



Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response

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Summary

The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department's East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union's (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country's nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.

Congress has appropriated increasing counterterrorism assistance for Africa over the past decade, and has demonstrated continued interest in both the nature of the terrorist threat and efforts to counter it through hearings, investigations, and legislation. Questions have been raised regarding

- the level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts;
- the underlying assumptions on which these programs have been developed;
- cooperation between implementing agencies; and
- the extent to which U.S. programs actually prevent or mitigate radicalization, recruitment, and support for violent extremist organizations.

This report provides an overview of current U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs and influence operations in East Africa and explores some of the strategies underpinning them. It also provides a brief description of the evolving terrorist threat in the region. The security cooperation and civil affairs activities of the U.S. military in the region have grown substantially in the past decade, primarily in response to these threats, and the report explores the various roles of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other agencies, in implementing counterterrorism and counter-extremism programs in the region. The report does not address covert or clandestine operations to collect intelligence or capture or eliminate terrorist targets in the region.

Related legislation includes several bills introduced in the aftermath of the July 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303, H.Res. 1538, and H.Res. 1596, as well as S.Res. 573, on Somalia; S. 3757, on Ethiopia; and H.Res. 1708, on Eritrea. For further information, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins; CRS Report RL33911, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, by Ted Dagne; and CRS Report RL34003, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, by Lauren Ploch.

Contents

Overview	1
Congressional Interest.....	3
The Transnational Terrorist Threat in East Africa.....	4
Al Qaeda in East Africa.....	4
The Emergence of Al Shabaab.....	6
A Profile of Al Shabaab Today: Composition, Tactics, and Messaging.....	7
The Current Regional Threat.....	12
The U.S. Response.....	12
Strategic Guidance.....	13
Addressing the “Root Causes” of Violent Extremism.....	15
Counter-Extremism Programs in East Africa	17
Influence Operations/Public Diplomacy Efforts to Counter Extremism.....	17
Financial Sanctions and Travel Restrictions.....	19
Assistance to Counter Terrorist Financing	20
Constraining Terrorist Mobility	21
Efforts to Build Regional Partners’ Counterterrorism Capabilities.....	22
Regional Programs.....	23
The East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSi).....	23
The Safe Skies for Africa Program	26
The Africa Coastal/Border Security Program.....	26
The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)	26
U.S. Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).....	29
Bilateral Programs	33
Select Oversight Issues for Congress.....	36
Policy and Program Coordination of Regional Counterterrorism Programs.....	36
Human Rights Concerns.....	37
U.S.-Somalia Policy: Possible Counterterrorism Implications.....	38
Security Assistance Issues	39
Measuring the Success of Counterterrorism Efforts	40
Looking Ahead	41
Acronyms	42

Figures

Figure 1. Map of East Africa	11
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Tables

Table A-1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Djibouti.....	46
Table A-2. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Djibouti	46
Table A-3. State Department and USAID Assistance to Ethiopia.....	49

Table A-4. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Ethiopia..... 49

Table A-5. State Department and USAID Assistance to Kenya..... 52

Table A-6. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Kenya..... 52

Table A-7. State Department and USAID Assistance to Somalia 55

Table A-8. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Somalia 56

Table A-9. U.S. Support to AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces 56

Table A-10. State Department and USAID Assistance to Tanzania 58

Table A-11. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Security Assistance to Tanzania..... 58

Table A-12. State Department and USAID Assistance to Uganda..... 60

Table A-13. U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Security Assistance to Uganda..... 61

Table B-1. East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI)..... 64

Table B-2. Assistance Provided through Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA 65

Appendixes

Appendix A. Country Counterterrorism Profiles 43

Appendix B. Regional Program Funding 64

Appendix C. Related Hearings of the 111th Congress 66

Contacts

Author Contact Information 67

Overview

In 1998, Al Qaeda (AQ) conducted its first U.S.-documented terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring over 4,500 in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.¹ Al Qaeda and related groups have executed subsequent terrorist attacks in East Africa, including the first known attack by an American suicide bomber in Somalia in October 2008. On July 11, 2010, 76 people, including one American, were killed in near simultaneous bombings in Kampala, Uganda. Al Shabaab, a Somali Islamist² insurgent group with ties to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility, marking the group's first successful attack outside Somali territory. Al Shabaab has threatened attacks in Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and has threatened other countries and Western targets in East Africa.

Al Shabaab's threats mirror those issued by Al Qaeda. In an audio message addressed to Somalis released in April 2009, Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden stated, "the war which has been taking place on your soil for these years is a war between Islam and the International Crusade," and called on Somalis "to continue their steps on the path of Jihad."³ According to the U.S. State Department, the continued presence of Al Qaeda operatives in the region and Islamist militants in Somalia poses the greatest threat to U.S. and allied government interests in the region, where porous borders remain vulnerable to the movement of terrorists and illicit materials. The reported recruitment efforts of Al Shabaab in the United States have also raised concern regarding threats to the homeland and the involvement of U.S. citizens in terrorism activities overseas.

East African countries have faced threats from a variety of groups that employ terrorist tactics. U.S. counterterrorism policy is focused on transnational AQ operatives in the region and on those local groups, like Al Shabaab, that share a common extremist ideology with Al Qaeda and whose success may benefit Al Qaeda's aims. The United States implements a range of overt, covert, and clandestine programs to counter the transnational terrorist threat in this region. These efforts are part of what the Bush Administration referred to as the "Global War on Terror," and what the Obama Administration calls "a global campaign ... to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qa'ida and its affiliates."⁴ Debate over their focus, guiding strategy, tactics, and effectiveness continues.

This report explores U.S. measures to prevent, deter, and preempt terrorism in East Africa, focusing on the response to threats posed by violent Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qaeda

¹ "Terrorism" is defined in 22 USC § 2656f, as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Violent extremism is a broader term that may encompass acts against both non-combatant and combatant targets.

² The term "Islamist" here refers to those who advance a formal political role for Islam, through the implementation of Islamic law, political mobilization through a religious party, or the creation of a religious system of governance.

³ Open Source Center (OSC), "UBL Calls on Somalis to Continue Jihad Against 'International Crusade,'" GMP20090319076005, March 19, 2009. The Arabic word "jihad" is derived from a verb that literally means to struggle or strive. Ideological material produced by Al Qaeda and other violent Islamists reflects their understanding of jihad as an obligation to defend Islam and Muslims from perceived non-Muslim aggression and, in some cases, offensively attack non-Muslims, or Muslims who oppose the creation of governments that rule according to Islamic law and principles. These groups support a range of strategic goals, priorities, and tactics. This report uses the terms "jihad" and "jihadist" to refer to groups and individuals whose statements imply they share Al Qaeda's understanding of the concept of jihad as a call to arms and who advocate or use violence to further local or transnational Islamist causes.

⁴ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010.

and Al Shabaab. It briefly examines the evolving threat posed by these groups in the region, and discusses the evolution of policies guiding the U.S. response. The report describes both regional and bilateral programs designed to counter the influence and activities of violent extremist organizations. These include not only security assistance and efforts to build regional capacity to counter terrorist financing and transit, but also efforts to address the root causes of extremism. As Congress continues to monitor these programs, questions for potential oversight may include the following:

What is the context, focus, and scope of U.S. counterterrorism programs in East Africa?

- How serious is the threat posed by violent extremist organizations in East Africa to U.S. interests? In what countries are U.S. and host nation targets most vulnerable to terrorist attack? How are U.S. resources matched against the threat?
- Given finite U.S. resources, how much should be devoted to countering terrorist threats in East Africa compared to those elsewhere in the world?
- What are the drivers of violent extremism in East Africa? How might they differ from those in other regions that have experienced increased terrorist activity?
- To what extent are U.S. counterterrorism programs in East Africa designed to address the specific context of the countries in which they are implemented?

How are counterterrorism programs coordinated?

- Which agencies currently implement counterterrorism programs? Are they best placed to do so? How has interagency coordination of these programs evolved? What challenges remain?
- To what extent are counterterrorism programs accompanied by effective communications and public affairs strategies to explain their aims? How are U.S. counterterrorism efforts perceived by host country populations?
- Is there a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy guiding counterterrorism-related development and civil affairs interventions?
- How are counterterrorism programs balanced between military and law enforcement or judicial assistance, and between security assistance and “development” programs, such as efforts to counter extremist ideologies?

Are these programs effective in countering or preventing extremism? Could they be improved?

- What metrics are used to evaluate these programs?
- How effective are partner nations’ efforts in disrupting or reducing the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa? To what extent have partner governments conducted operations that demonstrate enhanced counterterrorism capabilities attributable to U.S. training or assistance?
- To what extent, if at all, should efforts to counter violent extremism in the region incorporate initiatives to reach out to non-violent Islamists to marginalize violent extremists? What are the potential costs or dangers of such a strategy?
- To what extent do counterterrorism programs potentially conflict with other U.S. regional policy goals, such as the promotion of human rights and democracy?

Congressional Interest

In November 2001, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa declared in a hearing on Africa and the War on Global Terrorism, “It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region can be ignored, especially not Africa.”⁵ In that hearing, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, who is now the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, testified that Africa was “the world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism.” Congress has maintained an active interest in terrorist threats over the past decade, and has focused increasingly on the growing capabilities of AQ affiliates.⁶ During the past year, multiple committees held hearings on the evolving threat of Al Qaeda and its global network, and witnesses have drawn attention to the activities of Al Shabaab and its relationship with Al Qaeda (hearings are listed in **Appendix C**). Congress has also focused on Al Shabaab’s recruitment efforts in the United States. In January 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a majority staff report on Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, which warned, “the potential threats from Yemen and Somalia pose new challenges for the United States and other countries fighting extremism worldwide.”⁷

Political instability and terrorist activities in and emanating from Somalia have been the subject of increasing focus. Members have expressed concern with the ongoing humanitarian crisis and security situation, and in 2010 the chairman of the Senate Africa Subcommittee voiced his concern that “we still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties our programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be grasping at straws to ‘do something’ while our national security increasingly hangs in the balance.”⁸ He introduced S.Res. 573, calling for the development of a comprehensive strategy to address Somalia’s multiple crises. Several bills were introduced in the aftermath of the 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303, which calls upon the Administration to formulate a comprehensive strategy and work with African partners to address the terrorist threat in the region; H.Res. 1538, which condemns the bombings and calls for the Administration to work with partners to address the security threat emanating from Somalia; and H.Res. 1596, which condemns Al Shabaab for its conscription of child soldiers. Related legislation, H.Res. 1708, introduced in September 2010, calls for Eritrea to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its alleged ties to Al Shabaab.

Congress has explored the U.S. response to terrorist threats, including those in East Africa, through a range of hearings and oversight activities. The Armed Services Committees have examined the various strategies and programs to counter violent extremism, and the Senate has scrutinized U.S. outreach to Muslim communities overseas. In its most recent defense authorization, H.R. 5136, the House Armed Services Committee expressed concern that the Department of Defense (DOD) had not focused sufficient effort on messaging programs aimed at delegitimizing violent extremism, and that despite a number of programs focused on the mission, they were not well coordinated or supported. The committee found that “the Department must first understand the ideological environment, including how these groups leverage digital media,” and recommended increased funding. The committee has also sought to expand or enhance

⁵ Hearing by the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, “Africa and the War on Global Terrorism,” November 15, 2001.

⁶ See also CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

⁷ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb*, January 21, 2010.

⁸ Senator Russ Feingold, “Statement on the Continuing Crisis in Somalia,” *Congressional Record*, June 7, 2010.

several counterterrorism authorities, including the “Section 1208” program, which allows DOD to provide assistance to foreign forces facilitating U.S. Special Operations Forces operations to counter terrorism; various counter-ideology initiatives, including efforts to facilitate DOD understanding of the cultural and ideological contexts of radicalization; and the “Section 1206” train and equip program, which has been used to build capabilities in East Africa. Members of Congress have also expressed concern that the U.S. government may not be adequately assessing long-term risks associated with providing training and military equipment for counterterrorism purposes to countries with poor records of human rights, rule of law, and accountability.⁹

U.S. military and security assistance efforts in East Africa have drawn the attention of the 111th Congress. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee has investigated the activities of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its sub-regional presence in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Senate committees have expressed support for the task force’s regional engagement activities, but have requested clarification on CJTF-HOA’s future role in Africa (see “Regional Programs”).¹⁰ The House of Representatives, in its FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136) has requested a report on activities implemented by AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA to counter violent extremism in Africa. Congress also continues to conduct oversight of security assistance to regional counterterrorism partners.¹¹

The Transnational Terrorist Threat in East Africa

Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have had a presence in East Africa for almost 20 years, although the extent of their operations there has varied over time. The region’s porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and, in some cases, state complicity in terrorist activities, combined with the almost 20-year absence of central authority in Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. Some countries in the region have served at various times as terrorist safe havens, staging areas, or transit points. U.S. and allied interests have been periodically targeted, prompting the United States to enhance security measures in the region and engage regional partners to strengthen their own counterterrorism capabilities.

Al Qaeda in East Africa¹²

Sudan became a safe haven for Islamic extremist groups in the early 1990s, when the Sudanese government actively supported the activities of terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden used Sudan as a base of operations beginning in 1992 to support various *jihad* efforts around the world, before he was expelled in May 1996.¹³ During this time Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming and

⁹ See, e.g., Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” November 17, 2009.

¹⁰ Committee Report 111-135 for S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act, 2010; and Committee Report 111-226 for S. 3615, the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2011.

¹¹ See, for example, S. 3757, on Ethiopia.

¹² For more information, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

¹³ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), pp. 163-198; and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, 2004, pp. 57-70.

training the Somali factions responsible for killing 18 U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993, although the extent of AQ ties to the actual perpetrators is unknown.¹⁴ Bin Laden's stated grievances against the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and against American culture have been widely documented, but according to some analysts, the AQ leader and his colleagues also saw the U.S. military's engagement in Somalia as a threat to Al Qaeda's presence in the region.¹⁵ Sudan's refusal to hand over individuals implicated in an AQ-linked plot to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak led to U.N. Security Council sanctions in April 1996.¹⁶

To the east, along the Somali coast, another militant Islamist movement, *Al Ittihad Al Islamiya* (AIAI, or Al Ittihad), Arabic for "the Islamic Union," grew in prominence with the goal of establishing a pan-Somali Salafist emirate.¹⁷ Somali fighters who had joined the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan began to return in the late 1990s and helped to establish AIAI training facilities. Al Ittihad's ties with Al Qaeda operatives have been subject to debate, but several of its former commanders would later establish the militia known as Al Shabaab.¹⁸ Al Ittihad, which suffered internal divisions and military pressure from various Somali militias, was forced repeatedly to relocate its operations. One AIAI faction moved into Luuq, a Somali town near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, where they strictly enforced their interpretation of Islamic law, or *sharia*. Segments of Al Ittihad were also active in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. By 1993, the group was reportedly receiving AQ training and organizational and logistical support.¹⁹ In 1995, members of Al Ittihad were implicated in attacks against civilian targets in Ethiopia's two largest cities. The Ethiopian military retaliated, defeating AIAI through a series of battles in 1996-1997. Some former Al Ittihad leaders continued to press their political aspirations through clan-based *sharia* courts, and some reportedly maintained ties with Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda's initial interest in Somalia, according to declassified internal AQ documents, was as a possible alternate to Afghanistan as a base of operations.²⁰ Senior AQ military commander Mohammed Atef, also known as Abu Hafs, made several trips to the country, beginning in 1992. AQ operatives reportedly established training bases in Ras Kamboni, a Somali town near the Kenyan border, and other Somali sites, as well as in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, but operational challenges appear to have led Al Qaeda to view Somalia as more useful as a transshipment point for operations elsewhere in the region, particularly Kenya.²¹

Reports suggest that Al Qaeda began planning for a large-scale terrorist attack against American targets in East Africa in 1993, scouting for "soft" targets and establishing a cell in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi.²² Bin Laden's personal secretary, Wadih el Hage, and a Comorian citizen, Fazul

¹⁴ U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, *United States v. Usama bin Laden*, 6 November 1998.

¹⁵ Wright, *The Looming Tower*, op. cit., pp. 169-172. See also The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point's Harmony Project, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, 2006, p. 39.

¹⁶ See Wright, op. cit., pp. 213-214. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1054 imposed diplomatic and travel sanctions on Sudan for its failure to extradite suspects in the assassination attempt and for its continued support of terrorist activities.

¹⁷ CRS Report RL33911, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, by Ted Dagne; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Somalia's Islamists*, Africa Report No. 100, December 12, 2005.

¹⁸ For information on Al Ittihad – Al Shabaab links, see Roland Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab," *Journal of East African Studies*, November 2009.

¹⁹ ICG, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, Africa Report No. 45, May 2002.

²⁰ The CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit., pp. 38-40, 138, 189-190.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *The 9/11 Commission Report*, op. cit., p. 68. Some reports suggest that the Al Ittihad leadership had prior knowledge of the attacks. ICG, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, Africa Report No. 95, July 11, 2005.

Abdullah Mohammed (also known as Harun Fazul), who had trained with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, were key members of the Nairobi cell, which operated under the guise of a humanitarian relief organization. On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were struck by near-simultaneous truck bombs. Several cell members, including el Hage, were subsequently apprehended; el Hage and four others are now serving life sentences in U.S. prison, and a fifth alleged conspirator, Tanzanian citizen Ahmed Ghailani, is standing trial in New York.

According to one account, Fazul, who remains among the FBI's list of most wanted terrorists, later became involved in alleged AQ money laundering efforts through the so-called "blood diamonds" trade,²³ and in 2001 he assembled operatives in Mogadishu to begin planning the next attack. He was briefly detained by Kenyan police in July 2002 on robbery charges, but reportedly escaped before they realized his identity. On November 28, 2002, two Kenyans fired surface-to-air missiles—reportedly purchased in a Mogadishu arms market and smuggled into Kenya by Fazul—at an Israeli airliner departing Mombasa. The operatives missed their target, but their Kenyan accomplices drove a truck bomb into a nearby hotel, killing 15 and injuring 80. Kenyan police apprehended several suspects, but Fazul and co-conspirator Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, labeled by some U.S. officials as the top two AQ leaders in East Africa, remained at-large.²⁴ According to some sources, Fazul subsequently became a senior leader in Somalia's nascent Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), while Nabhan reportedly trained UIC militants.²⁵ U.S. officials believe that Fazul is now the top AQ leader in Somalia, a role he assumed after Nabhan's death.²⁶

The Emergence of Al Shabaab

In the absence of central authority in Somalia in the 1990s, a network of local Islamic courts emerged, establishing a level of law and order in parts of the country that was welcomed by many Somalis.²⁷ The courts' leadership varied in their ideological approaches, representing diverse views on political Islam, Somali nationalism, and clan identity. *Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin* ("Mujahidin Youth Movement" or MYM, hereafter Al Shabaab), a militia loosely affiliated with the courts, emerged in 2003-2004 under young former AIAI commanders who had fought in Afghanistan.²⁸ Unlike the courts and their individual militias, which were largely clan-based and nationalist in their agenda, Al Shabaab's leadership drew from across clans, ascribing to a broader irredentist vision of uniting Somali-inhabited areas of East Africa under an Islamist caliphate.

Al Shabaab's vision for Somalia ran counter to the political transition proposed under the auspices of the nascent Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia.²⁹ The secular TFG

²³ Douglas Farah, *Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).

²⁴ U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, "A New Beginning: U.S. Policy in Africa," September 15, 2009.

²⁵ The CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit.

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, available at <http://www.state.gov>.

²⁷ Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab," op. cit. See also CRS Report RL33911, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, by Ted Dagne.

²⁸ Abdirahman Ali, *The Anatomy of al-Shabaab*, <http://www.scribd.com>, accessed July 8, 2010; Christopher Harnisch, *The Terror Threat From Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab*, The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2010.; and Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab."

