and Objectives of Program	4.1
4-2	Essential Elements of Program	4.1
4-3	Plant Inspections and Surveys	4.2
	a. Early Plant Inspections	4.2
	b. Procedure in Early Plant Inspections	4.3
	c. Security Survey Program	4.4
	d. Security Survey Reports	4.5
	e. Classification of Facilities	4.6
4-4	Action on Survey Report Recommendations	4.7
4-5	Security Assistance to Contractors	4.8
4-6	Protective Measures for Prevention of Sabotage and Espionage	4.9
4-7	Visitor Control	4.10
4-8	Success of Plant Protection Program	4.11

**SECTION 5 - SHIPMENT SECURITY**

5-1	Need for Shipment Security Program	5.1
5-2	Survey of Shipment Security	5.1
5-3	Shipment Security Program	5.2
5-4	Shipment Security Measures	5.2
	a. Guard Pools	5.2
	b. Courier System	5.3
	c. Other Security Measures	5.4
5-5	Methods of Transportation	5.4
	a. General	5.4
	b. Railway Express	5.5
	c. Rail Freight	5.5
	d. Rail Travel by Courier	5.6
	e. Motor Freight	5.7
	f. Air Transport	5.7
5-6	Shipment Security Accomplishment	5.8





~~SECRET~~

Par. No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page No.

	d. Decentralization of Personnel Security to Branch Intelligence Offices	7.4
	e. Organization of Intelligence and Security Division	7.4
	f. Creation of Plant Security Section, and Section for Safeguarding Military Information	7.4
	g. Creation of Administrative, Shipment and Courier, and Evaluation and Review Sections	7.5
7-3	Personnel of Intelligence and Security Division	7.5
	a. Establishment of District Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment	7.5
	b. Reorganization of and Increase in Intelligence and Security Division Personnel	7.7
	c. Administration of Non-Counter-Intelligence Personnel	7.7
	d. Organization of Intelligence and Security Division Personnel of 1 July 1945	7.8
	e. Separation of Intelligence and Security Functions	7.10
7-4	Administration	7.11
	a. Organization of Administration Section	7.11
	b. Centralized Control	7.11
	c. Investigative Equipment	7.12
	d. Confidential Funds	7.12
	e. Mail and Records and Classified File Sections	7.13

APPENDIX "A" - LETTERS & ORGANIZATION CHART

APPENDIX "B" - MEMORANDA & INTELLIGENCE BULLETINS

APPENDIX "C" - MISCELLANEOUS, FORMS, & MANUALS

APPENDIX "D" - REFERENCES

APPENDIX "E" - COPIES OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS  
TYPICAL LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION CASES

APPENDIX "F" - PERSONNEL OF INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
DIVISION

INDEX

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SUMMARY

1. Introduction. - The successful development and use of an atomic weapon required that the activities of the Manhattan District be afforded the highest possible degree of security. An intensive program, therefore, was essential to maintain the secrecy of the Project and to prevent interruption to operations from sabotage, fire, explosion, and similar interference. The fact that Germany never made a large scale effort to make an atomic bomb is proof that efforts to maintain secrecy, concerning the progress of the Project, were successful. Since the Project was without geographic limitation, the scope of the security program was likewise. Also, in order to maintain security effectively, it was essential that the security program be geared to perform a number of specialized functions; i.e., a subversive investigative program; a personnel security program; a plant protection program; a visitor control program; a shipment and courier system; a program to safeguard military information; a comprehensive security program at Clinton Engineer Works, including an identification system, the guarding of perimeter gates and vital units and installations, a fire prevention program, the maintenance of a municipal police force and Review Board; and the handling of all administrative matters pertaining to these functions. In accomplishing this program it was necessary for the District Intelligence and Security Division to relieve the Service Commands of responsibility for inspection of certain plants or sections of plants engaged on District work. It

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was also necessary to assume responsibility for investigations of subversive activities at Clinton Engineer Works, Hanford Engineer Works, Site Y, University of California, University of Chicago, Columbia University and numerous other locations of interest to the Manhattan Engineer District. Arrangements were made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and office of Naval Intelligence for the District to assume the same investigative responsibility at plants, or completely segregated portions thereof, where employees were engaged on full-time District work. Preliminary investigations of Federal criminal offenses committed at project sites were made by the District.

2. Counter-Intelligence. - It was to be expected that the enemy would follow two possible courses of action, i.e., (a) obtain vital information through infiltration of disloyal personnel and (b) sabotage District installations. The objective of counter-intelligence, therefore, was to investigate all subversive, disloyal or disaffected personnel, all incidents having espionage, sabotage or subversive significance, and all unauthorized disclosures of classified project information. Six types of counter-intelligence investigations were conducted: (a) Personnel investigations, (b) Espionage investigations, (c) Sabotage investigations, (d) General Subversive investigations, (e) Safeguarding Military Information (SMI) investigations, and (f) Miscellaneous investigations. The Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment has handled more than 1,000 general subversive investigations, over 1,500 cases in which classified project information was transmitted

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to unauthorized persons, approximately 100 suspected espionage cases, and approximately 200 suspected sabotage cases.

3. Personnel and Company Clearance.

A program was initiated in the fall of 1942 which was designed to assure the entrusting of classified work of the District only to those persons or business firms whose loyalty, integrity and discretion had been clearly established. Employees were considered as being in two categories - classified and unclassified-- depending upon the type of information to which they would have access. Clearance procedures of classified employees underwent several modifications as the District expanded and conditions changed. All procedures, however, included positive identification and investigation of the individual through the use of personnel security questionnaires or personal history statements, fingerprint charts and proof of citizenship or alien registration; special investigations were made in doubtful cases. The penalties for disclosure of classified information were made clear to the individual, who was then required to read and sign, either the Espionage Act or a special secrecy agreement. Master reference lists of undesirables were maintained to aid in forestalling their employment or reemployment. No one was permitted to have access to classified information until at least the minimum clearance requirements were satisfied. Subsequent to October 1943, employees were divided into three groups, depending upon the type of information to which they had access, and were subject to

investigation, the extent of which varied according to their classification. From the inception of the District until August 1945, some 400,000 employees had been investigated.

Company clearance was based on a check of the files of the A. C. of S., G-2, a Dun and Bradstreet credit report, and agency checks of key personnel. In all, approximately 600 companies had been cleared by August 1945.

4. Plant Protection.

A Plant Protection Program was inaugurated for the prevention of espionage, sabotage, fires, explosions, major accidents and other similar hazards. Security standards established jointly by the Army and Navy were adopted as the basic plant protection policy.

The first step in the program was the inspection and survey of vital plants and installations. Although comprehensive surveys covering all phases of plant security were at first impossible, with the addition of more plant protection personnel a security survey program was set up, in August 1943, as a part of the Plant Protection Program launched at that time. This survey program provided for prompt security surveys of all installations engaged on important work of interest to the District. After 20 September 1943, such surveys covered all aspects of plants in order to discover various conditions which might cause interruptions to production or the loss or compromise of classified information. Reports on the results of surveys, containing recommendations for necessary improvements and overall security ratings,

were made on a special survey report form to the Area Engineer or other officer responsible for the security of the facility. In order that complete security coverage would be assured, a list of all important facilities was established on 15 April 1944 and revised bi-monthly thereafter. Commencing in June 1944, these facilities were classified into three categories according to their relative importance to the Project, "A" facilities being those at which an interruption would seriously delay the overall program, "B" facilities where only a minor delay would result, and "C" facilities where no delay would occur. A composite security rating of "Excellent", "Good", "Fair", or "Poor" was indicated in the security survey report covering each facility, and it was required of the responsible Area Engineer that "A" and "B" facilities be provided with the protective measures necessary to merit a security rating of not less than "Good" and "Fair" respectively.

Upon receipt of a survey report, the Area Engineer instituted such action to provide protection, in accordance with the findings of the report, as he deemed necessary after balancing potential hazards against "calculated risks". At the principal sites it became necessary for the District Intelligence and Security Division to assist contractors in taking the required security measures.

In December 1942, a system was adopted for the control of all visitors to District installations engaged on classified work, to insure that only individuals of known loyalty, whose presence was necessary to the advancement of the work at the

installation visited, were given access to restricted areas. Control was exercised by requiring each visitor to obtain, prior to his visit, the written authorization of specified responsible District officials.

Up to 31 December 1945 there were no serious construction or production interruptions attributable to security hazards, nor any known serious compromise of classified information, attributable to lack of physical protection against espionage. Thus it is apparent that the Plant Protection Program was a success.

5. Shipment Security.

The shipment of classified materials, equipment and documents grew in volume with the expanding activities of the District. In the early stages of the Project, security was insured by adherence to the general policies of the War Department for safeguarding military information. As the District expanded, the need for a special program to provide effective security for shipments of highly important materials with a minimum of delay in delivery became apparent. Such a program was initiated in the latter months of 1943. Under this program, guard pools were established at Chicago, Illinois, and at Wilmington, Delaware. These guards were used to protect rail or motor shipments among the numerous contractors' plants in the east and mid-west and the Hanford Engineer Works. Pools of officer and guard couriers were established at Oak Ridge, New York, Chicago, Santa Fe, and Richland and the couriers were assigned to transport TOP SECRET documents and small shipments

of highly classified and vitally important materials. Other means of security were also used where practicable, such as: sealed containers, freight cars or motor trucks, with or without periodic inspections en route.

Methods of transportation used depended on such factors as: delivery time, size and weight, shipping costs, government and commercial restrictions, value and characteristics of the materials, proper utilization of manpower and continuity of production. Railway express, rail freight and motor freight were the usual means of transportation. In some instances special air transport shipments were made.

6. Security of Information.

In order to protect classified project information from the enemy, there was need for a program which would minimize the amount of information circulated concerning the Project and educate all project personnel on the necessity of protecting such information. To carry out such a program, in September 1945 there was created within the District Intelligence and Security Division a section for safeguarding military information. With the inauguration of the program the scope of activity pertaining to safeguarding military information was greatly enlarged to include three distinct phases: Security of Information, Security Education, and Censorship of Publications.

The Security of Information Program was designed to keep at a minimum disclosures of classified project information. To



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serve as a guide in the proper handling of such information, Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, "Safeguarding Military Information--Regulations" was issued in November 1943 and later supplemented by a District Circular Letter. All documents containing classified information, (TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED), were assigned a like classification and protected accordingly. Other measures taken to assure security of information were the limitation of information furnished to persons and facilities to that which was necessary to enable them to perform their work; the use of code names and words to describe certain highly secret items; the review of all official correspondence with other government agencies; the investigation of "loose talk" cases with necessary corrective action; and the establishment of requirements to be met by project personnel. District contractors appointed security agents who were responsible for applying security policies within their respective organizations. Branch Intelligence Offices closely supervised the activities of these security agents. Work in public relations was conducted to secure the cooperation of newspapers in localities adjacent to plant sites and to gain the good will of nearby communities.

The Security Education Program was designed to educate District personnel to become instinctively security-conscious. A variety of educational media were used to remind project personnel neither to discuss nor to circulate news articles or rumors concerning certain specified types of project information. Appeal was made on the grounds of patriotism, loyalty to the fighting men and

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the desirability of preventing project information from reaching the enemy. The Security Education Program, by convincing project workers of the necessity for security, greatly strengthened plant protection.

The scope of the Censorship Review Program was gradually broadened, from coverage of a few leading daily newspapers and a few periodicals, until by the spring of 1944 there was complete coverage of 370 newspapers and 70 magazines. On 1 December 1943, a censorship code, continuing a previous confidential directive relating to atomic theory, equipment and materials, was issued by the Office of Censorship to editors and broadcasters. Publications were reviewed for violations or near violations of the code and for other items pertaining to the work of the District or related subjects. Clippings, periodicals or books containing violations or other matters were reviewed by the District SWI Section, and violations were referred to the Office of Censorship for action.

7. Organization.

Intelligence and security functions were performed for the Manhattan District by an organization which came to be known as the Intelligence and Security Division and was the product of a gradual historical development. For approximately one year after creation of the District, a Protective Security Section carried out programs for personnel security, plant protection, security education and safeguarding military information. In February 1943, the District Intelligence Section was created, and an officer in the Intelligence Section of each Service Command was designated to act

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as liaison officer with the District Intelligence Section. Immediate steps were taken to establish Branch Intelligence Offices, which subsequently reached eleven in number, each responsible for all intelligence and security within its geographic area. In May 1943, responsibility for personnel security was transferred from the Protective Security Section to the Intelligence Offices. In July 1943, the Intelligence and Protective Security Sections were consolidated to form the Intelligence and Security Division, with headquarters at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. With the addition of new military personnel in August 1943, a Plant Protection Section and Safeguarding Military Information Section were created; an Administrative Section was created in February 1944; a Shipments and Courier Section in May; and an Evaluation and Review Section in June. In December 1943, a District Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment was organized and sufficient personnel were assigned thereto to carry out the expanding investigative activities of the Intelligence and Security Division. In February 1944, the Intelligence and Security Division was re-organized and increased. In May 1944, the Thirteenth Provisional SED Unit was created to administer non-counter-intelligence military personnel, but, in January 1945, such personnel were transferred to the CIC Detachment, Manhattan District, for administration.

As of 1 July 1945, the Intelligence and Security Division consisted of 143 officers and 156 enlisted men under Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons, Chief of the Division, and was organized into six branches:

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three (District Security Branch, Administration Branch, and Clinton Engineer Works Branch) under Major K. J. McLeod, Deputy Chief, and three (Evaluation and Review Branch, Safeguarding Military Information Branch, and Branch Offices Branch) under Captain B. W. Menke, Executive Officer.

On 7 September 1945 the functions and operation of the Intelligence and Security Division were separated. Responsibility for production security, shipment security, personnel clearance, security education and minor security violations was assumed by the various Area Engineers. The Security Division of District Headquarters served the District Engineer in a staff capacity. Responsibility for investigation of subversive, sabotage and serious SMI cases was assumed by the Intelligence Unit in addition to responsibility for security and intelligence functions at Site Y and Washington, D. C.

With the creation of the Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment, Manhattan District, in December 1945, an Administration Section was organized to administer the Detachment, expend confidential funds at Clinton Engineer Works, supervise branch office expenditures, and procure, issue, and account for all investigative equipment. For security reasons and to facilitate control, administration of the Detachment was centralized at District Headquarters. Special Investigative equipment was obtained from the Counter-Intelligence Corps Depot, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and reissued to the Branch Offices. Confidential funds were obtained from the G-2

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Finance Officer and allotted to the Branch Offices upon monthly request, while the Administration Section assumed accountability for and responsibility for the expenditure of these funds at Clinton Engineer Works and promulgated policy and supervised expenditures in the field. Subsequently, the Administration Section assumed responsibility for administration of civilian personnel at District Headquarters and for operation of the Mail and Records and Classified File Section of the Intelligence and Security Division.

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY

BOOK 1 - GENERAL

VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

1.1. Necessity for Security Program. - The Manhattan District was officially created in August 1942 to supervise scientific research and development in the field of atomic energy and to construct and operate the necessary plants for the production of atomic weapons. If the Project was to be successful, however, it was necessary to afford it maximum protection and to cloak it in the utmost secrecy. There were strong indications that the German government had already embarked upon a similar program. It was apparent that the successful completion of the American Project prior to the German might decide the course of the war and be a dominant factor in the post-war peace. The consequences of the use of atomic weapons by the enemy were frightfully obvious should it attain its objective first. Speed, therefore, was of paramount importance, which meant that the Project could brook no damage, interference or other activities which would cause delay. It was to be expected that once the enemies of the United States learned of the Project, they would try every means within their power to sabotage it. The absolute necessity, then, of keeping all classified information concerning the Project from the enemy and of taking every precaution to secure it from attempts at sabotage was obvious. That necessity was given official recognition in a letter, dated

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29 June 1945, from the President of the United States to Brigadier General L. R. Groves (See App. A-1), directing that every precaution was to be taken to insure the security of the Project and emphasizing that its significance to the nation required even more drastic safeguards than other highly secret war developments.

Apart from the fact that details of scientific information would have been of great value to the German project, the fact that in 1945 the Manhattan Project was making progress and that a successful end seemed in sight, would have been the greatest imaginable stimulus to the German scientists and political leaders. Not only would it have eliminated their doubts that a successful solution of the technical and industrial problems was possible, but it would have required the Reich to expend the utmost efforts to beat the United States to that solution. Such a race might have been disastrous for the Allies. Apparently, however, the Germans felt that they were well ahead of the United States in the race of research and development, and their efforts continued to be limited and divided. This was the greatest triumph of the Intelligence and Security Division.

1-2. General Purpose of Security Program. - The broad purpose and objective of the security program was to provide the secrecy and protection necessary to prevent all possible espionage, sabotage, damage, interference or other harmful effects which might endanger the successful completion of the Project.

1-3. Scope of Security Program.

a. Geographic. - Attainment of the above security objective, under the circumstances prevailing in the Manhattan District Project, entailed the solution of problems of unprecedented complexity. The Project was necessarily without geographic limitation and required a tremendous concentration of manpower, material, and scientific knowledge at various points throughout the country.

b. Functional. - If security was to be effectively maintained under such circumstances, it was essential that the security program be geared to perform a number of specialized functions.

These functions embraced:

(1) A subversive investigative program, to investigate potential subversives, subversive groups known to be engaged in District espionage activity and incident cases involving possible sabotage or espionage (See Section 2).

(2) A personnel security program, providing for the careful selection, screening and investigation of all persons having access to classified information, material, equipment, or work areas, and the rejection or removal of those who were potentially disloyal, disaffected or subversive, or who lacked the character or discretion to insure the security of the classified information disclosed to them (See Section 3). However, the emphasis was upon completing the project and in some cases an employee who was considered irreplaceable was retained although his loyalty was questionable. Such employees were carefully watched at all times.

(3) A plant protection program, providing for the periodic inspection of all important installations, to protect them



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against possible sabotage, accident or fire, and to assure uninterrupted production (See Section 4).

(4) A visitor control program, to supervise and control admittance of persons other than employees to plants and restricted areas performing classified District work (See Par. 4-7).

(5) A shipment and courier system, to provide protection for highly classified documents and material, including the end product, in their transmission from one location to another (See Section 5).

(6) A program to safeguard military information by:  
(a) educating all employees as to the necessity of refraining from the unauthorized disclosure of any information concerning the nature of the work being done by the Manhattan District, the scope of the Project, the identity of certain prominent people connected with the Project or the names and locations of independent contractors with their relation to the District and to each other; (b) investigating and taking preventive action on all loose talk cases; and  
(c) arranging, through the office of censorship, a voluntary censorship of all periodicals, magazines, and radio broadcasts to prevent any discussion of atomic energy or its various ramifications (See Section 6).

(7) Operation of a comprehensive security program at CEW. The security program at CEW provided for: (a) an identification system, to prevent unauthorized persons gaining admittance to the general project areas and to facilitate the ingress and egress

of legitimate workers with a minimum of interference (See Par. 4-6); (b) guarding of perimeter gates and vital units and installations by Military Police and Auxiliary Military Police; (c) a fire protection program, involving the periodic inspection of vital units and installations and the direct supervision of the procurement, assignment, maintenance and use of all fire prevention equipment and personnel (See Book I, Volume 12); (d) maintenance of a municipal police force and a Review Board, to keep law and order and enforce applicable Federal and State laws and the Area Regulations (See Book I, Volume 12). The above program at CEW has cost an estimated \$7,500,000.

The Security program at Hanford is outlined in Book IV. The book to be written concerning Site Y will give an account of its security problems and program. The program at the Clinton Engineer Works is given in this Volume because its operation was a direct responsibility of the Intelligence and Security Division of the District office, whereas at Hanford, Los Alamos, and other sites, the Area Engineer was responsible and such programs are thus more appropriately covered in individual project histories.

(8) The handling of all administrative matters pertaining to maintenance of the staff and equipment necessary to the performance of the foregoing functions (See Par. 7-4).

1-4. Relationship of District Forces to Other Government Agencies. - Since the <sup>Intelligence and Security Division</sup> District Intelligence and Security Division is responsible for performance of the foregoing functions only

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insofar as they pertain to the work of the Manhattan District, it was found necessary, in order to avoid unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction, to take special steps to define and delimit the Division's jurisdiction as distinguished from that of cooperating agencies, such as the Service Commands and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which would ordinarily also have jurisdiction over such matters. Effective 1 January 1944 (See App. A-2), the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands were relieved of all counter-intelligence responsibility with respect to the Project, although their facilities have been utilized for routine investigations, agency checks, maintenance of routine liaison with other investigative agencies, and special assistance in emergencies. Authority was granted in February 1943 (See App. B-2), to relieve the Service Commands of responsibility for continuing inspection of plants engaged, in whole or in part, on work for the Manhattan District, and, where this authority has been exercised, such responsibility has been assumed by the Manhattan District. Full responsibility has been assumed by the District Intelligence and Security Division for the investigation of all subversive activity at Clinton Engineer Works, Hanford Engineer Works, and Site "Y" at Los Alamos, New Mexico. At other locations the Division had only such jurisdiction to investigate subversive activity as was allotted to it by virtue of oral arrangement with the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This jurisdiction of the Division was subsequently broadened, also by oral arrangement, to include jurisdiction over those plants, or completely segregated portions of plants

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having employees engaged on full-time work for the Manhattan District. Responsibility for the investigation of criminal offenses involving violations of Federal law remains with the FBI, although, at the Clinton Engineer Works, Hanford Engineer Works, and Site "Y", preliminary investigations are conducted by representative of the District Intelligence and Security Division, to verify the commission of offenses and to determine if they are matters falling within jurisdiction of the FBI. Agents in charge of the various FBI field offices are advised of the location of important Manhattan District contractors, and close liaison is maintained between such field offices and the appropriate Branch Intelligence Officer. Subversive investigations are thus coordinated, and in all borderline cases investigative jurisdiction is determined through mutual consent. In each of the espionage cases where a channel for passing Project information was established the recipient of the information was a non-District employee and became an FBI Subject. Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) and FBI agents worked closely together in such cases, dividing the surveillance assignments and exchanging information frequently.

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SECTION 2 - COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE

2-1. General.

a. Possible Courses of Enemy Action. - The mission of Counter-Intelligence with respect to the Manhattan District was a tremendously responsible one. Even though every possible effort were exerted to maintain the secrecy of the Project, it could not be assumed that the enemy would be unable to learn of the existence of a project so vast as the Manhattan District, nor could it be assumed that the enemy, once aware of the Project, would be indifferent. Two possible courses of enemy action seemed self-evident:

(a) infiltration of District installations by personnel who could be relied upon to furnish vital information, or (b) sabotage of District installations in order to prevent this country from accomplishing its objective. Since the enemy might take either or both courses of action, it was necessary to take every precaution to detect and prevent both.

b. Objective of Counter-Intelligence. - Thus, it has been necessary for the District to assume responsibility for handling all matters of a subversive nature relating to the Project and within its jurisdiction as outlined in Paragraph 1-4. This responsibility includes investigations of all subversive, disloyal or disaffected persons, or those who are potentially such; all incidents having possible espionage, sabotage, or subversive significance; all unauthorized disclosures of classified project information; as well as a considerable number of miscellaneous cases, the import of which might

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endanger the security of the Project.

2-2. Counter-Intelligence Investigations. - In attaining the foregoing objective the District has conducted six types of counter-intelligence investigations; (a) Personnel; (b) Espionage; (c) Sabotage; (d) General Subversive; (e) Safeguarding Military Information; and (f) Miscellaneous.

a. Personnel Investigations. - The loyalties of project employees have been of prime concern to the District, and generally the extent of each investigation has been in direct proportion to the opportunity which the position occupied afforded for obtaining classified information. Where an employee was considered irreplaceable and his removal would have inevitably retarded the progress of the work, he was retained even though his loyalty might be questionable. This policy of giving first priority to getting the job done placed added responsibility on those responsible for anti-subversive investigations, who of necessity had to follow the activities of such persons closely. Moreover, limited investigations of certain key project personnel who had recently migrated to the United States were not sufficient to enable one to judge the extent to which they could be entrusted with classified information. These conditions, together with a recognition that human nature is somewhat unpredictable when subjected to unusual pressure, necessitated more or less continuous vigilance over important project employees even after their intelligence files disclosed considerable information about them.

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b. Espionage Investigations. - In April 1945, a non-District employee, whose loyalty to the United States was questionable, solicited and received classified information from a then unidentified Project employee. There were indications at that time of planned attempts to obtain additional Project information at periodic intervals for transfer to a foreign government. Upon learning of this plan, immediate steps were taken to identify this Project employee and to thwart the plan to establish an espionage channel. Especially selected CIC agents were rushed to the area where the information had been obtained and after a few weeks of intensive surveillance activity the employee who had passed the information was identified. These agents continued extensive surveillance and investigation of this employee, his associates and many other Project employees whose loyalty appeared doubtful after preliminary investigation. Suitable backgrounds were prepared for other agents who were placed in strategic positions within the Project. These agents were of great assistance as listening posts among suspected employees, and in locating persons who warranted more than the usual investigation. An "undercover" office was established in this area, which operated ostensibly as the office of a magazine subscription company and later as an insurance adjustment agency.

Other such special surveillance squads were organized in the District to supplement personnel investigations as investigative activities were intensified. These specially trained agents maintained close surveillance of District personnel believed to be

most likely to transmit classified project information to unauthorized persons. Reports from all parts of District were carefully reviewed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to determine: (a) the members of any espionage network, including both District and non-District employees; (b) the modus operandi for infiltrating Project installations; (c) evidence of activities inspired by any foreign Government; and (d) connection, if any, between similar activities at District installations even though widely separated geographically. Other espionage attempts were detected but it is felt that prompt action and intensified investigative activity in each case prevented the passing of any substantial amount of Project information.

The CIC Special Agents assigned to espionage cases became proficient in all phases of investigation technique. Many of them displayed skill and ingenuity unsurpassed by the most experienced investigators. Pictures of certain individuals and activities were obtained by use of a telephoto lense or a special camera that could be concealed in the hand. Agents have borrowed the equipment of street photographers or enlisted the assistance of night club photographers to obtain certain pictures.

Agents impersonated men of all occupations in order to obtain information that would enable them to evaluate a suspect properly. An agent worked as a hotel clerk for over two years while another became bell captain in the few months he worked as a bell hop. Agents have posed as electricians, painters, exterminators, contractors, gamblers, etc. One suspect may have wondered why the



electrician took almost two hours to repair a light fixture and another might have thought it a coincidence that two men wearing hearing aids were sitting at tables near that selected by him and his party. Actually, the two men had special amplifiers carried in brief cases. The surveillance of a certain individual immediately after his arrival in the country was made comparatively easy by an agent who learned of the travelers plans in detail by sitting in at the ship panel with the customs officer. Many difficult twenty-four hours surveillances were maintained. One suspect was shadowed by an agent who travelled as fellow passenger on a cross-country plane trip. A crack train was held up for thirty minutes in one instance so as to allow time for agents to fly to a station to take up surveillance of a passenger.

c. Sabotage Investigations. - As previously noted, a second course of action to which the enemy could have committed itself was to sabotage Manhattan District installations. Attempts at such sabotage would seem likely if the enemy was aware of the great progress being made by our country in the development of the atomic bomb. Here can be seen the absolute need for secrecy, plant security and personnel clearance. It must be conceded that allied knowledge of the enemies' efforts towards the development of an atomic bomb was limited when Manhattan District operations were initiated. Progress of the District could not be delayed; it had to continue without interruption and particularly without destruction or damage caused by sabotage. From the very beginning, therefore,

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the Manhattan District policy demanded a complete investigation of every mechanical failure or breakdown of equipment within the plants which could not immediately be attributed to normal operating causes. The complex, novel and intricate design of some equipment led to conclusions of possible sabotage whenever such equipment failed to operate. Investigation usually allayed the fears of interested responsible officials by establishing the cause of such failures to be the inexperience of loyal, conscientious employees. These investigations contributed considerably toward the adoption of remedial measures which aided the progress of construction and operations. Counter-intelligence Corps agents at one plant prepared to apprehend the "saboteurs" who were cutting multi-colored wires from important electrical installations. When apprehended, the "saboteurs" were found to be indiscreet individuals who were cutting out these wires to weave them together to form a colorful belt or watchfob. At one stage in operations, it became a justifiable reason for termination if an employee possessed a ring, fashioned out of monel piping. This procedure became necessary because in too many instances, this type of material was being ripped out, often from very essential equipment, in order for some thoughtless individual to make a ring for himself, his spouse or his sweetheart. Initial information on such incidents was properly believed to be planned, willful sabotage to effect a delay in this tremendously important war work. At times, a combination of circumstances caused calm, conscientious Intelligence agents to suspect

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an attempt at sabotage. There was the instance when a workman was detected endeavoring to pass a gate with a length of pipe, lengths of wires, dry cell batteries and an alarm clock, carefully wrapped and concealed. Only an explosive was lacking to fabricate a time bomb. Was this a plan to sabotage? Investigation determined that the offender had taken the clock to the plant to repair it, since proper tools were available to him there, and the other articles were being stolen for his personal use in his home. To be sure, a satisfactory explanation could not be found for every incident of damage or destruction to project property. However, since these unexplained incidents were few in number, and since they did not cause serious damage or delay, it is a reasonable conclusion that they were not the result of sabotage. The activity of the Counter-intelligence Corps in performing its function to prevent sabotage has been admirably, efficiently and successfully performed.

d. General Subversive Investigations. - This characterization was given to investigations of employees whose loyalties to the United States were questionable. Generally, there were two methods by which derogatory information was obtained: (1) personnel clearance investigations, (2) the overall surveillance program of the Counter-intelligence Corps which sometimes revealed undesirable facts that were not disclosed during the routine personnel clearance investigations.

Since the allegation of disloyalty is a serious one and somewhat difficult to confirm or deny, general subversive

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investigations were necessarily delicate in nature and required exhaustive treatment in every detail. It was one thing to assert that a person was disloyal to the United States but quite another to produce tangible evidence supporting such an assertion. The object of the Counter-intelligence Corps was to get the facts in every case, including the circumstances surrounding the complaint which had been made. Frequently the informant had unintentionally magnified the seriousness of a statement by removing it from the atmosphere in which it was stated; other informants indiscreetly made charges about persons with malicious intent; others were "alarmists" and became apprehensive over insignificant matters; still other informants offered derogatory data on employees whose allegiance could be properly questioned. The true character of complaints was not self-evident at the time of presentation, however, and only after thorough investigations could general subversive cases be intelligently evaluated.

In addition to complaints made by informants about prospective employees and employees, there were organizational affiliations which, though not per se subversive, were indicative of possible political ideologies inimical to the interests of the United States. Wherever it was discovered that an employee belonged to one or more of such organizations, a complete investigation of that person was instituted. The fact that employees frequently omitted the names of these organizations from the Personnel Security Questionnaire accomplished at the time of employment by the District

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was suggestive that, in the opinion of the persons concerned, such organizations, if known, would work against their clearances for classified work.

The general overall surveillance program of the Counter-intelligence Corps proved productive in certain cases in uncovering undesirable contacts made by Manhattan District employees with subversive elements. Where such discoveries were made, intensive investigations were instituted immediately to determine the full significance of such contacts, and they were continued until sufficient information had been acquired to make a decision as to the advisability of retaining such persons on classified work. It would have been easier, of course, to have discharged all employees about whom there was some doubt as to loyalty. But the rights of the individual to work had to be considered as well as the need of the Manhattan District for the individual's services, and possible jeopardy of this country's interests was the guiding principle in making such decisions. Where an employee could be transferred to a less sensitive job and fulfill a need, he was usually retained even though some doubt may have existed as to his adherence to democratic principles.

e. Safeguarding Military Information Investigations. -

Covered under Section 6.

f. Miscellaneous Investigations. - Miscellaneous cases

were those investigated by CIC agents which could not properly be classified as Personnel, Espionage, Sabotage, General Subversive,

or S.I. Most of these cases were cases of suspected fraud against the government. CIC agents conducted an investigation in each case before submitting it to Federal Authorities for prosecution. These cases included the apprehension of an individual who stole \$5,000 from a bank, and the investigation of bus drivers and operators which resulted in the indictment of fifty-seven persons.

2-3. Volume of Counter-Intelligence Work. - Statistically, the Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment of the District has handled more than 1,000 general subversive investigations and over 1,500 cases where classified project information was transmitted to unauthorized persons; approximately 100 cases in which espionage seemed to be probable; and approximately 200 cases where sabotage could have been present. The above statistics measure only to a partial extent the quantity of counter-intelligence work performed, for many special incidents not normally regarded as being within the scope of counter-intelligence work have been treated as such because of the unique position held by the Manhattan District in the war effort. Among the many and varied assignments for CIC agents was that of bodyguards for key scientists. J. R. Oppenheimer, E. O. Lawrence, A. H. Compton and Enrico Fermi were accompanied by agents almost constantly. Other scientists were protected at intervals depending upon the work they were doing. It was necessary for these agents to be good conversationalists and be able to adapt themselves to any situation in which their wards might become involved. They were selected to be pleasing companions as well as bodyguards. These

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bodyguards were referred to in the Article "The Top Top Secret" published in the New Yorker magazine for the week of 27 October 1945.

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3-1. General Policy. - In the Fall of 1942 a program was initiated by the Manhattan District which was designed to assure the entrusting of classified work, of interest to the District, only to those persons whose loyalty, integrity and discretion had been clearly established. The program applied to all Manhattan District personnel, all contractors' employees and all companies or firms engaged on work of interest to the District. It provided for the investigation of such employees and companies and for the rejection or removal of any such found to be potentially disloyal, disaffected or subversive, or lacking in the character, integrity or discretion to insure the security of classified information disclosed to them. This careful screening of persons entrusted with District work was continued after the story of the Manhattan Engineer District and the Atomic Bomb had been released. The program consisted of two parts - Personnel Clearance and Company Clearance, which will be discussed in order.

3-2. Personnel Clearance.

a. Classification of Employees. - The Personnel Clearance program provided first of all for the classification of all employees into two categories - classified employees and unclassified employees, a classified employee being one who had access to classified information, material or a classified work area of interest to the Manhattan District. The basic aims of the program were:

- (1) Each classified employee should be subject to careful and conscientious original selection.

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(2) The identity of each classified employee should be positively established prior to his assignment to classified work.

(3) The loyalty, honesty, character and discretion of each classified employee should be established by investigation prior to his assignment to classified work. With these ends in view, each classified employee was to be investigated and cleared.

b. Clearance of Classified Employees. - The procedure adopted for clearance of classified employees was designed to accomplish the foregoing ends, although it was found necessary to change the procedure from time to time to conform with conditions prevailing in the District.

(1) Original Procedure. - Under the original procedure, each classified employee at the time of his employment furnished proof of citizenship, executed a Personnel Security Questionnaire (See App. C-1), and was fingerprinted. In addition, the necessity for safeguarding classified information was specifically called to his attention, and he was required to read and sign the Espionage Act. Personnel Security Questionnaires and fingerprint charts were forwarded to the Internal Security Division, Second Service Command, where the questionnaires were screened by representatives of the Service Command, investigations were conducted, and reports were returned to the District for evaluation and review. Fingerprint charts were forwarded by the Internal Security Division, Second Service Command, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where they were checked against the criminal indices and returned through channels to the Protective Security Section of the District (See Par. 7-2a). If no adverse information was disclosed, the submitting contractor was notified by letter that the employee was cleared for assignment to

classified work. Prior to the receipt of this notification, assignment of the individual to classified work was prohibited.

(2) Changes in Procedure, May 1943. - With the rapid expansion of District activity, it became apparent that the foregoing procedure was unwieldy and cumbersome and took too much time, and that a more expeditious processing of Personnel Security Questionnaires for investigation was necessary. Consequently, in May 1943, the following changes were effected:

(a) Operation of the personnel security program was transferred from the Protective Security Section to the newly formed Intelligence Section, which decentralized operation of the program to the branch Intelligence Offices. The latter assumed responsibility for clearance of all personnel within the boundaries of their geographic areas.

(b) Under the authority of letter, dated 12 May 1943, from the Provost Marshal General (See App. A 3), the directors of Internal Security of the Service Commands designated liaison officers to work with branch Intelligence Officers, and priorities were established for all Manhattan District investigations.

(c) To expedite assignment of employees to classified work, clerical personnel were obtained and trained to screen the Personnel Security Questionnaires and Personal History Statements by applying pre-determined screening principles (See App. B 1), and to grant immediate clearance where there was no indication that investigation would disclose derogatory information. While this screening process expedited the assignment of employees it also was sufficiently thorough to prevent

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the employment of undesirables. For example, preliminary check of one applicant, who was denied employment, showed that he was the author of a book on the structure of the atom; that he was employed in independent research in atomic energy for two years and that he was in contact with known subversive organizations.

(d) Job classification and the amount or character of classified information to which the employee would have access were included in the criteria for determining the scope of investigations to be conducted.

(e) Through the liaison established with the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands, and with the Officers of the A. C. of S., G-2, expeditious agency checks and special investigations were requested whenever necessary to supplement the routine investigation normally conducted.

(f) Investigations were correlated with pending subversive investigations and evaluated in the light of existing subversive trends.

(g) The employment of aliens was carefully scrutinized, and clearance was granted only when there was a positive need for the applicant's services and his loyalty had been established by investigation.

(h) The more complete Personal History Statement (See App. C 2), was required for all employees with foreign backgrounds.

(i) Maintenance of Intelligence files was decentralized to the branch Intelligence Officers, and a procedure was established for transfer of Intelligence files when an employee transferred from one contractor to another. The policy of maintaining a

central card file at District Headquarters, reflecting clearance information on each individual employee engaged on work of interest to the District, was continued.

(3) Change in Procedure, October 1943. - In October 1943, the procedure for the selection and clearance of personnel was crystallized in Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 (See App. B 4), which was distributed to all District contractors. It reflected one major change, the signing of the Secrecy Agreement (See App. C 3), instead of the reading and signing of the Espionage Act.

(4) Changes in Procedure after October 1943. - Subsequent to October 1943, there were few basic changes in the personnel clearance program. The more important were:

(a) Periodic checks of all contractors to insure their compliance with existing policy concerning personnel clearance.

(b) The procurement of a central subversive file check on all personnel employed subsequent to February 1944.

(c) The transmittal of Personnel Security Questionnaires to the Service Command where the majority of the leads would be developed, instead of to the Service Command having jurisdiction over the employing facility, thus materially expediting the investigation of the individual and the return of the complete report.

(d) The forwarding of fingerprint charts to the Washington Branch Office of the District Intelligence and Security Division, for immediate transmittal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the direct return of criminal records disclosed. Check of fingerprint criminal files resulted in several thousand individuals being rejected

for work with the Manhattan District. In addition, many individuals who were wanted by other government agencies were apprehended. Arrest records ranged from speeding and disorderly conduct charges to murder, arson, rape, narcotics, mayhem and other heinous crimes. One individual's record indicated that he had been arrested one hundred and sixteen times for bootlegging. Several persons were apprehended after they were found to be escaped convicts, deserters and parole violators.

(e) A crystallization of the policy concerning the transfer or re-employment of non-manual employees, which prohibited the transfer of non-manual workers from one District installation to another except when specifically directed in order to carry on work for the advancement of the Project.

(f) The investigation of all military personnel.

(g) The periodic compilation and distribution to all contractors of a master reference list of undesirables, whose employment on work of interest to the Manhattan District was limited or, in some cases, prohibited.

(h) The classification of Civil Service and contractors' employees into three clearly defined groups (i.e. group 1, those having access to "top secret" information, or "secret" information reflecting the overall program of the District or of any major subdivision, or information concerning the processing and development of end products; group 2, those having access to all classified information other than that stated under group 1; and group 3, those having access only to unclassified information), with the establishment of minimum investigating standards for each group. This was necessitated by the continued

expansion and consequent employment on classified work of thousands of people who could not be investigated prior to employment because of the limited facilities for investigation.

(1) The transfer of responsibility for personnel investigation to certain major operating contractors and the development of the contractors' routine investigative program. The increase in personnel employed in classified work required more loyalty investigations than the Service Commands were able to handle. It was necessary, therefore, that major operating contractors develop within their own organizations a personnel investigative program which, when supplemented by a central subversive file check and a fingerprint check, met the minimum standards for personnel security.

(5) Present Procedure. - Present procedure for the selection and clearance of personnel is outlined in Intelligence Bulletin No. 12, revised as of 28 May 1945 (See App. B 5). There were no important changes in procedure.

c. Volume of Employee Investigations. - From the date of inauguration of the Personnel Security Program to August 1945, approximately 400,000 employees have been investigated.

3-3. Company Clearance. - It was required by District Circular Letter (MI 43-3) (See App. A 5), that District contractors or subcontractors first be cleared before classified information could be made available to them. Company clearance was designed principally to eliminate contractors with potentially subversive foreign affiliations and to prevent fraud and collusion, by disclosing the financial assets of the company, members of the board of directors, principal stockholders, etc. Clearance

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was based on a check of the files of the A. C. of S., G-2, a Dun and Bradstreet credit report, and agency checks of key personnel. In November 1944, responsibility was transferred to the branch Intelligence Officers for clearance of companies within their geographic areas. From the date of inauguration of company clearance to August 1945, approximately 600 companies have been cleared. Several companies have been denied clearance. The greater percentage of the companies denied clearance was a direct result of agency checks. Most information developed through agency checks was of a potentially subversive nature, for example, an agency check conducted on one large company revealed that the principal officials and management had become too closely connected with matters of vital interest in various foreign countries and too deeply involved in foreign affairs. The natural interests of that company in foreign countries necessarily involved them to some extent in politics within those countries and there were times when they had to do delicate finessing to maintain a neutral position insofar as such countries were concerned. The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff recommended against employment of the company on secret contracts. Therefore, a proposed classified contract with this company was never executed. Clearance was denied a small number of companies based on Dun & Bradstreet reports. When these reports indicated a company not to be in good credit standing, it was deemed inadvisable for the District to negotiate a contract.

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SECTION 4 - PLANT PROTECTION

4-1. Need For and Objectives of Program. - As the project developed from the planning stage to the research, construction, and production stages, it was recognized that the physical protection of the many facilities involved was vital to the early completion of the Project. Prevention of unauthorized entry and close control of personnel were fundamental in the prevention of espionage or sabotage. The danger of fires, explosions, major accidents and similar hazards presented a threat of delay having effects equally as serious as sabotage. Accordingly, a plant protection program was inaugurated to insure: (1) the installation of adequate physical safeguards, such as fencing barriers, alarm systems, and flood lighting; (2) the organization of efficient guard forces; (3) the establishment of identification systems and similar methods of personnel control, and (4) the adoption of effective fire protective measures. This program was based upon frequent intensive surveys and inspections by qualified personnel of the Plant Protection Section of the Intelligence and Security Division, the purpose of such surveys being to determine the need for, and recommend proper action toward installation of, security measures consonant with the importance of the particular facility surveyed.

4-2. Essential Elements of Program. - To accomplish the above, it was necessary to undertake a number of essential functions. The security standards established jointly by the Army and Navy and published in "Plant Protection for Manufacturers", WD Pamphlet No. 32-1, dated 1 May 1943 (See App. C 5), were adopted as the basic plant protection

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policy. In order to determine what measures were essential to insure the security of vital plants, it was necessary to inspect or survey those plants. The particular contractors involved then had to be informed as to what measures were essential and apprised of their security responsibility. In many cases where contractors had neither the experience nor the personnel to take the required steps, it became necessary to assist them. Finally, the problem of insuring that no unauthorized persons gained admittance to vital plants was so important that it was necessary to vest control of all visits to such plants in the District Engineer. In describing the operation of Plant Protection, therefore, there will be discussed in order Plant Inspections and Surveys, Action on Survey, Report Recommendations, Security Assistance to Contractors, and Visitor Control.

4-3. Plant Inspections and Surveys.

a. Early Plant Inspections. - The early plant inspections were confined to those facilities engaged in highly classified work. The majority of this work was concerned with research, design and development, but at some locations production of materials and equipment had been started. Although at this stage the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands had full responsibility for the security of such facilities, it was nevertheless deemed necessary in many cases, because of the highly classified nature of the work being performed by various contractors, that the District assume such responsibility and exclude Service Command representatives from areas in which such work was being performed. Authorization to assume such responsibility was obtained from higher authority on 23 February 1943 (See App. B 2). The reports of the

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Service Command inspectors covering plants or areas where unclassified work was being done were constantly reviewed and evaluated by the District to avoid duplication of effort as much as possible. Where undesirable conditions, as revealed in the Service Command reports, threatened continued production, the District endeavored to secure correction where practicable.

b. Procedure in Early Plant Inspections. - The early security inspections were concerned primarily with having the management designate a Security Agent who would be responsible for the security of District work at the facility, reviewing and discussing with him the policies and procedures outlined in the Protective Security Manual (See App. C 5), and establishing the necessary security measures to safeguard District work properly. During these visits emphasis was placed also on personnel clearance, visitor control, and safeguarding classified project information. Inspections were made to determine the adequacy of physical protection, guard forces, identification systems and other related security measures established to safeguard District work and classified information related thereto. However, since efforts to procure inspection personnel experienced in plant protection engineering were almost wholly unsuccessful at that time, comprehensive surveys covering all phases of plant security, including fire protection and the elimination of production hazards, could not be made. The physical security provided at the various installations was thus largely dependent on the "security-mindedness" of Area Engineers, plant managers, research directors, and security agents. At a number of installations good security programs were developed, but some facilities were slow in providing the high degree of protection necessary for the nation's greatest secret and its most

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vital war production effort.

c. Security Survey Program. - With the addition of more plant protection personnel, a regular Plant Protection Program was launched in August 1943, to insure that each of the hundreds of vital plants and installations were safeguarded from sabotage and espionage and related hazards which might cause delay in construction or operation. An important part of this program was the Security Survey Program. This provided for prompt security surveys of all installations engaged on important work of interest to the District, including many suppliers of unclassified equipment, the prompt procurement of which was vital to the construction program. A standard survey method was adopted (See App. B 6). Surveys were made of entire plants, facilities and other installations; in some cases, surveys were limited to those areas within plants where District work was being carried on. At that time many plants were already being inspected by Service Command representatives and competent fire protection engineers of various insurance organizations. Full advantage was taken of their reports. At the beginning security inspections did not include fire prevention, but on 20 September 1943, responsibility for fire prevention and protection was assumed (See App. D 1). Thereafter, surveys covered all aspects of plants, for the purpose of discovering conditions which might lead to sabotage, espionage, fire, explosions, major accidents, inadequate power and water supplies, labor trouble, and improper handling of classified documents, all of which might cause either interruptions to production or the compromise or loss of classified information. This Security Survey Program was continued along the same lines until after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Effective 15 August 1945, the responsibility for staff supervision of

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fire prevention and protection activities was assigned to the District Safety and Accident Prevention Branch. On 7 September 1945, when the functions and operations of the Intelligence and Security Division were separated, trained personnel were transferred directly to the staffs of the Area Engineers and Operations Officers to continue security survey activities. Personnel from the District Security Office were also employed to visit the various installations to determine that the security programs maintained were adequate.

d. Security Survey Reports. - One of the principal difficulties encountered in the early phases of the program was the problem of evaluating the relative importance of the many facilities. Close liaison was maintained by the Intelligence and Security Division with Area Engineers and their technical staffs, in order that the security program might maintain consistency with the production and development program, which was frequently subject to major changes. The District Intelligence Office served as a clearing house in distributing to Branch Offices such information relative to operations as was necessary to carry on security activities efficiently. By 15 April 1944 all facilities known to be doing work of a classified nature, or work important from the "continuity of production" standpoint, had been surveyed. The results of each survey were reported directly to the Area Engineer or other officer primarily responsible for the security of the particular facility, on a special survey report form (See App. C 7). Patterned after the standard Office of the Provost Marshall General form, it provided for detailed reporting on compliance by the facility with Manhattan District security requirements, on personnel clearance, visitor control, and the safeguarding of classified documents and material, as well as the general requirements for the

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prevention of sabotage, espionage, fires, and other potential production hazards. Reports included specific recommendations for necessary improvements and graded the many factors affecting security. An overall rating of "Poor", "Fair", "Good", or "Excellent" was assigned each facility. Reports were reviewed by supervising officers in the branch Intelligence Offices prior to transmittal to the Area Engineers. A copy of each report was also forwarded to the District Intelligence Office, where it was reviewed for conformance with District policy and for general quality.

e. Classification of Facilities. - Inasmuch as the type and degree of security to be provided depended upon the relative importance of each facility, it became necessary to evaluate from a security standpoint the importance of all District activities. First of all a complete list of all important facilities was prepared. Such a list was established on 15 April 1944 and has been revised bi-monthly since. Then, in June 1944, three general categories of facilities were established. These categories were applied to all work in the District. Facilities at which interruption or delay of construction would definitely and seriously delay the Project were identified as "A" facilities; those at which interruption or delay would cause a minor delay were identified as "B"; and others supplying critical materials or performing classified work not of "A" or "B" importance were identified as "C" facilities. For example, the Tennessee Eastman Corporation and Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation plants at Oak Ridge and the Hanford Engineer Works at Hanford were classified "A". Facilities, such as the Linde Air Products Company, Tonawanda, N. Y. and the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, St. Louis, Missouri, supplying uranium in various forms were first placed in the "A" category.

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but as duplicate suppliers became available and a certain stock-pile built up, these plants were given a "B" Rating of Importance. Machine shops, such as the Diestel Tool and Machine Company and the Mercury Engineering Company, Detroit, Michigan, supplying parts to the Chrysler Corporation, an "A" facility, were placed in the "C" classification because substitute shops would be quickly available in the event production was interrupted. Responsible Area Engineers were instructed that security of "A" facilities should rate not lower than "Good" and of "B" facilities not lower than "Fair", as reported in security surveys. At this time, schedules for resurveys were based upon the relative importance of the facility and its security rating. For example, an "A" facility rated less than "Good" was scheduled for monthly resurveys. In the early months of 1945, the list of facilities being surveyed averaged 450 installations. In the twelve-month period from 1 July 1944 to 1 July 1945, approximately 1036 surveys were made.

4-4. Action on Survey Report Recommendations. - Upon receipt of a survey report, the Area Engineer instituted such action as he deemed necessary to provide protection in accordance with the findings of the report. As an example, at the suggestion of the District Intelligence Office, a completely new security organization was provided by the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation for better coordination of the security activities at the very important Gas Diffusion Plant (K-25) Area at Oak Ridge. Also, on the recommendation of the district's plant protection representative, the Decatur Area Engineer authorized the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation to install automatic sprinkler systems to improve greatly the fire protection in several vital combustible warehouse and process

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areas, at a cost of approximately \$13,000. Again, upon the suggestion of District representatives, a vital experimental chemical process at Yale University was completely relocated and protected within a week to eliminate a very serious explosion hazard, which was considered so dangerous that operations were otherwise to be suspended by the research director. Providing security was by no means an exact science, since the seriousness of the hazards could not be definitely determined. All protection was considered relative; therefore, security measures depended on balancing potential hazards against "calculated risks". Full consideration was also given to the cost of providing security (See App. C 6 and B 6). The maintenance of adequate guard forces was one of the major security expenses, as indicated by the fact that there were over 5,000 civilian guards protecting various important installations of the District in January, 1945, at an approximate cost of \$1,000,000 a month. In addition, at the principal sites there were about 800 U. S. Army Military Police. Following V-E Day and V-J Day the need for such extensive guarding was carefully evaluated, and appropriate adjustments were made. From January 1945 to December, 1945, for instance, the guard force at the Tennessee Eastman Corporation plant was reduced from 855 to 444.

4-5. Security Assistance to Contractors. - The Security Survey Program was the keystone of the Plant Protection Program. Nevertheless, considerable time and effort were devoted to related activities. At the principal sites it was soon discovered that contractors had neither the experience nor the personnel to set up adequate security organizations, and it became necessary for personnel of the District Intelligence and Security Division to assist in the procurement and training of

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security personnel, the establishment of security procedures, and the procurement of equipment and supplies for security activities. Plans for fencing, lighting, patrol roads, towers, gates and identification systems were closely reviewed. Likewise plans for buildings and water supply systems were closely scrutinized to check the adequacy of fire protection features (See App. D-2). As an example, during the construction of the K-25 and K-27 plants of the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation, Oak Ridge, representatives of the District Intelligence and Security Division worked constantly with the Construction Officer and contractor to incorporate into the construction, as far as practicable, all measures to prevent sabotage, espionage, fires and explosions. When the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, St. Louis, Missouri, was making its plans for a new plant to process uranium, plant protection inspectors of the District were called in so that the maximum fire protection might be provided for this important installation and adequate safeguards installed in the hazardous ether extraction operation. When the Monsanto Chemical Company, at Dayton, Ohio, took over a new site, a plant security inspector met with company officials to discuss the desired methods of fencing, lighting, guarding, badge identification, and fire protection. Security personnel worked very closely with the Tennessee Eastman Corporation during the planning of its new final process building, and all possible measures were incorporated into the design to assure the entrance of only authorized personnel and to prevent the theft of the vital final product.

#### 4-6. Protective Measures for Prevention of Sabotage and Espionage.-

Although the principles of protection remained the same, standards and



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requirements varied in their application. In general, security surveys and resulting recommendations provided for protection designed to prevent unauthorized entry and to control personnel. For protection against unauthorized entry, fencing and screening were used as the most effective barriers, entrances were kept at a minimum and were locked or guarded at all times, lighting was provided to aid observation, and, in certain cases, burglar alarm systems were installed. A guard force was the principal enforcement agency to prevent unauthorized entry. For the quick and positive discovery of unauthorized entry, an identification system, consisting chiefly of the use of identification cards or badges and of movement restrictions, was established. To protect classified information and material and to prevent sabotage, restricted areas were established, especially where regular plant employees working outside such areas had not been cleared. Finally, in order to insure that only persons of known loyalty, who could definitely contribute to the work at an installation, should obtain access thereto, a system of visitor control was adopted.

4-7. Visitor Control. - With the establishment of the District Personnel Security Program in December 1942, it was apparent that, to be effective, the same degree of control must be applied to visitors as was exercised over the selection and assignment of personnel to be regularly employed on highly classified work. Therefore, a system was adopted for the control of all visitors to installations engaged upon classified work. As already stated, the objective of this system was to insure that only individuals of known loyalty, who could definitely contribute to the advancement of the work at the installation visited, were given access to restricted areas set up where Manhattan District classified work was

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being performed. Control was exercised by requiring each visitor to obtain prior to his visit the written authorization of the District Engineer or his representative. Most of the visits were between units of the Project, and the visitors were, therefore, project personnel whose backgrounds had been checked. Visitors not regularly engaged on the Project were investigated before being issued written authorization. In September 1943, this control was further tightened when the power of authorization of visits was limited to the Area Engineer or other officer responsible for a particular phase of the Project. At the same time, the original system was revised and the mechanics were somewhat simplified. Several types of forms used as written authorization were eliminated in favor of a standard printed pass (See App. C 4), which could be completed in a fraction of the time formerly required. However, the principal problem could not be eliminated. This problem resulted from the time required to arrange clearance and written authorization for a visit to an installation, sometimes thousands of miles from the office of the District or Area Engineer. Most visits were considered urgent by the contractor, and, as a result, teletype and telephone clearances and authorizations became more and more frequent. While the Visitor Control System had many defects which could not be corrected, experience has shown that the basic policy upon which the system was founded has been complied with. Security agents were impressed with the necessity for military authorization before allowing any visitor access to classified work.

4.8. Success of Plant Security Program. - During the entire history of the Project up to 31 December 1945, there was no known compromise of classified information or damage to buildings, equipment, or material,

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which could be ascribed to the lack of physical protection against espionage or sabotage. Considering the difficulty of evaluating the potential espionage and sabotage hazards, therefore, it is apparent that a reasonable and successful program was accomplished. Much credit for this record is due the many guards and military police who carefully checked the credentials and badges of all personnel passing through the gates to the various project and to inner classified work areas. Attempts to "crash the gates" and run through road blocks were relatively few. Occasionally it was necessary to use firearms to stop a fleeing car or person who ignored a guard's challenge. One such incident resulted in a fatality. On one occasion at the University of Chicago West Stand Laboratories, a stranger was successful in evading the notice of a guard and entering the classified area but in a few minutes was apprehended. Violations in the control of visitors were investigated and corrective measures taken. The stress placed upon preventing fires and explosions also resulted in a very favorable record, and there were no serious construction or production interruptions attributable to these causes. Considering the fire hazards and combustible construction at some of the supply, research and warehouse facilities, serious fires might have resulted in costly delays in completing the District's mission. Fires originating from the spontaneous ignition of uranium in the form of turnings and grindings presented a serious problem at the Hanford Engineer Works, the University of Chicago, and a number of other plants processing uranium metal (See Par. 5-6). Safeguards devised through studies by District plant protection personnel kept these fires to a minimum in both storage and transit and prevented this hazard from leading to any costly

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fires in vital production buildings and equipment. The accomplishment of a successful plant security program resulted, for the most part, from the cooperation with the Intelligence and Security Division of all the Area Engineers, Operations and Construction Officers and their staffs as well as the thousands of persons engaged in the contractors' security departments and guard forces.

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5-1. Need for Shipment Security Program. - Since the inception of the Manhattan District in August 1945, there has been within the Project a continual flow of materials and information, much of which, because of its critical importance to the war effort or its peculiar characteristics, has been classified. During the early months of the Manhattan District, classified materials were shipped among the various installations engaged or working for the Project, in accordance with the general War Department policies prescribed for the safeguarding of all military information (Sec App. C 8). In addition, from July 1945 to July 1948, the District Protective Security Section assisted and advised the responsible Area engineers in providing necessary security measures to safeguard those materials properly. However, no organized shipment security program was considered necessary at that time. It was not until the latter part of 1948 that the manifold problems relating to the shipment of many highly classified or hazardous materials made special consideration necessary. With the greatly increased volume of shipments of classified materials between various locations where Manhattan District work was in progress, it became evident that close control would have to be exercised over those shipments, and that in many cases the material involved would require special handling. Materials were being shipped in broadly fluctuating quantities between widely scattered installations, and security aspects were constantly changing.

5-2. Survey of Shipment Security. - With a view toward estab-

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lishing such a shipment security program, a survey of shipment security was undertaken in November 1944, to determine what measures would be necessary to satisfy the shipment security requirements of a rapidly expanding District program.

5-3. Shipment Security Program. - As a result of this survey, a Shipment Security Program was initiated to insure that procedures for the handling and shipment of classified materials would be as uniform as possible. Guard pools, a courier system and other security measures were established, methods of transportation were prescribed, and special precautionary procedures, to be followed in the case of shipment of certain vital products, materials and equipment requiring special consideration, were decided upon.

5-4. Shipment Security Measures.

a. Guard Pools. - In February 1944, a guard pool, consisting of 20 guards, was established under the supervision of the Chicago Branch Office and located at Chicago, Illinois. In May 1944, a force of 6 men was set up in Wilmington, Delaware, under the supervision of the Wilmington Area Engineer. The size of these guard pools was later increased to 33 men and 6 men respectively. All guards were sworn in as Auxiliary Military Police by the Service Commands and were armed. They were assigned primarily to guard rail shipments and truck or truck convey movements. Advantage was taken of the Chicago guard pool by consolidating at Chicago all shipments of uranium billets being carried from eastern plants to Hanford (See Book IV, X-10 Project) and transporting them from that point as a single shipment. Guards from the Chicago pool provided the necessary protection. On the return trip from

Hamford, these guards were utilized to protect shipments of classified metal scrap and turnings from Hamford to plants in the Midwest and East for reprocessing. Guards were also drawn from the Chicago pool to protect truck movements of classified materials between various facilities and between facilities and the sites. In general, a policy was followed of using guard couriers on all shipments of secret material by either rail or motor whenever the high dollar value of the material or the urgency of delivery was a prime importance.

b. Courier System. - It was necessary to establish a special courier system for the transportation of "Top Secret" documents and small quantities of highly classified materials. Under the system as originally set up, all "Top Secret" documents and materials were to be carried by officer personnel when available and, otherwise, by agents of the Counter-Intelligence Corps. In January 1945, it was decided that officer personnel only should be used for this purpose. Accordingly, approximately 25 officers were procured, to form an officer courier pool, and were assigned to Oak Ridge, New York, Chicago, Santa Fe, and Richland. In addition, guard couriers as well as officers were used to transport small but vitally important quantities of highly classified material by rail, closed space. They frequently traveled in civilian clothes and carried the material in ordinary luggage, in order to avoid attracting attention. They were instructed to keep the material being carried in their immediate physical possession, in a locked compartment on the train at all times, and to transport the material to and from the train by armed guard escort. By March 1945, courier shipments of radioactive materials had become so numerous that it became necessary to

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give special consideration to the possible health hazards to the courier personnel. Because of the fact that they were traveling, in closed compartments in trains, with the material in their immediate physical possession, it was felt that some method should be used to determine the degree of exposure experienced. A system was worked out whereby film badges (see Book I, Volume 7 - Medical Program) were issued to couriers to carry on their persons during each trip. The film badges were forwarded to the Medical Section for checking at the conclusion of each trip. Through December, 1945 no serious exposures of personnel have been experienced. The containers used to transport the materials have therefore been considered to provide adequate protection for couriers.

c. Other Security Measures. - Where the use of guards or couriers on classified shipments was not possible or feasible, other substitute security measures consonant with the particular situation were taken. On railroad shipments arrangements were made, where possible, to give special consideration to such shipments, to equip cars with special seals, and to make individual checks of cars at stops along the route. Measures taken on truck shipments included the use of sealed containers for materials, the use of seals on trucks, the investigation of drivers, and special instructions for handling shipments.

5-5. Methods of Transportation.

a. General. - It was determined as a result of the survey mentioned in paragraph 5-2 that the selection of proper methods for shipping District materials would involve many considerations in addition to the classification of the materials themselves. Some of the more important factors were: delivery time, size and weight, shipping

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costs, government and commercial restrictions, value and characteristics of the materials, proper utilization of manpower and continuity of production. Eight methods, providing various degrees of security, were found to be available for handling shipments. These were:

(1) Railway Express, carload (CL), hand-to-hand signature, armed guard service;

(2) Railway Express, less-than-carload (LCL), hand-to-hand signature, armed guard service;

(3) Rail freight, carload, sealed cars;

(4) Rail freight, carload, Manhattan District guards;

(5) Motor freight, commercial carrier, truckload, sealed truck;

(6) Motor freight, commercial carrier, truckload or less-than-truckload, Manhattan District guards on truck or in convoy car;

(7) Motor freight, government truck, truckload or less-than-truckload, Manhattan District guards on truck or in convoy car;

(8) Courier, Special Agents and Manhattan District guards, rail or air travel, closed space when required.

b. Railway Express. - As the result of a study made in January 1944, it was found that the services of the Railway Express Money Department could be utilized to advantage by the District for intermittent shipments of classified materials. Accordingly, instructions were issued on 11 January 1944 to all Area Engineers regarding the use of this method of shipment (See App. A 4).

c. Rail Freight. - As already indicated in paragraph 5-4 a,

use was made of rail freight to carry uranium billets from eastern plants to Hanford and to return classified metal scrap and turnings from Hanford to plants in the Midwest and East for reprocessing. Shipments of highly classified basic materials such as uranium metal, ores, and oxides, special chemicals and other metals, when made in large quantities, were carried by rail freight. In many cases these were consigned between individuals, in order to conceal the identity of commercial firms engaged in processing classified materials. Rail freight was also used to haul highly classified equipment for the Project between manufacturing plants and from manufacturing plants to the sites. Where practicable, shipment was made in sealed railroad cars.

In some cases, however, because of the size and construction of units, it was necessary to place them on railway flat cars and use tarpaulin coverings. For example, large quantities of secret barrier material were transported from Linde Air Products Company, Tonawanda, New York, to Houdaille-Hershey, Decatur, Illinois, by sealed, commercial motor vans. After processing into secret barrier tubes, the tubes were then carried to the Chrysler Corporation, Detroit, Michigan, by Government trucks with armed Auxiliary Military Police drivers. After the barrier tubes were installed in secret filter units, these large and bulky units were shipped by railway flat car and protected from view by tarpaulin.

d. Rail Travel by Courier.- As previously indicated in paragraph 5-4 b, "Top Secret" documents and small but vitally important quantities of highly classified materials were carried by couriers in a locked train compartment. Such materials included uranium metal, ores

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and oxides, special chemicals and other metals. In the same manner U-235 from the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, "Postur" from the Monsanto Chemical Company in Dayton, Ohio, and "Vitamin B (891A)" from the American Cyanamid Company in Stamford, Connecticut, were all shipped to Site "Y". Whenever possible, shipments to "Y" from points in the East were consolidated at Chicago to conserve time and personnel and were carried on to "Y" as single shipments.

e. Motor Freight. - Shipments of classified materials and equipment were regularly made by motor freight as well as rail freight, except in the case of equipment of such size and construction as to render truck shipment impracticable. In addition, in February 1945, a truck convoy system was established to transport end products to Site "Y". One convoy carried the end product, plutonium, from Hanford to Site "Y", while another carried "Kala" from Clinton Laboratories at Oak Ridge to Site "Y". These convoys were in charge of officers, with enlisted men and CIC agents acting as special guards. They were set up to move continuously to destination, with a complete change in personnel at the half-way point. Other motor truck shipments, such as regular shipments of uranium hexafluoride from the Harshaw Chemical Company in Cleveland, Ohio, to the K-25 Plant at Oak Ridge, were made in government trucks with armed Auxiliary Military Police drivers dressed in plain clothes.

f. Air Transport. - During the month of July 1945, when activities at Site "Y" were in the most critical stage, air transport was used on three occasions to expedite the delivery of U-235 from the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. Arrangements were made with the Army Air

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Forces to have a transport plane ready at the Knoxville Airport at an appointed hour on each occasion. The material was transferred from the Y-12 Plant to the Airport by special military escort and accompanied on the plane trip by two officer couriers from the Shipment Security Section. A military escort was again provided from the Santa Fe Airport to Site "Y". Numerous other classified shipments by ATC plane were made when urgency of delivery was paramount.

5-6. Shipment Security Accomplishments. - All of the important shipments of highly classified material have been handled exclusively by Manhattan District personnel. Top secret materials have been transported on hundreds of occasions either by officers travelling as passengers in trains, planes or automobiles, or by truck convoys operated by military personnel under the command of officers. In every case deliveries were completed without delay or unusual incidents. Several minor vehicular accidents have occurred. However, these were on practice runs or return trips, and in no way jeopardized the safe delivery of material.

Shipments of equipment to be installed in process plants, shipments of uranium in its various forms, and shipments of allied chemicals and materials were in most instances made by common carrier. Occurrences of lost, misrouted or damaged shipments were few, but in every case full investigation showed that the incident was a result of normal operational hazards and not of subversive origin.

On two occasions trucks carrying uranium oxide were involved in serious accidents. CIC agents, immediately dispatched to the scene, protected the shipment until new transportation was secured. In

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another instance, a container of uranium grindings being shipped by Railway Express ignited spontaneously while it was standing on the station platform in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Flames shot thirty feet into the air and caused considerable local alarm, and consternation among Railway Express officials. No damage resulted other than the loss of the material. Security officers from the District contacted Railway Express officials and satisfied them that the District would take necessary steps to prevent a recurrence.

Considering the volume of classified shipments the program was unusually successful. For example it has been estimated that eighteen officer couriers have traveled about 832,000 miles during the past thirteen months and have never lost or mislaid a bag, package, or document entrusted to them, nor have they even missed a train connection. During this same period government trucks, sometimes in convoys, have traveled 800,000 miles during the same period carrying classified material without mishap.

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SECTION 6 - SECURITY OF INFORMATION

6-1. Need for Program for Safeguarding Military Information.

It was reasonable to expect that the nation which first succeeded in developing an atomic explosive would win the war. It was essential, therefore, to protect from the enemy all information concerning Manhattan Project activities which could be used to advantage in pursuing similar work. Indications that foreign agents were already making concerted efforts to obtain information concerning the Project (See Par. 2-2) made obvious the need for an intensive program for safeguarding military information. Policies and procedures were formulated to minimize the amount of data circulated concerning the Project and to thoroughly impress all personnel doing work connected with the Project with the necessity for protecting project information. It was with this purpose in mind that in September, 1943, a new section, known as the Section for Safeguarding Military Information, was created within the District Intelligence and Security Division.

6-2. Scope of Program for Safeguarding Military Information.

In the early stages of the Manhattan District's Security Program, the District Protective Security Section then in being was principally concerned with instructing project personnel in the meaning of classified information and in the proper methods of handling, transmitting, and caring for classified material in accordance with AR 380-5 (See App. C 8). The Protective Security Manual (See App. C 5), prepared in February 1943, emphasized the need for safeguarding classified information and set forth the rules for handling classified documents. Until its

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consolidation with the District Intelligence Section in July 1943, the Protective Security Section's activities in the SMI field were primarily limited to distribution of the manual and explanation of its provisions. After the creation of the Section for Safeguarding Military Information, however, and the inauguration of a definite program to prevent the loss or unauthorized disclosure of classified matters pertaining to the Project, the scope of activity with a view to safeguarding military information was greatly enlarged. The program was divided into three distinct phases: Security of Information, Security Education, and Censorship of Publications.