²⁹ The TFG was established in August 2004 as a result of a two-year peace process backed by the sub-regional organization known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations. See Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare*, ENOUGH Strategy Paper, September 2008.

was intended to preside over a five-year period culminating in elections, but it faced opposition from clan, militia, and Islamist leaders, as well as internal struggles, and was initially unable to establish itself in Mogadishu, moving instead to the city of Baidoa. Tensions in Mogadishu rose between the Union of Islamic Courts and a group of warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), reportedly supported by Ethiopia and the United States for their purported efforts to capture suspected AQ operatives.³⁰ By mid-2006, UIC militia had taken Mogadishu and some surrounding areas, and by year's end they occupied much of southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab's influence in the UIC grew during this time.³¹

Efforts to mediate between the UIC and the TFG failed as divisions within the UIC grew, culminating in a declaration of jihad against Ethiopia by UIC hardliners, led by former AIAI leader Hassan Dahir Aweys. In December 2006, at the TFG's behest, the Ethiopian military advanced on Mogadishu; within weeks, the UIC militias were defeated. The United States, which viewed the UIC's armed wing to be associated with Al Qaeda and its political leadership unwilling to address concerns regarding alleged links, was supportive of Ethiopia's operations.³² The United States also conducted air strikes in early January 2007 against suspected AQ operatives reportedly fighting alongside UIC militia.³³

A promised AU peacekeeping force for Somalia was slow to materialize, and in subsequent months an increasingly complex insurgency emerged, feeding on historic anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis and a lack of TFG capacity to secure territory without Ethiopian military support.³⁴ A message broadcast in January 2007 from prominent AQ leader Ayman Al Zawahiri calling for jihadists to support Somali efforts to attack Ethiopia may have contributed to insurgent recruitment.³⁵ Intense fighting between Somali insurgents and TFG and allied Ethiopian forces forced over 700,000 from the city, and human rights abuses were reportedly widespread.³⁶ Some moderate UIC leaders commenced talks with the TFG in early 2007; others, including Al Shabaab, employed guerilla tactics in what many analysts suggest has been an effort to lure the TFG and Ethiopian (and later AU) forces into a "war of attrition."³⁷

A Profile of Al Shabaab Today: Composition, Tactics, and Messaging

Al Shabaab today is a hybrid of a locally focused Islamist insurgent group and a transnational terrorist affiliate of Al Qaeda. Reports on Al Shabaab's leadership, organizational structure, and membership vary. The group is nominally led by Ahmed Abdi Godane (a.k.a. Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed or "Abu Zubeyr") and a *shura* (council) composed of both Somalis and foreigners.³⁸ The U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia has referred to Al Shabaab as "a sprawling coalition of

³⁰ Jeffrey Gettleman, "The Most Dangerous Place in the World," *Foreign Policy*, February 16, 2009.

³¹ Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab," op. cit., p. 391.

³² Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Prepared Statement for the House Armed Services Committee, March 5, 2008; and Menkhaus, "Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America," Prepared Testimony for the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, March 11, 2009.

³³ Jim Garamone, "Aircraft Attack Al Qaeda Haven, Ike Moves Off Somalia," January 9, 2007.

³⁴ In late January 2007, two years after East African Heads of State initially signaled their intent to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia, the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of an AU mission to Somalia.

³⁵ OSC, "Al-Zawahiri Urges Somalis, Muslims To Fight Ethiopian Forces," FEA20070105069027, January 5, 2007.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *So Much to Fear: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia*, December 8, 2008.

³⁷ ICG, *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State*, Africa Report No. 147, December 23, 2008.

³⁸ See also CRS Report RL33911, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, by Ted Dagne.

jihadists, business interests and clan militias,” but some recent analyses suggest that the group has become more centralized under the control of a group of hardliners, with significant influence from foreign operatives.³⁹ Several known AQ operatives are reportedly part of this group, including Harun Fazul. Reports estimate Al Shabaab to have several thousand fighters, including at least several hundred foreign fighters, reportedly predominantly from Kenya, but also from Tanzania, Sudan, Bangladesh, Chechnya, and Pakistan, as well as from Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Among the fighters from the United States is a Lebanese-American from Alabama, Omar Shafik Hammami, now known as Abu Mansour al-Amriki, who appears in the group’s propaganda videos and is believed to be one of its commanders.⁴⁰

Several of Al Shabaab’s top leaders and some of its fighters have fought and trained abroad with terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and other foreign groups have reportedly provided training, equipment, and support, and U.N. reports suggest that the group has benefited from support from Iran, Syria, Libya, and Eritrea.⁴¹ Al Shabaab reportedly relies on some financial and logistical support from segments of the Somali diaspora, including sizeable communities in Dubai and the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi. Much of its revenue also appears to come from control of infrastructure (e.g., ports and roads) and taxes on business revenues in Somalia.

Al Shabaab employs extremist intimidation and terror tactics designed to instill fear in the population. Its so-called religious police mete out severe punishments, including floggings, amputations, stoning, and beheadings, for violations of its strict interpretation of Islamic law.⁴² Al Shabaab has conducted kidnappings, shootings, and targeted political assassinations, not only of TFG officials but also of journalists, civil society activists, and aid workers.

Al Shabaab’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers is a new dimension in the context of Somali conflict, tactics of urban warfare that have been successfully used by terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. U.N. experts suggest that the IEDs used by Al Shabaab have become increasingly sophisticated, as have the tactics for their use, and the planning and execution of the suicide bombings of AMISOM targets indicate a level of expertise reminiscent of AQ operations.⁴³ In 2007, Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for at least five successful suicide bombings.⁴⁴ In 2008, Somalia ranked fourth globally, behind Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, in the number of fatalities incurred by terrorist attack.⁴⁵ Among the attacks attributed to Al Shabaab was the coordinated suicide bombing of five targets, including the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), in Somaliland and Puntland in 2008. Today, Al Shabaab is considered by U.S. officials to be one of the most deadly violent extremist groups in the world, responsible in 2009 for the second-highest number of deadly attacks by Sunni extremists after the Taliban.⁴⁶ According to

³⁹ U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)*, S/2010/91, March 10, 2010. See also ICG, *Somalia’s Divided Islamists*, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Andrea Elliot, “The Jihadist Next Door,” *New York Times*, January 27, 2010. See CRS Report R41416, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol.

⁴¹ For information on these allegations, see the reports of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia.

⁴² Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia*, April 19, 2010.

⁴³ U.N. Security Council, S/2010/91, op. cit.

⁴⁴ By some accounts, the first suicide bombing in Somalia occurred in September 2006. Al Shabaab began to claim responsibility for such attacks in March 2007. For a timeline, see Harnisch, *The Terror Threat From Somalia*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ National Combating Terrorism Center (NCTC), *2008 Report on Terrorism*, April 30, 2009.

⁴⁶ NCTC, *2009 Report on Terrorism*, April 30, 2010.

some reports, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may have shared chemical bomb-making capability with Al Shabaab.⁴⁷

Terrorist tactics are not the only tools in Al Shabaab's arsenal. The group employs a combination of conventional military tactics and guerilla-style attacks against TFG and AU forces, as well as against rival insurgent groups. Al Shabaab forces use automatic weapons, grenades, and mortars. Al Shabaab has also used guided surface-to-air missiles known as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), reportedly shooting down a cargo plane in Mogadishu in 2007 with a sophisticated SA-18 missile, which can differentiate between target aircraft and other heat sources.⁴⁸ Al Shabaab is also reported to have less advanced SA-7s, the type of missile used against the Israeli airliner in Mombasa. Yemeni arms networks are thought to provide many of the weapons used in Somalia today, and Al Shabaab reportedly receives most of its supplies through the port of Kismayo, which it controls, and other smaller southern ports, as well as overland from allies in Puntland.⁴⁹ The group has also allegedly acquired TFG arms, either by force or sale. The group's insurgent tactics have been largely successful in gaining territory: Al Shabaab currently controls much of southern and parts of central Somalia, as well as parts of Mogadishu.

Radio and Internet have been important propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment tools for violent extremist groups, and Al Shabaab has proven adept at strategic communications. The group maintains an official website (formerly <http://www.alkataib.net> or <http://www.alkataib.com>) with videos and statements posted online in Somali, Arabic, and English, to reach an international audience. Al Shabaab also uses Internet chatrooms to solicit contributions. Within Somalia, Al Shabaab has taken over local FM radio stations in areas under its control. Alleged abuses by TFG and Ethiopian forces, reported U.S. support for Ethiopian military operations, and civilian casualties purportedly resulting from U.S. airstrikes or from retaliatory TFG, Ethiopian, and AU military strikes have all been exploited by Al Shabaab to support its narrative.

Al Shabaab uses the Internet to emphasize its commitment to global jihad, and to pledge fealty to Al Qaeda, which serves both its fundraising and recruitment goals. In 2008, after a U.S. missile strike killed Al Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro, the group's leaders made multiple pronouncements of their commitment to the global jihad movement, and subsequently announced a revenge campaign against U.S. and Western targets in Somalia.⁵⁰ In August 2008, Mukhtar Robow, one of Al Shabaab's top leaders, publicly acknowledged the group's growing ties to Al Qaeda, saying, "We are now negotiating to unite as one. We will take our orders from Sheik Osama Bin Laden because we are his students."⁵¹ He also threatened, for the first time on record, Al Shabaab attacks against targets outside Somalia, warning, "once we end the holy war in Somalia, we will take it to any government that participated in the fighting against Somalia or gave assistance to those attacking us." At that time, some U.S. officials, while recognizing linkages between the groups, publicly dismissed the idea that Al Shabaab was following orders

⁴⁷ Greg Miller, "CIA Sees Increased Threat from al-Qaeda in Yemen," *Washington Post*, August 24, 2010.

⁴⁸ U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1724 (2006)*, S/2007/436, July 18, 2007; and U.N. Security Council, S/2010/91, op. cit.

⁴⁹ See the reports of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia.

⁵⁰ OSC, "Somalia's Mujahidin Youth Movement Spokesman Discusses Progress of Jihad," GMP20080527873001, May 8, 2008; and OSC, "Somalia: MYM Commander Shaykh Al-Zubayr Sends Message to Global Jihad Leaders," AFP20080603410001, June 1, 2008. Foreign fighter Omar Hammami (Abu Mansour al-Amriki) also expressed Al Shabaab's commitment to global jihad in January 2008, OSC, "Abu-Mansur al-Amriki' Condemns 'Courts,' Praises MYM Views, Bin Ladin," GMP20080213106001, February 7, 2008.

⁵¹ Edmund Sanders, "Conditions May Be Ripe for Al Qaeda to Gain in Somalia," *Los Angeles Times*, August 25, 2008.

from Al Qaeda. Other public expressions of allegiance followed, and in September 2009, Al Shabaab released a video expressing greetings to Osama Bin Laden, in which Al Shabaab leader Godane speaks of awaiting guidance from the AQ leader.⁵² The extent to which, if at all, Al Shabaab is acting based on commands from AQ's central leadership remains unclear, but it is apparent that the groups have a reciprocal relationship. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to Al Shabaab as a "junior partner" to Al Qaeda in early 2010.⁵³ U.S. officials have also raised concern with reports of increasing collaboration between Al Shabaab and AQAP in nearby Yemen, which is estimated to host several hundred thousand Somali refugees.⁵⁴

Al Shabaab recruitment and fundraising in the United States is of increasing concern to U.S. officials. As the State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism* notes, the number of Americans seeking to become operatives for foreign terrorist groups has increased in recent years, as has the prominence of U.S. citizens as advocates of violent extremism.⁵⁵ Recruitment among the Somali diaspora has drawn particular attention from U.S. law enforcement. Al Shabaab's ability to recruit from the broader American Muslim community has also drawn concern.⁵⁶ The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that the number of persons believed to have left the United States for Somalia in recent years is comparatively larger than the number who have gone to other conflict zones.

⁵² OSC, "Somalia: Mujahidin Youth Movement Issues 'O Usama, Here We Are' Video," AFP20090922410001, September 20, 2009.

⁵³ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, March 25, 2010.

⁵⁴ "U.S. Weighs Expanded Strikes in Yemen," *Wall Street Journal*, August 25, 2010.

⁵⁵ For more information, see CRS Report R41416, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, by Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol.

⁵⁶ U.S. District Court, *United States of America v. Omar Shafik Hammami*, September 24, 2009.

Figure 1. Map of East Africa



Source: CRS.

The Current Regional Threat

U.S. counterterrorism officials assert that the AQ threat is becoming “more widely distributed and more geographically and ethnically diversified among affiliates and among those who are inspired by the AQ message.”⁵⁷ Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and both Al Qaeda and AQAP, combined with reports of increasing influence by hardliners within Al Shabaab and an apparent willingness and ability to deliver on threats, have contributed to a renewed focus by policymakers on radicalization throughout East Africa. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson called the 2010 Kampala bombings a “wake up call” for the international community and argued that Al Shabaab’s ability to conduct suicide bombings outside Somalia indicates that threat has risen.⁵⁸ Uganda has charged more than 30 people in connection with the attacks, including 14 Ugandans, 10 Kenyans, 6 Somalis, 1 Rwandan, and 1 Pakistani, according to news reports.⁵⁹ The two suicide bombers were believed to be Kenyan and Somali. A Ugandan self-proclaimed Al Shabaab member accused of leading the attacks told journalists that he was motivated by “rage against the Americans,” in part for U.S. support of the TFG.⁶⁰ The suspected involvement of a significant number of non-Somali East African nationals in the bombings suggests that violent extremist organizations are successfully recruiting and networking in East Africa, raising possible policy implications for U.S. policies toward the region.

The U.S. Response

The U.S. government views the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates to be of increasing concern. The National Security Strategies (NSS) of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations have each repeated concerns about terrorist activities in Africa, and the most recent National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, identifies three areas on the continent—Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel—as places where AQ affiliates have attempted to establish safe havens.

While the State Department has consistently over the last decade classified the terrorist threat in East Africa to be the most serious in Africa, official assessments of the severity of the threat to U.S. interests have varied over time.⁶¹ In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John McConnell testified before Congress that while Al Qaeda had, in late 2006, established “a footprint in Somalia that had the prospects of being formidable,” Ethiopian operations and related U.S. efforts had subsequently kept the group “tamped down or on the run.”⁶² He did not address allegations that the Ethiopian military intervention could strengthen Islamist insurgents by providing an example of U.S.-supported military intervention in a Muslim country. One year later, the new DNI, Dennis Blair, testified that the capabilities of terrorist groups in East Africa were

⁵⁷ Statement by U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin, “Confronting a Resilient al Qaeda: The United States Strategic Response,” at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 21, 2010.

⁵⁸ Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson and Ambassador to the AU Michael Battle, July 27, 2010.

⁵⁹ Ben Simon, “Uganda Charges 32 Over Bombings,” Agence France Presse (AFP), August 19, 2010.

⁶⁰ “Kampala Bombing Mastermind Says Motivated by ‘Rage Against Americans,’” AFP, August 12, 2010.

⁶¹ See the State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2000-2009*, as well as the annual congressional testimony of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on current and future threats to U.S. national security.

⁶² DNI John M. McConnell, Remarks during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, February 27, 2008.

increasing, and in early 2010 he suggested that Al Qaeda in Iraq veterans might be redeploying to Yemen and East Africa.⁶³ Blair expressed the view that while most Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda operatives in the region would remain “focused on regional objectives in the near-term,” some might try to “redirect to the Homeland some of the Westerners, including North Americans now training and fighting in Somalia.” According to the State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism*, the threat these groups pose remains largely focused on targets in the region:

Al-Shabaab’s leadership was supportive of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and both groups continued to present a serious terrorist threat to American and allied interests throughout the Horn of Africa.... Somalia remained highly unstable, and a permissive environment for terrorist transit and training. Foreign fighters, a small number of AQ operatives, and likeminded indigenous Islamic extremists continued to pose a threat to regional security.

The State Department warns, however, that the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on December 25, 2009, by a Nigerian national trained in Yemen “underscored that we cannot expect al-Qa’ida affiliates to be focused solely on the near enemy—the governments in their own countries and regions—or American facilities in their immediate surroundings.”⁶⁴ The head of British intelligence has called Somalia a “seedbed for terrorism,” comparing it to Afghanistan in the 1990s and suggesting that suspected AQ plots targeting Britain are increasingly originating in Somalia and Yemen, rather than Pakistan.⁶⁵ Interpol’s Secretary General has expressed similar concerns, noting the number of Somali militants who have trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁶⁶

Strategic Guidance

U.S. counterterrorism doctrine today is based on the idea that terrorism has become “a preferred tactic for ideological extremists around the world.”⁶⁷ The U.S. government response to terrorism has evolved in the past twenty years, from a primarily law enforcement response to one guided by a broad U.S. strategy “to lead an international effort to deny violent extremist networks the resources and functions they need to operate and survive.” The Department of Defense (DOD) defines counterterrorism as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.”

While the Obama Administration no longer uses the phrase “war on terror,” a phrase coined under the Bush Administration, the 2010 National Security Strategy declares that the United States is “at war” with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.⁶⁸ The U.S. government conducts an array of direct, “tactical counterterrorism” efforts, what President Barack Obama’s ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism refers to as “taking individual terrorists off the street.”⁶⁹ These include direct

⁶³ DNI Dennis C. Blair, Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2009; and Prepared Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Assessment,” *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, op. cit.

⁶⁵ William Maclean, “Threats from Somalia, Yemen Rise: Britain’s MI5,” Reuters, September 17, 2010.

⁶⁶ “Interpol Head Warns of Somali Threat,” Associated Press, September 30, 2010.

⁶⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, Joint Publication 3-26, November 13, 2009.

⁶⁸ U.S. military efforts formerly referred to as part of the “global war on terror” or GWOT are now referred to as overseas contingency operations (OCO). Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror: Is Given New Name,” *Washington Post*, March 25, 2009.

⁶⁹ Daniel Benjamin, “USG Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism,” Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, March 10, 2010.

military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to find, capture, or kill senior leaders of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and covert actions by other government agencies.

According to open sources, the United States has conducted at least seven military strikes against AQ targets in Somalia since early 2007. These include multiple air strikes in January 2007 against suspected AQ operatives and an alleged terrorist training camp in southern Somalia; June 2007 naval strikes targeting foreign fighters in the Puntland region; and March 2008 naval strikes reportedly targeting suspected AQ operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, wanted in connection with the 1998 embassy attacks and the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab's top military commander Aden Hashi Ayro and several senior deputies were killed in a U.S. cruise missile attack in central Somalia on May 1, 2008. More recently, on September 14, 2009, U.S. Special Forces killed Nabhan, reportedly in a commando raid by helicopter, in southern Somalia.

While tactical measures are an important element of counterterrorism efforts, President Obama asserts that "a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone."⁷⁰ Al Shabaab is both a terrorist and an insurgent group, and its aims are both military and political. U.S. military doctrine suggests that the success or failure of an insurgency is often dependent on the support of the local population.⁷¹ U.S. counterterrorism policy today therefore aims to "go beyond the law enforcement, intelligence, and military efforts that thwart" terrorists, by seeking to "shape and constrain the environments where terrorists operate."⁷² The Bush Administration issued a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), first released in 2003 and updated in 2006, which outlined a framework for protecting the United States and its allies through efforts to disrupt and disable terrorist networks. The 2006 NSCT laid out four near-term priorities:

- Prevent terrorist attacks by attacking terrorists and their capacity to operate and travel, and by defending potential targets;
- Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies;
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and
- Deny terrorists physical, legal, cyber and financial safe havens.

The NSCT also highlighted democratization as a longer-term method for combating terrorism. President Obama's first National Security Strategy outlined the new Administration's strategic vision to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat" Al Qaeda and its affiliates, repeating the near-term priorities listed above and stressing a need to build "positive partnerships" with Muslim communities. The current Administration's counterterrorism policy emphasizes counter-radicalization efforts, an area in which officials suggest U.S. efforts have "lacked sufficient focus."⁷³ The Administration stresses that such efforts must be customized to address the specific political, economic, and social factors that may radicalize individuals in a particular community.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ President Barack Obama, "Remarks on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009.

⁷¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, October 5, 2009. See also David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," November 30, 2004.

⁷² U.S. Department of State, "Foreword," *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, op. cit.

⁷³ Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Robert F. Godec, "U.S. Counterterrorism Policy," June 30, 2010.

⁷⁴ Ibid. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *The National Intelligence Strategy*, August 2009.

Addressing the “Root Causes” of Violent Extremism

U.S. counterterrorism programs in East Africa, as more generally, are influenced by a range of studies on radicalization and methodologies for countering that phenomenon.⁷⁵ While the bulk of U.S. development assistance to Africa aims broadly to contribute to increased peace and security, good governance, and improved social and economic development, a subset of aid in East Africa has a counter-extremism component that seeks to address what the Obama Administration refers to as the “upstream” factors of radicalization, aiming to foster conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. These programs often target communities deemed “at-risk” that may not be reached by other development programs.⁷⁶ A study conducted for USAID, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between drivers that contribute to recruitment into violent extremist organizations; community support or tolerance of their activities; or an enabling environment conducive to their operations. Such studies also stress that counter-extremism programs, a subset of counterterrorism efforts, should be designed with an understanding of country and community-specific contexts in which radicalization occurs, because the “root causes” of violent extremism may vary considerably from one country to the next. USAID has used its study, along with regional- and country-specific studies on drivers and risk factors, in the development of such programs in Africa.

Many early assumptions about the socioeconomic, political, and cultural drivers of violent extremism (VE) have been reexamined in recent years and are important for evaluating appropriate responses to violent extremism in East Africa.⁷⁷ As the USAID *Guide* points out, “the vast majority of those affected by the underlying conditions to which VE often is ascribed do not, in fact, resort to violence – and it is not clear at all that the few among them who do are motivated primarily by the conditions in question.”⁷⁸ While underlying social and economic conditions, such as poverty and unemployment, may not directly correlate to an increased risk of violent extremism, they may nonetheless be indirect drivers, exacerbating cultural and ideological factors that extremist groups may exploit. Rhetoric used by violent extremist groups generally does not reference poverty or other underlying conditions, according to the *Guide*, but rather focuses on “issues of identity, existential threats, perceived humiliation, cultural domination and oppression.”

Socioeconomic Drivers

The paths toward radicalization among Muslim communities in East Africa vary, but some common themes emerge. Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab both successfully use the “victimization narrative” to recruit and elicit support, manipulating perceptions of societal discrimination in countries like Kenya, where many Muslims express a sense of social, cultural, political, and

⁷⁵ These studies focus on “drivers of violent extremism.” See, e.g., Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, USAID, February 2009; Denoeux and Carter, *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*, USAID, October 2009; the CTC at West Point, *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities*, February 14, 2006; and Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds.), *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, (Cambridge) 2008.

⁷⁶ USAID Senior Deputy Assistance Administrator for Africa Earl Gast, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” Prepared Statement for the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 17, 2009.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Scott Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. II, Issue 5, March 2008; and Keefer and Loayza, *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, op. cit.

⁷⁸ Denoeux and Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, op. cit.

economic exclusion from the rest of the country. Kenya's Muslim population is concentrated largely in Coast and Northeastern Provinces, and in certain Nairobi neighborhoods. Social service delivery and infrastructure investments have been historically poor in these areas, in comparison with other parts of the country. Middle East-based Islamic charities reportedly provided important social services, including education and health care, before the government closed some of these enterprises as part of its response to the 1998 embassy bombings and the September 2001 World Trade Center attacks.

Boredom, idleness, and thrill-seeking impulses among youth may also be push factors for extremism, and, when combined with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations stemming from a lack of job opportunities in many East African countries, may make some Muslim youth more susceptible to recruitment by groups like Al Shabaab. As one anthropologist argues, "today's most virulent terrorism is rooted in rootlessness and restlessness."⁷⁹

Extreme economic deprivation can, in some cases, become a factor for recruitment into violent extremist groups or community tolerance of their presence, particularly, as in the case of Somalia, when combined with the state's inability to provide security or access to justice.⁸⁰ Al Shabaab has reportedly made some inroads among Somali communities by establishing a greater level of public order and security in areas under its control, although many Somalis consider its draconian interpretation of Islamic law to be foreign and its punishments too severe. The group has engaged in various public works projects, repairing bridges and roads. Reports suggest, however, that, unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan, it has made little effort to govern, leaving local authorities to provide basic government services.⁸¹ For potential recruits, Al Shabaab reportedly offers salaries of between \$100-\$300 per month, along with rations and medical care, and it offers assistance to fighters' families if they are killed. In a country with few wage-earning opportunities, the incentive of a monthly income may be enough to draw some young men into the group's rank-and-file. Al Shabaab also reportedly forcibly recruits men into service.

Cultural and Political Drivers

East African Muslims have been increasingly exposed to extremist religious ideologies, and the concept that Islam is under attack by the West has become a prominent factor pushing many toward extremism. Al Qaeda messaging plays to this perception, comparing Western or Western-supported interventions in Muslim countries like Somalia or Iraq to the military campaigns of Christian crusaders in the Middle Ages. Al Shabaab's narrative of fighting against America and its purported Christian "proxy," Ethiopia, on behalf of Islam resonates among some in the region. Some East African Muslims also perceive domestic anti-terrorism efforts to be part of a Western conspiracy against Muslims. Kenyan Muslim groups strongly criticized the arrest and alleged torture and rendition of Muslims to Ethiopia, Somalia, and Guantanamo Bay in 2007, and they maintain that the Kenyan government has committed acts to humiliate Muslims under the guise of counterterrorism.⁸² Muslim communities in Uganda have expressed similar concerns in regard to the actions of counterterrorism forces in their country (see "Human Rights Concerns" below).

⁷⁹ Scott Atran, "Pathways To and From Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-Based Field Research," Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2010.

⁸⁰ Denoeux and Carter, *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming*, op. cit.

⁸¹ Harnisch, *The Terror Threat From Somalia*, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

⁸² See, e.g., a 2007 letter presented to the Kenyan Minister of Defense by Muslim leaders in Mombasa, included in the CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit.

The deportation of radical Muslim clerics and scholars from Kenya has also drawn censure, as evidenced in January 2010 by Kenyans, some waiving Al Shabaab flags, rioting in Nairobi in response to government efforts to deport a radical Jamaican imam. Subsequent police raids in Nairobi neighborhoods reportedly engendered widespread resentment among Muslims there.⁸³

Some analysts suggest that political drivers, such as political repression, gross human rights violations, and public perceptions of government corruption and impunity, which are high in East Africa, may fuel grievances that provide motivation to support or participate in violent extremism. According to the *USAID Guide*, “governments that engage in gross human rights violations are particularly prone to pushing individuals into terrorist groups,” even if an individual has been affected only indirectly, for example, when a friend or relative has been the victim of torture or disappearance. The extent to which the United States is seen by local communities as an “enabler” of such actions complicates U.S. counter-extremism efforts.

Counter-Extremism Programs in East Africa

U.S. efforts to counter the spread of violent Islamist extremism in East Africa include development interventions that aim to reduce identified drivers and may also, or instead, aim to improve local attitudes toward the United States or domestic authorities. Some of this programming may be formally classified by USAID as aiming broadly to foster peace and stability, rather than having a specific counterterrorism focus, but officials argue the goals are ultimately linked. Relevant programs include those aimed at fostering opportunities among at-risk Muslim youth for employment and positive social interaction, and those focused on the political and economic inclusion of minorities and marginalized populations. Some programs have a geographic focus (e.g., the Kenyan coast), and some aim to distribute assistance across communities and, among ethnic Somalis, across clans. Outreach to the Somali diaspora is increasingly being emphasized. Where possible, USAID guidance stresses, the need for community involvement in the identification and implementation of projects in an effort to take into account a potential mistrust of outsiders’ intentions.

Influence Operations/Public Diplomacy Efforts to Counter Extremism

The U.S. government seeks to influence the attitudes and perceptions of foreign populations in support of U.S. policies and interests through a range of so-called “deliberate” communication efforts. Some programs aim specifically to counter violent extremist organizations’ recruitment and financing efforts, while other public diplomacy initiatives may contribute to these ends indirectly.⁸⁴ These efforts, sometimes referred to as “influence operations,” are an important component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, aiming to undermine terrorist groups’ credibility among local populations. They target a variety of audiences, including both “key influencers” such as community and religious leaders, and vulnerable populations. They may sometimes be

⁸³ “Somalia-Kenya: Raids and Rancour,” IRIN, January 27, 2010.

⁸⁴ In 2007, the Bush Administration issued the first National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication and established an office within the State Department to coordinate U.S. messaging efforts to counter extremist ideology. The Obama Administration’s National Framework for Strategic Communication is outlined in a March 16, 2010 report to Congress. For further discussion of current debates surrounding U.S. public diplomacy efforts, see CRS Report R40989, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues*, by Kennon H. Nakamura and Matthew C. Weed, and CRS Report RL31787, *Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues*, by Catherine A. Theohary.

implemented discretely or indirectly, aiming to counter victimization narratives and communicate respect for Islam and indigenous customs.

The Obama Administration has stressed a strategy of communicating the United States' vision through broader engagement with Muslims around the world, including those in Africa.⁸⁵ This approach, now outlined in the 2010 NSS, was articulated in a June 2009 speech by President Obama in Cairo "to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims" through a relationship not narrowly defined by counterterrorism objectives. Countering the violent extremist ideology of Al Qaeda nevertheless remains a key priority in some of the Administration's communication and engagement efforts. In May 2010, the Administration created a new Global Engagement Directorate within the National Security Staff to coordinate U.S. outreach efforts for national security purposes, including those related to countering terrorism. In July 2010, based on recommendations from the Secretary of State, the intelligence community, and with the support of DOD, the State Department began the establishment of an interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which will operate under the direction of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The State Department engages foreign populations through a variety of multimedia and print materials, and through outreach by U.S. embassies. The State Department's *America.gov* website, for example, which is available in seven languages including Arabic, provides information on American society and U.S. policies, and includes features like "A Multicultural Ramadan," which explores the cultural heritage of American Muslims. It also produces publications such as *Being Muslim in America* and provides information on U.S. policy toward Africa and engagements with African communities. The State Department has opened American Corners throughout East Africa in partnership with host country institutions like the Zanzibar Public Library in Tanzania to expand access outside capital cities to information on the United States. In addition to its two American Corners in the predominantly Muslim cities of Mombasa and Lamu, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi operates an American Reference Center, which is open to the public and provides information resources and conducts outreach events. Outreach efforts have included opening the center to librarians from Kenya's madrassas. The center works with other embassies in the region to develop similar programs. The embassy's Public Affairs office has two outreach staff who work on Muslim and Somali issues, and the office produces a Swahili publication, *Maisha*, which is distributed to key opinion leaders throughout the country. The State Department also sponsors exchange programs in which African Muslim leaders participate.

In some countries, State Department public diplomacy programs may be augmented by the deployment of U.S. Special Operations Command Military Information Support Teams (MIST).⁸⁶ These teams, which typically consist of personnel from U.S. Army Special Operations Command, reportedly receive specialized training, including language and cultural familiarity. Some observers suggest, however, they may not have enough understanding of the region to communicate effectively. As of July 2010, MIST teams were operating in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to support the U.S. embassies' Public Affairs offices.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ See Charles Corey, "Obama's Cairo Speech Resonates with Africans, State's Carson Says," *America.gov*, June 11, 2009; and Remarks by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John O. Brennan, "A new Approach to Safeguarding Americans," The White House, August 6, 2009.

⁸⁶ MIST teams may contribute to a variety of embassy goals, including not only CVE, but also support for good governance and anti-smuggling/trafficking media campaigns.

⁸⁷ Information provided to the author by U.S. Africa Command.

AFRICOM's initiative to counter violent extremist ideologies in West and North Africa, Operation Objective Voice (OOV), has yet to expand into East Africa, due to budget constraints. The program is designed to leverage media capabilities to repudiate extremist ideologies through such programs as the website *Maghreb.com*, targeted at audiences in the Maghreb. AFRICOM received authority to expand OOV programs into East Africa in 2010.

Other U.S. government efforts to communicate with East African communities include the Voice of America (VOA), which, according to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), targets its broadcasts in Africa to areas prone to terror incidents, genocide, or failed states. VOA aims to serve as a reliable and authoritative source of news and to transmit U.S. policy views through radio "editorials" and other programs, and the BBG identifies countering global extremism as part of its strategic guidance. VOA broadcasts in seven regional languages, in addition to English and French. In 2009, VOA began offering news via text message in Swahili for East and Central Africa. VOA established its Somali service in 2007, and it transmits FM radio broadcasts from Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Al Shabaab has reportedly accused VOA's Somali Service chief, who is a Somali national, of abandoning his Islamic faith and using propaganda to mislead Somalis.⁸⁸

Financial Sanctions and Travel Restrictions

Programs to prevent terrorists from financing their operations, including technical assistance to build the capacity of allies, are a key component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The Treasury Department leads U.S. efforts to detect, track, and prosecute those involved in terrorist financing, coordinating with international partners, including those in East Africa. On September 23, 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, significantly expanding the scope of U.S. sanctions against terrorists and terrorist organizations. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has subsequently frozen several hundred million dollars in terrorist-related assets and currently designates over 500 individuals as terrorists or part of terrorist support networks. The groups implicated in terrorist activities in East Africa that are subject to U.S. financial sanctions or travel restrictions include the following:

- Al Qaeda—designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Section 1(b) of E.O. 13224;⁸⁹
- Al Shabaab—designated as an FTO on February 28, 2008, and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist; and
- Al Ittihad and the Lord's Resistance Army—listed in the "Terrorist Exclusion List," which includes entities and individuals linked to terrorism. Their associates are prohibited from entry into the United States pursuant to Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001.

Also among the entities that the United States has targeted for terrorist financing in East Africa is the Saudi-based Al Haramain Foundation (AHF), an Islamic charity that had branches throughout the East Africa region in the 1990s, including in Somalia.⁹⁰ AHF's East Africa branches were

⁸⁸ "Al-Shabab Denounces VOA Somali Service Chief," VOA, April 28, 2010.

⁸⁹ E.O. 13224 blocks property and bans transactions with those who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

⁹⁰ The Somali AHF branch was designated under E.O. 13224 on March 11, 2002. Other AHF branches in the region were subsequently designated in 2004. AHF is also designated under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267.

linked by the Treasury Department to Al Qaeda and Al Ittihad, and its Kenya branch was involved in the planning of the 1998 embassy bombings.⁹¹ AHF's Somalia office was linked to Al Barakaat Bank (designated under E.O. 13224 on November 7, 2001), a Somali-based Islamic finance institution with branches around the world that was found to be a major source of material, financial, and logistical support to Bin Laden and terrorist groups. Efforts to cut off sources of terrorist financing have, on occasion, inadvertently fueled anti-American sentiment in East Africa, cutting funding for charitable causes such as health clinics and orphanages.⁹²

In addition to the sanctions imposed against Al Shabaab and several of its identified leaders in E.O. 13224, President Obama declared a national emergency to address the security threat emanating from Somalia in April 2010 with E.O. 13536, blocking the assets of those determined to have engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. This includes acts that threaten the TFG or AMISOM, obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or support acts of piracy.⁹³ Several of these individuals were also targeted for U.N. sanctions in April 2010 under paragraph 8 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008) on Somalia and Eritrea. U.N. sanctions on Al Qaeda and related entities and individuals, outlined in Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and subsequent resolutions, target two Somalis, Hassan Al Turki and Hassan Dahir Aweys, along with Harun Fazul, for sanctions. Resolution 1267 lists Al Ittihad as an entity associated with Al Qaeda; Al Shabaab is not currently named in the resolution.

U.S. counterterrorism policy has also sought to isolate and punish foreign governments found to support terrorist groups. The Clinton Administration placed sanctions on Sudan for its support of terrorism in 1993, and the country remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, despite a reported improvement in counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.⁹⁴ This designation makes Sudan subject to a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, prohibitions on economic assistance, and various financial and other restrictions.⁹⁵

Assistance to Counter Terrorist Financing

The Treasury Department considers efforts to develop financial sector oversight capabilities within African states necessary for preventing the transnational financing of terrorism. Many African banking systems remain vulnerable to terrorists and other criminals, and African governments often lack resources to track the flow of funds, conduct oversight of remittance systems, or freeze and confiscate terrorist-related assets. The Somali diaspora often uses *hawalas*,

⁹¹ The CTC at West Point, *Al Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit., p. 92. The entirety of AHF was designated under E.O. 13224 on June 19, 2008.

⁹² ICG, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, op. cit.

⁹³ E.O. 13536 identified one entity, Al Shabaab, and eleven individuals for sanctions, including top Al Shabaab figures Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohamed (a.k.a. Abu Zubeyr or Godane), Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (a.k.a. Shangole), and Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud; militia leader and alleged Al Shabaab arms supplier Mohamed Sa'id "Atom"; former Al Ittihad leaders Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al Turki, who is reportedly allied with Al Shabaab, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, now head of Hizbul Islam; as well as top Hizbul Islam figure Yasin Ali Baynah. An Eritrean official and a leading Yemeni arms dealer are also included in the list. Godane, Al Turki, and Aweys had been previously named in E.O. 13224 and were already subject to sanctions. Godane, along with Mukhtar Robow and Issa Osman Issa, who is accused of firing at the Israeli airliner in Mombasa in 2002, were added to E.O. 13224 in November 2008 as senior Al Shabaab leaders.

⁹⁴ The sanctions against Sudan are pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. For information on Sudanese counterterrorism cooperation, see the State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

⁹⁵ CRS Report RL33574, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, by Ted Dagne.

informal money transfer systems, to remit funds to family members in Somalia. The U.N. Sanctions Committee on Somalia has reported on the use of such remittance networks to support Somali insurgent groups and suggests that increased international monitoring of hawalas has made them a less attractive financing option for such groups. New forms of financing have emerged, including breaking down larger sums into smaller amounts to avoid detection; using couriers; or converting funds into commodities such as rice and sugar that are later reconverted into cash.⁹⁶ Reports suggest that the Somali diaspora in the Nairobi neighborhood of Eastleigh uses an overland courier system to transmit funds to family members, and potentially armed groups. Al Shabaab also raises funds inside Somalia, drawing revenue from ports, checkpoints, and various commercial and criminal enterprises.⁹⁷ Al Shabaab's control of Kismayo port, for example, has reportedly proven lucrative, drawing over \$1 million quarterly in port-use charges.⁹⁸

The United States has sought to internationalize regulatory requirements on terrorist finance.⁹⁹ The Treasury Department supports and liaises with regional organizations, including the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which promotes international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and its regional counterpart, the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

The State Department coordinates U.S. assistance efforts to strengthen the ability of foreign partners to detect, investigate, and combat terrorist financing through its Counter-terrorism Financing (CTF) program and related initiatives.¹⁰⁰ Such efforts are often conducted by or in collaboration with Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance and the Department of Justice, as well as other federal agencies, and may include support to partner nations for the development of legislation on terrorist financing and other regulatory reforms, as well as training on such topics as cash courier interdiction and oversight of charitable activities. The CTF program has also supported the establishment of financial intelligence units (FIUs) in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. A U.S. attorney with expertise in terrorist financing serves as a Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) in Nairobi, training prosecutors and providing technical expertise to countries in the region. In Kenya, for example, the RLA assisted in the drafting of anti-money laundering legislation passed in 2009 that established mechanisms for detecting and seizing illicit proceeds, including the creation of a Financial Reporting Center and an Asset Recovery Agency.