6-3. Security of Information.

a. Purpose. - The Security of Information Program involved the formulation and execution of policies which would keep at a minimum disclosures of classified project information. In the course of performing this function, the following steps were taken.

b. Safeguarding Military Information—Regulations. - In November 1943, Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, "Safeguarding Military Information—Regulations," (See App. B 7), was prepared and distributed to serve as a guide for the proper handling of classified information. It defined classified information and set forth illustrations of SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and RESTRICTED categories and prescribed the regulations and proper methods for preparing, classifying, transmitting, reproducing, accounting for, storing, and destroying classified documents and materials. Certain additions to and modifications of the rules of AR 380-5 (See App. C 8) were made in order to make the bulletin practical and usable by large numbers of civilians and contractor personnel doing

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District work. In March 1946, a major change in AF 380-5 established a new category of classified information, "TOP SECRET", which applied to certain vital Manhattan District information. Accordingly, instructions were issued in a District Circular Letter (See App. A5) outlining policies and procedures to be followed in applying this new category.

c. Classification of Correspondence. - Studies were made of equipment, materials, products, processes, operations and administrative matters of the District in order to afford a basis for determining the proper classification (TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED) of each of these items, and correspondence concerning these items was thereupon classified accordingly.

d. Compartmentalization of Jobs and Job Sites. - A policy of compartmentalization, under which persons and facilities were furnished only such information as was necessary to enable them to perform their work, was initiated and later intensified. Laboratories, universities, plants, and contractors were not permitted to obtain information concerning the overall structure or work of the District and were furnished only those data which their operations required. When practicable, assembly of equipment was performed at places other than those in which the manufacturing took place, and the processing of raw materials was broken down in such a way that it was done in various stages at scattered locations. The existence and relation to one another of the various project sites, and the relation of the contractors, laboratories and universities to one

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another and to the Project, were concealed in so far as possible to prevent persons from acquiring knowledge of the scope or nature of the Project.

e. Code Names and Words. - Code names and words were designed for the principal project sites as well as for basic materials and equipment. Inasmuch as the background and training of many of the project scientists were of such a character and so well known that their connection with the District would indicate the nature of its work, elaborate care was taken through code names, avoidance of publicity, and security instruction, not to disclose such connection. With the public release of information concerning the District, these measures and use of code names were relaxed.

f. Review of Correspondence with other Government Agencies. - The immensity of the Manhattan District naturally required the assistance and cooperation of key government agencies. As another means of limiting the spread of information concerning the scope and operations of the District, this division reviewed a large amount of official correspondence with these agencies to insure the omission of all such information possible. For example, requests to Selective Service offices for deferment of key personnel were screened to insure omission of descriptive terms about the applicant's duties which would indicate the nature of the project's activity. Requests for personnel to War Manpower Commission offices omitted terms and phrases describing personnel needed that would reveal the work carried on by the District. Similarly, correspondence with other

agencies such as the War Labor Board in connection with union and contractor negotiations was reviewed to minimize the disclosure of classified information.

g. Review of Contracts for Security. - The Intelligence and Security Division, especially in the early days of the project, was frequently called upon for advice in assigning security classifications to contracts with companies or individuals to perform work for the District, i.e., whether the contracts would fall into "Group 2" or "Group 3". (See Book I, Volume 5 - Fiscal Procedures).

h. Investigation of "Loose Talk" Cases. - The Security of Information Program further included the investigation by District Intelligence agents of leakages of information through "loose talk" and of violations of the procedures for handling classified material. Complete security of information could be achieved only by following all leaks to their source. Investigations of such "loose talk" cases and violations were reviewed and evaluated for the purpose of determining future action and policies to prevent recurrence of such incidents as well as to determine the specific information that might have been revealed through the particular violation. Complete card files on all such cases were maintained for reference and study. Since September 1943, investigations were conducted of more than 1500 "loose talk" or leakage of information cases and corrective action was taken in more than 1200 violations of procedures for handling classified material. A few typical "loose talk" or leakage of information cases are set forth in Appendix E. A common violation of the procedure for handling

classified material was the failure of various offices to lock at night, safes containing classified material. At District headquarters and most other facilities where classified material was stored, guards made tours shortly after closing time to check whether all safes were locked. When a safe was found unlocked, effort was made to contact the person responsible for the safe and instruct him to return to the office and check the contents prior to locking the safe. Other violations included the failure to put classified waste in proper "burn" baskets; failure to enclose secret and confidential mail in double envelopes, failure to send secret material by registered mail and similar violations of Army rules for the handling and disposition of classified material.

1. Action on Violations. - Upon discovery of the source of a violation of regulations for safeguarding military information, the violator, if a project employee, was usually reprimanded, informed of the possible application of the Espionage Act, and warned not to repeat the violation. If the violation, however, was a repetition of previous similar violations or if it was particularly flagrant, either the employee's employment was terminated or he was removed from all work involving access to classified material. If the violator was a person other than a project employee, an appeal was made to him to refrain from any further such violations. An effort was also made to stop the spread of the information already disclosed, by making similar appeals to all persons to whom the disclosure had been made. About two-thirds of disclosure of information

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cases involved project employees.

j. Requirements for Project Personnel. - All personnel, military and civilian, were required to execute Declarations of Secrecy (See App. C-3) and were given interviews, upon separation, to remind them of their responsibility to protect classified project information. All scientific articles written by project technical personnel, whether referring to District work or not, as well as all releases and advertisements concerning the Project, were screened prior to release. Personnel were instructed not to make personal notes or records from classified documents or classified equipment. All consultants of the Project were required to execute personal history statements (See App. C-2) and were given instructions in security matters prior to performing work for the District.

k. Application of SWI Policies to Contractors. - The organization of the Intelligence and Security Division included branch offices in principal cities, which not only conducted investigations of District intelligence and security matters but also supervised the security of contractor facilities in their areas. Each principal contractor designated a security agent to carry out security regulations prescribed by the District. In this way the various policies concerning Security of Information were internally applied to contractor facilities away from the project sites as well as at the plants located on principal sites. In plant surveys of contractor facilities conducted by inspectors from the Plant Protection Section, checks were made of the

management's knowledge of and compliance with Security of Information regulations, and of the proper handling of classified matters, as well as of the adequacy of storage of classified papers and documents. Reports of these surveys were reviewed by the Section for Safeguarding Military Information, to insure that all facilities doing classified work were meeting Security of Information standards commensurate with the classification (SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED) assigned to the contract. Labor recruiting teams were instructed not to divulge any classified information in their personnel recruitment programs. Measures were taken to prohibit contracting firms from using their firm names in return addresses on envelopes used in correspondence with the District. In accordance with rule 581 of General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A., Sec. 77a et seq), as amended to May 25, 1942, contractors of the District, their subcontractors and representatives were given instructions to omit from registration statements for the Securities and Exchange Commission any information that might be considered classified by the District. Upon the termination or completion of contracts with the District, surveys were made to see that the contractor had returned all classified documents and materials to the District, or had taken adequate measures to safeguard such documents until such time as public release of information concerning the District was made.

1. Public Relations Work. - Work in public relations was conducted, to secure the cooperation of newspapers in cities and towns located near principal project sites, in omitting stories

and newsitems which would disclose the scope or nature of the Project, attract undue attention to it, or unduly emphasize its secrecy. To avoid harmful rumors and speculations, it was also considered important to secure the good will of nearby communities. This was done by pointing out to civic groups, that project officials were aware of the additional wartime burdens on the communities, including labor shortages, crowded living conditions, increased traffic problems, etc., and that they wished to cooperate in every way to minimize these hardships.

6-4. Security Education.

a. Purpose.- The Security Education Program was instituted to educate all District personnel, military and civilian, in such manner that they would become instinctively security-conscious, to the end that classified documents, information and material would be properly handled and safeguarded, that loose talk would be minimized, and that no information of value would be disclosed by word or action to the enemy or to those not properly authorized to receive it.

b. Contractors' Security Agents.- To accomplish this objective, principal contractors, both at project sites and at their own plants where classified District work was done, appointed personnel in their security departments to act as security agents, to supervise and execute the bulk of the security educational program in the plants. Under the direction of the District Section for Safeguarding Military Information, the various branch Intelligence Offices, prior to 7 September 1945, supervised the work of these security agents in their respective areas and supplied them with

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educational materials and ideas. After 7 September 1945, this supervision was accomplished by the various Area Engineers through their Security Offices. Intelligence Bulletin No.3(See App.BB), prepared in September 1943, outlined the program and specified the work to be done by security agents. For assistance in promoting security agents of the companies, whenever possible, secured the services of persons from other departments to serve as department security agents, with the duty of impressing upon personnel in the departments the need for protecting information about their job. Security education of U.S.E.D. personnel was also conducted by the various branch Intelligence Offices.

c. Media of Security Education.- By the fall of 1944, overall program had been so developed that employees received security instructions from the day of employment through the day of termination. Along with other phases of employment processing, new employees were given security talks, outlining their security responsibility on the new job, and were furnished leaflets which explained the security requirements of the Project. New employees signed Secrecy Declarations stating they would not divulge classified information to unauthorized persons. For employees already on the job, security agents conducted periodic meetings at which security lectures were given or training films shown. Security posters, handbills, circulars and notices were continually displayed and distributed to employees; payroll inserts and telephone stickers were employed as constant reminders of security responsibility. At the principal project sites, flash movie trailers of a few

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seconds duration were frequently shown at project theaters. These trailers contained security messages similar to the type used on posters and handbills. Editorials frequently appeared in project newspapers stressing the importance of security of information. Frequently, news events were used in editorials and security talks, prepared by the SWI Section, to emphasize the importance of security. The invasion of the continent of Europe through Normandy was used as an illustration of a well-kept secret which met with success largely because of the secrecy maintained. The landings of German agents on the Atlantic Coast were used as illustrations of the need for safeguarding project information in conversations and correspondence. Prior to V-E Day, elaborate plans were made to distribute posters, handbills and editorials, stating that there would be no relaxation of security for the District. These materials were prepared and distributed to all branch offices, which in turn distributed them to the company security agents. Upon the announcement of V-E Day, these materials were immediately displayed, to advise personnel that rigid security requirements were still in effect. Similar posters, billboards, etc. were displayed upon the public release of information concerning the District advising that information not officially released should still be protected. Most of these methods described above were continued after the use of the atomic bombs and public release in August 1945 of information concerning the scope and purpose of the District. However, greater emphasis was placed on a close alliance of security officials with management, "on the job" superintendents, foremen and supervisors, and technical leaders,



including frequent meetings with such groups for discussion of security problems and adoption of a realistic program regarding the information still to be protected.

d. Contents of Education Media. - Employees were continually reminded through such media of the types of information concerning the Project which should not be discussed. These included references to the mission of the Project, the size, scope, or nature of its operations, general problems worked on, materials and equipment used in restricted areas, connection and relationship to each other and to the District of various projects and laboratories throughout the country, and professions or former connections of principal technical personnel. Workers were further cautioned against circulation of newspaper articles which might discuss technical work performed on the Project, or circulation of any rumors covering the above listed subjects. After the announcement of the scope and purpose of the District, personnel were instructed to protect technical and production information which had not been officially released. The principal criterion for information that had been released was Dr. H. D. Smyth's Report "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Under the Auspices of the United States Government."  
"(Commonly known as "The Smyth Report")."

e. Grounds of Appeal to Project Personnel. - In order to educate personnel in the importance of the protection of information, it was necessary first to overcome the natural human inclination to discuss with friends items of great interest. It was

also necessary to explain the types of information that should not be publicized. Furthermore, security education had to be conducted in a manner that would appeal to all of the various categories of personnel (technical, clerical, administrative, construction, and laboring) in the District. Because of the extreme secrecy maintained concerning the work of the Project, the majority of the workers did not know what was being done on it, and because of the rules of compartmentalization, they did not know of the existence of other project sites about the country, what other plants at their own sites were doing, or what work the other departments in their own plants were performing. As a result, prior to the public announcement of the District's work, workers largely depended upon the word of the Army that secrecy was important, and the explanation had to be clearly made to them that, although they had no knowledge of the actual purpose of the Project, they nevertheless had important information, through their knowledge of types of equipment used, materials handled, size of buildings, and number of people on the job. Grounds for protecting information were largely patriotism, loyalty to the fighting men, and the reasoning that the less publicity given the Project, the more difficult it would be for the enemy to acquire information about it and also, the greater would be the element of surprise.

f. Effect on Plant Protection. - The program of security education not only prevented undue publicity about the District, and minimized rumors and speculation which could have resulted in damaging effect, but it strengthened the Plant

Protection Program as well, by clarifying to personnel the reasons for identifications and other plant protection requirements and by prompting workers to report unusual incidents and suspicious circumstances or persons.

5. Security Education in Nearby Communities. - The Security Education Program was also carried into communities near project sites, through talks to civic groups by project officials, pointing out the need for public cooperation in stopping rumors and in refraining from or preventing discussion of the work of secret wartime projects. Newspapers of nearby cities, under the encouragement of the Security Education Program, also ran editorials on the need for public security of information.

6-5. Censorship.

a. Scope. - From July 1942, to February 1943, the Protective Security Section conducted a censorship review program on a small scale. One civilian reviewed a few leading daily newspapers and a few periodicals, for items of interest to the District or concerning its key personnel. In the spring of 1943, after the District Intelligence Office was established, the coverage of newspapers and periodicals was increased and considerable retroactive work was done on subjects, of interest to the District, published prior to that date. At this time these duties were assigned to a WAC. In September 1943, the censorship review work was placed under the then newly organized Section for Safeguarding Military Information. Review of publications was continued by a WAC in the District Office of the SMI Section. A second WAC was added to the

District Office in December 1943, and a third WAC in June, 1944. Also, branch Intelligence Offices began reviewing leading newspapers published in their areas. A survey was made in the spring of 1944 of the completeness of coverage of newspapers and periodicals by the District and branch offices, and additional assignments were made to each of the branch offices to insure complete coverage of the leading newspapers and periodicals in their area. Three hundred and seventy newspapers and seventy magazines were periodically reviewed, until the public release of information, at which time most subscriptions were allowed to expire.

b. Censorship Code. - On 28 June 1943, Byron Price, Director of Censorship, issued the following notes in a confidential letter to the Nation's editors and broadcasters.

"Confidential and not for publication:

"The codes of wartime practices for the American broadcasters request that nothing be published or broadcast about new or secret military weapons.....experiments. In extension of this highly vital precaution, you are asked not to publish or broadcast any information whatever regarding war experiments involving:

"Production or utilization of atom smashing, atomic energy, atomic fission, atom splitting, or any of their equivalents.

"The use for military purpose of radium or radioactive materials, heavy water, high voltage discharge equipment, cyclotrons.

"The following elements or any of their compounds:

Polonium, uranium, ytterbium, hafnium, protactinium, radium, thorium, deuterium."

On 1 December 1943, a new code of the Office of Censorship was issued to editors and broadcasters, continuing the confidential directive of 28 June 1943 already in effect.

c. Review of Publications. - Publications were not only reviewed for violations or near violations of the Censorship Code but were also reviewed for publicity pertaining to scientific developments related to the work of the District, for information concerning similar scientific work being done in foreign countries, and for publicity about secret weapons developed by allied and enemy countries which might be related to District work. Publicity regarding key personnel and principal project sites was also carefully reviewed, to analyze the nature and amount of information being circulated and to determine whether such information included classified matters. Items concerning strikes and labor situations, in key industrial areas where plants doing District work were located, were also analyzed. Publications, especially technical trade journals and magazines, were reviewed to ascertain the schedule of meetings of scientific groups, so that such meetings could be attended by District personnel, to ascertain whether scientific matters related to District work were discussed. Scientific books, treating topics related to the work of the District, were reviewed to detect any statements that the Army or the Government was interested in the particular work. These latter

publications were also reviewed, to follow the progress of current research, at non-District facilities and by persons not connected with the District.

d. Action on Violations. - All important clippings, periodicals, or books, containing censorship violations or other matters as related above, were forwarded by branch offices to the District Section for Safeguarding Military Information, for review. Items involving violations of censorship were forwarded by the branch offices directly to the Washington Liaison Office, which in turn referred them to the Office of Censorship. If the Office of Censorship deemed the item a violation of the Censorship Code, letters were written to the appropriate editor of broadcaster, explaining to him the violation and requesting his cooperation in the future.

e. Typical Censorship Violations. - Some of these violations included letters to the editors of well known newspapers criticising the Army for not getting busy with atomic weapons. "Hints point to the earlier realization of the atomic bomb" one optimistic reader wrote to the Toledo Blade in December 1944. "A special substance said to have amazing potentialities could, if it is automatically exploded the right way, ensure victory." The University of Chicago Maroon, shortly after VE Day, praised the school for having a monopoly on Nobel Prize winners and said "Compton and his colleagues are working on problems fraught with tremendous possibilities to mankind, of releasing atomic energy." A Cleveland reporter, after spending a vacation

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near Los Alamos, New Mexico wrote a story entitled "The Forbidden City." He said "The Mr. Big of the city is a college professor, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, called the second Einstein. A wide-spread belief is that he is developing ordnance and explosives. Supporters of this guess argue that it accounts for the number of mechanics working on the production of a single device, and there are others who will tell you tremendous explosions have been heard." The repercussion from these articles, however, was almost nil.

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SECTION 7 - ORGANIZATION

7-1. General. - Intelligence and Security functions were performed for the Manhattan District by an organization which, by 1 July 1945, had come to be known as the Intelligence and Security Division (See App. A 7). That Division, which was under the direct command of the District Engineer, was the product of a process of development and numerous changes in organization, which kept pace with the growth of the District and its increasing security needs.

7-2. Historical Development of Intelligence and Security Division.

a. Protective Security Section. - In June 1942, a Protective Security Section was established in accordance with OCE Circular No. 1070, dated 15 January 1942 (See App. D-3), and 1st Lt. W. A. Fogg was designated District Protective Security Officer. This section functioned for approximately one year, and for the purpose of performing the functions described in Sections 2 through 6, established a personnel security program, a plant protection program, and a limited program for security education and for safeguarding military information. Responsibility for counter-intelligence was assumed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Major John Lansdale, Jr. was designated as liaison officer between the District and the Military Intelligence Division.

b. District Intelligence Section. - As the work of the <sup>Manhattan</sup> District progressed, the need for a closely supervised District counter-intelligence program became apparent; therefore, in Febru-

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ary 1943, Captains H. K. Calvert and R. J. McLeod were assigned to the Manhattan District, to organize an Intelligence Section. Captain Calvert was designated District Intelligence Officer. Approximately two weeks later, two additional officers were assigned on detached service from the Counter-Intelligence Corps, to serve as assistants. Simultaneously with the creation of the Intelligence Section, the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands were notified by the A. C. of S, G-2, of the existence of the Intelligence Section and were requested to designate an officer in the Intelligence Division of each Service Command to act as liaison officer with the Intelligence Section of the Manhattan District. The liaison officer thus designated was advised that the Manhattan District was engaged on a Project of great secrecy and importance, that knowledge of the Project and of the nature and extent of the program was to be confined to as few people as possible, and that, as elements of the Project were located in each of the Service Commands, it would be necessary to utilize Service Command investigative facilities. Each Service Command liaison officer was authorized to correspond directly with the Manhattan District Intelligence Section.

c. Branch Intelligence Offices. - Immediate steps were taken to procure additional personnel and during the succeeding three months, other Counter-Intelligence Corps officers were obtained, stationed at the Clinton Engineer Works, Chicago, St. Louis, Site "Y", and Berkeley, and assigned as Intelligence Officers for Manhattan District activities in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth

and Ninth Service Commands, respectively. Direct liaison between Intelligence Officers and Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands was immediately established. Operating in a staff capacity, the Intelligence Section and its branch Intelligence Offices were responsible for all counter-intelligence pertaining to the Manhattan District. During the remainder of the history of the Division, <sup>ten</sup> additional Intelligence Offices were established as follows:

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Columbus, Ohio	July 1943
Hanford Engineer Works	July 1943
New York, New York	August 1943
Baltimore, Maryland	January 1944
Washington, D. C.	January 1944 (liaison as well as Branch Office)
Boston, Massachusetts	February 1944
Grand Junction, Colorado	May 1944
Pasadena, California	April 1945

C.C.

Such offices came to be referred to as Branch Intelligence Offices. Subsequently, the United States was divided into eleven geographic subdivisions, and a Branch Intelligence Office was established for each subdivision (See Page 7.9). This resulted in the elimination of the St. Louis and Columbus Offices and in the addition of a new office at Cleveland, Ohio. Each Branch Intelligence Officer was responsible for all intelligence and security within his geographic area. The organizational breakdown of each Branch Office was similar to that of the District. Branch Intelligence Officers operated under the direct command of the District Intelligence and Security

D

Officer and also acted as officers on the staffs of the various Area Engineers having responsibility for installations physically located within the geographic boundaries of the Branch Office.

d. Decentralization of Personnel Security to Branch Intelligence Offices. - In May 1943, responsibility for personnel security was transferred from the Protective Security Section to the Intelligence Section and was immediately decentralized to the Branch Intelligence Offices, each of which assumed responsibility for the investigation and clearance of all personnel engaged on classified Manhattan District work within the geographic boundaries of the Branch Office, which closely paralleled the boundaries of the Service Commands.

e. Organization of Intelligence and Security Division.- In July 1943, the Intelligence and Protective Security Sections were consolidated under Captain Calvert, and the Intelligence and Security Division was organized. In August, the Headquarters of the Manhattan District, including the Intelligence and Security Division, was transferred from New York to the Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

f. Creation of Plant Security Section for Safeguarding Military Information. - In intensifying the plant protection program, steps were taken to recruit the best available personnel, and in August 1943, Lt. James W. Haley, who had had previous experience in plant protection with the Internal Security Division, First Service Command, was obtained and designated Plant Protection Officer, with authority to create a Plant Security Section. Two

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additional officers were transferred shortly thereafter, and by May 1944, ten additional specially trained enlisted men had been obtained. Lt. Nicholas Pel Genio, who had had special training in safeguarding military information, was obtained from the Counter-Intelligence Corps and a separate Section for Safeguarding Military Information was created.

g. Creation of Administrative, Shipment and Courier, and Evaluation and Review Section. - A separate Administrative Section was created in February 1944, to handle all administration pertaining to the Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment, (see Par. 7-3), to procure, issue, and assume responsibility for all special investigative equipment and to supervise the expenditure of Confidential Funds. In May, a separate Shipment and Courier Section was established to provide protection for highly classified documents and material, including the end product, during transmission between various locations. In June 1944 Evaluation and Review Section, to coordinate all subversive investigations and to prepare special reports for higher echelons, was organized.

7-3. Personnel of Intelligence and Security Division.

a. Establishment of District Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment. - Handicaps experienced in coordinating the complex ramifications of the espionage case of April 1943 (see paragraph 2-2b), with pertinent Manhattan District activities, and difficulties encountered in having the Service Commands perform auxiliary investigations, pointed to the need for a Counter-Intelligence Corps organization in the District, capable of assuming all investigative respon-

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sibility. As a result, under a Memorandum for the Commanding General, ASF, dated 18 December 1943, from General Strong (see App. B-3), the establishment of a Special Detachment of 25 officers and 137 enlisted men from the Counter-Intelligence Corps was authorized for the purpose of providing security for the work of the District. By letters, dated 27 December 1943, to the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands from General Strong (see App. A-2), the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands were relieved of counter-intelligence responsibility with respect to the Project, although it was pointed out that their assistance might be required from time to time, in cases of emergency and in maintaining routine liaison with the other investigative agencies. As a result of these changes, the District Intelligence Office, which formerly had been mainly a staff unit, henceforth became an operational unit, which was in a position to expedite investigations and to function more efficiently. A number of the officers already assigned to the Intelligence and Security Division were assigned to the CIC Detachment, and the recruiting of new personnel began. In December 1943 Captain Calvert and Captain McLeod <sup>went to the staging area at Camp Halibird, Maryland</sup> and selected, by reviewing the personnel files and by personal interview, 137 Special Agents of the CIC. This group consisted of lawyers, technicians, former policemen, linguists, auditors etc., all specialists in their various fields. Many of these agents were scheduled for overseas assignments but because of the high priority of the Manhattan District were withdrawn from these assignments. On 7 January 1944, Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr.,

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was transferred from the Military Intelligence Service to the Detachment, as a special assistant to General Groves, and was given full responsibility for all intelligence and security affecting the Project. This included the operation of a positive intelligence program and direct supervision over the counter-intelligence and security programs of the Manhattan District.

b. Reorganization of and Increase in Intelligence and Security Division Personnel. - In February 1944, Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons was appointed Chief of the Intelligence and Security Division, vice Major H. K. Calvert. The Division was reorganized and additional personnel were obtained. Additional plant inspectors were obtained from the Provost Marshal General, assigned to the Special Engineer Detachment, Manhattan District, and detailed to the Intelligence and Security Division for duty. Specially trained enlisted men were also selected from the Special Engineer Detachment and assigned to the Division, to operate in undercover capacities and as consultants on technical investigations. Personnel of the Intelligence and Security Division is listed in Appendix F.

c. Administration of Non-Counter-Intelligence Personnel. - The rapid expansion of intelligence and security activity and the procurement of additional personnel necessitated the creation, in May 1944, of the Thirteenth Provisional SED Unit, also commanded by Lt. Colonel W. B. Parsons, to administer non-counter-intelligence enlisted personnel assigned to the Division. By September 1944, the strength of the Division totalled 100 officers and 150 enlisted men. To simplify administration, authority to increase the size of

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the CIC Detachment by transferring to it all officers and enlisted men then assigned to the Intelligence and Security Division, was requested, and in January 1945, the Detachment's strength was increased to 148 officers and 161 enlisted men. All non-counter-intelligence personnel were then transferred to the Counter-Intelligence Corps and reassigned to the CIC Detachment, Manhattan District.

d. Organization of Intelligence and Security Division

Personnel as of 1 July 1945. - As of 1 July 1945, 143 officers and 156 enlisted agents were assigned to the Intelligence and Security Division, Manhattan District. As Chief of the Division, Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons was assisted by Major R. J. McLeod, Deputy Chief, and Captain B. W. Menke, Executive Officer. The Division was organizationally divided into six branches, three of which were under the direct supervision of Major R. J. McLeod and three under Captain B. W. Menke (See App. A-7). These were as follows:

Deputy Chief

(1) The District Security Branch under Captain J. W. Haley, organized, coordinated and supervised the District Security program. This Branch was sub-divided into two sections; Plant Protection and Shipments. These sections performed the functions described in Section 4 and 5.

(2) The Administration Branch, under Captain J. E. Southerland, which supervised the administration of all military and civilian personnel of the Division; operated the Division Mail and Records Section; expended Confidential Funds at CEW; supervised Branch Intelligence Office expenditures; procured, issued

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and accounted for all special investigative equipment; and supervised District Personnel Clearance. This Branch was sub-divided into three sections: Mail and Records, Military Personnel, and Personnel Security, the functions of the last-named of which are described in Section 5. The other functions of the Administration Branch are described in Paragraph 7-4.

(5) The Clinton Engineer Works Branch under Major McLeod's direct supervision, which operated the Security and Intelligence programs at the CEW. This Branch was sub-divided into seven sections: Guards, Major L. R. Block; Review Board, Captain R. Tait; Intelligence, Captain G. W. Rensen; Security, Captain J. W. Haley; and Area Offices in each of the three plant areas. Captain E. B. Brown served as Intelligence and Security Officer at the Tennessee Eastman Electromagnetic (Y-12) plant; Captain R. E. Johannesson as Intelligence and Security Officer at the Carbide and Carbon Gaseous Diffusion (K-25) plant and Lt. E. A. McCaskill in the same capacity at Monsanto Chemical's Pile (X-10) plant. The Intelligence and Security Sections, performing functions for Clinton Engineer Works equivalent to those performed for the District by the Branch Offices and District Security Branches, were organized and operated upon the same basis as such branches.

Executive Officer

(1) The Evaluation and Review Branch under Captain C. L. Clark, which reviewed, evaluated and coordinated all investigations and prepared daily, monthly, and special reports for higher echelons.



(2) The Branch for Safeguarding Military Information under Lt. N. Del Genio, which formulated SMI policies and procedures, supervised security education, reviewed and evaluated censorship and publicity, and reviewed District documents destined for other agencies. These functions are described in Section 6.

(3) Branch Offices Branch, which supervised and coordinated all Intelligence activities of the eleven Branch Offices. The investigatory functions described in Section 2 were initiated by this Branch but were actually performed by the Branch Intelligence Offices. After performance, the results were reviewed and evaluated by the Evaluation and Review Branch. The Branch Offices were under the supervision of the following officers:

Boston, Massachusetts	Lt. J. E. Nolan
New York, New York	Capt. D. S. Teeple
Baltimore, Maryland	Lt. H. R. Walsh
Cleveland, Ohio	Lt. J. R. Baskin
Chicago, Illinois	Major G. C. Thompson
Grand Junction, Colorado	Capt. P. B. Mountjoy
Santa Fe, New Mexico	Capt. T. O. Jones
Berkeley, California	Capt. J. A. King
Richland, Washington	Capt. L. E. Johnson
Washington, D. C.	Capt. F. B. Rhodes
Pasadena, California	Capt. R. W. Kirkman

e. Separation of Intelligence and Security Functions.

On 7 September 1945, the functions and operations of the Intelligence and Security Division were separated as follows:

(See App. A-8)

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a. The responsibility for all activities in connection with production security, shipment security, personnel clearance, security education, and minor security violations were assumed by the Area Engineer for all installations under their immediate supervision. The Security Division of District Headquarters with Colonel W. E. Parsons, District Security Officer, served the District Engineer in a staff capacity.

b. Responsibility for conducting investigations of subversive allegations against project personnel, sabotage and S.M.I. violations of a serious nature was assumed by the Intelligence Unit under the supervision of Major Claude C. Pierce. The Intelligence Unit also assumed responsibility for all security and intelligence functions at Site Y, its affiliated responsibilities, and at Washington, D. C. Branch Intelligence Officers were directly responsible to Major Pierce.

7-4. Administration.

a. Organization of Administration Branch. - With the establishment of a Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment in December 1943, an Administration Section was organized to handle all administration pertaining thereto, to expend Confidential Funds at the Clinton Engineer Works and to supervise all branch office expenditures, and to procure, issue and account for all special investigative equipment.

b. Centralized Control. - For security reasons and to facilitate control, administration of the Detachment was centralized at District Headquarters. Agents were placed on detached service at the Headquarters of the Branch Offices or, in the case of resident agents,

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at locations within the geographic bounds of the Branch Offices. In some instances the geographic location of agents was so highly classified that code symbols were used and only the finance officer computing the pay of the agent was permitted to know the exact location. All records were maintained at Detachment Headquarters, each office submitting a daily morning report by TW. For security reasons, a single payroll was processed through the Finance Office, Knoxville, Tennessee, all orders and travel orders were classified confidential, and per diem reimbursement for travel was paid by the Manhattan District Disbursing Officer. All travel vouchers were prepared by the Administration Section from itineraries forwarded by the various Branch Offices.

c. Investigative Equipment. - Special investigative equipment was obtained from the CIC Depot, Camp Ritchie, Maryland and issued on memorandum receipts to the various Branch Offices. This equipment consisted of various types of cameras, sound detecting and recording equipment, guns ranging from 2" detective specials to .45 caliber sub-machine guns, finger print equipment, for taking prints and for picking up latent prints, handcuffs, blackjacks, lock pick sets, x-ray lamps, short wave radios, etc. Central property records were maintained at District Headquarters in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

d. Confidential Funds. - Confidential funds were obtained by General Groves from the G-2 Finance Officer and were allotted to the various Branch Offices upon monthly request. These funds were used for many and varied expenses incidental to the operation of the

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Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment. Confidential funds were used to purchase civilian clothes for Agents, for Confidential informants, loans to agents to finance emergency trips, unusual expenses while on surveillance work, etc. Special necessary equipment which could not be procured through normal procurement channels was also purchased with these funds. A uniform accounting system was established at all Branch Offices, and periodic audits of all accounts, both as to the accountability for monies and legitimacy of expenditures, were made by a special auditor for General Groves. Accountability for and responsibility for expenditure of confidential funds at the Clinton Engineer Works was assumed by the Chief of the Administration Section, who also promulgated policy and supervised expenditures in the field.

e. Mail and Records and Classified File Sections. - The Administration Section subsequently assumed responsibility for the administration of civilian personnel at District Headquarters and for the operation of the Mail and Records and Classified File Sections, which, for security reasons, operated independently of the Classified File and Mail and Records Sections of the Manhattan District.

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "A"  
LETTERS & ORGANIZATION CHART

- No.
1. Letter dated 29 June 1943 from President Roosevelt to General Groves.
  2. Letter dated 27 December 1943 from Major General Strong to Commanding General, Fourth Service Command, Subject: Personnel on DSM Project.
  3. Letter dated 12 May 1943, from the Provost Marshal General to Commanding General, First Service Command, Subject: Loyalty Investigations of Personnel of the Manhattan District, U. S. Engineers.
  4. Letter dated 11 January 1944, from Captain H. K. Calvert to all Area Engineers, Subject: Shipment of Materials by Railway Express (EIDMC-53).
  5. District Circular Letter (MI 43-3), dated 23 March 1943, Subject: Company Clearance.
  6. District Circular Letter (MI 44-13), dated 6 May 1944, Subject: Safeguarding Military Information.  
TOP SECRET - M.E.D.
  7. Organization Chart, Intelligence and Security Division.
  8. District Circular Letter (MI 46-5), dated 4 September 1945, Subject: Separation of Intelligence and Security Functions.

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C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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June 29, 1943

My dear General Groves:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under your immediate supervision and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

I am writing to you as the one who has charge of all the development and manufacturing aspects of this work. I know that there are several groups of scientists working under your direction on various phases of the program. The fact that the outcome of their labors is of such great significance to the nation requires that this project be even more drastically guarded than other highly secret war developments. As you know, I have therefore given directions that every precaution be taken to insure the security of your project. I am sure the scientists are fully aware of the reasons why their endeavors must be circumscribed by very special restrictions. Nevertheless, I wish you would express to them my deep appreciation of their willingness to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of the possible dangers and the personal sacrifices involved. In particular, I should be glad to have you communicate the contents of this letter to the leaders of each important group. I am sure we can rely on the continued wholehearted and unselfish labors of those now engaged. Whatever the enemy may be planning, American Science will be equal to the challenge. With this thought in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.

Very sincerely yours,

s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

Brigadier General L. R. Groves,  
Room 5120, New War Department Building,  
21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W.,  
Washington, D.C.

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2 Pages

Series A B

APPENDIX A

27 December 1943

2

Subject: Personnel on DSM Project

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

To: The Commanding General,  
Fourth Service Command,  
Atlanta, Georgia.

1. Reference is made to letter to you dated 25 May 1943, subject as above, which is rescinded.
2. Heretofore, substantially all counter intelligence activities within your Command, with respect to the DSM Project, have been carried on under the direction of Colonel Stacy Knopf of your Command.
3. A special detachment is now being organized to carry on counter intelligence activities with respect to the entire DSM Project. However, your assistance may be required from time to time in cases of emergency and in maintaining routine liaison with other investigative agencies. Colonel Stacy Knopf of your Command is familiar with this proposed organization and its representatives within your Command.
4. The Secretary of War directs:
  - a. That effective 1 January 1944 you are relieved of counter intelligence responsibility with respect to the DSM Project.
  - b. That the separate files concerning the DSM Project maintained by Colonel Stacy Knopf, by direction of this Division, be transferred effective 1 January 1944 to the custody of the District Intelligence Officer, Manhattan Engineer District, within your Command. Extracts of counter intelligence information from these files of general interest to your Command may be retained for your general counter intelligence files to the extent that such extracts do not disclose the character, activities, or objects of the DSM Project.
  - c. That confidential funds of the Military Intelligence Division continue to be disbursed by you to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District for DSM counter intelligence activities in accordance with present directions until further instructions are issued through this division.
  - d. That all equipment heretofore devoted by your office exclusively to counter intelligence activities in connection with the DSM Project be transferred to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District within your Command.
  - e. That you cooperate with and render assistance to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District within your Command to the fullest extent, and that such assistance and cooperation be given first priority in all cases.

APPENDIX 42

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f. That future instructions of the Secretary of War concerning this matter may be issued by Brigadier General L. R. Groves, C. E.; that all such instructions and communications issued through General Groves be communicated directly to the officer designated in paragraph 3, and that all liaison between the Area Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District and your office be through the same officer. The connection of General Groves with the Manhattan Engineer District will not be disclosed to anyone other than the officer designated in paragraph 3.

GEO. V. STRONG,  
Maj General  
A. C. of S., G-2



1 4 6  
May 12, 1943

**Subject:** Loyalty Investigations of Personnel of the Manhattan District, United States Engineers.

**To:** Commanding General, First Service Command,  
808 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts.  
Attention: Director of Internal Security.

1. The Manhattan District of the United States Engineers is in charge of a very important secret war project. Certain installations in connection with this project are within your Service Command. It is essential that the civilian personnel employed at these installations be given loyalty investigations for employment without delay.

2. In order to maintain strict secrecy in connection with loyalty investigations of the civilian personnel at these projects it is desired that you designate a suitable officer to act as liaison with the Manhattan District, United States Engineers. It is desired that this office be furnished a copy of your correspondence with the Manhattan District.

3. All necessary details as to installations, contractors, facilities, and the location of each will be furnished you direct by the District Engineer of the Manhattan District in the near future.

ALLEN W. GULLION,  
Major General,  
The Provost Marshal General.

(Similar letter to Service Commands One to Eight, incl., and Western Defense Command.)

APPENDIX 43

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

11 January 1944

WDMS-53

Subject: Shipment of Materials by Railway Express.

To: All Area Engineers.

1. Investigation indicates that certain "valued" shipments of materials by Railway Express Agency are not given maximum protection.

2. Shipments on "Money Receipt" or "Money Bill" can be made by special arrangement with Railway Express at the basic first class express rate. Armed guard protection in "value rooms" and while on railroad cars, together with signature to signature transmission is afforded such shipments.

3. If, in addition to the above, materials are shipped under MED guard or MED contractor's guard to and from Railway Express terminal "value room", it is believed that greater security will result from consignor to consignee.

4. It is suggested that the above method of shipments be investigated in your area and put in operation where feasible.

5. This should not be construed as a substitute for armed guard protection or officer courier protection afforded certain shipments.

For the District Engineer:

H. K. CALVERT,  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX A44<sup>4</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
P. O. Box 42  
Station F  
New York, New York

MI-I

March 23, 1943

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI-43-3)

Subject: Company Clearance.

To: Those Concerned.

1. Reference is made to District Circular Letter, (P.S. 43-25) dated February 9, 1943, Subject: Notice of Preliminary Contract Negotiations.

2. The Intelligence Section has been charged with the responsibilities of clearing all companies to be employed on classified contracts or sub-contracts of interest to this District. Henceforth, the notice of preliminary contract negotiations, which should include the firm name and address, the names and addresses of the officials of the company, names and addresses of representatives of the firm with whom negotiations will be carried on, the classification of the contract and the approximate date it is desired to begin negotiations, together with any additional information concerning the firm which may be known and which would reflect upon the company's acceptability for the classified work, should be submitted direct to the Intelligence Section.

3. Requests for clearance should be made at least two weeks in advance of the time it is contemplated making classified information available to the company, whenever practicable, since it will generally take that long to effectuate proper clearance of the company for classified work. It is necessary that complete information be given in order that the records regarding the company and the officials thereof may be accurately checked.

For the District Engineer:

H. K. CALVERT,  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:  
A & E

APPENDIX ATT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 5 PAGE(S)  
NO. 101 OF 252 COPIES, SERIES A

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

6 May 1944.

EID/C-56

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 44-13)

Subject: Safeguarding Military Information: TOP SECRET - M.E.D.

To: All Concerned.

1. GENERAL.

a. Set forth hereunder is procedure to be followed in the Manhattan District relative to TOP SECRET documents.

b. It will be noted by comparison with AR 380-5 (15 March 1944) that there are certain variations from procedure described therein. These variations apply only to MED and to the Office of General Groves by his direction, because considerations peculiar to the Manhattan Engineer District make literal application of the regulations impractical. Procedure for handling TOP SECRET documents, originating other than within the MED and the Office of General Groves shall be in strict compliance with AR 380-5 (15 March 1944).

2. DEFINITION.

a. Certain SECRET documents, information, and materiel, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation, shall be classified TOP SECRET.

Particulars and examples of TOP SECRET:

(1) Production figures of end products peculiar to the District; combined production figures of basic feed materials, not to include miscellaneous special supplies;

(2) Critical information pertaining to the military use of end products peculiar to the District;

(3) Information of methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Service or Counter Intelligence Service, or which would imperil security agents.

-1-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX ~~A~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXAMPLES

(a) Information relative to the location or operating set-up of technical installations.

(b) Information of such Counter Intelligence import as might affect international relations.

3. CLASSIFICATION.

a. TOP SECRET classification will be by the authority of the District Engineer:

EXAMPLE

:	TOP SECRET	:
:	By Authority of the District Engineer:	:
:	PER	:
:		:

b. Authority to classify:

The following officers are authorized to classify TOP SECRET:

District Engineer - Colonel K. D. Nichols  
District Executive Officer - Colonel E. H. Marsden  
Assistant to District Engineer - Major H. S. Traynor  
Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps - MED - Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr.  
District Intelligence Officer - Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons  
Deputy District Intelligence Officer - Major R. J. McLeod  
Project Y - Lt. Col. Whitney Ashbridge  
Henford Engineer Works - Lt. Col. Franklin T. Matthias  
Madison Square Area Engineer - Lt. Col. John R. Ruhoff  
New York Area - Lt. Col. James C. Stowers  
Cleveland Area - Major H.S. Benbow  
Chief, Operations Unit - Major W. E. Kelley  
Assistant, Operations Unit - Major E. J. Murphy  
Chief, Operations Unit - Major Arthur V. Peterson  
Berkeley Area - Captain H. A. Fidler  
Chicago, Deputy Area Engineer - Captain J. H. McKinley  
Rochester Area - 1st Lt. Ray C. Armstrong

The following Branch Intelligence Officers:

HEW Branch - Major Kirby M. Gillette  
Project Y - Major Peer de Silva  
Berkeley, California - Captain Lyall E. Johnson  
Chicago Branch - Captain T. O. Jones  
Madison Square Branch - Captain Bernard W. Menke

c. When it is necessary for civilian project managers or civilian scientific personnel to classify TOP SECRET, appropriate requests will

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be made to the respective area engineers to so authenticate. It does not necessarily follow that civilian or scientific personnel, when seeking authentication, will reveal the contents of the documents requiring this classification, but will reveal the distribution to the authenticating officer, who will be responsible for reporting said distribution in accordance with Par. 8 hereunder.

4. TRANSMISSION AND HANDLING.

a. TOP SECRET matter will be transmitted only by especially designated couriers or officers of the Manhattan Engineer District.

(1) All TOP SECRET matter will be inclosed in a double, sealed envelope for transmission. The inner envelope will be marked TOP SECRET and will specifically designate the person who may open the envelope.

EXAMPLE

```
TOP SECRET
:
:
: The District Engineer,
: U. S. Engineer Office,
: P. O. Box E,
: Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
:
: To be opened only by
: Col. K. D. Nichols or
: Col. E. H. Marsden.
:
```

(2) Receipts will be contained within the outer envelope for the sealed inner envelope. Receipts for the document itself will be inclosed in the inner envelope. In the absence of the person to whom the inner envelope is addressed, it may be received by the addressee's confidential secretary, who will not, however, open the inner envelope, and in such cases both receipts will be executed and returned. Where the documents are received personally by the addressee, only the receipt for the document need be returned. All officers having authority to classify TOP SECRET will furnish the District Engineer and the Washington Branch Office the names of confidential secretaries authorized to receive TOP SECRET documents in the absence of the addressee thereof.

(3) TOP SECRET matter, after being inclosed in the appropriate double envelope, will be carried by the courier in a specially designed pouch which will be worn under his shirt and attached to his person at all times until delivery. Two of these specially designed pouches will be furnished to each officer of the MED authorized to authenticate TOP SECRET. Empty pouches will be returned to the transmitting office immediately.

(4) Couriers, in each instance, will receive full instructions reference their mission from the transmitting officer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(5) Every attempt will be made to travel by closed pullman space. Air transportation will be used by couriers only in extreme emergencies.

(6) All MED officer couriers or other especially designated couriers will be appropriately, but not ostentatiously armed.

(7) Under no circumstances will the courier or conveying guard, if any, indulge in alcoholic beverages.

#### 5. PROCESSING.

a. It is not contemplated that this procedure will limit the processing of TOP SECRET material to listed TOP SECRET officers only. It is obvious that in any headquarters certain officers and confidential secretaries will be necessary to process TOP SECRET matters. This group must be kept to a minimum and the confidential secretaries, both military and civilian, must be specifically selected, approved, and properly cleared. Such personnel must be registered with the District Engineer and in the Washington Branch Office.

(1) The number of separate copies: - The procedure for this is set forth in Par. 8 a, (1) of Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, containing MED regulations for Safeguarding Information, dated 27 November 1943, will obtain for TOP SECRET matter.

(2) Each TOP SECRET document will reflect on the last page the exact distribution of the document, the date, and the name of each courier.

#### EXAMPLE

Copy No. 1 - Colonel K. D. Nichols; date - 13 April 1944;  
Courier - Capt. J. A. Jones.

Copy No. 2 - Colonel F. T. Matthias; date - 13 April 1944;  
Courier - CIC Special Agent B. Smith.

Copy No. 3 - Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons; date - 13 April 1944;  
Courier - CIC Special Agent R. E. Brown.

(3) Each TOP SECRET document initiated by civilian or scientific personnel (See Par. 3, c) will in addition, bear notice that the officer or civilian addressee will account therefor to the District Intelligence office, as provided in Par. 8, hereunder.

#### 6. REPRODUCTION.

a. Reproduction will be made only by authority of the officer originally authenticating the document to be reproduced. General Groves and Col. Nichols may, however, order reproduction of any TOP SECRET document. In any case when the properly authorized officer has ordered reproduction of a TOP SECRET document, it will be his

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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responsibility to notify all persons who have previously received copies of the document so that distribution sheets can be properly amended.

7. STORAGE.

a. TOP SECRET information will be stored in a three-combination safe to which only persons entitled to receive the information and designated confidential secretaries will have access.

8. ACCOUNTING.

a. On the first day of each month beginning with the first day of the month following the receipt of this directive, officers listed in 3 b. supra and all other persons in possession of TOP SECRET documents will forward to the District Intelligence Officer a statement listing, (1) the number and location of TOP SECRET documents authenticated by them during the preceding month, and the number of copies made, reproduced, or authorized to be reproduced. (2) The number and location of all copies of TOP SECRET documents reproduced by them and of which they were not the original authenticating officer. (3) The number, location, and origin of all TOP SECRET documents received by them.

b. These reports will be consolidated by the District Intelligence Officer and any discrepancy will be investigated immediately.

c. The date of the document or reproduction will determine the month during which it will be accounted for. Where the date of dispatch is such that the addressee will not receive it during the accounting month, the authenticating officer will make appropriate notation in his report.

9. DESTRUCTION.

a. TOP SECRET matter will be shredded and burned by the officer custodian in the presence of a disinterested officer or in the case of civilians, by the civilian authorized to receive the information in the presence of a responsible disinterested officer or civilian.

(1) Certificate of Destruction will show the following: Number of copies destroyed by cremation; the date; by whom destroyed; by whom witnessed. A copy of the certificate will be forwarded to the officer of origin of the document.

*K D Nichols*  
K. D. NICHOLS,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
District Engineer.


Distribution:  
"G" and  
Area Intelligence Officers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY  
DIVISION**

Lt. Col. W. E. Parsons Chief  
 Maj. R. J. McLeod Deputy  
 Captain E. W. Menke Exec. Off.  
 WAC (1) Civilian (2)



**PRODUCTION SECURITY SECTION**  
 2nd Lt. (1)  
 Civilian (2)  
 Supervises plant survey program, identification and visitor control systems. Coordinates all activities related to physical protection against sabotage and espionage.

**SHIPMENT SECTION**  
 1st Lt. (2)  
 2nd Lt. (6)  
 Civilian (1)  
 Supervises and coordinates shipments of classified materials and documents throughout the District. Transports Top Secret material between sites. Furnishes courier service to operations and construction officers.

**PERSONNEL SECURITY SECTION**  
 1st Lt. (1)  
 Civilian (17)  
 Investigates character and loyalty of all military and civilian personnel of Manhattan District. Also investigates all contractor employees at CEW. Supervises and coordinates personnel security activities of Branch Offices.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL SECTION**  
 2nd Lt. (1)  
 WAC's (2)  
 Civilian (4)  
 Administers all military personnel and supervises use of all CIC equipment.

**SERVICE & RECORD SECTION**  
 WAC's (4)  
 Civilian (11)  
 Administers civilian personnel. Supervises files. Processes mail.

**INTELLIGENCE SECTION**  
 Capt. (1)  
 2nd Lt. (2)  
 EM (27) WAC's (7)  
 Civilian (4)  
 Investigates subversive activities and security violations.

**SECURITY SECTION**  
 Capt. (1)  
 2nd Lt. (1)  
 EM (2)  
 Civilian (235)  
 Supervises all activities relative to prevention of sabotage and espionage. Operates Oak Ridge Fire Department.



**GUARD SECTION**  
 Major (1) Capt. (5)  
 1st Lt. (6) 2d Lt. (2)  
 EM (168) Civilian (659)  
 Operates security control for CEW and Police Det. Oak Ridge.

**REVIEW BOARD**  
 Capt. (1) 2d Lt. (2)  
 1st Lt. (1) Civilian (7)  
 Supervises law enforcement activities.

**SECURITY EDUCATION SECTION**  
 1st Lt. (1)  
 Civilian (1)  
 Devises, initiates, and circulates information and media for security education. Evaluates SMI violations. Indoctrinates military personnel.

**CENSORSHIP SECTION**  
 1st Lt. (1)  
 WAC's (8)  
 Coordinates coverage of leading newspapers and commentators publicity on District. Checks violations and maintains records indicating publicity trends.

**RECORDS SECTION**  
 Civilian (1)  
 Maintains accounting records on Top Secret documents. Also records on destruction of classified material.



~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

4 September 1945

EIDMI-2

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-5)

SUBJECT: Separation of Intelligence and Security Functions.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Effective 7 September 1945, the functions and operations of the Intelligence and Security Division will be separated and will be performed as outlined herein. For the purpose of this letter, the term "Area Engineer" shall include officers designated as Operations Officers.

2. The responsibility for all activities in connection with production security, shipment security, personnel clearance, security education, and minor security violations, unless specifically excepted, will be assumed by the Area Engineers for all installations under their immediate supervision. Trained personnel will be transferred to the staffs of the Area Engineers as mutually agreeable to assist them in these matters. The Security Division of District Headquarters with Colonel W. B. Parsons as District Security Officer will serve the District Engineer in a staff capacity.

3. Pending the issuance of more detailed instructions and approval of the recommendations for the application of the revised security policy to each area, the operating policies with respect to each of the security functions outlined in paragraph 2 above will be as follows:

a. Production Security. Production Security, including guard system, fencing, lighting, and identification and control of personnel, will be established and maintained as a responsibility of the Area Engineer in accordance with the general policy as prescribed by the District Engineer.

b. Shipment Security. Security for the transmission of classified documents and materials, unless specifically excepted, will be the responsibility of the Area Engineer or other officer supervising the installation or activity transmitting such document or material. The Security Division will maintain a small pool of couriers at C.E.W. and Chicago which will be available to all units of the District for the purpose of transporting Top Secret documents or material and materials of unusual characteristics which should not be transported by common carrier.

~~RESTRICTED~~

A-8

4 September 1945.

Subject: Separation of Intelligence &amp; Security Functions.

c. Security Education and Safeguarding Military Information. The Area Engineer will be responsible for the supervision and continued observance of those practices and procedures designed to protect classified project information as set forth in existing District Circular Letters and Intelligence Bulletins. He will conduct necessary investigations and take corrective action concerning violations of procedures for safeguarding classified information. An active Security Education Program will be conducted by the Area Engineer to instruct appropriate personnel at all facilities as to what information is classified under existing policies, the necessity for protecting classified information and in the mechanics of safeguarding classified information. The Area Engineer will investigate reports of loose talk and other leakages of information. Where this investigation indicates the scope of the violation is more than a local matter or is of serious import, it will be referred to the Intelligence Unit for further investigation. (See paragraph 5 for Intelligence functions).

d. Personnel Clearances. It will be the responsibility of the Area Engineer to assure proper selection and clearance of all personnel as a prerequisite to employment as classified employees under the jurisdiction of their office. The mechanics of screening, categorizing and forwarding clearance papers for investigations as prescribed in Intelligence Bulletin No. 12 dated 28 May 1945 will be performed by the Area Engineer except at C.E.W. where present procedures will continue. Close liaison should be maintained with the personnel and security offices of the various contractors and the Security and Intelligence Headquarters of the Service Command within whose boundaries the Area Engineer's office is located. All requests for loyalty investigations will be transmitted to the Service Command in which the Area office is located irrespective of the individual's location, address or background leads. Data cards indicating the individual's clearance status will be transmitted to the District Office in accordance with present policy. It will not be necessary to notify the District office when the investigation of each individual is completed unless information of a derogatory nature is developed, under which circumstances complete information will be forwarded. Termination of any employee on the basis of derogatory information of a subversive nature must be approved by the District office.

4. It will be the responsibility of all Area Engineers to keep the District currently advised of incidents, situations or information which may affect the security of the Manhattan District. Periodic surveys and inspections by the Security Division will be conducted to insure the adequacy of security measures at the major installations.

5. Responsibility for conducting investigations of subversive allegations against project personnel, sabotage and S.M.I. violations, except as described in paragraph 3 c, will be assumed by the Intelligence Unit under the supervision of Major Claude C. Pierce acting for Major

4 September 1945

SUBJECT: Separation of Intelligence & Security Functions.

General L. R. Groves with headquarters in Washington, D. C. The Intelligence Unit will also assume responsibility for all security and intelligence functions at Site Y, its affiliated facilities, and at Washington, D. C. Branch Intelligence Officers will be directly responsible to Major Pierce and will receive detailed instructions from that office.

For the District Engineer:

*E. H. Marsden*

E. H. MARSDEN,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

"AE"- "H"- "S"

The following Military Intelligence Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

- |      |                 |                  |      |
|------|-----------------|------------------|------|
| 43-1 | 44-2            | 45-1             | 46-1 |
|      | 44-4            | 45-1 (Suppl. 1)  | 46-2 |
|      | 44-6            | 45-2             | 46-3 |
|      | 44-7            | 45-3             | 46-4 |
|      | 44-7 (Suppl. 1) | 45-4             |      |
|      | 44-9            | 45-5             |      |
|      | 44-11           | 45-8             |      |
|      | 44-16           | 45-9             |      |
|      | 44-17           | 45-10            |      |
|      | 44-18           | 45-10 (Suppl. 1) |      |
|      | 44-19           | 45-12            |      |
|      | 44-20           | 45-13            |      |
|      |                 | 45-14            |      |

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOLD I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "B"  
MEMORANDA & INTELLIGENCE BULLETINS

No.

1. Memorandum dated 2 February 1943 from Lt. Russell E. Harris to Protective Security Personnel, Subject: Instructions for Use in Evaluating Personnel Security Questionnaires and Case Reports.
2. Memorandum dated 23 February 1943, from Major General Styer for the Chief of Engineers, Subject: Security Responsibility (SPAAM-381)(2-3-43).
3. Memorandum for the Commanding General, ASF, dated 18 December 1943, from Major General George V. Strong, Subject: Organization Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment for Manhattan Engineer District.
4. Intelligence Bulletin No. 4, Selection and Clearance of Personnel, 22 October 1943.
5. Intelligence Bulletin No. 12, Selection and Clearance of Personnel, 28 May 1945.
6. Intelligence Bulletin No. 2, Security Inspections, 11 September 1943; Intelligence Bulletin No. 7, Security Surveys, 27 October 1944; Intelligence Bulletin No. 9, Security Surveys, 9 March 1945.
7. Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, Safeguarding Military Information Regulations, 27 November 1943, revised 1 September 1944.
8. Intelligence Bulletin No. 3, Security Education Program, 15 September 1943.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
P. O. Box 42  
Station F  
New York, N.Y.

PS-2

February 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM to: Protective Security Personnel.

Subject: Instructions for Use in Evaluating Personnel Security Questionnaires and Case Reports.

1. In accordance with recent instructions received from the Office of the Provost Marshal General, it will be necessary to divide PSQs into the following 3 classes before submitting them to the Service Commands:

a. Individuals requiring a routine investigation, but not requiring a check of subversive files of F.B.I. and O.N.I. This class will include all individuals who are not included under paragraphs b or c below.

b. Individuals requiring a routine investigation and a check of subversive files of F.B.I. and O.N.I. It will be necessary to request a check of F.B.I. and O.N.I. files if the PSQ contains statements which might indicate questionable loyalty, or when a review of the P.S.Q. reveals any of the following:

- (1) Place of Birth: Any country other than the United States.
- (2) Relatives: Any relative born outside the United States.
- (3) Military Service: Service in the military forces of any country other than the United States.
- (4) Employment: When not fully accounted for since 1935.
- (5) Membership in Organizations: If a member of an organization the character of which is not well known or is known to be questionable.
- (6) Foreign Countries Visited: If a visit has been made to a foreign country since 1930.
- (7) Description of Duties: If the duties performed or to be performed are of such highly confidential or secret nature that a check of FBI and ONI files is required.

c. Individuals requiring a special investigation and a check of the subversive files of F.B.I. and O.N.I. This class will include the individuals listed below.

Subject: Instructions for Use in Evaluating Personnel Security Questionnaires and Case Reports.

- (1) Individuals of Oriental extraction.
- (2) Individuals who emigrated from enemy countries subsequent to January 1, 1943.
- (3) Individuals who have visited an enemy or an enemy controlled country twice since January 1, 1933 or once since January 1, 1938.
- (4) Individuals born in an enemy country or of enemy ancestry who have maintained residence in or made visits to an enemy country since January 1, 1933.
- (5) Individuals who have received education in, were employed in or who have resided for more than six weeks in Germany or Italy subsequent to January 1, 1933.
- (6) Individuals who have emigrated from an enemy occupied country subsequent to January 1, 1938.
- (7) Individuals entering the United States subsequent to January 1, 1919 who have a parent, sister, brother, child or spouse in an enemy or enemy-occupied country or serving in the Armed Forces of an enemy or enemy controlled country.
- (8) Individuals with a criminal record disclosing indications of possible danger to the war effort.
- (9) Individuals who have served in the army of a country now at war with the United States.
- (10) Individuals who entered the United States after the last war from an enemy or enemy-occupied country, and who have become naturalized citizens of the United States since January 1, 1933.
- (11) Individuals having membership in organizations known to be enemy sponsored or otherwise subversive or committed to violent overthrow of the Government of the United States, or adherence to the interests of any foreign power to the exclusion of the interests of the United States.

Special investigations of individuals not coming within the above categories will be requested when a general evaluation of the questionnaire or other circumstances indicate the desirability thereof.

2. For the purpose of interpreting the above instructions, the following are:

a. Enemies or allied with the enemy.

Bulgaria	Korea
Finland	Manchuria
Germany (including Austria)	Rumania
Hungary	Thailand
Italy	Japan

Subject: Instructions for Use in Evaluating Personnel Security Questionnaires and case reports.

b. Countries dominated or controlled in part or in whole by the enemy:

Albania	Luxembourg
Belgium	The Netherlands
Czechoslovakia	Norway
Denmark	Poland
Estonia	Portugal
France	Spain
Greece	Sweden
Latvia	Switzerland
Lithuania	Yugoslavia

3. Individuals classified under paragraph 1c will not be employed on classified work before the P.S.Q. has been investigated and the case report has been received from the Service Command. Persons requesting clearance on such individuals will be notified not to assign them to classified work pending further notice from this office.

4. It is requested that the cases of individuals who are described in paragraph 1c, the cases of aliens, and any other doubtful cases be brought to the attention of the Officer in Charge of Personnel Clearance before any action is taken.

RUSSELL E. HARRIS,  
1st Lieut., Corps of Engineers,  
Assistant.



C  
O  
P  
Y

February 25, 1948.

SPAAM 381 (2-9-48)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

(Attention: Manhattan District Engineer)

Subject: Security Responsibility.

1. Reference is made to secret letter dated February 9, 1948, from the Chief of Engineers, signed by Brigadier General L. R. Groves, addressed to the Provost Marshal General, subject as above.
2. When, in your opinion, it becomes necessary in the interest of secrecy to assume full continuing protection responsibility for any plant, facility, station or other activity or any part thereof connected with your special work under General Groves, you will furnish a true copy of this letter to the Commanding General of any Service Command as your authority for such action.
3. You will also furnish the Commanding General of the Service Command concerned with specific information as to boundaries of any area over which you undertake continuing protection responsibility and the period for which the arrangement is to continue. You will set forth in detail any normal protection service which you wish continued by the Service Command and point out that "emergency protection" responsibility is still vested in his command.

By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

W. D. STYER,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C O P Y

18 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ASF

Subject: Organization of Counter Intelligence  
Corps Detachment for Manhattan Engineer  
District.

1. The Chief of Staff has authorized the establishment of a special detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned and enlisted men to provide security for the work carried on by the Manhattan Engineer District.

2. The Secretary of War Directs:

a. That necessary action be taken to organize a detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned and enlisted personnel under the Chief of Engineers or an officer especially designated by him to be used solely to provide security for the work carried on by the Manhattan Engineer District.

b. That the following grades and ratings be authorized for this detachment and for no other purpose:

1	Colonel	
1	Lieutenant Colonel	
5	Majors	
10	Captains	
8	First Lieutenants	25
12	Master Sergeants	
22	Technical Sergeants	
26	Staff Sergeants	
77	Sergeants	137
		<u>162</u>
		Total 162

c. That this detachment procure all supplies from a confidential list of equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps and that no standard table of equipment be established.

Page 1 of 2

C O P Y

APPENDIX 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C O P Y

d. That necessary Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to provide for this detachment be furnished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

GEORGE V. STRONG  
Major General  
A. C. of S., G-2

Page 2 of 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C O P Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tenn.

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

22 October 1943

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 4

SELECTION AND CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL

1. GENERAL

The importance of the work of the Manhattan Engineer District requires that only persons of unquestionable loyalty and discretion be engaged thereon. To insure this, assignment of individuals to classified work shall be made in accordance with the following procedure which will assure the assignment of persons of demonstrated loyalty and the rejection or elimination of those who are potentially disloyal, disaffected, or subversive, or who lack the character or discretion to insure the security of classified information disclosed to them.

2. DEFINITIONS

a. The term "classified employee" as used in this bulletin shall refer to persons engaged on classified work or having access to classified work areas of interest to the Manhattan Engineer District.

b. The term "Intelligence Officer" shall refer to the Manhattan Engineer District Intelligence Officer within whose territory the unit or installation is located and who is charged with the responsibility for all intelligence matters at the facility.

3. SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

Each classified employee shall be subject to careful and conscientious original selection by the employing contractor. In addition each classified employee shall be cleared by the Intelligence Officer in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed.

4. CLEARANCE PROCEDURE

a. Proof of Citizenship - Prior to employment each classified employee (except aliens) shall furnish proof of citizenship. Aliens shall furnish proof of alien registration. The following may be accepted as evidence of citizenship:

- (1) Birth Certificate.
- (2) Baptismal Certificate indicating date and place of birth.
- (3) Honorable Discharge from the United States Army providing same does not bear notation of alien status at time of discharge.

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APPENDIX ~~A8~~ <sup>B4</sup>

(4) Naturalization Certificate.

(5) Declaration of citizenship providing (2) or (3) cannot be furnished.

b. Forms - Each classified employee shall complete, prior to employment, the following forms which will be furnished by the Intelligence Officer:

WDA 30-19-105  
(1) Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form 58, in quadruplicate. (If an alien, Alien Questionnaire WD PMGO Form No. 301)

(2) Personal History Statement (As required by the Intelligence Officer)

(3) National Defense Fingerprint Chart.

(4) Secrecy Agreement (Type A to be executed by all classified scientific personnel. Type B to be executed by all other classified personnel)

(5) Data Card, in duplicate.

VV  
c. Transmission of Forms - Proof of Citizenship and Secrecy Agreement will be retained by the contractor. All other forms will be transmitted to the Intelligence Officer or to such military agency as the Intelligence Officer shall direct. Results of investigation conducted by military, naval or civil governmental agencies, or by commercial credit companies should be forwarded to the Intelligence Officer. This will avoid duplicate investigation and will, in many instances, expedite the employment of otherwise questionable persons.

d. Assignment to Classified Work - Upon completion of required forms, classified employees may be placed on work of interest to the Manhattan District unless they fall within one of the following exceptions:

(1) Aliens.

(2) Individuals not born in the U. S. or one of its territories.

(3) Individuals of Oriental extraction.

(4) Individuals who have visited an enemy country since 1 January 1933.

(5) Individuals who have a parent, sister, brother, child or spouse in an enemy or enemy-occupied country.

(6) Individuals who have served in the army of a country now at war with the United States.

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(7) Individuals with a criminal record disclosing indications of possible danger to the war effort.

(8) Individuals having membership in organizations known to be enemy sponsored or otherwise subversive or committed to the violent overthrow of the Government of the United States, or to adherence to the interests of any foreign power to the exclusion of the interests of the United States.

(9) Individuals engaged on special work for whom the Intelligence Officer requires PRIOR clearance.

Employees falling in one or more of these nine categories shall not be employed without the prior consent of the Intelligence Officer. Clearance for the employment of aliens cannot be granted until consent has first been obtained from the Office of the Secretary of War.

5. TERMINATION OR TRANSFER

When the employment of an individual on classified work of interest to the Manhattan District is terminated, Secrecy Agreement will again be signed by the released employee and forwarded to the Intelligence Officer. Employees transferring from one unit of the project to another will not resubmit required forms providing the Intelligence Officer is immediately notified of the transfer so that clearance may be obtained from, or transferred to, the proper unit.

*H. K. Calvert*

H. K. CALVERT,  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3+

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Doc. No. 12 Page  
No. 22 of 25 Copies, Series B

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 12  
SELECTION AND CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL  
28 May 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX <sup>85</sup>~~110~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 May 1945

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 12

SELECTION AND CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL

1. GENERAL

The importance of the work of the Manhattan District has not been decreased by the defeat of Germany. As the work of the District progresses from the construction to the operation stage, it becomes increasingly important that only persons of unquestionable loyalty and discretion be engaged thereon. Care must be exercised to assure the assignment of persons of demonstrated loyalty, and the rejection and elimination of those who are potentially disloyal, disaffected, or subversive, or who lack the character or discretion to insure the security of classified information disclosed to them. This bulletin, which supercedes Intelligence Bulletin No. 4, dated 22 October 1943 and supplement thereto, dated 27 July 1944, reflects the present personnel clearance policy of the District.

2. APPLICABILITY OF PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROCEDURE

a. Personnel to whom the District clearance procedure applies may be categorized as follows:

- (1) Military personnel.
- (2) Civil Service personnel.
- (3) Contractors' employees.
- (4) Consultants.

b. Definitions:

(1) The term "classified employee", as used in this bulletin, refers to all persons, excluding military personnel, engaged on classified work or having access to classified work areas of interest to the Manhattan District.

(2) The term "unclassified employee", as used in this bulletin, refers to persons, other than military personnel, directly connected with work of interest to the Manhattan District but who do not have access to classified information or classified work areas. This definition is intended to include clerical personnel, construction workers, concessionaires, and other individuals at the Clinton Engineer Works, the Hanford Engineer Works, and other installations who, though not having access to classified documents, materiel, or equipment, are in daily contact with large groups of classified workers and consequently acquire, through observation and association,



information which becomes classified through collection and association with unclassified information previously obtained. The term "unclassified employee" is not intended to include the great mass of workers who, by virtue of their employment by a private concern under contract with the District or one of its private associates, manually work on unclassified materiel or equipment which becomes classified upon final assembly, where the worker has no knowledge of the unusual character of the materiel or equipment, its potential use, or its ultimate consignee.

(3) The term "employee", as used in this bulletin, refers to all classified employees and those unclassified employees to whom the personnel clearance procedure has been applied.

(4) The term "classified information," as used in this bulletin, includes all information of a classified nature regardless of its form, substance, or mode of transmission, i.e., documents, materiel, equipment, etc.

### 3. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL CLEARANCE

a. The following are basic principles of personnel clearance:

(1) Each classified employee should be subject to careful and conscientious original selection.

(2) The identity of each classified employee should be positively established prior to his assignment to classified work.

(3) The loyalty, honesty, character, and discretion of each classified employee should be established by investigation prior to his assignment to classified work.

These principles represent the desirable objective in personnel security; they should not be interpreted as the minimum standard for clearance. As a security objective, they should constantly be borne in mind and should be applied insofar as they are applicable to clearance of personnel at a unit or installation when all existing circumstances have been given careful consideration. It is recognized that under existing operating procedure the procurement of a complete background investigation on all classified employees is impossible. Extent of investigation is necessarily limited by the number of employees to be investigated and the available facilities for investigation. Although desirable, investigation prior to assignment to classified work is, in many instances, impractical in view of the volume of work involved, and the immediate need for the services of certain types of employees. It is the responsibility of the Branch Intelligence Officer, however, to provide the highest possible degree of personnel security after due consideration has been given to all attending circumstances and operational problems.

b. Where unclassified employees acquire some classified information through observation and association, and where criminal tendencies of employees of this group may adversely affect the work of the project, limited investigation is believed necessary. The extent to which the provisions of the personnel clearance procedure will be applied, if at all, to unclassified employees, is left to the discretion of the Branch Intelligence Officer.

#### 4. CLEARANCE FORMS REQUIRED

a. Proof of Citizenship - Prior to employment, each employee (except aliens) will furnish proof of citizenship. Aliens will furnish proof of alien registration and will be processed in accordance with specific instructions hereinafter outlined. The following are acceptable as evidence of citizenship:

- (1) Birth Certificate.
- (2) Baptismal Certificate, indicating date and place of birth.
- (3) Honorable Discharge from the United States Army, Navy or Marine Corps providing same does not bear notation of alien status at time of discharge.
- (4) Naturalization Certificate.
- (5) Declaration of Citizenship, providing (1), (2) or (3) cannot be furnished.