Constraining Terrorist Mobility

The U.S. government maintains a range of watchlists, including the Terrorist Screening Database and the No Fly List, which have drawn increased attention from Congress in the wake of the failed terrorist attack on a U.S. airliner in December 2009.¹⁰¹ The State Department provides

⁹⁶ U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008)*, S/2008/769, December 10, 2008.

⁹⁷ For more information, see CRS Report R41004, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress*, by John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler.

⁹⁸ U.N. Security Council, S/2008/769, op. cit.

⁹⁹ The U.N. Security Council originally established sanctions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 1999 with Resolution 1267. Subsequent U.N. Security Resolutions imposed further sanctions on terrorist-related entities.

¹⁰⁰ CTF is funded through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs (NADR) account. Programs may also be funded through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account.

¹⁰¹ For more information, see CRS Report RL33645, *Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening*, by William J. Krouse and Bart Elias.

assistance to improve foreign governments' watchlisting capabilities through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), a global initiative created in the aftermath of the 1998 embassy bombings to provide countries with a system for identifying and apprehending suspects who might attempt to flee after a terrorist attack. Under this program, funded under the NADR account, the U.S. government provides select partner nations with a computer system known as PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System) to facilitate immigration processing and to exchange information with State Department officials on suspected terrorists attempting to travel through their countries. Beginning in FY2010, the TIP program has added biometric enhancements to overcome individuals' efforts to disguise their identities. In East Africa, Kenya is considered, along with Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen, to be a high priority partner within the TIP/PISCES program, and Djibouti, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda are also participants. The PISCES system is operational at sea and airports throughout the region.

Efforts to Build Regional Partners' Counterterrorism Capabilities

The U.S. government views the development of capable and professional security forces, entities under civilian control that respect the rule of law and human rights, as an increasingly important contribution to peace and security in Africa, and considers strengthening partner governments' security institutions to be a "crucial part" of efforts to defeat terrorist groups.¹⁰² The text box below provides an overview of U.S. security cooperation programs. Specific counterterrorism-related assistance in East Africa is described in subsequent sections. Issues related to the scope and focus of these programs are addressed in the "Select Oversight Issues for Congress" section.

¹⁰² General William E. Ward, "U.S. Africa Command: 2010 Posture Statement," Prepared Statement for the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, March 9-10, 2010; and DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, op. cit.

State Department and DOD Security Assistance Programs

The U.S. government provides foreign security forces, both military and civilian, with training and equipment to build their capacity to counter terrorist threats through an array of programs and funding authorities. The State Department, which has traditionally taken the lead on security assistance policy, oversees the three primary security assistance programs: the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). IMET provides training at U.S. military schools and other training assistance on a grant basis, and among other topics introduces participants to elements of U.S. democracy, such as the American judicial system, legislative oversight, equality issues, and commitment to human rights. A subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E-IMET), provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice for military and civilian personnel. FMS allows countries to purchase U.S. defense articles, services and training, and the FMF program allows foreign militaries to acquire such items through grants.

The State Department also provides security assistance through the following funding accounts: Economic Support Funds (ESF); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs (NADR); and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Under the department's NADR account the United States provides training and equipment to foreign law enforcement and other security officials to minimize vulnerability to terrorism through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.

Congress also has granted the Department of Defense a number of authorities to conduct security cooperation activities with foreign forces. One of DOD's signature security assistance programs is the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which provides counterterrorism training to foreign military officers and defense and security officials. Congress gave DOD expanded authorities for a significant new temporary train-and-equip program in Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 109-163) to address lengthy administrative and procurement delays in similar State Department-funded programs. This "Section 1206 authority," which requires the concurrence of the Secretary of State on programs, was designed to improve the capabilities of foreign forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stabilization operations with U.S. forces. DOD also provides counternarcotics training to foreign militaries and law enforcement through "Section 1004" and "Section 1033" authorities regularly extended in annual defense appropriations.

Some foreign militaries benefit from training through interaction with U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) through Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), or through engagements authorized under Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, which authorizes the reimbursement of foreign forces for support to U.S. counterterrorism operations. DOD also conducts educational and academic exchange programs through several regional centers, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and DOD's service academies. The National Guard also engages through its State Partnership Program (SPP), in which U.S. states' and territories' National Guard units pair with foreign countries to conduct a variety of security cooperation and civil affairs activities. In addition to these training and exchange programs, DOD transfers excess defense articles (EDA) and drawdowns of in-stock defense articles to certain foreign countries and international organizations.

Regional Programs

The East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII)

In 2003, the Bush Administration announced the creation of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), a State Department program to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.¹⁰³ Funded through the FMF, PKO, INCLE, NADR, ESF, and Development Assistance (DA) accounts, EACTI focused on improving partner countries' police and judicial counterterrorism capabilities, as well as coastal and border

¹⁰³ While Eritrea was initially identified as a partner nation, participation in EACTI ceased when USAID closed operations there in 2005 at the request of the Eritrean government.

security. In its first two years, FY2003 and FY2004, EACTI received over \$100 million in funding, approximately half of which was allocated toward border and coastal security.¹⁰⁴

In FY2009, the State Department launched a new regional program, the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSIS), to replace EACTI and, according to the State Department, build on the best practices of an interagency counterterrorism program in West Africa.¹⁰⁵ EARSIS aims to foster regional counterterrorism efforts, build partner capacity, and diminish support for violent extremism. Partner countries include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Yemen is considered an EARSIS candidate.

Many counterterrorism programs that began under EACTI have continued under EARSIS. Some military programs, including those with partner naval forces, have been conducted in cooperation with the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. Assistance provided under EACTI and/or EARSIS includes the following:

- **Border Security**—Under EACTI, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti received training and equipment, including tactical vehicles, with FMF and PKO funds to strengthen border patrols. Aid provided through EACTI and subsequently EARSIS to strengthen immigration and border controls for Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda has included training and equipment with INCLE and NADR funds to aid in the identification, monitoring, and interdiction of terrorists at border posts. It has also included efforts implemented by the International Organization for Migration to provide migration management training and technical assistance. With TIP funds, PISCES systems have been installed at air and seaports in the region, and Kenya and Tanzania have received Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) aid. Airport security training and equipment has also been provided through the Safe Skies for Africa program.
- **Coastal Security**—Under EACTI, FMF and PKO funds supported coastal security initiatives in Djibouti, Kenya, and Eritrea, such as maritime training and equipment for navies and coastal patrols, and joint exercises with U.S. forces. PKO funding for such efforts in Djibouti and Kenya continues under EARSIS.
- **Police Training**—EACTI provided training, communications equipment, vehicles, and spare parts to partner countries' police forces and supported training for law enforcement officials with INCLE funding at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana with an expanded counterterrorism curriculum. Training and equipment for police continues under EARSIS.
- **Counter-Terrorism Financing**—EACTI provided technical assistance to support the drafting of CTF and money laundering legislation and the development of financial intelligence units (FIUs) in each of the partner countries. A Regional Legal Advisor was deployed to Kenya in late 2004 to

¹⁰⁴ Funding levels for FY2003 and FY2004 were provided by the State Department Bureau of African Affairs. Figures for subsequent years were not available.

¹⁰⁵ The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has also developed eight Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSIs), including an East Africa RSI, to provide a vehicle through which the U.S. government can develop collaborative strategies and pool resources in key areas of terrorist activity. The East Africa RSI is a separate initiative from EARSIS, which is a stand-alone program intended to be implemented by the State Department, USAID, and DOD.

support programming. EACTI funding also supported a U.N. mentor for the East and South Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

- **Interagency Counterterrorism Coordination**—With ATA funds, EACTI supported the establishment of national counterterrorism coordination cells, including joint terrorism task forces, in partner nations to facilitate communication and information sharing among various government entities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Kenya received significant ATA assistance for this effort. Support for joint terrorism task forces in the region continues under EARSII.
- **Counter Extremist Influence**—EACTI DA funds supported a variety of education initiatives in disadvantaged Muslim communities, particularly in areas receiving little or no other donor support. These efforts supported teacher training, community involvement, adult literacy, radio instruction, and access to education for girls. Public diplomacy efforts, funded with ESF, included media outreach to counter anti-American messages from Islamist-controlled media outlets. ESF funding also provided community assistance and self-help grants.

Unlike EACTI, EARSII has its own budget line item. In its first year, EARSII received \$5 million in PKO funds, which were used to train and equip counterterrorism units in Kenya and Djibouti. The State Department subsequently requested \$10 million annually in FY2010 and FY2011 PKO funds for EARSII. As with EACTI, bilateral country accounts are enhanced with regional funding sources, but in comparison to the regional counterterrorism program in West Africa, EARSII remains, to date, a more loosely defined framework (see “Policy and Program Coordination of Regional Counterterrorism Programs” below). The State Department is currently leading an interagency effort to develop an overarching strategy for counterterrorism efforts in East Africa and systematize the EARSII program.

Congress stipulated in Sec. 7070(b) of the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) that at least \$24.7 million be made available for EARSII in FY2010 through the DA, ESF, NADR, and PKO accounts. Congress also required that at least \$10 million in FY2010 ESF funds be allocated to Africa’s two regional counterterrorism programs for projects to be administered by USAID. In FY2009, USAID provided \$5.5 million for youth and cross-border dialogue programs in Kenya and Somalia. FY2010 ESF funds allow an expansion of these programs.

In total, the State Department has allocated approximately \$27.5 million for EARSII in FY2010 (**Table B-1**). This does not include DOD Section 1206 assistance provided to EARSII partner countries (**Table B-2**), or CT-related ESF programs administered by USAID. EARSII PKO funding has supported efforts to improve partner nations’ maritime, border security and air capacities, and has provided training on military intelligence and civil-military operations. AFRICOM nominates projects for PKO funding, which are reviewed and prioritized internally and then submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and finally approved and funded by the State Department. EARSII PKO programs have, to date, been implemented by AFRICOM, its components, and CJTF-HOA. Regional ATA funding supports ongoing programs and is expected to include expanded regional training programs. EARSII also provides funding through NADR’s RSI account, and FY2010 programs include border patrol training, airport screening equipment, and media and community relations training for police officials. INCLE programming modeled after justice sector efforts in the Trans-Sahara region commenced in FY2010 under EARSII.

The Safe Skies for Africa Program

Civil aviation remains a potential terrorist target in East Africa, and four EARS countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) are participants in the Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA) program, managed by the Department of Transportation and implemented by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) in collaboration with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). SSFA, funded by the State Department with ESF and PKO funds, provides technical assistance on airport security, aviation safety, air navigation, and accident/incident investigation.¹⁰⁶ Subsequent to September 11, 2001, the program also began providing airport security equipment. A resident aviation security advisor in Nairobi, Kenya, continues to provide direct advice to East African countries on meeting aviation standards and addressing potential threats. According to the FAA, only one country in the sub-region, Ethiopia, currently meets the international aviation standards needed to qualify for direct flight connections with the United States. Direct flights planned between the United States and Kenya were cancelled in 2009 after the TSA assessed that “security vulnerabilities in and around Nairobi” posed a “credible threat.”¹⁰⁷

The Africa Coastal/Border Security Program

In FY2005, the State Department established the Africa Coastal/Border Security (ACBS) program to complement EACTI and the regional counterterrorism effort in the Sahel with a regional program to enhance partner nations’ ability to monitor and defend their maritime and land borders from terrorist and criminal activities and to protect their fisheries and environmental resources. Funded with approximately \$4 million annually in regional FMF resources and supported periodically with Excess Defense Articles (EDA), the program’s regional approach was designed to allow for multilateral engagement, and technical surveys, training, and equipment, including maintenance and spare parts. The State Department introduced a new regional program, Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS), in FY2009 to address and stabilize regional crises with PKO funds. The State Department has requested \$5.6 million for ACSBS for FY2011.

The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In October 2002, U.S. Central Command developed a joint task force to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region,” and provide a forward presence in the Horn.¹⁰⁸ That mission, described colloquially by U.S. officials as a “capture/kill” effort, corresponded to the 2002 National Security Strategy’s directive of “identifying and destroying the [terrorist] threat before it reaches our borders.” The mission gradually evolved, moving away from deliberate military action toward a security cooperation mandate with an “indirect” approach to counter-extremism.¹⁰⁹ Under AFRICOM, which took command authority for CJTF-HOA in October 2008, the task force’s strategy became more broadly defined as “cooperative conflict prevention,” in line with AFRICOM’s mission to build African nations’ capacity to address destabilizing forces and provide for their own security.

¹⁰⁶ For more information, see GAO, *International Aviation: Federal Efforts Help Address Safety Challenges in Africa, But Could Benefit from Reassessment and Better Coordination*, GAO-09-498, June 2009.

¹⁰⁷ “Kenya Summons U.S. Envoy Over Delta Flights,” Reuters, June 3, 2009.

¹⁰⁸ CJTF-HOA, Fact Sheet, December 2006. For information on the initial deployment, see Commander of CJTF-HOA Major General John F. Sattler, “Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Briefing,” News Transcript, January 10, 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Information provided to the author at Camp Lemonnier by CJTF-HOA in October 2008.

Today, CJTF-HOA does not directly engage terrorists (though other U.S. forces using the base reportedly do), but efforts to counter violent extremism remain a significant focus of its activities. Between 1,500 and 2,500 short-term rotational U.S. military and civilian personnel make up the task force, whose operational area includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan. Countries in close proximity to CJTF-HOA's operating area are considered "areas of interest."¹¹⁰ In addition to its main headquarters at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the task force uses temporary forward operating locations in Kenya and Uganda.

CJTF-HOA personnel train the region's security forces in counter-terrorism and other areas of military professionalization, collect intelligence, conduct civil affairs projects, oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts, and serve as advisors to multilateral peace operations. They also serve as military mentors, including through the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which seeks to build African peacekeeping capacity. The task force also provides military assistance and training to forces deployed in support of AMISOM in coordination with ACOTA. While some of these efforts may not have a specific counter-terrorism focus, DOD officials suggest that they contribute to increased partner capability to respond to terrorist threats and to secure their own territory, thereby reducing the area in which terrorists may be able to operate.

CJTF-HOA also supports humanitarian missions, including the airlift of humanitarian supplies to Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. Some of the task force's humanitarian efforts are intended to be preventative; for example, CJTF-HOA has facilitated the deployment of weather sensors throughout the region in an effort to provide climatology data that could better predict severe weather and limit the effects of flooding and drought. As part of its effort to support AMISOM, CJTF-HOA has worked with non-governmental organizations to provide medical supplies to the Ugandan forces for delivery of assistance to the people of Mogadishu.

CJTF-HOA also conducts civil-military operations throughout East Africa.¹¹¹ These operations include civil affairs and engineering projects such as digging wells and building or repairing schools, hospitals, bridges, and roads. They also include Medical and Veterinary Civil Action (MEDCAP and VETCAP) projects, through which U.S. military medical personnel may provide inoculations or basic health services. Such projects are sometimes conducted in coordination with host government officials or military personnel. These efforts, which some refer to as a campaign to "win hearts and minds," are designed to meet several operational objectives.¹¹² Unlike traditional humanitarian and development aid projects, such activities are generally intended to provide access and/or influence perceptions about the United States and the U.S. military, or its local partners, including local security forces. Depending on the situation, these efforts may be more narrowly focused on establishing an entry point into potentially hostile communities, building local relationships or gaining knowledge about a host population, or simply reducing friction between the population and a U.S. or partner military presence in the area. These operations may also be more broadly intended to "mitigate the underlying stresses that can

¹¹⁰ These include Burundi, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen.

¹¹¹ The U.S. Army defines "civil-military operations" as those which involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.

¹¹² CENTCOM, "CJTF HOA donates supplies to Djiboutian Well Drillers," March 12, 2007. See <http://www.hoa.africom.mil>.

contribute to regional instability” or to address socioeconomic factors seen as the drivers of violent extremism.¹¹³

Some analysts and aid practitioners question whether such programs might be more appropriately coordinated by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization than by the military. Unlike in Iraq or Afghanistan, where the U.S. military has conducted civil affairs efforts in areas often considered unsafe for civilian aid workers, CJTF-HOA projects are conducted in a non-kinetic environment. (CJTF-HOA does not conduct civil-military operations in Somalia.)

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on CJTF-HOA in 2010.¹¹⁴ GAO found that the task force was not conducting long-term assessments to determine whether its activities were having their intended effects. GAO also found that civil affairs projects composed almost 60% of its activities. Despite an apparent focus of effort on civil affairs, some reports suggest that the scope of these projects, combined with a lack of continuity, is insufficient to have a sustainable impact on underlying conditions that may contribute to radicalization. A recent independent study found “no evidence that the hearts and minds projects have achieved the broader strategic objectives of countering terrorism and violent extremism or reducing conflict and improving stability.”¹¹⁵ Other evaluations of CJTF-HOA’s civil affairs projects have noted some positive contributions.¹¹⁶ With some exceptions, U.S. embassy personnel report that many of the projects in Kenya have brought positive public attention to the United States and the U.S. military, although their impact on radicalization among local populations is unclear.¹¹⁷

CJTF-HOA operations, estimated at \$80 million in FY2010, have been funded separately from other AFRICOM activities.¹¹⁸ GAO has questioned the availability and source of long-term funding for the task force. As GAO also notes, CJTF-HOA’s activities are funded through a complex rubric of DOD and State Department authorities and accounts, which complicates planning for a sustained level of cooperation activities with African partners. AFRICOM is conducting a DOD-directed review of CJTF-HOA to determine its future role. AFRICOM’s commander has stressed that the task force’s efforts to counter violent extremism and its location in Djibouti “remain of utmost importance given the rising regional threat from Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in Yemen.”¹¹⁹ Some question whether CJTF-HOA should narrow its activities to focus solely on counterterrorism, or maintain and possibly broaden its security cooperation mandate in line with AFRICOM’s mission. Given this debate, the task force’s mandate, structure, and resources are under scrutiny, from both Congress and DOD.

¹¹³ Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Vicki Huddleston to the GAO, April 6, 2010.

¹¹⁴ GAO, *Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force*, GAO-10-504, April 2010.

¹¹⁵ Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya*, Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, 2010.

¹¹⁶ For example, efforts to develop a coastal “community watch” program in Kenya in collaboration with co-located State Department ATA trainers resulted in the formation of an early warning system that has reportedly led to the apprehension of suspected pirates by the Kenyan Navy and maritime police.

¹¹⁷ Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds?*, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ The Navy provides about 75% of the task force’s budget, which has been funded through supplemental overseas contingency operations requests. In FY2010, AFRICOM’s contribution to CJTF-HOA is estimated at \$4 million, from its Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) accounts.

¹¹⁹ General Kip Ward, “U.S. Africa Command 2010 Posture Statement,” Prepared Statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on March 9-10, 2010.

While CJTF-HOA is a military task force, like AFRICOM, it stresses a “whole-of-government” approach to its efforts, but challenges remain. CJTF-HOA personnel serve relatively short deployments to the region, lasting between several months and one year, which provides little time to gain cultural understanding or familiarity with the task force’s programs or interagency procedures, or to build relationships in the region.¹²⁰ Partly in response to these concerns, the task force established a Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team (SCRAT) composed of social scientists and civilian specialists who aim to provide regional and functional expertise and promote greater cultural understanding among CJTF-HOA personnel. The SCRAT, established in September 2009, provides input into CJTF-HOA planning, and is developing evaluation materials to improve the task force’s tools for program assessment.

U.S. Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

In March 2010, the force commander of the AU Mission in Somalia stated that “the struggle for peace in Somalia represents the frontline in the international fight against the global terrorist network, Al Qaeda.”¹²¹ Three months later, Al Shabaab threatened revenge against Uganda and Burundi for the alleged killing of Somali civilians by their AMISOM forces.¹²² East African Heads of State subsequently termed the conflict in Somalia “not a conflict among the Somalis but between the people of Somalia and international terror groups.”¹²³ Six days later, simultaneous bombs in Kampala killed more than 70 civilians, fueling concerns that AU troop contributors would recall their forces, leaving Somalia’s nascent security forces and occasionally allied militias as the last line of defense for the fragile and divided TFG. Instead, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni reiterated his country’s commitment to AMISOM, arguing “just as the world came to regret leaving Afghanistan to its own fate in the 1990s, it would be a historic mistake to expect the war-weary Somali people to tame this global menace on their own.”¹²⁴ President Obama has publicly supported AMISOM’s efforts, warning, “what we know is that if Al Shabaab takes more and more control within Somalia, that it is going to be exporting violence the way it just did in Uganda.”¹²⁵

The United States has provided logistics support, equipment, and pre-deployment training for AMISOM troop contributors at the request of the African Union since 2007. That assistance has totaled an estimated \$230 million to date, and does not include funds provided via U.N. contributions to AMISOM. The United States does not provide direct funding support to the African Union for AMISOM. Training has been provided through the State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and by CJTF-HOA, and has been complemented by training from France. Equipment and logistical support has been provided by the State Department, and communications training has been provided through AFRICOM. In January 2009, the United Nations authorized a logistics support package for AMISOM through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1863, but the United States continued to provide most logistics

¹²⁰ GAO, GAO-10-504, op. cit.

¹²¹ AMISOM Force Commander Maj. Gen. Nathan Mugisha, “Somalia is Frontline in Global Fight Against Violent Extremism,” *AMISOM Bulletin*, Issue 2, March 15, 2010.

¹²² “Somali Islamist Leader Urges Attacks on AU Forces for ‘Killing Civilians,’” AFP, July 5, 2010.

¹²³ Communiqué of the 15th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of States, July 6, 2010.

¹²⁴ Yoweri Museveni, “Somalia’s Hour of Need,” *Foreign Policy*, August 25, 2010.

¹²⁵ The White House, “President Obama Interviewed by the South African Broadcasting Corp.,” July 13, 2010.

support for much of the year while the U.N. established its support contracts. U.S. support now focuses on equipment, training, and troop transport.

The Mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia

Debate within the international community continues regarding the scope of AMISOM's mandate and capabilities, and the extent to which they allow the force to counter the terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab. AMISOM's current mandate is outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1772 (2007) as: (1) to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage, and protection of those involved in the political dialogue; (2) to provide protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out government functions and to provide security for key infrastructure; (3) to assist in the re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces; (4) to contribute, as requested and within its capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian aid; and (5) to protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.¹²⁶ The African Union most recently renewed AMISOM's mandate in January 2010, for a period of 12 months, and the U.N. Security Council gave its authorization under Resolution 1910 (2010). The African Union is now seeking to increase its troop levels and has requested that the U.N. Security Council impose a no-fly zone and naval blockade on Somalia.

ACOTA has directly trained over 8,400 Ugandan troops for AMISOM deployment, composing four of the six Ugandan battle groups that have gone to Somalia; training for a seventh group began in August.¹²⁷ One of the six battle groups was trained by an ACOTA-trained Ugandan cadre. ACOTA has also trained all eight of the Burundian battalions (approximately 7,000 troops) that have deployed with AMISOM, and is now training two additional battalions. Under State Department guidance, ACOTA training for AMISOM troop contributors aims to deliver "high-end" U.N. Chapter Seven Peace Enforcement with counterinsurgency training.¹²⁸ In addition to the core peacekeeping training package, AMISOM contributors have received training on military operations on urban terrain; enhanced counter-IED techniques; obstacle identification and clearance; enhanced force protection; enhanced combat convoy training; combat medical procedures; and counter-insurgency tactics. Troop contributors have requested cultural awareness training, and they are provided with basic language training to facilitate interoperability.

AMISOM has been constrained by a shortage of troops and equipment, including mobility and force protection assets. Reports also suggest that the force would benefit from improved medical, intelligence, and special forces capabilities. Despite troop pledges from several African countries, many lack the equipment to participate. Others lack the political will. In the aftermath of the 2010 Kampala bombings, IGAD and the African Union decided to add an additional 2,000 soldiers to AMISOM's deployment, then estimated at just over 6,000 troops, to bring the mission up to its

¹²⁶ Following a January 2007 AU decision to deploy a mission to Somalia, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1744, authorizing the AU mission now known as AMISOM.

¹²⁷ The ACOTA program provides Peace Support Operations training, including light infantry and small unit tactics, and focuses on support for national peacekeeping training centers and on training African troops who can in turn train other African units. ACOTA is implemented by the State Department Bureau of African Affairs, in collaboration with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and AFRICOM. DOD provides small military teams for special mentoring assistance to ACOTA training events. ACOTA partners receive a training package based on U.N.-approved Programs of Instruction that is tailored to meet the needs of recipients' capabilities and needs.

¹²⁸ This term refers to operations whose mandates are authorized by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and are often categorized as "peace enforcement" rather than peacekeeping. Interview by author with the ACOTA Program Office, August 3, 2010. For more information on U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, see, e.g., U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, October 5, 2009.

authorized troop strength of 8,100.¹²⁹ Current force size is estimated at 7,200. The African Union has called for the force to be increased to 20,000 troops.

The African Union has stated that support from the international community “remains below the optimal level required to sustainably turn around the political and security situation in Somalia,” and has repeatedly called on the U.N. Security Council to transform AMISOM into a U.N. peacekeeping operation.¹³⁰ The United Nations contributes financial support to AMISOM troop contributors through a trust fund. In September 2010, the U.N. Special Representative on Somalia reported that U.N. resources to reimburse troop contributors were insufficient (in part due to donor-imposed restrictions on expenditures for AMISOM’s military component), and that troop allowances were consequently being funded by the European Union.¹³¹ Troop contributors have called for a more predictable payment system, and the African Union has requested that its personnel be paid at a level comparable to U.N. peacekeepers to incentivize deployment.

AMISOM’s deployment to Somalia is currently limited to key strategic locations in Mogadishu, including the airport, the seaport, State House (Villa Somalia), and AMISOM installations. The U.N. Secretary-General and humanitarian officials have reported a high percentage of civilian injuries from mortar attacks and artillery shelling by all parties to the Somali conflict, and the Secretary-General has expressed particular concern about child casualties caused by shelling of civilian areas and “indiscriminate return fire” by TFG and AMISOM troops.¹³² Al Shabaab has incorporated these allegations into its narrative, and reports suggest that its soldiers deliberately fire mortars from civilian areas to provoke return fire that will result in civilian casualties. AMISOM officials have expressed regret that civilians have been caught in the cross fire in Mogadishu, but have rejected charges that peacekeepers have indiscriminately shelled civilians.¹³³ In response to concerns, ACOTA has incorporated mortar training into its AMISOM curriculum.

AMISOM has also incorporated initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis in Mogadishu, efforts which may contribute to force protection. It maintains two hospitals in the city, which reportedly provide free health care to an estimated 12,000 outpatients monthly. AU peacekeepers also provide safe drinking water to local residents living near AMISOM camps. The mission also conducts outreach program with a local women’s organization to improve maternal health, and a pilot program to provide both primary and adult education in a village in southern Mogadishu.

¹²⁹ Communiqué of the 15th Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Somalia, Addis Ababa, July 5, 2010.

¹³⁰ Communiqué CXCIV of the AU Peace and Security Council at its 214th Meeting, Addis Ababa, January 8, 2010.

¹³¹ U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2010/447, September 2010.

¹³² U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2010/234, May 11, 2010; Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), “Somalia’s Civilians Continue to Bear Brunt of Mogadishu Warfare,” August 4, 2010.

¹³³ James Butty, “AU Peacekeepers Deny Indiscriminately Shelling Mogadishu Residents,” VOA News, July 23, 2010.

Terrorist Safe Havens? Weak and Failed States in East Africa

Denying terrorist groups the use of ungoverned or under-governed spaces as safe havens is a key component of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and the 2010 National Security Strategy specifically identifies Somalia, along with Yemen, the Maghreb, and the Sahel, as areas where Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sought sanctuary. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism not only advocates building partner capacity to secure territories against use by terrorists, it suggests that building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction and stabilization will in turn mitigate conditions conducive to terrorist exploitation. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also outlines a growing role for security force assistance in U.S. defense strategy, in part to “deny terrorists and insurgents safe havens.”

Somalia has been considered a failed state for almost 20 years. Its internationally recognized government currently lacks the ability to provide basic social services, or to secure its territory or borders. Most observers believe the TFG would be unable to hold its presence in Mogadishu without the security presence of AMISOM. Pockets of localized stability exist, including in Somaliland and Puntland, but they are not unaffected by the criminality and violence facing other parts of the country, and some accuse authorities of profiting from the war economy. Sporadic conflict has displaced over 1.5 million Somalis internally, and Somalia’s neighbors host over 500,000 refugees. Somalia’s ungoverned spaces have provided a permissive environment for terrorist transit, training, and recruitment.

While failed states such as Somalia may offer safe haven and a “favorable labor market” for recruitment, they may also pose organizational and logistical challenges that hinder the ability of violent extremist groups to operate transnationally. Reports suggest, for example, that AQ operatives found Somalia less hospitable than expected in the early 1990s.¹³⁴ AQ operatives reportedly found Somalis’ clan identities and suspicion of foreigners, as well as the unreliability of local “allies,” to be impediments to its operations. The country’s widespread banditry, poor roads, weak financial services, and other logistical challenges created additional costs for the group as it tried to move personnel and resources through the area for training. Coastal Kenya, on the other hand, with its porous borders, relative stability, and basic infrastructure, including banks, provided what some consider a “weak state” environment that proved to be a conducive setting for AQ activities, and provided easier access to high-profile Western targets.

The obstacles facing AQ operatives in Somalia in the 1990s continue to constrain foreign operatives and fighters in the country, including those affiliated with Al Shabaab. Reports suggest that the role of foreigners within Al Shabaab diminishes popular support for the group among Somalis, who may increasingly perceive Al Shabaab as a tool of foreign fanatics using Somalia for their own purposes. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to coordinate and execute terrorist attacks against international targets, both in Somalia and beyond its borders. AMISOM’s ability to counter the threat posed by Al Shabaab is limited both by its mandate and its current capabilities.

Some analysts suggest that the United States should focus on denying terrorist groups like Al Shabaab the *benefits* of ungoverned spaces, including in some cases through tactical strikes, rather than engaging in expensive, and potentially protracted, nation-building efforts. In Somalia, some suggest that “until there is meaningful political reconciliation between the clans, attempts to construct governance arrangements will be a recipe for conflict,” and that assistance should instead be pursued through existing traditional authorities.¹³⁵ Others argue for increased diplomatic efforts to build a political coalition between clans and sub-clans and the TFG, while targeting “spoilers” of peace efforts with sanctions or targeted military operations.¹³⁶ The Administration’s new “dual track” strategy toward Somalia appears to contain elements of both approaches, but debate continues on what role, if any, security assistance should play in Somalia (see “U.S.-Somalia Policy: Possible Counterterrorism Implications”). In Somalia’s neighboring “weak” states, U.S. engagement may seek to address core institutional and governance problems that prevent governments from addressing terrorist threats, taking into account issues of political will and the extent to which U.S. assistance may elicit unintended negative reactions among local populations.

¹³⁴ The CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit.

¹³⁵ Bronwyn E. Bruton, *Somalia: A New Approach*, Council Special Report No. 52, March 2010.

¹³⁶ Andre Le Sage, “Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,” *Strategic Forum*, No. 257, Institute for National Strategic Studies, June 2010.

Bilateral Programs

The U.S. government provides counterterrorism assistance to foreign countries through a range of bilateral initiatives, both civilian and military. Most are coordinated by the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and are designed to meet the specific needs of the recipient country. They include traditional security and justice sector capacity building programs, as well as other programs tailored to deny terrorists transit, financing, or sanctuary. Some, but not all, of these programs are described in the State Department's annual Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. A brief overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region by country is provided in **Appendix A**. The United States does not provide security assistance to the government of Eritrea, which it has accused of providing support to extremist elements in Somalia, some with links to Al Qaeda.¹³⁷ Assistance to Sudan for counterterrorism efforts is also limited, based on legislative restrictions.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the State Department shifted the focus of its signature counterterrorism effort, Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA), to newly identified "frontline" nations in the war on terrorism, including—in Africa—Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.¹³⁸ ATA assistance to Africa has increased substantially, from \$3.5 million in FY2000 to an estimated \$25 million in FY2010; \$23 million has been requested for FY2011. Kenya has consistently been one of the largest ATA recipients in the world, ranking only behind Afghanistan, Jordan, and Pakistan in FY2010. ATA assistance there has focused on strengthening interagency collaboration, improving prosecutorial capabilities, and improving the maritime interdiction capability of the police and Navy, particularly in waters near the Somali border. The State Department requests a significant portion of its ATA assistance for Africa from Congress regionally, rather than bilaterally. The department only requested bilateral allocations for Kenya and South Africa for FY2011 (\$8 million and \$1 million respectively); the bureau requested \$14 million regionally, to be dispersed based on needs during the year. In FY2010, in addition to bilateral ATA funds for Kenya, East African countries received \$7.6 million in regional funding through EARSI and additional funds for FBI training in Uganda. FY2009 ATA for East African countries included a regional initiative to bring police from heavily ethnic Somali precincts in the United States together with their counterparts in Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, and South Africa to share best practices and cultural tips for community policing and police outreach. Funding for Counterterrorism Financing (CTF), Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) is requested both bilaterally and regionally. CT Engagement with Allies (CTE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) funds are budgeted globally.

The Department of Defense does not generally request security cooperation programs funded through DOD authorities from Congress on a bilateral basis, and country funding levels are often not available until the end of the fiscal year in which they are programmed. DOD's primary counterterrorism capacity building program, Section 1206, is designed to meet urgent and emerging threats, and consequently programs are identified, prioritized, and chosen by DOD, with concurrence from the State Department, throughout the fiscal year. Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are, to date, the largest recipients of Section 1206 funding on the continent (see **Table**

¹³⁷ Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, "An Overview of U.S. Policy in Africa," Hearing by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, March 24, 2010.

¹³⁸ Today, according to the *FY2011 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification*, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq are considered "frontline" states.

B-2; Yemen, the largest global recipient, has received over \$250 million in Section 1206 aid). Section 1206 programs for FY2011 are now under consideration, and AFRICOM officials suggest that East African countries will remain a high priority for funding.¹³⁹ AFRICOM also provides counterterrorism assistance to foreign partners through the CTFP program. In 2009, AFRICOM hosted its first annual month-long Military Intelligence Professionals Courses (MIPC) for mid- to senior-level East African military officers and their civilian counterparts. East African security officials benefit from a range of other CTFP courses held both in Africa and the United States.

The State Department and USAID conduct a number of other bilateral programs that aim to contribute to counterterrorism goals. The State Department has used INCLE funds in East Africa to build law enforcement and judicial capabilities to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorists. The State Department has also used the so-called “Section 1207” program, through which DOD transfers funds under Section 1207 of the NDAA for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) for programs that support reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities, to support a range of counterterrorism-related efforts in Kenya and Somalia, including police training, youth programs, and, in Somalia, a range of economic growth projects that in part aim to counter recruitment efforts by Al Shabaab. USAID has used ESF funds in several East African countries to support youth and education projects that aim to delegitimize terrorism. Broader good governance programs may also contribute to a less hospitable environment for terrorist groups like Al Shabaab. Efforts designed to broaden the political dialogue in Somalia and empower local authorities, for example, as well as programs to improve government effectiveness, may contribute to an increase in the perceived legitimacy of the TFG and reduce support for insurgent groups. Moreover, assistance that addresses non-terrorism concerns, such as health, education, and basic crime, may also serve to undermine the narrative of violent extremist groups.

¹³⁹ Correspondence between the author and AFRICOM officials in July 2010.

U.S. Government Offices Coordinating Counterterrorism Efforts in East Africa

The **National Security Council**, which is charged with coordinating national security-related policies among agencies, supports the President in the development of U.S. counterterrorism policies, and may, on occasion, direct interagency reviews of existing policies and programs. The **National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**, established in 2004 at the behest of Congress and per the 9/11 Commission, is designated with, among other duties, responsibility for conducting strategic operational planning for CT activities across the government.¹⁴⁰ Among other products, the NCTC produced a National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP-WOT), released in 2006 and again in 2008, to provide a broad interagency strategic plan for implementing counterterrorism priorities. Intelligence Community efforts are managed and directed by the **Director of National Intelligence (DNI)**.

Within the **State Department**, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is charged with organizing and overseeing international counterterrorism activities, but the Bureaus of African Affairs; Diplomatic Security, which implements the department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and Rewards for Justice programs; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Economic and Business Affairs, and Political-Military Affairs; and the Office of Public Diplomacy, among others, each play a role in the planning and implementation of counterterrorism programs in the region. The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) conducts public diplomacy and communications programs for foreign audiences.

The **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)** is the interagency lead for development components of counterterrorism programs in East Africa, and it coordinates with the State Department to design and implement programs that address the drivers of violent extremism. In East Africa, USAID also coordinates some of its counter-extremism programming with DOD.

At the **Department of Defense (DOD)**, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) guides DOD strategy and policy on counterterrorism, while the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, under the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA), guides regional security and defense strategy and policy, and oversees security cooperation programs, including those that are CT-related, in the region. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advise on military strategy and readiness. The U.S. military's counterterrorism efforts in East Africa are implemented by two combatant commands, U.S. Special Forces Command (SOCCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Within the **Department of Justice (DOJ)**, the Counterterrorism Section (CTS) of the National Security Division supports efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorists and works with foreign partners on such efforts overseas, and also leads DOJ efforts to identify, designate, and prosecute terrorist financiers. In the Criminal Division, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) provides Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs) to implement State Department-funded efforts to strengthen foreign criminal justice sector institutions. In East Africa, a Nairobi-based RLA provides technical assistance for the region, including on counterterrorism. DOJ also implements the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)** Office of International Operations stations agents at Legal Attaché offices in the U.S. embassies in Kenya, Egypt, and Yemen to liaise with law enforcement, intelligence, and security services in the region, and provides training on investigative techniques.

The **Department of the Treasury**'s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence coordinates the department's intelligence and enforcement functions, working with foreign governments to identify and address money laundering and terrorist financing threats. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces counterterrorism sanctions. The Economic Crimes Team within the department's Office of Technical Assistance provides expertise and training to foreign partners to support these efforts.

Multiple offices within the **Department of Homeland Security** implement counterterrorism programs overseas. Among them are the U.S. Coast Guard, which assesses the anti-terrorism measures of foreign ports through its International Port Security program. Other DHS subcomponents, including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), also implement counterterrorism and related training and assistance programs in East Africa.

¹⁴⁰ For more information, see CRS Report R41022, *The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns*, by Richard A. Best Jr.