Military personnel who are aliens are not subject to assignment to the Manhattan District. Citizenship of military personnel will be presumed unless the individual's Personal History Statement or Service Record discloses information to the contrary.

b. Secrecy Agreement - Secrecy Agreements, designed to impress upon the employees the fundamental need for safeguarding military information, will be executed as follows:

- (1) Type "A" will be executed by all classified scientific employees.
- (2) Type "B" will be executed by all other classified employees.
- (3) Type "C" will be executed by unclassified employees within the discretion of the Branch Intelligence Officer.
- (4) Completion Secrecy Declaration will be executed by all classified employees upon contract termination (Intelligence Bulletin No. 11, dated 26 May 1945).
- (5) Military personnel will execute appropriate military

declaration of secrecy form upon transfer from the District.

c. Data Card - Data card will be prepared for each employee. As soon as practicable, attached sample of data card will supersede card presently in use.

d. Questionnaire - Officers will execute Personal History Statement. All other personnel subject to Manhattan District clearance procedure will execute WD AGO Form 19-105, revised Personnel Security Questionnaire. The Personal History Statement may supplement this form or be used in lieu of it within the discretion of the Branch Intelligence Officer.

e. Fingerprint Chart - All employees, including Civil Service personnel, will be fingerprinted on the National Defense Fingerprint Chart. The former policy of separately fingerprinting Civil Service personnel on the Civil Service Fingerprint Chart has been discontinued (War Department Personnel Circular No. 34, 26 March 1945). Military personnel will not be fingerprinted.

#### 5. TRANSMISSION OF RECORDS

##### a. Intra-District

(1) Proof of Citizenship and Secrecy Agreement will be retained in the contractors' files subject to inspection. Military Declaration of Secrecy executed by military personnel upon transfer will become a part of the individual's 201 file.

(2) Intelligence files (201) of officer personnel will be maintained at the District Intelligence Office and will not be forwarded upon inter-area transfer. Intelligence files of contractors' personnel, Civil Service personnel, and enlisted personnel will be maintained by the Branch Intelligence Office having jurisdiction over the employing contractor or station and will be forwarded upon transfer of the individual to another Manhattan District station or contractor.

(3) Data card will be forwarded to the District Intelligence Office immediately upon assignment or employment and will reflect type of investigation initiated. When investigation of military personnel and/or Civil Service personnel is completed, the District Office will be advised so that the proper notation can be made on the data card. Notification to the District Office that investigation has been completed will not be necessary in the case of contractors' employees except where derogatory information is developed or there is a change in the individual's clearance status, i.e., a restriction is placed or a previous restriction is removed. On all contractors' employees, this office will assume that initial clearance is in effect unless specifically advised to the contrary.

b. To Outside Agencies

(1) Upon transfer of District Civil Service personnel to other Government agencies, intelligence files will be carefully screened and forwarded to the unit to which the employee is transferred. Upon the release or termination of contractors' employees or upon the separation, as distinguished from transfer, of Civil Service personnel, intelligence files will be retained in the office of the Branch Intelligence Officer and will not be forwarded to the Discontinued Projects Branch. An exception to the provisions of this circular has been obtained (District Circular Letter, Civilian Personnel 45-11, dated 6 December 1944).

(2) Part I of ASF Circular No. 403, dated 11 December 1944, requires that an entry be made on the Service Record of an enlisted man or woman or on the Qualification Card, WD AGO Form 66-1, of an officer or warrant officer, indicating the extent, results and date of loyalty investigation or check conducted. The notation required by this circular will be made on the Service Record or Form 66-1 of Manhattan District military personnel when the individual is transferred from the District. All transfers from the Manhattan District are processed through the District Military Personnel Section and in each case the files of this office are checked and the proper entry is made. In view of this procedure, Circular No. 403 requires no action on the part of the Branch Intelligence Officers. Intelligence files of military personnel will not be forwarded.

6. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CLEARANCE

The minimum standards for clearance are outlined below. The scope of investigation indicated under each category constitutes the minimum investigation required and should be supplemented by additional information when, in the opinion of the Branch Intelligence Officer, further inquiry is believed advisable.

a. Military Personnel

(1) Clearance of military personnel will be based on a three-way central file check, routine investigation (mail investigation conducted by the Branch Intelligence Office or Service Command routine investigation), and FBI criminal file check. A Service Command special investigation will supplement or be conducted in lieu of the routine investigation for military personnel having access to "top secret" information.

(2) Inasmuch as the majority of the military personnel assigned to the District originally report to Oak Ridge for duty, primary responsibility for their clearance is assumed by the District Intelligence Officer. Branch Intelligence Officers must take positive action, however, to insure that

all military personnel within their areas have been cleared, and where clearance has not been granted by the District Intelligence Office (where the individual is transferred directly to an area office) immediate action will be taken. For officer personnel, Personal History Statements will be forwarded to this office, which will take all necessary action. When enlisted SED and WAC personnel, transferring into the District, report directly to area offices without having been cleared by the District Office, all action to effect formal clearance will be taken by the appropriate Branch Intelligence Office.

b. Civilian Personnel - Civil Service personnel and contractors' personnel will be categorized as follows:

(1) Group I - Classified employees having access to (a) top secret" information, or (b) "secret" information reflecting the over-all program of the District or of any major subdivision, or (c) information concerning the processing and development of end products.

(2) Group II - All classified employees not included in Group I.

(3) Group III - Unclassified employees.

Minimum requirements for clearance are as follows:

Group I - Special investigation (Service Command or Manhattan District investigation), FBI subversive file check, and FBI fingerprint check.

Group II - Routine investigation (Service Command routine, mail investigation conducted by the contractor, or Branch Intelligence Office, or loyalty investigation conducted by a credit agency), FBI fingerprint check, and central FBI subversive file check.

Group III - Central FBI subversive file check and fingerprint check.

7. TRANSFER OR RE-EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

a. Contractors' Personnel - Transfers of employees from one District installation to another, except when specifically directed to carry on work necessary for the advancement of the project, are undesirable for security reasons, and transfers of non-manual employees from one phase of the project to a different phase must be specifically approved by the Area Engineer in charge of the unit to which the individual is transferred and cleared by the Branch

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Security Information

28 May 1945

Intelligence Officer having jurisdiction over the unit to which the transfer is made. Concurrence of the Area Engineer having jurisdiction over the installation from which the transfer is made should also be obtained. (Reference - letter dated 14 July 1944, same subject)

b. Civilian Civil Service Personnel - Letters dated 27 March 1944 and 14 July 1944, Subject: Transfer or Re-employment of DSM Employees, are not applicable to the transfer of Civil Service employees. Prior to the transfer of a Civil Service employee, the approval of the Branch Intelligence Officer and the District Executive Officer must be obtained.

c. Military Personnel - All transfers of military personnel emanate from the District Military Personnel Section which assumes full responsibility for compliance with general security policy.

8. ALIENS

a. Paragraph 61, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, provides that no alien shall be employed on a classified war contract unless consent has first been obtained from the Secretary of War. To expedite the granting of consent in cases of alien employment, this authority has been delegated to the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands. Consent for employment of an alien is actually granted by the Commanding Officer of the Service Command upon the recommendation of the Director, Security and Intelligence Division.

b. Aliens to be employed on classified Manhattan District work will furnish proof of alien registration and execute WD PMGO Form No. 301, in sextuplicate, which will be forwarded to the Director, Security and Intelligence, of the Service Command having jurisdiction over the employing facility, with a request that consent be granted for the alien's employment. Assignment to classified work prior to the receipt of this consent is prohibited.

c. Security of Manhattan District work requires clearance standards for aliens which are higher than those normally applied by the Service Command; consequently, letters transmitting Alien Questionnaires should specifically request that a special investigation be conducted and that a copy of the report of investigation be transmitted with the letter of consent to the requesting Branch Office. Immediate arrangements to procure this additional service should be made with the Service Command inasmuch as the procedure is not in accordance with the Service Command's present operating policy.

d. It should be noted that consent for the employment of an alien by "X" Company does not authorize the employment of the same alien by "Y" Company within the same or another Service Command. When consent is desired for the alien's employment by a new employer,

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a new Alien Questionnaire must be submitted to the Service Command having jurisdiction over the new employer and new consent must be obtained. If, however, consent has been granted for the alien's employment by the "X" Company in "X" Service Command, temporary consent can normally be obtained by TXX for his employment by "Y" Company in "Y" Service Command, if the name of the original employer and the date of the original consent are furnished.

9. MASTER REFERENCE LIST

Each Branch Office will submit to this office and to all other Branch Offices lists of undesirables in accordance with letter dated 22 April 1944, Subject: Compilation of Master Reference Lists.

10. TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIVE CHANNELS

a. Service Command Investigations

(1) Special Investigations - This type of investigation is based upon agency checks and background investigation by investigators of the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Commands. The extent of the investigation is determined by the Service Command acting as the office of origin as the investigation progresses. Appropriate leads in other Service Commands are included in the special investigation as a routine investigative procedure.

(2) Routine Investigations - This type of investigation includes a FBI and local police check together with a limited verification of the data submitted by the subject on Personnel Security Questionnaire, ordinarily conducted by mail. Routine investigations are automatically converted into special investigations if derogatory information is developed.

(3) Submission of Requests - Requests for Service Command investigations, accompanied by three copies of the PSQ, will be forwarded to the appropriate Branch Intelligence Officer for transmission to the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Command. The type of investigation desired, routine or special, will be specifically stated and the words "Service Command" will be used to clearly distinguish the requests from those desiring Manhattan District personnel investigations. Requests will be transmitted through the appropriate Branch Intelligence Office to the Service Command where the majority of the leads will be developed and not to the Service Command having jurisdiction over the employing facility. The Branch Intelligence Office receiving the request will transmit it directly to the Security and Intelligence Division, assume responsibility for having the desired investigation completed, and forward a copy of the report to the Branch Office originating the request. For investigation of military personnel, general

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~~Security Information~~

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Service Command policy requires the submission of loyalty check sheet forms, in quadruplicate, in lieu of the Personnel Security Questionnaire.

b. Central FBI Subversive File Checks

(1) This type of investigation consists of a check of the central subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the absence of positive information, no report is received by the requesting Branch Office. Where derogatory information is disclosed, a summary of information or a copy of the report is furnished.

(2) Requests for central FBI subversive file checks will be forwarded to the Branch Intelligence Officer, Washington Branch Office. Personnel Security Questionnaires for each individual to be checked, bearing a red border stamped at the bottom of the form in order to insure priority in processing, will be forwarded with a letter of transmittal, alphabetizing the PSQs submitted. Positive reports will be returned through the Washington Branch Office via the District Intelligence Office.

c. Three-Way Central File Checks

This type of investigation consists of a check of the central files of the FBI, ONI, and MID. Requests will be forwarded on loyalty check sheet forms, in quadruplicate, to Major B. M. Bates, Office of the AC of S, G-2, Who's Who Branch, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. If immediate action is desired, the loyalty check sheet form should bear an "expedite" stamp to insure priority in processing. Where expedite checks are requested by TWX, sufficient identifying information should be furnished.

d. Service Command Agency Checks

This type of investigation includes checks of the subversive files of the Headquarters SID, Headquarters ONI, appropriate FBI field office, and local police. One copy of the Personnel Security Questionnaire should be forwarded for each agency to be checked. Requests will be transmitted to the appropriate Branch Intelligence Officer who will forward them to the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Command and act as the forwarding agency for the returned reports. For military personnel, general Service Command policy requires the submission of loyalty check sheet forms in lieu of the PSQ. Expedite agency checks requested by TWX will reflect sufficient identifying information.

e. FBI Criminal Fingerprint Checks (Civilian)

This type of investigation consists of a fingerprint check against the criminal files of the FBI. National Defense Fingerprint Charts will be forwarded by the Branch Intelligence Offices to the

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 12

28 May 1945

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C. Attention: Mr. George Burtor. T-2 criminal records will be returned directly to the requesting office.

f. FBI Criminal File Checks (Military)

Criminal record checks for military personnel will be forwarded to the Washington Branch Office for transmission to the FBI. Requests for criminal record checks will state the individual's given name, middle initial or initials, last name, and Army Serial Number (original serial number will be given if the number has been changed). To facilitate expeditious handling by the FBI, the attached 3" x 4" form, reflecting, in the upper right hand corner, the code symbol of the office of origin, will be used by all Branch Offices. Reports will be returned through the Washington

g. Investigations Conducted by Contractors

All investigations conducted by contractors and investigations conducted by credit agencies, when supplemented by a central FBI subversive file check or service Command agency check and a FBI criminal check, will be considered as equivalent to the routine investigation normally conducted by the Service Command.

h. Manhattan District Investigations

Manhattan District personnel investigations will be requested in accordance with letter dated 12 September 1944, Subject: Investigative Report Form and Case Manual.

11. DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 12

Distribution of Intelligence Bulletin No. 12 is restricted to members of the Intelligence and Security Division, Manhattan District. Copies of this bulletin will not be furnished private contractors. Specific instructions concerning personnel clearance procedure at each Manhattan District installation will be issued by the appropriate Branch Intelligence Office.

2 Incls:  
Data Card (sample)  
Request for inv. (sample)

W. B. PARSONS,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

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~~Security Information~~

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Security Information

DATA CARD

CONFIDENTIAL		
Name _____		
(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
Soc. Sec. No. _____	Date of Employment _____	
Address _____		
Employer _____	Unit _____	
Location _____		
Birthplace _____	Date of Birth _____	
Citizenship _____	Alien Reg. No. _____	
_____ SC AC <input type="checkbox"/> R <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> Rpt. Rec'd _____		
_____ Central Files FBI <input type="checkbox"/> ONI <input type="checkbox"/> MID <input type="checkbox"/> _____		
_____ Mail Inv. <input type="checkbox"/> Merchantile Inv. <input type="checkbox"/> _____		
_____ MED Personnel Inv. _____ (DSM File No.) _____		

REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL FILE CHECK ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington 25, D. C. Attn: Identification Division	NYBO	
It is requested that a criminal file check be conducted on the following:		
Name _____		
(Last Name)	(First Name)	(Middle Initial)
Army Ser. No. _____		
(Original Number)		
P. O. Box 2610 Washington, D. C.	FRED B. RHODES, JR., Captain, Corps of Engineers, Branch Intelligence Officer.	

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Security Information

WAR DEPARTMENT  
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
OAK RIDGE, TENN.

MI-5

11 September 1943

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 2

SECURITY INSPECTIONS

1. Foreword

Reference is made to District Circular Letter (MI 44-2) dated 26 July 1943 transferring the functions of the Protective Security Section to the Intelligence Section. To carry out these functions, periodic inspections will be made of all units of interest to this District.

2. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of these inspections will be to observe and report the status of protective measures in force and to make appropriate recommendations for safeguarding all work by or for the Manhattan Engineer District. Inspections may be made of an entire plant, facility, or other installation or may be confined to certain restricted areas within such plant, facility, or installation. The areas to be covered will be determined by the Intelligence Officer serving the unit to be inspected. All inspections will be complete detailed inspections of the property covered. The thoroughness of each inspection will be without regards to the form on which it is reported.

3. Inspection Procedure

Inspections will be made as frequently as necessary and this may require complete inspection of the more important installations each month. In other cases, inspection frequency may vary up to three or four month intervals. However, it is desirable that every effort be made to complete an original inspection of every unit without delay based on the new Survey Report Form.

Officers and other qualified personnel of the Intelligence Section will make these inspections. Whenever Accident and Fire Protection Inspections have been carried out by personnel of the Safety Section, the Intelligence Section will not duplicate their work but reports by the Safety Section will be secured and submitted as a part of the Security Survey Report.

On arrival at an installation, the inspector will seek out the Security Agent, and after informing him of the purpose of the visit, he will proceed with the inspection accompanied by the Security Agent. In so far as possible, conditions will be determined by actual observations of the inspector. Questioning of the Security Agent will be limited to that information which cannot be obtained by physical inspections. Wherever unsatisfactory conditions are found either appropriate recommendations will be made or a comment on the condition will be included in the report showing why a recommendation was not submitted. Minor recommendations which the management has indicated will be carried out, should be noted on the report, but no further action need be taken. On important recommendations or recommendations involving considerable expenditures, a draft of a letter of recommendation should be prepared for the signature

### 3. Inspection Procedure (cont'd.)

of the Area Engineer or other Officer responsible for the inspected installation and included as a part of the inspection report. On each reinspection, the status of all previous recommendations should be checked and any which have not been carried out should be resubmitted.

In making recommendations and giving protective advice, inspectors should bear in mind that their action may meet with subsequent disapproval of higher authority if found to be based on any but sound practical principles of plant protection engineering.

As a guide in inspection work, reference should be made to the INTERNAL SECURITY INSPECTION MANUAL issued by the Provost Marshal General's Office and to PLANT PROTECTION FOR MANUFACTURERS issued by the War Department. Copies of both may be obtained from the Director of Internal Security of any Service Command.

### 4. Reports

To insure uniform inspection procedure and to provide a means of reporting each inspection, a SECURITY SURVEY REPORT form will be used. In its entirety, this form will consist of a summary sheet and four sections as follows:

- I Prevention of Espionage and Sabotage
- II Fire Prevention and Protection
- III Accident Prevention
- IV Passive Defense

Every inspection will be reported. Beginning with the original inspection and once every six months thereafter, a complete SECURITY SURVEY REPORT will be submitted. The SECURITY SURVEY REPORT form, a copy of which is attached to this Bulletin, will be used. Intermediate inspections may be reported by completing the summary sheet (page one) of the form and attaching thereto, a brief narrative report on changes in conditions and on the status of previous recommendations. Each report will contain a list of all important recommendations made whether of a major or minor nature.

Because of the various types of installations to be reported, the inspector must use good sense and judgment in making out his report. For the larger installations necessary comments may require much more space than the few lines on the form allow. For this reason, the reverse side of each sheet has been left blank and when necessary additional sheets will be added. The other extreme will be the reporting of a small office or a small restricted area, when it may be more practical to omit reporting in detail on Fire and Accident Prevention and instead write a brief narrative description of conditions. Otherwise, all items on the report form will be completely answered except that the abbreviation DNA (does not apply) may be used where an item on the report form is not pertinent to the particular unit being reported upon. Insofar as is practicable the word or words which apply shall be underlined.

#### 4. Reports (Cont'd.)

Ratings should reflect the best judgment of the inspector and should be based upon a comparison of conditions found with conditions which adequate security requires. All ratings below "Good" should be explained. Either a specific recommendation for correction should be made or a sound reason given for not making a recommendation.

#### 5. Final Action

Reports will be prepared in triplicate within ten days of the date of inspection. After being reviewed, the original will be forwarded to the Area Engineer or other officer responsible for the inspected unit. He will institute such action as is necessary to correct deficiencies by the adoption of the recommendations included in the report or by equally effective methods. The duplicate will be submitted to the District Intelligence Officer and the third copy will be retained.

#### 6. Relations with other Inspection Services

Many of the facilities at which Manhattan Engineer District maintains an interest are already being inspected by Service Command representatives as well as competent fire and safety engineers. Full advantage should be taken of the experience of these men and copies of their reports should be secured whenever possible. Every effort must be made to avoid conflicts and duplication of the work of other War Department inspectors. Close liaison should be maintained with the Service Commands. Any problems concerning inspection jurisdiction should be referred to the District Office immediately.

#### 7. In Conclusion

The degree of security provided at units and projects being carried on by this District, will depend, to a large extent on the inspections carried out by the Intelligence Section. Inspectors have the duty of assisting operators in carrying out their responsibility for the prevention of interruption or delay in the completion of their work. The inspector must be informed, he must be observing, he must be tactful and courteous and above all, he must be guided by COMMON SENSE AND GOOD JUDGMENT.



H. K. CALVERT,  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

~~RESTRICTED~~

United States Army  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

SECURITY INFORMATION

27 October 1944

BIDMI-6

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 7

SUPPLEMENT A

SECURITY SURVEYS

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Bulletin No. 7, above subject, dated 28 June 1944.
2. The procedure for conducting plant security surveys and reporting thereon is amended as follows:

a. Procedure

Before visiting an installation for the purpose of making a plant survey, the local Area Engineer or the person responsible for work being done at a location where no Area Engineer is stationed will be notified in advance in order that arrangements may be made to have the surveying personnel accompanied during the survey. (Ref. Par. 6, Intelligence Bulletin No. 7).

b. Ratings

Each Fair or Poor Rating should be fully explained. This includes not only Composite Ratings as given on "Sabotage and Espionage", "Fire Protection", and "Continuity of Production" but sub-section ratings such as "Physical Protection", "Identification", "Safeguarding Military Information", "Employees", etc. Explanation of individual items of the report such as "Fencing", "Photo Badges", "Housekeeping", etc. is not necessary. (Ref. Par. 8, Intelligence Bulletin No. 7)

c. Recommendations

(1) Recommendations are to be made only after a thorough study of all factors involved. Each recommendation will include supporting data and reasons justifying each such recommendation. Where an expenditure of funds is necessary a statement of the estimated cost will be included. (Ref. par. 9, Intelligence Bulletin No. 7).

(2) If an unsatisfactory condition is reported, the correction of which cannot be justified because of excessive cost or other extenuating circumstances, no recommendation will be made. A full explanation including cost estimates and other pertinent data should be included to show why no action has been recommended. (Ref. par. 9, Intelligence Bulletin No. 7).

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~~Security Information~~

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 7 - SUPPLEMENT A.

(3) After listing all recommendations and clearly indicating any with which the Area Engineer or his representatives did not concur, a statement similar to the following will be made:

"The above recommendations when carried out should correct all the unsatisfactory conditions noted in this report with the exception of those conditions indicated in the report for which corrective action is not recommended because of excessive costs or other extenuating circumstances". (Ref. Par. 9, Intelligence Bulletin No. 7).

W. B. PARSONS,

Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

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United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

23 June 1944

EID.C-53

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 7

SECURITY SURVEYS

1. Foreword

This bulletin is a revision of and replaces Intelligence Bulletin No. 2, above subject, dated 11 September 1943. It has been prepared for the information and guidance of officers and inspectors of the Intelligence and Security Division, Area Engineers, and others concerned with the security of the MED projects. Its purpose is to state the mission of the District Plant Security program; to clarify the duties of inspectors; and to outline the procedures to be followed in making security surveys.

2. General

With the development of the MED project, the need for insuring uninterrupted production at key facilities becomes increasingly important. The present critical offensive stage of the war and the accompanying manpower requirements have in many instances necessitated a relaxation in the protection of plants and other war facilities. Therefore, a determined effort must be made to assure the security of those installations where not only production but PRODUCTION ON SCHEDULE is essential. The primary purpose of the District Plant Security Program is to minimize the possibility of delay in the successful completion of the project. Standards of security will, therefore, vary according to the necessity for security as determined by the facilities' relative importance.

3. Security Requirements

In setting up requirements for security at a particular installation the principal consideration will be the effect which its loss would have upon the completion date of the overall program. What applies to one plant or facility may not be applicable to another and although principles of protection will remain the same, standards and requirements will vary in their application. This requires that a thorough study be made of each facility in conjunction with a complete physical survey of its vulnerability to fire, sabotage, espionage, and related hazards. Some of the factors which determine the degree of security or protective measures are:

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- a. Importance of a facility's product.
- b. Vulnerability and replaceability.
- c. Alternate sources of supply.
- d. Availability of alternate space.
- e. Availability of replacement equipment.
- f. Relation to other production schedules.
- g. Effect of production interruption on overall program.

It may be readily seen that the adequacy of security measures can be properly evaluated only after consideration of these factors.

#### 4. IED Facility List

While it is impossible to follow hard and fast rules for the evaluation of the many IED facilities, it is possible to indicate in general terms their relative importance. Therefore, three categories indicating relative importance have been established. These categories listed in order are:

##### a. Class "A" Facilities

These facilities at which the interruption of construction or operations would definitely and seriously delay the completion of the mission of the IED.

##### b. Class "B" Facilities

These facilities at which the interruption of construction or operations would cause only a minor delay in the overall program.

##### c. Class "C" Facilities

These facilities important to the program because they are furnishing critical supplies or services but at which the interruption of construction or operations would not delay the overall program. Examples of such facilities are research work upon which progress of design, construction or operations is not dependent, facilities quickly replaceable or for which alternate facilities are immediately available.

A current list of facilities with this information included is maintained and may be referred to as a guide in setting up security standards.

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## 5. Frequency of surveys

Periodic surveys will be made of all IED installations. Initial surveys will be made immediately following the receipt of notification that work is planned or has begun. The frequency of subsequent surveys will be based upon the Rating of Importance as given on the IED Facilities List and the status of security as previously determined. Unsatisfactory "A" Facilities should be surveyed every 30 days. All other "A" Facilities and "B" Facilities should be surveyed at intervals of not less than 90 days. Other listed facilities should be visited at intervals determined by the responsible Intelligence Officer. Complete surveys of these installations need only be made as deemed necessary by the responsible Intelligence Officer.

## 6. Procedure

Previous to making a Security Survey or Inspection of a facility the inspector should thoroughly familiarize himself with the nature of the work being done at the locations and its relative importance to the IED project. He should know the name of the person he is to contact upon his arrival at the facility and the extent to which IED interests in the work have been revealed. If this information is not on hand it should be secured through Intelligence channels from the responsible Area Engineer or Contracting Officer. Under no circumstances should the inspector visit any IED facility before he has availed himself of this information. In addition, the inspector should review previous Security Surveys and Inspection Reports covering the facility to be visited. If special hazards with which the inspector is not sufficiently familiar are indicated on these reports, he should seek information and advice from his superior officer. Upon request further assistance will be provided by the District Office. As the Area Engineers or their representative make frequent visits to the more important installations, the inspector should where possible, coordinate his inspection with them so that he may discuss conditions while at the location.

Upon his arrival at an installation, the inspector should first contact the individual responsible for security. At the larger more important installations this will usually be the resident Area Engineer, at others it will be the Security Agent or a responsible executive who has been designated by the Contracting Officer as the proper official to contact. After explaining his mission and obtaining permission, the inspector should proceed with his survey.

Full time should always be allowed to make a good complete survey. One good survey is of more value than many poor ones. Insofar as possible conditions will be determined by actual observations of the inspector. Questioning of individuals will be limited to that information which cannot be obtained by physical inspections. A survey can be made of an entire facility, or may be confined to certain restricted areas within such facility. The areas to be covered will be determined by the nature and location of IED work.

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When making a security survey, the inspector should bear in mind that his function is to discover and report the status of protective measures. During the survey the inspector will make only recommendations of a maintenance nature. Other recommendations must first be approved by a reviewing officer.

In making recommendations and giving protective advice, inspectors should realize that their action may meet with subsequent disapproval of higher authority if found to be based on any but sound practical principles of plant protection engineering.

As a guide in inspection work, reference should be made to the INTERNAL SECURITY INSPECTION MANUAL issued by the Provost Marshal General's Office and to PLANT PROTECTION FOR MANUFACTURERS issued by the War Department. Copies of both may be obtained from the District Intelligence Office.

## 7. Reports

To insure uniform procedure in conducting and reporting security surveys a SECURITY SURVEY REPORT form, copy of which is attached will be used. In addition to the cover sheet this form consists of three sections as follows:

- I Sabotage and Espionage Protection
- II Fire Protection
- III Continuity of Production

Every survey to be complete must be fully reported. In addition to rating the many items affecting security, special hazards and unsatisfactory conditions should be fully described in the space provided for Comments. Beginning with the original survey and once every six months thereafter a complete Security Survey Report will be prepared. Intermediate surveys may be reported on the same form, except that Comments may be limited to recent changes and the status of previous recommendations.

Because of the various types of installations surveyed, inspectors must use good judgement in preparing their reports. For the large important installations many pages of comments may be required whereas in reporting on a small office or restricted area it may be more practical to omit entirely those sections of the report form pertaining to Fire Protection or Continuity of Production.

Reports should be promptly written and submitted. In no case should more than five days elapse between the date of survey and the date on which the report is forwarded to the responsible Area Engineer. It should be remembered that all reports reflect the ability of the inspector. Brief intelligent comments will disclose to the reviewing officer special situations or hazards which would not be brought out otherwise. Contradictory statements, inaccurate data and carelessness in reporting are all indications that the inspector does not know his job.

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### 8. Composite Ratings

While the relative importance of a facility should be given prime consideration in making major recommendations it should not influence the grading of items under Fire Prevention and Protection and Continuity of Production. Ratings for each of these sections of the report should be based upon a comparison of conditions found with those in the best facilities of similar size and occupancy.

The Prevention of Sabotage and Espionage, however, can only be properly rated by evaluating the relative importance of the facility and deciding if the necessary security has been provided.

All ratings below "Good" should be fully explained under COMMENTS.

### 9. Recommendations

Fact finding by the inspector is simply incidental to the recommendations for corrective measures which result from the survey. A competent inspector reporting on a well managed facility where there is good cooperation frequently will have no recommendations to make for he will have secured compliance with all maintenance recommendations during his survey. If recommendations other than those of a maintenance nature are required because of unsatisfactory conditions found during the survey the procedure outlined below should be followed.

#### a. Minor Recommendations

Recommendations involving minor expenditures, and recommendations which it is believed will be readily carried out by the management without involving reimbursement by the government will be included in the Survey Report after being reviewed by the Intelligence Officer responsible for the security inspections.

#### b. Major Recommendations

At some installations the correction of unsatisfactory conditions may require considerable expenditures, use of critical materials, delays, or changes in production methods or operations. Typical examples would be critical or vital installations where adequate security could only be obtained through the installation of extensive fencing, protective lighting, alarm systems, sprinkler systems or water supply facilities or through the employment of additional personnel such as guards or firemen; or by altering or adding to existing buildings or by rearranging vital processes within a plant.

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Before a survey report containing major recommendations is submitted their necessity and practicability will be discussed with the responsible Area Engineer. If the Area Engineer cannot be contacted personally, he should be requested to dispatch an officer to examine with the security inspector, the unsatisfactory conditions. After these conditions have been jointly examined, the inspector will prepare his report. Any recommendations included in the report with which the Area Engineer or his representative did not fully concur, should be clearly indicated.

#### 10. Final Action

Reports will be prepared within five days of the date of completion of the survey. After review by local approving officer, two copies will be forwarded to the Area Engineer or other officer responsible for the facility, who will institute such action as he deems necessary to correct deficiencies either by the adoption of the recommendations included in the report or other equally effective methods. One copy of the report will be forwarded by the Area Engineer or other responsible officer to the District Engineer, Attention: District Intelligence Officer, together with appropriate comments as to action taken.

#### 11. Relations with other Inspection Services

Many of the facilities at which Manhattan Engineer District maintains an interest are already being inspected by Service Command representatives as well as competent fire and safety engineers. Full advantage should be taken of the experience of these men and copies of their reports should be secured whenever possible. Every effort must be made to avoid conflicts and duplication of the work of other War Department inspectors. Close liaison should be maintained with the Service Commands. Any problems concerning inspection jurisdiction should be referred to the District Intelligence Office immediately.

#### 12. Conclusion

The degree of security provided at facilities engaged on the IED project will depend to a large extent on the Security Surveys made by the Intelligence and Security Division. Inspectors have the duty of assisting Area Engineers in carrying out their responsibility for the prevention of interruption or delay in the completion of their work. The inspector must be informed, he must be observing, he must be tactful and courteous and above all, he must be guided by COMMON SENSE AND GOOD JUDGEMENT.

*W. B. Parsons*

W. B. PARSONS,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

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ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

EIDMI-6

9 March 1945

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 9

SECURITY SURVEYS

1. Foreword

This bulletin is a revision of and replaces Intelligence Bulletin No. 7 dated 28 June 1944, and Supplement A thereto dated 27 October 1944. The information provided herein is for the assistance of Area Engineers and personnel of the Intelligence and Security Division. Its purpose is to state the mission of the Plant Security Program, to clarify the duties of those making Security Surveys, and to outline procedure.

2. General

The purpose of the District Plant Security Program is to minimize the possibility of delay in the successful operation of the project, and to insure the proper safeguarding of classified project information. It is necessary, therefore, that surveys be continued at facilities whose production is vital to a phase of the project, or where there is information of a classified nature.

3. Security Requirements

a. In establishing requirements for security at a particular facility, consideration will be given to the following factors:

(1) The effect which loss of production at the facility would have upon the completion of the overall program.

(2) The amount and type of classified information and/or material at the facility.

(3) The prevention of loss or damage to Government property.

b. The requirements for good protection at one facility may not be applicable to another, and while basic standards for protection should be recognized, their application will vary according to need. This requires that a comprehensive survey be made of each facility to determine its vulnerability to fire, explosion, sabotage, espionage and related hazards.

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 9

4. MED Facility List

a. While it is not feasible to follow rigid standards for the evaluation of importance of MED facilities, three categories have been established as a guide as follows:

(1) Class "A" Facilities

Those facilities at which the interruption of operations would seriously delay the completion of the mission of the MED.

(2) Class "B" Facilities

Those facilities at which the interruption of operations would cause only a minor delay in the overall program.

(3) Class "C" Facilities

Those facilities which are important to the program because they are furnishing critical supplies or services but at which the interruption of operations would not delay the overall program. Facilities having classified material or documents should be included in this category, even though their production is not considered essential.

Examples of such facilities are those quickly replaceable or for which alternate facilities are quickly available, research locations where work is not urgently necessary to completion of design or construction and locations not in Class A or B where classified work is carried on.

b. A current list of facilities is maintained, not only as a guide to those locations requiring security surveys, but also as a general source of information and reference concerning all important locations in which the District is interested. It is desirable to retain facilities on this list at which important work is being performed or where classified information is available until production for the District has been completed, or in the case of classified contracts, until a completion survey has been made. Where an Area Engineer considers that no further security surveys are needed at a facility, the District Intelligence Officer should be so notified.

5. Frequency of Surveys

All facilities of importance to the District as indicated by the "A", "B" or "C" ratings assigned on the Facility List will be surveyed. An original complete survey will be made immediately after a facility has been listed. The frequency and extent of later surveys will be determined by the responsible Branch Intelligence Officer. The following schedule is

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 9

furnished as a general guide in determining the frequency of such subsequent surveys:

Poor or Fair "A" Facilities	60 days
Good or Excellent "A" Facilities	90 days
Poor or Fair "B" Facilities	90 days
Good or Excellent "B" Facilities	120 days
"C" Facilities (Classified Work)	120 days
"C" Facilities (Unclassified Work)	180 days

6. Procedure

a. Previous to making a security survey or inspection of a facility, the inspector should thoroughly familiarize himself with the nature of the work being done at the locations and its relative importance to the MED project. He should know the name of the person he is to contact upon his arrival at the facility and the extent to which District interests in the work have been revealed. If this information is not on hand, it should be secured through Intelligence channels from the responsible Area Engineer or Contracting Officer. Under no circumstances should the inspector visit any District facility before he has availed himself of this information. In addition, the inspector should review previous security surveys and inspection reports covering the facility to be visited. If special hazards with which the inspector is not sufficiently familiar are indicated on these reports, he should seek information and advice from his superior officer. Upon request, further assistance will be provided by the District office. As the Area Engineers or their representatives make frequent visits to the more important installations, the inspector should, where possible, coordinate his inspection with them so that he may discuss conditions while at the location.

b. Upon his arrival at an installation, the inspector should first contact the individual responsible for security. At the larger, more important installations this will usually be the resident Area Engineer, at others it will be the Security Agent or a responsible executive who has been designated by the Contracting Officer as the proper official to contact. After explaining his mission and obtaining permission, the inspector should proceed with his survey.

c. Full time should be allowed to make a complete survey. Insofar as possible, conditions will be determined by actual observation and questioning of individuals will be limited to information which cannot be determined by physical inspection. All work and locations of interest to the District at a facility should be examined, together with surrounding buildings or other areas which may affect the security of District work.



d. Upon completion of a survey, those recommendations of a maintenance nature or which require no considerable outlay of money should be discussed with a responsible executive, and efforts should be made to reach an agreement that they will be carried out. Where such an agreement is reached, the recommendations will be listed in the report followed by a statement in parenthesis "(will be done)."

e. Unsatisfactory conditions requiring a major change, or improvements requiring a considerable expenditure, may be discussed with management. At that time it should be clearly pointed out that any recommendations to be made covering such conditions will be submitted in writing by the Area Engineer.

7. Safeguarding Military Information

It is recognized that the ratings of importance on the MED Facility List do not indicate the importance of a facility from the standpoint of the classified information which may be contained therein. As the project progresses, the security of information at certain installations may become more important than continuity of production. The responsible Branch Intelligence Officers should schedule visits to insure proper safeguarding of such information, regardless of the assigned rating of importance.

8. Reports (See Standard Report Form Attached)

a. All security surveys except visits for a special or limited purpose, will be reported on the form provided by the District Intelligence Office. Where certain sections of the form do not apply at a location, these sections should be marked DNA on the cover page and the pages containing these items should be deleted from the report.

b. Each original survey must be fully reported. In addition to rating the items affecting security, special hazards and unsatisfactory conditions (including items rated "Poor" or "Fair") should be fully explained under Comments in the proper section of the report. Surveys made subsequent to the original visit should also be reported on the regular form but comments may be limited to important conditions affecting security, recent changes, and the status of previous recommendations.

c. Reports should be promptly written and submitted so that no more than seven days shall elapse between the date of survey and the date on which the report is forwarded to the responsible Area Engineer.

9. Ratings (See Attached letter, subject, "District Policy Regarding Plant Security," dated 17 June 1944).

a. While the relative importance of a facility should be given prime consideration in making major recommendations, it should not influence the ratings. These should be based upon a comparison of conditions at a facility with those in the best facilities of similar size and occupancy.

b. The composite ratings are not intended to represent a mathematical summary of all ratings in the section. One or two outstanding deficiencies can so adversely reflect upon security of the project as to warrant a low "as a whole" rating, even though most factors may be favorable.

c. All ratings below "Good" should be fully explained.

10. Recommendations

The primary value of a survey lies in the recommendations upon which corrective measures can be based. Frequently, however, a competent inspector reporting on a well-managed facility will have no recommendations since he will have secured compliance with minor suggestions during the survey. Such suggestion will be listed in the report as provided in paragraph 6 d.

Minor recommendations to which the facility has not readily agreed and major recommendations requiring an expenditure of funds will be listed in the report after giving due consideration to the items listed below:

a. Recommendations will be made only after a thorough study of all factors involved. The comments under the pertinent section will include supporting data and reasons justifying each recommendation so that there can be no question as to why it was made. Where an expenditure of funds is necessary, a statement of the estimated cost will follow the recommendation.

b. Where the correction of unsatisfactory conditions may require a considerable expenditure, use of critical materials, delays, or changes in production methods, the recommendations will be fully discussed with the Area Engineer or his authorized representative prior to including them in the report. If direct contact with the Area Engineer is not feasible, the matter should be taken up through the Branch Intelligence Officer having liaison with the Area Engineer. (Any recommendation included in the report with which the Area Engineer or his representative did not fully concur, should be clearly indicated.)

c. If an unsatisfactory condition is reported, the correction of which could not be justified because of excessive cost, near completion of WED work or other extenuating circumstances, no recommendation will be made. The facts should, however, be reported under Comments with cost data and pertinent information to show why no action has been advised.

d. After listing all recommendations, a statement similar to the following will be made:

"The above recommendations when carried out will correct all of the unsatisfactory conditions noted in this report except for those deficiencies for which corrective action is not recommended because of excessive cost or other extenuating circumstances."

11. Final Action

a. After review by the local approving officer, copies of the report will be forwarded to the Area Engineer or other responsible officer. The letter of transmittal will indicate to the Area Engineer any unusual conditions outlined in the report which should be called to his attention and should also suggest the action to be taken by his office.

b. The Area Engineer will institute such action as he deems necessary to correct deficiencies either by the adoption of the recommendations included in the report or other equally effective methods. One copy of the report will be forwarded by the Area Engineer or other responsible officer to the District Engineer, Attention: District Intelligence Officer, together with appropriate comments as to action taken.

12. Relations with other Inspection Services

Many of the facilities at which WPD maintains an interest are already being inspected by Service Command representatives as well as competent fire and safety engineers. Full advantage should be taken of the experience of those men and copies of their reports should be secured whenever possible. Every effort must be made to avoid conflict with and duplication of the work of other War Department inspectors. Close liaison should be maintained with the Service Commands. Any problems concerning inspection jurisdiction should be referred to the District Intelligence Officer immediately.

13. Conclusion

The degree of security provided at District facilities will depend to a large extent on the security surveys made by the Intelligence and Security Division. Inspectors have the duty of assisting Area Engineers in carrying out their responsibility for the prevention of interruption or delay in the completion of their work. The inspector must be informed, he must be observing, he must be tactful and courteous and above all, he must be guided by COMMON SENSE AND GOOD JUDGMENT.

*W. R. Parsons*  
W. R. PARSONS,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

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SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION

REGULATIONS

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 5  
MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT

27 November 1943  
Revised 1 September 1944

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Intelligence Bulletin No. 5  
Safeguarding Military Information  
Regulations  
Manhattan Engineer District

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

	Page
1. GENERAL COMMENTS -----	1
2. DEFINITIONS	
a. Classified Information -----	1
<u>b.</u> Document -----	1
<u>c.</u> Engineering Data -----	1
<u>d.</u> Material -----	2
<u>e.</u> TOP SECRET -----	2
<u>f.</u> Secret Matter -----	2
Examples -----	2
<u>g.</u> Confidential Matter -----	2
Examples -----	3
<u>h.</u> Restricted Matter -----	3
Examples -----	3 & 4
<u>i.</u> Registered Matter -----	4
3. RESPONSIBILITY	
a. General -----	4
<u>b.</u> Right to Possess Classified Information -----	4
<u>c.</u> Loss or Subjection to Compromise -----	5
4. PREPARATION	
a. General -----	5
<u>b.</u> Reproduction -----	5
Care Required -----	5
5. CLASSIFICATION	
a. General -----	6
<u>b.</u> By Whom -----	6
(1) TOP SECRET -----	6
(2) Secret -----	6
(3) Confidential -----	6
(4) Restricted -----	6
<u>c.</u> Marking -----	6
(1) Books, Pamphlets, etc. -----	6
(2) Photographs, Drawings, etc. -----	6
(3) Contracts -----	6
(4) Maps and Photomaps -----	6
<u>d.</u> Additional Marking (When accessible to others than War Department employees) -----	6 & 7
6. DISSEMINATION	
a. When Given to Authorized Persons Not Subject to Military Law -----	7
<u>b.</u> Oral Discussion -----	7
<u>c.</u> Negotiations and Consultations with Outsiders -----	7
<u>d.</u> Cancellation or Change of Classification -----	7 & 8
<u>e.</u> Publication of Articles -----	8
<u>f.</u> Supplies, Reports and Sales -----	8
<u>g.</u> Photographs -----	8 & 9
<u>h.</u> Requests for Information -----	9

~~RESTRICTED~~

	Page
7. TRANSMISSION	
a. General -----	9
(1) Handling of Classified Material -----	9
(2) Cover Sheet -----	9
(3) Custodian -----	9
b. Top Secret Documents -----	10
c. Secret Documents -----	10
(1) Intra Office -----	10
(2) Between Places or Offices Separated by Time or Distance -----	10 & 11
Form - Means - Caution - Receipts	
d. Confidential Documents -----	11
(1) Intra Office -----	11
(2) Between Places of Offices Separated by Time or Distance -----	11
Form - Means - Caution - Receipts	
e. Restricted Documents -----	11 & 12
f. Caution -----	12
g. Registered Documents -----	12
h. Transmittal Letters -----	12
8. ACCOUNTING	
a. Top Secret -----	12
b. Secret -----	12
(1) Numbering of Separate Copies -----	12
(2) File Record -----	13
(3) Verification Receipt -----	13
Receipt File - Book - Items Required	
c. Confidential -----	13
d. Restricted -----	13
e. Registered -----	15
9. STORAGE	
a. General -----	14
(1) Rules -----	14
(2) Charge Slips -----	14
(3) Appointment and Function of Duty Officer -----	14
b. Top Secret -----	14
c. Secret and Confidential -----	14 & 15
d. Restricted -----	15
e. Registered -----	15
f. Upon Completion or Termination of a Contract -----	15
10. DESTRUCTION	
a. Top Secret -----	15
b. Secret, Confidential and Registered Documents ---	15
c. Restricted Documents -----	15
d. Disposal of Waste -----	15 & 16
e. Destruction of Classified Materiel -----	16
11. SECRECY DECLARATIONS and EXIT INTERVIEWS -----	16

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

## 1. GENERAL COMMENTS

The enemy Intelligence and others hostile to the interests of our country are constantly seeking information concerning our forces, our equipment, and our plans. Security is our means of blocking the attempts of these groups to gain their desired information.

To assure adequate Security, a definite system is necessary. The purpose of such a system is not only to save vital information from falling into the hands of possible enemies of our country, but also to develop such habits of care in handling it all times, that apathy and negligence are averted and that persons unauthorized to have access to classified matters do not get it through our carelessness. Matters of vital importance to the government must be protected at all times whether at war or at peace.

Consequently, it is of the utmost importance that great caution be exercised in the handling and in the dissemination of all information - Written or oral - relative to this Project at any time.

Accordingly, the following regulations based on the rules and intent of Army Regulations 380-5, entitled Safeguarding Military Information with such amendments deemed applicable to the Manhattan District's project prosecuted mainly by civilian personnel shall govern operations pertaining to classified information. Rigorous enforcement of the policies contained herein will insure the continuing maintenance of the proper degree of secrecy which is so vital to the successful attainment of the desired objective.

## 2. DEFINITIONS

To facilitate an understanding of the contents of this Section, the following terms are defined:-

a. Classified Information. All information concerning documents, devices, and material relative to this Project, designated as TOP SECRET, Secret, Confidential, or Restricted, as well as the items themselves.

b. Document. The term "document" includes printed, mimeographed, typed, photostated, and written matter of all kinds; maps, photomaps, drawings, notes, and blueprints, or photostatic copies thereof; photographs and photographic negatives; engineering data, correspondence and plans; and all similar matter..

c. Engineering Data. The term "engineering data" comprises drawings, blueprints, photostats, photographs, designs, mathematical calculations, formulae, processes, and similar items that can be reduced to documentary form.

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d. **Materiel.** The term "materiel" comprises all physical and material equipment, devices, and supplies, both complete and in process of development and construction, including models that show features in whole or in part, machines, apparatus, fixtures, and all components or accessories thereof.

e. **TOP SECRET.** Certain Secret documents, information, and materiel, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation, shall be classified TOP SECRET. (For examples see Confidential District Circular Letter MI 44-13 dated 6 May 1944, subject - SMI: TOP SECRET, M.E.D.)

f. **Secret Matter.** Information or features contained therein, the disclosure of which might endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interest or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation, is classified Secret. The following are examples of items which shall be classified Secret:-

(1) Documents relating to technical design, distinctive methods, or special processes; of containing specific reference to materials peculiar to the work of this District or their use.

(2) Documents containing names, formulae, symbols, melting points, densities, or similar technical data which would reveal to the technician the nature of a unique process, the basic materials, products peculiar to the Project, or similar vital information.

(3) Documents relating to personnel, organization, progress, funds, power and material requirements, or similar pertinent information which indicates the actual size or scope of the entire Project or an especially critical portion thereof, or show the exact relationship between the various agencies engaged on the general project.

(4) Maps, photographs, or similar documents, definitely showing vital parts of technical features of this Project.

(5) Articles of distinctive materiel, including supplies, equipment, models, or apparatus, together with their special components or accessories.

(6) Documents showing the meaning of a code, name, or symbol.

g. **Confidential Matter.** Information or features contained therein, the disclosure of which although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interest or prestige of the United States, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation, is classified Confidential. Confidential shall include items of the following nature:-

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Security Information

(1) Documents relating to technical design, distinctive methods, special processes, materials, peculiar to the work of this District, etc., provided code names and symbols are used exclusively.

(2) Documents relating to site selection, power and material requirements, allotments of money, personnel, organization, progress, and similar pertinent information which reveal the size or scope of a separate phase of the Project, provided such phase is not considered sufficiently important to warrant classification of such information as Secret.

(3) Drawings, photographs, or similar documents pertaining to but not definitely showing unique portions or parts of technical features of this Project.

(4) Articles of materiel similar to those described under Secret Matter, but of less critical nature.

(5) Documents showing the meaning of code name or symbol used to refer to Confidential information.

(6) Documents relating to special investigations, clearance, or assignment of personnel who will have knowledge of, or access to, classified information wherein adverse information is reflected.

h. Restricted Matter. Information or features contained therein which is for official use only, or when disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy, or denied the general public, is classified Restricted. The following are examples of items which shall be classified as Restricted.

(1) Documents relating to the design and construction of non-technical buildings or utilities.

(2) Documents concerning relatively unimportant administrative and personnel matters or other Project information which must not be disclosed to the general public.

(3) Drawings, photographs, or similar documents showing sites prior to construction with no additions or titles indicating relationship to the Project.

(4) Documents relating to technical design, distinctive methods, special processes, materials exclusively peculiar to the work of this District, or similar matters, provided code names and symbols are used exclusively, and provided that successful interpretations of these documents by unauthorized persons would not be indicative of the scope or status of any phase of the Project.

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(5) Documents referring to shipments, disposition, etc., of small amounts of common or of coded special materials.

(6) Documents referring to specifications when the requirements specified do not indicate the material or its use, or where such requirements are coded.

(7) Personnel clearance investigations where no adverse information is developed.

Restricted information shall not be disclosed to persons other than Project employees. Such information may be given to any person known to be engaged on this Project or employed by contractors or sub-contractors on work related to the Project.

1. Registered Matter. Only such documents - whether Restricted, Confidential, or Secret - to insure exceptional administrative control will, in addition to the classification, be Registered. (Note; this does not mean Registered Mail.) Each copy of the document will be numbered; strict accounting reflecting custody, transfer, and location of each copy will be maintained.

### 3. RESPONSIBILITY

a. General. The safeguarding of classified information is the responsibility of all military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department, and of THE MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES OF ALL COMMERCIAL FIRMS engaged on this work. The officer or civilian in charge of each organization so engaged is responsible that all military personnel and civilian employees are familiar with these regulations. Contractors are responsible that all classified work allotted to sub-contractors or agents, are informed of these regulations.

b. Right to Possess Classified Information. Two cardinal rules govern the right to possess classified information:-

(1) The person must be authorized to have the information (i.e. known to require the information in connection with official duties and in performance of his work.)

(2) If the person is authorized to have the information, then he is entitled to only so much as is necessary for him to execute his function. Thus, no person in the military service, person employed by the War Department or employed by contractors engaged on this Project is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of his commission or official position.

In order to minimize risk of compromise, employees of the Project shall be organized into small working groups or teams so far as possible, each working on its own phase of the job and not being permitted to inspect or discuss the work being done by others.

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It is not expected that this procedure will at all times be feasible; however, the general principle of limiting an individual's knowledge of the project at the minimum necessary for the proper performance of his duties shall be strictly followed throughout.

c. Loss or Subjection to Compromise. Any individual connected with this Project in any way whatsoever who may have knowledge of the loss or subjection to compromise of a classified document or article of material shall promptly report that fact to the responsible custodian, who shall, in turn, report such information to his superiors for transmittal to the Intelligence Officer servicing the installation involved.

#### 4. PREPARATION

a. General. Clerical and technical work on classified matters shall be performed only by persons cleared in accordance with MED Intelligence Bulletin No. 4, Selection and Clearance of Personnel, dated 22 October 1943.

#### b. Reproduction.

(1) Where necessary to reproduce classified documents through the use of an organization's general facilities or those of a previously cleared outside concern, the tracings, stencils, originals, negatives, etc., shall be accompanied during the entire period these documents are away from the restricted areas by a properly qualified person, who shall supervise the reproduction and shall be responsible for returning all original items, reproductions, imperfect prints, etc. to the Project.

(2) Top Secret. See Confidential District Circular Letter MD 44-13, dated 6 May 1944, subject - SMI: TOP SECRET, MED.

(3) Secret. Will be reproduced by permission of originating office except in cases of emergency where circumstances will not permit time for such request. In these cases notice will be given to the originator as soon as possible. (See also par. 8 b. Accounting, Secret).

(4) Confidential and Restricted. If reproduced, copies will have same classification and care as the original.

(5) Registered. Reproduction forbidden except by authority of office of origin.

(6) The making of abstracts, notes, photographs, sketches, or other copy of District documents, models, or work by any personnel employed on the Project, especially by scientific or consultant personnel for personal files or records, is strictly prohibited.

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5. CLASSIFICATION

a. General. (See par. 4 supra - Preparation.)

b. By Whom.

(1) TOP SECRET (See Confidential District Circular Letter MI 44-13)

(2) Secret. By any commissioned officer, by the head of an organization performing MEB work, and a limited number of others designated by him whose responsibility it will be to insure that all material bears the proper classification and receives the proper care.

(3) Confidential. Same as for Secret.

(4) Restricted. Any Project worker.

c. Marking. The classification of a document shall be indicated preferably by stamped impression of letters (red if possible) not less than one-quarter inch in height. Stencils and similar items may be marked with the typewriter provided capitals are used and the classification is underscored in such a manner that it will be as conspicuous as possible. The classification on tracings and other items to be reproduced shall be similarly underscored. Except as noted below, each separate page or sheet of a document will be marked at the top and bottom.

(1) Classified books and pamphlets, the pages of which are permanently and securely fastened together, shall be marked on the cover, title page, and first page. Three staples, or the equivalent, provided the pages are of such quality as to offer adequate resistance to tearing, shall be considered permanent and secure fastening.

(2) Classified photographic negatives, drawings, or tracings shall carry a legend of the proper classification in such position that it will be reproduced on all copies made therefrom or clearly marked at top and on the back with the proper classification.

(3) Contracts for the manufacture of classified material shall be plainly and conspicuously marked, not typed, with the proper classification on the first page.

(4) Classified maps and photomaps shall be appropriately marked under the scale.

d. Additional Marking - Classified documents furnished or accessible to persons other than those of the military or naval services and their civilian employees will, in addition to being marked, Top Secret, Secret, Confidential or Restricted, bear the

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following notation (preferably by rubber stamp) which will be placed in a conspicuous place on the document.

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

## 6. DISSEMINATION.

a. When given to Authorized Persons Not Subject to Military Law. - Such persons shall be made thoroughly acquainted with all pertinent regulations and specifically instructed that transmission of classified information to any unauthorized individual is strictly prohibited by law. See also additional Marking, paragraph 5 - d supra.

b. Oral Discussion - Either public or private discussion of classified information with or in the presence of unauthorized persons is strictly forbidden. Since employees must necessarily talk with problems related to the work in the performance of their duties, it is advisable to invent fictitious terms or code names, which are not descriptive, for reference to secret or confidential matters which it is necessary to discuss. The invention of such language is left to the individual organization so that the terms used will not be uniform throughout all phases of the general project.

c. Negotiations and Consultations with Outsiders - In the event it becomes necessary or advisable to discuss classified project information with consultants, experts, manufacturers, or other persons not directly connected with the project and not properly cleared, authority shall be secured from the District Intelligence Office or the Intelligence Officer serving the contractor. It is necessary that the contractors obtain the written approval of the District Engineer or his authorized representative prior to entering negotiations involving classified information with prospective sub-contractors.

Requests for such approval shall be directed to the Intelligence Officer serving the prime contractors and shall be submitted in accordance with District Circular Letter EI 43-3, dated 23 March 1943, subject - Company Clearance. After authority has been received from the District Engineer or his authorized representative and prior to the dissemination of any classified information, notice in accord with par. 5 d, Additional Marking, will be made.

## d. Cancellation or Change of Classification.

(1) It is the obligation of all authorities to keep classified matter constantly under review and to downgrade it as soon as conditions permit.

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(2) By Whom.

(a) TOP SECRET. (See Confidential District Circular Letter MI 44-3)

(b) Secret. By any commissioned officer of the MED who will thereupon notify all other recipients of copies of the change.

By civilian personnel authorized to classify documents Secret.

(c) Confidential and Restricted.

By any commissioned officer of the MED or by authorized civilian personnel who will notify parties concerned.

(3) In any of the above cases whenever any change in classification is desired, (whether by civilian or military personnel) such change will not be made without prior consultation with appropriate Branch Intelligence Office.

(4) Method. By ruling out the classification stamp at top of first page and affixing the statement, "Classification cancelled or changed to \_\_\_\_\_, by authority of the District Engineer, by (name and grade of officer or other person making the change, and the date thereof.)"

Cancellation or change of classification of material may be accomplished by letter of instruction to all offices and personnel concerned.

e. Publication of Articles. The publication by civilians of any information whatsoever relative to this Project is strictly forbidden unless the prior approval of the District Engineer has been obtained. Articles proposed for publication shall be submitted in their entirety to the office of the District Engineer direct or through the Branch Intelligence Office servicing the contractor, for review and approval.

f. Supplies, Reports and Sales. Code names, or unrelated symbols should always be used rather than tell-tale names and formulae.

g. Photographs. Pursuant to Federal Law with the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1942 (Public Law No. 627), only designated authorized personnel will be permitted to make photographs (including aerial photographs), sketches, maps, or other representations within, or in the vicinity of restricted areas. Employees and visitors in absence of adequate regulations shall be required to leave cameras with the guard at the gate when entering restricted

areas. Photographs of classified features of the Project shall be taken only by authorized personnel when such record is necessary in the conduct of the work. Such photographs, when taken, shall not be developed or printed in outside commercial establishments, nor retained in any form in the personal possession of any Project employee.

h. Requests for Information. Requests other than those mentioned in par. 6 c for classified information from private individuals or firms not directly connected with this Project shall be immediately referred to the responsible officer or to the Branch Intelligence Officer servicing the Area. Reply to the request of any unauthorized individual or firm is strictly prohibited, prior to obtaining the approval of the District Engineer. Such replies shall feign lack of interest, knowledge of, or connection with classified matters when the organization concerned has not previously been engaged on such work. A draft of the suggested reply shall be submitted for approval of the District Engineer, or to the Intelligence Officer servicing the Area. Extreme care and discretion must be exercised in replying to requests involving only unclassified matters. Each and every fact offered in such a reply regardless of its seeming triviality, must be carefully scrutinized to insure that nothing of importance is revealed. It must be remembered that the products peculiar to this Project; the size, scope, and status of the Project; and the relationship between the various agencies involved must remain strictly Secret.

## 7. TRANSMISSION

### a. General.

(1) Handling of Classified Material. The greatest degree of security can be obtained only by strictly limiting those handling or having knowledge of classified matters to the least practicable number consistent with efficient prosecution of the work.

(2) Cover Sheet - A cover sheet shall be attached to each Top Secret and Secret document immediately upon receipt, or in the case of the writer's retained copy, immediately after preparation. In addition to covering the text of the document from general view, it will indicate those persons who have seen it, since all persons shall be required to sign the sheet when the document has been read by them.

(3) Custodian - Responsible custodians shall be designated to care for all files containing information to which several project employees must have access in the performance of their work. These individuals shall personally issue and return all documents, and those employees authorized to receive such documents shall not be given actual access to the files or safes, or permitted to enter storage vaults.

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b. Top Secret Documents - See special instructions in District Circular Letter (MI 44-13) and supplements thereto.

c. Secret documents.

(1) Intra Office - Transmitted by authorized messenger, addressed to the person authorized to receive the document which will have a protective cover sheet thereon. A receipt is required containing no classified information nor anything indicating the classified nature of the document to which it applies. It will be signed by receiver and returned as soon as possible to sender.

(2) Between Places or Offices Separated by Time and Distance Longer Than Paragraph (1) Above.

(a) Form - Transmitted in an inner and outer cover with typewritten matter protected from direct contact with inner cover. The inner envelope shall be sealed with wax protected by scotch tape and shall be addressed in the usual manner and marked "Secret" so that the classification will be seen immediately when the outer envelope is removed. The outer envelope shall be carefully sealed and addressed in the ordinary manner and shall bear no indication of the classified nature of its contents.

(b) Means - Within the United States, between authorized personnel either personally or by an especially trustworthy person who has been properly cleared. Otherwise, transmittal shall be accomplished by U.S. Registered Mail enclosed in an inner and outer cover as stated above, inner envelope will be sealed with wax, protected by scotch tape, transmitted by Air Mail only when in the opinion of the sender, the conditions require it.

(c) Caution - When it is necessary to transport classified material personally or by messenger away from an office, an inventory reflecting appropriate identification of the classified papers taken will be made, and a copy of the inventory, properly classified, will be retained in the office of the responsible officer or other person transporting the documents, until the documents are accounted for.

Thus, in the event such classified documents are lost, immediate notice of exactly what information has been compromised will be made to the District Intelligence Office or to the Intelligence Officer serving the Area.

(d) Receipts - For Documents: Will be prepared in triplicate; the original to be signed personally by the recipient and returned to the sender; the duplicate will be retained by the recipient, and the triplicate will be

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held in sender's suspense file. Copies will be inclosed with the documents and will reflect the date, serial or file number and the number of inclosures or indorsements in space provided.

Sample copy of receipt form is attached to District Circular Letter (Corresp. 44-8), 19 April 1944.

(e) Receipts - For Registered Mail: The use of Post Office Department Return Receipt (Form No. 3811) attached to the outer cover of Secret and Confidential matter sent by registered mail in addition to classified document receipts is unnecessary except in transmission of Secret and Confidential matter to and from United States installations in Canada and in those cases in which the time element or other special circumstances are such as to make it desirable that information of the arrival of the document or other matter at its destination should reach the addressor at the earliest possible moment.

d. Confidential Documents.

(1) Intra Office - Covered by a protective sheet, addressed to person authorized to receive the document, delivered by a "cleared" messenger. Receipt is optional with sender.

(2) Between Places or Offices Separated by Time and Distance Longer Than Paragraph d - (1) supra.

- |           |   |  |
|-----------|---|--|
| (a) Form  | ) | Same as for Secret documents except that when in the opinion of the transmitting officer no serious consequences will be entailed by their loss, such documents (except Registered) may be transmitted by ordinary mail. Receipts are not required unless sender considers matter of special importance. |
| (b) Means | ) |  |

Transported by Air Mail only when in the opinion of the sender the conditions require it.

(c) Receipt - Receipt forms are not required unless sender considers matter of special importance, in such case receipt forms are same as those used for Secret documents.

e. Restricted Documents.

Transmittal may be accomplished by authorized messenger

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or by ordinary mail. The receipt form is not required and double envelopes are unnecessary. Such documents may be opened by any project employee designated by the addressor.

f. Caution.

When transmitted to authorized civilians other than those of military or naval services, classified documents in addition to the classification will bear the notation listed supra (see paragraph Marking, 5-d).

g. Registered Documents.

Same as for secret. If custody remains with the person sending the document, a temporary receipt will be enclosed for signature and returned by the receiving officer. If custody is to be transferred to the receiving officer WD Form No. 34 will be enclosed.

h. Transmittal Letters.

A letter of transmittal or cover letter will be classified no lower than the highest classification carried by any of the inclosures. It should be noted that in some cases a letter may be deserving of a higher classification than any of its inclosures.

8. ACCOUNTING

a. TOP SECRET (See District Circular Letter MI 44-13 and supplements thereto.)

b. Secret. A strict system of accounting for all secret material originated or received shall be established. Only the minimum number of copies required will be made.

(1) Numbering of separate copies. Each separate copy of a Secret document shall bear a notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page indicating the number of pages or sheets of which the document consists, the series designation for that particular group of copies, and the number of that copy within the group. The series designation shall be by capital letter beginning with the letter "A". For example, when three copies of an original document consisting of five pages are produced, the first copy is marked as follows:

This document consists of <u>5</u> pages. No. <u>1</u> of <u>3</u> copies, Series <u>A</u> .
---

The second copy will be "No. 2 of 3 copies, Series A"; and the third, "No. 3 of 3 copies, Series A". In computing the number of copies, the ribbon copy shall be considered as one

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one copy; i. e. one ribbon and two carbon copies shall be counted as three copies. If, after original preparation, additional copies of a document are required, subsequent series shall be designated "B", "C", "D", etc.

(2) File Record. The originator or writer shall record on his retained file copy of each Secret document the complete distribution of each series. In the event the recipient of a copy of such document requires additional copies, he shall request them from that originator.

(3) Verification of Receipt.

(a) Receipt File. To verify the receipt of Secret documents by addressees, signed receipts as indicated in paragraph 7 c (2) (d), shall be required and filed upon return. When transmitting a Secret document the triplicate copy of the receipt form shall be retained in an abeyant file to insure return of signed copy by the addressee. Upon receipt by the addressee, he shall sign and return to the sender the original receipt form and file the duplicate copy. The original receipt form shall be permanently filed by the sender upon return and the triplicate copy may be removed from the abeyant file and destroyed. In this manner, through the medium of receipts, an accurate check is possible at any time to determine whether or not Secret documents have been safely delivered to the addressees.

(b) In large organizations where a central mailing and receiving section is established for handling classified material, a record book shall be maintained to indicate for each Secret document, the date, copy number, serial letter, names of sender and addressee, reference or file number, postal registry number, and date of receipt or mailing. When the signed receipt for outgoing mail is returned, the date of receipt by the addressee shall be noted in the book to complete the record. When such a record book is maintained centrally, the receipt files required above shall be maintained by the writers or originators of the documents.

c. Confidential. When in the opinion of the sender - based on the importance of the information contained in the document - it is necessary to number each separate copy, the procedure outlined for Secret documents will be followed.

d. Restricted. No accounting required, unless document is registered. If registered, receipt (WD Form No. 34) will be inclosed.

e. Registered. WD Form No. 34 (semi-annual or Transfer Report of Registered Documents or Devices) will be used as receipt, made in triplicate, disposed of as follows:-

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Original - to office of origin.  
Duplicate - retained by transferring office.  
Triplicate - retained by receiving office.

9. STORAGE

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a. General.

(1) Rules. Classified information received by or transmitted within the Project shall not be handled unsealed by the regular administrative employees. Secret or Confidential material shall never be left on desks or locked in desks. When not actually in use or under the personal care of the individual responsible for its safekeeping, Secret or Confidential material shall always be returned to the safes or lock files provided for its storage. Classified documents shall not be taken away from the offices for any reason without the express permission, in each case, of the person responsible for their custody.

(2) Charge Slips. When Secret or Confidential documents are removed from the files for issuance to authorized employees, the custodian shall prepare a memorandum charge slip containing a description of the documents, the name of employee to whom issued, and the date. At the close of business each day, the custodian shall check the charge slips to determine whether or not all documents have been returned. In the event any document is not returned, the custodian shall check immediately to insure that prior authority was obtained for retention of the document.

(3) Appointment and Function of Duty Officer. The officer in charge of each Section, or in the case of civilians the responsible authority for each Section, shall designate each day a "Duty Officer" who shall be charged with the responsibility of checking at the close of each day's business all safes and files in his Section to see that classified information is properly secured. He will certify to same on a Duty Sheet.

b. TOP SECRET - Will be stored in a three-combination safe to which only persons entitled to receive the information and designated confidential secretaries will have access. (See District Circular Letter (MI 44-13)).

c. Secret and Confidential Documents - Will be stored in the most secure files available, preferably a three-way combination safe. The following will be prominently displayed on the inside of every safe or combination file:-

- names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons to be advised if the repository is found open after hours.
- names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons knowing the combination.
- date on which the combination was last changed.

If a key repository must be used, keys therefor will be possessed only by the responsible executive and his designated assistant.

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Each safe combination shall be regularly changed at least twice each year and immediately upon reasonable suspicion that it has become known to unauthorized persons or when an authorized employee possessing the combination leaves the Project. Cabinet file locks shall be immediately changed upon loss of a key.

d. Restricted Documents - Will be stored in such a manner as to insure a reasonable degree of security.

e. Registered Documents - Will be stored in equivalent of a three-combination safe, if such is not available, will be kept under constant armed guard.

f. Upon completion of all work under a contract performed by a private organization, all Secret or Confidential documents and material furnished to or originated by, such organization shall be returned to the contracting official or other authorized Government representative pursuant to provisions of District Circular Letter (MI 44-12) dated 20 April 1944, subject - Transmission of Classified Drawings, Prints, Designs, Material, etc., Upon the Completion or Termination of a Contract.

## 10. DESTRUCTION

a. TOP SECRET. See Confidential District Circular Letter (MI 44-13) 6 May 1944 and supplements.

b. Secret, Confidential and Registered Documents - shall be shredded and burned by the custodian in the presence of a disinterested officer or turned over to the Classified Files Section to destroy.

In case of civilians, destruction will be in the presence of a disinterested person.

Certificate of Destruction will be signed by the witnessing civilian or officer and sent to the officer or chief directing the destruction.

c. Restricted Documents - will be torn to shreds or burned or otherwise destroyed by an authorized employee so as to render them useless.

d. Disposal of Waste. Classified waste, including all work sheets, drafts, carbon paper, stenographic notes, imperfect copies, stencils, etc., shall be torn into small pieces and safeguarded until

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burned under the supervision of a trusted employee who has been properly cleared to handle classified information. Under no circumstances shall cleaning people or other service employees be given access to restricted areas until proper disposition has been made of waste materials. If it is desirable to retain any of the above items, they shall be given the same classification and safeguarded in the same manner as the material produced from them.

e. Destruction of Classified Material. When the responsible officer or civilian official directs the destruction of classified material, a report embodying the following will be forwarded to the District Engineer, attention of the District Intelligence Officer:-

(1) Brief description of classified material destroyed, in sufficient detail to properly classify and identify same.

(2) Location at which the destruction occurred,

(3) Estimated value of the classified material destroyed.

(4) Extent of salvage.

(5) Name of person directing that the material be destroyed to prevent disclosure of classified information.

(6) Other requirements of par. 60, AR 380-5 (15 March 1944) are also applicable.

### 11. SECURITY DECLARATIONS AND EXIT INTERVIEWS.

a. At time of employment an educational talk should be had with each new employee on the necessity for Security. The talk should be followed by the employee accomplishing a Secrecy Declaration Form pursuant to provisions of District Circular Letter MI 44-7, dated 15 October 1943, subject - Declaration of Secrecy.

b. At time of termination - an exit interview should be given to all personnel relieved from assignment to the Manhattan Engineer District in accordance with District Circular Letter MI 45-6, dated 24 July 1944, subject - Exit Interviews.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tenn.

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MI-6

15 September 1943

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 3

Subject: Security Educational Program

To: All Area Engineers, M.E.D. Attention: Intelligence Officers

I. General:

A. Mission of the Program

1. The manifold types of violations and derelictions in safeguarding classified military information evidence the need for a security educational program. The mission of such a program is to so educate all personnel concerned that they may become instinctively alert-minded and security-wise to the end that not only will all classified documents and other papers be handled and safeguarded in accordance with provisions of AR 380-5 and supplementary matter pertaining thereto but, also, that loose talk will be eliminated, and words and actions will disclose no information of value to the enemy or to those not properly authorized to receive it. Accordingly, the following program is submitted for adoption and adaptation as circumstances permit.

II. Details:

A. Security Agent

1. Upon this person depends the supervision and execution of the bulk of the educational program presented.

2. Consequently, the selection of such agent wherever possible should be made with care. Not only should he have time enough at his disposal, but, also, he should be tactful, a promoter, possessing ability to sell himself and his work to all concerned. Further, he should have personal address, some flair for public speaking, possessed of imagination and some ability to dramatize.

B. Method:

1. This security educational agent should schedule activities so that he can assemble as large a group as possible of pertinent personnel - i.e. supervisors or others in charge of sections where classified work and documents are handled - for the first of periodic talks on the subject of "security". These are the

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personnel who will execute the Security Agent's program in the lower echelons. The Security Agent might open his talk by explaining the average American's proneness for satisfying his curiosity by acquiring information, his tendency to disseminate it in his unguarded conversation or in his incautious, written communication or to give it without questioning the recipient's right to have it.

2. The security educational Agent should explain that the object of enemy intelligence is to collect information which will reveal, or from which can be deduced our proposed military activity. Then, he should explain how espionage works - that is, that it consists mainly of acquiring bits of information from this, that, and other sources which may be apparently unrelated. From these varied, scattered sources, it is all compiled by specialists to formulate a complete picture, thus giving the enemy sufficient notice of our activities which may result in the failure of our mission and destruction of our force. He should stress that although information may be conveyed to one who is not authorized but yet apparently reliable, the informant has lost control of his information; he has set it in motion, and he cannot be sure that the recipient will not in some way disclose it to another whose carelessness will cause it to fall into the hands of the enemy.

3. Further, he should explain that if the individual can keep from disclosing his information, that makes one less available source contributing to the picture the enemy seeks to reproduce, and that the completion of their picture reflecting our military activities or defense work may be so delayed that it is of no use to him when it is completed, because our mission will have been achieved. Indeed, it may be that the suppression of one bit of information that a person unwittingly passed on may prove to be the very piece that makes the jig-saw picture intelligible to the enemy. In short, then, military or project information will be shared with no unauthorized person.

4. The question arises as to what categories of military or project information should not be discussed. The answer is simple. All military or project information should not be discussed with or written to persons not authorized to receive it.

5. To be effective, however, the word "ALL" should be particularized. Particulars will vary at various installations; accordingly, they may be drawn from the work being performed there. However, some of the following may be pertinent illustrations of what should be left out of conversation outside of technical areas or in the presence of unauthorized persons, or should be omitted in personal letters.

- (a) Any allusion to the mission of the project.
- (b) Any reference to the general problems being worked on.
- (c) Any technical data covering (a) and (b).



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- (d) Reference to any materials being processed, procured, or present anywhere on the Reservation.
- (e) The types of equipment within the restricted areas, or the manner of operation.
- (f) The affiliation of the project with any other war project.
- (g) Reference to the professions or former connections of persons working in any technical or restricted areas.
- (h) Discussion of the functions of co-workers in other restricted areas of the project.
- (i) The name of the contractor under whom the project is being operated.
- (j) The size or scope of the project.
- (k) The mention of any sensitive points, e.g., the centers for communications, the power and water supply, and other utilities, including the fire protection system, or the extent thereof.
- (l) Circulation of newspaper articles that may discuss technical work or any of the above listed items, performed on the project.
- (m) Circulation of any rumors covering above listed subjects.
- (n) Any photographs showing restricted areas or any items listed supra.

6. The purpose of elaborating on the topics hereinabove mentioned will be to illustrate how loose talk concerning any of these topics may result in loss or damage by hostile agents or may incite further search and inquiry by persons hostile to our interests. Further, the above list of topics will serve to alert personnel towards any questions directed to them by strangers; for, if an enemy agent cannot acquire information by listening to loose talk, he must interrogate and the persistent interrogator will be reported and can be dealt with.

### III. Suggestions For Presenting the Talk:

1. In presenting his talk to supervisory or to operational personnel, the security educational Agent should bear several points in mind. He may have to overcome the prejudices or apathy probably existing among his audience that security is extremely dull; he will have to avoid technical jargon, e.g., "security of information", "of material", "of the project"; for it may mean nothing to his listeners. He must show that security is not merely negative, it is a positive weapon to blind the enemy, to keep him guessing, possibly to dilute his strength by spreading his forces to cover all contingencies. He must avoid a succession of "Don'ts" or a repetition of the necessity to "Keep your mouth shut", else he will soon put his audience to sleep. He should open on a light note, should sandwich heavy bits between more attractive material, such as spicy stories, personal reminiscences or examples of violations of security already noted in the particular installation involved.

2. He should emphasize that security is not a matter for specialists, rather it directly concerns every individual; he should stress that everyone is personally responsible for security and that a lapse on his part may well provide the enemy with what he wants to know. Emphasize to administrative or other persons in supervisory capacity the importance of exemplifying security-consciousness, for the attitude of the workers will be conditioned by that of their superiors. It is well to remember that personal example is eloquent.

3. Further, having presented his message on the need for no loose talk, or the necessity for safeguarding military and project information, the Security Agent, to stimulate active interest on the part of all concerned may ask his audience for their suggestions on how such a program may be best effectuated.

4. Some sort of "Suggestion Box" or Contest may be devised to receive suggestions which may be the subject of informative cartoons or posters or which may be the basis of a better security observance program.

5. The importance of giving a clear informative talk covering the above subject matter cannot be over-emphasized. Personnel see many memoranda covering many subjects. In many cases they develop a habit of merely glancing through the contents. The number of varied memoranda militates against their complete absorption in the absence of incessant supervision. Giving a talk, therefore, is a different approach, will serve to impress the content and the ends to be achieved. Further, at the conclusion of the talk when suggestions are asked for better effectuating the Security program, there should be an immediate participation therein. Suggestions for Security made by personnel are more apt to be observed than any rules which may be imposed.

6. All these devices keep the subject of Security before the minds of personnel and will enliven interest.

#### IV. Other Media

##### A. General:

1. Having explained the importance of security to the work being done on the installation, the security educational Agent may then employ other media further to vivify and to fix in the mind of his audience the need for security concerning the work being done.

##### B. Particulars:

1. As soon as practicable after his talk, arrangements should be made for the audience to attend a showing of War Department training films on safeguarding military information and related subjects. A list of available training films and a brief description of their contents is reflected in the appendix (Exhibit A). If in a project, films may be shown in the Project Theatre as an extra to the current shows.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Thereafter, there should be an appropriate follow-up based on AR 380-5 circulated to all personnel handling or having access to classified papers. A composite diagram pertaining to operations concerning classified material has been prepared and is submitted in the appendix hereto (Exhibit B). Copies of this diagram should be circulated to all personnel concerned, and care should be taken to see that all have read it and understand it. An occasional checkup by the Security Agent is advisable to note compliance therewith.

3. Also, helpful in this regard is a manual for personnel handling or having access to secret, confidential and restricted documents, published by the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, 1 June 1943, a copy of which is also appended hereto (Exhibit C). Some revisions have been made to suit Manhattan Engineer District's subject matter.

4. Further, War Department Training Circular #99, (1942), contains an informative talk on the motives that impel loose talk and reasons for the necessity of eliminating it. Designed primarily as a basis for Security talks to soldiers, this circular, nevertheless has matter applicable to civilians.

5. Valuable for its explanation of how seemingly unrelated bits of information may be collected and fitted together by the enemy to reflect an intelligent picture of our war activities is a readable pamphlet entitled: A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE MOTHERS, WIVES, FATHERS, BROTHERS, SISTERS AND FRIENDS OF SERVICE MEN from GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL KING.

6. In order to remind pertinent personnel to check that safes, files and other repositories have been locked at closing time, a fan shaped card about six inches long may be inserted in the handles of safe cabinets, lock-files etc. when they have been opened and removed after being locked for the night (Exhibit D).

7. Further small card notices (3" x 4") bearing the inscription "IS YOUR SAFE LOCKED?" may be circulated and judiciously posted (Exhibit E).

8. POSTERS designed for individual as well as for mass appeal should be generously distributed throughout the buildings and other places where workers congregate throughout the area. These should include notice of the Federal Sabotage Act, the Espionage Act, and subjects on the theme of no loose talk. Appended hereto is a title list of other Posters available from the A.G.O. procurable through Service Commands Hqs., (Exhibit F). Attempts are being made to secure pertinent posters from other sources such as the Office of War Information and Army Service Forces. These will be distributed upon receipt. They should be rotated frequently to keep them from becoming stale.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. A large billboard or a large bulletin board readily visible and located at entries or exits to the post may be erected, reflecting, in substance, the following caution:

"What you see here,  
What you do here,  
What you hear here,  
When you leave here,  
Let it stay here."

10. Cautionary notices on the theme of "no loose talk", or "zip your lip", or "don't discuss your work", may be printed on hand bills or somewhere on other public notices ordinarily circulated.

11. Use of music with cautionary slogans as a theme may be used, such as,

- (1) Jingles in juke boxes, or
- (2) Tunes broadcast on the public address system.

12. TELEPHONE BOOTHS - Post attractive posters therein reminding to omit reference in conversation to military matters or other suggested topics concerning the project.

13. TELEGRAPH - Install a voluntary form of censorship, i.e., "Leave out references to military matters or to the project".

14. MATCH FOLDERS, STATIONERY, etc., and other matter having general circulation. These may be utilized to carry some catchy line or cautionary notice.

15. Any other means which may be peculiar to an installation and which serve to educate personnel to become security-conscious may be utilized.

## V. Areas Surrounding Installations

A. Having thoroughly covered the project installation, the security educational program may be carried into nearby communities, towns and cities. The approach in these outside contacts surrounding a project or other important installation, should be made through the Service Command in order to disassociate the project as the sponsor of specific requests, and thus check curiosity on the part of those whose services are enlisted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

solicited:

1. The cooperation of such organizations may be solicited:
  - a. Chamber of Commerce: responsible persons therein may be interviewed and their cooperation secured to circulate and post posters, cartoons and other educational notices in business houses, public gathering places and public conveyances, etc.
  - b. Newspapers in neighboring communities may be furnished lead stories, cartoons, etc., all on the theme of "zip your lip - don't discuss military or defense matters, the enemy wants to know what you know."
  - c. Local radio stations may broadcast appropriate spot announcements, etc., "here's a message from ---- (the commanding general of the service command), we are at war, keep military or other defense information out of your conversation;" or "we are at war, don't discuss defense industries or other military matters with anyone." They may also put on local dramatizations on the effects of leakages of information. The Office of War Information has done considerable work in this respect; appropriate items maybe suggested to this office for transmission to that Agency.
  - d. The services of regional offices of the American Legion, the D.A.R., the U.S.O., etc., may possibly be enlisted in disseminating a security educational program appropriate to their areas.

B. Summary:

An enterprising security educational Agent will capitalize on his knowledge of the installation, its environs and the constituency to develop other pertinent suggestions. The aim is clear: it is to vivify the need for being security-wise and to build the habit of alertness by constant repetition, using a variety of appeal. Ingenuity is valuable. As alertness increases, the work of the enemy agent is made progressively difficult; he must then come out in the open; he must interrogate persistently; must try to observe; consequently, all those who are apparently unauthorized to seek information will be reported.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

VI. Precautions:

A. Concurrent with the instructive talk and the publicity follow-up, various precautionary measures may be instituted. These may be summed up as follows:

1. Check the efficiency of the plan frequently and maintain recurrent inspections to assure compliance.
2. Maintain a list of contacts which will report criticisms of the educational talk or other phases of the program, so that appropriate remedial action can be guided accordingly.
3. Undertake a survey especially in sections of the installation handling or having access to classified papers on the status of security in connection therewith. Appended hereto is a sample list of questions which may be used to test the adequacy of security in such places (Exhibit G).
4. If outside sources seek to purchase products produced under contract with the Manhattan Engineer District or destined for this District, see that all inquiries from such outside sources without revealing the present activities of the company will be forwarded to the District Engineer, Attention of the District Intelligence Officer.
5. Devote special attention to the Security Educational Program as it affects young personnel. There are a number of young college and graduate students engaged in classified work which involves traveling and visiting experimental laboratories. Upon employment they will be exposed to the various phases of the Security Program. Prior to departure from a home station, care should be taken to see that they have reviewed pertinent sections of literature on the subject (AR 380-5, WD Training Circular 99, 1942. A Personal Message from General Marshall and Admiral King, etc.), have been again alerted to inquiries from unauthorized personnel and cautioned against discussing any matter pertaining to their work in public places or conveyances.
6. Maintain an inventory of Security Violations and the action taken with respect thereto. Similarly, for any violations of Censorship. A list of rumors concerning the project or the work of contractors for the project is valuable. All these serve as a guide in laying plans for future security educational measures.

For the District Engineer:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H. K. CALVERT  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
District Intelligence Officer.

~~SECRET~~

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "C"  
MISCELLANEOUS - FORMS, MANUALS, ETC.

No.

1. Personnel Security Questionnaire.
2. Personal History Statement for Employees on National Defense Contracts.
3. Declarations of Secrecy, Forms A, B, and C.
4. Visitor Permit, Manhattan Engineer District.
5. Protective Security Manual, dated 1 February 1943.
6. WD Pamphlet No. 32-1, "Plant Protection for Manufacturers", dated 1 May 1943.
7. Security Survey Report, Manhattan Engineer District.
8. Army Regulations No. 800-5, Safeguarding Military Information, dated 15 March 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Green 1

# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ☆ ☆ ☆ PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

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1. (U. S. Government Bureau requesting) (Address) (Date)

2. (Agency or company employing) (Address)

3. (Description of duties of employee)

4. (Last name) (First name) (Middle name) (Alias)

5. (Present address) (Street) (City) (State) (Date)

6. (Last previous address) (Street) (City) (State)

7. (Place of birth) (Date) (Social Security No.)

8. (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) (Alien registration number)

9. (Sex) (Color) (Height) (Weight) (Color of hair) (Color of eyes) (Marital status)

(Do not use this space)

(Service Command number)

R.  S.

### 10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only) School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From--	To--

### 14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

### 15. Foreign countries visited since 1939: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1939	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT



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7. (Place of birth) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) \_\_\_\_\_ (Social Security No.) \_\_\_\_\_ R.  S.

8. (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) \_\_\_\_\_ (Alien registration number) \_\_\_\_\_

9. (Sex) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color) \_\_\_\_\_ (Height) \_\_\_\_\_ (Weight) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of hair) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of eyes) \_\_\_\_\_ (Marital status) \_\_\_\_\_

10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only.)  
 School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From—	To—

14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

16. References: (Give names of three responsible citizens, not relatives or employers, who have known you the past 10 years.)

NAME	RESIDENCE ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	YEARS KNOWN

17. \_\_\_\_\_ (Signature and title of approving authority) 18. \_\_\_\_\_ (Usual signature or mark of employee)

PINK 2

# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ☆ ☆ ☆ PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. \_\_\_\_\_ (U. S. Government Bureau requesting) \_\_\_\_\_ (Address) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date)

2. \_\_\_\_\_ (Agency or company employing) \_\_\_\_\_ (Address)

3. \_\_\_\_\_ (Description of duties of employee)

4. \_\_\_\_\_ (Last name) \_\_\_\_\_ (First name) \_\_\_\_\_ (Middle name) \_\_\_\_\_ (Alias)

5. \_\_\_\_\_ (Present address) (Street) \_\_\_\_\_ (City) \_\_\_\_\_ (State) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date)

6. \_\_\_\_\_ (Last previous address) (Street) \_\_\_\_\_ (City) \_\_\_\_\_ (State)

7. \_\_\_\_\_ (Place of birth) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) \_\_\_\_\_ (Social Security No.)

8. \_\_\_\_\_ (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) \_\_\_\_\_ (Allen registration number)

9. \_\_\_\_\_ (Sex) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color) \_\_\_\_\_ (Height) \_\_\_\_\_ (Weight) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of hair) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of eyes) \_\_\_\_\_ (Marital status)

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\_\_\_\_\_ (Date)

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### 10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only.)  
 School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

### 13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From--	To--

### 14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

### 15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

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(Place of birth)

(Date)

(Social Security No.)

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8. (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) (Allen registration number)

9. (Sex) (Color) (Height) (Weight) (Color of hair) (Color of eyes) (Marital status)

10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only) School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From—	To—

14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

16. References: (Give names of three responsible citizens, not relatives or employers, who have known you the past 10 years.)

NAME	RESIDENCE ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	YEARS KNOWN

17. (Signature and title of approving authority)

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18. (Usual signature or mark of employee)

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8. (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) (Allen registration number)

9. (Sex) (Color) (Height) (Weight) (Color of hair) (Color of eyes) (Marital status)

10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only.)  
 School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From—	To—

14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

16. References: (Give names of three responsible citizens, not relatives or employers, who have known you the past 10 years.)

NAME	RESIDENCE ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	YEARS KNOWN

17. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature and title of approving authority)

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18. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Usual signature or mark of employee)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ☆ ☆ ☆ PERSONNEL SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. \_\_\_\_\_ (U. S. Government Bureau requesting) \_\_\_\_\_ (Address) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date)

2. \_\_\_\_\_ (Agency or company employing) \_\_\_\_\_ (Address)

3. \_\_\_\_\_ (Description of duties of employee)

4. \_\_\_\_\_ (Last name) \_\_\_\_\_ (First name) \_\_\_\_\_ (Middle name) \_\_\_\_\_ (Alias)

5. \_\_\_\_\_ (Present address) (Street) \_\_\_\_\_ (City) \_\_\_\_\_ (State) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date)

6. \_\_\_\_\_ (Last previous address) (Street) \_\_\_\_\_ (City) \_\_\_\_\_ (State)

7. \_\_\_\_\_ (Place of birth) \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) \_\_\_\_\_ (Social Security No.)

8. \_\_\_\_\_ (Citizenship) (If naturalized, give place, date, and number of certificate) \_\_\_\_\_ (Alien registration number)

9. \_\_\_\_\_ (Sex) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color) \_\_\_\_\_ (Height) \_\_\_\_\_ (Weight) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of hair) \_\_\_\_\_ (Color of eyes) \_\_\_\_\_ (Marital status)

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10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only.)  
 School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From—	To—

14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

9. (Sex) (Color) (Height) (Weight) (Color of hair) (Color of eyes) (Marital status)

10. Relatives: (List following members of family, even though deceased.)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	ADDRESS	COUNTRY WHERE BORN	CITIZENSHIP
Father:				
Mother:				
Spouse:				
Children:				
Parents-in-law:				
Brothers and sisters:				

11. Education: High School or College. (Name last attended only.)  
School \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

12. Military Service: Date: From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

13. Employment: (Account for all time from 1935 to date.) Show present position first.

NAME OF EMPLOYER	STREET ADDRESS	CITY AND STATE	DATE	
			From—	To—

14. Membership in organizations: (List all organizations of which you are or have been a member since 1930.)

NAME	CHARACTER	ADDRESS	YEARS MEMBER

15. Foreign countries visited since 1930: (If foreign born show date and port of first entry here: \_\_\_\_\_)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED SINCE 1930	LEFT (U. S. A.)	RETURNED (U. S. A.)	REASONS FOR VISIT

16. References: (Give names of three responsible citizens, not relatives or employers, who have known you the past 10 years.)

NAME	RESIDENCE ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	YEARS KNOWN

17. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature and title of approving authority)

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18. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Usual signature or mark of employee)

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# PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT FOR EMPLOYEES ON NATIONAL DEFENSE CONTRACTS

(Every question must be answered. If the answer is "no" or "none," so state. If exact answer is not known, answer according to your best knowledge and belief)

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Office of Employment \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name of Office)

(Room, building)

(Street, city, state)

(Telephone No.)

Your position, giving duties (be specific) \_\_\_\_\_

I have (will have) (have not) (will not have)\* access to confidential matters in this position.

**i. Identification**

Male\*  
Female      Married  
Single  
Divorced

a. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Last name)                      (First name)                      (Middle name)                      (Alias)

b. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Race)                      (Nationality)                      (Maiden surname, if a married woman)

c. Height \_\_\_\_\_ Weight \_\_\_\_\_ Color of eyes \_\_\_\_\_ Color of hair \_\_\_\_\_

Wear glasses \_\_\_\_\_ Complexion \_\_\_\_\_  
(Yes or No)

Scars or distinguishing marks on face or hands \_\_\_\_\_

d. State any known physical defects or diseases \_\_\_\_\_

**2. Birth and Nationality**

a. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Month, day, year of birth)                      (Place of birth—city and state)

b. \_\_\_\_\_  
(County seat of county in which you were born (if born in the United States))

c. If foreign born, give the following information:

Date of arrival in the United States \_\_\_\_\_  
(Month)                      (Day)                      (Year)

Name of ship and port of entry \_\_\_\_\_

Alien Registration Number \_\_\_\_\_

Naturalization papers obtained:

Declaration of Intention (First papers) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date, name and address of court, and

name of person to whom declaration was issued)

Certificate of Naturalization (final papers) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number, date, name and address of court, and name

of person to whom certificate was issued)

If above papers were not issued to you, the above named holder is \_\_\_\_\_  
(Relationship)

**3. Addresses**

a. Present residence address \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number)                      (R. F. D. or Street)                      (City or town)

(State)                      (Telephone)                      Date (From)

b. Previous residence addresses in the last 10 years:  
Number                      R. F. D. or Street                      City or Town                      State                      Date From:                      To:

\*Strike out words not applicable



c. State your whereabouts and activities during the period 1914—1918, inclusive:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Legal voting residence:

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Number) (R. F. D. or Street) (City or Town) (State) (Telephone)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(County) (Congressional District)

4. Family Data

a. Father

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name) (Present address—Street—City—State)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Occupation during major part of life) (Born: Date—City—State)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Nationality) (If naturalized, when and where)  
Deceased? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, \_\_\_\_\_  
(Yes or No) (Date and place of death)

b. Mother

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name (Present address—Street—City—State)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Occupation during major part of life) (Born: Date—City—State)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Nationality) (If naturalized, when and where)  
Deceased? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, \_\_\_\_\_  
(Yes or No) (Date and place of death)

c. Present Spouse

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date of marriage) (City) (State)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name) (If wife, give maiden name) (Address)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(If employed, give name and address of employer)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Born: Date—City—State) (Nationality)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(If naturalized, when and where)

d. Previous Spouse

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name) (Date of Divorce or Decease)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date of Birth) (Place of birth)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Present Occupation) (Employer)

e. Children

Name Born: Date—City—State  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

f. Brothers and Sisters

Name	Born: Date—City—State	Employed by	Located at City—State
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

**g. List dependents (Other than Spouse and Children above)**

Name	Address	Age	Relationship

**h. Do you have any relatives (to and including first cousins) who are not citizens of the United States, or who reside within the jurisdiction of any foreign government?**

If yes, Name	Relationship	(Yes or No)		Nationality	Residence

**5. Education**

**a. Common School 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8\***

Grade Schools Attended:		Location	Dates (in years only)
Name			

**b. High School 1 2 3 4\***

High Schools attended:		Location	Dates (in years only)
Name			

Graduated? \_\_\_\_\_ Date of graduation \_\_\_\_\_ High School from which graduated \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Yes or No)

**c. Business School 1 2 3 4\***

Business Colleges attended:		Location	Dates (in years only)
Name			

**d. College 1 2 3 4\* Give here the details of your college education:**

Name and Location of College	Dates of Attendance (Month and Year)		Semester Hours Credit Received	Major Subject	Degree and Date Conferred
	From	To			

**e. Graduate or Professional School 1 2 3 4\***

Name and Location of College	Dates of Attendance (Month and Year)		Semester Hours Credit Received	Major Subject	Degree and Date Conferred
	From	To			

\*Draw circle around number indicating years completed.

f. List names of any scholastic, honorary, or professional fraternities or societies of which you are a member:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

g. List the foreign languages which you know.

Language	Do you speak it fluently?	Do you write it well?	Do you translate it accurately?	How did you gain this ability?

6. a. State what foreign countries you have visited or lived in since 1933.

Name of country	Visited	Lived In	Dates	Give reason why you were in foreign country

b. Were you ever in the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corp, Coast Guard or National Guard? \_\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)

If yes, which one? \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, give organization, dates of service, and name of Commanding Officer:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

c. What (is, was)\* the highest rank held? \_\_\_\_\_

d. Have you ever been in the civil or armed services of any foreign government? \_\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)

If yes, give particulars

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

e. List all clubs, societies, trade unions, associations, religious affiliations or any type of organization with which you have been connected in any way whatever. (Give addresses, nature of organization, and indicate whether you are now connected with such organization.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**7. Personal**

a. Are you entirely dependent on your salary? \_\_\_\_\_ If not, what other sources of income have you? \_\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)

\_\_\_\_\_

\*Strike out words not applicable.

b. Credit References. (List three)

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c. Bank accounts are maintained at the following (include Building & Loan, Postal Savings, etc.)

Name of Institution	City	State

d. Social Security Number \_\_\_\_\_

e. Have you ever been arrested, or summoned into court as a defendant or indicted, or convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or has any case against you been filed, or have you ever been ordered to deposit collateral for alleged breach or violation of law or police regulation or ordinance whatsoever, with the exception of traffic violation? \_\_\_\_\_

(Yes or No)

If yes, describe:

1. Civil

Nature of proceeding	Date	City	State

2. Criminal

Charge	Date	City	State	Law enforcement agency involved	Penalty imposed

f. Have you ever been fingerprinted? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, give details:

(Yes or No)

Date	City and State	Name of agency taking fingerprints	Reason

8. Employment

a. Experience: In the following spaces, give a complete record of all employment you have had during the past 10 years, including Government employment and military service, and accounting for all periods of unemployment. Begin with your present or last position and work back.

Dates of Employment (Mo. and Yr.)	Name, complete address, nature of business of employer, name of supervisor. (If unemployed give own address at that time)	Lowest, highest and last salary per annum in each position	Name of position, description of duties, reason for leaving. (If employed by Government, state last efficiency rating)
From _____ To _____	Name _____ Address _____		
From _____ To _____	Name _____ Address _____		
From _____ To _____	Name _____ Address _____		
From _____ To _____	Name _____ Address _____		
From _____ To _____	Name _____ Address _____		

b. Do you hold a Civil Service Status? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, what \_\_\_\_\_

(Yes or No)

**9. Character References (other than relatives or employers)**

**List Five.**  
**Full Name**

**Full Address**

**Occupation**

---

---

---

---

---

I CERTIFY that the foregoing answers are correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. (Any false statement is sufficient cause for rejection of application or dismissal after appointment.) Furthermore, I will not divulge nor disclose any secret or confidential information that I may acquire by reason of my employment unless authorized by proper authority.

Date \_\_\_\_\_

(Name as usually written)

Declaration of Secrecy "A"  
Designed for Execution by all Physicists, Chemists,  
and other Employees of Similar Professional or  
Scientific Caliber

In consideration of the vital interest which the United States of America has in the successful and expeditious completion of the work being carried on here at \_\_\_\_\_:

I hereby state, without mental reservation, that I bear true faith and allegiance exclusively to the United States of America, that I have in the past and will in the future secure to the Government of the United States of America the sole benefit of any developments here made, to the exclusion of any other country, company, party, organization, or person, whomsoever. Upon the truth of this statement I stake my personal and scientific reputation.

Recognizing the importance of safeguarding all matters pertaining to this and to related work, I state that no printed matter, drawings, memoranda, notes, pieces of equipment, or any other records or materials of any kind whatsoever have been or will be taken or utilized by me for other than official purposes - and then only in accordance with the established rules, from the \_\_\_\_\_, or from any office, shop, or laboratory connected or associated therewith.

I further state that any and all knowledge of the work or activity of the \_\_\_\_\_ or whereabouts of any allied work which has been or will be acquired by me, has been and will be considered as classified information and has not been or will not be used for discussion, correspondence, communication or reference with any person or persons not authorized to receive such information.

That I understand should I either intentionally, or through gross negligence, permit any unauthorized person to obtain classified information regarding this project I will have then violated the Provisions of the National Espionage Act and will be subject to punishment thereunder by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or fined not more than \$10,000.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature upon Entry on Duty

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature upon Separation from  
Employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Declaration of Secrecy "B"  
Designed for Execution by all Employees Having Access  
to Classified Information other than Scientific Personnel

I hereby state, without any mental reservation whatsoever, that I bear true faith and allegiance exclusively to the United States of America and that I have in the past and will in the future secure to the Government of the United States of America the sole benefit of any information I have to the exclusion of all other countries.

That I have not, or will not in the future, take or utilize any printed matter, drawings, memoranda, notes, pieces of equipment or any other records, or materials of any kind whatsoever, from \_\_\_\_\_ other than for official purposes and then only in accordance with the established ruled of \_\_\_\_\_;

That any and all knowledge of the work or activity of \_\_\_\_\_, or whereabouts of any of its installations or allied projects which has been, or will be acquired by me, will be considered as Classified Information and has not been or will not be used for discussion, correspondence, or communication with any person or persons not authorized to receive such information.

That I understand should I either intentionally, or through gross negligence, permit any unauthorized person to obtain Classified Information regarding this project I will have then violated the Provisions of the National Espionage Act and will be subject to punishment thereunder by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or fined not more than \$10,000.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature upon Entry on Duty

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature upon Separation from  
Employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

DECLARATION "C"

(Designed for all employees not having access to classified information.)

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do solemnly swear:

That I understand if I am entrusted with any document, blue print, plan, map, or information relating to the National Defense and should I, either intentionally or through gross negligence, permit an unauthorized person to obtain such, I will then have violated the provisions of the National Espionage Act and will be subject to punishment thereunder by imprisonment of not more than ten years or fined not more than \$10,000; further,

I understand should I deliberately injure, interfere, or obstruct the National Defense of the United States by injuring or destroying National Defense material, property, or utility, I will have then violated the Federal Sabotage Act and will be subject to punishment thereunder by imprisonment for not more than ten years or fined not more than \$10,000; further,

That I will not take or use any printed matter, drawings, memoranda, specifications, maps, pieces of equipment or other records of materials of any kind, whatsoever, from \_\_\_\_\_, other than for official purposes and then only in accordance with established rules of \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date



- Citizen
- Alien  
(check one)

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VISITOR PERMIT  
MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT

(see reverse side for instructions)

Visitor \_\_\_\_\_

Representing \_\_\_\_\_

Unit to be visited \_\_\_\_\_

Person to be contacted \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose of visit \_\_\_\_\_  
(state limitations)

Date and duration of visit \_\_\_\_\_

Means of Identification \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(signature of visitor)

"I certify that the required clearance forms have been submitted to the Manhattan Engineer District by the visitor named above and that no restrictions have been placed on his employment."

\_\_\_\_\_  
(signature of supervisor)

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_  
(Area Engineer or other officer responsible for the unit from which the request is initiated)

Permit issued by \_\_\_\_\_  
(Area Engineer or other officer responsible for the unit to be visited)

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act 50 U.S. C., 31 and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

(Submit in triplicate)  
(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A15

PROTECTIVE SECURITY MANUAL

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
P. O. BOX 42 - STATION F  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

~~RESTRICTED~~

FEBRUARY 1, 1943

APPENDIX <sup>C5</sup> ~~A14~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

FOREWORD

The purpose of this manual is to provide a statement of District policy regarding protective Security procedures, establish basic rules, and present an outline of basic requirements for the guidance of contractors and area offices of the Manhattan District, and others engaged on this project in establishing an adequate security program.

This manual has been prepared by the protective Security Section of the Manhattan District based on conditions existing in January, 1943. Rapidly changing conditions may require modification of these instructions and procedures at unpredictable times in the near or distant future.

Nothing in these instructions shall be construed to detract from the authority of an authorized representative of this office, if such representative is, or should be, assigned to any of the organizations receiving this manual to assume control of the Protective Security program. Such representative may effect such amendments to these instructions as he may deem necessary to properly discharge his responsibilities in this regard.

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Security Information

INDEX

Paragraph No.

Description

Page No.

Section I - Introduction

1-01	Purpose.....	1
1-02	Responsibility for Security.....	1
1-03	Definition of Security Responsibilities.....	1
1-04	Appointment of Security Agent.....	1

Section II - Selection and Clearance of Personnel

2-01	General.....	2
2-02	Eligibility for Employment.....	2
2-03	Employment of Aliens.....	2
	(a.) Unusual qualifications.....	2
	(b.) Procedure.....	2
2-04	Acceptable Evidence of Citizenship.....	3
	(a.) Primary.....	3
	(b.) Secondary.....	4
2-05	Selection.....	4
	(a.) General.....	4
	(b.) Special Cases.....	4
2-06	Formal Clearance.....	5
	(a.) For Whom Required.....	5
	(b.) Procedure.....	6
2-07	Informal Clearance.....	7
	(a.) For Whom Required.....	7
	(b.) Procedure.....	7
2-08	Notification of Clearance.....	7

Section III - Visitor Control

3-01	Purpose.....	8
3-02	Classes of Visitors.....	8
	(a.) Casual Visitors.....	8
	(b.) Visitors Given Information or Access.....	8
3-03	Operation.....	8
	(a.) Class I Visitors.....	8
	(b.) Class II Visitors.....	9
	(c.) Class III Visitors.....	9
3-04	Individuals Free to Visit at Will.....	10
3-05	Extended Visits.....	10
3-06	Unauthorized Visits.....	10
3-07	Classification of Forms.....	10
3-08	Reports and Returns.....	11

~~RESTRICTED~~

Security Information

Paragraph No.

Description

Section IV - Safeguarding Classified Information

4-01	General.....	12
	(a.) Basic Regulations.....	12
	(b.) Purpose.....	12
	(c.) Definitions.....	12
	(d.) Responsibility.....	12
	(e.) Right to Possess Classified Information.....	13
	(f.) Dissemination of Classified Information.....	13
	(g.) Loss or Subjection to Compromise.....	14
	(h.) Requests for Information.....	14
	(i.) Telephone, Telegraph and Teletype.....	14
	(j.) Photographs.....	15
	(k.) Secrecy Instruction and Discipline.....	15
4-02	Classification.....	15
	(a.) Purpose and Method of Notification.....	15
	(b.) Who May Classify.....	15
	(c.) One Classification Only.....	15
	(d.) Overclassification.....	15
	(e.) Cancellation or Change of Classification.....	16
4-03	Secret Matter.....	16
4-04	Confidential Matter.....	17
4-05	Restricted Matter.....	17
4-06	Preparation.....	18
	(a.) General.....	18
	(b.) Reproduction.....	18
	(c.) Responsibility.....	18
	(d.) Disposal of Waste.....	18
4-07	Marking.....	19
	(a.) Classification.....	19
	(b.) Additional Marking.....	19
4-08	Accounting.....	19
	(a.) General.....	19
	(b.) Numbering of Separate Copies.....	20
	(c.) File Record and Reproduction by Others.....	20
	(d.) Verification of Receipt.....	20
4-09	Transmission.....	21
	(a.) Secret Documents.....	21
	(b.) Confidential Documents.....	21
	(c.) Restricted Documents.....	21
4-10	Handling of Classified Material.....	21
	(a.) General.....	21
	(b.) Rules.....	22
	(c.) Charge Slips.....	22
	(d.) Cover Sheet.....	22
4-11	Storage.....	22
	(a.) Equipment.....	22
	(b.) Custodian.....	23
4-12	Return of Documents.....	23
4-13	Destruction of Classified Documents.....	23

Section V - Plant Protection

5-01 General.....24

5-02 Scope.....24

5-03 Design.....24

5-04 Physical Control.....24

    (a.) Fencing.....24

    (b.) Floodlighting.....25

    (c.) Restricted and Vital Areas.....25

    (d.) Essential Tools and Equipment.....25

    (e.) Shipping Platforms and Parking Areas.....25

    (f.) Truck Control.....25

    (g.) Housekeeping.....26

    (h.) Plant Layout.....26

    (i.) Passive Protection.....26

5-05 Employee Identification and Control.....26

    (a.) Badges.....26

    (b.) Badge Rules.....26

    (c.) Identification.....26

    (d.) Absences.....27

    (e.) Movement.....27

5-06 Guard System.....27

    (a.) General.....27

    (b.) Organization.....27

    (c.) Training.....27

    (d.) Duties.....28

    (e.) Guard Book.....29

    (f.) Communication System.....29

5-07 Espionage and Sabotage.....29

    (a.) Espionage.....29

    (b.) Sabotage.....30

    (c.) Prevention.....30

Section VI - Plant Safety

6-01 General.....32

6-02 Scope.....32

6-03 Program.....32

Section VII - Reports

7-01 General.....33

7-02 Immediate Reports.....33

    (a.) Upon Receipt of These Instructions.....33

    (b.) At Time of Occurrence or Receipt of Information.....33

7-03 Weekly Report.....34

7-04 Monthly Reports.....34

    (a.) Employees Assigned to Classified Duties.....34

    (b.) Protective Measures.....34

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

~~RESTRICTED~~

1-01. Purpose.- Successful completion of the project at the earliest practicable date is our basic mission, and accomplishment of this will be assured by zealous diligence, coordinated teamwork, and planned security through careful forethought. The objective of Protective Security is to establish and maintain the security of classified project information and to prevent interruption and delay in the work as a result of espionage, sabotage, and inherent hazards such as fire and accident.

1-02. Responsibility for Security.- The commanding officer or civilian in charge of each organization engaged on this project is responsible for adequately maintaining the security of his establishment. Each private individual, firm, corporation, or institution engaged on this project has certain responsibilities with respect to the security of the project which are expressed by the following quotation from Army Regulations 380-5, as amended September 28, 1942:

"54a. A private individual, firm, or corporation which enters into a contract to engage in technical work for the War Department becomes responsible in matters within his or its control for the safeguarding of all secret, confidential, or restricted matters that may be disclosed or that may be developed in connection therewith. A clause to this effect will be included in such a contract, but its omission will not release the Contractor from his responsibilities under the Espionage Act and other pertinent laws.

"54b. Contractors are responsible that all classified projects allotted to subcontractors or agents are fully protected by a similar agreement."

1-03. Definition of Security Responsibilities.- The safeguarding of a classified project in a broad sense takes cognizance of all factors, internal and external, which are potentially capable of adversely effecting the national interests or the accomplishment of the stated objective, and involves the following security elements:

Selection and Clearance of Personnel.

Visitor Control.

Safeguarding Classified Information.

Plant Protection.

Plant Safety.

1-04. Appointment of Security Agent.- To properly implement such a program and effectively fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of each organization with respect to the security of the project, it is required that a capable executive, who will be referred to hereafter as the Security Agent, be designated to assume full charge of the installation and maintenance of the security system. Since each organization or establishment is in a sense unique and differs in many respects from all other concerns, even from those in similar fields of activity, the first and most important problem of the Security Agent is the development of a security program for his organization within the framework of the following outlined procedures and principles.

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2-01. General.- Since classified information may be disclosed to none but loyal and trustworthy persons, some selective system must be adopted which will, within limits of reasonable accuracy, assure the employment or assignment to classified duties of none but persons of demonstrated loyalty and trustworthiness and the rejection or elimination from the project of those who are even potentially disloyal, disaffected, or subversive; or who lack the maturity of character and discretion necessary to assure the integrity of classified information disclosed to them. Therefore, contractors performing work under the jurisdiction of the Manhattan District are required to comply with the procedure outlined in this section for the selection and clearance of all employees assigned to this project.

2-02. Eligibility for Employment.- Only such persons whose loyalty and discretion are without question shall be employed on this project in positions involving knowledge of, or access to, classified project information. The consideration of aliens for employment, regardless of their nationality, is definitely discouraged, and under no circumstances shall an alien be employed in any position which necessitates his having knowledge of, or access to, classified information without the prior approval in writing of the Secretary of War and the District Engineer. United States citizenship should be included as a basic requirement for all persons prior to showing them any consideration as prospective employees, and all persons presenting themselves as citizens shall be required to produce conclusive evidence in one of the forms listed in paragraph 2-04.

2-03. Employment of Aliens.- (a) Unusual Qualifications.- Approval will not be granted for the employment of aliens, regardless of nationality, in positions involving classified matters, where such positions can be filled satisfactorily by United States citizens. Prior to requesting approval for the employment of any alien, due consideration shall therefore be given to the availability of a qualified U. S. citizen for the position to be filled. If the requisite qualifications are of an extremely unusual nature necessitating rare technical training and ability resulting in a very limited group of eligible persons, and, provided a qualified United States citizen definitely cannot be obtained; then, and only then, will a request for the approval of such employment be considered.

(b) Procedure- When it becomes necessary to request approval for the employment of an alien, the Alien Questionnaire (see Appendix - Part A) shall be accomplished in sextuplicate, and forwarded to the District Engineer, attention Protective Security Officer. This form shall be accompanied by one fingerprint chart, data card and a letter outlining the reasons for the request, showing particularly why it is essential to employ such alien rather than a citizen of the United States. Provided the necessity for such employment is definitely established, the War Department will give special and expedited consideration in passing on requests for approval of the employment of nationals of the United Nations and friendly American Republics, and any other aliens, including enemy aliens, who come within the following categories:



Aliens who have served in the armed forces of the United States and have been honorably discharged.

Aliens who have, or who have had, members of their immediate family in the United States military service.

Aliens who have resided in the United States continuously since 1916 without having returned to the country of origin within the last ten years.

Aliens who have married persons who, at the time of marriage, were citizens of the United States, provided such aliens have resided in the United States continuously since 1924 without having returned to the country of origin within the last ten years.

Aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and who had filed petitions for naturalization before December 7, 1941.

In interviewing a prospective alien employee, it is advisable to offer no definite encouragement regarding the possibility of his employment. A definite offer of employment in a position involving classified matters should be made only upon receipt of the written approval of Secretary of War and the District Engineer.

2-04. Acceptable Evidence of Citizenship. - (a) Primary. - Preferably, proof of United States citizenship shall be established by presentation of one of the following documents:

Certified copy of public record, showing date and place of birth.

Certified copy of baptismal or other church record made at the time of birth, or shortly after, showing date and place of birth.

Naturalization certificate.

Honorable discharge certificate from the Armed Forces of the United States provided it does not bear notation of alien status at time of discharge.

In cases where either of the first two documents mentioned above are presented, a certified or photostatic copy of such document shall be retained in the employer's files. Pertinent information regarding naturalization or honorable discharge certificate, when such documents are presented, must be incorporated with the individual's personnel record in the form of a statement signed by a designated representative of the employer's Personnel Department. Such statement shall clearly indicate that this representative has personally examined such document and shall include identification of the document presented, exact name of individual as it appears on the document, certificate number, effective date, court or place of issuance, dates of service, and similar pertinent information.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Security Information

(b) Secondary. - Individuals who are unable to present any one of the documents listed in subparagraph (a) above, shall be required to file with his employer a statement to that effect together with correspondence received in reply to inquiries therefor clearly indicating that a bona fide attempt has been made to secure those documents normally available in similar cases. A Declaration of Citizenship (see Appendix - Part A) signed by the applicant to the effect that he is a citizen of the United States shall then be acceptable for filing provided he can produce secondary evidence in one of the following forms:

U. S. State Department Passport.

A certified statement of two responsible citizens older than the subject who have knowledge of his citizenship and can certify as to his place of birth.

Similar secondary evidence which is customarily accepted as proof of citizenship.

A copy of the above secondary supporting evidence shall be retained with the signed Declaration of Citizenship in the employer's files in all cases where the reproduction of such document may be readily accomplished. If a copy cannot be obtained, a statement signed by a designated Personnel representative to the effect that he has personally examined such document and listing all pertinent information shall then be filed.

2-05. Selection. - (a) General. - All persons to be assigned positions on this project involving classified matters shall be subject to careful and conscientious original selection by the employing organization. The responsibility of the organization in this respect is extremely important to the security of the project since the information available locally and through the medium of personal interview is, in a vast majority of cases, more accurate and personal than information available from a formal investigation, and is a necessary supplement to the routine loyalty investigation which will be arranged by this office. The submission of requests for clearance of personnel will in all cases be considered as an affirmation on the part of the employer that, after careful selection and interview, no question exists concerning the applicant's loyalty and integrity.

(b) Special Cases. - Personnel executives are cautioned to exercise extreme care and thoroughly consider all available information prior to accepting for employment applicants in the following classes:

Individuals of Oriental extraction.

Individuals who emigrated from enemy countries subsequent to January 1, 1933.

Individuals who have visited an enemy country twice since January 1, 1933 or once since January 1, 1938.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Security Information

Individuals born in an enemy country who have visited an enemy country since January 1, 1933.

Individuals who have received education in, were employed in, or who have resided for more than six weeks in Germany or Italy subsequent to January 1, 1933.

Individuals who have emigrated from an enemy-occupied country subsequent to January 1, 1938.

Individuals entering the United States subsequent to January 1, 1919 who have a parent, sister, brother, child or spouse in an enemy or enemy-occupied country.

Individuals with a criminal record disclosing indications of possible danger to the war effort.

Individuals who have served in the army of a country now at war with the United States.

Individuals who entered the United States after the last war from an enemy or enemy-occupied country, and who have become naturalized citizens of the United States since January 1, 1933.

Individuals having membership in organizations known to be enemy sponsored or otherwise subversive or committed to violent overthrow of the Government of the United States, or to adherence to the interests of any foreign power to the exclusion of the interests of the United States.

Such applicants will require special investigation and employers shall disclose no vital classified information to such individuals, if accepted for employment, prior to receipt of written notification of clearance from this office. The employer will be held fully responsible for such persons assigned to classified duties until formal clearance is granted. (See paragraph 2-08.)

2.06. Formal Clearance. - (a) For Whom Required. - Prospective employees to whom classified information is to be disclosed or who, in the performance of their duties, are to have access to classified information (including janitors, guards and watchmen who on occasion may have access during non-working hours to offices or other locations where classified material is being stored or where classified work is performed) shall be formally cleared. Generally, this group is comprised of executives, supervisors, engineers, technicians, draftsmen, secretaries, foreman, auditors, file clerks, messengers, etc. Prior to assignment to classified work, each individual shall be properly instructed in accordance with sub-paragraph 4-01 (k). Persons not directly engaged on the project to whom classified information must be disclosed during the course of necessary consultations and for similar purposes either shall be cleared in the same manner as though actually employed, or authority shall be obtained from this office prior to such disclosure (see sub-paragraph 4-01(f)(3)). Employees of other divisions of your organization or those of outside agencies will require no clearance provided their services are utilized without the disclosure of any classified information.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Security Information

(b) Procedure - (1) Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form NNI-140 - Formal clearance will be issued by this office after Form NNI-140, Personnel Security Questionnaire, completely executed and properly indorsed by the employer, has been submitted and investigated. This form will be completed in quintuplicate, in strict accordance with the instructions issued by this office. These instructions are included in the Appendix - Part B, and will normally be furnished with the initial supply of Forms NNI-140, or may be obtained upon request from the District Protective Security Officer. All questions will be completely and truthfully answered, except that no vital information will be included on this form. Details regarding the position which the applicant will occupy and other revealing information shall be shown on the data card only. (See sub-paragraph 3 below). If delay in submission of this form would be occasioned thereby, photograph and notarization may be omitted, provided signature is witnessed by two responsible persons with their names and complete address typed below their signatures. The employer's indorsement of Form NNI-140 will be construed by this office as certifying that the individual's loyalty and integrity are vouched for by the employing organization.

(2) Fingerprint Card - One National Defense Program fingerprint chart shall be completed and forwarded to this office for each person engaged on the work, regardless of whether or not he has been previously fingerprinted. Instructions are available from the District Protective Security Officer describing the necessary equipment and the proper method of taking satisfactory fingerprints. Descriptive data regarding the individual fingerprinted and all other information required shall be typewritten or printed accurately and legibly in accordance with the instructions issued by this office and included in the Appendix - Part B.

(3) Data Card - For each employee engaged on the work in a position involving classified matters, a data card shall be completed and forwarded to the District Protective Security Officer. This card shall include complete details of the work to be performed by the individual and the amount of classified information he will have knowledge of or access to during the course of his assignment. The card shall be marked with the appropriate classification stamp. These cards together with instructions for their completion are available from this office, and are illustrated in the Appendix.

(4) Espionage Act Certificate - Each employee to be assigned to classified duties shall be required to read and sign the Espionage Act Certificate prior to such assignment. This signed and witnessed certificate shall be retained in the employer's file available at any time for inspection by representatives of this office. This certificate form is illustrated in the Appendix - Part A and may be reproduced as required.

(5) Letter of Transmittal - Form NNI-140 (5 copies), fingerprint chart, and data card shall be forwarded without delay to the District Engineer, attention of the Protective Security Officer. The letter of transmittal requesting clearance shall state the employer's name, name of contracting agency (such as Manhattan District), and the location to which the applicant will be assigned if your organization has several separate branches. It shall also state that acceptable evidence of citizenship has been furnished in accordance with paragraph 2-04 and an Espionage Act certificate has been executed; both of which are on file and available for inspection at any time.

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Security Information

2-07. Informal Clearance. - (a) For Whom Required. - Prospective employees to whom no classified information will be disclosed and who will not have access to restricted areas where classified material is stored or classified work performed shall be informally cleared in accordance with this paragraph. The average plant worker who performs his work outside of restricted areas and in a routine manner with no knowledge of its classified nature is an example of this class of employee.

(b) Procedure. - Employees of this class shall be carefully selected and must offer, and file with the employer, conclusive proof of United States citizenship in accordance with paragraph 2-04. They shall be required to complete a standard type personnel history statement in lieu of Form NNI-140 and shall be fingerprinted in accordance with subparagraph 2-06 (b) (2). The standard form of personnel application used by most employment offices is usually acceptable as a personal history statement. Personal history statements will be retained in the employer's files available for inspection by representatives of this office. This type of employee will be considered satisfactorily cleared when these requirements have been met and the fingerprint card has been transmitted to this office.

2-08. Notification of Clearance. - Prior to receipt of written notification of clearance, the employer may assign a United States citizen to the work provided the amount of classified information disclosed to such person is reduced to the absolute minimum. Entire responsibility for such employee shall rest with the employer until this office has given written approval. Upon completion of investigation of each person to be assigned classified duties, the District Protective Security Officer will notify the employing agency of the subject's clearance. It must be remembered that clearance may not be granted, and therefore persons used on classified work prior to receipt of approval must necessarily be given the least practicable amount of classified information. Even after clearance has been granted, further investigation may produce discrediting information which will require withdrawal of such clearance and removal of the employee from classified work. Employees who cannot be cleared or for whom clearance is later withdrawn shall not be informed of the reason for their removal from the work.

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3-01. Purpose. - A potential source of unauthorized dissemination of classified information concerning the project is the admission of visitors to restricted areas and the discussion with them of classified project information. An important duty of the Security Agent is to insure proper compliance with the Visitor Control System as outlined herein. This system is designed to accomplish the following objectives:

To insure strict limitation of visits to those which contribute to the advancement of the work.

To insure that all visitors are properly "cleared" by Army for access to classified information.

To insure that the unit to be visited is fully advised as to the information which may be disclosed to the visitor.

3-02. Classes of Visitors. - (a) Casual Visitors. - Persons to whom the disclosure of classified information is not authorized, such as salesmen, agents, and other casual visitors having no official connection with the project, including consultants, specialists, etc., whose services can be utilized without disclosure of classified information or admission to restricted areas where classified work is being performed, shall never be admitted to the work, nor shall the work be discussed with such persons. They may, however, at the discretion of the person in charge of the organization, be received in outer offices only. Formal authorization for such visits will not be required, and such visits need not be included in the regular weekly report required by paragraph 7-03.

(b) Visitors Given Information or Access. - Those persons to whom classified information must be disclosed or who must be admitted to restricted areas where classified work is being performed, according to type of clearance required, are divided into the following three classes:

Class I. U. S. citizens not representing a foreign government or a foreign-controlled firm.

Class II. Foreign Nationals (friendly or enemy) employed by the U. S. Government or a U. S. controlled firm.

Class III. Foreign Nationals (friendly or enemy) other than those listed in Class II, and U. S. citizens representing a foreign government or a foreign-controlled firm.

3-03. Operation. - (a) Class I Visitors. - (1) Initiation of Request for Visit. - The requests for visits by U. S. citizens not representing a foreign government or a foreign-controlled firm may be initiated only by the officers listed in (2) below, by a member of the Executive Committee, by one of the two alternates who may be designated for each member of the Executive Committee, or by the visitor's superior. Forms V-1 and V-2 shall be used for the request and distributed for approval as noted on the form.

(2) Approval of Request. - Essentiality of the visit will be determined and approval granted by Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, Col. J. C. Marshall, Lt. Col. K. D. Nichols, Lt. Col. Robert C. Blair, or the Area Engineer assigned

~~RESTRICTED~~~~Security Information~~

to the project where the request is initiated. Requests for visits originated by organizations to which an Area Engineer is not assigned shall be submitted on Forms V-1 and V-2 directly to the District Engineer, Attention: Protective Security Officer.

(3) Distribution of Forms. - The approving officer will advise the unit to be visited of the approved visit by forwarding the original copy of the "Authorization for Visit", Form V-2, to the person to be visited. The original Form V-1 will be retained by the approving officer for his file. The duplicate copy of Form V-2 will be transmitted to the visitor by the approving officer for presentation by the visitor to the person visited. The approving officer will destroy the duplicate copy of Form V-1, and forward the triplicate copy of Forms V-1 and V-2 to the District Engineer, Attention: Protective Security Officer.

(4) Visitors Credentials. - The following credentials shall be required of all Class I visitors (except those individuals designated in paragraph 3-04 as being free to visit at will) for admittance to any branch of the general project:

Form V-2 accompanied by the identifying credentials noted on the form such as: officer's identification folder, official identification card issued by the organization represented by the visitor, driver's license, membership cards, or similar credentials which commonly serve as means of positive identification.

(b) Class II Visitors. - The procedure outlined for Class I visitors shall apply for Class II visitors, foreign nationals (friendly or enemy) employed by the U. S. Government or a U. S. controlled firm, with the following exceptions:

Forms V-3 and V-4 shall be used in place of Forms V-1 and V-2 respectively.

Approval of this class of visitor may be granted only by Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, after clearance from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Because of the nature of approval required, Class II visits should be anticipated sufficiently in advance for clearance to be obtained from higher authority. Requests for such visits shall be transmitted by the initiator to the District Engineer, Attention: Protective Security Officer.

(c) Class III Visitors. - The procedure outlined for Class I or Class II, visitors will not apply to Class III visitors. Visitors of this class will comply with AR 380-5 as revised September 28, 1942, paragraph 59b, which provides that Class III visitors will be admitted to Government projects engaged on classified work only on written authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff and the District Engineer. Such visitors will be unusual, and in each case special application should be made to the District Protective Security Officer.

~~Security Information~~ 3-04. Individuals Free to Visit at Will. - Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, Col. J. C. Marshall, Lt. Col. K. D. Nichols, Lt. Col. Robert C. Blair, Area Engineers within their respective areas, Executive Committee Members (See letter dated December 30, 1942, Subject: Control of Visits), and the Executive Committee Technical Aide shall be free to visit at will those units where contact has been established. These individuals shall be required to present official identification cards for admittance. If one of the above listed persons desires to visit a unit where he is not known, he shall use the visitor system as described herein for his initial visit.

3-05. Extended Visits. - In cases where the duties of a key person on one project require that he keep in close touch with another project through frequent visits, extended visiting privileges for frequent or repeated visits covering a period not to exceed three months may be granted by the use of the visitor system. When granting an authorization of this type by means of Forms V-2 or V-4, the approving officer shall indicate under "Remarks" on the reverse side of the authorization below his signature, the date upon which the authorization becomes void. The procedure to be followed will be that outlined in paragraph 3-03 for Class I or Class II visitors. The expiration date will be checked at the time of each visit by those concerned in order that proper steps may be taken to renew, if necessary, the extended visiting privileges prior to the date of expiration.

3-06. Unauthorized Visits. - Exceptional cases may occur when a visitor arrives without an approved authorization for visit. If that unit is under the supervision of an Area Engineer to whom the individual and his connection with the project are known, the Area Engineer may:

Secure by telephone, ratification of the necessary and desirability of the visit from the person who would normally submit requests for the visitor concerned.

Approve, at his discretion, an authorization for the visit. If such a procedure is followed, the Area Engineer shall immediately forward a special memorandum report of the visit to the District Protective Security Officer.

If the project is not under the supervision of an Area Engineer, the individual in charge of the project may secure, by telephone, ratification of the desirability of the visit from the person who would normally submit requests for the visitor concerned, together with approval for the visit, by telephone, from the nearest person designated in paragraph 3-03 (a) (2). In the event the above procedure is followed, the individual in charge of the project shall immediately forward a special memorandum report of the visit to the District Protective Security Officer.

3-07. Classification of Forms. - All visitor forms shall be classified by the individual initiating the request. The applicable classification will normally be "confidential," though exceptional instances may warrant the classification "secret". The classification shall be stamped in the space provided for that notation on the visitor form.

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Security Information



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~~Security Information~~

3-08. Reports and Returns. - All units shall submit to the District Protective Security Officer, a weekly report of visitors as required in paragraph 7-03. The visitor's copies of Form V-2 or V-4, which are surrendered by the visitor at the time of the visit, shall be submitted with this weekly report. Visits by individuals making use of extended visiting privileges as outlined in paragraph 3-05, shall also be entered on the weekly report. Forms authorizing extended visits shall be forwarded to the District Protective Security Officer by the visitors themselves, on the date of expiration.

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~~Security Information~~

4-01. General. - (a) Basic Regulations. - All classified information, documents, and materiel relative to this project shall be safeguarded in strict accordance with the following provisions which are based directly upon Army Regulations No. 380-5, entitled "Safeguarding Military Information," as amended September 28, 1942, with such revisions having been made as were deemed necessary to transform the basic regulations so that they are more directly applicable to a classified project prosecuted mainly, if not entirely, by civilian personnel.

(b) Purpose. - The purpose of safeguarding classified information is to protect vital information from falling into the hands of possible enemies of our country. Facts which in themselves seem quite trivial may eventually furnish vital details when pieced together with seemingly insignificant information from numerous sources; and, for this reason, it is of utmost importance that great discretion be exercised in the dissemination of all information relative to this project. Rigorous enforcement of the policies contained herein and strict compliance with all existing regulations on the subject will insure maintenance of the proper degree of secrecy which is so vital to the successful attainment of the desired objective.

(c) Definitions. - To facilitate an understanding of the contents of this section, the following terms are defined:

Classified Information. - Classified information includes all information concerning documents, devices, and materiel relative to this project, designated as SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, or RESTRICTED, as well as the items themselves. All other project information, documents, and materiel are regarded as unclassified.

Document. - The term "document" includes printed, mimeographed, typed, photostated, and written matter of all kinds, maps, photomaps, and aerial photographs and mosaics; drawings, sketches, notes, and blueprints, or photostatic copies thereof; photographs and photographic negatives; engineering data; correspondence and plans; and all similar matter.

Engineering Data. - The term "engineering data" comprises drawings, blueprints, photostats, photographs, designs, mathematical calculations, formulae, processes, and similar items that can be reduced to documentary form.

Materiel. - The term "materiel" comprises all physical and material equipment, devices, and supplies required for completion of this project, both complete and in process of development and construction, including models that show features in whole or in part, machines, apparatus, fixtures, and all components or accessories thereof.

(d) Responsibility. - The safeguarding of classified information is the responsibility of all military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department, and of the management and employees of all commercial firms engaged on this work. The commanding officer or civilian in charge of each organization so engaged is responsible that all military personnel and

civilian employees are familiar with the pertinent provisions of this section.

(e) Right to Possess Classified Information. - No person in the military service or employed by the War Department, nor any individual connected with or employed by a commercial firm engaged on this project is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of his commission or official position. Such information shall be entrusted only to those who need it in the performance of their official duties and to insure adequate planning, proper coordination, and efficient prosecution of the work. Employees of the project shall be organized into small working groups or teams so far as possible, each working on its own phase of the job and not being permitted to inspect or discuss the work being done by others. It is not expected that this procedure will at all times be feasible; however, the general principle of limiting an individual's knowledge of the project to the minimum necessary for the proper performance of his duties shall be strictly followed throughout.

(f) Dissemination of Classified Information. - (1) Instruction. - When classified information is disseminated under the provisions of this section to persons not subject to military law, they shall be informed that it affects the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act. Such persons shall be thoroughly acquainted with all pertinent regulations and specifically instructed that transmission of classified information to any unauthorized individual is strictly prohibited by law with severe penalties for such violations.

(2) Oral Discussion. - Either public or private discussion of classified information with or in the presence of unauthorized persons is strictly forbidden. Since employees must necessarily talk about problems related to the work in the performance of their duties, it is advisable to invent fictitious terms or code names, which are not descriptive, for secret or confidential matters which it is necessary to discuss. The invention of such language is left to the individual organization so that the terms used will not be uniform throughout all phases of the general project.

(3) Negotiations and Consultations with Outsiders. - In the event it becomes necessary or advisable to discuss classified project information with consultants, experts, manufacturers, or other persons not directly connected with the project and not properly cleared, authority shall be secured from this office prior to such disclosures. Prime contractors are required to obtain the written approval of the District Engineer prior to entering negotiations with prospective subcontractors. Requests for such approval shall include the complete names and addresses of all individuals to be contacted together with a statement containing the name and address of the company represented, type of business, years engaged on such business, approximate length of each individual's service with the company, his citizenship, and all other pertinent information known concerning both the company and the individuals.

(4) Contract Information. - All information concerning contractual relationships between the various organizations engaged on this project including subcontractors and suppliers shall be restricted to the least practicable number of project personnel to whom the information is absolutely necessary for the proper performance of their duties. Dissemination to outside individuals of such information, including the names of firms engaged on the work, is strictly forbidden. Project personnel in possession of such information will be held responsible for its safeguarding in accordance with this policy.

(5) Publication of Articles. - The publication by civilians of any information whatsoever relative to this project is strictly forbidden unless the prior approval of the District Engineer has been obtained.

Articles proposed for publication shall be submitted in their entirety to this office for review and approval. For the regulations relative to the publication of articles by military personnel, see AR 380-5, sub-paragraph 4(b).

(6) Supplies, Reports, Sales. - Another source of wrongful dissemination of pertinent information concerning the work is the marking of raw materials, supplies, and products. Code names and symbols should always be used, rather than true names and formulae. Wherever possible, inventories and reports made to others should hide the fact that unusual quantities of materials, etc., indicative of the purpose of a contract, are being handled. Private sales of the products, if made in the past prior to commencement of the work on this contract, may continue to be made. If products produced under this contract are new to the company or differ in specification from those previously produced, private sales shall not be made, and all inquiries from other sources seeking to purchase such products shall be answered negatively and non-committally without revealing the present activities of the company. Inquiries and sales shall be reported in accordance with sub-paragraph 7-02 (b).

(g) Loss or Subjection to Compromise. - Any individual connected with this project in any way whatsoever who may have knowledge of the loss or subjection to compromise of a classified document or article of material shall promptly report that fact to the responsible custodian, who shall, in turn, report such information to his immediate superior for transmittal to the District Engineer. Upon receipt of such information, the District Engineer will review the circumstances and make decision as to the action to be taken in each case of this nature.

(h) Requests for Information. - Requests for classified information from private individuals or firms not directly connected with this project shall be immediately referred to the District Engineer. Reply to the request of any unauthorized individual or firm is strictly prohibited, prior to obtaining the approval of the District Engineer. Such replies shall feign lack of interest, knowledge of, or connection with classified matters when the organization concerned has not previously been engaged on such work. A draft of the suggested reply shall be submitted for approval of the District Engineer. Extreme care and discretion must be exercised in making reply to a request involving only unclassified matters. Each and every fact offered in such a reply regardless of its seeming triviality, must be carefully scrutinized to insure that nothing of importance is revealed. It must be remembered that the end products; the size, scope, and status of the project; and the relationship between the various agencies involved must remain strictly secret. The War Department's interest in the various phases of the project must be kept strictly confidential wherever this is possible.

(i) Telephone, Telegraph and Teletype. - Classified information must never be discussed over the telephone except in cases of extreme emergency, and then only when code names, symbols, or other means are used to garble the conversation in such manner that it is intelligible to the other person only because of his experience on the work or due to his understanding the prearranged code names and symbols employed. The telegraph and teletype shall be used with even greater caution, and practically no classified information can be sent in the clear by either means. In emergencies when any of the above means of communication must be utilized, extreme care shall be exercised in the choice of references, code names, and symbols. The Security Agent shall be responsible for the proper instruction of all project personnel in this regard, and shall check for compliance at every opportunity. This is an extremely important matter and strict compliance of all concerned is demanded.

(j) Photographs. - In accordance with the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1942 (Public Law No. 627), only designated authorized personnel will be permitted to make photographs (including aerial photographs), sketches, maps, or other representations within, or in the vicinity of, restricted areas. Employees and visitors shall be required to leave cameras with the guard at the gate when entering restricted areas. Photographs of classified features of the project shall be taken only by authorized personnel when such record is necessary in the conduct of the work. Such photographs, when taken, shall not be developed or printed in outside commercial establishments, nor retained in any form in the personal possession of any project employee.

(k) Secrecy Instruction and Discipline. - The Security Agent of each independent agency or office shall be responsible for appropriate instruction of the project personnel and for the proper enforcement of the procedures and policies contained in this section. He shall make frequent inspections to insure strict compliance with all regulations relative to the safeguarding of classified information. Prior to assignment, proper instruction must be given to all personnel having access to classified information with particular emphasis being given the penalties prescribed by the Espionage Act for violation thereof. It must be indelibly impressed upon all, that thoughtless or talkative persons, those who seek to impress others with their importance by showing the amount of information they possess, and those who feel they must tell family and friends all they know, may become a menace to this project, and this country as well. Each individual connected with this project shall be warned that even the most insignificant facts relative to his work must never be revealed to strangers. It is the duty of each employee to caution his fellow workers when they are overheard discussing project information in public places, and, if they fail to heed the warning, such persons should be reported immediately to the Security Agent. Any person whose actions or conversations are such as to arouse suspicion should be reported.

4-02. Classification. - (a) Purpose and Method of Notification. - Military information is of varying degrees of value to foreign governments and therefore requires the exercise of varying degrees of precaution for its safety. For the purpose of providing the necessary variations in safeguarding the several types of critical information, the classifications SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and RESTRICTED have been established. (See paragraphs 4-03, 4-04, and 4-05.) The method of notifying all concerned of the particular classification of a classified document, article of materiel, or similar item shall be by conspicuously marking such item, when practicable, in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph 4-07. If such marking is impracticable, all concerned shall be specifically notified in writing of the classification of such item.

(b) Who May Classify. - The number of persons permitted to classify documents and other matter originated by an organization shall be strictly limited to the head of the organization and a limited number of others designated by him, whose responsibility it will be to insure that all material bears the proper classification. This requirement is necessary to insure uniform classification in accordance with the definitions.

(c) One Classification Only. - A document or article of materiel shall be assigned not more than one of the three classifications, but if more than one is assigned through error, the more restrictive classification shall apply.

(d) Overclassification. - Documents or articles of materiel requiring classification shall be assigned the least restrictive classifica-

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Security Information  
tion consistent with the proper safeguarding of the information or materiel concerned. Overclassification shall be avoided since it causes unnecessary delay in transmission and handling, and depreciates the importance of classified information in the minds of handling personnel.

(c) Cancellation or Change of Classification. - The authority making the original classification, or higher authority, may cancel or change the classification of a document by writing or stamping over the original mark at the top of the first page, "Classification cancelled by authority of (signature and date)" or "Classification changed to \_\_\_\_\_ by authority of (signature and date)." The classification of materiel may be cancelled or changed by the same authorities by appropriate letters of instruction.

4-03. Secret Matter. - Documents and articles of materiel shall be classified, and, if practicable, marked SECRET when disclosure of the information or features contained therein might endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interest or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation. The following are examples of items which shall be classified as SECRET:

Documents relating to technical design, distinctive methods, or special processes; or containing specific reference to the end products or their use.

Documents containing names, formulae, symbols, melting points, densities, or similar technical data which would reveal to the technician the nature of a unique process, the basic materials, end products, or similar vital information.

Documents relating to personnel, organization, progress, funds, power and material requirements, or similar pertinent information which indicates the actual size, scope, or status of the entire project or an especially critical portion thereof, or shows the exact relationship between the various agencies engaged on the general project.

Maps, photographs, or similar documents definitely showing vital parts of technical features of this project.

Articles of distinctive materiel including supplies, equipment, models, or apparatus, together with their special components or accessories.

Documents showing the meaning of a code name or symbol used to refer to secret information.

Minutes of meetings wherein vital information was discussed.

Information and items such as the above shall receive protection of the highest degree to insure absolute secrecy and security. The nature, contents, or whereabouts of documents or articles of materiel within this classification shall be made known only to the least number of persons consistent with

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Security Information

satisfactory prosecution of the work. The inviolability of secret information is the duty and responsibility of all persons having knowledge thereof, no matter how obtained.

**4-04. Confidential Matter.** - Documents and articles of materiel shall be classified and, if practicable, marked CONFIDENTIAL when disclosure of the information contained therein, although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interest or prestige of the United States, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation. In general this classification shall be used for all documents and items relating to this project, which, in themselves, do not disclose sufficient detail to warrant the classification SECRET, and shall include items of the following nature:

Documents relating to technical design, distinctive methods, special processes, end products, or similar secret matters, provided code names and misleading symbols are used exclusively.

Documents relating to site selection, power and material requirements, allotments of money, personnel, organization, progress, and similar pertinent information which reveal the size, scope, or status of a separate phase of the project provided such phase is not considered sufficiently important to warrant classification of such information as SECRET.

Drawings, photographs, or similar documents pertaining to but not definitely showing unique portions or parts of technical features of this project.