Select Oversight Issues for Congress

Policy and Program Coordination of Regional Counterterrorism Programs

Strategic guidance for U.S. counterterrorism and counter-extremism efforts in East Africa is provided by multiple government agencies, and the extent to which there is a comprehensive and integrated interagency plan for countering the threat regionally is unclear. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has noted that, with the exception of DOD, the U.S. government has “in the past, organized its counterterrorism efforts through bilateral country teams. Such an orientation has had the potential to create stovepipes, lack of focus, and loopholes that terrorists could exploit.”¹⁴¹ Bilateral counterterrorism aid for some East African countries, most prominently Kenya, has been relatively robust in the past decade, but regional planning and multi-country programming appear limited. Given the region’s porous borders, the high number of Somali refugees in the region, and the shared threat posed by Al Shabaab, there appears to be significant opportunity for programming that promotes cooperation between partner nations.

In 2002, the Bush Administration launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) to increase the security, military, and counterterrorism capabilities of countries in the Sahel region of West Africa. In 2003, the Administration launched a similar effort for East Africa, EACTI. PSI, which focused solely on building security sector capacity, was transformed in 2005 into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led, multi-faceted interagency effort to integrate counterterrorism and military training with development assistance and public diplomacy programs designed to counter violent extremism and reduce the ability of terrorist groups to use the region as a safe haven. The State Department’s EACTI, which incorporated development initiatives from its initial stages, also evolved, but the current regional program, now known as EARSII, remains less institutionalized in terms of interagency coordination and regional planning than its West African counterpart. TSCTP, unlike EARSII, is supported by a DOD program of record, Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), coordinated by AFRICOM’s Joint Special Operations Task Force – Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS). CJTF-HOA has implemented some CT-related programming at the behest of the State Department, but it does not have a comparable role within EARSII. The State Department is currently working to systematize the interagency components of EARSII.

The State Department’s East Africa regional programs have not received comparable funding to TSCTP, although some countries in East Africa have significantly larger portions of bilateral funding, particularly through DOD Section 1206 assistance. TSCTP began to receive funding through its own budget line item in FY2007 with development programs prioritized and funding determined by a Standing Interagency Working Group. East Africa regional counterterrorism efforts were not identified under a budget line item until FY2009 with the advent of EARSII, and EARSII’s PKO allocation has been half that of TSCTP, which receives roughly \$20 million in PKO funds annually. As mentioned above, Congress stipulated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2010 (P.L. 111-117) that not less than \$24.7 million be made available for EARSII in FY2010 through the DA, ESF, NADR, and PKO accounts. By comparison, over

¹⁴¹ U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “The Terrorist Enemy,” at www.State.gov/s/ct/enemy/, accessed September 6, 2010.

\$80 million was to be made available for TSCTP. EARSII remains, to date, a more loosely defined framework than its West African counterpart.

Human Rights Concerns

Some U.S. officials and human rights advocates have raised concerns over human rights abuses committed under several East African governments that receive U.S. counterterrorism assistance. The State Department, in its annual *Human Rights Report*, has described the human rights records of many governments in the region as poor.¹⁴² In its most recent report, the State Department cited reports of unlawful killings, torture, abuse, and excessive force by security forces in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. Human rights concerns were also raised regarding Somali security forces. Police forces throughout the region have been accused of excessive force and corruption, and according to the report, many police continue to conduct abuses with impunity.

In some East African countries, there are allegations that governments have condoned abuses by anti-terrorism security forces or violated citizen rights under the pretext of countering terrorism. For example, the State Department and several independent human rights groups have raised concerns with the actions of Uganda's paramilitary Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT), including allegations of torture by the JATT at its detention facilities. Some rights activists have accused Kenya's Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) of arbitrary arrests and disappearances.¹⁴³ Muslim groups in predominantly Christian Kenya have repeatedly accused the Kenyan government of using anti-terrorism measures to persecute Muslim communities.¹⁴⁴ They have raised concerns with the deportation of several Muslim scholars, and have accused the ATPU of harassment, extortion, and theft during raids. In 2008, Amnesty International raised concerns over Kenya's alleged practice of "extraordinary renditions," the unlawful transfer of persons to third countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and the United States.¹⁴⁵ These charges have been reiterated by other advocacy groups.¹⁴⁶ Human rights groups have challenged the legality of the extradition of Kenyan suspects to Uganda to stand trial for charges related to the 2010 Kampala bombings.¹⁴⁷

Congress has routinely taken measures to prevent U.S. security assistance from being provided to foreign security forces associated with gross human rights abuses. A legislative provision popularly known as the "Leahy Amendment" restricts security assistance provided under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² For non-governmental reports on alleged abuses, see, e.g., the following HRW reports, *Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Ogaden Area of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State*, June 12, 2008; *Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees*, June 17, 2010; *All the Men Have Gone: War Crimes in Kenya's Mt. Elgon Conflict*, July 28, 2008; and *Get the Gun: Human Rights Violations by Uganda's National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region*, September 11, 2007.

¹⁴³ HRW, *Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force in Uganda*, April 2009.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report 2009*, October 6, 2009.

¹⁴⁵ Amnesty International, "Kenya: Unlawful Transfers of 'Terror Suspects' Must Be Investigated," July 31, 2008.

¹⁴⁶ REDRESS and Reprieve, *Kenya and Counterterrorism: A Time for Change*, February 2009; and HRW, *Why Am I Still Here? The 2007 Horn of Africa Renditions and the Fate of Those Still Missing*, October 1, 2008.

¹⁴⁷ "Kenyan Judge Lambasts Extradition of Bomb Suspects," Reuters, September 28, 2010.

¹⁴⁸ Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a provision in P.L. 104-208 restricting International Narcotics Control (INL, now INCLE) assistance to "any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit committed gross violations of human rights." The restriction was expanded in Section 570 of P.L. 105-118 to prohibit *all* forms of foreign operations assistance to a unit found to have committed abuses. The restriction was included in subsequent annual foreign operations and defense appropriations, and was later codified as Section (continued...)

In addition to the Leahy Amendment, Congress has introduced other legislative provisions that restrict assistance to foreign forces, including several in East Africa, that have demonstrated a lack of respect for human rights, rule of law, or civilian control. Foreign operations and defense appropriations bills routinely restrict certain types of security assistance to countries of concern. The FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), for example, prohibited Somalia from receiving IMET. It also required the Secretary of State to provide Congress with a written explanation of any training or equipment it intended to provide to Ethiopia with FMF funds, including an explanation how the State Department would ensure that such assistance would not go to individuals or units with records of rights violations. Similar language is contained in the Senate draft of the FY2011 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, S. 3676. In addition to these bilateral restrictions, some appropriations legislation includes blanket restrictions, such as the prohibition of certain forms of U.S. assistance to countries that use child soldiers, or to countries in which the democratically elected head of government has been overthrown by decree or in a military coup d'état.

In response to the Leahy Amendment, the State Department conducts vetting of potential security assistance trainees. Several GAO reports have noted cases in which trainees were not properly screened for abuses prior to receiving U.S. assistance.¹⁴⁹ Some officials have expressed concern that the department lacks adequate resources to conduct proper vetting.¹⁵⁰

U.S.-Somalia Policy: Possible Counterterrorism Implications

There has been considerable debate regarding U.S.-Somalia policy, much of which centers on humanitarian and national security concerns, particularly related to terrorism and piracy. Some of these discussions have focused on the extent to which Somalis perceive the internationally recognized TFG as legitimate. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has described Somalia as a problem that can be looked at on three levels. First, as a collapsed state suffering a humanitarian crisis, and second, as a regional problem, with refugees and illegal arms undermining the stability of Somalia's neighbors. At the third level, he describes Somalia as an international problem, providing a sanctuary and staging ground for pirates and violent

(...continued)

620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in P.L. 110-161. Language in P.L. 110-116 allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the restriction on DOD training programs if, after consultation with the Secretary of State, it is determined that "extraordinary circumstance" requires it. In addition to the Leahy Amendment, Section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, prohibits security assistance to police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a country whose government has been found to have committed human rights abuses.

¹⁴⁹ In P.L. 111-117, conferees rejected a Senate provision to transfer FMF funds to Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) for the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to monitor the use of FMF assistance. However, Conference Report 111-366 did direct that "not less than \$2,000,000 from funds made available under this heading be used for such purpose, and that the Secretary of State consult with the Committees on Appropriations prior to the obligation of these funds." This directive only addresses funding for FY2010; a more permanent funding mechanism for vetting has not been established. See GAO, *Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed*, GAO-08-754, June 2008; GAO, *Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight*, GAO-06-850, July 2006.

¹⁵⁰ The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act required the State Department to transfer \$4 million in IMET funds to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to ensure adequate monitoring of the uses of security assistance.

extremists.¹⁵¹ Given the increasingly international nature of the threats emanating from Somalia, the State Department is now advocating for a “more aggressive” international response.¹⁵²

Several Members of Congress have also called for more robust U.S. and international engagement on Somalia. In September 2010, the Senate passed S.Res. 573, which calls on the President to develop a comprehensive policy to ensure that U.S. humanitarian, diplomatic, political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa. The Obama Administration has acknowledged concerns and conducted an interagency review of its Somalia policy. As a result of that review, in late September 2010 the State Department announced a “dual-track” policy toward Somalia, one which would maintain support for the TFG, AMISOM, and the regional peace process, but would also seek to engage more actively with Somaliland, Puntland, and groups in southern and central Somalia that are opposed to Al Shabaab. The State Department views support to Somaliland and Puntland as providing a “bulwark against extremism and radicalism that might emerge from the south.”¹⁵³

The United States has not had an embassy in Somalia since 1991; U.S. interests there are represented by the U.S. ambassador to Kenya. Staffing on Somalia issues at the Nairobi embassy has grown since 2006, from one mid-level Somalia watcher to a “Somalia Unit” composed of several foreign service officers. In Washington, DC, the State Department has three Somalia desk officers; USAID has one. Some in Congress have called for President Obama to appoint a special envoy for Somalia, similar to the position created for Sudan, which has a sizeable support team.

Security Assistance Issues

Another Administration policy review which may affect counterterrorism programs in East Africa is one currently being conducted by the Obama Administration on security sector assistance programs. Such programs in East Africa have increased in the last decade, due in large part to terrorism concerns. Sustaining recipients’ capabilities to counter terrorist threats is a particular challenge in East Africa, where most countries have scarce resources to maintain the equipment and training they receive through U.S. programs. In some cases, they may prioritize their own national security needs differently, and focus their limited resources elsewhere. Analysts warn that the United States and other donors should be wary of creating incentives for partner nations to “tolerate” low levels of terrorist activity as they increase state security capacity. Some suggest that the U.S. government should condition security assistance on a partner country’s level of counterterrorism effort rather simply on the presence of a threat.¹⁵⁴

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has referred to the current array of U.S. security assistance programs as a “hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”¹⁵⁵ He also argues that the congressional budget cycle is not conducive to addressing emerging threats from

¹⁵¹ Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, “Briefing on the African Union Summit,” July 27, 2010.

¹⁵² Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, “A Dual-Track Approach to Somalia,” Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 20, 2010.

¹⁵³ Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, “Remarks to the Press From UNGA,” September 24, 2010.

¹⁵⁴ The CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

¹⁵⁵ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010.

failed and failing states. Gates has advocated for an “indirect” approach to combating irregular threats and preventing crises, by building the security capacity of foreign partners like those in East Africa. There is debate within Congress and the Administration regarding the appropriate authorities, resources, and capabilities of the Departments of State and Defense respectively in this area. The House Armed Services Committee, for example, views DOD’s Section 1206 train and equip authority to be distinct from traditional foreign aid-related security assistance authorities because they are designed to address DOD-identified U.S. national security needs.¹⁵⁶

AFRICOM considers Section 1206 to be one of the most important and responsive security cooperation programs for responding to emerging terrorist threats in Africa. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya are significant recipients of Section 1206 assistance, almost \$100 million since FY2007, funding that far outweighs FMF and other State Department security assistance provided to these countries (**Table B-2**). Some observers have raised concern about the sustainability of capabilities developed under Section 1206 programs, which are not currently designed to be multi-year programs. DOD officials argue that the lack of multi-year planning and funding authorities hinder their ability to maintain collaborative relationships with foreign partners and limit the ability of such assistance to contribute to institutionalized progress.

Measuring the Success of Counterterrorism Efforts

Applying metrics to gauge the success of counterterrorism and counter-extremist programs designed to build long-term capacity or affect perceptions or attitudes can be challenging.¹⁵⁷ Some measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts by the number of terrorist attacks, defining “success” by the absence of incidents. This measure may not take into account, however, periods when terrorist groups may be focusing their attention or planning elsewhere. Further, it may leave in question whether specific anti-terror efforts have been effective in countering the threat. Media reports or official statements from foreign recipients of counterterrorism assistance may highlight their tactical achievements, including the apprehension of suspected terrorists or the disruption of terrorist plots, but these accounts may fail to capture missed opportunities or mistakes made. Intelligence failures, for example, may go unnoticed until another attack occurs.

One way in which the U.S. government measures the “success” of capacity building programs is through the number of participants trained. This measurement may not take into account, however, the extent to which trainees are able to operationalize their new skills. A soldier may be trained in counterterrorism tactics, for example, but then be deployed for a different mission. Or his unit may lack the resources or equipment to engage the enemy. U.S. technical assistance for the development of legal frameworks to counter terrorist financing or travel may bring about new laws, but their implementation may be hindered by corruption or weak enforcement capabilities. Programs that aim to build security sector capacity may be assessed on measurements of readiness, equipment, leadership, command and control, adherence to human rights standards, and professionalism. Coalition-building programs may also have measurable outcomes, for example, increased regional intelligence sharing and joint operations.

¹⁵⁶ H.Rept. 111-166, accompanying the National Defense Authorization for FY2010, H.R. 2647.

¹⁵⁷ CRS Report RL33160, *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*, by Raphael F. Perl. The State Department identifies some of the performance indicators and targets it uses for measuring counterterrorism programs in various documents, including its *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations*.

The failure to date of terrorist groups to meet their declared objectives in East Africa, for example, to instigate regime change or gain broad popular support in the region, may be attributed to a range of factors, including moderate religious and cultural beliefs in the region, inadequate finances, pressure from regional security forces, or increasing resentment among local populations where these groups have sought safe haven. The extent to which U.S. counter-extremism programs affect these factors is difficult to determine. U.S. efforts to strengthen the capacity of Somali intelligence services in the past decade have reportedly led to some notable successes, including the disruption of terrorist operations in the planning stages, and such efforts have reportedly assisted the capture of several AQ operatives in Somalia.¹⁵⁸ Some of these programs may have unintended consequences, though, offering near-term “wins,” but, in some cases, alienating local populations and contributing to support for or tolerance of violent extremism in the longer term.

Public opinion surveys may give an indication of the extent to which U.S. programs change public perceptions, but poll results may not indicate whether an individual or community would have been susceptible to radicalization in the first place. Some communities may be hostile toward participating in surveys.¹⁵⁹ Practitioners continue to evaluate and reformulate formal methods for evaluating performance to gauge the extent to which U.S. counter-terrorism programs have also contributed to containing and marginalizing violent extremist groups.

Looking Ahead

The geographic diversity of the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda and those who share its violent extremist ideology confronts U.S. and allied policymakers with a complex set of challenges. Not least among these questions is how best to allocate finite resources against a loosely affiliated global network of groups willing and able to use terrorist tactics, to prevent not only another sophisticated and catastrophic September 11, 2001-type attack, but also more primitive, small-scale attacks, including against the U.S. homeland. How should policymakers weigh the current and future threats that may emanate from places like Afghanistan and Yemen, against those from East Africa, and what is the best course of action? How should policymakers prioritize terrorist concerns against other threats to regional and international stability? When weighing the wide range of security threats in Africa, such as a potential return to civil war in Sudan and continuing instability in the Great Lakes region, what level of U.S. effort should be focused on countering the threat posed by violent extremist groups like Al Shabaab? U.S. counterterrorism efforts in East Africa today include a range of diplomatic, development, and defense responses that focus increasingly on building African counterterrorism capabilities. How effective have these efforts been to date? How is success measured? To what extent do current foreign aid authorities and agency mandates enable nimble and appropriately scaled response to terrorist threats originating in East Africa? To what extent do allies in the region share U.S. security priorities and allocate their own resources accordingly? What are their limitations in confronting irregular threats like terrorism? These and other questions may be of interest to Members of the 112th Congress.

¹⁵⁸ ICG, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?* op. cit..

¹⁵⁹ The CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit., p. 143.

Acronyms

ACBS	African Coastal /Border Security Program
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACBSBS	Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security Program
AIAI	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQ	Al Qaeda
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
AU	African Union
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
CTE	Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies
CTF	Counter Terrorism Financing
CTFP	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
DA	Development Assistance
DIILS	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
EACTI	East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative
EARSI	East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EXBS	Export Control and Related Border Security
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
JCET	Joint Combined Exercise Training
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NADR	Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NSS	National Security Strategy
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	The Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia
TIP/PISCES	Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts

Appendix A. Country Counterterrorism Profiles

The profiles below provide an overview of U.S. counterterrorism priorities and related strategic concerns in East African countries, briefly describing U.S. efforts to counter terrorism and radicalization. Programs that aim broadly to foster peace and stability but which may also contribute to counterterrorism goals are included. Program funding information gives a profile of relative U.S. government spending on programs and priorities discussed in the preceding report.

For each country, two tables are provided. The first table presents annual funding levels for the State Department's five overarching Objectives for Foreign Assistance identified in the department's Foreign Policy Framework. It is included to provide context for the counterterrorism and related security assistance listed in the second table. Funding identified by the State Department under the "Peace & Security" Objective Sub-category "Counterterrorism" is also included in the first table, but those figures may not reflect all regional or global funding allocated by the department to a given country for counterterrorism programs. This table does not include funding provided by the Department of Defense.

The second table provides funding information for various U.S. counterterrorism and related assistance programs, including security assistance, to the countries in the region. It includes both bilateral, regional, and global funding allocated by the State Department and USAID to individual countries in a given fiscal year. Funds identified as "regional" are budgeted regionally or globally by the State Department, rather than bilaterally. Country funding levels for these accounts are usually reported after the close of the fiscal year. Regional funding provided to a country through NADR sub-accounts may or may not be included in the bilateral NADR funding figures. Not all of the security assistance listed is primarily aimed at countering terrorism, but programs funded by these accounts may contribute to partner professionalization, readiness, and capacity to counter a range of security threats, including terrorism. Information on DOD-funded counterterrorism programs, including Section 1206 train and equip assistance and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, as well as DOD counternarcotics assistance which may have a counterterrorism component, is also indicated in the table.

Djibouti

As host to the only U.S. military base in Africa, the State Department describes Djibouti as a “strategic U.S. partner located in a volatile region,” and “one of the most forward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing efforts against terrorism.”¹⁶⁰ Djibouti also hosts a sizable French military presence, serves as a base for international counter-piracy operations, and is a regional logistics hub for the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations. Djibouti sits about 20 miles from Yemen across the Bab al Mandeb Strait, a critical chokepoint between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The Djiboutian government faces an array of regional threats, including ongoing instability in neighboring Somalia and Yemen, a border dispute with Eritrea, and maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. According to the State Department, aid to Djibouti aims “to ensure that this strategic gateway to internal African markets and to the Gulf of Aden remains safe, secure and stable, both for the benefit of the people of Djibouti, and for the entire Horn of Africa and the rest of the world.”¹⁶¹

The State Department reports that Djibouti, which has established a Financial Intelligence Service, has been cooperative with U.S. counterterrorist financial measures. The country has amended its laws to comply with the international conventions related to terrorism that Djibouti has ratified, and has laws in place that permit extradition and mutual legal assistance on terrorism investigations.¹⁶² The United States has provided Djibouti with assistance to improve its ability to process machine-readable travel documents at its air, land, and sea ports to constrain terrorist mobility.