Articles of materiel similar to those described in paragraph 4-03 above, but of less critical nature.

Documents showing the meaning of a code name or symbol used to refer to confidential information.

Documents relating to the investigation, clearance, or assignment of personnel who will have knowledge of, or access to, classified information.

Confidential information and items shall be carefully protected by all concerned to insure their security from unauthorized persons. Information of this classification shall be made available only to those persons whose duties require that they have such knowledge and to such other persons of especial trust who must be informed.

**4-05. Restricted Matter.** - Documents and articles of materiel shall be classified, and, if practicable, marked RESTRICTED when the information contained therein is for official use only, or when disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy, or denied the general public. The following are examples of items which shall be classified as RESTRICTED:

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information

Documents relating to the design and construction of non-technical buildings or utilities.

Documents concerning relatively unimportant administrative and personnel matters or other project information which must not be disclosed to the general public.

Drawings, photographs, or similar documents showing sites prior to construction with no additions or titles indicating relationship to the project.

Articles of materiel intended for official use only.

Restricted information shall not be disclosed to persons other than project employees. Such information may be given to any person known to be engaged on this project.

4-06. Preparation. - (a) General. - Clerical and technical work on classified matters shall be performed only by persons cleared in accordance with paragraph 2-06. Technicians and others preparing documents, especially correspondence, shall be thoroughly familiar with the rules of classification and the use of code names and symbols, and shall be required to exercise sufficient care in preparation so that each document may be given the lowest possible classification. Special attention and study shall be devoted to the various means of avoiding the more restrictive classifications, such as the avoidance of names of products, direct references, summaries of the information, etc., which in themselves require classification of the document in which they appear. The additional time required in preparation to insure the lowest possible classification consistent with proper clarity will be justified by the resultant ease with which the document may be transmitted, handled, and stored. Employees shall be encouraged to develop and utilize methods of writing which will result in the greatest practicable number of unclassified documents. The number of secret documents originated should remain decidedly in the minority in comparison with the numbers of those of lower classification or unclassified. Through the use of code names and symbols, less restrictive classifications will result for all project correspondence and the necessity for secret memoranda and similar communications within a separate organization should be eliminated almost entirely. To minimize the danger of compromise from persons no longer connected with the work, code names shall be changed occasionally.

(b) Reproduction. - In the event it is necessary to reproduce classified documents through the use of the organization's general facilities or those of an outside concern, the tracings, stencils, originals, negatives, etc., shall be accompanied during the entire period these documents are away from the restricted areas by a properly qualified employee. This trusted employee shall supervise the reproduction and shall be responsible for returning all original items, reproductions, imperfect prints, etc., to the project.

(c) Responsibility. - Clerical and technical personnel shall be responsible for the security of all reference documents, preliminary drafts, and other incidental information. Immediately upon completion of a classified document, they shall make proper disposition of such items used during the course of preparation and dispose of all waste materials in accordance with subparagraph (d) below.

(d) Disposal of Waste. - Classified waste, including all work sheets, drafts, carbon paper, stenographic notes, imperfect copies, sten-



ulls, etc., shall be torn into small pieces and safeguarded until burned under the supervision of a trusted employee who has been properly cleared to handle classified information. Under no circumstances shall cleaning people or other service employees be given access to restricted areas until proper disposition has been made of waste materials. If it is desirable to retain any of the above items, they shall be given the same classification and safeguarded in the same manner as the material produced from them.

4-07. Marking. - (a) Classification. - The classification of a document shall be indicated preferably by stamped impression of letters not less than one-quarter inch in height. Generally red ink shall be used except when more conspicuous results can be obtained by using ink of another color. Stencils and similar items may be marked with the typewriter provided capitals are used and the classification is underscored in such a manner that it will be as conspicuous as possible. The classification on tracings and other items to be reproduced shall be similarly underscored. Except as noted below, each separate page or sheet of a document will be marked at the top and bottom. The marking at the top shall be so placed that it will not be hidden from view when the pages are clipped or stapled together.

Classified books and pamphlets, the pages of which are permanently and securely fastened together, shall be marked on the cover, title page, and first page. Three staples, or the equivalent, provided the pages are of such quality as to offer adequate resistance to tearing, shall be considered permanent and secure fastening.

Classified photographic negatives, drawings, or tracings shall carry a legend of the proper classification in such position that it will be reproduced on all copies made therefrom. Photographs made from negatives not so inscribed shall be marked at the top and on the back with the proper classification.

Contracts for the manufacture of classified material shall be plainly and conspicuously marked, not typed, with the proper classification on the first page.

Classified maps and photomaps shall be appropriately marked under the scale.

(b) Additional Marking. - Classified documents furnished or accessible to persons other than military personnel and civilian employees of the Government shall, in addition to being marked SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, or RESTRICTED, bear the following notation (preferably by rubber stamp) which will be placed in a conspicuous location on the first page only:

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4-08. Accounting. - (a) General. - A strict system of accounting for all classified material, except RESTRICTED matter, originated

of received shall be established. In the interests of efficient accounting and security of information, it is advisable to prepare only the minimum number of copies of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents absolutely required. The Security Agent shall make frequent inspections to insure that separate copies of all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents are properly numbered and the distribution records are accurately maintained.

(b) Numbering of Separate Copies. - Each separate copy of a SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document shall bear a notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page indicating the number of pages or sheets of which the document consists, the series designation for that particular group of copies, and the number of that copy within the group. The series designation shall be by capital letter beginning with the letter "A". For example, three copies of an original document consisting of five pages are produced, the first copy is marked as follows:

This document consists of 5 pages.  
No. 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

The second copy will be "No. 2 of 3 copies, Series A"; and the third, "No. 3 of 3 copies, Series A". In computing the number of copies, the ribbon copy shall be considered as one copy; i. e., one ribbon and two carbon copies shall be counted as three copies. If, after original preparation, additional copies of a document are required, subsequent series shall be designated "B", "C", "D", etc.

(c) File Record and Reproduction by Others. - The originator or writer shall record on his retained file copy of each SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document the complete distribution of each series. In the event the recipient of a copy of such document requires additional copies, he shall request them from the originator. Except in cases of emergency, reproduction of such document by the recipient is strictly prohibited. In an emergency, prior authority of the originator shall be obtained by phone or otherwise. If there is no objection to reproduction, he shall authorize a definite number of copies and designate the series letter to be used. Immediately upon completion, the recipient shall furnish the originator a complete record by number of the distribution made by him.

(d) Verification of Receipt. - (1) Receipt File. - To verify the receipt of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents by addressees, signed receipts shall be required and filed upon return. The suggested form of receipt is illustrated in the Appendix - Part A. When transmitting a SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document the triplicate copy of the receipt form shall be retained in an abeyant file to insure return of signed copy by the addressee. Upon receipt by the addressee, he shall sign and return to the sender the original receipt form and file the duplicate copy. The original receipt form shall be permanently filed by the sender upon return and the triplicate copy may be removed from the abeyant file and destroyed. In this manner, through the medium of receipts, an accurate check is possible at any time to determine whether or not SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents have been safely delivered to the addressees. To provide a means of rapid check and complete this record, the postal registry number shall be noted upon the retained triplicate copy of the receipt form by the sender; and upon the original and duplicate by the recipient.

(2) Record Book. - In large organizations where a central mailing and receiving section is established for handling classified material, a record book shall be maintained to indicate for each SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL document, the date, copy number, serial letter, names of sender and addressee, reference or file number, postal registry number, and date of receipt or mailing.

**RESTRICTED**

Security Information

When the signed receipt for outgoing mail is returned, the date of receipt by the addressee shall be noted in the book to complete the record. When such a record book is maintained centrally, the receipt files required above shall be maintained by the writers or originators of the documents.

(c) Investigation and Assignment of Personnel. - Matters relating to the investigation, clearance, and assignment of personnel are normally classified CONFIDENTIAL, but need not be accounted for as required by the above sub-paragraphs. Such documents should be forwarded in double envelopes with the inner envelope bearing the classification mark, but postal registration is generally considered unnecessary. Receipt forms may, or may not, be used as desired by the sender. Personnel Security Questionnaires, although they contain no revealing information and bear no mark of classification, shall be handled in this manner.

4-09. Transmission. - (a) Secret Documents. - Preferably SECRET documents shall be transmitted between authorized personnel either personally or by an especially trustworthy personal assistant who has been properly cleared for such work. When this is impracticable, transmittal shall be accomplished by United States registered mail. When forwarded by registered mail the document shall be inclosed in an inner and outer cover. Receipt forms shall be prepared in triplicate and the original and duplicate inclosed with the document (see sub-paragraph 4-08(d)). The receipt form shall contain no classified information nor anything indicating the classified nature of the document to which it applies. The document shall be folded within the receipt forms to prevent direct contact between the typewritten matter of the document and the inner cover. The inner envelope or sealed cover shall be addressed in the usual manner and marked SECRET so that the classification will be seen immediately when the outer envelope is removed. The outer envelope shall be sealed and addressed in the ordinary manner and shall bear no indication of the classified nature of the contents. Upon receipt and prior to opening the envelopes, the addressee shall personally inspect the seals and wrappers for evidence of tampering. If such evidence is apparent, the facts shall be reported immediately to the issuing authority, who shall initiate an investigation without delay. The original copy of the receipt form shall be signed, dated, postal registry number noted thereon, and returned by ordinary mail to the sender. A cover sheet shall be placed on the document in accordance with sub-paragraph 4-10(d)).

(b) Confidential Documents. - Transmittal may be accomplished by formally cleared messenger or registered mail. Preparation for transmittal and action upon receipt shall be as prescribed for SECRET documents except that inspection and opening may be accomplished by any properly cleared individual whom the addressee may authorize. The attachment of a cover sheet is not required.

(c) Restricted Documents. - Transmittal may be accomplished by authorized messenger or ordinary mail. The receipt form is not required and double envelopes are unnecessary. Such documents may be opened by any project employee designated by the addressee.

4-10. Handling of Classified Material. - (a) General. - Classified matter pertaining to the project shall be handled only by the individuals to whom addressed, the writers, those employees who must be given such information for the proper performance of their duties, and specially trustworthy and selected clerical personnel designated to prepare, transmit, receive, file, and account for such material. Attention is directed to the fact that Army

regulations prescribe that no employee is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of his status or position. It is the accepted practice to provide employees with excerpts from or verbal instructions based on the original classified document and containing only that amount of information necessary for the efficient performance of their work. The greatest degree of security can be obtained only by strictly limiting those having knowledge of classified matters to the least practicable number consistent with efficient prosecution of the work.

(b) Rules. - Classified information received by or transmitted within the project shall not be handled unsealed by the regular administrative employees. At the close of business and at other times when an employee is away from his place of work, desk, or drafting table, the classified material in his possession shall be returned to the custodian of the files from whom it was obtained, and all other material upon which he is working shall be placed in his desk or carefully covered. Classified material shall never be left on desks or locked in desks. When not actually in use or under the personal care of the individual responsible for its safekeeping, classified material shall always be returned to the safes or lock files provided for its storage. Classified documents shall not be taken away from the offices for any reason without the express permission, in each case, of the person responsible for their custody. Custodians shall be required to use to fullest advantage the charge slips and cover sheets described in the following subparagraphs.

(c) Charge Slips. - When classified documents are removed from the files for issuance to authorized employees, the custodian shall prepare a memorandum charge slip containing a description of the document, the name of employee to whom issued, and the date. At the close of business each day, the custodian shall check the charge slips to determine whether or not all documents have been returned. In the event any document is not returned, the custodian shall check immediately to insure that prior authority was obtained for retention of the document.

(d) Cover Sheet. - A cover sheet shall be attached to each SECRET document immediately upon receipt, or in the case of the writer's retained copy, immediately after preparation. The suggested form of cover sheet is illustrated in the Appendix - Part A. In addition to covering the text of the document from general view, it will indicate those persons who have seen it, since all persons shall be required to sign the sheet when the document has been read by them. Upon completion of circulation and return to the files, this sheet also serves as a record for the custodian to indicate those persons authorized to see the document should it be requested at some later date.

4-11. Storage. - (a) Equipment. - All SECRET matter shall be habitually locked, when not in actual use, in a three-combination safe or cabinet file, the combination for which is known only to the executive responsible for the custody of the material, and, if necessary, to an especially trustworthy assistant who is responsible for the accounting and issuance of the material to authorized persons designated by the executive. All CONFIDENTIAL matter shall likewise be stored in three-combination safes or files whenever possible; otherwise in key-locked files, the keys for which are possessed only by the responsible executive and his designated assistant. All RESTRICTED material shall be stored in such a manner as to insure a reasonable degree of security. Storage of RESTRICTED material in ordinary cabinet files within the restricted area will be sufficient. Combination safes and lock files shall be of substantial construction. Each safe com-

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information

Combination shall be regularly changed at least twice each year and immediately upon reasonable suspicion that it has become known to unauthorized persons or when an authorized employee possessing the combination leaves the project. Cabinet file locks shall be immediately changed upon loss of a key.

(b) Custodian. - A responsible custodian shall be designated to care for all files containing information to which several project employees must have access in the performance of their work. This individual shall personally issue and return all documents, and those employees authorized to receive such documents shall not be given actual access to the files or safes, or permitted to enter storage vaults. The custodian shall be responsible for the maintenance of the files in such manner that all file documents may be properly accounted for at all times. (See paragraph 4-10 above.)

4-12. Return of Documents. - The recipient of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents is responsible for their security until such documents are returned to the originator. Immediately upon serving their intended purpose, such documents should be returned to the issuing office. The originator shall sign and return the receipt form in the usual manner and make appropriate notation in his records relieving the individual of further responsibility. At any time after issuance, when deemed advisable in the interests of security, the District Engineer, the originator, or other competent authority may direct the return of all copies of any SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document. Upon completion of all work under a contract performed by a private organization, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents and material furnished to, or originated by, such organization shall be returned to the Contracting Officer or other authorized Government representative.

4-13. Destruction of Classified Documents. - The Contracting Officer, his authorized representative, or other competent Government authority will destroy all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL matter other than waste as defined in subparagraph 4-06 (d), in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5 after it has served its intended purpose. Private individuals or firms engaged on this project shall not destroy such documents except in extreme cases of emergency when immediate destruction is considered the only means of preventing disclosure to unauthorized persons. Such individuals or firms will be held responsible for the destruction of all classified waste. Responsible custodians of RESTRICTED matter shall destroy such documents and materiel by burning when such items have served their purpose.

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~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information

5-01. General. - After qualified personnel are selected and properly trained in the policies and procedures governing classification, handling, storage, and transmission of classified information, it is necessary that their place of work be secure. Theoretically, without safeguards or security measures of any kind, it is impossible, if a semblance of secrecy is to be preserved, to engage in activities related to a classified subject. In this light, each restrictive security measure adopted, in reality, adds to freedom of activity, increases efficiency, and enlarges production. In the larger sense, of course, the entire subject discussed in these instructions falls under the heading of Safeguarding Classified Information. Those topics covered under that heading (Section IV) concerned chiefly those security measures and procedures which are primarily individual, in that, for the most part, the employees concerned are themselves responsible for their effective application. This section takes up those phases of the subject that are related to the security of the place of work or are, by their nature or scope, necessarily the primary responsibility of the management.

5-02. Scope. - The subject of Plant Protection is chiefly concerned with, first, the prevention of espionage, sabotage, malicious mischief, and other subversive activities; and, second, the elimination of all conditions which are potential delaying factors or might result in interruption of production. This involves such matters as guards, fences, lights, passive protection (air raid, blackout, and evacuation), employee safety program, good housekeeping, plant layout, visitor control, truck control, employee control and identification, protection of utilities (especially power facilities), analysis of working conditions and processes, and installation of corrective or remedial measures to assure continuous maximum production and early completion.

5-03. Design. - In view of the wide differences in the organization, management and physical makeup of individual plants, no hard and fast or stereotyped systems are advisable. Therefore, local conditions at the plant will largely determine the security measures to be adopted. It shall be the responsibility of the plant Security Agent to design a plant protection program based on the general patterns discussed below, which constitutes the basic principles common to all systems. The development of the security program based on these general principles and intelligently adapted to the existing local conditions, should result in an effective and successful plant protection program.

5-04. Physical Control. - (a) Fencing. - Guarded areas and facilities should be completely enclosed by a "man-proof" fence at least six feet high with not less than three strands of barbed wire at the top, preferably inclined toward the outside, and so constructed that there will be no space between the bottom of the fence and the ground. Fences should not be located so as to cut off the escape of persons who might be caught between burning buildings. The number of gates should be kept at a minimum and be located so as to render the best service. Gates should be kept locked when not in use. Where suitable fencing is not practicable, as along the front of a building, next to railroad tracks or sidewalks, heavy wire screens may be desirable for first and second story windows. These screens should be of small mesh so that incendiaries or other dangerous materials cannot pass through. They should be so installed that they can be removed or opened only from inside the building.

(b) Floodlighting. -

(b) Floodlighting. - Exterior floodlighting systems should be such that no trespasser can proceed to any point in the plant property without being observed by guards or watchmen. Floodlights preferably should be installed inside fences and be so arranged as to illuminate the entire area surrounding buildings. Suitable control during blackouts must be provided.

(c) Restricted and Vital Areas. - Visitors shall not be admitted to restricted areas except with express permission as outlined under the Visitor Control procedure. (See Section III). Within restricted areas, secret and especially vital processes, power plants, compressor rooms, transformer vaults, experimental laboratories and rooms in which vital material is being stored generally will be considered vital areas. Access to vital areas shall be allowed only to employees and visitors expressly concerned with the work performed therein.

(d) Essential Tools and Equipment. - Technical and precision tools should be kept in restricted, well screened and locked areas, protected against possible fire damage (preferably under sprinkler protection) and with an attendant on duty at all times when the plant is operating. At other times, special attention should be given these areas by guards. A suitable charge-out system should be maintained and a daily check-up of tools should be made.

(e) Shipping Platforms and Parking Areas. - Shipping and receiving platforms should be located away from restricted manufacturing areas so that it will not be necessary for outside delivery or pick-up men to enter these areas. This will eliminate the necessity for escorting and close guarding of trucks. Employees' cars shall be parked outside the restricted plant areas, so that all employees will have to enter the plant through pedestrian entrances. Visitor's automobiles should be parked outside of the plant area. All persons who are required to enter such plant areas by automobile should be positively identified, and the contents of all automobiles should be carefully checked.

(f) Truck Control. - In plants where trucks must enter the restricted areas, a truck register shall be maintained giving the following information:

Date and time of entrance.

Registration number of truck.

Name of owner.

Signature of driver and helper.

Brief description of contents of truck.

Time of departure.

Trucks shall be required to enter a specific gate. Before admission, the guard shall ask to see the driver's license, and definitely ascertain that any person accompanying the driver is a bona fide helper. Before permitting trucks to pass in or out, they shall be inspected to insure that no unauthorized or damaging materials are brought into or shipped out of restricted areas. This shall be accomplished by checking the materials noted on the bill of lading or the delivery ticket. Where inspection

supervise the loading or unloading. Upon admission, trucks shall be escorted to and from the loading platforms by a guard or a project employee.

(g) Housekeeping. - Good housekeeping will be required. Accumulations of waste, debris, etc., shall be avoided. Salvage materials, maintenance supplies, unused equipment, and building materials shall be neatly stored in prepared locations easily accessible for inspections.

(h) Plant Layout. - When planning new plant facilities or the expansion of existing facilities to accommodate increased production requirements of classified military contracts with this office, full consideration shall be given plant protection requirements to insure the most advantageous physical conditions and consequent economy of guarding.

(i) Passive Protection. - Air raid precautions shall be developed in accordance with the suggestions of local office of Civilian Defense.

5-05. Employee Identification and Control. - (a) Badges. - An employee identification system shall be installed, using suitable badges, supplemented if advisable with identification cards, whereby employees may quickly recognize an outsider or an employee who is not in the area to which he is assigned. The most satisfactory type of badge is a combination color and number system (with wearer's photograph) which will indicate the department to which the wearer is assigned, his payroll number and identity. The color scheme may be extended to indicate official status in addition to place of work. Badges should be of a type which it is impossible to alter. Subcontractor's employees shall be subject to the same regulations as regular employees and shall be identified by special badges.

(b) Badge Rules. - The following regulations should be strictly enforced to insure the proper functioning of the badge system:

Badges shall be worn in a uniform place on the outside of employee's clothing, and shall be worn at all times when employees are on the plant property.

Officials and administrative personnel shall wear badges at all times when within the confines of the plant restricted areas.

Employees reporting for work without their badges shall be sent home for them. The exchange of badges shall be severely dealt with, and a suitable fine or other penalty shall be exacted for lost badges, ample to cover the overhead inconveniences.

Employees and members of the guard force shall understand that there are no exceptions to these rules and that all persons, irrespective of rank, without proper identification shall be reported.

All employees shall be held responsible for the enforcement of these rules. Full cooperation is demanded.

(c) Identification. - Employees should be positively identified when entering the plant, preferably by one or more alert guards stationed at employees entrances who shall check identification card or badge. This can be accomplished best by arranging the entrance gates in such a way that

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information



employees must enter in one or more single lines, each of which will be checked by guard or other responsible employee. Employees should be assigned to a particular entrance and always enter or leave the plant at that point.

(d) Absences. - A daily check of absentees is desirable during war emergency. Any employee absent from work without a legitimate excuse should be looked upon with suspicion. Continued absences on the part of an employee should be cause for investigation to ascertain the reason therefor. Employees leaving the plant before termination of their shift shall obtain a pass from their supervisor. This pass shall be taken up by the guard at the gate who shall note the time of departure thereon.

(e) Movement. - The movement of employees between departments shall be restricted (see paragraph 4-01 (e)). It shall be a rule of the organization, understood by all employees, that employees found in areas other than those to which they are assigned, will be subject to disciplinary action. The enforcement of departmental employee restrictions depend upon careful checks and vigilance on the part of supervisors and department heads working in cooperation with the guards. Rest rooms, lunch rooms, and other such facilities should be located so that employees will not pass through restricted areas to reach them. Employees' clothing, lunchboxes, etc., should be kept out of vital areas or offices in which secret work is being performed.

5-06 Guard System. (a) General. - A twenty-four hour, seven-day week guard system, which shall be under the command of the plant Security Agent shall be established and maintained to protect all areas where classified work is being performed. The guards shall function when on duty as civilian assistants to the Military Police. It is desirable that the guards also be deputized by local police departments so that they may make arrests, if necessary, in the vicinity of restricted areas.

(b) Organization. - Under the Security Agent, there shall be a Chief of Guards in charge of the entire guard organization, and a Senior Guard in charge of each shift. Sufficient personnel shall be assigned to provide at least hourly coverage during nights and idle days and to control all entrances to restricted areas where classified work is being performed. Additional guards shall be assigned to protect especially important or vital units within the restricted areas. A reserve of from 1 to 3 men, depending upon the size of the guard force, shall be on duty each shift to assist guards on post in case of alarm. Only men who are alert, intelligent, trustworthy and in good physical condition shall be selected for employment as guards. Attention is invited to the requirement that guards are formally cleared as prescribed in paragraph 2-06. The Chief Guard shall be responsible for keeping the Security Agent fully informed as to the activities of the Guard Force.

(c) Training. - A comprehensive set of rules, which shall be known as Guard Orders, governing the operation of the guard force and detailing the duties of the guards, shall be prepared. A copy shall be furnished each member of the guard and frequent checks shall be made by the Chief Guard and Senior Guards to insure that each man is at all times thoroughly familiar with the Guard Orders and any Special Orders which may, from time to time, be issued. Special instructions shall be prepared to govern the operation of the guard force in the event of air raid alarm, and the training of the guard shall include instruction in the performance of special duties during air raid alarms. The guard shall be so disciplined and trained that in the event of alarm certain guards - depending upon the location of the incident - answer the alarm while the majority of the men remain at their posts and redouble their watchfulness. The Guard Force cannot be considered properly trained unless they are thoroughly familiar with the following:

Entire plant area, especially restricted and vital areas.

All common forms of espionage and sabotage (See paragraph 5-07).

Location of especially hazardous units, processes and materials.

Location and use of all available fire protection equipment, including sprinkler control valves.

Location and use of all fire alarm facilities, call boxes, etc., and guard communication system.

Conditions that may cause fire.

Location and operation of all important steam and gas valves and all main electric switches.

First-aid methods and location of first-aid equipment for use in case of accidents.

Action to be taken in an emergency that can be reasonably foreseen and action to be taken in cases not covered by instructions.

(d) Duties. - The guard shall be responsible for the protection of the offices, laboratories, plant and other facilities connected with the project. Guards should never be required to perform work in the plant which might interfere with their duties in maintaining plant protection. Their duties shall include the following:

Make regular patrols of all restricted areas, giving special attention to areas which are vital or would likely be of particular interest or vulnerable to espionage or sabotage agents.

Be especially watchful for foreign objects which might be used for sabotage purposes.

Inspect fences, locked gates, doors, etc., being on the alert to discover conditions which might facilitate entrance to restricted areas.

Be especially watchful to discover fires or potential fire and other hazards, and inspect fire-fighting apparatus for evidence of tampering or disturbances.

Patrol and inspect exteriors as well as interiors of buildings.

Check the credentials of all persons entering or leaving the restricted areas, and admit no one without proper credentials or authorization from the Security Agent. (See sub-paragraph 5-05 (d)). Under no condition shall intoxicated persons be permitted on the premises.

Inspect all lunch boxes, packages, bundles, etc., carried by persons entering or leaving restricted areas. All cameras carried by persons entering restricted areas shall be left with the guard outside the restricted areas, and returned to the owner at the time he leaves.

Inspect all automobiles, trucks and railroad cars at point of entrance to insure that no unauthorized or damaging materials are brought in or shipped out.

Control the interdepartmental movement of employees and require all persons within restricted zones to wear identification badges.

Escort visitors, trucks, etc., within restricted zones except when accompanied by and under the supervision of a project employee.

Report all unusual incidents to Senior Guard or Chief Guard who shall enter a report of same in the Guard Book.

(c) Guard Book. - The Chief Guard and Senior Guards shall maintain a written record of all guard activities. In this record, known as the Guard Book, will appear all unusual incidents or occurrences noted during each tour of duty; all orders and instructions received by the guards, giving name of person issuing same (which shall be only the Security Agent, the executive in charge of the project or their designated alternates); and names of guards on duty, showing time of posting and relief. The Guard Book shall be maintained more or less in the form of a diary which will present a narrative report of each shift. It shall be kept up to date at all times and available for inspection by representatives of this office.

(f) Communication System. - A communication system for the use of the guards shall be installed. It should provide for the positive identification of the guard calling in, permit the summoning of single guards or all guards simultaneously, and definitely indicate the location from which the call was made. Guards will be required to report on a regular basis, and in the event of failure of a guard to report immediately, investigation shall be made by the Senior Guard in charge of the shift.

5-07. Espionage and Sabotage. - (a) Espionage. - The Security Agent must anticipate and block all opportunities for the practice of espionage within his plant. The ingenuity of foreign agents or enemy sympathisers must be met with a superior ingenuity on the part of plant management in locking the doors to information of value to the enemy. Some of the more common methods of espionage agents are the following:

Purchasing information from employees.

Theft or purchase of stolen plans, papers, and other documents.

Copying documents.

Photographing of the finished product.

Theft of finished product; particularly small parts or samples.

Questioning employees; either openly or under pretext.

Personal observation of production operations, test runs, shipment of finished product or confidential papers.

Espionage rings disguised as commercial concerns, scientific organizations, business men's groups, professional advisor services, etc.

(b) Sabotage. - The successful enemy agent with the mission of sabotage must produce large and spectacular results of which his employer is sure to hear. The sabotage objective of greatest importance to plant management is the interruption of production which delays or denies to the military forces supplies needed for the successful conduct of the war. The possibilities of major scale sabotage attempts must be foreseen by the plant Security Agent and action taken to prevent their successful accomplishment. Attempts at minor, small-scale acts of sabotage can be expected from enemy sympathisers which can, and must be, anticipated and prevented also. The major scale saboteur is certain to seek the conditions under which one act of sabotage may result in a more far reaching effect on the production of this country than all the little petty annoyances of sabotage combined. He must be gratified to find large volumes of precious critical material gathered together at a single point, where one major accident, or combination of conditions can strike an effective blow. Where conditions require concentration of precious materials, protection methods must be worked out such that if the act of sabotage is not entirely prevented, the extent of damage will be positively limited. A likely tool of wholesale sabotage is destruction by fire. Serious crippling of the production program by fire can readily occur if the important equipment and critical supplies and materials are stored or placed together in a manner where a single fire can destroy them. The application of sound principles of fire protection, prevention, and fighting will deprive the saboteur of success in the use of fire as a tool and minimize the extent of loss and damage if not prevent it entirely. It is well to remember that whatever the cause of fire, the most important step of all is immediate action with proper equipment when the fire is discovered.

(c) Prevention. - In the prevention of espionage and sabotage, much can be accomplished through effective identification and control of personnel; adequate physical protection, as by fencing; the employment of adequate well-trained guards; and the instilling into the mind of every employee the essential need of constant alertness and the prompt reporting of suspicious incidents. Employee relations and personnel control are important factors in

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information

maintaining plant security. Employees and former employees naturally are familiar with the plant and its processes and have accurate information which, in the event of their disloyalty, may enable them to release vital information or to commit sabotage at vulnerable points. Loyal employees, because of honorable and patriotic motives in times of emergency, will assist in protecting plant property and will report any suspicious act or occurrences which may be indicative of attempts at espionage or sabotage.

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

6-01. General. - The Plant Security Agent shall initiate and supervise a plant safety program with the plant safety engineer in accordance with the practices established by the various national safety committees and councils for industrial safety. During war, when every resource at our command is being utilized to capacity, the loss of a man-hour, machine-hour, or production-hour from preventable accidental causes, or through any act or omission on our part is very closely related to sabotage, and produces exactly the same net results. The reduction of such losses to a minimum, through the medium of a well integrated plant safety program is therefore a true function of Protective Security.

6-02. Scope - The subject of plant safety, as referred to herein, is concerned with not only the personal safety of all individual employees, but also with the safety of the physical features of the plant itself. Safeguarding employees against the hazards of unguarded machinery, defective equipment, improper lighting and unsafe practices of the employees themselves, and the safeguarding of the physical plant against fire, explosion, etc., fall within the scope of plant safety.

6-03. Program - A detailed discussion of safety will not be undertaken in these instructions. Past emphasis on industrial safety should assure at least a nucleus of safety trained people in the organization, and with the wealth of published data on the subject available, the Security Agent should be able to develop a first class acceptable safety program. Proper attention should be given to the designation of fire control areas and squads within the plant, and the instructing of employees in the correct methods of combating the several types of fires. Special attention will be given to the proper control of new hazards introduced by the nature of project activities.

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Security Information

7-01. General. - To keep the District Engineer informed and assist in the coordination of the security program throughout the general project, the following reports are required. All reports shall be carefully prepared and promptly mailed at the times specified. Organizations to which an Area Engineer has been assigned may be required to forward all communications and reports relative to the protective security system through his office in order that he may be continuously informed on the subject. The exact procedure shall be established by each Area Engineer concerned. Such reports and communications, regardless of whether or not they are forwarded through the Area Engineer, shall be addressed as follows:

b. The District Engineer  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
P.O.Box 42 - Station F  
New York, N. Y.  
Attention: Protective Security Officer.

7-02. Immediate Reports. - (a) Upon Receipt of These Instructions. - Immediately upon receipt of these instructions, each organization engaged on this project shall report the complete name, mailing address, and telephone number of the executive whom they have designated to act as Security Agent. As soon as possible, thereafter, a report shall be submitted listing the names, and designations of all persons who have knowledge of or access to classified matters then engaged on the work. Immediate steps shall be taken to formally clear these individuals in accordance with paragraph 2-06.

(b) At Time of Occurrence or Receipt of Information. - Complete details relative to the following shall be reported in a confidential manner immediately upon occurrence or receipt of information:

Evidence of tampering, subjection to compromise, or loss of classified documents or materiel.

Evidence of suspected disloyalty of employees or other personnel directly or indirectly connected with the general project.

Evidence of attempted espionage or sabotage.

Evidence of tampering or entry to restricted areas, safes, locked files, etc.

Private sales of products and inquiries seeking to purchase. (See sub-paragraph 4-01(f)(6)).

Name, designation, nature and amount of information known, and reasons given for each employee leaving the project who had knowledge of or access to SECRET information.

Security Information to all persons leaving the project with the intention of leaving the United States. Information in this instance shall be furnished as far in advance as possible of the date of the proposed departure from the country.

7-03. Weekly Report. - Each organization shall submit a weekly report of visitors to be in the mail by Monday of the week following the calendar week covered by the report. This report shall be prepared in the form illustrated in the Appendix - Part A and shall include for each visitor, his name, organization represented, date and time of arrival and departure, and persons contacted. Visitor pass forms surrendered by such visitors shall be returned to this office with this report as required by paragraph 3-06.

7-04.- Monthly Reports. - (a) Employees Assigned to Classified Duties. - On the first of each calendar month a report shall be submitted listing all changes during the previous month in the assignment of persons engaged on classified work (except RESTRICTED). This report shall be prepared in the form illustrated in the Appendix - Part A. For each individual newly assigned, released, or transferred the report shall indicate his name, action, date effective, and appropriate remarks. In the case of an employee resigning, his reason shall be noted. If a person is transferred to or from another organization engaged on the general project, or another unit of your organization maintained separately at some remote location, that organization or unit shall be identified. Transfers between separate branches of a unit all of which are located at the same general site need not be reported. This portion of the report is primarily intended to cover transfers between distinctly separate units located in different cities.

(b) Protective Measures. - A narrative progress report shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month describing the protective measures installed during the past month, those proposed for future installation, and noting the causes for any delay in completion of pending measures.

o o o

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Security Information



APPENDIX - PART A

The forms illustrated on the following pages, with the exception of the Personnel Security Questionnaire, finger print chart, data card and visitor pass forms, shall be reproduced as required by the separate organizations engaged on the project. Those forms excepted above will be furnished by this office upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Accomplished form to be submitted in sextuplicate by contractor seeking written consent of the Secretary of War for employment of an alien in relation to aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential or restricted) War Department contracts.

Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of employer \_\_\_\_\_ City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_ 4. \_\_\_\_\_ 5. \_\_\_\_\_  
Alien's full name (any alias?) Age Birthplace Citizen of what country
6. \_\_\_\_\_ 7. \_\_\_\_\_ 8. \_\_\_\_\_  
Married or single Male or female Citizenship status of husband or wife
9. \_\_\_\_\_ 10. \_\_\_\_\_  
Number of children Citizenship status of children
11. \_\_\_\_\_ 12. \_\_\_\_\_  
First papers applied for (Date) First papers received (Date)
13. \_\_\_\_\_ 14. \_\_\_\_\_  
Second papers applied for (Date) Why was naturalization delayed?
15. \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of last entry into United States:
16. \_\_\_\_\_ 17. \_\_\_\_\_ 18. \_\_\_\_\_  
Place of entry Name of ship Dates of prior entries (Attach explanation)
19. \_\_\_\_\_  
Length of service with contractor:
20. \_\_\_\_\_  
Complete present address:
21. \_\_\_\_\_  
All previous addresses:
22. \_\_\_\_\_  
Former employers in and outside the United States (Give dates of employment):
23. \_\_\_\_\_  
Military or naval service (Give dates and name of country)
24. \_\_\_\_\_ 25. \_\_\_\_\_  
Membership in organizations, societies, clubs or committees Religion
26. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dates and places of any arrests with statement of offenses and disposition
27. \_\_\_\_\_  
Names, relationship, and addresses of members of immediate family living in any foreign country:



TO BE EXECUTED BY THE CONTRACTOR

31. \_\_\_\_\_ 32. \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of employer • Name of alien
33. Is contract a prime contract or a subcontract? \_\_\_\_\_
34. Indicate whether contract is an aeronautical, or classified (Secret, confidential and restricted) contract: \_\_\_\_\_
35. Government procurement agency for which work is being done: \_\_\_\_\_
36. \_\_\_\_\_  
Government's numerical designation of contract, such as (W-535-ac-13333)
37. \_\_\_\_\_  
Job title and description of alien's proposed duties under contract
38. Can alien be shifted to other work and replaced by a citizen without interfering with production? \_\_\_\_\_ 39. If not, state special qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_
40. Will alien have access to plans, specifications or work under aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential and restricted) War Department contracts, or will he be likely to participate in such contract trials? \_\_\_\_\_
41. Is material upon which alien is working subject to sabotage? \_\_\_\_\_
42. Could sabotage be readily detected? \_\_\_\_\_
43. Would sabotage mean failure of performance of the finished product? \_\_\_\_\_
44. Will alien have access to information pertaining to new ideas, plans or specifications, not generally known to the industry? \_\_\_\_\_
45. \_\_\_\_\_  
Has alien served as seaman since 1938? (Explain)
46. What is the reputation of alien for loyalty to the United States? \_\_\_\_\_
47. \_\_\_\_\_  
Describe any rumors or incidents concerning alien's loyalty
48. \_\_\_\_\_  
Do you recommend consent for this alien's work in relation to the above contract?
49. Are you sufficiently well acquainted with alien to vouch for his loyalty to the United States? \_\_\_\_\_ 50. If so, do you vouch for his loyalty? \_\_\_\_\_

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Title \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendations of Army Factory Representative and/or District Procurement Representative.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

38. Can alien be shifted to other work and replaced by a citizen without interfering with production? \_\_\_\_\_ 39. If not, state special qualifications: \_\_\_\_\_
- 
40. Will alien have access to plans, specifications or work under aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential and restricted) War Department contracts, or will he be likely to participate in such contract trials? \_\_\_\_\_
41. Is material upon which alien is working subject to sabotage? \_\_\_\_\_
42. Could sabotage be readily detected? \_\_\_\_\_
43. Would sabotage mean failure of performance of the finished product? \_\_\_\_\_
44. Will alien have access to information pertaining to new ideas, plans or specifications, not generally known to the industry? \_\_\_\_\_
45. \_\_\_\_\_  
Has alien served as seaman since 1938? (Explain) \_\_\_\_\_
46. What is the reputation of alien for loyalty to the United States? \_\_\_\_\_
47. \_\_\_\_\_  
Describe any rumors or incidents concerning alien's loyalty \_\_\_\_\_
48. \_\_\_\_\_  
Do you recommend consent for this alien's work in relation to the above contract? \_\_\_\_\_
49. Are you sufficiently well acquainted with alien to vouch for his loyalty to the United States? \_\_\_\_\_ 50. If so, do you vouch for his loyalty? \_\_\_\_\_

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Title \_\_\_\_\_

Recommendations of Army Factory Representative and/or District Procurement Representative.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ Signed \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Approved July 4, 1942

DECLARATION OF CITIZENSHIP

I, \_\_\_\_\_, declare that I am a citizen of the United States, by reason of \_\_\_\_\_ am applying for employment on Government war contracts on work which may be secret, Confidential, or Restricted in character. I am declaring my citizenship for the purpose of securing such employment.

"(a) It is hereby made a felony for any alien or other person, whether an applicant for naturalization or citizenship, or otherwise, and whether an employee of the Government of the United States or not-----\*\*\*\*\*

(18) Knowingly to falsely represent himself to be a citizen of the United States without having been naturalized or admitted to citizenship, or without otherwise being a citizen of the United States.

\*\*\*\*\*

(d) Any person violating any provision of subsection (a)\*\*\*shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Act of October 14, 1940, c.876, section 346; 54 Stat. 1163; 8 U.S.C. 746)

"\* \* \* Whosoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false \* \* \* certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." (Act of April 4, 1938, c.69; Criminal Code, Section 35 (a); 52 Stat. 7; 50 U.S.C. 80)

I was born in \_\_\_\_\_ date \_\_\_\_\_.

Witness \* \*

I have read the laws herein quoted and am aware of the penalties imposed for misrepresentation.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Title & Address)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Title & Address)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signed)

If natural born, indicate whether by birth in the United States or by birth in a foreign country of American parentage. If by naturalization, indicate whether by naturalization by court proceedings, by naturalization of parent or marriage to a citizen of the United States, including dates and names of places, persons and title of Court involved.

# NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

## APPLICANT

Name of contributor \_\_\_\_\_ City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_  
(State whether Police Department, Sheriff's Office, or other official designation)

Applicant for \_\_\_\_\_  
(Specify position)

Name of company \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Birthplace \_\_\_\_\_ Citizenship \_\_\_\_\_


Age \_\_\_\_\_ Date of birth \_\_\_\_\_

Height \_\_\_\_\_ Weight \_\_\_\_\_

Hair \_\_\_\_\_ Eyes \_\_\_\_\_

Complexion \_\_\_\_\_ Build \_\_\_\_\_

Scars and marks \_\_\_\_\_



O-16-28517

**IMPORTANT - PLEASE INCLUDE ALL REQUESTED DATA**

# NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Classification \_\_\_\_\_  
(Surname) (First) (Middle)  
**(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT PLAINLY)**

No. \_\_\_\_\_ Color \_\_\_\_\_ Sex \_\_\_\_\_ Reference \_\_\_\_\_

## RIGHT HAND

1. Thumb	2. Index finger	3. Middle finger	4. Ring finger	5. Little finger

## LEFT HAND

6. Thumb	7. Index finger	8. Middle finger	9. Ring finger	10. Little finger

Impressions taken by: _____ <small>(Signature of official taking prints)</small>	Note amputations	_____
Date impressions taken _____		_____
<b>FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY</b>		<b>FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY</b>

Left hand	Left thumb	Right thumb	Right hand

**PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THIS CARD**



DATA CARD			
Name _____	Address _____		
Unit _____	Location of Unit _____		
Employer _____	Contracting Agency _____		
Date Employed _____	Date Fingerprinted _____		
P.S.Q. Completed _____	Espionage Act Signed _____		
Citizenship Status _____			
Date of Birth _____	Place of Birth _____		
H. S. _____	From _____	To _____	Grad. _____
College _____	From _____	To _____	Degree _____
College _____	From _____	To _____	Degree _____
(Do Not Use These Spaces)			
Submitted to S. C. _____	Released _____		
Date Reemployed _____	Where _____		
Preliminary Check by _____			Date _____
Formal Clearance by _____			Date _____
(over)			

Front Side

Previous Employer _____	Address _____		
Position Held _____	From _____	To _____	
Age _____	Ht. _____	Wt. _____	Hair _____
Build _____	Complexion _____		Eyes _____
Nationality of Father _____	Special _____		
Citizenship of Father _____	of Mother _____		
Relatives outside U. S. _____	of Mother _____		
	Country _____		
Payroll Classification _____			
Title of Position _____			
Type of Duties _____			
Category _____			
Remarks _____			

Reverse Side

0  
P  
Y  
ESPIONAGE ACT

EXTRACT FROM  
"THE CODE OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"  
IN FORCE JUNE 14, 1940

TITLE 50 - WAR -  
CHAPTER 4 - -ESPIONAGE

Section 31. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting national defense.

(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dock-yard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section 36 of this title; or (b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or (d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national

defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than \$10,000, (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I. Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 217, as amended by Public Act No. 443, Laws of 1940.)

Section 32. Unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense.

Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years: Provided, that whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and (b) whoever in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years, (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 2, 40 Stat. 218.)

Section 33. Seditious or disloyal acts or words in time of war.

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years or both. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 3, 40 Stat. 219; Mar. 3, 1921, c. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.)

Section 34. Conspiracy to violate preceding sections.

If two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions of sections 32 or 33 of this title, and one or more of such persons does any act or affect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy, shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy.

Except as above provided conspiracies to commit offenses under this chapter shall be punished as provided by section 38 of Title 18. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 4, 40 Stat. 219.)

Section 35. Harboring or concealing violators of law.

Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under this title shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than \$10,000. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 5, 40 Stat. 219, as amended by Public Act No. 443 Laws of 1940.)

Section 36. Designation of prohibited places by proclamation.

The President in time of war or in case of national emergency may by proclamation designate any place other than those set forth in subsection (a) of section 31 of this title in which anything for the use of the Army or Navy is being prepared or constructed or stored as a prohibited place for the purposes of this chapter: Provided, that he shall determine that information with respect thereto would be prejudicial to the national defense. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 6, 40 Stat. 219.)

Section 37. Places subject to provisions of chapter.

The provisions of this chapter shall extend to all Territories, possessions, and places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States whether or not contiguous thereto, and offenses under this chapter when committed upon the high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and outside the territorial limits thereof shall be punishable hereunder. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 8, 40 Stat. 219.)

Section 38. Jurisdiction of courts-martial and military commissions.

Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 12 of this title shall be deemed to limit the jurisdiction of the general courts-martial, military commissions, or naval courts-martial under chapter 36 of Title 10 and Chapter 21 of Title 34. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 7, 40 Stat. 219.)

Section 39. Jurisdiction of Courts of Canal Zone and Philippine Islands of offenses on high seas.

The several courts of first instance in the Philippine Islands and the district court of the Canal Zone shall have jurisdiction of offenses under this chapter and chapter 12 of this title committed within their respective districts, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the United States of offenses under this chapter and chapter 12 of this title committed upon the high seas, and of conspiracies to commit such offenses, as defined by section 88 of Title 18, and the provisions of said section, for the purpose of this chapter and chapter 12 of this title, are hereby extended to the Philippine Islands and to the Canal Zone. In such cases the district attorneys of the Philippine Islands and of the Canal Zone shall have the powers and perform the duties provided in this chapter for United States attorneys. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title XIII, Sec. 2, 40 Stat. 231.)

Section 40. "United States" defined.

The term "United States" as used in this chapter and chapter 12 of this title includes the Canal Zone and all territory and waters, continental or insular subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title XIII, Sec. 1, 40 Stat. 231.)

Section 41. "Foreign government" defined.

The words "foreign government", as used in this chapter, shall be deemed to include any government, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace, which government, faction or body of insurgents may or may not have been recognized by the United States as a government. (June 15, 1917, c. 30 Title VIII, Sec. 4, 40 Stat. 226.)

Section 42. Effect of partial invalidity of chapter.

If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this chapter or of chapter 12 of this title shall for any reason be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered. (June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title XIII, Sec. 4, 40 Stat. 231.)

My signature below indicates that I have read the Espionage Act quoted as above and hold myself responsible for conduct in accordance with the provisions thereof.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Organization

\_\_\_\_\_  
City

\_\_\_\_\_  
State

Note: Sign one copy in ink and send it promptly to the Secretary of the National Defense Research Committee, 1530 P Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Retain one copy for your reference and file.



(Classification)

APPLICATION FOR VISIT

Instructions pertaining to Form V-1 and V-2:

Requesting office will prepare in quadruplicate answering all questions completely and forward in triplicate to approving officer. Approving officer will forward the triplicate copy to District Protective Security Officer.

1. Visitor: \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Address: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Citizen: \_\_\_\_\_ When & Where born: \_\_\_\_\_  
(a) If naturalized, state when & where and give certificate number: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Has visitor been formally cleared by Army for access to Classified Information: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

5. If not cleared, state by what authority included in Army clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

6. State any limitations or restrictions included in Army clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

(over)



(Classification)

AUTHORIZATION FOR VISIT

Additional instructions for Form V-2 only:

Approving officer will, upon approval, forward original to the person in charge of the unit to be visited, and transmit duplicate to visitor. Visitor will not present Form V-2 directly to the guard but to the person in charge of the unit to be visited, who will retain same and submit with the weekly visitor report, except extended privilege visitors, who will, at its expiration, return Form V-2 to the Manhattan District, P. O. Box 42, Station F, New York, N. Y. Attention: District Protective Security Officer.

1. Visitor: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Name and location of unit to be visited: \_\_\_\_\_

Instructions pertaining to Form V-1 and V-2:

Requesting office will prepare in quadruplicate answering all questions completely and forward in triplicate to approving officer. Approving officer will forward the triplicate copy to District Protective Security Officer.

1. Visitor: \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Address: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Citizen: \_\_\_\_\_ When & Where born: \_\_\_\_\_  
(a) If naturalized, state when & where and give certificate number:

4. Has visitor been formally cleared by Army for access to Classified Information: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of clearance \_\_\_\_\_

5. If not cleared, state by what authority included in Army clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

6. State any limitations or restrictions included in Army clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

(over)

Form V-2



AUTHORIZATION FOR VISIT

(Classification)

Additional instructions for Form V-2 only:

Approving officer will, upon approval, forward original to the person in charge of the unit to be visited, and transmit duplicate to visitor. Visitor will not present Form V-2 directly to the guard but to the person in charge of the unit to be visited, who will retain same and submit with the weekly visitor report, except extended privilege visitors, who will, at its expiration, return Form V-2 to the Manhattan District, P. O. Box 42, Station F, New York, N. Y. Attention: District Protective Security Officer.

1. Visitor: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Name and location of unit to be visited: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Date and duration of visit: \_\_\_\_\_

4. Clear outline of necessary limitations and restrictions, scope of visit, and information which may properly be disclosed. \_\_\_\_\_

(over)





\_\_\_\_\_  
:  
:

9. (a) Has visitor been formally cleared by Army for access to Classified Information: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of clearance: \_\_\_\_\_

(b) If not cleared, state by what authority visitor is engaged on the work:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(c) State any limitations or restrictions included in Army clearance: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Name and location of unit to be visited: \_\_\_\_\_

To see: \_\_\_\_\_

11. Date and duration of visit: \_\_\_\_\_

12. Concise statement of purpose of visit (which presumably will contribute to the advancement of the work): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

.....  
\_\_\_\_\_  
:  
:  
:

(Classification)

5. What identification will visitor possess? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Title)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Unit)

7. Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Title)

8. Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(Complete name and address of your firm, corporation, or institution.)

REPORT OF ALL VISITORS WITH WHOM CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WAS DISCUSSED OR WHO HAD ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED WORK AREAS.

Week Ending \_\_\_\_\_

1. Name in full, last name first, and organization represented.
2. Indicate by, "N.C." under Departure Date if visit is not complete.
3. Attach visitor's copy of Form V-2 or V-4 except for extended or incomplete visits.

Name	Organization	Arrival		Departure		Persons Contacted
		Date	Time	Date	Time	

WAR DEPARTMENT  
 U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE  
 Manhattan District  
 P. O. Box 42  
 Station F  
 New York, N. Y.

# RECEIPT

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

RE: Receipt of Material.

Original to be signed personally by the recipient and returned to the sender.  
 Duplicate to be retained by the recipient.  
 Triplicate retained by sender for suspense file.

I have personally received from (sender) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (sender's address) \_\_\_\_\_, the material as identified below. I  
 assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal else-  
 where of this material in accordance with existing regulations. The material,  
 including inclosures and attachments, is identified as follows: (In identifying  
 material avoid any reference which might cause the receipt form to become CLAS-  
 SIFIED.)

Description (Check or indicate)	Date of Document or Letter of Transmittal	From	Reference or File No.	Addressed To	Date Mailed
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# RECEIPT

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ORIGINAL RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY



(Complete name and address of your firm, corporation, or institution.)

REPORT OF PERSONNEL CHANGES

Month of \_\_\_\_\_

- (1). Name in full, last name first, of each person assigned to or released from classified duties.
- (2). Indicate action as follows: A, new assignment; R, released. Show effective date.
- (3). For all releases, show reason for leaving. If person is transferred to or from another organization engaged on the general project, or another unit of your organization located in another city, name that organization or unit.

(1). Name	(2). Action	(3). Remarks

APPENDIX - PART B

Additional copies of the following instructions  
will be furnished by this office upon request.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
P.O. Box 42, Station F  
New York, N. Y.

INSTRUCTION FOR COMPLETING FINGERPRINT CHART

Only the National Defense Program Applicant fingerprint chart, Form No. 16-22517, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be used. All data requested shall be legibly and accurately entered in the appropriate spaces, preferably typewritten, in accordance with the following instructions:

1. NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR, CITY, STATE: Enter, without exception, "Commanding General, S.O.S., U. S. Army, Washington, D. C."
2. APPLICANT FOR: Enter name of position to be occupied by the applicant.
3. NAME OF COMPANY: Enter the name of the employing firm or company and complete address of the company's office at the site of operations.
4. DATE: Enter the date on which finger impressions are taken.
5. ADDRESS: Enter the applicant's complete local address.
6. REMAINING BLANKS ON SAME SIDE OF CHART: All blanks are self-explanatory and shall be completed with responsive, concise, legible information.
7. PHOTOGRAPH: If delay in submission of this chart would be occasioned thereby, the photograph shall be omitted.

IMPRESSION SIDE

8. NAME: Enter complete name of applicant as indicated.
9. CLASSIFICATION and REFERENCE: Leave these spaces blank.
10. COLOR and SEX: Enter color and sex of applicant. Color to be indicated as white, black yellow, etc.
11. NO.: Enter code number assigned by the Manhattan District.
12. FINGER IMPRESSIONS: Applicant's finger impressions shall be carefully taken in accordance with the instructions issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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John Edgar Hoover,  
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
Washington, D. C.

HOW TO TAKE FINGERPRINTS

The equipment required for taking good fingerprints is so inexpensive that this element is not prohibitive to anyone who desires to take advantage of this important science for identification. The equipment consists of a tube of printer's ink, a roller, an inking plate on which the fingers are inked, and possibly a card holder. The last item is not absolutely essential but can be of valuable assistance in holding the fingerprint card in place to prevent blurring. An inking slab also is utilized for the initial distribution of the ink where it is necessary to print a number of persons at the same time. The slab is not considered to be essential where a small number of individuals are to be fingerprinted.

Best results can be expected from the use of printer's black ink, for it dries so rapidly that fresh work can be handled immediately with very little danger of smudging. It is likewise simple to regulate the consistency of printer's ink by warming or using a reducing fluid when the ink is too thick. Plain writing fluid or regular stamp-pad ink is not satisfactory, as prints taken with such inks usually are illegible.

The roller best adapted to fingerprint work is similar to that used by printers in making galley proofs, and its size is a matter to be determined by the individual needs and preference of each operator. The usual one is about 6 inches long and 2 inches in diameter and may be obtained at a printers' supply house.

A good inking plate may be made from a wooden block shaped like a T section of railroad rail with the top covered by any hard, non-porous material such as glass. An ordinary piece of plate glass, however, about one fourth of an inch thick, about 6 inches wide, and 14 inches long usually will suit the purpose well. This inking glass should be elevated to sufficient height to allow the subject's forearm to assume a horizontal position when the fingers are being inked. For example, it may be placed on the edge of a counter or table of counter height. In such a position the operator has greater assurance of avoiding accidental strain and pressure on the fingers and should procure more uniform impressions. If the glass is placed on the edge of the table the subject's fingers which are not being printed can be made to "swing" off the table and will not interfere with the fingerprinting process.

This equipment should be supplemented by cleansing fluids and rags to prepare the subject's fingers and to thoroughly cleanse the slab, roller and inking plate after each using. Care should be taken to see that the subject's fingers are free from foreign matter and that no moisture is present when the fingers are inked since this condition will cause blurring of the impressions. Denatured alcohol, benzine, or gasoline is well suited to this purpose, and the failure to use some such



cleanser will result in imperfect impressions either devoid of identifying characteristics or possessing false markings caused by lint, dust, or gummed ink.

There are two types of impressions involved in taking fingerprints. On the upper portion of the fingerprint card 10 prints are taken individually of the thumb, index, middle, ring, and little fingers in the appropriate blocks for each hand in the order named and are known as "rolled impressions"; at the bottom of the card prints are taken simultaneously printing all the fingers of each hand. These are called "plain impressions" and are used as a check upon the sequence of the rolled impressions.

In order to understand the importance of carefully taking the rolled impressions, it must be remembered that the classification of prints involves differentiation by patterns, ridge counting, and ridge tracing, and certain focal points must be included to make classification possible. In taking the rolled impressions care should be taken to see that the entire pattern on each finger is printed. It is necessary that the "deltas" be shown to permit proper classification. This may be best accomplished by inking the entire first joint of each finger and rolling the finger printed from one edge of the fingernail to the other.

When the operator is prepared to take a set of finger impressions, a very small daub of ink should be placed on the glass or inking slab, if one is used, and thoroughly rolled until a very thin, even film covers the entire surface.

The subject should stand in front of and at forearm length from the inking plate. In taking rolled impressions the bulb of the finger is placed upon the inking plate, the plane of the nail at right angles to the plane of the inking plate, and the finger is then turned over or rolled until the bulb surface faces the opposite direction.

Care should be exercised to see that each finger is inked evenly from the tip to below the first joint.

By pressing the finger lightly on the card and rolling in exactly the same manner, a clear, rolled impression of the finger surface is obtained. Best results may be expected by inking and printing each finger separately, beginning with the right thumb and then, in order, the index, middle, ring, and little fingers.

If consideration is given to the anatomical or bony structure of the forearms when taking rolled impressions, more uniform prints will be obtained. The two principal bones of the forearm are known as the radius and the ulnar, the radius being on the thumb side and the ulnar on the little finger side of the arm. As suggested by its name, the radius bone revolves freely about the ulnar as the spoke of a wheel about the hub. To take advantage of the natural movement in making finger impressions the radius should always be made to revolve about the ulnar from the awkward to the easy position. This requires that the thumbs should always be rolled toward and the fingers away from the center of the body. This process leaves the fingers relaxed at the completion of rolling, and they may be easily raised from the printed surface without danger of slipping and smudging the impressions.

While the degree of pressure exerted in inking and taking rolled impressions is important, this factor can be best determined by experience and observation. It is quite important, however, that the subject be cautioned to relax and not attempt to assist by exerting any pressure on the inking surface, for the operator could not then gauge the pressure on the paper, and blurred prints would follow. It is necessary upon occasion to experiment in printing the fingers of certain classes of persons where the ridges may be obliterated or rendered indistinct because of occupational or other factors. The application of the proper amount of pressure with the use of exactly the requisite amount of ink assists in taking good impressions in these cases. Should it be found impossible to obtain satisfactory results because the ridges are worn down, good prints sometimes are obtainable after a week or two elapses, during which the subject is not engaged in his usual occupation, destructive to the ridges.

To obtain "plain impressions" all the fingers of the right hand are pressed lightly on the inking plate and then pressed simultaneously on the lower right-hand corner of the card in the space provided. After the same operation is completed with the left hand, the thumbs of both hands should be inked and printed together in the spaces provided.

Care should be exercised to inscribe legibly the individual's name and all other data requested on the fingerprint form. On the impression side of the card, the heading "Classification" and "Reference" must be left blank on cards forwarded to the FBI since this space is reserved for the entering of the fingerprint classification assigned by the fingerprint experts in the Bureau's Identification Division.

United States Engineer Office

Manhattan District

P. O. Box 42, Station F

New York, N. Y.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING DATA CARD

1. NAME - Enter full name of individual in capital letters with the last name first.
2. ADDRESS - Enter his present address.
3. UNIT - Enter name of Unit to which individual will be assigned.
4. LOCATION OF UNIT - Enter address of Unit.
5. EMPLOYER - Name of Company or Agency paying individual.
6. CONTRACTING AGENCY - Enter name of Government Agency for which work is being performed. (i. e., Manhattan District or OSD)
7. DATE EMPLOYED - Enter date individual begins work on this project.
8. DATE FINGERPRINTED - Self-explanatory.
9. P. S. Q. COMPLETED - Enter date Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form NNI-140, was completed and forwarded for approval.
10. ESPIONAGE ACT SIGNED - Enter date of applicant's signature.
11. CITIZENSHIP STATUS - Enter native, naturalized, or alien, as applicable. If naturalized, enter certificate number, date, and place of issuance. If an alien, state citizenship and enter alien registration number.
12. DATE OF BIRTH - Self-explanatory.
13. PLACE OF BIRTH - Self-explanatory.
14. H. S. - Insert name of school, years attended, and state whether or not individual graduated.
15. COLLEGE - Insert name of college, years attended, and degree received.
16. COLLEGE - Insert similar information relative to graduate work or other college attendance.
17. The remaining spaces on the front of the card shall be left blank.
18. PREVIOUS EMPLOYER - Give information required concerning most recent position.

- 19. AGE, HT., WT., HAIR, EYES, BUILD, COMPLEXION - Self-explanatory.
- 20. SPECIAL - Indicate any distinguishing features of the individual, such as scars, amputations, deformities, peculiarity of speech, etc.
- 21. NATIONALITY OF FATHER, MOTHER - Indicate country where born.
- 22. CITIZENSHIP OF FATHER, MOTHER - Insert native, naturalized, or alien.
- 23. RELATIVES OUTSIDE U. S. - Insert number of relatives living outside U. S.
- 24. COUNTRY - Insert name of country or countries where these relatives live.
- 25. PAYROLL CLASSIFICATION - Self-explanatory.
- 26. TITLE OF POSITION - Enter title of position to be held by applicant when this is different from payroll classification.
- 27. TYPE OF DUTIES - Concise statement of type of work to be performed including degree of trust (low, medium, or high).
- 28. CATEGORY - Concise statement as to how completely informed person will necessarily be regarding the work of this project. Give degree of classification of his work (restricted, confidential, or secret).
- 29. REMARKS - Enter any other pertinent information regarding individual.

**NOTE:** Complete detailed information shall be given in spaces 27 and 28. The data card shall be marked SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL according to the information given.

- 18. DATE OF BIRTH - Self-explanatory.
- 19. DATE OF DEATH - Self-explanatory.
- 20. EDUCATION - Insert name of college, university, and degree received.
- 21. EMPLOYMENT - Insert name of employer and position held.
- 22. TRAINING - Insert name of training school and course received.
- 23. REFERENCES - Give names of individuals who can vouch for individual's reliability.
- 24. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - Give any other information not covered by other items.



**PLANT PROTECTION  
FOR  
MANUFACTURERS**



MAY 1, 1943

**WAR DEPARTMENT**

PAMPHLET No. 32-1

PREPARED JOINTLY BY THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943.

Pamphlet No. 32-1, Plant Protection for Manufacturers, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

(A. G. 004 (3-15-43).)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

G. C. MARSHALL  
*Chief of Staff*

OFFICIAL:  
J. A. ULIO,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General*

This is a revision of the Plant Protection Pamphlet No. 32-1, published by the Plant Protection Division, War Relocation Authority, in February 1943.

To prevent a shortage of essential production materials, the War Relocation Authority has issued order (1) to protect against all hazards of value to the Nation and to provide manufacturers with the requirements.

What applies to the War Relocation Authority and although production standards and requirements requires that a copy be by representative protection inspection.

Protection against hazards is placed squarely on the War Relocation Authority and to assure that the War Relocation Authority is protected against

**WAR DEPARTMENT**  
**OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF WAR**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

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**FOREWORD**

This is a revision of the pamphlet with the same title issued by the Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, in February 1942.

To prevent avoidable destruction, interruption, or delay in the production and delivery of munitions and other material essential to the prosecution of the war, the War and Navy Departments have set up certain standards and requirements in order (1) to provide for the security of plants and facilities against all hazards, and (2) to safeguard information that might be of value to the enemy. The purpose of this pamphlet is to provide manufacturers with a guide to these standards and requirements.

What applies to one plant may not be applicable to another, and although principles of protection will remain the same, standards and requirements will vary in their application. This requires that a determination be made for each individual plant by representatives of the War or Navy Department (plant protection inspectors), in collaboration with management.

Protection against all normal hazards is a responsibility placed squarely upon the shoulders of manufacturers. Inspections and recommendations are made to assist manufacturers, and to assure that our vital war industries are thoroughly protected against all hazards.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE.	
1. Sabotage -----	1
2. Industrial information sought through espionage.-----	2
3. Tactics of spies.-----	2
4. Employees as a factor in the prevention of sabotage and espionage..	3
5. Necessity for employee identification.-----	4
6. Investigation of employees is essential.-----	5
7. Fingerprinting -----	5
8. Protection of the plant area against unauthorized entry.-----	6
9. Visitors -----	7
10. Restricted areas.-----	8
11. Classified information.-----	9
12. Administrative precautions against espionage.-----	9
II. REMOVAL OF SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES.-----	9
III. EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS.-----	10
IV. PROTECTION OF POWER FACILITIES.-----	10
V. FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION.	
1. Responsibility of management.-----	12
2. Fire prevention an essential to victory.-----	12
3. Good housekeeping.-----	12
4. Subdivision of values.-----	13
5. Physical barriers.-----	13
6. Elimination of fire causes.-----	14
7. Electrical maintenance.-----	14
8. First-aid fire protection.-----	14
9. Automatic sprinkler protection.-----	16
10. Inspection requirements.-----	17
11. Fire prevention education.-----	17
12. Plant fire brigades.-----	17
13. Fire alarms.-----	18
14. Water supplies.-----	18
15. Cooperation with public fire department.-----	18
16. Responsibility essential.-----	19



## VI. ACCIDENT PREVENTION.

	Page
1. The importance of a safety program, and its principal factors.....	19
2. Safety organization.....	20
3. Unsafe practices.....	20
4. Protective equipment and clothing.....	20
5. Physical hazards.....	21
6. Education and promotion.....	21
7. Records essential.....	21
8. Cooperation with other agencies.....	21
9. Compliance.....	21

## VII. GUARD FORCES.

1. General requirement.....	21
2. Uniforms.....	22
3. Arms and equipment.....	22
4. Selection of guards.....	22
5. Investigation and fingerprinting.....	22
6. Training requirements.....	22
7. Organization.....	23
8. Rules, regulations, and records.....	23
9. Duties of guards and watchmen.....	23
10. Guard communication systems.....	23
11. Militarization of plant guard forces.....	23

**PL  
FOR**

### **I.**

#### **I. SABOTAGE.**

Even in peacetime and may result in the desire of our enemy consideration. The fact in the summer of 1918 method of attack from

Although there has been a rise in enemy-inspired attitude for this reason agents in this country have been induced to eventual of seizing opportunities and delays to the production of goods.

The saboteur may be successful in his attempts and attempts frequently result from natural causes.

It is essential that all opportunities for sabotage be fully taken advantage of in defense possible.

There are numerous forms of sabotage. It is urgent to take measures particularly against the following:

a. Damage to machinery, abrasives, chemical elements, and other damaging elements which may have been used in the production of goods.

b. Damage to irreparable property, such as bombs, gas explosion devices, etc.

c. Damage to power lines, telegraph boards or other key equipment.

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21  
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21  
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# PLANT PROTECTION FOR MANUFACTURERS

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21  
22

## I. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE

22  
22 ✓

### I. SABOTAGE.

22  
22  
23  
23  
23

Even in peacetime, sabotage and malicious mischief are a constant hazard and may result in serious damage and delay to production. In wartime the desire of our enemies to disrupt American production becomes a serious consideration. The fact that enemy trained saboteurs were landed on our shores in the summer of 1942 indicates the importance the enemy attaches to this method of attack from within.

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Although there has been no proof, since the start of this war, of any organized, enemy-inspired sabotage, it would be dangerous to accept a complacent attitude for this reason and assume that enemy sympathizers, and enemy agents in this country are unaware of the vital importance of our war production to eventual victory, and that they have neither plans nor intentions of seizing opportunities that may be presented, to cause serious destruction and delays to the production of war materials.

The saboteur may be sly and furtive. He may strike when least expected, and attempts frequently to avoid suspicion by making his depredations appear to result from natural causes.

It is essential that we remain constantly conscious of danger, estimate carefully all opportunities open to a saboteur, and provide the most effective defense possible.

There are enumerated below some of the more probable methods of sabotage. It is urgent to consider and provide protection against these or other forms particularly applicable to your plant:

a. Damage to machines, equipment, or materials by breakage, manipulation, abrasives, chemicals, or foreign bodies. This includes the introduction of damaging elements into a machine through the medium of lubricating oils which may have been polluted.

b. Damage to irreplaceable machinery, equipment, or buildings by time bombs, gas explosions, incendiary bombs and devices, or other explosives.

c. Damage to power stations, transmission lines, transfer stations, switchboards or other key points of the power system, including damage to the

water supply system, gas installations, lighting systems and telephone or other communications system.

- d. Tampering with gages, precision tools, or technical mechanisms.
- e. Tampering with blueprints, formulae, or working models.
- f. Bacterial infection or other pollution of water and foodstuffs.
- g. Creating conditions conducive to accidents or injury of personnel.
- h. Damage by arson, taking advantage of existing fire hazards to allay suspicion.

## 2. INDUSTRIAL INFORMATION SOUGHT THROUGH ESPIONAGE.

Espionage agents, and spies for profit, are interested in almost all information relating to war industries. The following types of information are likely to be the most frequently sought:

- a. Improved methods of production.
- b. Type of material being produced.
- c. Ultimate destination of completed units, and the means of transportation to such destination.
- d. Rate of production and capacity.
- e. Quantity of articles on order by this and other governments.
- f. Specifications, formulae, and plans of all munitions and war equipment.
- g. Test records of newly developed munitions, airplanes, guns, torpedoes, and related equipment.
- h. Sources of supply of raw materials and/or partially machined materials.

## 3. TACTICS OF SPIES.

Espionage agents may exhibit unlimited ingenuity in collecting pertinent information for their governments. Following are examples of tactics to which spies and enemy agents may resort in obtaining information regarding industrial plants:

- a. Infiltration of spies into plants as employees.
- b. Obtaining admission as a privileged visitor, or inspector, through impersonation or other fraud.
- c. Purchasing information from employees.
- d. Theft or purchase of plans, specifications, and other confidential documents.
- e. Making copies of documents.
- f. Photographing working models or finished products.
- g. Reproduction or theft of working models or finished products.
- h. Questioning employees either openly or under pretext.
- i. Enticing employees who are particularly familiar with the production of secret and confidential materials to enter the services of a foreign power and serve in an advisory capacity for the production of similar war munitions.
- j. Reporting personal observation and study of production operations, test runs, or confidential papers.
- k. Foreign espionage rings disguised as commercial concerns, import-export associations, scientific organizations, insurance agencies, businessmen's groups, and engineering organizations may attempt to obtain confidential or

other information of benefit to a single foreign agent has identification or organization, as circumstances, obtains information disclosed.

l. Pressure and threat of a foreign agent, who reside in a foreign country.

m. Skillful extraction of information from the family or close friends of the employee.

n. Information obtained from the family or close friends of employees congregated together is not restricted.