Security Sector Assistance

U.S. security cooperation efforts with Djibouti include border and coastal security and related counterterrorism initiatives, which aim to protect both the host country and the U.S. forces stationed there, as well as efforts to promote general military professionalization.¹⁶³ Djibouti has been a recipient of significant Section 1206 security assistance from DOD, totaling almost \$28 million to date, to secure its land and maritime borders against terrorist threats or transit. Such assistance has included maritime domain awareness (MDA) training and equipment, including navigation radar, a vessel communications and tracking system, as well as border security equipment, including night vision goggles, global positioning systems, and ammunition. U.S. Naval staff have provided coastal security training on planning, intelligence, operations, logistics, and command/control with Section 1206 assistance. The United States has also provided IMET and FMF to help Djibouti protect its borders and address terrorist threats, and the country receives a large FMF allocation given its size, roughly \$2 million annually in recent years. The United States has supported the construction of facilities for the

Djibouti at a Glance

Population: 720,000
Urban population: 87%
Median Age: 21.4
Infant Mortality Rate: 58/1,000
Religions: Muslim 94%, Christian 6%
Literacy: 67.9%
Unemployment rate: 59%
GDP: \$2.04 billion
GDP per capita: \$2,800
Military Spending: 3.8% of GDP
Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking: 155 out of 182 countries
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*.

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2010*.

¹⁶² United Nations, *Report from Djibouti Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1624, S/2006/172*

¹⁶³ These bilateral programs are managed by the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) at the U.S. Embassy, although some efforts are conducted in collaboration with CJTF-HOA.

Djiboutian Navy and road improvements between border posts near Somalia. In July 2009, the U.S. and the Djiboutian Navies established a new harbor security force to ensure protection of vessels transiting through Djibouti's port and to provide training opportunities between U.S. and Djiboutian personnel. With CTFP funding, Djiboutian security officials have participated in counterterrorism-related events at the African Center for Strategic Studies and the National Defense University, as well as the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism Course. Djibouti has also received seaport security training through CTFP. According to DOD, Djibouti's ability to control its borders has a direct effect on the department's strategic objective of countering the spread of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.¹⁶⁴

The State Department is providing over \$2 million in FY2010 EARS PKO funds to train and equip Djibouti's counterterrorism force, the National Gendarmerie; over \$2 million for the Djiboutian Republican National Guard, which provides security to prevent terrorist incidents; and \$1 million to improve Djibouti's maritime response capabilities. The State Department reports that the national police are playing an increasing role in border monitoring and internal security. The United States provides Djibouti with INCLE funding to enhance police professionalization, and to counter threats from criminals and extremists in neighboring countries.¹⁶⁵ NADR funds support improved port and airport security, and have contributed to the refurbishment of border posts. Djibouti is a focus country under the Coast Guard's International Port Security initiative.

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

Security assistance to Djibouti has significantly outweighed humanitarian and development assistance in recent years. Djibouti's human development indicators are low, and its unemployment rate is exceptionally high. The State Department has labeled the Djiboutian government's human rights record as poor, and perceptions of state corruption and official impunity remain a problem. U.S. bilateral aid aims to address some of these issues, including through governance programs that seek to encourage greater pluralism and political participation. Other U.S. aid has focused on education and health initiatives, including efforts to reduce child mortality, to "ensure continued internal stability in Djibouti."¹⁶⁶ Education programs include skills development for out-of-school youth and efforts to increase girls' school enrollment and attendance. Some argue that U.S. efforts to address some of Djibouti's socioeconomic challenges may in turn mitigate some of the social and political frustrations that could lead to radicalization. Given a constrained budget, USAID has worked with CJTF-HOA, along with the Djiboutian Ministry of Health, to realign its civil affairs program in Djibouti to meet still-urgent maternal and child health needs by building or rehabilitating health clinics. Whether this effort has had an impact on countering radicalization is unknown, but USAID suggests that CJTF-HOA's efforts, provided in a targeted manner, have supported the host government's target of providing health care access to 100% of the country.

¹⁶⁴ DOD, Congressional Notification of FY2009 Section 1206 program for Djibouti, June 11, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Table A-1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Djibouti

\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	1,300	900	0	1,000	1,542	600
Investing in People	3,300	1,950	2,146	2,146	5,546	2,200
Economic Growth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Humanitarian Assistance	2,444	1,145	2,735	1,299	N/A	N/A
Peace & Security	4,387	4,501	2,641	2,677	2,330	3,600
Counterterrorism	170	356	0	0	0	0

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011. FY2009 Humanitarian assistance funding draws from USAID/OFDA reporting and may indicate all funding.

Table A-2. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Djibouti

\$, in thousands

Source	Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State and USAID Bilateral Funding	FMF	4,468	3,960	3,800	1,983	2,000	2,000	2,500
	IMET	239	307	345	360	377	330	350
	INCLE	0	0	0	298	300	0	750
	NADR	25	120	356	0	0	0	0
State and USAID Regional Funding	NADR-ATA	0	120	356	0	500	N/A	N/A
	NADR-TIP	25	75	75	0	300	300	N/A
	EARS PKO	0	0	0	0	1,930	3,378	N/A
DOD Funding	Section 1206	0	0	8,900	5,100	3,300	10,400	N/A
	Section 1004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	12	N/A
	CTFP	0	15	3	58	314	133	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs for regional figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) for DOD figures.

Ethiopia

With one of the largest standing armies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia's relative strength and its active counterterrorism role have led the U.S. government to view it as a key ally in a turbulent region. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters, and over 2,000 Ethiopians serve in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Ethiopia is home to over 50,000 Somali refugees and over 40,000 refugees from neighboring Eritrea and Sudan. Ethiopian authorities face multiple ethnic insurgencies, and there have been several terrorist bombings in the capital, Addis Ababa. Ethiopia has a long history of involvement in Somalia. The two countries fought a war over Ethiopia's Ogaden region—where a majority of inhabitants are ethnically Somali—in the late 1970s, and ethnic Somali irredentism continues to threaten Ethiopia's internal cohesion. Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in late 2006 led to a prolonged military engagement there, and although Ethiopian forces officially pulled out in January 2009, there have been subsequent reports of periodic incursions. Ethiopia reportedly continues to provide military support and training to armed factions the country.¹⁶⁷ Aside from Somalia, the Ethiopian government's main strategic concern is its volatile relationship with Eritrea. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting Ethiopian rebel groups and Islamist militants in Somalia, and Eritrea has accused Ethiopia of supporting its opposition groups.

Promoting regional stability is a top priority for the United States in its relations with Ethiopia. The State Department Office of the Inspector General suggests that the relationship has lacked policy guidance and the U.S. Embassy "has a quiver of carrots but no sticks as it seeks to rein in a government whose political direction may be putting U.S. strategic interests at risk."¹⁶⁸

State Department reports suggest that Ethiopia has been cooperative in shutting down avenues of terrorist funding, but that it remains vulnerable to money laundering activities. The Treasury Department provided technical assistance to Ethiopia for the drafting of its new anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing legislation, which parliament passed in late 2009. Human rights advocates have raised concerns with Ethiopia's new Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, which passed prior to the 2010 parliamentary election.¹⁶⁹

Ethiopia at a Glance

Population: 85.24 million
Urban population: 17%
Median Age: 16.8
Infant Mortality Rate: 81/1,000
Religions: Christian 60.8%, Muslim 32.8%, indigenous 4.6%, other 1.8%
Literacy: 42.7%
Unemployment rate: N/A
GDP: \$75.9 billion
GDP per capita: \$900
Military Spending: 3% of GDP
HDI Ranking: 171/182 countries
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

Security Sector Assistance

Ethiopia's military, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), emerged from a coalition of rebel groups that overthrew the Derg regime in 1991, and the United States has assisted with the ENDF's ongoing transition to an all-volunteer professional military force since military ties with Ethiopia resumed in 2001. Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and assistance has increasingly focused on the country's capacity to counter

¹⁶⁷ Armed groups reportedly receiving aid include Alhu Sunna Wal Jama'a and other factions fighting Al Shabaab.

¹⁶⁸ State Department OIG, *Report of Inspection: Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*, Report No. ISP-I-10-51A, April 2010.

¹⁶⁹ Some suggest that Ethiopia's draft counterterrorism law provides an excessively broad definition of terrorist activity that could restrict freedom of speech, expression and assembly and undermine due process

insurgencies, improve regional security, and deter terrorism. Ethiopia is also one of the largest troop contributors for U.N. peacekeeping operations and has received support through the ACOTA program. Ethiopia has received significant DOD Section 1206 assistance, totaling almost \$35 million to date. Initial assistance included C-130 engines and spare parts, and later programs supported the development of combat engineering, command and control, and night vision capabilities for the ENDF and its counterterrorism units. Section 1206 and FMF assistance has provided communications equipment to support Ethiopia's deployment and counterterrorism capabilities. Under EACTI, Ethiopia received \$13 million in PKO and FMF funds for border security training and related equipment, including C-130 parts and communications gear. The United States has provided subsequent support to improve the country's tactical airlift capacity.

IMET courses for Ethiopia focus on counterterrorism, intelligence, English language instruction, and senior-level professional military education. FMF funds have supported U.S. trainers at the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College. The Ethiopian government values these training opportunities, which includes such topics as the role of the military in a democratic society, as essential to developing a more professional force. Congress has restricted military assistance to Ethiopia in various legislation based on concerns over reports of serious human rights abuses committed against civilians. FY2009 Section 1206 assistance was temporarily suspended due to Leahy vetting concerns; a different unit was later chosen, vetted, and approved.

The State Department has requested INCLE funding for FY2011 to develop investigative techniques and information sharing among law enforcement and border agents to enhance Ethiopia's ability to counter both trafficking and terrorism. This request would also aim to increase the professionalism and responsiveness of the Ethiopian federal police, which have been accused of corrupt practices, impunity, and various human rights abuses. According to the State Department, the federal police have acknowledged that many of its members lack professionalism and has sought human rights training from the international community.¹⁷⁰ EARSIF funds continue to support efforts to improve Ethiopia's airport security and border control capabilities.

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

U.S. aid to Ethiopia includes programs that aim to mitigate conditions that may lead to violent extremism, or that may indirectly contribute to such ends. In addition to food aid, Ethiopia receives significant U.S. assistance for education, health, and agriculture programs, including primary and adult education initiatives in predominantly Muslim areas. Under EACTI, the State Department provided community assistance and self-help projects, as well as education programs, to underserved communities in these areas. CJTF-HOA conducts civil affairs projects, including school renovation and health projects. The State Department and USAID support conflict management programs and efforts to improve service delivery among Muslim communities. EARSIF funds messaging programs aimed at media and religious and civic leaders. The State Department reports that Ethiopia's press restrictions make public diplomacy efforts difficult.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, op. cit.

¹⁷¹ OIG, Report No. ISP-I-10-51A, op. cit. The government frequently jams VOA's Amharic service, and websites critical of the government's human rights record are often blocked.

Table A-3. State Department and USAID Assistance to Ethiopia

\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	9,200	900	2,267	6,000	1,603	3,175
Investing in People	153,608	1,950	415,143	422,887	445,379	475,029
Economic Growth	109,821	0	34,258	100,947	77,450	95,565
Humanitarian Assistance	30,104	1,145	478,654	329,535	N/A	N/A
Peace & Security	5,117	4,501	3,629	5,477	7,793	8,750
Counterterrorism	270	1,150	1,000	0	0	0

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011

Table A-4. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Ethiopia

\$, in thousands

Source	Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State and USAID Bilateral Funding	FMF	7,050	0	1,900	198	843	843	2,000
	IMET	572	594	472	586	634	700	725
	INCLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	500
	NADR	0	270	1,150	1,000	0	0	0
State and USAID Regional Funding	FMF	N/A	1,980	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	NADR-ATA	301	170	950	1,000	1,000	N/A	N/A
	NADR-TIP	0	200	200	0	425	325	N/A
DOD Funding	DOD Section 1206	0	0	9,300	15,200	10,300	0	N/A
	CTFP	0	63	57	130	61	213	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs for regional figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, and DSCA for DOD figures.

Kenya¹⁷²

The United States has a long history of security cooperation with Kenya. Instability in neighboring countries, combined with concerns over possible terrorist movement across Kenya's porous border with Somalia and along its coastline, has caused Kenya, a regional hub for trade and finance and a top tourism destination, to take an increasingly active role in regional security. Kenya is home to over 400,000 refugees, including over 350,000 Somalis that live in crowded camps near Dadaab in eastern Kenya. According to some reports, Kenyan security forces have clashed with Al Shabaab fighters in Kenyan territory. U.S. and Kenyan officials have expressed increasing concern that Al Shabaab may try to conduct attacks in Kenya, although some analysts suggest that the group's reliance on Eastleigh as a financial and logistics hub may reduce the likelihood of attack. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region poses a significant threat. Piracy in the waters off the coast is also of continuing concern, and ship traffic to and from the port of Mombasa is particularly vulnerable.

Coastal Kenya is considered to be the "decisive arena in the fight against al Qaeda and associated movements in the Horn."¹⁷³ Al Shabaab has targeted ethnic Somalis and African Muslims for recruitment, and many of its foreign fighters reportedly come from disadvantaged communities along the south coast. Many Kenyan Muslims distrust the government and view its counterterrorism efforts as discriminatory. The Kenyan government has faced opposition in its efforts to pass anti-terrorism legislation, first introduced in 2003, and the rendition of suspects in the 2010 Kampala bombings to Uganda has been challenged in the Kenyan courts.¹⁷⁴

Security Sector Assistance

The State Department reports that "post-election violence, ongoing chronic insecurity in several regions, and significant refugee flows from Somalia place competing demands on Kenya's national security resources, and on Kenya's ability to focus on specific counterterrorism initiatives. By building capacity to enhance overall security, U.S. assistance will also contribute significantly to improving Kenya's ability to combat terrorism."¹⁷⁵ Kenya is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Assistance has increasingly focused on improving Kenya's capabilities to control its land and sea borders and counter terrorism. Kenya has received over \$4 million in IMET since FY2000, and over \$25 million in FMF. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Kenya have included fighter aircraft, helicopters, and Air Force computer systems, and have totaled over \$20 million since FY2008. FMF and FMS deliveries contribute to the military's 10-year modernization program. Through

Kenya at a Glance

Population: 39 million
Urban population: 22%
Median Age: 18.8
Infant Mortality Rate: 55/1,000
Religions: Christian 78%, Muslim 10%, indigenous 10%, other 2%
Literacy: 85.1%
Unemployment rate: 40%
GDP: \$63.5 billion
GDP per capita: \$1,600
Military Spending: 2.8% of GDP
HDI Ranking: 147/182 countries
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

¹⁷² See also CRS Report RL34378, *Kenya: Current Conditions and the Challenges Ahead*, by Ted Dagne.

¹⁷³ CTC at West Point, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁴ The State Department reports in its *Country Reports on Terrorism* that existing laws do not allow police to detain terrorist suspects and prosecute them effectively. In late September 2010, a Kenyan High Court judge ruled that the arrest and rendition of terrorist suspects to Uganda was illegal.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011*.

EACTI, Kenya received \$12.5 million in coastal and border security assistance with FMF and PKO funds, through which the United States provided training, patrol boats, and equipment for a Special Operations Company and a Motorized Infantry Battalion. Kenya has also received support through EARSIS PKO funds to build various counterterrorism capabilities. Kenya is the largest African recipient of DOD Section 1206 programs, totaling over \$37 million to date. The Kenyan military also benefits from both bilateral and multilateral exercises with U.S. forces, including through JCETs and through military-to-military exchanges. CJTF-HOA civic affairs teams have worked in cooperation with Kenya Ministry of Defense water well and medical teams to forge a cooperative relationship and exchange technical knowledge. EARSIS FY2010 funds are supporting further civil-military operations training. The Kenyan military has requested assistance from AFRICOM for the establishment of an independent Inspector General Office.

Kenya is one of the largest global recipients of ATA funding, which supports border and coastal security efforts and law enforcement programs. This assistance includes training and equipment for a multiagency coast guard-type unit to patrol the waters near Somalia; and efforts to improve security at the port of Mombasa. Kenya is a focus country under the Coast Guard's International Port Security Initiative. CJTF-HOA also provides naval training and collaborates with ATA trainers on some of their programs. DOD has provided Section 1004 counternarcotics assistance to support maritime training and to provide anti-corruption training to law enforcement authorities. ATA assistance also supports counterterrorism training for the Kenyan Police, including the provision of equipment in 2009 for a new cyber forensics lab. Human rights reports suggest that corruption and impunity remain significant problems within the country's police force, and there have been credible allegations of serious abuses, including extrajudicial executions.¹⁷⁶ Some reports also suggest that the police, including the U.S.-trained Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, have reportedly mishandled critical evidence¹⁷⁷

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

U.S. efforts to counter violent extremism in Kenya have largely focused on education and youth programs. Beginning in 2004, EACTI funds contributed to a USAID program, Education for Marginalized Children in Kenya, concentrating on the predominantly Muslim North Eastern and Coast provinces, which have the lowest education statistics in the country. School infrastructure projects were a part of the program. In 2008, USAID has also begun supporting a Higher Education Scholarship Program in collaboration with the Ministry of Education focused on improving access to Kenya's public universities for students from North Eastern province. With FY2009 ESF funds, USAID has allocated \$3 million to a program designed to empower youth in the northeast city of Garissa and the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. DOD has provided over \$8 million in Section 1207 assistance to Kenya, with \$2 million allocated to the Garissa program. U.S. assistance in FY2011 is expected to include new efforts to target informal urban settlements in Nairobi and Mombasa that are aimed at mitigating potential conflict and extremism.

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Philip Alston, "Statement on Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya," February 25, 2010; and U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., "Kenya: Police Lose Vital Files on Al-Qaeda," *Nairobi Star*, July 20, 2009.

Table A-5. State Department and USAID Assistance to Kenya

\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	5,015	5,077	8,400	22,900	15,490	20,300
Investing in People	203,994	366,028	554,550	593,303	617,810	634,260
Economic Growth	22,430	21,159	28,760	64,550	43,895	47,391
Humanitarian Assistance	32,921	80,970	64,733	133,723	0	0
Peace & Security	5,193	5,040	10,015	14,965	10,470	12,000
Counterterrorism	4,563	4,010	5,753	8,000	8,000	8,000

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011

Table A-6. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Kenya

\$, in thousands

Source	Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State & USAID Bilateral Funding	FMF	0	0	0	198	250	1,000	1,000
	IMET	139	0	45	524	915	970	1,000
	INCLE	0	0	0	0	0	2,000	2,000
	NADR	4,544	4,763	4,565	6,211	5,500	8,500	8,000
	NADR-ATA	3,484	3,150	2,910	5,455	5,105	8,000	8,000
	NADR-EXBS	75	100	375	0	0	N/A	N/A
	NADR-TIP	285	—	375	298	—	—	—
State and USAID Regional Funding	ESF	0	0	0	N/A	3,150	N/A	N/A
	NADR-CT	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5,000?	8,000	8,000
	NADR-TIP	—	700	125	—	500	500	N/A
	NADR-CTE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	175	N/A
	NADR-CTF	700	813	600	125	125	N/A	N/A
	FMF	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	500	N/A
	EARSI-PKO	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	2,770	5,500	N/A
DOD Funding	DOD Section 1206	0	0	3,110	10,700	15,200	8,500	N/A
	DOD Section 1207	0	0	2,000	0	0	0	N/A
	DOD Section 1004/1033	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	422	55	N/A
	CTFP	555	453	683	855	797	125	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs for regional figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, and DSCA for DOD figures.