## 4. EMPLOYEES AS A MEANS OF SABOTAGE AND

The greatest single protest and aggressive cooperation of the vast majority of employees is their hearty cooperation in the war effort.

incalculable, for as a group

a. Know all details of espionage or undercover men

b. Know their fellow workers

c. Can be trained to exert

Thoroughly effective cooperation can be secured without education and discipline essential. The most important factors to be considered should be educated are—

a. Willing acceptance of inconveniences by the many for the few subversives.

b. The dangers of talking

c. The dangers of hysterical or unwise organizations.

d. The dangers of spreading rumors in Japan."

e. Detection of and reporting

f. Observance of suspicious

g. Avoidance of unwarranted

h. Avoidance of associating

i. Avoidance of suspicious financial opportunities.

j. Noting and reporting un

k. Familiarity with the ta

To be effective, education of employees is essential. Furthermore, it must be sufficient to arouse the imagination of the employee.

her  
other information of benefit to a foreign power. Instances are known where a single foreign agent has become associated with a legitimate and loyal association or organization, as a member thereof, and under apparent legitimate circumstances, obtains information of value which would not otherwise be disclosed.

lay  
*l.* Pressure and threat with reference to relatives and friends, of an employee, who reside in a foreign country.

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rely  
*m.* Skillful extraction of information of value to the enemy from members of the family or close friends of an employee.

*n.* Information obtained in public and semipublic places where groups of employees congregate for social or other purposes and where conversation is not restricted.

4. EMPLOYEES AS A FACTOR IN THE PREVENTION OF SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE.

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The greatest single protective factor in industry can be the understanding and aggressive cooperation of all loyal employees. It is unquestionable that the vast majority of employees is patriotic and anxious to contribute wholeheartedly to the war effort. The value of this great reservoir of assistants is incalculable, for as a group they—

*a.* Know all details of operation more completely than either plant management or undercover men;

*b.* Know their fellow workers far more intimately; and

*c.* Can be trained to exercise an ever-present and all-inclusive surveillance.

Thoroughly effective cooperation of employees cannot be expected or secured without education and training in the problems involved and the discipline essential. The more important points relative to which employees should be educated are—

*a.* Willing acceptance of the unpleasant fact that all employees must be inconvenienced by the many rules and regulations designed to trap or thwart the few subversives.

*b.* The dangers of talking business away from the job.

*c.* The dangers of hysteria and disaffection which may be inspired by subversive organizations.

*d.* The dangers of spreading unconfirmed rumors, such as "Made in Japan."

*e.* Detection of and reporting trespassers.

*f.* Observance of suspicious characters and their actions.

*g.* Avoidance of unwarranted approaches by strangers anywhere.

*h.* Avoidance of association with dubious characters.

*i.* Avoidance of suspicious promotional offers involving lurid business or financial opportunities.

*j.* Noting and reporting unusual equipment failures and accidents.

*k.* Familiarity with the tactics of spies and saboteurs.

To be effective, educational work of this character must be continuous. Furthermore, it must be sufficiently appealing to capture the interest and imagination of the employee. Experience indicates that the most effective form

of education is the informal, on-the-job instruction conducted by the employee's immediate supervisor. Here it is possible to use actual, everyday examples to illustrate general principles, thus fixing the problems and responsibilities more firmly in mind than by depending entirely upon classroom or textbook instruction. The written text usually serves better as reference material for the supervisor than for the employees whom he instructs.

## 5. NECESSITY FOR EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION.

Spies or saboteurs may attempt to gain physical access in order to plan or carry out their assigned mission. It is required, therefore, that plants and facilities essential to the prosecution of the war maintain an identification system whereby employees may quickly and positively recognize a stranger, or an employee outside his proper area.

In some small plants, this may be accomplished by personal recognition, but in larger plants, a positive employee identification system must be established and enforced. Adequacy of this identification system will be determined by personnel of the plant protection inspection service. Minimum standards normally will require the following:

*a. Individual identification.*—The most practical method is by identification card or badge. The badge pinned to the clothing is preferred, and is essential in large plants. It is visible at all times and is less liable to be lost. The badge system should meet the following requirements:

- (1) The badge itself should be of tamperproof design.
- (2) Make-up and issue rigidly controlled to minimize counterfeiting or theft, and insure return upon termination of service.
- (3) Every employee to wear his badge at all times within the plant area.
- (4) Badges always to be worn in a uniform place on the clothing.
- (5) Badge to include either a photograph or descriptive information sufficient to identify readily and positively the badge with its wearer (photograph is preferred).
- (6) Visitors should be issued special badges or passes as indicated in the section on "Visitor Control" (see pages 7 and 8).

*b. Movement restrictions.*—Enemy agents may not be stupid and may be within war plants as presumably "loyal" employees, with identification card or badge. Restriction of movement is therefore necessary as an added precaution. In very large or vital plants, an individual badge should be valid only for one shift or for one section of the plant. A badge system using different colored backgrounds, for example, will help spot an employee not in his own department, or in the plant during an unauthorized period. Such an employee should be challenged by the nearest person and required to show a special pass signed by his foreman. An employee entering or leaving at off-shift hours may be controlled in a similar manner.

*c. Enforcement.*—No identification system is better than its enforcement. It is probable that a clever intruder will be revealed, not by a glaring fault, but by an otherwise minor error. Rigid enforcement is therefore a requirement. Although this is a primary responsibility of the plant guards and foremen,

each employee must do compliance.

An excessive number of by excessive absenteeism indications of poor execution.

## 6. INVESTIGATION

Employees are in a very or espionage. Positive importance in time of war espionage or sabotage is United States Department must exercise every make application for employment.

*a. Minimum information for the prosecution of the war*

- (1) Fingerprints as required
- (2) Personal history to be submitted by your plant protection
- (3) Routine mail or telephone calls from employers, and a check application form.

*b. Additional information*

- (1) Aliens may be employed without prior consent of the War Department; consent may be required in special cases at the request of a special agent.
- (2) Selected employees may be subject to the request of a special agent.

*c. Special workers* are those such as contractors, consultants, and personnel depends entirely from a complete check, done by the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

*d. Suspected disloyalty* of employees should be reported to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

## 7. FINGERPRINTING.

All present employees at plants and facilities vital to the war effort should be permitted to do so by the concerned authorities.

The purpose of the program is to indicate that continued employment is essential to the war effort. Criminal Investigation of War and Navy Department should initiate appropriate action in

each employee must do more than his share towards maintaining strict compliance.

An excessive number of lost or "forgotten" badges is often accompanied by excessive absenteeism, continued "labor troubles," low morale, or other indications of poor executive control by plant officials.

#### **6. INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES IS ESSENTIAL**

Employees are in a very favorable position for accomplishment of sabotage or espionage. Positive determination of their loyalty is of extreme importance in time of war. Investigation of actual or suspected cases of espionage or sabotage is a function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice. To avoid such cases the plant management must exercise every possible precaution to determine that persons who make application for employment are loyal and dependable.

a. Minimum information on employees at plants and facilities essential to the prosecution of the war is as follows:

- (1) Fingerprints as required by War and Navy Departments.
- (2) Personal history to be entered on an employment application form approved by your plant protection inspector.
- (3) Routine mail or telephone check on references, particularly previous employers, and a check of important or doubtful statements appearing on the application form.

b. Additional information required in special cases:

- (1) Aliens may be employed on classified or aeronautical contracts only with *prior* consent of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. Consent may be requested by submission of the forms provided.
- (2) Selected employees may be required to submit additional personal data upon the request of a service command representative or plant protection inspector.

c. *Special workers* are those stationed in the plant but employed by others, such as contractors, consulting engineers, or caterers. Investigation of this personnel depends entirely upon circumstances, and may consist of anything from a complete check, down to a simple statement of loyalty.

d. *Suspected disloyalty* for any reason or cause will be reported at once to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

#### **7. FINGERPRINTING.**

All present employees and applicants accepted for employment in plants and facilities vital to the war effort are required to be fingerprinted. Other plants and facilities desiring to participate voluntarily in this program may be permitted to do so by the commanding general of the service command concerned.

The purpose of the program is to identify persons whose criminal records indicate that continued employment in their present positions may endanger the war effort. Criminal records are confidential and for the exclusive use of War and Navy Departments personnel, who evaluate the information and initiate appropriate action in accordance with the purpose of the program as

set forth above. The War and Navy Departments are not primarily concerned with the morals of employees, and disregard criminal records unless they disclose tendencies that may make their employment a risk. Production of war materials is of critical importance and every person who can contribute without endangering the war effort will be permitted to do so.

### 8. PROTECTION OF THE PLANT AREA AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY.

Access to the plant must be so arranged that intruders may be excluded or captured, and visitors controlled.

#### a. Physical requirements.

- (1) *Fencing* is the most effective barrier. Present metal shortages require the use of ingenuity in designing suitable fencing from available material.
- (2) *Entrances* should be kept at a minimum number. They should be locked or guarded at all times.
- (3) *Screening* should be used on all vulnerable windows, ventilators, drains, or other small openings.

*b. Enforcement.*—No physical barrier is effective unless backed up by human observation. Fences, locks, and bars will delay but will not stop a determined intruder. All employees should be on the alert to spot any unauthorized entry.

*c. The guard force* normally will be the principal enforcement agency. Static guards are required at all unlocked places of entry to control all persons entering or leaving. Roving guards must be provided to patrol all other vulnerable points of possible entry.

Guards and watchmen should make regular patrols of the entire plant, with special attention to areas likely to be of particular interest to espionage or sabotage agents. Guards should vary their routes occasionally so that their appearance at any given point cannot be anticipated. Guards' and watchmen's rounds should be arranged so as to cover the interiors and exteriors of all important buildings. Watch-clock stations should be so located that all points of the plant and yard will come under the observation of a guard or watchman on each round.

Fences must be inspected on each round and watch should be kept for foreign objects which might be used for sabotage purposes, or to facilitate entrance to the plant. Locked gates and entrances must be checked and any abnormal condition immediately reported.

Trucks and railroad cars should be checked by guards at points of entrance. In important plants, guards should be stationed at receiving and shipping platforms to keep unauthorized persons away and to make sure that no unauthorized or damaging materials are brought in or shipped out.

In general, guards should have no duties other than the maintenance of plant protection. In small plants, however, watchmen may sometimes assist firemen, start process heaters or furnaces, etc., provided such duties do not interfere with their regular rounds or other guard functions.

*Parking lots* preferably should be adjacent to plant areas they employees will have to enter through. Persons entering the plant areas should be checked. Visitors who are to park their automobiles outside

### 9. VISITORS.

*a. Responsibility.*—The plant and visits within any plant should be under the supervision of the commanding officer of the Government and with the owner and operator of the installation. Thus, all authorized visitors should be approved by the person primarily responsible for the plant.

*b. Limitation of visitors.*—Only those persons who are necessary for the maintenance and necessary purpose of the plant should be admitted, and Navy representatives, and

#### c. Special visitors.

- (1) Reporters, photographers, and news correspondents should not be admitted to a plant unless accredited by the commanding officer or the Office of the Chief of Staff, and the purpose has been determined beforehand.
- (2) Foreign nationals (except those representing a Government) should be admitted only on written authorization from the Department General Staff.
- (3) State and local officials should be admitted only on written authorization. Ordinances may be applicable to the Army or Navy.
- (4) Firemen, policemen, plumbers, and other persons should be admitted in an emergency only on written authorization. Reasonable precautions should be taken to avoid a state of confusion to the plant.
- (5) Casual visitors, such as family members, should be admitted by the plant only on written authorization approved by the plant.
- (6) Properly identified agents should be admitted to the plant only on written authorization from the Army and Navy, and should be accompanied by a representative of their duties.

*d. Visitors essential to production.*—Visitors essential to production, such as repairmen, accredited insurance adjusters, and consultants may be admitted by the plant only on written authorization from representatives of the Army and Navy.

#### e. Control of visitors.

- (1) Visitors will be kept in the plant only when accompanied by a representative of the plant.

*Parking lots* preferably should be outside the plant yard, but if within or adjacent to plant areas they should be separated by fencing so that all employees will have to enter the plant through pedestrian entrances. All persons entering the plant areas by automobile should be positively identified, and in case of any doubt the contents of automobiles should be carefully checked. Visitors who are not personally known should be required to park their automobiles outside the plant area.

## 9. VISITORS.

*a. Responsibility.*—The primary responsibility for the control of visits to and visits within any plant, facility, or installation rests with the commanding officer of the Government-operated plant, facility, or installation, and with the owner and operator of the privately operated plant, facility, or installation. Thus, all authorizations to visit are subject to approval or disapproval by the person primarily responsible.

*b. Limitation of visitors.*—No visitor will be admitted except for a legitimate and necessary purpose. This restriction applies to all, including Army and Navy representatives, and all other Federal or local government officials.

### *c. Special visitors.*

- (1) Reporters, photographers, and other representatives of publicity agencies may not be admitted to a manufacturing establishment engaged on war contracts unless accredited by the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department or the Office of Public Relations of the Navy Department, and unless the purpose has been made known to, and approved by, the plant management beforehand.
- (2) Foreign nationals (except Canadians) and United States or Canadian citizens representing a foreign government or organization will be admitted only on written authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, or the Director of Naval Intelligence.
- (3) State and local officials making inspections required by State laws and local ordinances may be admitted without prior authorization from representatives of the Army or Navy.
- (4) Firemen, policemen, physicians, nurses, and similar authorities may be admitted in an emergency without prior authorization. In an emergency every reasonable precaution will be taken to prevent persons from taking advantage of confusion to make unauthorized entry.
- (5) Casual visitors, such as salesmen or applicants for employment may be admitted by the plant management under established rules and restrictions approved by the plant protection inspector.
- (6) Properly identified agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may be admitted to the plant without prior authorization from representatives of Army and Navy, and should be given all possible assistance in the performance of their duties.

*d. Visitors essential to production.*—Persons essential to production, such as repairmen, accredited insurance company inspectors, and technical consultants may be admitted by plant management without prior authorization from representatives of the Army or Navy.

### *e. Control of visitors.*

- (1) Visitors will be kept constantly under surveillance, or will be accompanied by a plant, Army, or Navy official.



- (2) **Each visitor must be prepared to identify himself and, in plants engaged in classified work or projects, to show that he is a citizen of the United States.** For these purposes the visitor will carry a card, issued by his employer, which adequately identifies him, and whenever necessary, indicates that his citizenship and loyalty have been verified. Although identification cards are not required to follow any specific form, any visitor to an important plant, facility, or installation who does not possess an identification card containing the following minimum information *may* be excluded therefrom by such commanding officer or operator:

- (a) Personal characteristics such as name, height, weight, color of hair and eyes, race, birth date, distinguishing marks.
- (b) Photograph; print of one or both thumbs or index fingers; signature of holder.
- (c) A statement substantially as follows, preferably personally signed by an authorized official of the visitor's employer:

This is to certify that the information hereon is correct; that the person identified hereby is our representative; and that information, verified to the satisfaction of the undersigned, has been presented that he is a citizen of \_\_\_\_\_, and is loyal to the United States.

**An identification card is for purposes of identification only. It is not a pass and does not confer authority to visit a plant or facility, no matter by whom issued.**

- (3) Minimum requirements of the War and Navy Departments in the matter of records is a visitors' book showing for each visitor his signature, address, and affiliation, purpose of visit, time of entry and departure, name of plant official granting admission, and **whether or not the visitor had access to "Secret," "Confidential," or "Restricted" plans or material.**

#### 10. RESTRICTED AREAS.

Power plants, compressor rooms, switch and transformer rooms, experimental laboratories, and rooms in which essential defense material is being processed generally will be considered vital areas. These areas should be restricted from the entrance of unauthorized persons and guarded where necessary. Visitors, except essential repairmen and technical consultants, must not be admitted to restricted areas except on the express authority of a Government inspector.

8

✓ **11. CLASSIFIED INFO**  
Classified information is "Restricted." When sent used reading:

This document contains information that is exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act. Its transmission to unauthorized persons is prohibited.

It is essential to make certain that the use of classified information does not violate the paragraph. Classified blueprints and engineering offices, except where necessary for their return. All classified information must be locked up when not in use.

✓ **12. ADMINISTRATIVE**  
Keys and safe combinations must be controlled by trusted employees. Should the safe combinations must be changed.

Waste paper from administrative offices, blueprint rooms, etc., must be destroyed so that no classified material can be recovered.

Janitors and charwomen, who are often given unusual opportunities to observe classified material, should be given salaries that may have more than one source, subject to frequent but irregular payments.

The use of telephones in restricted areas is discouraged.

#### II. REMOVAL

There are occasions when cause to suspect an employee of espionage, having engaged in a plant of importance to the Government.

A procedure has been established for the removal of personnel from employment.

Contractors should immediately report the presence of any such person to the agency having responsibility with a statement of the circumstances sufficient to justify an investigation under the Espionage Acts.

## ✓ 11. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

Classified information is that marked either "Secret," "Confidential," or "Restricted." When sent to civilian organizations, an additional stamp is used reading:

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

It is essential to make certain that their handling of classified information does not violate the paragraph of the Espionage Act cited above.

Classified blueprints and other documents must be retained in planning or engineering offices, except when charged out to authorized persons responsible for their return. All classified material should be returned to files and locked up when not in use.

## ✓ 12. ADMINISTRATIVE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ESPIONAGE.

Keys and safe combinations must be issued only to a limited number of trusted employees. Should such person leave the employ of the company, the safe combinations must be changed promptly.

Waste paper from administrative offices, engineering departments, drafting and blueprint rooms, etc., must be disposed of by burning or shredding so that no classified material can be salvaged and used.

Janitors and charwomen, due to their access to all parts of the plant, have an unusual opportunity to obtain classified information, and by reason of low salaries may have more than ordinary inducement to do so. They must be subject to frequent but irregular surveillance by members of the guard force.

The use of telephones for other than company business should be discouraged.

## II. REMOVAL OF SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES

There are occasions when adequate investigation reveals that there is good cause to suspect an employee of a proclivity for subversive activity, or of engaging in, having engaged in, or preparing to engage in subversive activity in a plant of importance to Army or Navy procurement.

A procedure has been established by joint action of the War Department and Navy Department for the prompt removal of such suspected subversive personnel from employment.

Contractors should immediately notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the agency having responsibility for continuing protection at the plant of the presence of any such persons in the employ of the company, together with a statement of the circumstances which need not include concrete evidence sufficient to justify an arrest for violation of the National Sabotage or Espionage Acts.

### III. EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS

Law and regulations prohibit the employment of any alien on aeronautical or classified War and Navy Department contracts without written consent *beforehand* of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

An alien holding first citizenship papers is an alien, and is required to have the foregoing consent.

Application for consent for the employment of an alien must be accompanied by an alien questionnaire, delivered to the agency having responsibility for continuing protection.

### IV. PROTECTION OF POWER FACILITIES

A great number of manufacturing plants are dependent upon a continuing supply of electric power for uninterrupted operation. Equipment used for this purpose is subject to ordinary wear and tear as well as to possible acts willfully committed for the purpose of causing damage. The possibility of acts of deliberate damage may be lessened through the restriction of access to vital equipment as already outlined.

In addition to general protective measures discussed elsewhere in this pamphlet, the minimum requirements and the protection of certain vital installations deserve special consideration.

Electric power sources must be ample to provide for a reasonable reserve beyond full load demands; transformers must be of sufficient capacity safely located and protected; distribution lines must be properly installed and supported; power house equipment must be safeguarded from fire and electrical hazards; and admission to power house areas must be carefully restricted.

1. Maintenance of electric generators and motors must be given special attention particularly when it is necessary to exceed rated capacities. The advice of competent electrical engineers is essential before additional loads are added. Temperatures and oil levels must be checked regularly on equipment subjected to overloading. Combustible material should be eliminated from areas containing electric generators. Most generator fires result from short circuits or grounds and usually involve the combustible covering of windings. In open-type generators, first-aid extinguishers such as carbon dioxide, vaporizing liquid (carbon tetrachloride), or small hose (after equipment is electrically dead) can be used effectively. For enclosed-type generators of 3,000 KVA or greater capacity, built-in equipment such as perforated water-spray pipes or carbon dioxide systems are recommended. For generators of less than 3,000 KVA capacity the values involved do not usually warrant the expense of built-in equipment.

Regular inspections of equipment will result in a minimum of unexpected outages from worn and deteriorated apparatus. Plant conditions permitting, electric generating and distributing equipment regularly in use should be

overhauled annually. should include a consideration of the lubricating system; in the case of a steam turbine; units such as oil cooler;

2. Transformers have almost any convenient they are protected against Oil-filled transformers drained vaults, or outside capacity must be located form a serious exposure and the resulting inclosure

Regular inspections consideration of the oil that, in many instances provide experienced personnel involving both generating

3. Outside overhead leaving a powerhouse, with lightning arresters grouped wires and lead coverings.

4. *Powerhouses.*—All roofs of powerhouses large, expensive units. if noncombustible, water boards to prevent water

All powerhouses should as well as an ample supply tetrachloride) extinguishers systems are desirable transformers.

5. Competent and safe the safe maintenance of are highly desirable. in good operating conditions

6. Gas facilities must should be odorized in employees should be instructed precautions to avoid explosion personnel are available to the system should be arranged the building can be constructed inspected at regular intervals

overhauled annually. Inspection of generating and associated equipment should include a consideration of (1) the surfaces and alinement of bearings, the lubricating system; (2) buckets, nozzles, and governing system in the case of a steam turbine; (3) the insulation and physical connections of windings in the case of an electric generator; (4) the tubes in heat exchanger units such as oil coolers and condensers.

2. Transformers having a noncombustible dielectric may be located at almost any convenient place within a manufacturing property, provided they are protected against malicious tampering and mechanical injury. Oil-filled transformers must be at a safe location in noncombustible well-drained vaults, or outside of buildings. Oil-filled transformers of large capacity must be located well away from building walls where they may form a serious exposure. Outside transformers must be adequately fenced, and the resulting inclosure well supervised.

Regular inspections of circuit breakers and transformers should include consideration of the oil, contacts, and control apparatus. It is to be noted that, in many instances, manufacturers of equipment are in a position to provide experienced personnel to assist in making inspections of this nature involving both generating and distributing equipment.

3. Outside overhead transmission lines more than 600 feet long entering or leaving a powerhouse, substation, or transformer bank should be provided with lightning arresters; main conductors must be run in conduit; and grouped wires and lead-covered cables must have noncombustible outer coverings.

4. *Powerhouses.*—Automatic sprinklers can be safely used under plank roofs of powerhouses where voltages do not exceed 600, and there are no large, expensive units. Sprinklers can be safely used with higher voltages if noncombustible, waterproof shields are used over generators and switchboards to prevent water damage.

All powerhouses should have small hose and portable water-spray nozzles as well as an ample supply of carbon dioxide and vaporizing liquid (carbon tetrachloride) extinguishers. Yard hydrants and hose or fixed water-spray systems are desirable also for the protection of large, outside, oil-filled transformers.

5. Competent and special civilian inspection services are available for the safe maintenance of boilers, pressure vessels, and similar equipment, and are highly desirable. All safety devices for such equipment must be kept in good operating condition and should be overhauled periodically.

6. Gas facilities must be inspected frequently for gas leaks. Natural gas should be odorized in order to facilitate detection of gas leaks. All employees should be instructed to report all gas leaks immediately. Special precautions to avoid explosions should be employed even when trained personnel are available to repair faulty gas lines inside buildings. The piping system should be arranged in such a manner that the gas supply entering the building can be controlled from the outside. Control valves should be inspected at regular intervals to insure proper operation.

## V. FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

### 1. RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT.

The War and Navy Departments hold the management of every plant responsible for taking all practicable measures for preventing fires, extinguishing any fire which occurs, and minimizing possible interruption to production or destruction of raw materials or finished products by fire. This responsibility must be placed in the hands of an executive of the plant who has sufficient authority to institute and maintain a continuous fire prevention program and take all necessary measures for the fire protection of the property, including the authority to order the immediate correction of any hazardous condition which may be so dangerous as to require emergency action.

The War and Navy Departments expect all executives responsible for fire protection to be fully informed on fire protection matters in their plants, and to have at hand for study and reference such technical books, pamphlets, and periodicals on fire protection as may be necessary to equip them to discharge their duties effectively.

### 2. FIRE PREVENTION AN ESSENTIAL TO VICTORY.

Preventable fires have caused more numerous and serious delays in the war production program than any other factor of plant protection. Fire prevention and protection must necessarily keep pace with the rapid development of industrial properties. Concentration of values in closely grouped buildings greatly increases the need for modern fire protection programs.

Fires from a multitude of causes are inherent to practically all forms of manufacturing. The prevention of fire by forethought is the only effective solution of the fire problem in the production of munitions. Continuity of war production uninterrupted by fire is an essential objective in the war emergency, and *no form of insurance is an acceptable substitute for munitions damaged or destroyed, or for manufacturing equipment rendered useless for the production of more munitions.*

Most manufacturing fires and explosions are preventable. Delays in the war production program due to fire can be prevented through good housekeeping, subdivision of values, adequate physical barriers to prevent the spread of fire, the elimination of fire causes, suitable first-aid protection equipment, automatic sprinkler protection where construction is combustible or there are important combustible materials, the organization of a plant fire brigade, adequate alarm service, and a thoroughly reliable water supply.

The human factor, which is so vitally important in preventing fires, is always present. Fires resulting from human carelessness or oversight may not necessarily be serious, but lack of good judgment in fire fighting, inadequate maintenance and supervision of the fire-protective system, or the improper manipulation of sprinkler control valves frequently result in disastrous losses.

### 3. GOOD HOUSEKEEPING.

The maintenance of good housekeeping conditions is the first and most important principle of fire prevention. It is essential that management, fore-

men, and employees be prime essential to the waste material, a common

Good management requiring conditions result more than reduce the personal injuries; they produce a better product. The good housekeeping standpoint with resulting product.

Metal waste cans are to be thrown into a corner. Self-closing tight container.

A place for everything efficacious than periodic well-piled stock kept well

Good housekeeping practices. Frequent cleaning, exhaust, ventilating, heat and overflow pipes, dryer

Good housekeeping is Rubbish, dry grass, and where it will form an explosion. There may be other exposures of lumber in one area or lumber or rearranged as a pile

### 4. SUBDIVISION OF

A simple, effective measure fire is **subdivision**. equipment, and finished accident can destroy all accomplished by storing other or by separate storages such as standard fire walls

### 5. PHYSICAL BARRI

Large areas invite large fire wall cut-offs are the means the destruction of an entire areas, to separate manufacturing of fire under the most adequate provided and well maintained fire barriers.

Openings between floors protected in a manner to

men, and employees be impressed with the fact that good housekeeping is a prime essential to the war production program, and that carelessness with waste material, a common cause of preventable fires, must be eliminated.

Good management requires good housekeeping conditions, and good housekeeping conditions result in fewer fires. Good general order and neatness do more than reduce the number of fires; they result in fewer accidents and personal injuries; they promote pride in the place of employment; they result in a better product. There is no form of munitions manufacturing where good housekeeping conditions cannot be emphasized from the fire hazard standpoint with resulting benefit to morale, to working conditions, and to product.

Metal waste cans are essential to take care of refuse which might otherwise be thrown into a corner. These cans should be emptied daily before closing time. Self-closing tight covers stifle a fire igniting spontaneously in such a container.

A place for everything and everything in its place is better and more efficacious than periodic clean-ups. Operating efficiency and safety demand well-piled stock kept well below sprinklers, and wide aisles kept clear.

Good housekeeping practices should not be confined to manufacturing areas. Frequent cleaning of lint accumulations or flammable deposits inside exhaust, ventilating, heating, and air-conditioning ducts, conveyors, supply and overflow pipes, dryers, ovens, and spray booths is essential.

Good housekeeping is equally essential outside of manufacturing areas. Rubbish, dry grass, and waste must not be permitted to accumulate outside where it will form an exposure to the plant if fire occurs in such material. There may be other exposure hazards such as the storage of a large quantity of lumber in one area or quick-burning sheds that need to be reduced in number or rearranged as a part of the good housekeeping program.

#### 4. SUBDIVISION OF VALUES.

A simple, effective means of safeguarding important material from loss by fire is **subdivision**. Wherever possible, storage of essential material, equipment, and finished goods should be so arranged that no single fire or accident can destroy all available units of any particular item. This can be accomplished by storing such units in various locations remote from each other or by separate storage in a single building cut off by physical barriers such as standard fire walls with the openings therein adequately protected.

#### 5. PHYSICAL BARRIERS.

Large areas invite large fires. Substantial physical barriers or complete fire wall cut-offs are the most effective means of confining a fire and avoiding the destruction of an entire plant. Such cut-offs are essential to divide large areas, to separate manufacturing operations, and positively limit the spread of fire under the most adverse conditions. Automatic fire doors should be provided and well maintained at all necessary openings in walls serving as fire barriers.

Openings between floors such as at elevators, stairways, and chutes must be protected in a manner to prevent the ready passage of fire and hot gases

between floors at such points. Good floor cut-offs, when properly maintained in sprinklered buildings, are effective in retarding the spread of a fire from floor to floor.

### 6. ELIMINATION OF FIRE CAUSES.

With the development of new processes, the number of danger spots and hazards in manufacturing plants is increasing constantly. It is important therefore in each situation to understand what the hazard is, lay out the process safely, provide essential protective equipment, and, finally, to operate the process carefully. Some common fires are incident to—

- a. Electrical equipment.
- b. Oil and gas fired equipment.
- c. Portable cutting and welding equipment.
- d. Ovens and dryers.
- e. Storage and use of magnesium, aluminum, powder, and magnesium alloys.

There are many other danger spots, such as spray painting, fuel oil, gas, pulverized coal, combustible dust, chemical processes, paper-making processes, and cotton mill operations, all of which must be given special attention in safeguarding industrial plants against damage or destruction by fire.

### 7. ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE.

It is essential that electrical equipment be installed and maintained in accordance with the provisions of the National Electrical Code. All wiring must be well supported and protected against mechanical injury. Circuits should be properly protected by circuit-breakers or fuses of correct setting or rating. Switches and fuses should be in tightly closed metal boxes properly secured to walls or posts.

Motors should be kept free from oily deposit or dust. Pendant lamp cords should be maintained in good condition and replaced when worn. All extension lights should be provided with wire guards, particularly where they may come in contact with combustible material. Electrical equipment in areas where flammable vapors or dusts may be present should be of vapor-tight or explosion-proof design, as conditions may require.

### 8. FIRST-AID FIRE PROTECTION.

a. *Need for equipment.*—First-aid fire-fighting equipment such as fire pails, extinguishers, and small hose are of particular value during working hours or in the hands of a good watchman, if used promptly and with good judgment on incipient fires. A surprisingly small amount of extinguishing liquid will generally extinguish a fire in ordinary combustible material if it is promptly and properly applied. "A little fire is quickly trodden out, which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench."

b. *Choice of equipment.*—It is essential that throughout manufacturing properties there shall be instantly available something with which to extinguish a fire. In choosing the most effective equipment, consult a competent fire protection engineer with broad experience in manufacturing hazards and follow his advice. It is advisable to confine purchases of fire-extinguishing

equipment to that of Mutual Laboratorie

c. *Combustibles*  
tanks, water-filled-c  
for use on fires in o  
of one 2½-gallon e  
area. Water pails  
first-aid protection  
recommended for th  
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for contents and ope

f. *Maintenance of*  
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returning to service.  
for signs of mildew  
and hose is so stored

g. *Training in use*  
fighting equipment a  
when placed in the

equipment to that which bears the approval of the Underwriters' or Factory Mutual Laboratories.

*c. Combustibles of different types require special equipment.*—Pump tanks, water-filled-cartridge or soda-acid type extinguishers are quite suitable for use on fires in ordinary combustibles and should be available on the basis of one 2½-gallon extinguisher for each 1,500 to 2,000 square feet of floor area. Water pails in ample number and well maintained provide excellent first-aid protection for many occupancies. Foam type extinguishers are recommended for the protection of dip tanks and other flammable liquid containers. Carbon dioxide extinguishers are useful for running fires in small amounts of flammable oils and gases, for electrical fires, and where delicate or valuable equipment may be damaged by the use of other types of extinguishers. Vaporizing liquid (carbon tetrachloride) is a nonconductor of electricity, hence extinguishers of this type are recommended where electrical fires may be anticipated. Approved dry-chemical type extinguishers are effective on floor and spillage fires and on fires in small containers of flammable liquids. Automatic foam equipment is frequently advisable for large dip tanks and other flammable liquid containers.

*d. Maintenance of extinguishers—accessibility.*—Keep extinguishers full and in good working order. With several types it is advisable to have them discharged and recharged annually. If the shell of a pressure type extinguisher is dented or shows signs of corrosion, the extinguisher should be given hydrostatic test. Place extinguishers where they are readily accessible. Alternated red and white bands or red lights on posts or walls will aid in promptly locating fire-fighting equipment.

*e. Extinguishers should be sealed.*—During the war emergency it is desirable to seal extinguishers to prevent malicious tampering. With the conventional soda-acid, foam, water-filled, and dry powder types this can be accomplished by using cheap lead and wire seals commonly known as "freight car" seals. The wire is passed around one of the supports of the extinguisher cap and then around the discharge pipe of the extinguisher and sealed. This prevents opening the extinguisher without breaking the seal but does not interfere with its use or discharge. Small vaporizing liquid (carbon tetrachloride) pump-type extinguishers can be sealed by passing gummed paper around the extinguisher and the bracket on which it is mounted. This paper seal may be dated and if broken will be prima facie evidence that the extinguisher has been handled. All extinguishers should be checked for contents and operating condition before sealing.

*f. Maintenance of hose.*—Unlined linen hose should never be tested with water, and after its use for fire purposes should be thoroughly dried before returning to service. Examine the hose fabric near the standpipe coupling for signs of mildew due to leakage, and make sure that the nozzle is attached and hose is so stored that it can be quickly used without kinking.

*g. Training in use of equipment is essential.*—Some types of first-aid fire-fighting equipment are surprisingly effective in the hands of an expert, but when placed in the hands of an inexperienced workman, under extreme



emergency conditions, may be less effective than more simple forms of first-aid protection. Whatever the equipment, make sure that workmen are thoroughly instructed in the hazards inherent to their particular jobs and trained in the proper use of the extinguishing equipment provided. To be effective, first-aid fire protection equipment must be used promptly and by persons familiar with its use and limitations.

## 9. AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER PROTECTION.

*a. Importance.*—The most important and effective fire protection device for manufacturing properties is the automatic sprinkler. Under average conditions, when properly installed, and with ample water supplies, automatic sprinkler protection rates over 90 in a scale where 100 represents perfection in total fire protection. The importance of automatic sprinkler protection cannot be over-emphasized in the protection of munitions plants against loss by fire. Manufacturing properties having important values in single fire areas of combustible construction or occupancy are not suitable for the production of munitions in war emergency without thoroughly reliable automatic sprinkler protection.

*b. Effectiveness.*—Seventy percent of all fires occurring during the last 40 years under automatic sprinkler protection have been practically or entirely extinguished by sprinkler protection alone. An additional 26 percent of such fires have been held in check, making the efficiency of automatic sprinkler protection approximately 96 percent perfect. In this same period, over 50 percent of the fires occurring under automatic sprinkler protection have been controlled by one or two heads. Over 80 percent of such fires have been controlled by less than eight sprinkler heads; excellent evidence of the prompt effectiveness of automatic sprinkler protection. No other single fire protection device has proved so effective in reducing interruption of production caused by fire.

*c. Provision for adequate water supply.*—Where fire department connections are provided to the sprinkler system, arrangements should be made with the fire department to make use of them in case of fire. The prompt use of such equipment may offset, to some extent, a delay due to a closed valve or obstructed yard system. Fire department pumpers should take suction from city mains or other sources outside the yard system wherever possible in order not to interfere with the functioning of the automatic sprinkler system.

*d. Inspection of control valves.*—In time of war every munitions manufacturing plant should make a daily inspection of every sprinkler control valve with a written record of its condition. The hazards resulting from a closed valve are so great that no sprinkler valve should be operated except on authority of the plant protection supervisor, plant engineer, or master mechanic. Sprinkler valves closed for repairs should be properly marked by a distinctive tag or other means and a suitable and prominent reminder of the condition left on the desk of the master mechanic or other responsible official for follow-up. When necessary to close a sprinkler control valve temporarily, a competent and reliable watchman should remain constantly at such valve to open it promptly in case of fire.

*e. Control valves.*—that will positively as be apparent. The po tained wide open is a systems.

## 10. INSPECTION

In addition to daily of all fire protection e made by capable and suitable report forms plant protection supe promptly corrected. housekeeping conditi All equipment for the new hazards should b official in order that a

## 11. FIRE PREVENTION

A continuous fire cation of employees. fire hazards should re All employees should clude the importance cleanliness, the need structed, and what the

## 12. PLANT FIRE

The development o points of greatest fire department should ha fires which may start organized fire brigad are fully familiar with assemble quickly to t threatens to get beyon

The fire brigade w men as a highly impor report and be responsi He should not be unc others to whom produ safety. The strength frequency of drills wi its hazards. In plant assistant should be a with the power circuit watchmen or maintena Plants operating more each shift.

*e. Control valves.*—All sprinkler valves should be sealed open in a manner that will positively assure that should they be tampered with the condition will be apparent. The positive assurance that sprinkler control valves are maintained wide open is an essential item in all inspections of automatic sprinkler systems.

#### ✓ 10. INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS.

In addition to daily sprinkler valve inspections, make regular inspections of all fire protection equipment at least weekly. These inspections should be made by capable and trustworthy men who will record conditions found on suitable report forms. These records should be carefully checked by the plant protection supervisor, and any defects or deficiencies reported must be promptly corrected. Inspections also should include a careful check of housekeeping conditions and the disposition of combustible waste material. All equipment for the protection of hazardous processes must be examined, new hazards should be noted, and recommendations made to the appropriate official in order that adequate protection may be provided.

#### ✓ 11. FIRE PREVENTION EDUCATION.

A continuous fire prevention program should be conducted for the education of employees. Every employee engaged in work which may involve fire hazards should receive instructions as to proper procedures to avoid fires. All employees should be instructed in general fire prevention matters, to include the importance of refraining from smoking in prohibited areas, general cleanliness, the need for keeping fire doors and fire extinguishers unobstructed, and what they are expected to do in case of fire.

#### ✓ 12. PLANT FIRE BRIGADES.

The development of the plant fire fighting organization should start at the points of greatest fire hazards, the operating departments. Every operating department should have a fire squad trained in attacking and extinguishing fires which may start within its area. Beyond this, most plants need a well organized fire brigade composed of trained men from all departments who are fully familiar with the plant fire fighting equipment, and who are able to assemble quickly to take over from department fire squads any fire which threatens to get beyond their control.

The fire brigade will not be a success unless recognized by the management as a highly important department. The chief of the fire brigade should report and be responsible to an important executive in the plant organization. He should not be under the direction of the production superintendent or others to whom production necessities may suggest short cuts which sacrifice safety. The strength of the fire brigade, the amount of equipment, and the frequency of drills will depend upon the size of the plant and the nature of its hazards. In plants having fire pumps, the plant engineer or his chief assistant should be a member of the fire brigade. An electrician familiar with the power circuits should also be a member. It is desirable to include watchmen or maintenance employees on duty when the plant is not operating. Plants operating more than one shift should have a trained fire brigade for each shift.

### 13. FIRE ALARMS.

*a. Fire alarm boxes.*—Where there is a public fire alarm system, there should be a fire alarm box conveniently located for the prompt transmission of alarms in the event of fire. If desired, this box may be connected to auxiliary stations in the plant so that the operation of private box will transmit the alarm to the public fire department as well as notify the plant fire brigade and other plant officials.

*b. Central alarm stations.*—Large plants may require a central alarm station independent of the public system. This central station provides a point not only for receiving alarms but for supervising the plant police force and watchmen, and, when outside help is needed, may send calls to the public fire and police departments. As few plants are large enough to warrant operation of their own central stations, privately operated central stations in most principal cities provide reliable central station service and supervision for a large number of properties.

*c. Automatic systems.*—Fire alarm systems which are automatic in their operation are often a desirable form of protection for manufacturing properties. These automatic fire alarm systems are heat actuated. The alarm is transmitted through electric wires or by systems of air tubing. The reliability of such systems depends on the supervision that is given to them.

*d. Supervision essential.*—Unsupervised fire alarm systems, either manual or automatic, are unreliable.

### 14. WATER SUPPLIES.

No fire protective system is better than its water supply. Public water systems, gravity tanks, fire pumps, and private reservoirs are the usual sources of water supplies. In most large plants, two or more independent water supplies are necessary for reliability. In the event of shut-off or failure of one supply the other will be available. It is sometimes necessary to obtain a greater total volume of water than can be obtained through a single source. Absolute reliability of water supply must be assured at all important munition plants.

Secondary sources of water supply are secured through such means as gravity tanks and fire pumps. These must be properly maintained. Adequate maintenance may be assured by periodic inspections and tests under competent engineering supervision.

Water supplies should be used to the best advantage. The fire brigade chief should have a clear idea of the total amount of water available and should not use more lines than can be supplied adequately at good pressure. It is better to maintain good pressure at the sprinklers and supply a few strong hose streams that will reach the heart of the fire, than to rob the sprinklers or have a large number of feeble and ineffective streams.

### 15. COOPERATION WITH PUBLIC FIRE DEPARTMENT.

It is important that the public firemen be given an opportunity to become familiar with the private fire protective system of the plant. When private protection is laid out, provision must be made for an ample supply of water to sprinklers. If a fire occurs and opens an unusually large number of heads,

there may not be sufficient water for the same system. In such cases, suction from the yard or outside suction source may be necessary.

When water supply is adequate, the best use can be made by having the fire department connect up the sprinkler systems. The fire department should have standing instructions to connect up in this manner.

### 16. RESPONSIBILITY.

In a serious fire emergency, the responsibility is shared by management and the fire department. The situation must definitely be handled by one individual with clear authority.

## VI.

### I. THE IMPORTANCE OF WATER SUPPLIES.

Injuries to personnel in 1941, over 480,000, were caused by fire. The magnitude of the organized effort to combat fire is aggravated by the substitution of women for men in military service. The war plants with prime importance are those which have programs to meet the needs of the war—

- a. An effective safety program.
- b. Careful selection of personnel.
- c. Intensive shop safety training.
- d. Disciplinary control.
- e. Maximum use of fire protection devices.
- f. Special provisions for fire protection.

- g. Emphasis on safety.
- h. Adequate first-aid facilities.
- i. Accident records and progress made.

If both management and the fire department are in making the plant a safe place, the fire will be clearly apparent in the results.

there may not be sufficient water to supply both sprinklers and hydrants from the same system. In such cases, fire department pumpers should not take suction from the yard systems but should furnish additional water from outside suction sources.

When water supplies are limited and many sprinklers open, generally the best use can be made of fire department pumpers by connecting them to fire department connections and pumping from city mains directly into the sprinkler systems. Fire departments in many well regulated communities have standing instructions for the first or second pumper arriving at a fire to connect up in this way.

#### **16. RESPONSIBILITY ESSENTIAL.**

In a serious fire emergency it is essential to avoid divided or obscure responsibility. A definite understanding must be reached between the plant management and the local fire department. Plans for meeting a serious fire situation must definitely place the fire-fighting responsibility in the hands of *one individual* with complete and undisputed authority.

### **VI. ACCIDENT PREVENTION**

#### **1. THE IMPORTANCE OF A SAFETY PROGRAM, AND ITS PRINCIPAL FACTORS.**

Injuries to personnel have resulted in serious delays to war production. In 1941, over 480,000,000 man-days were lost because of accidental industrial injuries. The magnitude of the accident problem demands aggressive organized effort to conserve manpower in this war emergency. The problem is aggravated by the demand for speed, and the increasing demand for the substitution of women and older men to replace those who are drafted for military service. The War and Navy Departments therefore require that plants with prime and subcontracts, and facilities important to the prosecution of the war which have not already done so, expand their safety and health programs to meet the exigencies of the manpower shortage. Briefly, this calls for—

- a. An effective safety organization.
- b. Careful selection, training, and placement of employees.
- c. Intensive shop supervision.
- d. Disciplinary control of unsafe work practices by employees.
- e. Maximum use of personal protective equipment and clothing.
- f. Special provision for guarding against physical and mechanical exposures.
- g. Emphasis on safety promotion and education.
- h. Adequate first-aid and medical facilities.
- i. Accident records sufficient to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, and progress made.

If both management and employees are interested in safety and are active in making the plant a safe and healthy place in which to work, the results will be clearly apparent in the plant's safety and health record. This can be

accomplished best by the wholehearted cooperation of management with employee representatives in establishing efficient methods of finding and correcting the specific conditions and circumstances which cause personal injuries and illness.

## 2. SAFETY ORGANIZATION.

Accident prevention work is essentially a simple and understandable procedure. It requires only that the conditions and circumstances which in all probability will cause accidents be found and corrected. Most accidental injuries result from two causes: (1) the violation of a commonly accepted safe practice rule; or (2) exposure to a mechanical or physical hazard.

A safety organization is most effective when the simplicity of real accident prevention work is kept in mind continuously, and when the chief objective of the organization is that of finding and correcting those specific unsafe practices of employees and mechanical hazards that have caused accidents in the past, and may be expected to cause accidents in the future.

The first requirement of any safety organization is that management actively participate. Personnel should include a safety director, safety inspectors, and safety committees. The safety director, as the direct representative of management, plans and directs all safety activities, and is responsible to management for the effective functioning of the safety program.

Safety inspectors survey structures, yards, storage spaces, machines, tools, equipment, materials, safety appliances and equipment, and safe work performance. They report findings and recommendations, or if necessary correct unsafe conditions and circumstances on the spot. They also investigate accidents, prepare records, and assist generally in safety work.

The safety committee serves as a clearing house and forum, considering (a) the progress of safety work; (b) recommendations from all sources; (c) accident investigation; (d) the quality of safety work by all participants in the program; (e) educational and promotional activities; and (f) the correction of outstanding mechanical and personal causes of accidents.

The key man in every safety plan is the foreman. He is closely associated with the employees under his charge and his personal influence and example, as well as his authority, provide him with a degree of control that is of great importance in safety work. He is in the best possible position to know the hazards and to enforce safe practice rules. No safety program can hope to be successful without the sympathetic and intelligent support of competent foremen.

## 3. UNSAFE PRACTICES.

The great majority of industrial injuries occur because employees violate commonly accepted rules. Therefore, in any safety program aggressive effort must be made to devise practical methods of correcting unsafe practices, and of creating safe work habits on the part of all employees. Consideration should be given not only to traumatic injuries but to health as well.

## 4. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING.

The most careful worker is nevertheless likely to sustain injury if he is exposed without adequate personal protective equipment or clothing while

engaged in an operation where personal protective equipment is necessary.

## 5. PHYSICAL HAZARDS.

Buildings and other structures should be maintained; dangerous mechanical equipment should be guarded; exit and entry facilities should be clear; and manufacturing processes should be in accordance with accepted safety practices.

## 6. EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

Safety posters or bulletins should be prominently displayed; and creating and maintaining a continuous safety effort. Consideration should be given to prizes and awards.

## 7. RECORDS ESSENTIAL.

Records with regard to accidents should be kept, showing the essential facts of accidents, and developed and utilized.

## 8. COOPERATION WITH MANAGEMENT.

Accident prevention "cooperation" is the responsibility of plant management. Efforts to insure safe transportation to and from work should be made; operation of chambers of commerce, police and traffic officials, local safety councils, and other organizations should be authorized and resources used.

## 9. COMPLIANCE.

A great many plants require considerable improvement in manpower. Inspection should be often with the assistance of Civilian Defense, and a health and safety program in place for improvements. Compliance is a spirit of cooperation.

## VII

## 1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.

It is required that all personnel be trained and watchful (a) protect all vital and

engaged in an operation which requires such personal protection. Suitable personal protective equipment and clothing must be provided and used where necessary.

✓ **5. PHYSICAL HAZARDS.**

Buildings and other structures should be safely designed, constructed, and maintained; dangerous moving parts of machines, tools, and other mechanical equipment should be guarded; safe housekeeping should be maintained; exit and entry facilities should be adequate to meet any emergency situation; and manufacturing, processing, storage, and transportation in general must be in accordance with accepted safe practice.

✓ **6. EDUCATION AND PROMOTION.**

Safety posters or bulletins, notices, slogans, and accident records in general should be prominently posted for the purpose of informing the personnel, creating and maintaining interest in safety, and publicizing the status of the safety effort. Consideration also should be given to safety contests, together with prizes and awards.

✓ **7. RECORDS ESSENTIAL.**

Records with regard to accidents and injuries must be maintained so that the essential facts of accident occurrence, and accident prevention may be developed and utilized.

✓ **8. COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.**

Accident prevention "on the job" and "in the plant" is a primary responsibility of plant management. However, the manpower situation demands that efforts to insure safety and health be extended to the home, and to transportation to and from work. Consequently, it is essential to seek the cooperation of chambers of commerce, defense transportation committees, police and traffic officials, railroad, trolley and bus companies, State and local safety councils, and any other agency or group eager to utilize its authority and resources to help win the war "on the home front."

✓ **9. COMPLIANCE.**

A great many plants are well organized for accident prevention; others require considerable improvement in the scope and measures taken to conserve manpower. Inspections are made by the War and Navy Departments, often with the assistance of the United States Department of Labor, the Office of Civilian Defense, and other agencies, to determine the efficacy of the safety and health program in any plant or facility, and to make recommendations for improvements. Compliance with recommendations is predicated upon a spirit of cooperation.

## **VII. GUARD FORCES**

✓ **1. GENERAL REQUIREMENT.**

It is required that all plants and facilities important to the prosecution of the war, not located in loft or tenanted buildings, provide an efficient and well-trained guard and watchman force, adequate in personnel and in training to:

(a) protect all vital and restricted areas and war materials at the plant or

facility; (b) guard entrances not locked; (c) check carefully all persons, vehicles and materials entering or leaving the plant; (d) oversee traffic within the plant; (e) enforce rules and regulations essential for protection against fire, safety and other hazards; (f) make patrols and watchmen-rounds with adequate frequency; and (g) perform such other protective duties as may be necessary.

## 2. UNIFORMS.

In large plants, guards should be furnished with uniforms and in all plants, regardless of size, guards should be provided with suitable badges and proper credentials. Complete uniforms help to build up the morale of the guard force and create respect for the wearer on the part of the other employees and outsiders.

## 3. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

In addition to the usual equipment such as flashlight, keys, notebook, and similar articles, guards in all important plants should be armed and adequately trained in the care and use of the weapons furnished.

## 4. SELECTION OF GUARDS.

One of the most important requisites of the guard force is that it be composed of vigorous, intelligent, well-trained, self-reliant men, preferably not over 60 years of age. Able-bodied men of more advanced age may be used as watchmen. Qualified women may be utilized if necessary as guards or watchmen.

## 5. INVESTIGATION AND FINGERPRINTING.

Guards should fill out the plant's regular application form for employment and special investigation should be made of their personal history, citizenship, society and organization membership, general reputation, background, and financial condition. Fingerprinting of guards and watchmen is essential. Employment of an alien as a plant guard must be approved by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy in the same manner as employment of an alien having access to work on classified or aeronautical contracts.

## 6. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

Plant guards and watchmen must be made to realize the importance of their jobs. It is the definite responsibility of management to provide suitable instructions and training to assure the competency of its personnel. It is extremely important that all guards be qualified and thoroughly trained in the care and use of firearms. Firearms should be properly stored and maintained in perfect working order at all times.

Guard forces cannot be considered as adequately trained unless they are thoroughly familiar with—

- a. All common forms of espionage and sabotage activities.
- b. Entire plant area, with particular reference to restricted and vital areas.
- c. Location and character of hazardous materials and processes.
- d. Use and location of all fire protective equipment, including sprinkler control valves.

- e. Conditions which
- f. Location and operation of main electric switches.
- g. First-aid methods of accidents.
- h. Duties in event of
- i. Action to be taken
- j. Use of plant comm

## 7. ORGANIZATION.

Guard and watchman appropriate plant official of guards. One man shift or watchmen. In small on the day shift with a su in tenanted buildings, c only minor war product on a 24-hour basis.

Guards should be assi but the change of gua coincide with employee

## 8. RULES, REGULATIONS.

A comprehensive set should be prepared by th member of the force. should be in guard he activities should be main

## 9. DUTIES OF GUARDS.

See paragraph 8c, Cha

## 10. GUARD COMMUNICATIONS.

In large plants a satis forces must provide for permit the summoning c definitely indicate the lo

Guards should be requ should be kept of the tim of a guard to report on

Watchmen's rounds r clock, with or without co Watch-clock records sho checked regularly to mak

## 11. MILITARIZATION.

a. Necessity and purp prosecution of the war t Navy, acting under auth

- e. Conditions which may cause fires.
- f. Location and operation of all important steam and gas valves and all main electric switches.
- g. First-aid methods and location of all first-aid equipment for use in case of accidents.
- h. Duties in event of fire, blackouts or air raids.
- i. Action to be taken in any other emergency that can be foreseen.
- j. Use of plant communication system.

#### 7. ORGANIZATION.

Guard and watchman forces should be organized under the direction of an appropriate plant official and operate directly under the supervision of a chief of guards. One man should be placed in charge of each shift of the guards or watchmen. In small plants, the chief of guards may assume this function on the day shift with a subordinate on the night shift. Except in small plants in tenanted buildings, or small plants which are locked at night and have only minor war production contracts, guard or watchman service should be on a 24-hour basis.

Guards should be assigned to shifts in accordance with local requirements, but the change of guard shifts should be so scheduled that it will not coincide with employee shifts.

#### 8. RULES, REGULATIONS, AND RECORDS.

A comprehensive set of rules and regulations governing the guard force should be prepared by the plant protection official and a copy furnished each member of the force. A list of telephone numbers for use in emergency should be in guard headquarters. Written records covering all guard activities should be maintained.

#### 9. DUTIES OF GUARDS AND WATCHMEN.

See paragraph 8c, Chapter I, "Sabotage and Espionage."

#### 10. GUARD COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.

In large plants a satisfactory communication system for the use of guard forces must provide for the positive identification of the guard calling in; permit the summoning of single guards, or all guards simultaneously; and definitely indicate the location from which a call is made.

Guards should be required to report on an hourly basis and accurate records should be kept of the time such reports are received. In the event of failure of a guard to report on time, an immediate investigation should be made.

Watchmen's rounds may be recorded by either a stationary or portable clock, with or without connections to a central station at the plant or outside. Watch-clock records should be supervised by an official of the plant and be checked regularly to make sure that there has been no tampering.

#### 11. MILITARIZATION OF PLANT GUARD FORCES.

a. *Necessity and purpose.*—So important are our war industries to the prosecution of the war that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, acting under authority of the President, have ordered the militariza-



tion of plant guard forces at important plants and facilities. The purpose is to increase the authority, efficiency, and responsibility of guard forces, and through military training to provide auxiliary forces throughout the United States to supplement the Army and Coast Guard in wartime emergency situations. Special and detailed War Department orders govern the organization, training and command of guard forces so organized.

*b. Emergency situations defined.*—An emergency situation in which the Auxiliary Military Police or the Coast Guard Police may be called upon may arise from flood, conflagration, or other disaster, internal disorders hazardous to property or production important to the prosecution of the war, enemy action by air raid, fifth column activity, paratroop attack or invasion, or may arise from any other condition or circumstance involving the plant or its community making it necessary to place in operation one or more of the emergency plans of the War Department or of the service command.

**SECURITY SURVEY REPORT  
MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT**

\_\_\_\_\_ **Branch Intelligence Office**

**Code** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date of Survey** \_\_\_\_\_

**Facility** \_\_\_\_\_

**Location** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Street) (City) (State)

**Security Agent** \_\_\_\_\_ **Engineer Contract No.** \_\_\_\_\_

**Previous MED Inspection** \_\_\_\_\_ **Area Engineer** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date) (Rtg.)

**Previous S.C. Inspection** \_\_\_\_\_ **Contract Classification** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date) (Rtg.)

**Sabotage and Espionage Protection** \_\_\_\_\_ **Fire Protection** \_\_\_\_\_

**Continuity of Production** \_\_\_\_\_ **Composite Security Rating** \_\_\_\_\_

Rate Poor, Fair, Good, or Excellent

**Description of Premises and Vicinity**

**Outline of MED work**

**Approved by** \_\_\_\_\_

**Submitted by** \_\_\_\_\_

**I. SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE**

**COMPOSITE RATING**

**A. Physical Protection**

- Fencing \_\_\_\_\_
- Barriers \_\_\_\_\_
- Gates \_\_\_\_\_
- Doors \_\_\_\_\_
- Window Screens \_\_\_\_\_
- Partition walls \_\_\_\_\_
- Protective lighting \_\_\_\_\_
- Burglar Alarm \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (skylights, sewers, manholes, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Guard Force**

- Total Strength \_\_\_\_\_
- On MED work \_\_\_\_\_
- First Shift \_\_\_\_\_
- Second Shift \_\_\_\_\_
- Third Shift \_\_\_\_\_
- Number of Posts \_\_\_\_\_
- Number of Patrols \_\_\_\_\_
- Communications \_\_\_\_\_
- Supervision \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Physical Qualifications \_\_\_\_\_
- Equipment Efficiency \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**C. Identification**

- EMPLOYEES
- Photo Badge \_\_\_\_\_
  - Number Badge \_\_\_\_\_
  - Card Pass \_\_\_\_\_
  - Recognition \_\_\_\_\_
  - Method of Control \_\_\_\_\_
  - Enforcement \_\_\_\_\_

- VEHICLES
- Truck Register \_\_\_\_\_
  - Drivers Identified \_\_\_\_\_
  - Contents Inspected \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**D. Protection of Production**

**1. Vital Areas**

- a. Physical Restrictions \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Entrances Guarded \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Special Identification \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Supervision of Employees \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Inspection of lunch, boxes, packages, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

**2. Vital Equipment**

- a. Physical Protection \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Guards Alerted \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Supervision of Employees \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Frequency of Inspection \_\_\_\_\_

**3. Materials and Products**

- a. Arrangement of Processes \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Supervision of Employees \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Crating or Packaging \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**E. Visitor Control**

CASUAL VISITORS

- Visitor Register Identification \_\_\_\_\_
- Badge or Pass System \_\_\_\_\_
- Escort \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED VISITORS

- Visitor Register Identification \_\_\_\_\_
- Badge or Pass System \_\_\_\_\_
- Escort \_\_\_\_\_
- MED Compliance Clearance Reports \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**F. Personnel Clearance**

- Total Employees \_\_\_\_\_
- On MED Work \_\_\_\_\_
- On Classified MED work \_\_\_\_\_

EMPLOYER INVESTIGATION

- Application Form \_\_\_\_\_
- Check Previous Employers \_\_\_\_\_
- Check Personal References \_\_\_\_\_
- Check Credit Company \_\_\_\_\_

MED COMPLIANCE

- Submission of Fingerprints \_\_\_\_\_
- Submission of PHS \_\_\_\_\_
- Submission of Form 58 \_\_\_\_\_
- Proof of Citizenship \_\_\_\_\_
- Alien Clearance \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**G. Safeguarding Military Information**

- Management's knowledge of Manhattan Engineer District Requirements \_\_\_\_\_
- Interest Displayed by Management \_\_\_\_\_
- Extent of Manhattan Engineer District Compliance \_\_\_\_\_
- Continuing Educational Program \_\_\_\_\_
- Familiarity of Employees with MED Requirements \_\_\_\_\_
- Storage Facilities and Usage \_\_\_\_\_
- Preparation, handling, and transmittal of classified material \_\_\_\_\_
- Accounting practices (receipts, records, inventories) \_\_\_\_\_
- Practices for Destroying Classified Materials \_\_\_\_\_
- Reports of Losses or Irregularities \_\_\_\_\_

**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

II. FIRE PROTECTION

COMPOSITE RATING

**A. Construction**

Floor Area \_\_\_\_\_ sq. ft.      Devoted to MED Work \_\_\_\_\_ sq. ft.  
 Roof and Floor Construction \_\_\_\_\_% Hollow Joist \_\_\_\_\_% Open Joist \_\_\_\_\_% Plank on Steel \_\_\_\_\_% Plank on Timber  
 \_\_\_\_\_% Concrete or Gypsum on Steel \_\_\_\_\_% Reinforced Concrete \_\_\_\_\_% All Metal \_\_\_\_\_% Other (Define) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Wall Construction \_\_\_\_\_% Masonry \_\_\_\_\_% Frame \_\_\_\_\_% Metal \_\_\_\_\_% Other (Define) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Fire Areas (considering hazards involved)      Large      Normal      Small  
 Protection of Floor Openings (Stairs Elevators Conveyors) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Maintenance and Repair of Buildings \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Occupancy**

Special Hazards:  
 Nature \_\_\_\_\_  
 Location \_\_\_\_\_  
 Handling \_\_\_\_\_  
 Housekeeping \_\_\_\_\_  
 Smoking Restrictions \_\_\_\_\_  
 Welding & Cutting Practices \_\_\_\_\_  
 Maintenance of Equipment \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**C. Exposure**

Other Sections of Building:  
 Construction \_\_\_\_\_  
 Occupancy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sprinkler Protection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Adjacent Buildings:  
 Spacing \_\_\_\_\_  
 Construction \_\_\_\_\_  
 Occupancy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sprinkler Protection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Protection Against Exposure \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**D. Protection**

Automatic Sprinklers:  
 \_\_\_\_\_% Floor Area Sprinklered \_\_\_\_\_% Needing Sprinklers  
 Sprinklers fed by: (Public Mains) (Gravity Tank) (Pressure Tank) (Pump(s))  
 Static Pressure on Highest Sprinklers \_\_\_\_\_ lbs. from \_\_\_\_\_  
 Water Flow Alarm (Electric) (Water Motor) (Local) (Central Station) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sprinkler Control Valves (Inside) (Outside) (All Open) (Sealed) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Available Volume of water at 15 lbs. pressure on top sprinklers \_\_\_\_\_ gpm  
 Extent of Sprinkler Protection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Water Supply:  
 Public Water: Diameter Street Mains \_\_\_\_\_ in.      Diameter Plant Connections \_\_\_\_\_ in.  
 Static Pressure \_\_\_\_\_ lbs.      Residual Pressure \_\_\_\_\_ lbs. with \_\_\_\_\_ gpm flowing or \_\_\_\_\_ lbs. with  
 2" drain valve open  
 Tank or Reservoir \_\_\_\_\_ gals. capacity      Elevation \_\_\_\_\_ ft.  
 Fire Pumps      Centrifugal Underwriter      Condition \_\_\_\_\_  
 Yard Piping and Hydrants \_\_\_\_\_  
 Adequacy of Water Supply \_\_\_\_\_  
 Public Fire Department      Strength \_\_\_\_\_      Distribution of Cos. \_\_\_\_\_      Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
 Public Fire Department (Volunteer) (Part Paid) (Fully Paid)      Efficiency \_\_\_\_\_  
 Fire Alarm (Public Box \_\_\_\_\_ ft.) (Alarm in Plant) (Telephone) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Probable Number of good 1 1/8 Streams Available (All sources) \_\_\_\_\_ (First Alarm)  
 Private Fire Brigade (\_\_\_\_members)      Efficiency \_\_\_\_\_  
 First Aid Fire Fighting Equipment      Supply \_\_\_\_\_      Condition \_\_\_\_\_  
 Fire Prevention Inspections      None      Monthly      Weekly      Daily

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**III. CONTINUITY OF PRODUCTION**

**COMPOSITE RATING**

**A. Power - Fuel - Supplies**

Electric Power: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Primary Source \_\_\_\_\_  
  Secondary Source \_\_\_\_\_  
  Protection of Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
Available Fuel Supply \_\_\_\_\_  
Available Water Supply \_\_\_\_\_  
Raw Materials: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Storage \_\_\_\_\_  
  Method of Handling \_\_\_\_\_  
  Available Supply \_\_\_\_\_  
Finished Products: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Storage \_\_\_\_\_  
  Shipping Facilities \_\_\_\_\_  
  
**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Plant**

Maintenance: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Buildings \_\_\_\_\_  
  Mechanical Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
  Electrical Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
  Special Process Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
Replacement Equipment: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Supply on Hand \_\_\_\_\_  
  Available Sources \_\_\_\_\_  
Spare Parts and Tools: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Supply on Hand \_\_\_\_\_  
  Available Sources \_\_\_\_\_  
Location of Vital Processes \_\_\_\_\_  
Arrangement of Vital Processes \_\_\_\_\_  
  
**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**C. Industrial Safety**

Interest of Management \_\_\_\_\_  
Safety Organization \_\_\_\_\_  
Employee Selection \_\_\_\_\_  
Training & Placement \_\_\_\_\_  
Shop Supervision \_\_\_\_\_  
Personnel Protective Equipment \_\_\_\_\_  
Mechanical & Physical Safeguarding \_\_\_\_\_  
Industrial Health Control \_\_\_\_\_  
First Aid & Medical Facilities \_\_\_\_\_  
Accident Records & Reports \_\_\_\_\_  
  
**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**D. Employees**

Labor Relations: \_\_\_\_\_  
  Closed Shop - Open Shop - Union Shop \_\_\_\_\_  
Unions \_\_\_\_\_  
  
strikes since 1 Jan. 1942 \_\_\_\_\_  
  
Rating for Labor Relations \_\_\_\_\_  
Employee Morale \_\_\_\_\_  
Work Attendance \_\_\_\_\_  
Available Labor Supply \_\_\_\_\_  
Replacement Training Program \_\_\_\_\_  
Administrative Control \_\_\_\_\_  
  
**RATING** \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:**

Use continuation sheets if additional space required

ARMY REGULATIONS  
No. 380-5

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 15 March 1944.

**SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION**

	Paragraphs
SECTION I. General.....	1-22
II. Documents.....	23-32
III. Registered documents.....	33-39
IV. Cryptographic security.....	40-54
V. Matériel.....	55-68
VI. Visitors.....	69-72
VII. Air space reservations, reserved areas and restricted areas.....	73-74
VIII. Troop movements and individual travel.....	75-87

**SECTION I  
GENERAL**

	Paragraph
Need for classification.....	1
Definitions.....	2
Categories.....	3
Top secret matter.....	4
Secret matter.....	5
Confidential matter.....	6
Restricted matter.....	7
Grading.....	8
Authority to classify.....	9
Classification of matter from other governmental agencies.....	10
Dissemination of classified matter.....	11
One classification only.....	12
Overclassification.....	13
Responsibility.....	14
Cancellation or change of classification.....	15
Loss or subjection to compromise.....	16
Reproduction of classified matter.....	17
Photographs of certain classified matter.....	18
Requests for military information.....	19
Dissemination of classified military information.....	20
Testimony before Congress.....	21
Legislation pertaining to War Department.....	22

\*This pamphlet supersedes AR 380-5, 28 September 1942, including C 2, 14 December 1942; C 3, 22 December 1942; C 4, 1 January 1943; C 5, 23 January 1943; C 6, 16 February 1943; C 8, 24 February 1943; C 9, 16 March 1943; C 10, 26 April 1943; C 11, 11 June 1943; C 13, 13 August 1943; C 14, 16 November 1943; C 15, 22 January 1944; C 16, 25 January 1944; C 17, 15 February 1944; section XII, Circular No. 14, and Circular No. 91, War Department, 1944.

1. **Need for classification.**—Military information is of varying degrees of value to the United States and to the enemy and therefore requires the exercise of varying degrees of precaution for its safety. To safeguard official matter, it must be examined and graded into categories so that it may be recognized and accorded proper handling. For the purpose of providing the necessary variations in safeguarding the several types of critical information, and to grade matter accurately and uniformly, the classifications and the applicable protective measures to be adhered to are hereinafter outlined.

2. **Definitions.**—*a. Aircraft.*—The term "aircraft" includes all weight-carrying devices or structures designed to be supported by the air, either by buoyance or by dynamic action.

*b. Air space reservation.*—An air space reservation is the air space located above an area on the surface of the land or water, designated and set apart by Executive Order of the President or by a State, Commonwealth, or Territory, over which the flight of aircraft is prohibited or restricted for the purpose of national defense or for other governmental purposes.

*c. Classified military information.*—Classified military information includes all information concerning documents, cryptographic devices, development projects, and matériel falling in the categories of *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*.

*d. Cryptographic material.*—Cryptographic material includes all documents and devices employed in changing plain-language messages into unintelligible form by means of codes and ciphers.

*e. Cryptographic security.*—Cryptographic security is that branch of signal communication which deals with the provision of technically sound cryptographic systems, their proper use, and their careful safeguarding.

*f. Cryptographic system.*—Code and/or cipher and instructions therefor.

*g. Distribution.*—Extent of actual or authorized issue of specific matter.

*h. Documents.*—Any form of recorded information. The term "document" includes printed, mimeographed, typed, photostated, and written matter of all kinds; maps, photomaps, and aerial photographs and mosaics; drawings, sketches, notes, and blueprints, or photostatic copies thereof; photographs and photographic negatives; engineering data; correspondence and plans relating to research and development projects; and all other similar matter.

*i. Engineering data.*—The term "engineering data" comprises drawings, blueprints, photostats, photographs, mathematical calculations, formulas, processes, and all similar items that can be reduced to documentary form.

*j. Foreign government.*—The term "foreign government" includes any recognized or nonrecognized government and any faction or body of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace.

*k. Handling.*—Care in transmission and custody.

*l. Impedimenta.*—The term "impedimenta" refers to organizational equipment which accompanies troop movements.

*m. Matériel.*—Any article, substance, or apparatus. The term "matériel" comprises military arms, armament, equipment, and supplies of all classes, both complete and in process of development and construction, models that show features in whole or in part, design, mock-ups, jigs, fixtures, and dies and all other components or accessories of military equipment.

*n. Mock-up.*—A mock-up is a model, usually full size and constructed of inexpensive material, made for the purpose of studying the construction and use of an article of matériel or mechanical device.

*o. Munitions of war.*—  
*p. Order of battle.*—I the units and formation theaters.

*q. Paraphrasing.*—To ing is the same but its p

*r. Photomap.*—A phot or single vertical used in

*s. Plain text, clear text language* is the text o meaning in any known l

*t. Registered matter* tered usually by number

*u. Reserved area.*—A water designated and se of national defense, adm

*v. Short title.*—A shoi matériel, or device for 1 letters, words, or combi abbreviated designation relative to classification

*w. Troop.*—The term is not part of a troop m

*x. Troop movements.*— units or organized detac the purpose of the me wounded, and all similar A movement may be ov theater, or returns (to tl

*y. United States.*—Th includes the Canal Zone subject to the jurisdiction June 1917 (40 Stat. 231;

*z. Visitor.*—As used in a Government or commi fied work or project for 1

(1) A person emp

(2) A person dire

3. **Categories.**—Officia graded under one of the:

*a. TOP SECRET* (sig

*b. SECRET.*

*c. CONFIDENTIAL.*

*d. RESTRICTED.*

4. **Top secret matter.** ments, information, and r whose unauthorized disc nation shall be classified.

- o. Munitions of war.*—Any item used for war.
- p. Order of battle.*—Important disposition of our forces with the identities of the units and formations composing those forces in or adjacent to operational theaters.
- q. Paraphrasing.*—To paraphrase a message is to rewrite it so that its meaning is the same but its phraseology is different.
- r. Photomap.*—A photomap is a reproduction of an aerial mosaic, composite, or single vertical used in place of or to supplement a map.
- s. Plain text, clear text, or plain language.*—“Plain text,” “clear text,” or “plain language” is the text of a message which, on its face, conveys an intelligible meaning in any known language.
- t. Registered matter (document).*—Any classified document or device registered usually by number and periodically accounted for.
- u. Reserved area.*—A reserved area is an area on the surface of the land or water designated and set apart by Executive Order of the President for purposes of national defense, admittance to which is either prohibited or restricted.
- v. Short title.*—A short title is a designation applied to a classified document, matériel, or device for purposes of security and brevity. It consists of figures, letters, words, or combinations thereof, and if registered usually contains an abbreviated designation of the office of origin, without giving any information relative to classification or content of the document, matériel, or device.
- w. Travel.*—The term “travel” refers to the movement of an individual who is not part of a troop movement.
- x. Troop movements.*—The term “troop movement” applies to the moving of units or organized detachments even though temporarily organized as such for the purpose of the movement. Movements of prisoners of war, sick and wounded, and all similar groups under military control are included in the term. A movement may be overseas (from the United States); intertheater, intratheater, or returns (to the United States).
- y. United States.*—The term “United States” as used in these regulations includes the Canal Zone and all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. *Section 1, Title XIII, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 251; 50 U. S. C. 40; M. L., 1939, sec. 2187).*
- z. Visitor.*—As used in these regulations a visitor is any person admitted to a Government or commercial manufacturing establishment engaged in classified work or project for the War Department except—
- (1) A person employed on the work or project, or
  - (2) A person directly and officially concerned with the work or project.
- 3. Categories.**—Official matter requiring classification shall be examined and graded under one of the following categories:
- a. TOP SECRET* (signal abbreviation, TOPSEC).
  - b. SECRET.*
  - c. CONFIDENTIAL.*
  - d. RESTRICTED.*
- 4. Top secret matter.**—*a. When classified top secret.*—Certain secret documents, information, and matériel, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation shall be classified TOP SECRET.



b. The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded TOP SECRET:

- (1) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (2) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with (1) above.
- (3) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (4) Information of the methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Services and Counterintelligence Services or which would imperil secret agents.
- (5) Critical information of new and important munitions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- (6) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

5. Secret matter.—a. Documents, information, or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified SECRET.

b. The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded SECRET:

- (1) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (2) Plans or particulars of operations not included under TOP SECRET.
- (3) Instructions regarding the employment of important new munitions of war.
- (4) Important improvements to existing munitions of war until accepted for service use.
- (5) Documents relating to the design and development of new matériel and containing information of the type described in a above.
- (6) Certain development projects.
- (7) Order of battle information and locations and moves affecting the order of battle. (Information on the enemy's order of battle will be graded according to the classification of the means by which it was obtained.)
- (8) Knowledge of enemy matériel and procedure, the value of which depends upon the enemy not knowing that we possess it.
- (9) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (10) Vital military information on important defenses.
- (11) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (12) Important cryptographic devices and material unless assigned to a lower category.
- (13) Information concerning items of matériel and methods of assembly classified as secret by a chief of a technical service.
- (14) *Certain military maps and photomaps.*
  - (a) In the continental United States, those illustrating and identified with a war plan, including local defense plans, defense projects, or any phase thereof.
  - (b) In oversea possessions and foreign territory occupied by the forces of the United States, those illustrating an approved war plan, including local defense plans, defense projects, or any phase thereof; those showing the lay-out of permanent

- defens  
vital to  
locatio  
naval l
- (15) Information v  
departments  
United State  
or the total  
thereto, exce  
designations.
  - (16) Photographs  
tions under  
from such pl  
with the act  
cordance wit
  - (17) Ground photo  
secret matter
  - (18) Troop movem

6. Confidential matte  
authorized disclosure of  
would be prejudicial to th  
activity, an individual, o  
culty, or be of advantage

b. The following are  
CONFIDENTIAL:

- (1) Matters, invest  
nature, the  
administrati
- (2) Routine operati  
tion of vital
- (3) Routine intelli
- (4) General milita
- (5) Military call s  
order of bat
- (6) Meteorological
- (7) Unit movemen  
adjacent to
- (8) Certain techni  
tenance and
- (9) General tactic
- (10) Regulations
- (11) Documents r  
and contain
- (12) Certain cryp
- (13) *Certain milit*

(a) In the  
perma  
terrai  
defini

defense works and naval bases and the adjacent terrain vital to their defense; and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element of permanent defense works and naval bases.

- (15) Information which will indicate the strength of garrisons in oversea departments and foreign territory occupied by the forces of the United States or information indicating the composition of units or the total quantity of specific items of equipment pertaining thereto, except that mailing addresses will include organizational designations.
- (16) Photographs and negatives of vulnerable points or vital installations under our control. Maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from such photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used.
- (17) Ground photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of *secret matter*.
- (18) Troop movements. See section VIII.

6. Confidential matter.—*a.* Documents, information, or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

*b.* The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded CONFIDENTIAL:

- (1) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (2) Routine operational and battle reports which do not contain information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (3) Routine intelligence reports.
- (4) General military radio frequency allocations.
- (5) Military call signs, unless so collected together that they reveal the order of battle.
- (6) Meteorological information of designated areas.
- (7) Unit movements of nonoperational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.
- (8) Certain technical documents and manuals used for training, maintenance and inspection of important new munitions of war.
- (9) General tactical lessons learned as a result of operations.
- (10) Regulations governing joint action of the Army and the Navy.
- (11) Documents relating to the design and development of new matériel and containing information of the type described in *a* above.
- (12) Certain cryptographic devices and material.
- (13) *Certain military maps and photomaps.*
  - (*a*) In the continental United States, those showing lay-out of the permanent defense works and naval bases and the adjacent terrain vital to their defense, and those that serve to fix definitely the location of any element of permanent defense

works and naval bases, except that when the complete map of a defense area consists of more than one sheet, only those sheets showing defense elements need be classified as CONFIDENTIAL.

- (b) In oversea possessions and foreign territory occupied by the forces of the United States, those not classified as SECRET, showing lay-out of military and naval radio stations, air bases, airdromes, air depots, supply bases, arsenals, proving grounds, or any area vital to defense.
- (14) Technical information, such as research of processes of manufacture which may be a distinct military asset and not a matter of general knowledge, and other technical items of the type described in *a* above.
- (15) Information and records compiled at the request of the War Department for its use in the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of matériel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs. See section 5a, added to act 3 June 1916, by section 5, act 4 June 1920 (41 Stat. 764; 10 U. S. C. 1193; M. L., 1939, section 1925).
- (16) Shipments of machine prepared and manually prepared monthly personnel rosters and W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 303 (Report of Change) for organizations and individuals outside the continental limits of the United States. Rosters and reports of change included in any shipment need not be individually classified.
- (17) All information relative to specific quantities of war reserves.
- (18) Aerial photographs and negatives of territories under our control in or adjacent to operational theaters. Maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from such photographs or negatives will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used.
- (19) Ground photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of confidential matter.
- (20) Troop movements. See section VIII.

7. Restricted matter.—*a.* Documents, information or matériel (other than TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL) which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes shall be classified RESTRICTED:

*b.* The following are examples of matter which normally will be graded RESTRICTED:

- (1) Information of moves of nonoperational significance in areas remote from theaters of war.
- (2) Training and technical documents for official use only or not intended for release to the public.
- (3) Certain routine documents relating to supply and procurement.
- (4) Aerial photographs and negatives of territories under our control remote from operational theaters.
- (5) Photographs and negatives of enemy, enemy occupied or dominated, areas except those which reveal secret sources. Maps, charts, and photomaps prepared from such photographs or negatives and from

photographs and negatives in accordance with the classification of the original photographs or negatives unless necessary in the interest of national defense.

- (6) Ground photographs and negatives of restricted matter.
- (7) Strength returns.
- (8) Certain parts of documents.
- (9) Documents relating to the procurement of matériel containing information of a confidential nature.
- (10) Procurement plans.
- (11) Certain cryptograms.
- (12) Certain Army orders.
- (13) Certain documents, reports, and maps, including maps, charts, and photomaps, vital to the future operations of the Army.
- (14) Certain military information:
  - (a) In the case of ground forces, information relating to the location, strength, and movements of units, and the location of bases, arsenals, and depots, and the location of public relations offices.
  - (b) In the case of naval forces, information relating to the location, strength, and movements of units, and the location of bases, arsenals, and depots, and the location of public relations offices.
- (15) Troop movements.
- (16) Nonattacking locations; and

8. Grading.—*a.* The designation of the grade of a document shall be made by authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General of the Staff of the War Department, or a general officer, the commander of an independent command, the chief of a military mission, or the chief of a military installation.

*b.* Each document shall be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used.

*c.* The grading of a file shall be that of the highest graded document in the file.

9. Authority to classify.—Documents shall be classified only by or by authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General of the Staff of the War Department, or a general officer, the commander of an independent command, the chief of a military mission, or the chief of a military installation.

*b. Confidential.*—Documents containing information of a confidential nature may be classified as RESTRICTED.

*c. Restricted.*—Documents containing information of a restricted nature may be classified as RESTRICTED.

photographs and negatives referred to in (4) above will be graded in accordance with the actual details shown thereon, and not necessarily in accordance with the classification of the photographs or negatives used.

- (6) Certain photographs, negatives, photostats, diagrams, or models of *restricted* matter.
- (7) Strength returns of units remote from operational theaters.
- (8) Certain parts of mobilization plans and regulations.
- (9) Documents relating to the design and development of new matériel containing information of the type described in *a* above.
- (10) Procurement plans.
- (11) Certain cryptographic devices and material.
- (12) Certain Army extension courses.
- (13) Certain documents regarding engineering principles and design details, composition, method of processing or assembling, which are vital to the functioning or use of an article of matériel.
- (14) *Certain military maps and photomaps.*
  - (a) In the continental United States, those showing military and naval radio stations, air bases, airdromes, air depots, supply bases, arsenals, and the adjacent terrain vital to their defense, not otherwise classified which are not suitable for public release; and
  - (b) In oversea possessions and foreign territory occupied by the forces of the United States, all military maps and photomaps not otherwise classified which are not suitable for public release.
- (15) Troop movements. See section VIII.
- (16) Nontactical radio frequencies and call signs in operation at fixed locations; and frequencies and call signs used for training.

8. Grading.—*a.* The designation of persons responsible for grading and regrading will be made by authorities listed in paragraph 9.

*b.* Each document should be graded according to its own content and not necessarily according to its relationship to another document. This also applies to extracts from previously classified documents except messages. See paragraphs 44c, 49b, and 50d.

*c.* The grading of a file or group of physically connected documents shall be that of the highest graded document therein.

9. Authority to classify.—*a. Secret.*—Matters may be classified as SECRET only by or by authority of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, an Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, an Assistant Chief of Staff of the War Department General Staff, the chiefs of the technical services, a general officer; the commanding officer of a depot, post, camp, station, or independent command, the commandant of a general or special service school, the chief of a military mission, a military attaché, or a military observer.

*b. Confidential.*—Documents, development projects, matériel, or technical information may be classified as CONFIDENTIAL by any commissioned officer.

*c. Restricted.*—Documents, development projects, technical data, and matériel may be classified as RESTRICTED by any commissioned officer.

10. Classification of matter from other governmental agencies.—Matter obtained from the Navy Department, other governmental agency, or friendly foreign government will be placed in the same classification category as that in which it was placed by the originating agency.

11. Dissemination of classified matter.—*No person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession.*

12. One classification only.—A document or article of matériel will not be assigned more than one of the four classifications, *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*. In the event of conflicting classifications, the highest classification will prevail.

13. Overclassification.—*Documents or matériel requiring classification under the provisions of these regulations will be assigned the least restrictive classification consistent with the proper safeguarding of the information or matériel concerned. Overclassification will be avoided since it causes unnecessary delay in the transmission of documents and depreciates the importance of classified information in the minds of handling personnel.*

14. Responsibility.—*a.* The safeguarding of classified military information is the responsibility of all military personnel, civilian employees of the War Department, and of the management and employees of all commercial firms engaged in classified work or projects for the War Department. Classified military information will be discussed only with military or civilian personnel having a legitimate interest therein.

*b.* In the case of War Department civilian employees, the commanding officer or his designated representative may permit such employees to have access to secret or confidential matter without an investigation when such permission is not in conflict with War Department Civilian Personnel Regulations.

15. Cancellation or change of classification.—*a.* The authority making the original classification, or higher authority, may cancel or change the classification of a document by writing or stamping over the mark at the top of the first page, "Classification canceled or changed to—, by authority of (officer authorized to change), by (name and grade of officer making the change and the date thereof)." This paragraph will in no way be construed as a limitation upon paragraph 47.

*b.* The authority making the original classification or higher authority may cancel or change the classification of matériel by letter of instruction to all offices or personnel concerned.

*c.* In the case of messages which have been previously cryptographed no change in classification will be made unless the text has been carefully paraphrased.

*d.* *It is the obligation of all authorities to keep classified matter constantly under review and to downgrade it as soon as conditions permit.*

16. Loss or subjection to compromise.—Any person in the military service or in its employ who may have knowledge of the loss or subjection to compromise of a *secret* or *confidential* document or article of matériel will promptly report that fact to the custodian of the document or matériel. The proper commanding officer will notify the office responsible for its issue, by the fastest means available, of the loss or subjection to compromise of a *secret* or *registered item*, or *confidential* operational plans, codes, ciphers, and weapons or equipment of vital importance to current or future operations, and will then in the case of a *secret* or *confidential* item make a thorough investigation of the circumstances, fix the responsibility,

and send to The Adjutant General the recommendations in the case.

17. Reproduction of classified matter.—*a.* No printing or reproduction, storage, or reproduction of the applicable provisions of the preparation, printing, or disposal of copies, and wastage incident to the information being reproduced.

*b.* The commandants of the units in which the printing or reproduction of classified information takes place.

*c.* The Commanding General of the Army Air Service Forces are responsible under their supervision for the security of classified publications for such publications to be released before release.

*d.* Whenever correspondence models pertaining to *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* information regarding engineering processing or of assembly use of the matériel, they will be handled as follows:

*e.* Preparation of press releases to prepare information to be disseminated may be of great value but will be carefully handled.

*f.* For additional instructions on the handling of diplomatic, and classified information.

18. Photographs of features of military equipment of the military service when necessary in the development or printed in compliance with the procedure for handling of the Provost Marshal General's possession of commercial equipment.

19. Requests for military information from individuals, firms, or corporations for classified military information (see paragraph 4 below) are governed by

- b.* (1) Exchanges of information shall be made only through the assistance of the Adjutant General.
- (2) Exchanges of information shall be made only through the assistance of the Adjutant General.

and send to The Adjutant General, through military channels, a report with his recommendations in the case.

17. **Reproduction of classified matter.**—*a.* Agencies entrusted with the printing or reproduction, storage, and issue of classified documents will be informed of the applicable provisions of these regulations. The authority directing the preparation, printing, or reproduction of classified documents will be responsible for the disposal of the notes, manuscripts, type, plates, stencils, negatives, and wastage incident thereto in a manner which will safeguard the secrecy of the information being reproduced.

*b.* The commandants of the general and special service schools are responsible that the printing or reproduction plants of their respective commands release no classified information to personnel or agencies not entitled thereto.

*c.* The Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces are responsible that service magazines or journals published under their supervision comply with the provisions of these regulations relative to security of classified military information, and will submit all material for such publications to the Bureau of Public Relations for review and action before release.

*d.* Whenever correspondence, documents, drawings, prints, photographs, or models pertaining to *secret, confidential, or restricted* matériel disclose information regarding engineering principles, design details, composition, methods of processing or of assembly which are vital to the manufacture, functioning, or use of the matériel, they will be appropriately classified.

*e.* **Preparation of press releases based on coded messages.**—Officers authorized to prepare information to be made public will constantly bear in mind that such material may be of great value to the enemy signal intelligence service. Information received or sent in cryptographic messages will never be released verbatim but will be carefully paraphrased before release to the public.

*f.* For additional instructions relative to the discussion of military, political, diplomatic, and classified subjects, see AR 600-700.

18. **Photographs of certain classified matter.**—Photographs of classified features of military equipment or of other classified items will be made by members of the military service or by civilian employees of the War Department only when necessary in the conduct of their official duties and if made may be developed or printed in commercial establishments that have established a specific procedure for handling classified film, which procedure has been approved by the Provost Marshal General. Such film or prints will not be retained in the possession of commercial establishments so utilized.

19. **Requests for military information.**—*a.* All requests from private individuals, firms, or corporations and Federal or State agencies or departments for classified military information (except those requests defined under *b* and *c* below) are governed by the provisions of AR 410-5 as amended.

- b.* (1) Exchanges of classified or unclassified military information, other than technical information, with foreign nationals will be made only through or with the express permission of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
- (2) Exchanges of classified or unclassified technical information with foreign nationals will be made in accordance with ex-

isting War Department instructions issued on this subject to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces.

c. Applications for information or records compiled and furnished at the request of the War Department for its use in the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of matériel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs will be referred to the Under Secretary of War for necessary action. The service of any process or subpoena for the production of any such record will be reported immediately by the person on whom it is served to the United States attorney for the district in which the service is made and, at the same time, direct to the Under Secretary of War.

20. Dissemination of classified military information.—a. Except regarding information to be released to the press by authorized military public relations agencies, when classified military information is disseminated under the provisions of these regulations to persons not subject to military law, they will be informed that it affects the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act and that its transmission to an unauthorized person is prohibited. See also paragraph 23b.

b. Publication of articles or books.—The inclusion of classified military information in any article or book published by a member of the Army of the United States or by a civilian employee of the Military Establishment is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the War Department. For additional information relative to publication of articles, see AR 310-10, 600-10, and 600-700.

c. Oral discussions of classified military information.—Either public or private discussion of classified military information with or in the presence or hearing of any person not authorized to have knowledge thereof is strictly forbidden.

21. Testimony before Congress.—a. When a person in the military service appears before a committee of the Congress and is called upon to give testimony which he knows to be *confidential* or *restricted*, he will respectfully request that his statements be taken in executive session only and not appear in the record of hearings, the Congressional Record, or other document open to public inspection.

b. When called upon to give testimony which he knows to be *top secret* or *secret*, unless he has previously been authorized by the Secretary of War to give such testimony, he will respectfully state that he is not authorized to disclose the information desired, and will inform the appropriate Member of Congress that a written request for the specific information should be transmitted to the Secretary of War. Testimony of a *secret* nature, when authorized by the Secretary of War, will be given only in executive session under the conditions cited in a above.

c. With regard to policies and facts which the public interest does not require to be kept *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*, see AR 600-10.

22. Legislation pertaining to War Department.—a. Recommendations to the War Department for legislation will be classified until released by the Secretary of War. Prior to such release, no information as to any legislative recommendation will be revealed to any individual or association not under War Department control except as may be required by law.

b. The nature and content of reports of the War Department on bills referred to it by committees of the Congress will not be disclosed to individuals or agencies outside the War Department.

Marking of classified documents  
Transmission of certain messages  
Handling and transmission of  
Handling and transmission of  
Handling and transmission of  
Handling and transmission of  
Routine correspondence, receipt  
Storage of classified documents.  
Return of secret and confidential  
Destruction of classified documents

### 23. Marking of classified

(1) Classified books and securely fastened and marked or stamped on the cover, title

(2) Classified communications securely fastened below, will be placed at the top of the page. Pages are clipped

(3) Classified drawings classification markings on copies made of graphic negative cover aerial reconnaissance will be marked and ending of the drawing will not lend themselves and will be kept the classification graphs and require a legend will appropriate classification kept in container to mark to will state in the

(4) Contracts for the and conspicuous on the first page

(5) Classified maps the scale.

b. Additional marking of Documents containing classification than those of the military in addition to being marked the following notation:

This document contains United States within the m

## SECTION II

## DOCUMENTS

	Paragraph
Marking of classified documents.....	23
Transmission of certain messages by electrical means.....	24
Handling and transmission of secret matter.....	25
Handling and transmission of top secret matter.....	26
Handling and transmission of confidential matter.....	27
Handling and transmission of restricted matter.....	28
Routine correspondence, receipts, and returns.....	29
Storage of classified documents.....	30
Return of secret and confidential documents.....	31
Destruction of classified documents.....	32

23. Marking of classified documents.—*a. Manner of marking.*

- (1) Classified books or pamphlets, the pages of which are permanently and securely fastened together, will be plainly and conspicuously marked or stamped *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* on the cover, title page, and first page.
- (2) Classified communications and other material not permanently and securely fastened together, except as indicated in (3), (4), and (5) below, will be marked or stamped with the appropriate classification at the top and bottom of each page. The marking at the top will be so placed that it will not be hidden from view when the pages are clipped or stapled together.
- (3) Classified drawings or tracings will carry a legend of the proper classification in such a position that it will be reproduced on all copies made therefrom. Whenever practicable, classified photographic negatives will be marked in the same manner. Continuous cover aerial reconnaissance and mapping negatives in roll form will be marked with the appropriate classification at the beginning and ending of each roll. These and any other negatives which do not lend themselves to marking will be handled on a classified basis, and will be kept in containers, properly secured, which will bear the classification mark to which the contents are entitled. Photographs and reproductions made from negatives which do not carry a legend will be marked on the front and on the back with the appropriate classification. Classified motion picture films will be kept in containers, properly secured, which will bear the classification mark to which the contents are entitled, and in addition, will state in the title the classification thereof.
- (4) Contracts for the manufacture of classified matériel will be plainly and conspicuously marked, not typed, with the proper classification on the first page.
- (5) Classified maps and photomaps will be appropriately marked under the scale.

*b. Additional marking of classified documents issued to authorized civilians.*—Documents containing classified military information furnished persons other than those of the military and naval services and their civilian employees will, in addition to being marked *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*, bear the following notation:

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C., 81 and 82,



as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

*c. Special marking of secret documents.*—All secret documents will show the authority for the classification, the initials of the classifying officer, and the date affixed. See paragraph 9a.

24. Transmission of certain messages by electrical means.—*a.* The highest grade cryptographic systems available will be used for the transmission of secret messages.

*b.* Secret messages will not be transmitted by electrical means in the clear, except over approved circuits and providing the rule in *c* below is not violated.

*c.* Messages which have been transmitted or are to be transmitted in a high grade cryptographic system of one nation will not be relayed or transmitted by another nation between point of origin and destination by electrical means in clear language or unapproved "scrambler" system, or low-grade cryptographic system.

25. Handling and transmission of secret matter.—*a.* Secret matter will be handled and transmitted in accordance with the following rules:

(1) *Preparation for transmission.*—Secret documents when transmitted will be inclosed in double sealed envelopes, the inner one marked secret. Typewritten matter in the document will be protected by a cover sheet, or by folding inward, from direct contact with the inner cover. The inner cover will be a sealed wrapper or envelope addressed in the usual way but plainly marked *secret* so that the notation will be seen when the outer cover is removed and will contain a receipt form which will identify the addressor, the addressee, and the document. The outer cover will be sealed and addressed in the ordinary manner with no notation to indicate its secret classification.

(2) Transmission and custody of secret documents and matériel will be covered by a receipt system.

(3) Registered secret documents or matériel will be periodically accounted for.

(4) It is the responsibility of the commissioned officer or the civilian holding a position equivalent to that of a commissioned officer having custody of secret documents to ensure that all security precautions are taken to guard such documents at all times.

(5) Secret documents will be transmitted only by officially designated courier. Where officially designated courier service is not available, secret documents may be transmitted by registered mail service or mail service superior to registered mail service, if the service is completely within national control.

*b.* Subject to the foregoing standards, secret documents will be transmitted by any of the following means:

(1) *Between offices of same headquarters or stations.*—At headquarters commanded by an authority qualified to make the secret classification, the commanding officer will provide for the security of inter-office transmission of *secret* documents.

(2) *Within continental United States.*

(a) Officially designated couriers (officer messenger or officer courier, including warrant officers).

(b) Registered

(c) Protected assures paragraph

(d) Military responsibility instruction

(3) *Outside continental United States, and via United States.*

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*c. Action upon receipt of*

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(2) The inner cover or his duly dated, signed, cover will be inclosure has

*d. Security of secret documents is forced down in e*

burning. If not subject to as are necessary to rende

- (b) Registered mail (including registered air mail).
  - (c) Protected commercial express, air or rail, under billing which assures the highest degree of protective handling. See also paragraph 68.
  - (d) Military aircraft. (The documents will be entrusted to a responsible officer or crew member on such aircraft with instructions regarding their security and delivery.)
- (3) *Outside continental United States.*—Includes transmission of secret documents, except secret cryptographic material, from points within the continental United States to points outside the United States, and vice versa, and between points outside the continental United States.
- (a) Officially designated couriers (officer courier, including warrant officers).
  - (b) United States Post Office registered mail through the Army Postal Service, provided the documents do not pass through a foreign postal system. Secret documents may, however, be transmitted to and from United States installations in Canada by United States and Canadian registered mail, with return receipt.
  - (c) State Department diplomatic pouch. (This means will be used exclusively for the transmission of secret documents through or within a neutral country.)
  - (d) United States or Allied military aircraft. (The documents will be entrusted to a responsible officer or crew member on such aircraft with instructions regarding their security and delivery.) See *d* below.
  - (e) Commanding officers of United States Army transports.
  - (f) Reliable citizens of the United States (that is, officers or officials of other Government departments or masters of vessels of United States registry).
  - (g) For specific means of transmission of secret cryptographic material, reference should be made to letter instructions on this subject issued by the War Department.

*c. Action upon receipt of secret matter.*

- (1) Prior to opening a sealed package or envelope containing secret documents, the seals and wrappers will be carefully inspected to determine whether there has been any tampering. If any evidence of tampering is noted, the facts will be reported immediately to the issuing authority, who will initiate an investigation without delay.
- (2) The inner cover marked *secret* will be opened only by the addressee or his duly designated representative. The receipt form will be dated, signed, and immediately returned to the sender. The inner cover will be destroyed by burning if the subject matter of the inclosure has been in contact therewith.

*d. Security of secret documents.*—If a military aircraft carrying secret documents is forced down in enemy territory, the documents will be destroyed by burning. If not subject to burning, they will be destroyed by such other means as are necessary to render them beyond recognition. Similar action will be

taken if forced down in neutral territory, if capture appears imminent. If the aircraft is forced down at sea, the documents will be sunk by the most practical method. For detailed instructions on destruction of classified documents in emergencies, reference should be made to letter on this subject issued by the War Department.

**26. Handling and transmission of top secret matter.**—Top secret matter will be handled in accordance with the rules given in paragraph 25a with additional safeguards as follows:

- a. Under no circumstances will such matter be transmitted by registered mail.
- b. Under no circumstances will messages so graded be transmitted by electrical means in the clear.
- c. It is mandatory that transmission and custody of such matter be covered by a receipt system.
- d. Top secret documents will be handled only by persons specifically designated and may not be disclosed to any person solely by virtue of his rank or office.
- e. The policies and special procedures governing the handling and transmission of top secret matter are covered by special letter instructions to parties concerned.

**27. Handling and transmission of confidential matter.**—a. Confidential matter will be handled in accordance with the following rules:

- (1) Confidential documents will be prepared for transmission in the same manner as secret documents, except that the inner cover will contain a receipt form only when the sender deems it necessary.
- (2) Confidential documents, except registered, will be transmitted by approved official means.
- (3) Registered confidential documents will be handled in the same manner as registered secret documents.
- (4) It is the responsibility of the commanding officer or equivalent official having custody of confidential documents to insure that appropriate security precautions are taken at all times.

b. Subject to the foregoing standards, confidential documents will be transmitted by any of the following means, whichever is most suitable:

- (1) *Within continental United States.*—Confidential documents will be transmitted in the same manner as secret documents, except—
  - (a) Any authorized messenger may be used instead of an officer messenger.
  - (b) Confidential documents, except registered, may be transmitted by ordinary mail when in the opinion of the forwarding officer no serious consequences will be entailed by their loss.
- (2) *Outside continental United States.*—The transmission of confidential documents except confidential cryptographic material from points within the continental United States to points outside United States, and vice versa, and between points outside the United States, will be done in the same manner as prescribed for secret documents.
  - (a) State Department diplomatic pouch will be used exclusively for the transmission of confidential documents through or within a neutral country.

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(b) For specific means of transmission of confidential cryptographic material, reference should be made to letter instructions on this subject issued by the War Department.

(c) *Action upon receipt of confidential matter.*

1. The standards prescribed in paragraph 25c(1) will be adhered to.

2. The inner cover marked confidential will be opened only by the addressee or his duly designated representative. The receipt form when used will be dated, signed, and immediately returned to the sender. The inner cover will be destroyed by burning if the subject matter of the inclosure has been in contact therewith.

(d) *Security of confidential documents.*—The same precautions as prescribed in paragraph 25d will be adhered to.

28. *Handling and transmission of restricted matter.*—a. Restricted matter will be handled and transmitted in accordance with the following rules:

(1) Restricted documents will be transmitted by such approved channels as will provide a reasonable degree of security.

(2) Registered restricted documents will be transmitted to and from foreign countries in the same manner as registered secret documents.

b. Subject to the foregoing standards, restricted documents will be transmitted by any of the following means, whichever is most suitable:

(1) *Within continental United States.*

(a) Authorized messenger.

(b) Ordinary mail.

(c) Express (rail or air).

(d) Freight.

(2) *Outside continental United States.*—Includes transmission of restricted documents, except restricted cryptographic material, from points within the continental United States to points outside the United States, and vice versa, and between points outside the continental United States.

(a) Vessels or aircraft of United States registry, Allied registry, or such vessels or aircraft, although not of United States or Allied registry, which are controlled and operated by the United States and do not pass through a foreign postal system.

(b) United States Post Office registered mail through the Army Postal Service, provided the documents do not pass through a foreign postal system. Restricted documents may, however, be transmitted to and from United States installations in Canada and in Alaska through the Canadian postal system.

(c) State Department diplomatic pouch will be used exclusively for the transmission of restricted documents through or within a neutral country.

(d) For specific means of transmission of restricted cryptographic material, reference should be made to letter instructions on this subject issued by the War Department.

29. Routine correspondence, receipts, and returns.—Routine correspondence, receipts, or returns, and reports of possession, transfer, or destruction need not be classified if reference therein to classified documents, other than registered documents, is made by file number, date, and subject only, with no indication of the classification. Extreme care will be exercised in such cases to insure that the subject referred to does not contain information which is classified. If the subject contains classified information, a short title will be used for the subject. Registered documents will be referred to by register number, date, and short title only, with no indication of the subject matter or classification.

30. Storage of classified documents.—*a. Storage of classified documents not registered.*

- (1) Secret and confidential documents, other than registered documents, will be stored in the most secure files available in a room that is kept locked when not in use.
- (2) Restricted documents will be stored and handled in such a manner as to insure a reasonable degree of security.

*b. Storage of registered documents.*

- (1) Registered documents will be stored in the most secure space available, preferably the equivalent of a three-combination safe. If a three-combination safe is not available, then the documents should be kept constantly under armed guard. Field lock safes will be considered the equivalent of three-combination safes for the storage of registered documents for units serving in the field outside of posts and garrisons.
- (2) Only commissioned officers, warrant officers, and specially trusted enlisted men and civilian employees will be permitted to have access to the containers of registered documents or the combination or keys thereto.
- (3) Safes containing registered documents will habitually be kept locked with the full combination whenever they are not under the direct supervision of a person officially entrusted with the combination.

*c. Cryptographic documents.*—So far as practicable, cipher tables, alphabets, and keys will not be kept in the same container as the code books, documents, and devices to which they apply. No *secret* document will be taken forward of battalion command post.

*d. Daily inspection.*—At every headquarters an inspection will be made each day immediately before the close of business to insure that all classified documents and cryptographic devices have been properly put away.

*e. Security in field.*—In tactical operations, actual or simulated, the commanding officer of the unit concerned is responsible that all documents are given the maximum security possible under the circumstances. No *secret* document will be taken into areas liable to imminent capture by the enemy.

*f. Security aboard ship.*—Where a ship's strong room is available, classified documents in transit will be stored therein.

31. Return of secret and confidential documents.—Upon change of station or separation from the military service, an officer will return to the source from which received, or otherwise properly account for, all secret and confidential documents which have been issued to him.

32. Destruction of classified documents.—*a. Secret and confidential documents.*

- (1) When confidential documents are present, the presence will be signified by the submission of registered documents who will document the report by the W:
- (2) Preliminary and work destroyed by after they cation and from then

*b. Restricted documents which will render then*

Authority to designate—  
Additional marking—  
Revision or reproduction  
Notification of change of  
Inventory and report of  
Report of transfer and de  
Prescribed forms—

33. Authority to designate secret, confidential, or restricted documents, and the manner in which they shall be registered in the interest of the service will be registered

34. Additional markings on secret, confidential, or restricted documents, the title ordinarily show the register number, and the date of registration will be made, and instructions for ultimate disposal. If the registered document is destroyed, the title to which reports of possession are sent.

*b.* All references to secret, confidential, or restricted documents by registered number and date of registration need not be included in the title of the document. If the document is more than one volume, each volume shall be so marked. The title or page number on which the reference or paper which refers to the document must have the same

- (1) When competent authority directs the destruction of *secret* or *confidential* documents, they will be burned by the custodian thereof in the presence of a disinterested officer. The certificate of destruction will be signed by both the custodian and the witnessing officer before submission to the officer directing the destruction. If the documents are registered, the certificate, signed by the custodian and the witnessing officer, will be sent to the officer directing the destruction, who will forward it to the office of record indicated in the registered document. If the headquarters has only one commissioned officer, the report will so state. Exceptions hereto may be authorized only by the War Department.
- (2) Preliminary drafts, carbon sheets, plates, stencils, stenographic notes, and work sheets containing secret or confidential data will be destroyed by the person responsible for their production immediately after they have served their purpose or will be given the same classification and safeguarded in the same manner as the material produced from them.

*b. Restricted documents.*—Restricted documents will be destroyed in any way which will render them useless.

## SECTION III

## REGISTERED DOCUMENTS

	Paragraph
Authority to designate.....	33
Additional marking.....	34
Revision or reproduction.....	35
Notification of change of classification.....	36
Inventory and report of possession.....	37
Report of transfer and destruction.....	38
Prescribed forms.....	39

**33. Authority to designate.**—Officers authorized to originate and issue secret, confidential, or restricted documents will designate as *registered* such secret, confidential, and restricted documents issued by them as they deem necessary in the interest of national defense. *Only documents of exceptional importance will be registered.*

**34. Additional marking.**—*a.* In addition to the marking *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*, the title page or inside front cover of a registered document will ordinarily show the register number, short title, office of record to which returns will be made, and instructions covering the returns for its accounting, and for its ultimate disposal. If this is not practicable, the required data will accompany the registered document on a separate sheet. The office of record is the office to which reports of possession and/or transfer reports on registered documents are sent.

*b.* All references to registered documents in semiannual or transfer reports, ordinary reports of destruction, or unclassified documents or correspondence will be by registered number, date, and short title only and such reports or correspondence need not be classified. In using a short title, every symbol of the short title will be included. If any accountable document consists of more than one volume, each volume will bear a separate short title. Any correspondence or paper which refers to a registered document by a title other than the short title must have the same classification as the registered document.

c. A registered document is not to be confused with a classified document to which, for administrative reasons, a number or short title is assigned for book-keeping or reference purpose only, and for which no accounting is required. In the absence of the additional markings required in *a* above, the document will not be reported upon.

**35. Revision or reproduction.**—*a.* A new or revised edition of an old registered document may be assigned a new short title but, where this is undesirable, the old short title followed by a symbol which will differentiate the new edition from the old edition is permissible.

*b.* Reproduction of a registered document is forbidden except by authority of the office of origin.

**36. Notification of change of classification.**—When the classification of a registered document is changed, the office of record will notify all offices to which it has been issued.

**37. Inventory and report of possession.**—*a.* Custodians will keep a complete inventory of all registered documents except those listed in *c* below and will make, or have made, on 30 June and 31 December of each year, an accurate return therefor to the proper office of record.

*b.* In making a semiannual report of possession the following details will be observed:

- (1) Each item will be physically inspected and its register number checked against the inventory.
- (2) At headquarters having two or more commissioned officers the custodian and one disinterested officer will make the inventory and both will sign the report. If the headquarters has only one commissioned officer, the report will so state.

*c.* No semiannual report of possession will be made of—

- (1) Training editions of code books, cipher alphabets, or keys, or of non-registered cipher devices accounted for as ordinary property.
- (2) Registered documents which have been placed in custody or storage for historical purposes.

*d.* Whenever a registered document is found which is not charged to the finder, a reasonable effort will be made to determine the office to which it pertains. If this is not found, the document will be forwarded through military channels to the issuing authority for disposition.

**38. Report of transfer and destruction.**—*a.* When a registered document is transferred from one person to another, or if the custodian remains the same but the organization's designation changes, a certificate of transfer in triplicate will be made. The certificate, containing an acknowledgment of receipt by the receiving officer, will be dated and signed by the transferring officer.

*b.* Immediately upon completion of the transfer, the original of the transfer certificate will be forwarded direct to the office of origin. A copy of the certificate of transfer will be retained by each of the officers concerned.

*c.* Whenever a registered document is removed from its proper place of custody and issued to another person, the custodian will require a written receipt.

*d.* Registered documents will not be accounted for as prescribed for ordinary property in AR 35-6520. The forms described in paragraph 39 will be used in lieu of shipping tickets, memorandum receipts, stock record cards, etc.

*e.* The issuing authority normally designates when registered documents will be destroyed and upon such notification registered documents will be destroyed as indicated in paragraph 32 and report of destruction forwarded.

**39. Prescribed forms.** Registered Documents or actions involving an indiv

*b.* War Department Fo Devices—Station) will be all transactions concerni vent the undiscovered loss

*c.* War Department Fo (or Devices) will be used

*d.* War Department Fo ments (or Devices)) wi registered documents.

*e.* Other forms authori Report of Destruction will

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Precautions necessary to ins  
Responsibility for classificati  
Drafting messages-----  
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Paraphrasing messages-----  
Method of handling outgoing  
Method of handling incoming  
Method of handling outgoing  
Method of handling restricted  
Transmission of literal plain  
Disposition or destruction of

**40. Authorization of c** devices intended for use i War Department. For fo delegated to theater comr special use within their the

**41. Restrictions on use** code, cipher system, or ci forbidden.

*b.* Messages for other c firms engaged in producing necessary, be cryptograph supplied by the other Gov being referred to the origi to an agency outside the M

**42. Personnel authoriz** No unauthorized cryptograph thoroughly familiar with tl pertaining to the cryptogra

*b.* Secret messages.—Th classified as secret will be

39. Prescribed forms.—*a.* War Department Form No. 32 (Record Card—Registered Documents or Devices) will be used for recording all temporary transactions involving an individual registered document.

*b.* War Department Form No. 33 (Record Card—Registered Documents or Devices—Station) will be used by each officer making a consolidated record of all transactions concerning registered documents. It serves as a check to prevent the undiscovered loss of the individual card, War Department Form No. 32.

*c.* War Department Form No. 34 (Transfer Report of Registered Documents (or Devices)) will be used in transferring registered documents.

*d.* War Department Form No. 34a (Semiannual Report of Registered Documents (or Devices)) will be used in reporting a semiannual inventory of registered documents.

*e.* Other forms authorized by separate branches for special purposes such as Report of Destruction will be employed where applicable.

SECTION IV

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY

	Paragraph
Authorization of cryptographic systems.....	40
Restrictions on use of authorized codes.....	41
Personnel authorized to perform cryptographic duties.....	42
Cryptographic security officer.....	43
Precautions necessary to insure cryptographic security.....	44
Responsibility for classification of messages.....	45
Drafting messages.....	46
Selection of cryptographic system.....	47
Paraphrasing messages.....	48
Method of handling outgoing secret messages.....	49
Method of handling incoming secret messages.....	50
Method of handling outgoing and incoming confidential messages.....	51
Method of handling restricted messages.....	52
Transmission of literal plain text and paraphrased versions of classified messages.....	53
Disposition or destruction of registered cryptographic material.....	54

40. Authorization of cryptographic systems.—All codes, ciphers, and cipher devices intended for use in the military service will be authorized only by the War Department. For forces in the field in time of war, this authority may be delegated to theater commanders and to oversea department commanders for special use within their theaters or departments.

41. Restrictions on use of authorized codes.—*a.* The use of any authorized code, cipher system, or cipher device for cryptographing personal messages is forbidden.

*b.* Messages for other departments of the Government and for commercial firms engaged in producing war matériel under Government contract may, when necessary, be cryptographed in War Department systems provided the text as supplied by the other Government department or firm is paraphrased, without being referred to the originator, prior to transmission and also prior to delivery to an agency outside the Military Establishment.

42. Personnel authorized to perform cryptographic duties.—*a. General.*—No authorized cryptographic system will be employed by any person who is not thoroughly familiar with the provisions of these regulations and all instructions pertaining to the cryptographic system to be employed.

*b. Secret messages.*—The cryptographing and decryptographing of messages classified as secret will be performed under the supervision of a commissioned



officer. For the specific qualifications of personnel who may be permitted actually to perform secret cryptographic work, reference should be made to letter instructions on this subject issued by the War Department.

*c. Confidential messages.*

- (1) At all headquarters of divisions and larger units the cryptographing and decrypting of *confidential* messages will be performed by personnel as prescribed for *secret* messages.
- (2) At all headquarters of units smaller than a division, messages classified as *confidential* will be cryptographed or decryptographed by personnel of the cryptographic section of the message center.

*d. Restricted messages.*—At all headquarters, messages classified as *restricted* will be cryptographed or decryptographed by personnel whose duties normally require the performance of this work.

43. *Cryptographic security officer.*—*a.* At each headquarters maintaining a message center the commander will appoint a commissioned officer as cryptographic security officer, who ordinarily will be the officer in charge of the message center. He will be the custodian of cryptographic material and will be responsible for all measures necessary to insure cryptographic security and physical security thereof.

*b.* If the cryptographic security officer believes that, in view of his knowledge of other messages on the same or like subject, a message has been incorrectly classified, or if he believes that the regulations governing the drafting and classifying of the message have been violated, he will request the originator to make the necessary change in the message or in its classification. If the originator does not comply with the request of the cryptographic security officer, the matter will be referred to the commanding officer of the headquarters concerned for final decision.

*c.* Cryptographic duties at any station where there is no regularly constituted message center will be performed by the custodian of cryptographic material or by personnel especially designated by the commanding officer. When cryptographic work is thus performed, the files of literal plain text messages and of cryptograms must be kept in different locked containers.

44. *Precautions necessary to insure cryptographic security.*—In order to insure cryptographic security the following principles must be observed:

*a.* Cryptographic material will be given the most secure storage available and will never be left unattended except when deposited in a three-combination safe or its equivalent. See also paragraph 30c in this connection.

*b.* Classified messages must be carefully drafted. The originator of a classified message is responsible for strict compliance with the provisions of paragraph 46.

*c.* The classification of messages must receive careful consideration by the originator since overclassification and underclassification are equally to be avoided. When a message has been classified and sent, all subsequent messages referring thereto must bear the same classification if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, except where the originator underclassified the original communication, in which case the proper higher classification will be used. Service messages referring to all or part of the plain text of previously cryptographed messages must be similarly classified and cryptographed. See paragraphs 10, and 12 to 16, inclusive.

*d.* The selection of the proper cryptographic system is a responsibility of the cryptographic security officer or the custodian of cryptographic material where

there is no cryptographic system of paragraph 47.

*e.* If time and available personnel permit, messages should be classified so that the instructions are clear. Particular care must be given to the form of the message.

*f.* The handling and distribution of the message should conform to the procedure prescribed in paragraph 10.

*g.* Paraphrasing is not to be used in such messages. Paraphrasing is to be avoided.

(1) The content of the message should be clear to the public.

(2) It is necessary to use the following:

(a) All

(b) Ex

(3) It is necessary to use the following:

(4) A classified system.

(5) A classified system.

Exceptions to the necessary instructions pertaining to the handling of messages should be referred to the War Department.

*h.* When it is necessary to destroy a message, the message should be buried within the message and should appear either at the beginning or at the end of the message.

45. *Responsibility for classification.*—The originator of a message is responsible for the classification of the message in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7. He is responsible for the classification of the message before forwarding it for distribution.

*b.* A message will be classified as *restricted* when it contains information that is *restricted* or *SECRET* as prescribed in paragraph 46.

46. *Drafting messages.*—Messages should be given a wide distribution and should be furnished the press, radio, newspaper, magazine, or any other medium prepared so as to permit their use as *restricted*. Such messages should be drafted in accordance with paragraph 46.

*b.* Standardization of the form and operation instructions for the use of a message, cryptographic phraseology and set form

there is no cryptographic security officer. He should be governed by the provisions of paragraph 47.

e. If time and availability of personnel permit, the cryptographed text of messages should be checked prior to transmission. The check should determine that the instructions governing the system employed are carefully followed. Particular care must be taken to assure that no plain text appears in the body of the message.

f. The handling and filing of both plain and cryptographed text should conform to the procedure described in paragraphs 49 to 53, inclusive.

g. Paraphrasing is resorted to as a protection to the cryptographic system and will not be used in such a manner as to permit loose handling of classified messages. Paraphrasing is to be employed when—

- (1) The content of previously cryptographed messages is released to the public or given a wide distribution within the Army.
- (2) It is necessary to send in cryptographic form—
  - (a) All or portions of a message previously transmitted in plain text.
  - (b) Extracts from publications, regulations, or instructions.
- (3) It is necessary to transmit in plain text all or portions of a message previously sent in cryptographic form.
- (4) A classified message is reencrypted in a different cryptographic system.
- (5) A classified message is reencrypted in a different key of the same system.

Exceptions to the necessity for paraphrasing may be granted only in accordance with instructions pertaining to certain cryptographic systems issued by the War Department.

h. When it is necessary to indicate in the text of a classified message information as to the ultimate addressee or the signature of the writer, such information will be buried within the text of the message before cryptographing and will not appear either at the beginning or at the ending of the message.

45. Responsibility for classification of messages.—a. Within the limitations prescribed in paragraph 51b the originator of a message is responsible that the classification given to it conforms to the definition given in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7. He is also responsible for the proper marking of the message before forwarding it for transmission.

b. A message will be classified and marked *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* when it contains classified information except when marked SEND IN CLEAR as prescribed in paragraph 51b(2).

46. Drafting messages.—a. Routine reports and messages which must be given a wide distribution, or the contents of which have been or may eventually be furnished the press, or which contain extracts or quotations from a newspaper, magazine, or any other document available to the public, will be prepared so as to permit their transmission in plain language or will be classified as *restricted*. Such restricted reports and messages will be paraphrased in accordance with paragraph 46d.

b. Standardization of the content and form of such documents as field orders and operation instructions is necessary, but when fixed expressions are repeated in a message, cryptographic security is greatly endangered. Hence, stereotyped phraseology and set form of expression, especially at the beginning or ending of

a message will not be used. Examples of stereotyped beginnings and endings are "Reference your," "Reurad," "Report," "Confirm," "Advise," "Request," "Stop," and "Acknowledge." Necessary references will be placed within the body of the message. Except as specifically provided for in certain cryptographic systems, or as specifically authorized by the War Department, the use of dummy letters or irrelevant text as "padding" for the purpose of concealing stereotypic phraseology is prohibited. Personnel concerned with the drafting and cryptographing of classified messages will be charged with guarding against repeated use of the same words or phrases.

a. Words not important to the sense will be omitted. Conjunctions, prepositions, and punctuation marks will be reduced to the minimum, and every effort will be made to avoid repetitions. When it is essential that punctuation marks be included in the body of the messages, they will be spelled, either in full or abbreviated form. Numbers will be spelled out.

d. The originator of all classified messages will paraphrase such portions as are quoted from—

- (1) A message in plain language.
- (2) A message in the same or another cryptographic system.
- (3) A newspaper, magazine, or document.

47. Selection of cryptographic system.—a. Subject to modification as outlined in paragraph 43b, the classification *top secret*, *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* given a message by its originator governs the cryptographic system to be used in cryptographing the message. All classified messages except those transmitted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 51b(2) will be transmitted in cryptographed form unless specific exception is made by the War Department. The least widely held cryptographic system available to all addressees of each message will be employed.

b. In order to prevent the cryptographing of *identical* subject matter by means of *different* codes and ciphers, once the message has been cryptographed, all subsequent messages on the same subject will normally be cryptographed in the same system. If a change of system is necessary, *reference to previous messages by their reference numbers will be avoided*.

c. The mere acknowledgment of a cryptographed message need not be classified.

d. When the same plain text message is transmitted to several addressees, it will ordinarily be cryptographed but once and the same cryptographed text sent to all addressees. If this is impossible because all addressees do not hold identical cryptographic systems, the text of each message which must be cryptographed in a different system will be carefully and differently paraphrased before cryptographing for each system. The only permissible exceptions to this rule are those cases in which necessity for paraphrasing has been specifically waived by the War Department in the instructions for certain cryptographic systems. The determination of the need for paraphrased versions is a function of the cryptographic security officer who may require the assistance of the originator of the message in the preparation of the necessary paraphrases. Where practicable, the cryptographic security officer will furnish copies of the paraphrased versions to the originator, except as noted in paragraph 41b.

48. Paraphrasing messages.—a. In paraphrasing, it is not sufficient to paraphrase only the beginning or ending of the message. The entire message will be subjected to the process.

b. When paraphrasing is applied to the message

- (1) Changing
- (2) Changing
- (3) Shifting the sentence
- (4) Changing
- (5) Substituting
- (6) Changing

order the text will

c. A paraphrase of original message.

49. Method of handling in after described will be determined in which the process

b. The originator of the original to the message thereby, one copy for bearing the following

The making of an original copy is absolutely necessary and safeguarded with the original without delay.

All such copies will be destroyed when returned upon determination of the need

c. The original plain text will be cryptographed in message centers service will be made at the interior the need will be determined. All work sheets used will be destroyed by burning.

d. The original copy returned to the originator and destroyed the text will be filed in the original

e. The transmitting copy, at least one copy in its original with local regulations

f. When certain cryptographed text is available, a copy will be made for file.

g. The method of handling is outlined above as modified

50. Method of handling in after described will be determined in which the process

b. When paraphrasing must be employed, all of the following processes will be applied to the message:

- (1) Changing the sequence of the paragraphs.
- (2) Changing the sequence of the sentences in each paragraph.
- (3) Shifting the positions of the subject, predicate, and modifiers in each sentence.
- (4) Changing from active to passive voice or vice versa.
- (5) Substituting synonyms or equivalent expressions.
- (6) Changing the length of the paraphrased version of the message in order that the final cipher text will not resemble the original cipher text with respect to length.

c. A paraphrase of a message will be accorded the same classification as the original message.

49. Method of handling outgoing secret messages.—a. The procedure hereinafter described will be followed at all headquarters, except the War Department in which the procedure will be as determined by the Chief of Staff.

b. The originator will prepare and number all copies of secret messages, send the original to the message center, and may retain, when security is not imperiled thereby, one copy for temporary file. Other carbon copies, all numbered and bearing the following notation, may be sent to local officers directly concerned:

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked *secret*. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to the originator without delay.

All such copies will be carefully accounted for by the originator and will be destroyed when returned. The copy in the temporary file will also be destroyed upon determination that the message has been correctly dispatched.

c. The original plain-text copy sent to the message center by the originator will be cryptographed at the cryptographic section of the message center. In message centers serving tactical units one copy only of the cryptographed message will be made and it will be sent to the transmitting agency. In the zone of the interior the number of copies to be made of the cryptographed message will be determined by the commanding officer of the headquarters concerned. All work sheets used in cryptographing the message will be immediately destroyed by burning.

d. The original copy of the literal plain text will be marked SENT (date) and returned to the originator who will place it in his *secret* file for outgoing messages and destroy the retained copy by burning. Only one copy of the literal text will be filed in the originator's office.

e. The transmitting agency will send the cryptographed message, retaining at least one copy in its file of outgoing messages for final disposition in accordance with local regulations.

f. When certain cryptographic systems are used in which no copy of the cipher text is available, a copy of the plain text may be retained by the message center for file.

g. The method of handling *top secret* messages will conform to the procedure outlined above as modified by the provisions of paragraph 26b, c, and e.

50. Method of handling incoming secret messages.—a. The procedure hereinafter described will be followed at all headquarters, except the War Department in which the procedure will be as determined by the Chief of Staff.

b. An incoming secret message will be copied in duplicate by the receiving operator; the original will go to the cryptographic section of the message center and the carbon copy to the files of the receiving station or message center, where it will be disposed of in accordance with local regulations.

c. A cryptographer will decryptograph the message, making only one copy of the decryptographed literal plain text, which will be marked SECRET and delivered to the addressee. The cryptographed version will be retained in the files of the message center, where it will be disposed of in accordance with local regulations. All work sheets used in decryptographing will be destroyed by burning. The cryptographic section will not retain any copy of the plain text in its files, except as provided in paragraph 49f. The placing on the message blank of any marks or notations even remotely connected with the cryptographic system or steps in decryptographing the message, such as underlining key words, indicating groupings corresponding to lengths of columns of key, etc., is forbidden.

d. The addressee may make and circulate a limited number of literal copies for the information of other officers directly concerned. These carbon copies will all be numbered and bear the following notation:

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked SECRET. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to \_\_\_\_\_ without delay.

All such information copies will be carefully accounted for by the addressee and will be destroyed when returned. Only one copy of the literal text of the message will be kept in the addressee's office.

e. The method of handling *top secret* messages will conform to the procedure outlined above as modified by the provisions of paragraph 28c and e.

51. Method of handling outgoing and incoming confidential messages.—  
a. At administrative headquarters having fixed message centers.—Whenever practicable, the procedure to be followed in the handling of messages in confidential codes or ciphers will be substantially the same as that prescribed for those transmitted in secret code or cipher, except within the War Department in which the procedure will be as determined by the Chief of Staff. They will, however, be marked and safeguarded in accordance with provisions of these regulations governing confidential documents.

b. In tactical operations, simulated or actual.

- (1) All messages not classified as *secret* will be regarded as *confidential* but need not be so marked. The procedure to be followed is prescribed in FM 24-5, and in other pertinent regulations and instructions issued by proper authority. All wire and radio messages except those noted in (2) below will be transmitted in cryptographic form.
- (2) When the information to be transmitted, if intercepted by the enemy, cannot be acted upon in time to influence the situation in question and time cannot be spared for cryptographing, the commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language by a radio station serving his headquarters or command. Such written messages will be marked SEND IN CLEAR over the signature of the commander or his authorized representative.

52. Method of handling in the handling of message the same as that prescribed

53. Transmission of lit-  
fied messages.—a. The sen-  
of a message which has b-  
strictly prohibited except a

(1) Authorized loca

(2) In exceptional c  
an authorized  
fied message  
transmission c

b. In cases of emergency  
graphed message may be s

(1) In accordance w

(2) In accordance w  
cryptographic

54. Disposition or dest  
Whenever a person who h  
stricted codes, ciphers, cipl  
further need for them, he w  
case of the field forces in t  
charged with the issue of su

b. When it has become  
subject to loss or compromi  
destroyed by burning, and  
yond use or repair, and if p

c. When cryptographic  
through long use, request  
authority.

Authority to classify-----  
Notification of classification o  
Responsibility for safeguardin  
Classification of information f  
Dissemination of classified tecl  
Destruction of classified mat  
Invitations for bids and contr  
Consultations with responsible  
Responsibility of Army repres  
Responsibility of Government  
Tests of classified matériel---  
Public display of classified ma  
Release of information or sale  
Protection of shipments via c  
sessions-----

55. Authority to classi  
sponsible for a research pro  
or procurement of an articl  
that the maintenance of an

52. Method of handling restricted messages.—The procedure to be followed in the handling of messages in *restricted* codes and ciphers will be substantially the same as that prescribed for those in *confidential* code or cipher.

53. Transmission of literal plain text and paraphrased versions of classified messages.—a. The sending by any means whatsoever of the literal plain text of a message which has been or will be transmitted in cryptographed form is strictly prohibited except as stated below:

- (1) Authorized local distribution within a headquarters by messenger.
- (2) In exceptional cases, when necessary in the performance of his duties, an authorized person may carry the literal plain text of a classified message provided the security requirements pertaining to the transmission of classified material are observed.

b. In cases of emergency, paraphrased versions of the plain text of a cryptographed message may be sent—

- (1) In accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 44g and 48c.
- (2) In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 25 as applied to secret cryptographic material.

54. Disposition or destruction of registered cryptographic material.—a. Whenever a person who has been issued registered *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* codes, ciphers, cipher devices, or documents pertaining thereto, has no further need for them, he will report that fact to the Chief Signal Officer or in the case of the field forces in time of war to the signal officer of the headquarters charged with the issue of such documents.

b. When it has become highly probable that cryptographic material will be subject to loss or compromise, all documents and translations of messages will be destroyed by burning, and the cipher machines or devices will be destroyed beyond use or repair, and if possible, beyond recognition.

c. When cryptographic documents or devices have become unserviceable through long use, request for their replacement will be made to the issuing authority.

## SECTION V

## MATÉRIEL

	Paragraph
Authority to classify.....	55
Notification of classification or reclassification.....	56
Responsibility for safeguarding technical information.....	57
Classification of information from commercial firms.....	58
Dissemination of classified technical information.....	59
Destruction of classified matériel.....	60
Invitations for bids and contracts.....	61
Consultations with responsible manufacturers.....	62
Responsibility of Army representatives or inspectors.....	63
Responsibility of Government contractors.....	64
Tests of classified matériel.....	65
Public display of classified matériel.....	66
Release of information or sale of matériel.....	67
Protection of shipments via commercial carriers within United States or its possessions.....	68

55. Authority to classify.—Whenever the chief of a technical service responsible for a research project or for the design, development, test, or production or procurement of an article of matériel or a component thereof shall determine that the maintenance of any degree of secrecy regarding them is sufficiently im-

portant to the national defense, he will classify it as *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted*.

56. Notification of classification or reclassification.—Whenever the chief of a technical service in charge of a research project, design, development, test, or production of a unit of matériel or component thereof shall determine that the matériel should remain classified after issue or that a change or cancelation of classification is desired, he will notify The Adjutant General, who in turn will inform all concerned.

57. Responsibility for safeguarding technical information.—*a.* Chiefs of technical services engaged in the preparation of plans, research, and development work, or new design, test, production, procurement, storage, or use of classified matériel are responsible for the promulgation of such additional instructions as may be required for the safeguarding of information in the offices, establishments, laboratories, shops, or Army posts under their jurisdiction.

*b.* All *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* models, exhibits, dies, machines, and other similar items which are to be loaned, leased, or given to a commercial organization will be properly marked to indicate classification when practicable. If such marking is impracticable, the commercial organization will be specifically notified in writing of the classification of such items and of the pertinent provisions of the Espionage Act.

58. Classification of information from commercial firms.—Information obtained from civilian manufacturers concerning proprietary processes will be classified as *confidential* unless otherwise authorized by the firm concerned.

59. Dissemination of classified technical information.—Classified information concerning technical projects or developments may be imparted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession, and to accredited representatives of foreign nations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 19b.

60. Destruction of classified matériel.—*a. Authority to direct.*—Whenever the chief of a technical service responsible for a research project or for the design, development, test, or production or procurement of an article of matériel or a component thereof shall determine that their destruction is necessary to safeguard information thereof, he will issue the necessary directive.

*b. Procedure in destruction of classified matériel.*—When destruction of classified matériel has been directed:

- (1) The custodian thereof will remove all components of a classified nature and destroy them by burning or by mutilation in the presence of a disinterested officer. The balance of the matériel will then be processed in accordance with existing regulations for the disposition of unserviceable property, or for salvage.
- (2) If the above is not practicable, the custodian will destroy the entire article of matériel by burning or by mutilation in the presence of a disinterested officer.
- (3) In either case, the certificate of destruction will be signed by both the custodian and the witnessing officer before submission to the officer directing the destruction. If the headquarters has only one commissioned officer, the report will so state. Exception hereto may be authorized only by the War Department.

61. Invitations for bids and contracts.—*a.* Prior to furnishing a prospective bidder or contractor with drawings, specifications, or other pertinent information

concerning any project or and annually thereafter general secrecy agreements individual or by a representative concerned:

In consideration of the inclosures, models, or projects of a *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* nature, signed prior to or coincident with the execution of Exhibit A which is attached to the undersigned subsequent to the undersigned's agreement to by or on behalf of and any and all representatives thereof:

1. The undersigned will not disclose, reproduce, or use in any way the drawings, specifications, or information of any kind, or incorporate in any way in any work peculiar to such drawings, specifications, or information.

2. The undersigned will not disclose, reproduce, or use in any way the drawings, specifications, or information referred to herein, or to assemblies which are vital to the production of the drawings, specifications, or information, without the written consent of the undersigned.

3. The undersigned will not disclose, reproduce, or use in any way the drawings, specifications, or information, except as specifically authorized in writing by the undersigned's representative. If reproducing papers, or of models or drawings, the product obtained shall be submitted to the undersigned's representative for censoring.

4. If a bid is not submitted, or if the nature as to which drawings, specifications, or information are not accepted, or in case a bid is accepted, the undersigned will promptly return, by express, such drawings, specifications, or information, together with a copy of the bid, if copies were received.

5. (a) The undersigned will not disclose, reproduce, or use in any way the drawings, specifications, or information, including submitters' names, without the written consent of the undersigned's representative. (Espionage Act: Subparagraph 19b; sec. 1, act 28 March 1915, sec. 2181).

(b) Sec. 1, act 12 January 1917, and E. O. 8381, 22 March 1917, sec. 2187a.

Second War Powers Act, sec. 1, act 12 January 1917, and E. O. 8381, 22 March 1917, sec. 2187a.

(b) If the successful bidder or contractor brings or causes to be brought into performance of the contract, the provisions of the law enacted by the Congress of the United States, shall apply.

6. The undersigned further warrants that the contractor's or subcontractor's hand on the contracting or

concerning any project or projects of a *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* nature and annually thereafter so long as such documents, etc., are in his custody, a general secrecy agreement reading substantially as follows will be signed by the individual or by a responsible officer on behalf of the firm or corporation concerned:

In consideration of the receipt of drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures, models, or matériel, and information disclosed orally, concerning projects of a *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* nature, delivered to the undersigned prior to or coincident with the date of this agreement and listed on Exhibit A which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, or to be issued to the undersigned subsequent to the date of this agreement, the following terms are agreed to by or on behalf of the undersigned individual, firm, or corporation, and any and all representatives, agents, employees, or subbidders or subcontractors thereof:

1. The undersigned will neither supply nor disclose any information regarding the drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures or models or matériel, or information disclosed orally, referred to herein to any unauthorized person, or incorporate in other projects special features of design or construction peculiar to such drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures, or models or matériel, or information disclosed orally.

2. The undersigned will not permit any alien employed or to be employed by the undersigned or by any subbidder or subcontractor to have access to the drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures, or models or matériel referred to herein, or to engineering principles, composition, subassemblies, or assemblies which are vital to the functioning or use of the article or to the work under any contract for the production thereof, or the contract trials, without the written consent beforehand of the Secretary of War.

3. The undersigned will not make or permit to be made reproductions of the drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures or of the models or matériel, except as specifically authorized by the contracting officer or his duly authorized representative. If reproduction of any drawings, specifications, and accompanying papers, or of models or matériel, is authorized, the undersigned will promptly submit the product obtained to the contracting officer or his duly authorized representative for censorship or such other action as he may deem necessary.

4. If a bid is not submitted on a project of a *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* nature as to which drawings, specifications, and accompanying inclosures, and models or matériel have been issued to the undersigned, or if a bid is made and not accepted, or in case award is made, upon the completion of the contract the undersigned will promptly return by hand, by registered mail, or by insured express, such drawings, specifications, and accompanying papers, or models or matériel, together with all copies thereof, to the office from which the original copies were received.

5. (a) The undersigned agrees to bring or cause to be brought to the attention of all persons engaged in the preparation of the bid, whether submitted or not, including subbidders and their employees, the following provisions of law: Espionage Act: Subparagraphs (d) and (e), sec. 1, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 217); sec. 1, act 28 March 1940 (54 Stat. 79; 50 U. S. C. 31; M. L., 1939, Supp. I, sec. 2181).

Sec. 1, act 12 January 1938 (52 Stat. 3; 50 U. S. C. 45; M. L., 1939, sec. 2187a), and E. O. 8381, 22 March 1940; 5 F. R. 1147; 50 U. S. C. 45; M. L., 1939, Supp. I, sec. 2187a.

Second War Powers Act, 1942, sections 1402, 1403, act 27 March 1942 (Public Law 507, 77th Cong.).

(b) If the successful bidder on any project, the undersigned agrees also to bring or cause to be brought to the attention of all persons engaged in the performance of the contract, including persons employed on subcontracts, the provisions of the law enumerated in (a) above.

6. The undersigned further agrees that no information in connection with any *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* project will be given to any person not in the contractor's or subcontractor's employ except upon the written consent beforehand of the contracting officer or his duly authorized representative.



b. The execution of the general secrecy agreement required in *a* above with any individual, firm, or corporation prior to the delivery of any classified military information, and the annual secrecy agreements executed thereafter, will constitute authority for delivery to such individual, firm, or corporation from time to time of other or additional classified information pertaining to any *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* project, without the necessity of executing a specific secrecy agreement in each case. A receipt substantially as follows will be obtained when the additional classified data are submitted to those who have entered into such agreement:

Receipt is acknowledged of \_\_\_\_\_ and it is recognized that these data are classified and come within the purview of the secrecy agreement signed by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.

62. Consultations with responsible manufacturers.—The commanding officers of arsenals and depots and other officers engaged in work on Government contracts are authorized to consult with all interested manufacturers or their representatives, inventors, and other persons concerning technical matters in which they have a legitimate interest. They will, however, inform all such persons of the classification of the projects, works, and developments.

63. Responsibility of Army representatives or inspectors.—*a.* The Army representatives or inspectors of the technical service are the local representatives of the War Department and will take the necessary measures to insure the safeguarding of classified information or projects in the hands of the contractors or in process of manufacture in their plants.

*b.* Army representatives or inspectors will advise contractors as to their responsibilities and the practical measures to be taken to safeguard *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* matters and will act favorably, if practicable, on any suggestion or request of the company tending to preserve secrecy. If at any time conditions at any plant, or any action of a company or its employees, jeopardize the security of classified matter pertaining to the War Department or violate the provisions of the Espionage Act, the Army representative or inspector will request the contractor to take prompt remedial action. If adequate precautionary measures are not taken immediately, he will report promptly to the chief of the technical service concerned and, if the situation requires, to the commanding general of the service command in which the item is in process of manufacture.

*c.* When Army and Navy inspectors are on duty at the same plant, the Army inspector will coordinate all security measures with the Navy inspector in order to avoid conflicting demands upon contractors.

64. Responsibility of Government contractors.—*a.* A private individual, firm, or corporation which enters into a contract to engage in technical work for the War Department becomes responsible in matters within his or its control for the safeguarding of all *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* matters that may be disclosed or that may be developed in connection therewith. A clause to this effect will be included in such a contract, but its omission will not release the contractor from his responsibility under the Espionage Act and other pertinent laws.

*b.* Contractors are responsible that all classified projects allotted to subcontractors or agents are fully protected by a similar agreement.

*c.* Whenever for any reason a contract agreement or subcontract has been made which does not include a security clause but later is found to involve *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* matter, the technical service concerned will

take the necessary steps to and that the contractor, agent and of his responsibility in

65. Tests of classified quately safeguarded by all

66. Public display of sponsible that all classified safeguarded during maneu strations, or exhibitions, or

*b.* (1) Photographs of revealing proc by the chief equipment has permissible ur therewith.

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68. Protection of shipm or its possessions.—*a.* Sele pertaining to classified me one of the following metho officer of the service, force, to make such classification, attaché.

*b.* Protection as for docum may be handled in the same i in paragraphs 25 to 28, inc quantity as to create suspic transported in the same mar

*c.* Railway express servi fidential shipments may be after advance arrangements

take the necessary steps to insure that the project or work is properly classified and that the contractor, agent, or subcontractor is informed of the classification and of his responsibility in the matter.

65. Tests of classified matériel.—Tests of classified matériel will be adequately safeguarded by all responsible officers.

66. Public display of classified matériel.—*a.* Commanding officers are responsible that all classified parts, components, or features of matériel are properly safeguarded during maneuvers, drills, parades, ceremonies, assemblages, demonstrations, or exhibitions, or exhibitions open to the general public.

*b.* (1) Photographs of equipment while in process of development or those revealing processes of manufacture are prohibited unless authorized by the chief of technical service concerned. After an article of equipment has been issued to combat units, release of photographs is permissible unless specifically prohibited by the instructions issued therewith.

(2) Requests for permission to take photographs of classified matériel, projects, or processes of manufacture will be referred to the War Department through the proper chief of technical service. If authority is granted, it will be with the understanding that the resulting photographs will be submitted to the War Department for review prior to release.

67. Release of information or sale of matériel.—*a.* Domestic sale, divulging information in connection with negotiations for foreign sale, and foreign manufacture of items of Army and Navy matériel and equipment are not permitted unless the War and Navy Departments are agreed that military secrecy is not compromised thereby.

*b. International traffic in arms.*

(1) The State Department administers international traffic in arms and military matériel coming within the scope of the Regulations Governing the International Traffic in Arms, Ammunitions, and Implements of War and Other Munitions of War.

(2) The State Department will not release for foreign sale any item coming within the scope of these regulations until the War and Navy Departments have stated that there is no objection to the release on grounds of secrecy affecting the national defense.

68. Protection of shipments via commercial carriers within United States or its possessions.—*a. Selection of shipping method.*—Disclosure of information pertaining to classified matériel will be prevented during transportation by one of the following methods of shipment, to be determined by a commissioned officer of the service, force, or organization authorizing its movement qualified to make such classification, by a higher authority so qualified, or by a military attaché.

*b. Protection as for documents.*—If size and quantity permit, classified matériel may be handled in the same manner as provided for similarly classified documents in paragraphs 25 to 28, inclusive. In cases where matériel is of such size or quantity as to create suspicion of its character and entail additional risk when transported in the same manner as documents, another method will be used.

*c. Railway express service protected by carrier's guards.*—*Secret, or confidential* shipments may be shipped via Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, after advance arrangements have been made for carrier to guard matériel from

the time it leaves the hands of consignor until delivered to consignee. Notwithstanding the general prohibition of insurance on Government shipments, any classified shipments may be shipped at their actual value and notation of such value made on the bills of lading. (See AR 55-105, 55-150, and 55-155). The officer determining the method of shipment will certify to the officer issuing the bill of lading the valuation to be used.

*d. Ordinary railway express service protected by military guards.*—This method of shipment may be chosen for *secret* or *confidential* matériel as provided in *a* above. In such case the principles of regulations governing guarding of freight shipments (see par. 8, AR 55-155) will be followed so far as appropriate for express service, with the definite exception that guards with express shipments will be furnished with transportation requests. The number of guards detailed to protect the shipment will be a minimum consistent with security requirements.

*e. Air express via commercial air lines protected by military guards.*—The provisions of *d* above will govern generally.

*f. Rail freight service protected by military guards.*—See paragraph 8, AR 55-155.

*g. Ordinary motor truck freight protected by military guards.*—The principles of paragraph 8, AR 55-155, will govern. Only one guard will be used for short runs unless more are necessary.

*h. Water freight service protected by military guards.*—The principles of paragraph 8, AR 55-155, will govern. When vessels are used which have arrangements for carrying passengers, transportation requests will be issued. When vessels are used which do not have arrangements for carrying public passengers, carriage free or at a reasonable charge, appropriate arrangements for meals will be negotiated.

*i. Straight or mixed troop trains.*—Classified matériel accompanying troops will be adequately guarded by organization personnel.

*j. Guards.*—Guards sufficiently armed will be provided in accordance with paragraph 8, AR 55-155. Neither carrier's nor military guards will be used for the sole purpose of preventing disclosure of information of *restricted* matériel. Guarded service may be used on any shipment when necessary to prevent physical sabotage. When possible, where concealment of the arm is not necessary, submachine guns, automatic rifles, or rifles should be provided in preference to pistols.

*k. Shipments of confidential matériel, except cryptographic equipment and components thereof may, at the discretion of the chief of the technical service involved, be shipped by one of the following methods, without guard:*

- (1) Protected express.
- (2) Sealed freight or express cars.
- (3) Sealed truck under own motive power.
- (4) Flat car, provided trucks or crates containing said equipment are suitably locked and/or sealed and locked and/or sealed to the car. In addition, the equipment will be protected from external view and injury from normal hazards in shipping.

*l. For specific means of shipment of cryptographic matériel reference should be made to letter instruction on this subject issued by the War Department.*

Classification-----  
Authority for admission-----  
Responsibility of commanding  
Responsibility of Government

69. Classification.—a.

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*b. United States citizens*  
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70. Authority for admi  
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## SECTION VI

## VISITORS

	Paragraph
Classification-----	69
Authority for admission-----	70
Responsibility of commanding officer, Army representative, or inspector-----	71
Responsibility of Government contractors-----	72

69. Classification.—*a. Foreign nationals.*—For the purpose of these regulations foreign nationals include—

- (1) Representatives, officials, or employees of a foreign government having an official status.
- (2) All other foreign nationals and citizens of the United States representing a foreign government, firm, or corporation.
- (3) Canadian nationals will be considered as and accorded the same privileges as citizens of the United States with respect to the matter of visits to Government or commercial manufacturing establishments and experimental laboratories engaged on classified work or projects.

*b. United States citizens.*—All citizens of the United States not included in *a* above.

70. Authority for admission.—*a. General.*—Correspondence and communications relating to visits will be routed direct between the various offices concerned.

*b. Foreign nationals.*

- (1) Foreign nationals (see par. 69a) will be admitted to Government or commercial manufacturing establishments and experimental laboratories engaged on classified work or projects, and to military posts, camps, and airfields only on written authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
- (2) Application for such visits will be made through the appropriate diplomatic representatives except in the case of foreign nationals employed by citizens of the United States or by firms or corporations owned or controlled by citizens of the United States, for whom applications will be submitted by their employers, approved by the commanding officer or management of the establishment to be visited, and forwarded with the recommendation of the chief of the technical service or appropriate commanding general of the service command concerned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
- (3) Applications submitted through either of the channels described above will include the following information:
  - (a) Name in full.
  - (b) Official title or position.
  - (c) Name of plant or plants, posts, camps, or airfields to which admission is desired.
  - (d) Date of visit or dates between which visits are desired.
  - (e) Purpose of visit.

For foreign nationals employed by citizens of the United States or by firms or corporations owned or controlled by citizens of the United States the following additional information will be required:

- (f) Nationality.
- (g) Length of service with present employer.

- (4) Prior to authorizing a visit to a War Department or commercial manufacturing establishment engaged in classified work or projects, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, will secure the recommendations of the Navy Department and the chief of the technical service concerned. Members of the armed forces of Canada and Mexico may, however, be admitted to Army posts, camps, and airfields near the borders of those countries for occasional visits on the authority of the commanding general of the army, defense command, or service command having jurisdiction over such posts, camps, or airfields, without reference to higher authority.

*c. United States citizens.*—Subject to the approval of the commanding officer or the contractor, United States citizens, except those representing a foreign government, firm, or corporation, may be admitted to War Department or commercial manufacturing establishments engaged on classified work or projects under the following conditions:

- (1) Casual visitors may be admitted provided no classified work or project is shown or discussed.
- (2) Representatives of other United States Government agencies, manufacturers, or their representatives, engineers, and inventors cooperating in War Department work and having a legitimate interest therein may be shown such works or projects as are considered necessary and desirable by the responsible chief of technical service. Authority for admission will be in writing.
- (3) Accredited reporters, photographers, and other representatives of publicity agencies may be admitted to manufacturing establishments engaged on work for the War Department, provided classified matter, projects, or processes of manufacture are not shown or discussed with them. News items, photographs, and motion pictures resulting from the visit must be submitted to the War Department Bureau of Public Relations for review prior to publication.

**71. Responsibility of commanding officer, Army representative, or inspector.**—*a.* The commanding officer of a military manufacturing establishment or the Army representative or inspector at a commercial manufacturing establishment is the local representative of the War Department in all matters regarding the admission of visitors. If, in his opinion, the situation at the time makes the admission of a visitor inadvisable, he is empowered to postpone the visit and request instructions from the office which authorized it.

*b.* The commanding officer or Army representative will make a report to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, through the appropriate chief of technical service or commanding general, service command, giving the following information concerning foreigners who visit establishments engaged in classified projects:

- (1) Name, official position, and nationality.
- (2) Authority for the visit.
- (3) Matters in which the visitors showed the greatest interest.
- (4) General nature of questions asked.
- (5) Expressed object of the visit.

- (6) Inspector's estimate.
- (7) General estimate of the visitor and the visitor's opinion.
- (8) A brief list of work.

**72. Responsibility of contractors engaged in work on the movements of persons.** give adequate security to such persons. In view of the wide make-up of individual plant and conditions at the plant and security measures to be adopted.

*b.* The following general plants engaged in classified

- (1) Visitors will be inspected by the inspector or a representative responsible person. Limitations or conditions which may apply.
- (2) Unless specifically stated in paragraph 70, visitors will be in a restricted material room, or a restricted material room will they be.

*c.* (1) War Department of the service. General, Materiel, appropriate, immediate visitors, except those who have gained information. The reports will

- (a) Name, official position, and nationality.
- (b) Authority for the visit.
- (c) Matters in which the visitors showed the greatest interest.
- (d) General nature of questions asked.
- (e) Expressed object of the visit.
- (f) Estimate of the value of the visit.
- (g) General estimate of the visitor and the visitor's opinion.
- (h) A brief list of work.

- (2) The commanding officer, service, or Corps, whichever is appropriate, will be the appropriate

- (6) Inspector's estimate of the real object of the visit.
- (7) General estimate of ability, intelligence, and technical knowledge of the visitor and his proficiency in the English language.
- (8) A brief list of what was shown and explained.

72. Responsibility of Government contractors.—*a.* Contractors or subcontractors engaged in work for the War Department must place such restrictions on the movements of persons employed or entering their plants or offices as will give adequate security to *secret, confidential, or restricted* matters in their possession. In view of the wide differences in organization, arrangement, and physical make-up of individual plants, no specific rules are practicable. Therefore, local conditions at the plant and the classification of the project will determine the security measures to be adopted.

*b.* The following general procedure in regard to visitors at establishments or plants engaged in classified projects for the War Department is prescribed:

- (1) Visitors will be accompanied during their stay at the plant by the inspector or Army representative, a member of his office, or some responsible person who is specifically informed as to the necessary limitations or restrictions, the scope of the visit, and the information which may be furnished.
  - (2) Unless specifically authorized by the authorities mentioned in paragraph 70, visitors will not be allowed in any shop, laboratory, drafting room, or section of a plant where secret, confidential, or restricted matériel is located or where classified work is in progress, nor will they be permitted to take photographs.
- c.* (1) War Department contractors will submit to the commanding general of the service command, chief of technical service, or Commanding General, Matériel Command, Army Air Forces, whichever is appropriate, immediately upon completion of the visit, a report of all visitors, except United States citizens and Canadian nationals, who have gained information concerning the classified work or projects. The reports will include the following information:
- (*a*) Name, official position, and nationality.
  - (*b*) Authority for visit.
  - (*c*) Matters in which the visitors showed the greatest interest.
  - (*d*) General nature of questions asked.
  - (*e*) Expressed object of the visit.
  - (*f*) Estimate of the real object of the visit.
  - (*g*) General estimate of ability, intelligence, and technical knowledge of the visitor and his proficiency in the English language.
  - (*h*) A brief list of what was shown and explained.
- (2) The commanding general of the service command, chief of technical service, or Commanding General, Matériel Command, Army Air Forces, whichever is appropriate, will submit the reports to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, through the appropriate chief of technical service.

SECTION VII

AIR SPACE RESERVATIONS, RESERVED AREAS, AND RESTRICTED AREAS

Air space reservations.....	Paragraph 73
Restricted areas.....	74

73. Air space reservations.—*a. Establishment.*—Air space reservations over military installations or reservations over which the flight of aircraft is prohibited or restricted for the purpose of national defense or for other governmental purposes are established by Executive Order of the President of the United States, or by a State, Commonwealth, or Territory.

*b. Territory of Hawaii.*—Section 3, Air Commerce Regulations of the Territory of Hawaii, prohibits private and commercial aircraft from flying over or crossing any part of Diamond Head and the fortifications of Fort Kamehameha and Fort Weaver.

*c. Philippine Commonwealth.*—Flying by any aircraft other than those of the United States and Philippine Governments within a distance of 6 miles from the perimeter of Corregidor Island, Fraile Island, Carabao Island, and Caballo Island, Manila Bay, and Subic Bay, Island of Luzon, and within 2 miles of the perimeter of Cavite Peninsula, Manila Bay, is prohibited by section 80, Air Commerce Regulations, the Government of the Philippine Islands, dated 15 October 1935.

*d. Responsibility of commanding officers.*—The commanding officer of a military reservation, post, camp, station, or installation over which an air space reservation has been established is responsible for the surveillance of the designated air space and for prompt report to The Adjutant General, through military channels, of any illegal flight therein.

74. Restricted areas.—*a. Designation.*—The commanding officer of a post, camp, station, or installation is responsible for the designation and proper safeguarding of restricted areas. If local conditions dictate, he will mark all ordinary entrances or approaches to such areas with a sign reading as follows:

WARNING

RESTRICTED AREA

It is unlawful to enter within this \_\_\_\_\_ without written permission of \_\_\_\_\_ (Area, building, etc.) (Authority)

*b. Procedure in case of violation.*

(1) The commanding officer of a military reservation, post, camp, station, or installation will cause any person not subject to military law who enters a restricted area or building to be detained, warned of his rights, and interrogated by proper authority. If it is a first offense and there is no evidence of deliberate intent, the offender may be warned against repetition and released upon the surrender of any unlawful photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphic representation in his possession. Otherwise the offender will be delivered without unnecessary delay to the nearest United States marshal with a written statement of the facts, the names

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General.....	
Classification requirements.....	
Dissemination of information.....	
Rail and motor movements.....	
In staging areas.....	
Embarkation.....	
Movement of vessels in harbor.....	
At sea.....	
Returns to United States.....	
Movements by air.....	
Higher classification.....	
Reason for classification.....	
Overseas.....	

75. General.—Commanding provisions of this section instructed in such provisions danger involved in the instructions of this nature at home station and staging

76. Classification requirements. any group or class of such restricted by, or by authorized officers authorized to classify of information, particularly

*b.* The following elements individual travel will normal

(1) *Secret.*—Documents

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- and addresses of the witnesses, and such pertinent exhibits as may be available.
- (2) When an investigation reveals that a person not subject to military law has entered such a restricted area or building, custody of the individual not having been effected, the commanding officer will promptly forward in writing to the nearest United States district attorney a report of all the facts, including the names and addresses of the witnesses.
- (3) A report will be made through military channels to the commanding general of the service command of each case brought to the attention of civil authority and will include a brief of all the facts and copies of all pertinent communications.

## SECTION VIII

## TROOP MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL TRAVEL

	Paragraph
General.....	75
Classification requirements.....	76
Dissemination of information.....	77
Rail and motor movements.....	78
In staging areas.....	79
Embarkation.....	80
Movement of vessels in harbors.....	81
At sea.....	82
Returns to United States.....	83
Movements by air.....	84
Higher classification.....	85
Reason for classification.....	86
Overseas.....	87

75. General.—Commanding officers of troops or individuals affected by the provisions of this section are responsible that such troops or individuals are instructed in such provisions, advised of their applicability, and warned of the danger involved in the spreading of information concerning troop movements. Instructions of this nature will be given prior to the oversea troop movement, both at home station and staging area.

76. Classification requirements.—a. Movement of troops or individuals, or any group or class of such movements, will be classified as *secret*, *confidential*, or *restricted* by, or by authority of, any officer authorized to make or authorize secret classifications under paragraph 9a. It is essential to proper classification that officers authorized to classify documents are able to identify classified elements of information, particularly those elements requiring a secret classification.

b. The following elements of information concerning troop movements or individual travel will normally be classified as indicated below in each case:

- (1) *Secret*.—Documents which contain any one of the following elements, either directly or by implication, require a classification of *secret*.
- (a) Oversea or intertheater geographical destinations (except those in Alaska, Canada, and Mexico).
  - (b) Date and time of departure from port of embarkation, port en route, or airport.
  - (c) Route, name, or destination of ship or convoy.



- (d) Estimated time of arrival at oversea or intertheater destination or ports en route.
  - (e) The meaning of assigned shipment numbers so far as the oversea or intertheater destination is concerned.
  - (f) The oversea or intertheater destination represented by a temporary APO number.
  - (g) Events en route involving enemy action.
- (2) *Confidential*.—Documents which contain any of the following elements will be classified *confidential*:
- (a) Information or description of unit movements of nonoperational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.
  - (b) Complete list or tabulation of units combined with and included under a single shipment number for oversea shipment. The combination of a single unit with its oversea shipment number and letter, however, is restricted information.
- (3) *Restricted*.—Orders, communications, reports, and other documents concerning troop movements, except as indicated in (1) and (2) above, will be classified as *restricted*. However, reports and communications concerning movements need not be classified if the classified elements of information and unit designations are not included therein and reference to the movement is made by shipment number and letter, by temporary APO number, or by main number.
77. Dissemination of information.—*a.* Officers and men will avoid talk or discussion of military movements with civilians and will view with suspicion any person asking questions about such movements or discussing topics pertaining thereto.
- b.* All persons connected with the military service who receive information concerning movements of organizations, detachments, or individuals, classified in accordance with paragraph 76, are forbidden to make public or to inform unauthorized persons concerning the classified elements of such movements.
- c.* When it is necessary to advise relatives or other persons of approaching departure, individuals connected with the military service will not disclose any classified information.
78. Rail and motor movements.—*a.* Rail and motor movements of troops in the United States, including those to Mexico and Canada, will normally be classified *restricted*. However, reports concerning arrivals and departure of such movements may be transmitted to persons authorized to receive such reports, unclassified, provided unit designations are not included therein.
- b.* When rail or motor movements are made preliminary to an oversea movement from the United States, cars, baggage and impedimenta will not be marked in the clear to show destination, date of departure, name of ship, or other classified elements of information. In such cases impedimenta will be marked with the assigned shipment number and letter. The unit designation will not be used as a marking on impedimenta, although the company letter or abbreviation may be used to identify the impedimenta of each company or similar unit in the movement.

*c.* During the progress of movements, individuals participating in such movements are to be kept from unauthorized persons.

79. In staging areas, the same care is to be exercised in the applicable areas.

*b.* Commanders of units are to see that movements are kept within prescribed limits all the time and not to exceed 48 hours in any one place. During this period, movements are to be prevented or limited as much as possible in the manner concerned. Special attention is to be given to movement (if in the United States) of individuals in restricted areas and to departure date.

80. Embarkation.—The same care is to be exercised without attracting undue attention. The disposition of troops is left to the discretion of the commanding officer. The playing of a band will not be permitted.

*b.* All persons not on duty are to be kept away from the pier at all times.

*c.* Personnel may take no special notice of the restrictions imposed in the area concerned.

*d.* Members of families are to be kept away from the piers or thereabouts. Members of families will be ordered away upon receipt of orders from the appropriate authority of the command with whom they attempt to communicate.

81. Movement of vehicles.—Vehicles will be moved under cover of darkness or moved during daylight, but not on deck supported by flags or whistles will be used.

82. At sea.—*a.* After departure for an intertheater destination, the same care is to be exercised as necessary for training or in the event of an emergency. If closed, the individuals participating in such movements are to be given particular care will be taken to see that they are allowed ashore at the proper time.

*b.* Events at sea concerning movements are to be kept as secret information by the command.

83. Returns to United States.—When making a return movement to the United States in accordance with paragraph 76, except in the event of an emergency, information only. How it is to be handled is *secret*.

84. Movements by motor, and rail movements.—The same care must be exercised in the event of an intertheater destination, since the same care is to be exercised in the event of a return to the destination.

SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION

c. During the progress of a movement by rail or motor within the United States, individuals participating therein will not communicate classified information to unauthorized persons.

79. In staging areas.—a. Instructions will be given to all individuals concerned in the applicable security provisions of this section.

b. Commanders of ports or airports of embarkation are authorized to restrict to prescribed limits all individuals under oversea movement orders for a period not to exceed 48 hours prior to departure for oversea or intertheater destinations. During this period of restriction, communication with civilians may be prevented or limited as may be considered necessary by the port or airport commander concerned. Special authority must be obtained from the War Department (if in the United States) or the theater commander (if oversea) for placing individuals in restriction more than 48 hours prior to the expected sailing or departure date.

80. Embarkation.—a. Troop movements will be made so far as practicable without attracting undue attention. Authority to use bands during embarkation of troops is left to the discretion of port commanders where, in their opinion, the playing of a band will not jeopardize the security of the movement.

b. All persons not on official business will be excluded from the piers at all times.

c. Personnel may take cameras within the limits of the pier or oversea, subject to the restrictions imposed by the commander of the port, ship, theater, or other area concerned.

d. Members of families, relatives, or friends of those sailing will not be allowed at the piers or thereabouts on the day of sailing. Any such persons found there will be ordered away summarily by the guard and report will be made to the appropriate authority of the officer or enlisted man with whom they were seen or with whom they attempted to communicate.

81. Movement of vessels in harbors.—Vessels loaded with troops or supplies will be moved under cover of darkness, whenever possible. If vessels must be moved during daylight, the commanding officer of troops will hold his men below deck or within deck superstructures to prevent attracting attention. Signals by flags or whistles will be limited to those necessary for safe navigation.

82. At sea.—a. After sailing from the port of embarkation, the oversea or intertheater destination will be disclosed to individuals aboard ship only as necessary for training or indoctrination en route. When such information is disclosed, the individuals will be warned of the secret classification thereof. Particular care will be taken to insure that this warning is given all individuals who are allowed ashore at intermediate stopping points.

b. Events at sea concerning or resulting from enemy action will be considered as secret information by all individuals concerned.

83. Returns to United States.—Classified elements of information concerning a return movement to the United States are identical with those enumerated in paragraph 76, except that the United States as a destination is *restricted* information only. However, the specific port of destination in the United States is *secret*.

84. Movements by air.—a. Generally, the same requirements for water, motor, and rail movements apply to oversea movements by air. However, greater care must be exercised by all concerned to the secrecy of specific oversea or intertheater destination, since such movement orders normally disclose a geographical destination.

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b. All individuals involved in such movements, communicating from intermediate stopping points, will refrain from disclosing classified information, particularly their oversea or intertheater destination.

85. Higher classification.—A higher classification than that indicated in this section may be assigned if the order, message, or other communication contains information which should be protected by a higher classification.

86. Reason for classification.—Whenever a classification higher than *restricted* is assigned to a movement order, the reason for such higher classification will normally be included therein. An example of an explanatory paragraph is as follows:

The following secret and confidential elements of information are contained herein: secret equipment (par. 11c); tabulation of units (par. 1); confidential mission (pars. 2 and 3). All other elements of this order are *restricted*.

87. Overseas.—a. After arrival overseas no information will be given concerning names or destinations of organizations, names of vessels, data concerning convoys, routes pursued, measures taken to avoid attack, dates of arrival, debarkation, or departure, or number of troops, or kind of cargoes carried.

b. The disclosure of the place of execution or acknowledgement on a legal instrument by one in or with the armed forces overseas is authorized, provided the military necessity of secrecy of strength and location of troops does not require suppression of such information, provided also, that such disclosure is necessary to the legality of the instrument and the execution of the instrument cannot be deferred without undue hardship, and provided the information disclosed will be of no substantial value to the enemy when and if it may reach him.

[A. G. 380.01 (18 Mar 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,  
*Chief of Staff.*

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

*Major General,*

*The Adjutant General.*

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REFERENCES

<u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Location</u>
1.	Memorandum dated 9 September 1943 from Captain H. E. Calvert to Major G. A. Nelson (EIDM MI-8-a), Subject: Security Responsibility; 1st Memo Ind., dated 11 September 1943, from Major Nelson to Captain L. D. Geiger, Labor Relations Board (EIDMC-1); 2nd Memo Ind., dated 14 September 1943, from Captain Geiger to Major Nelson (EIDM O-4); and 3rd Memo Ind., dated 20 September 1943, from Major Nelson to Captain Calvert (EIDM C-1).	Intelligence and Security Division file HQ-602.3 Security Responsibility.
2.	Engineering Manual, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Chapter VI, Water Supply, Distribution and Storage; Chapter SVII, Fire Prevention; Crosby-Fiske-Forster, Handbook of Fire Protection, published by National Fire Protection Association.	
3.	OCE Circular Letter no. 1070 (Construction Div No. 251), dated 15 January 1942, Subject: Organization for Protective Security Service in the Construction Division, O.C.F. and in the Offices of Division and Area Engineers, File No. CE 025.1 CFP.	

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "F"

COPIES OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS  
TYPICAL LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION CASES

~~SECRET~~

# Army Corps Prevented Espionage at Atomic Bomb Project

Scientists Guarded By Special Unit

Germans Believed Developments in U. S. Had Not Progressed Beyond Research

Oak Ridge, Tenn., Aug. 14 (AP)—It was revealed today that a "planned attempt" was made to espionage the American atomic bomb project here, and that it was thwarted by a specially-trained unit of the army's counter-intelligence corps.

Military agents were assigned to this home of the nation's top secret weapon and formed the nucleus of an organization which successfully protected the secret, an army release disclosed.

Key scientists working on the development of the bomb were constantly guarded, the army said.

"All attempts to obtain vital information were thwarted," the announcement said. It did not disclose whether the person or persons involved had been previously identified as having been apprehended in this country as enemy agents.

Rumors and speculations were traced to their source and so well was the secret guarded that the Nazis believed, only a short time before they surrendered, that the United States had not progressed beyond the early research stages in development of the atom bomb, the army said.

"With success of the project dependent upon the safety of a few key scientists, elaborate measures to protect their identity and whereabouts were instituted and counter-intelligence corps agents were assigned as constant bodyguards," the announcement continued.

## Atomic Bomb Espionage Is Thwarted

Richmond Times Dispatch  
OAK RIDGE, TENN., Aug. 14 (UP)—

There was "a planned attempt" at espionage during America's development of the atomic bomb but it was thwarted by military counter-espionage, the War Department announced today.

No details were given of the specific attempt mentioned in a departmental release describing the means by which the army had kept atomic developments and even the fact that extensive research was underway an inviolate secret for four years.

The research was dependent upon a relatively few scientists scattered about the country and the army's counter-espionage reckoned with the possibility of one or more of them being assassinated by desperate enemy agents. They were constantly surrounded by bodyguards. Their identities, whereabouts, and movements were surrounded with absolute secrecy.

The announcement in regard to espionage said only: "All attempts to obtain vital information were thwarted." Army officers, extending that statement slightly, said espionage attempts hadn't been limited to this 59,000-acre government reservation where much research was done and where atomic bombs are made.

Counter-espionage agents assigned here formed the nucleus of the elaborate organization which was so successful in protecting the secret that the Nazis believed at the time they surrendered that the Allies had not progressed in atomic knowledge beyond the early research stage, the announcement said.

THE NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Sunday Morning, Aug. 12, 1945 17-1

## Atomic Bomb Secret Protected By Great Intelligence Force

OAK RIDGE, Tenn., Aug. 11—(AP)—The secret of the atomic bomb was protected by an international military intelligence force directly responsible only to two top officers of the Manhattan District.

A personal letter from President Roosevelt in 1942 directed Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, officer in charge of the entire project, to take "extraordinary" steps to maintain secrecy and security.

The resulting organization was under such stringent regulations that Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives had to have special passes to enter the installations throughout the country.

Set up to operate as an independent agency outside G-2, the organization was headed by two military intelligence division officers, Col. John Lansdale, Jr., of Cleveland, Ohio, and Lt. Col. W. A. Connelley of Newark, N. J.

Assigned to Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, district engineer, was a hand-picked detachment under Maj. H. K. Calvert of Oklahoma City. Later Major Calvert was transferred to London to handle foreign intelligence for the project and Lt. Col.

W. B. Parsons of Seattle, Wash., replaced him at Oak Ridge. Headquarters for the red tape cutting organization spread throughout the entire country.

Screening of all personnel was handled exclusively by the district's organization and key persons were investigated thoroughly. All possible precautions were taken against sabotage and espionage and military police got special training for guarding the projects.

Investigative agencies, including the FBI, helped the district's military intelligence organization when called upon.

## 'Manhattan Project' Made Bomb; Closest-Guarded Secret of the War

WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (AP)—"Manhattan Project," probably the most guarded secret of the war, produced the atomic bomb.

Those two words magically produced needed materials, however scarce, as well as manpower to carry out the vast research which led to the disclosure today that this country had produced a bomb far more deadly than any other.

"Manhattan Project" whispered into the right ears meant the highest priorities for materials and manpower.

Thousands knew of the existence of "Manhattan Project," but few of them knew any more than that it was super-secret.

The project was so broken down that those working on it usually knew only one phase of it. And from the one phase they could not know the ultimate objective concerning it.

On a given day, for example, several army officers might ask the War Production Board for

overriding priorities for certain materials for "Manhattan Project." Even when they met, one did not know the mission of another.

Scores of universities and scientific laboratories had a part in the work. They were assigned one problem at a time, provided the answers to them, but still did not know where their work ultimately would lead.

Army officers who carried even the small bits of information about "Manhattan Project" moved about with brief cases chained to their wrists, often under guard.

A few times "Manhattan Project" even reached the newspapers in connection with the recruitment of manpower. Any inquiry, however, brought the response that it was a secret project and that no information could be given concerning it.

High officials of the WPP knew few or no details of "Manhattan Project."

# Military Intelligence <sup>Section 8-12 P. A-7</sup> Guarded Atomic Secret

## Regulations Were So Rigid FBI Agents Had To Have Special Passes for Entry; Organization Supervised by Gen. Groves

Special To The News-Seattle

OAK RIDGE, Aug. 11—The atomic bomb secret was protected for three years by an air-tight intelligence and security organization which operated under such severe regulations that FBI agents had to have special passes for entry into the various installations in this country, it was announced tonight. The Army sent agents throughout the United States and abroad.

The War Department gave official recognition to the Military Intelligence personnel who pursued their activities anonymously and who played the major role in controlling the intelligence and security aspects of the atomic bomb project.

In recognizing these atomic bomb protectors, the War Department gave in general outline the story of how the war's best-kept secret was kept. At the same time, the War Department emphasized that security of the project was still of highest importance on all information not officially released.

### Groves Supervised Organization

As an organization within an organization, the Military Intelligence Division of the Manhattan Engineer District was organized under the direct personal supervision of Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, officer in charge of the atomic bomb project, who was directed by personal letter in 1942 by President Roosevelt to take "extraordinary" steps to maintain security and secrecy.

"The organization which Gen. Groves directed to operate as an independent agency outside of G-2 and specifically as a separate unit under the Manhattan District was set up when Gen. Groves selected from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department two officers to act with and for him in establishing intelligence and security policies," the War Department said.

"These officers, both of whom have made extraordinary records in the Intelligence Division, were Col. John Lansdale Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, and Lt. Col. W. A. Conso-dine, Newark, N. J."

### Hand-Picked Officers

They in turn hand-picked a group of intelligence officers and agents for what was the most difficult security job of all time. This detachment of officers and agents was then assigned to Col. K. D. Nichols, district engineer, with Maj. H. K. Calvert, of Oklahoma City, in charge. Maj. Calvert was later transferred to London to handle foreign intelligence for the project and Lt. Col. W. B. Parsons, Seattle, Wash., took command of the detachment.

In an extraordinary departure from usual Army channels, this detachment was responsible directly to only Gen. Groves and Col. Nichols. Members of the detachment were spread throughout this country, from Washington to California and from Maine to Florida, with their headquarters at Oak Ridge, site of Clinton Engineer Works.

### Red Tape Slashed

Red tape was cut, short cuts were taken, formalities were done away with. "Protect the project" became the watchword of the group.

Personnel at all project installations were screened exclusively by the district's Intelligence Division for the elimination of undesirables. Security and secrecy agreements were executed by all, and exhaustive loyalty investigations were made of key persons.

Elaborate precautions were taken against espionage and sabotage. Every known method to insure production and shipment security was taken advantage of in the organization.

Information was compartmentalized so that each person knew only such information as was needed to do his or her part on the job. Army officers themselves were cognizant only of their particular phase of the work.

### Police Specially Trained

A security of information program was instituted to develop individual responsibility, and military police were specially trained for internal and perimeter control of all installations.

As the operations of the Intelligence and Security Division developed, the bulk of the intelligence matters were developed under the supervision of Gen. Groves' Washington office and this security program developed under supervision of the district engineer at Oak Ridge. There was complete co-ordination on both phases.

### Personnel Is Praised

In a statement, Col. Nichols said:

"Regardless of the rank of those connected with Military Intelligence, each member did his part and did it well. The magnificent security job that was done could not have been accomplished without the whole-hearted support of all concerned.

"The G-2 Division of the War Department, the Security and Intelligence Divisions of all nine service commands, office of Naval Intelligence, FBI, and each and every loyal American citizen who worked for the Manhattan District contributed to the success of the security of this project."

"In fact, America itself gave security to its own greatest project."

## Atomic Bomb Project Kept In Secrecy

SANTA FE, N. M., Aug. 6 (AP)—The government has protected its Los Alamos Atomic Bomb project, west and north of here, with such extreme secrecy that it has almost wiped the community off the map for two and one-half years.

So rigidly was the ban against publicity enforced that society page and sports stories from Los Alamos avoided mention of the place.

A one-time exclusive school for boys, Los Alamos was taken over by the government in the fall of 1942. Newspapermen were warned at once that the project was one the War Department ranked as extremely confidential.

Reporters never were given an opportunity to visit the project. But the public knew there was something secret hidden in the hills and conjectured over it.

The extent of the project has not been disclosed. New roads have been built to it, and over them flows an immense cargo—building materials, machinery, food, ice, coal and other commodities.

## 'Best Kept' War Secret Now Known

By RADFORD MOBLEY  
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—The best kept secret is now revealed.

Two years ago the Office of Censorship asked the American press to refrain from mentioning experiments with atomic bombs. The press kept that faith until the first one was dropped.

Byron Price, director of the Office of Censorship, Monday said the press in keeping the secret close "demonstrated patriotism of the highest order."

By 1943 it was known scientifically that such a bomb was probable. It was then that the Office of Censorship asked the press to desist further from mentioning "atomic experiments."

During the war the press has operated under a voluntary code of censorship restraining from printing any information which might give aid to the enemy.

## Colored Youth Won't Divulge Secret to Navy

Now it can be told: A 17-year-old colored boy went down to Chattanooga's navy recruiting station recently to enlist.

Chief James L. Bailey, specialist recruiter for the station, asked the boy where he had been working and he said, "Oak Ridge."

Then came the usual question about "What did you do?" and the colored boy said:

"I don't know, sir, and if I did I couldn't tell you."

"It's not all that secret, is it?" Chief Bailey asked.

"Boss, I'll tell you just how secret it is," he replied. "Say I'm standing out in the middle of a big field with a pair of posthole diggers a-digging a big hole. You come along and say, 'Boy, what you doing?'"

"Does I tell you I'm digging a posthole? Naw, sir, I tells you I don't know—that's what I do. If I tell you what I'm doing I get fired for divulging Government secrets."

# Volume of Atomics, Size of Bombs, Crew Training, Cloaked in Secrecy

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8.—(AP)—To all intents the atomic bomb is still a secret, except for the bare facts of its existence, where it is made and rough comparisons on its power.

Even the question whether the Japanese will feel it in big volume, or only occasionally and spasmodically, is left unanswered.

Except for President Truman's broad generalities: "These bombs are now in production. . . . We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. . . . If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth."

How big the bomb is—which governs whether a plane can lay the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT in one spot, dozens or hundreds—is carefully unrevealed. But the President spoke of "a bomb" on Hiroshima and atom-smashing equipment heretofore has been ponderous.

Mr. Truman said only that job was done by "an American airplane," leaving open the question whether regular operational types of bombers can handle the terrible new weapon.

There is no hint whether the destructive monster has been so simplified that non-technically trained crews can handle it once it is built.

Even its actual destructive force is secret—if the makers know it. The comparison with 20,000 tons of TNT may be more a physicist's calculation on release of energy, translated into layman's language, than a figure on area the explosion will devastate. And at last reports dust and smoke still obscured observers' view of the place where a bomb actually fell.

There is a hint—but no more—that standards of comparison applying to ordinary explosives may not work at all with atomic bombs. Secretary Stimson's statement of the bombs said security would permit revelation "of the nature of their action." Whether he was speaking only of the bomb mechanism, or of effects differing in essential nature from the blast of orthodox explosions was not clear.

## Workers In Secret Government Plant Are Proud Of Atomic Bomb's Success

OAK RIDGE, Tenn.—(UP)—Tens of thousands of workers at the government's "Clinton Engineering Works" and their families struggled to act like normal persons Tuesday and it wasn't at all easy.

For months, for some years, they had been living in an atmosphere of strain and secrecy. They knew they were working with component parts or the raw materials of a mighty war weapon. Very few of them had even an idea it was an atomic bomb, but they knew whatever it was, it was their country's most valued secret.

Workers were asked not to tell their wives. Wives were required not to pass on any suspicions they might have, particularly not to their children. No one was permitted to own a camera. The government was depending on the workers' patriotism, but their intelligence activities were being watched. Even to leave the city of 75,000 persons which the government built in four years and owns, lock, stock and barrel, the residents needed a pass.

Atomic Pioneers  
Tuesday they were excitedly discussing the matter which was theirs—they were the pioneers who had created the means of controlling atomic energy now focused in a weapon of unbelievable destructive force, but with awesome potentials of good. The residents gossiped on the street corners about something else but the weather. For the first time wives asked—and were told—what husbands were doing in the some 900 factory buildings getting his 80,000-acre government reservation.

A few men were in such key spots that they were able to guess what the gigantic and complicated project was. One was W. H. Clay, a chemical engineer, whose home is on Jackson Square.

"I knew or thought I knew what was coming months ago," he said. "But I never mentioned it to anyone—or hardly dared to think about it myself."

He didn't tell his wife. "I had my first news from the postman," Mrs. Clay said. "He told me and I flew to the radio."

Barber Kept Quiet  
Even the town barber kept his mouth buttoned on the amazing things going on all around—the government spent over one billion dollars here in four years.

"My customers and I talked about everything except the work on the project," Barber C. A. Goodwin said. "In the 17 months I have been barbering here I had never heard anyone say he thought or believed he knew what was being made here. I may have had my ideas, but I kept them to myself."

### Security Still Prevails at Oak Ridge



Despite the fact that the general type of work at the Clinton Engineer Works has been made known to the world, security still remains an important factor, and the workers are still checked in and out of the plant. Here Sue Cress, Woman Auxiliary M. P. checks the badge of Quincy R. Thompson as other workers stand in line waiting to be checked out. Sent. 9-10 P. 9

## 'Who's Goofy?' Asks Manager Who Doubted 'Secret City'

MEMPHIS, Aug. 9 (AP)—Manager Joe Simon of Warner Theater needed a new cashier. A pretty girl applied.

"Any experience?" Simon asked.  
"Yes."  
"Where?"  
"In a secret city."  
"A secret city," Simon mused. "Where? What state?"  
"In Tennessee."  
"A secret city in Tennessee? What's its population?"  
"About 75,000."

Simon scratched his head and gave the applicant the old brushoff. He decided that he didn't want such a goofy person handling his money.

"Is my face red?" Simon said today. "A couple of days after talked to the girl I read President Truman's announcement that the 'secret city' is Oak Ridge. Who's goofy?"



# Col. Nichols Asks End Of Speculation

OAK RIDGE, Aug. 9.—"Future possibilities of atomic energy are wrapped in technical details that cannot be released now and I ask that speculation concerning these possibilities be stopped," Col. K. D. Nichols, district engineer of the Manhattan district, said in an address here tonight.

He also asked that speculation concerning dangers pertaining to the Clinton Engineer Works be halted.

"There is absolutely no danger of an atomic explosion here," he said, "although in our plant here at Oak Ridge are the main units in a vast industrial effort for the production of atomic bombs, adequate safeguards have been taken to make an atomic explosion impossible."

In opening his address, Col. Nichols praised individuals and companies for their help to keep the project moving at top speed and with a maximum of secrecy.

"We have attained our first objective but we still have greater work to do. Our second objective is that we must be prepared to give our fighting forces just as many bombs as they need," Col. Nichols continued. "We cannot afford to let our men at the front lack the most effective weapon ever devised by man, and to insure this, we are building more plants daily."

Col. Nichols said that Oak Ridge needs every man and woman now working and hinted that considerable more manpower would be needed to "construct and operate plants that are to be built in the future."

In asking continued help in preserving secrecy at the plant, Col. Nichols said, that very little vital information has been released pertaining to the project and urged all workers to confine remarks only to information that is officially released. This is vital, he pointed out, to keep our lead in production of the Atomic Bomb until peace in the world is again assured.

Key operators, which according to Col. Nichols made Clinton Engineer Works a living reality are, Tennessee Eastman; Carbon and Carbide; Ferrelve; Monsanto Chemical Co.; and Roane-Anderson.

These plants were designed or constructed by Stone and Webster; Kellogg; Ford, Bacon and Davis; H. K. Ferguson Co.; Dupont, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and J. A. Jones Construction Co.

Col. Nichols also revealed that vital information was furnished the operators at Oak Ridge by the University of California, the University of Chicago and Columbia University.

"Many other universities and research organizations have furnished vital information," Col. Nichols said, including General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis Chalmers and Chrysler Corp. "I wish that all organization could be mentioned, but they can be sure that in due time credit will be given their efforts."

# Col. Nichols Cites Need Of Security

The following is a statement to the public from Col. Kenneth D. Nichols, district engineer of the Manhattan Engineer District, at Oak Ridge.

"The official release today of information regarding the scope and purpose of Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, Tenn., comprises the permissible limits of disclosures regarding the project at this time.

"With the revealing of the Manhattan District Engineer undertaking, the significance and vital importance of the project can now be appreciated by all.

"On behalf of the War Department and myself, I wish to extend sincerest thanks to all civilian and military personnel for their efforts. I also wish to commend the citizens of East Tennessee who aided in maintaining security.

"I am proud of each individual connected with or serving the project. Many have devoted their time and energy without stint, often under adverse conditions. Many were handicapped by not knowing the nature of the undertaking, but nevertheless rendered faithful service with nothing more than assurance to go on.

"I am confident that I can depend on each of them to continue to render the same whole-hearted cooperation and effort during the future as each has done in the past in achieving our objectives.

"Security on many phases of the project remains of greatest importance, and it is the duty of every employe, past and present, and of every citizen to protect all information not appearing in the official releases."

The following figures were released by the War Department, showing total costs for special plants and laboratories necessary for perfection of the atomic bomb.

Total expenditures	\$1,665,142,423.70
Clinton Engineer Works	\$1,106,393,000.00
Hanford Engineer Works	\$ 362,401,000.00
New Mexico Project	\$ 54,429,000.00

# Engineer Says Secret Should Remain In U. S.

## Col. Nichols Besieged by Reporters but Town Not 'Open'

By WILLARD YARBROUGH  
News-Sentinel Staff Writer

OAK RIDGE, Aug. 8.—Col. D. Nichols, district engineer at this home of the atomic bomb, disclosed today that facilities for its production are being expanded and said he hoped that after the war the terrible new destructive force would forever remain in the United States.

Nichols described the development of the bomb as the "greatest jumble in history" but one that was entirely justified because it will "very likely greatly shorten the Pacific war."

He said he was in no position to speculate on the possible peacetime application of the newly harnessed energy but added fervently:

"I trust it will forever be kept right here in the United States."

Nichols said the nearby source of unlimited electricity from Tennessee Valley Authority had been the chief factor in locating the largest atomic bomb plant here at Oak Ridge.

Since the very first breaking of ground, the plant has received top priority for literally everything it needs, he said.

Nichols, holding the first press conference here since news of the new bomb was released in Washington Monday, was besieged by newspapermen who had swarmed unsuccessfully about this secrecy since then.

**Still Under Wraps**  
For the most part it is still under wraps. Its big gates remain heavily closed. **Turn to Page 8, Col. 4)**  
**PLANTS BROUGHT**

# Plants Brought by TVA Power

(STARTS ON PAGE ONE)

guarded and the square rows of buildings that stretch over 50,000 acres of one-time farm land are still forbidden ground for all but awe-struck personnel who still haven't quite recovered from the knowledge of their fearful task.

Meanwhile, the War Manpower Commission, said that 10,000 additional workers are needed for jobs at Oak Ridge. The WMC has referred over 200,000 men to the project in the past 30 months, although all of these were not needed. It said.

Nichols said the new weapon "should help end this war quickly—sufficiently soon to justify the two billion dollars involved in its creation."

What has already struck Japan, he said, "is only a foretaste of what is coming."

He said the production schedule was set up at this great plant in 1942 "and we are right on it."

"We were given a job to do," he said proudly. "That job was the development of explosives for the use in war. We are fulfilling that job, and more plants are now being built for the purpose of manufacturing the atomic bomb."

Nichols voiced deep pride in the thousands of persons who contributed to the bomb's phenomenal success.

## Months of Strain

For months, for some years, they had been living in an atmosphere to strain and secrecy. They knew they were working with component parts of the raw materials of a mighty war weapon. Very few of them had even an idea it was an atomic bomb but they knew whatever it was, it was their country's most valued secret.

Workers were asked not to tell their wives. Wives were required not to pass on any suspicions they might have, particularly not to their children. No one was permitted to own a camera. The government was depending upon everyone's patriotism, but Army Intelligence officers were everywhere to see that there was no indiscretion. Even to leave this city of 75,000 persons which the government built in four years and owns, lock, stock and barrel, the residents needed a pass.

Today they were excitedly discussing the honor which was theirs — they were the pioneers who had created the means of controlling atomic energy now focused in a weapon of incalculable destructive force but with awesome potentials of good. The residents gossiped on the street corners about something else but the weather. For the first time, wives asked — and were told — what husbands were doing in the some 400 factory buildings dotting this 50,000-acre Government reservation.

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases.

Typical "loose talk" or leakage of information cases referred to in Paragraph 6.3, are set forth as follows:

(1) Several cases sprang from the Clergy one of which concerned a pamphlet entitled "Startling Power". In the winter of 1945, a Patent Engineer secured a copy of the pamphlet which had been published by the Good News Publishing Company, Chicago, Illinois and distributed by the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago in 1943. The article stated that "Uranium 235, extracted from natural uranium ore, promises to make all of our power sources mere child's toys by comparison. Professor John R. Dunning, Columbia University Leader in Atomic Energy Research has stated that the natural substances from which Uranium 235 is extracted abound abundantly in the earth and throughout many sections of the world". However, the pamphlet continued "We must not overlook the far more vital and assured fact that God has given to Christians the gift of the Holy Spirit with energies far more dynamic than those of exploding atoms or mysterious elements". The Patent Engineer concluded that U-235 merited investigation by his company and made this suggestion to his superior who in turn contacted Dr. Compton, Chicago University, and made inquiry to the Intelligence Division whereupon investigation was made concerning the information about U-235 known to the company and the engineer, with the discovery that the case had harmlessly arisen from reading of the pamphlet.

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

Some months later, a Lutheran minister in the South gave a sermon in which he stated "One of the developments in the field of Science today is a new source of energy called Uranium 235. But regardless of the power of Uranium 235 or other energy which Science may discover, it will never be powerful enough to comfort us in affliction or strengthen us in despair. We must search out the Lord for those things". Discrete inquiry revealed that the sermon was taken from the article "Startling Power". Shortly thereafter, a Presbyterian minister in Tennessee preached a similar sermon with the statements concerning the devastating energy contained in minute quantities of Uranium 235, but that even so the power of God was infinitely greater. He too had read "Startling Power".

(2) At Oak Ridge, a Confidential Informant advised the Intelligence and Security Division in the spring of 1945 that approximately ten employees suffering from a body rash believed that their rash resulted from exposure to radioactive elements and had asserted that because the Oak Ridge Hospital physicians had not given them satisfactory care they had gone to their own "off area" doctors. A great part of the informant's report was found to be misinformation, but it was ascertained that several employees had developed a rash possibly from excessive thermal conditions or from handling large quantities of carbon tetrachloride for cleaning purposes and had gone to the hospital for treatment. Through a

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

sense of fear and because the physicians could not state positively what had caused the rash, one or two of the patients had gone to private physicians "back home" to seek additional advice. To prevent patients from consulting "off area" physicians in the future and thereby disclosing classified information by describing their working conditions and materials used, the hospital was requested to assure such patients that Oak Ridge medical authorities were best equipped and trained to treat any cases arising out of the peculiar working conditions of the area. The operating companies were also asked to stress this fact to their personnel.

(S) A medical officer attached to a field hospital in Belgium wrote a letter in December 1944 to a friend working at Oak Ridge in which the officer stated his roommate had a kid brother also at Oak Ridge who had stated they were making atomic bombs there. The officer and his roommate, also a medical officer, were quite surprised when an Agent called upon them at the field hospital to make inquiry regarding the statement in the letter. The writer of the letter stated that the subject of atomic bombs first came to his attention in a 1941 article appearing in the Time Magazine and the subject was again broached in the presence of about eight or ten other officers when his roommate told the gathering that his brother was an engineer working on atomic bombs at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Later discussions were held of a very general nature and largely in a joking vein. The officer, whose brother worked

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

at Oak Ridge, disclosed that he had visited with his brother shortly before leaving the states and during the visit the brother stated that he was working on the atomic bomb at Oak Ridge and that the work was very secret and conducted on a huge scale. The officer did not mention the subject to anyone until shortly after the arrival of his unit in Normandy, November 1944, at which time he stated in a "bull session" that his brother was at Oak Ridge. The brother was interviewed at Oak Ridge and stated that at the time he had visited with his brother he had acquired very little actual knowledge about the project but knew in a general way what was being done. They had discussed in a speculative manner the potentialities of atomic power in war and in peacetime. The brother was seriously cautioned against future disclosures of this nature and admitted he had been most indiscreet.

(4) A Naval Lieutenant reportedly stated at a dinner party in March 1945 that he wondered when we would use the atomic bomb. He stated that only about ten pounds of U-235 are needed to end the war; that several thousand persons were working on it in Tennessee where most of TVA's electrical power was used. The lieutenant was interviewed and stated that he recalled a lecture given the chemistry department at Harvard in 1942 regarding the possibilities of atomic power and had since discussed the subject with friends and had read many articles in technical magazines regarding atomic power. He stated that anyone traveling for the government realized there was a great secret project there and he had merely assumed that it was

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

engaged in the development of atomic power. Subject was cautioned against further such disclosures.

(5) In June 1945, Dr. A. H. Compton received a long distance call from a man identifying himself as a Mr. Brown from Asheville, North Carolina who requested an unspecified quantity of U-235 for the purpose of creating a sensation in lectures he frequently gave. Dr. Compton reported the matter to the Intelligence and Security Division. Mr. Brown proved to be the editor of a farm journal in Asheville, and had read several articles about four years ago on the potentialities of U-235. Having received a copy of the Confidential Censorship Directive, he assumed America was interested in U-235 from a military standpoint. He had met Dr. Compton in Asheville when the latter had visited Brown's employer, the two being old friends. Knowing Dr. Compton's reputation in the field of cosmic rays and nuclear physics, Brown telephoned him to ascertain where he could obtain a sample of U-235. Security aspects concerning the element were explained to Brown and he gave assurance that he would make no further inquiry concerning same nor disclosure about the element.

(6) An employee of one of the operating companies at Oak Ridge wrote a letter to an uncle stating that she knew what was being done at Oak Ridge; that Dr. E. O. Lawrence was known as the "daddy rabbit" and that it was expected the war would be over

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

quickly when the product produced at Oak Ridge was finally used. Unfortunately, for her, the letter was dropped in a bus on the area at Clinton Engineer Works prior to mailing. She admitted to Intelligence agents that in her position as a confidential secretary she had necessarily acquired considerable information about the work of the project, but had been very foolish to reveal any of the information to her uncle. She was promptly terminated by the company for this indiscretion.

(7) A project worker reported in February 1945 to the Director of Security, Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago, that he had just come from a tavern across the street from the University Armory and had heard that the armory was soon to close up and that many of the people were transferring to New Mexico to a place that was quite confined and lacking in many of the urban comforts. Spot surveillance of the tavern for several days by Intelligence agents disclosed that employees of the tavern knew that the University of Chicago and the Army were working together at the armory; that shipments entered the armory under armed guards, and that the owner had probably made statements that some place in New Mexico was connected with the armory. One employee was overheard to state in the tavern that the armory was engaged in metallurgical experiments and research, and that experiments were conducted on animals. The owner of the tavern proved to be very cooperative in displaying security posters and

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Typical Leakage of Information Cases. (cont'd)

in promising to be an informant in reporting any "loose talk" about the armory overheard in the tavern.

(6) In the fall of 1944, an employee of a New York firm, doing engineering work for the project, was taking a train from New York to Oak Ridge carrying a highly secret file of engineering details. He arrived at the Pennsylvania Station with several minutes to spare before departure time of the train and used the time to make a last minute call to his wife from a telephone booth. After finishing the call, he started for the train and discovered he did not have the secret papers with him. As it was now time for the train to depart, he chose to report the loss by a quick telephone call to his office and request that someone come down and look for the papers, but advised that he was catching the train. The Security agent for the company rushed to the station and made a frantic search for the papers, finally locating them at the information booth. A telegram was sent to the union station in Washington requesting the employee be contacted when the train arrived there and told to telephone his office. When the employee made the call, he was ordered back to New York. He was soundly reprimanded for his failure to drop his travel plans and immediately search for the papers, and was terminated by the company.

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "F"  
PERSONNEL OF INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY SECTION

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel

25 January 1946.

COLONEL

Parsons, William B.  
Lansdale, John Jr.  
Consodine, William A.

MAJOR

Block, Lloyd R.	Jones, Thomas O.
Calvert, Horace K.	McLeod, Robert J.
De Silva, Peer	Thompson, Grover C.
Gillette, Kirby M.	Uanna, William L.
Johanneson, Royden E.	

CAPTAIN

Barnes, Guy E.	Mountjoy, Pearl B.
Brown, Emmons B.	Murray, James S.
Clark, Curtis L.	Remsen, George W.
Cooper, Murray M.	Rhodes, Fred B., Jr.
Davis, George B., Jr.	Sergeant, William T.
Davies, John L.	Simons, Foyle W.
Del Genio, Nicholas	Simpson, William J.
Grizzell, R. A.	Southerland, James E.
Haley, James W.	Stansbury, Max E.
Hayes, Arthur J.	Sterling, Thomas A.
Horan, John A.	Tait, Robert (NMI)
Johnson, Lyall E.	Teeple, David S.
King, John A., Jr.	Volpe, Joseph, Jr.
Kirkman, Robert W.	Webb, Martin
Leonard, George B.	Whitaker, Albert E., Jr.
McClenahan, Henry I.	White, Charles V.
Menke, Bernard W.	Winstead, Charles B.

1st LIEUTENANT

Adam, Francis O., Jr.	Barge, Richmond I.
Allen, George S.	Barnett, Oval C.
Ambrose, Wayne A.	Baskin, John R.
Anderson, Andrew J., Jr.	Beerman, Fred L.
Anderson, Wilbur S.	Belcher, Philip F.
Anderson, William A., Jr.	Bennett, Alfred
Aylor, John H.	Bolton, Frederick H.
Azevedo, Daniel (NMI)	Brady, Max (NMI)

25 January 1946  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel (cont'd)

1st LIEUTENANT (cont'd)

Brock, Lawrence V.  
Burnham, Brycen P.  
Bush, Robert H.  
Catana, Jose E.  
Callaghan, Francis P.  
Carr, Joseph F.  
Cater, William D.  
Clancy, James F.  
Clarke, Charles F., Jr.  
Collins, Burton W.  
Connors, Harold P.  
Cooley, Larry E.  
Crowley, John T.  
Dailey, Daniel H.  
D'Alfonso, Daniel V.  
Dazzo, Nicholas C.  
De Franco, Frank J.  
Deily, Robert E.  
Devlin, William J.  
Dunn, Jack H.  
Burkin, Edward  
Eckberg, Carlton R.  
Edwards, Robert W.  
Eisenhart, William S.  
Fell, Philip S. P.  
Forkner, Thomas F.  
Folts, William D.  
Fry, Bernard M.  
Gahan, Patrick J.  
Geary, Richard L.  
Gregg, Wayne D.  
Guilfoyle, Thomas D.  
Hart, Herbert S.  
Hitchcock, Glean E.  
Horsan, John A.  
Husking, William W.  
Houston, Leonard O.  
Hull, John N.  
Johnson, Charles L.  
Kendall, Raymond S.  
Killough, Robert S.  
King, William A.  
Koranda, Hugo  
Lannon, John J.  
Leahy, Thomas H.  
McAdam, Richard G.  
McCaskill, Elmer A.  
McMullen, William E.  
Madigan, Arthur R.  
Maguire, John J.  
Mahoney, John H.  
Marsh, Harold (NMI)  
Metzger, Donald A.  
Miskulin, Mike (NMI)  
Murphy, Elmer F., Jr.  
Neverick, Alfred A.  
Nolan, James E.  
O'Brien, Charles H.  
O'Connell, John J.  
O'Gara, John L.  
Olson, Edwin G.  
Pickett, Winston H.  
Redenius, Josephine L.  
Rendleman, John C.  
Richardson, Vaughan E.  
Riley, William T.  
Robinson, George O.  
Rogers, Max E.  
Rosenman, Bernard M.  
Rydzewski, Adolph L.  
Schacher, George P.  
Schumann, Vernon K.  
Seminara, Louis A.  
Simpson, Omer R.  
Smith, Arthur E.  
Smith, Lawrence D.  
Sulerud, John C.  
Taylor, Robert A., Jr.  
Thompson, Francis S.  
Titus, John L.  
Traver, Robert W.  
Vaughan, Spruill J., III  
Vettel, Charles T.  
Vinciguerra, John V.  
Waldner, Paul F.  
Walsh, Harry R.  
Weingarten, John L.

25 January 1946  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel (cont'd)

1st LIEUTENANT (cont'd)

Wells, Algie A.  
Wendt, Charles F.  
Warner, William L.

White, Harold R.  
Wulff, Albert V. R., Jr.  
Zindle, Harold J.

2nd LIEUTENANT

Blauvelt, Robert W.  
Kelley, Robert H.

Rhodes, Haris C.  
Rolander, Carl A.

25 January 1946  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel (cont'd)

MASTER SERGEANTS

Addison, Artie A., Jr.  
Averill, Roswell P.  
Boch, Alfred L.  
Burns, Lee G.  
Burrall, Charles L., Jr.  
Cooley, Richard P.  
Cullins, Phillip G.  
Cunningham, John J.  
Davis, Henry G., Jr.  
Deitz, Walter L.  
Detweiler, Charles B.  
Driscoll, Florence J.  
Foley, Richard J.  
Frye, Herbert H.  
Furney, Lester C.  
Gleaves, Raymond L.  
Goldston, Joseph C.  
Herrington, James T., Jr.  
Hoyt, James L.  
Joyce, Herbert M.

Kasefang, William E.  
Kilgore, James A.  
Lamb, Louis J.  
Larcom, Charles C.  
Marinucci, James R.  
Miller, John O.  
Nally, Charles M.  
Nolan, Richard H.  
Oliff, Hershel  
Rathman, George J.  
Russell, Edwin O.  
Stout, Patrick  
Thomas, Robert F.  
Wagner, Emil C.  
Wagener, William S.  
Walker, Andrew A.  
Walsh, Edward D.  
Wheaton, George W.  
Zimmer, Willard H.

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Bernaocchi, Julian N.  
Burke, William A.  
Callahan, Francis W.  
Campbell, Charles I.  
Christie, Charles B.  
Crowley, William A.  
Daerr, Robert L.  
Ebinger, Robert F.  
Edlund, Gustav V.  
Flournoy, Copley W.  
Finneran, Michael J.  
Foor, Richard A.  
Gleason, Edwin J.  
Graves, Harold P.  
Henderson, John B.  
Harris, William J.  
Hawkins, Howard G., Jr.  
Hensley, Charles D.  
Hoyt, James L.  
Hand, Francis M.  
Harvey, Sam B.  
Jensen, Harold H.  
Kemendo, Joseph P.  
Lamb, Louis J.

Linde, Arthur W.  
Longbotham, Miller P.  
Lorenz, Henry S.  
Ludwig, Donald P.  
Lynch, John J.  
Mayer, George A.  
Melton, Horace J.  
McGuire, Peter J.  
McElwreath, William J.  
Miller, Arnold R.  
Morgan, William H.  
Murphy, Peter C.  
Nadeau, Raymond L.  
Nolan, Walter H.  
O'Malley, Joseph M.  
Phillips, Jack H.  
Ream, Harold D.  
Safferstein, Nathan C.  
Schriver, Oliver M.  
Shanley, John F.  
Smith, Richard M.  
Staruski, Anthony  
Stevens, Alan  
Wilson, Paul W.

25 January 1946  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel (cont'd)

STAFF SERGEANTS

Arrington, Kenneth H.  
Asciutto, Alfred S.  
Bailey, Howard L.  
Baudino, John M.  
Brater, Donald C.  
Bloom, Phillip  
Chilcote, Lynn E.  
Christopher, Lloyd R.  
Cole, Clinton S.  
Curran, John E.  
Dauphin, Edward L.  
Dillard, Jack W.  
Dzimianski, John W.  
Eggers, Harvey H.  
Finnell, John E.  
Fitzroy, Roland V., Jr.  
Foote, Hillis C.  
Forgatch, Joseph  
Gagen, Norbert R.  
Game, Morgan F.  
Gaughan, John J.  
Gillett, Lee E.  
Grow, Kenneth A.  
Harley, Donald J.  
Hennessey, Matthew J.  
Johnson, Carl A. B.  
Johnston, Joe B.

Kadlec, Walter H.  
Karcz, Frank R.  
Kelley, William T.  
Kelly, James A.  
Kockritz, Herman  
Kulesh, William E.  
Milligan, John  
Moffat, Henry C.  
Mountford, Horatio C.  
Myers, James X.  
Myers, William T.  
Nichols, Gene A.  
Noel, Robert O.  
Oates, Peter F.  
Oland, Harold J.  
Platou, William R.  
Porter, Lee  
Ryan, Alvin F.  
Ryan, Earl F.  
Sanford, Logan H.  
Scaife, Oliver P.  
Schivers, Rufus W.  
Shuping, Clarence L.  
Tatur, Henry J.  
Thompson, Frank D.  
Valentine, William I.  
Whitehead, Vincent O.

SERGEANTS

Anderson, John H.  
Anderson, John Harold  
Campbell, Albert M.  
Eby, G. Hershey  
Engel, Charles E.  
Ennis, Frederick T.  
Hammond, William P.  
Hoeffel, Donald E.  
Hollan, John V.  
Hoover, Harold E.  
Keltie, James A.  
Kuchar, Keith  
Landon, Edward F.  
Loescher, Richard R.  
Nelson, Robert A.  
O'Brien, James A.

O'Neill, Cornelius B.  
Poling, John P.  
Riley, Arthur E.  
Rudisill, Edward L.  
Ryan, James C.  
Sentiff, Harry J.  
Sperry, Lawrence  
Spohn, William W.  
Stein, Raymond B.  
Sturdevant, Clinton T.  
Summer, Isidor H.  
Troy, Francis J.  
Walsh, Thomas F.  
Wingren, Richard H.  
Zumwalt, Dean E.  
Cowan, John H.

Col. Egan, John M.  
T/S Larmox, Leigh R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

INDEX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Abbreviation-----App. = Appendix)

- Accounting System, 7.12
- Administration, 7.11
  - Branch, 7.8
  - Mail & Records & Classified Files Sections, 7.13
  - of non-Counter-Intelligence Personnel, 7.7
  - Organization, 7.4, 7.5, 7.11, 7.12
- Agency Checks, 1.6, 3.4, 3.8
- Government, 1.8, 6.4,
- Agent, 7.11
  - CIC, 5.3, 5.7
  - Department Security, 6.9
  - Enlisted, 7.7
  - Foreign, 6.1
  - German, 6.11
  - Intelligence, 6.4
  - Resident, 4.5
  - Security, 4.5, 6.8, 6.9
  - Special, 5.5
- Agreement, Secrecy, 3.5, App. C-3
- Air Transport, 5.7
- Alarm Systems, 4.1, 4.10
- Aliens, 3.4
- Area Engineer, 4.5-4.11, 5.1, 5.2
- 5.5, App. A-4
- Army, 4.1, 5.7, 6.13
- Articles, Newspaper, 6.11
- Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2, 7.1
- Audits, 7.13
- Auxiliary Military Police, 1.5, 5.2
- 5.6, 5.7
  
- Barrier Material, 5.6, 4.1, 4.10
- Branch Office Branch, 7.10
  
- Censorship, 1.4, 6.2, 6.14-6.16, 7.10
- Citizenship, Proof of, 3.2
- Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 1.6
- Contractors, 3.6, 4.2, 4.8, 6.7
- Control, Centralized, 4.1, 7.11, 7.12
  
- Convoy, Car, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7
- Correspondence, Classification, 6.3, 6.4, 6.6
- Cost of Security, 1.5, 4.5, App. B-6, App. C-6
- Counter-Intelligence, 1.6, 2.1, App. A-2
- Corps, 5.3, 5.7, 7.2, 7.5, 7.11
- Courier, 14, 5.3-5.8
- Credit Report, 3.8
- Criminal Indices, 3.2, 3.6
  
- Derogatory Information, 3.3
- Development of Project, 2.10
- Documents, Classified, 1.8, 5.3, 5.6, 6.2, 6.5, 6.7, 7.5, App. C-5
- App. B-7
  
- Employees, 1.3, 2.2, 3.1-3.7, 4.5
- End Product, 1.4, 5.7, 7.5
- Enemy, 1.1, 2.1, 6.1, 6.9, 6.11, 6.13
- Equipment, 1.3, 5.6, 5.7, 6.3, 7.5, 7.11
- Europe, Invasion of, 6.11
  
- Facilities, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 3.7, 6.17
- FBI, 1.6, 1.7, 3.2, 3.5
- Federal Law, 1.5
- File, 2.2, 3.4, 3.7, 6.5
- Filter Units, 5.6
- Fingerprints, 3.2, 3.5
- Fire, 1.5, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.12
- App. D-1, App. D-2
- Foreign Affiliations, 3.7
- Freight, 5. 5-5.7
  
- Gates, 4.9
- Groves, L.R., Brig. Gen. 1.2, App. A-1, Maj.Gen. 7.7, 7.12, 7.13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Guards, 4.1, 4.3, 4.6, 5.2, 5.3,  
5.5, 5.7

Guards, 4.3, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9, 5.4

Identification, 6.14, 4.9, 1.4,  
4.1, 4.3

Information, Classified, 6.2,  
App. B-7, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 6.4,  
6.1, App. C-8, 6.7, 3.6, 2.3, 2.1

Inspection, 1.3, 1.5

Intelligence Agents, 6.5

Bulletin #3, 6.10, App. B-8

Bulletin #4, 3.5, App. B-7

Bulletin #5, 6.2, App. B-5

Bulletin #12, 3.7, App. B-5

Intelligence & Security Division,  
1.5, 1.6, 3.5, 4.5, 6.1, 6.7,  
7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, App. A-7

Introduction, 1.1-1.7

Investigations, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6,  
2.1, 2.2, 2.11, 3.2-3.7, 3.5, 6.7  
7.5

Job Classification, 3.4

Jobs, Compartmentalization & Job  
Sites, 6.3

Jurisdiction, 1.5-1.7, 2.1, 3.5

K-25 Plant, 5.7

Lectures, Security, 6.10

"Loose Talk", 1.4, 6.5, 6.8, App. E

Mail & Records Section, 7.13

Manhattan District, 1.1-1.5, 2.1  
3.1, 3.3, 4.10, 5.5, 7.1-7.13

Manual, Protective Security, 4.3,  
App. C-5

Materials, 5.1, 5.3, 4.6, 5.4, 6.3,  
6.4

Navy, 4.1

Notices, Security, 6.10

Oak Ridge, 5.3, 5.7

OCE Circular No. 1070, 7.1,  
App. D-3

OWC Report Forms, 4.5

Cres, Shipment of, 5.6

Organization, 7.1-7.13

Overall Program, 3.6

Pamphlet, No. 32-1, 4.1, App. C-6

Pass, Standard Printed, 4.11,  
App. C-4

Patrol Roads, 4.9

Perimeter Gates, 1.5

Personal History Statement, 3.3  
6.7, App. C-2

Personnel, 2.1-2.11, 3.1-3.7  
6.1, 6.4, 7.5-7.8, 7.11, App. B-4

Plant Inspection & Protection,  
1.3, 1.5, 4.1-4.13, 6.13, App. C-6

Power Supplies, 4.4

Provost Marshal General, 3.3, App. A-3

Public Relations, 6.8

Questionnaire, Personnel Security,  
3.2, App. C-1

Radioactive Materials, 5.3

Records, 3.5, 7.12

Reemployment, 3.6

Regulations, Area, 1.5, 6.2, App. B-7

Review Board, 1.5, 7.9

"Risks", Calculated, 4.8

Safeguards, Physical, 4.1

Securities, Act of 1933, 6.8

Service Commands, 1.6, 3.3, 3.4,  
3.5, 4.2, 4.4, 7.4, App. A-3,  
App. A-2, App. B-2

Shipment, App. A-4, 1.4, 5.1, 5.9  
7.5, 7.6



~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Thirteenth Provisional SED Unit,  
7.7  
Training Films, 6.10

Undercover Capacities, 7.7  
USED Personnel, 6.10

V-E Day, 6.11  
Visitors, Clearance of, 4.10-4.11  
Control, 1.4, 4.2-4.5, 4.6  
Vital Information, 2.1, 4.2, 4.4, 5.2

War,  
Department of, 3.8, 5.1, App. C-8  
Manpower Commission, 6.4  
Water Supplies, 4.9, App. B-2, App. D-2

Y-12 Plant, 5.7, 5.8  
"Y" Site, 1.6, 5.7, 5.8, 7.2