Somalia¹⁷⁸

According to the State Department, “the lack of security and the looming humanitarian crisis are the most critical challenges facing Somalia today.”¹⁷⁹ The TFG faces multiple security threats, not only from Al Shabaab, but from other insurgent groups and clan-based militias. The government controls only limited areas of Mogadishu secured by AMISOM. Al Shabaab and other insurgent groups control most of southern and much of central Somalia, including port cities like Kismayo, which serve as supply lines and valuable sources of revenue. Various criminal organizations, including pirate networks, operate on the coast.¹⁸⁰ Some speculate that Al Shabaab may have ties with pirate gangs, but clear linkages have yet to be made.¹⁸¹ Al Shabaab has threatened U.N. and foreign aid agencies; most have suspended operations in southern and central Somalia. The semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland have maintained relative stability, but also face threats from Al Shabaab and other destabilizing factors.¹⁸²

Security Sector Assistance

The U.S. government and other donors have placed increasing priority on building the capacity of the Somali security forces to reduce the current level of violence in Mogadishu and create an environment in which the TFG can deliver services to the population. The State Department asserts that AMISOM cannot conduct counterterrorism operations under its current mandate and thus that support for the emerging TFG military is critical for fostering long-term stability in Somalia and “diminishing reliance on AMISOM forces for peacekeeping and security.”¹⁸³

The State Department initiated its security sector reform effort for Somalia in September 2007, using PKO funds to finance Ugandan and Ethiopian trainers. Given security concerns, training has taken place in Uganda and other countries, with the United States providing logistics support and, in some cases, equipment. U.S. assistance was limited to support for third-country training efforts (e.g., training equipment, refurbishment of training facilities, and trainee transport) until FY2009, when the United States began providing operational support to the TFG forces in Mogadishu, including salaries, rations, spare parts, radios, and cash transfers for weapons and ammunition, after securing waivers from the U.N. Sanctions Committee. The United States continues to support third-country training, and has spent over \$30 million since FY2007 on assistance to the TFG forces. AMISOM also provides training for TFG forces under its mandate, and its police component provides training and mentors for the Somali Police Force (SPF).¹⁸⁴ Other donors, including the EU, also provide

Somalia at a Glance

Population: 9.83 million
Urban population: 37%
Median Age: 17.6
Infant Mortality Rate: 109/1,000
Religions: Muslim
Literacy: N/A
Unemployment rate: N/A
GDP: \$5.73 billion
GDP per capita: \$600
Military Spending: 0.9% of GDP
HDI Ranking: N/A
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

¹⁷⁸ See also CRS Report RL33911, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, by Ted Dagne.

¹⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification FY2011*.

¹⁸⁰ CRS Report R40528, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, by Lauren Ploch et al.

¹⁸¹ Media reports suggest that Al Shabaab may plan to target U.S.-flagged ships at sea. See Sarah Childress, “Somali Militants Try Piracy to Fund Attacks,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 10, 2010.

¹⁸² Mohamed Ibrahim and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Militant Alliance Adds to Somalia’s Turmoil,” *The New York Times*, July 28, 2010; and “Puntland Forces Attack al-Shabab in Somali Mountains,” BBC, July 26, 2010.

¹⁸³ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011*.

¹⁸⁴ Other donor support to TFG forces includes support for the country’s police services by UNDP and IGAD member (continued...)

support and training. A September 2010 U.N. report noted a sharp decline in the number of TFG and AMISOM casualties in recent months, despite an upsurge in violence in Mogadishu, and attributed the decline to improved security measures and counter-IED procedures.¹⁸⁵

The State Department conducted an assessment of the Somali security sector in December 2009, in collaboration with the TFG, the U.N., the AU, European donors, and civil society groups to examine existing capabilities and donor activities, and to prioritize areas for capacity building and reform. The absence of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Somalia poses challenges in monitoring security assistance there. Somali forces have suffered from a lack of pay, clan favoritism, and cronyism, which have lowered morale. This has contributed to concerns over defections or the possible transfer of intelligence or military assistance, particularly equipment, to insurgents.¹⁸⁶

In addition to the TFG's official security forces, several independent armed factions periodically align themselves with the TFG against Al Shabaab and other Islamist militias. Some reportedly received support from Ethiopia. Somaliland and Puntland also maintain their own security forces. Reported U.S. assistance to Somali "security forces" in the past has been controversial.¹⁸⁷ Alleged assistance provided to security institutions in Puntland was linked in the media to the "extraordinary renditions" of Ethiopian rebels and Islamist militants to Ethiopia, which, according to some analysts, eroded public support for the Puntland regime and increased anti-Western sentiment in the region.

The State Department reports that Somali police have been "generally ineffective, underpaid, and corrupt," but that there were fewer allegations of abuses in 2009 than previous years.¹⁸⁸ In FY2007, Somalia received \$25 million in Section 1207 assistance, focused on security sector reform activities, including efforts to foster national civilian police reform through existing UNDP Rule of Law programs, as well as security and justice infrastructure rehabilitation, youth employment and income generation activities. The 1207 assistance also included \$7.5 million in regional assistance to enhance community-police coordination for cross-border security and to establish neutral zones. The regional program focuses on capacity building for the Transitional Federal Institutions, security sector reform, quick impact stabilization programs and peace and reconciliation programs in Somalia's strategic border areas, Kenya and Ethiopia.

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

The TFG is viewed by many Somalis as corrupt and divided. Some analysts suggest that donor support for the government has simply reinforced poor performance and "prolong[ed] conditions within which a radical Islamist insurgency has thrived."¹⁸⁹ Others argue that donors should strengthen efforts to engender good governance, political competition, and consensus building in

(...continued)

states; training for 2,000 Somali soldiers by the European Union; and, reportedly, intelligence and military support to the TFG, as well as Puntland and Somaliland from the United Kingdom and Ethiopia.

¹⁸⁵ U.N. Security Council, S/2010.447

¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, "Guards for Somali Leader Join Islamists," *The New York Times*, July 22, 2010; and Gettleman, "In Somalia, a Leader Is Raising Hopes for Stability," *The New York Times*, September 16, 2009.

¹⁸⁷ ICG, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*

¹⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, op. cit.

¹⁸⁹ Ken Menkhaus, "Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and US Policy," Prepared Statement for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, June 17, 2010.

order to establish lasting political stability. The State Department views these as critical elements of its strategy in Somalia, and continues to explore ways to boost public confidence in the TFG and reduce divisions within the government, while at the same time exploring a “dual track” to increase engagement with Somaliland and Puntland, and local leaders opposed to Al Shabaab but not affiliated with the TFG. The State Department has budgeted over \$12 million in FY2009 and FY2010 for conflict mitigation and reconciliation, and an estimated \$20 million for democracy and governance programs. Governance programs include quick-impact programs to demonstrate positive effects of the political reconciliation process and include training for local authorities on transparency and responsiveness to local needs in order to improve their credibility among the population. The United States also supports Somalia’s constitutional process and democracy efforts in Somaliland and Puntland. The State Department recently announced efforts to “engage more actively” with those governments, and with local leaders in south central Somalia.¹⁹⁰

In addition to governance initiatives, USAID implements several programs to foster economic growth and legitimate employment opportunities among Somalis. In 2008, USAID began a youth education and job skills training program. ESF funding aims to “expand business and livelihood opportunities in order to build confidence a peace process and in emerging governing institutions.” USAID is developing workforce readiness and business certification programs to enhance job opportunities among targeted youth, and is providing grants for community-driven programs to improve social service delivery and rehabilitation of infrastructure. The State Department plans to provide over \$10 million in FY2010 Section 1207 assistance to promote stability in Somalia through public-private partnerships and economic networks. This program, which will target such sectors as the livestock industry, aims to expand legitimate sources of revenue for Somalis and thereby counter Al Shabaab recruitment and reduce conflict.

Table A-7. State Department and USAID Assistance to Somalia
\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	4,512	8,973	1,914	8,687	11,270	8,550
Investing in People	3,000	4,087	9,253	9,055	6,550	6,550
Economic Growth	0	0	0	0	3,000	4,268
Humanitarian Assistance	27,377	34,701	197,400	123,438	31,167	N/A
Peace & Security	400	50,690	3,035	262,658	113,000	65,590
Counterterrorism	0	0	0	2,000	0	0

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011

¹⁹⁰ Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, Remarks to the Press from UNGA, September 24, 2010.

Table A-8. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Assistance to Somalia

\$, in thousands

Source	Objective/Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State & USAID Bilateral Funding	IMET	0	0	0	0	0	0	40
	INCLE	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,000
	NADR	0	0	0	754	0	2,000	2,000
	PKO	0	0	49,600	2,281	246,600	102,000	53,550
State & USAID Regional Funding	ESF	0	0	0	0	2,000	N/A	N/A
	NADR-ATA	0	0	0	0	900	N/A	N/A
	EARS ESF	0	0	0	0	2,000	N/A	N/A
DOD Funding	Section 1207	0	0	25,000	0	0	10,150	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; USAID for regional ESF figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense and AFRICOM for DOD figures.

Table A-9. U.S. Support to AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces

\$, in thousands

	FY06 Supp GPOI PKO	FY07 GPOI PKO	F07 Somalia PKO	FY07 Supp Somalia PKO	FY08 GPOI PKO	FY08 Somalia PKO	FY09 Bridge Supp Somalia PKO	FY09 GPOI PKO	FY09 Somalia PKO	FY09 Supp Somalia PKO	FY10 GPOI PKO (to date)	Total
AMISOM Support	10,000	8,662	9,600	36,801	8,329	4,822	57,831	5,055	11,600	46,149	1,888	200,736
TFG Support	0	0	0	3,199	0	0	9,169	0	0	18,280	0	30,649

Source: U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs. Funding levels as of September 1, 2010.

Notes: The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is funded primarily through the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. The State Department requests GPOI assistance globally, rather than on an individual country basis, and consequently such assistance is not included in individual countries' foreign assistance justifications in the annual International Affairs Congressional Budget Justifications. The GPOI funding indicated in this chart directly benefitted the Ugandan and Burundian troops deploying to Somalia with AMISOM. The Somalia PKO figure provided above for FY2008 includes \$2.54 million as part of the \$6.307 million provided to State by the U.N. pursuant to a Section 607 agreement for support to AMISOM. Up to \$35 million of FY2009 PKO funding obligated for support to AMISOM may be reimbursed by the U.N. for services provided on behalf of the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM.

Tanzania¹⁹¹

The United States and Tanzania have cooperated on counterterrorism issues since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, in which 11 were killed and over 70 injured. Tanzania shares borders with eight countries, and porous borders remain a security challenge. The State Department reports that the country remains vulnerable to international terrorism. The Tanzanian government passed legislation in 2002 criminalizing support for terrorist groups, and in 2006 passed legislation to counter money laundering. The country established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to receive, analyze, and disseminate suspicious transaction reports, with support from a Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold program. Tanzania hosts the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Tanzania is the second-largest recipient of TIP and CTF funding in the region.

Security Sector Assistance

Tanzania has received U.S. assistance to build its capacity to respond to terrorist threats, including through efforts to improve aviation and border security. In FY2007, the country received roughly \$1 million in Section 1206 assistance. FMF funding, which is part of a broader program to support military professionalization, has a counterterrorism component that supports Tanzanian efforts to improve command and control, communications, and night-vision systems. Border control efforts are also supported by NADR. Through EARSII, the United States has supported the military's development of a counterterrorism training curriculum, and Tanzania receives civil-military operations training through EARSII. In FY2011, U.S. assistance is expected to support upgrades to the country's border management system.

Tanzania initiated efforts in 2005 to establish a National Counterterrorism Center to collect, share and analyze data among agencies and coordinate crisis response. U.S. assistance continues to support the center. The State Department reports that Tanzanian police have limited investigative capability, and aid includes training in criminal investigation, crisis response, small arms trafficking and related counterterrorism courses.

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

Through EACTI, USAID supported basic education initiatives, including girls' scholarships, for Muslim and pastoralist populations and provided primary-level education programs by radio. Some of this aid is continuing under EARSII; for example, ESF funds in FY2010 supported communications efforts targeting Muslim communities. CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs teams have been active in coastal communities, conducting infrastructure improvements and other projects.

Tanzania at a Glance

Population: 41 million
Urban population: 25%
Median Age: 18.3 years
Infant Mortality Rate: 69/1,000
Religions: Christian 30%, Muslim 35%, indigenous beliefs 35%; Zanzibar: 99% Muslim
Literacy: 69.4%
Unemployment rate: N/A
GDP: \$57.7 billion
GDP per capita: \$1,400
Military Spending: 0.2% of GDP
HDI Ranking: 151/182 countries
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

¹⁹¹ See also CRS Report RS22781, *Tanzania: Background and Current Conditions*, by Ted Dagne.

Table A-10. State Department and USAID Assistance to Tanzania

\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	1,414	1,074	650	3,150	1,700	9,318
Investing in People	127,387	226,606	346,085	441,999	434,779	464,754
Economic Growth	6,082	6,186	8,500	9,740	25,500	74,000
Humanitarian Assistance	13,711	11,731	14,562	9,719	N/A	N/A
Peace & Security	2,701	2,368	449	375	1,050	1,550
Counterterrorism	2,701	2,289	149	0	450	0

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011

Table A-11. Select U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Security Assistance to Tanzania

\$, in thousands

Source	Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State & USAID Bilateral Funding	FMF	0	0	0	0	0	200	200
	IMET	0	0	66	300	375	400	400
	INCLE	0	0	0	0	0	450	950
	NADR	756	2,701	2,302	149	0	0	0
	NADR-EXBS	25	200	13	0	0	0	N/A
	NADR-TIP	—	—	175	149	—	—	N/A
State and USAID Regional Funding	NADR-ATA	731	2,101	1,689	N/A	1,126	N/A	N/A
	NADR-CTF	86	300	600	65	65	0	N/A
	NADR-TIP	200	100	—	—	375	375	N/A
	FMF	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	500	N/A
	EARS PKO	0	0	0	0	0	157	N/A
DOD Funding	Section 1206	0	0	937	0	0	0	N/A
	Section 1004/1033	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A
	CTFP	296	128	38	43	442	308	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs for regional figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, and DSCA for DOD figures.

Uganda¹⁹²

The State Department considers Uganda to be a key regional partner and a valuable ally in combating terrorist threats in the region. Uganda provides the majority of AU peacekeepers in Somalia, and it leads regional efforts to address the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an insurgent group that continues to terrorize civilians throughout Central Africa. U.S. officials have expressed concern that Uganda remains a transit point and area of recruitment for violent extremist groups, as well as a possible source for illegal government documents. President Yoweri Museveni has been a vocal supporter of counterterrorism efforts in the region, but the State Department has documented serious human rights abuses and electoral irregularities in Uganda,¹⁹³ and some observers have expressed concern that Museveni's cooperation on counterterrorism constrains Western criticism for alleged political abuses.

Uganda enacted anti-terrorism legislation in 2002 that provides the legal basis for prosecuting suspected terrorists and freezing assets, but the country has yet to adopt legislation to counter money laundering or terrorist financing.

Security Sector Assistance

The State Department reports that Uganda's counterterrorism response is constrained by a shortage of equipment, fuel, and funding, and that its security agencies need to improve cooperation and information sharing.¹⁹⁴ Ugandan forces also face competing security priorities, including operations against the LRA, insecurity in the Karamojong area, and troop contributions to AMISOM. U.S. restrictions on military assistance (related to Ugandan military operations in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo in the late 1990s) have been lifted gradually over the last decade, beginning in 2002 when Uganda withdrew troops from the DRC, to support operations against the LRA. Restrictions on IMET and FMF remained until May 2004, when funding was provided support peacekeeping, professionalization, and counterterrorism efforts. Uganda received aid through the former Front Line States Initiative, also known as the East Africa Regional Fund, which provided, for example, almost \$4 million in non-lethal military equipment; the country has received subsequent equipment through Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to counter the LRA threat. Uganda has received over \$12 million in FY2009 and FY2010 PKO funds for non-lethal anti-LRA assistance. The State Department has also provided \$2 million in PKO funds through the ACSBS program for non-lethal equipment and logistics support to Ugandan forces.

Uganda at a Glance

Population: 32.4 million
Urban population: 13%
Median Age: 15 years
Infant Mortality Rate: 65/1,000
Religions: Christian 82%, Muslim 12%, other 3%
Literacy: 66.8%
Unemployment rate: N/A
GDP: \$38.18 billion
GDP per capita: \$1,200
Military Spending: 2.2% of GDP
HDI Ranking: 157/182 countries
 Source: CIA World Factbook, UNDP

Uganda has been an active participant in the ACOTA program, and its forces have received a variety of counterterrorism-related training for their deployment to Somalia under AMISOM. The Ugandan military has also participated in counterterrorism training courses through EARSIS PKO funds, and Ugandan officers have participated in counterterrorism courses at the Naval

¹⁹² See also CRS Report RL33701, *Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda*, by Ted Dagne.

¹⁹³ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, op. cit.

¹⁹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism*, op. cit.

Postgraduate School (NPS) through CTFP. AFRICOM components have provided other assistance through mobile training teams. Other military aid has included training by CJTF-HOA personnel for Ugandan non-commissioned officers, and AFRICOM-supported education programs at Uganda's Senior Command and Staff College. Uganda received intelligence training through the Africa Data Sharing Network (ASDN) in 2010, primarily to address the LRA threat.

U.S. assistance to the Ugandan military includes a range of efforts to encourage respect for human rights, improve civilian protection, and improve civil-military relations. The State Department stresses that human rights training is an important component of its IMET program, which includes support for Ugandan efforts to prosecute abuses. Uganda hosted a regional security seminar in mid-2010 conducted by the NPS's Center for Civil-Military Relations with CTFP funds, and it is receiving additional civil-military operations training through EARSII.

The United States has supported efforts to build the capacity and professionalism of Uganda's law enforcement authorities with DA and INCLE funds. This assistance includes community-based police training; advanced courses for specialized police units working on maritime and border security and on the handling of forensic evidence; and training on general investigative techniques and crime scene management at the national police academy. DA funds also support Ugandan efforts to train police from the DRC, Southern Sudan, and Somalia at a regional center. The State Department allocated \$800,000 in ATA funds in 2010 to support counterterrorism-related community-based police training for Uganda and other East African nations.

Efforts to Mitigate Extremism and Foster Peace Through Development

Through EACTI, USAID supported Early Childhood Development in select Ugandan mosques and madrassas targeting poor communities and a strong focus on community participation. EARSII funding in FY2010 has supported messaging programs targeted at Muslim communities. Broader development assistance to Uganda includes efforts to foster social inclusion and increase access to justice, as well as to encourage more accountable and responsive governance.

Table A-12. State Department and USAID Assistance to Uganda

\$, in thousands

Objective	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009 actual	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
Governing Justly & Democratically	2,378	2,419	2,100	4,500	7,000	6,500
Investing in People	197,435	259,430	316,082	328,430	388,084	404,684
Economic Growth	42,561	23,772	48,735	50,047	57,750	62,283
Humanitarian Assistance	0	44,414	46,283	18,546	N/A	N/A
Peace & Security	2,030	4,110	5,825	2,629	3,985	6,835
Counterterrorism	100	27	200	0	0	0

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2006-2011

Table A-13. U.S. Counterterrorism and Related Security Assistance to Uganda

\$, in thousands

Source	Account	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010 estimate	FY2011 request
State & USAID Bilateral Funding	FMF	1,984	0	0	0	0	300	300
	IMET	293	340	283	625	629	550	600
	INCLE	0	0	0	0	0	235	1,535
	NADR	0	140	27	200	0	0	0
State and USAID Regional Funding	NADR- ATA	0	N/A	27	0	1,750	108	N/A
	NADR EXBS	25	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
	NADR-TIP	731	100	0	200	150	125	N/A
	PKO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4,400	7,600	N/A
	ACSBS PKO	0	0	0	0	0	2,000	N/A
	EARS PKO	—	—	—	—	—	675	N/A
DOD Funding	CTFP	26	25	3	55	58	1,048	N/A

Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2005-2011 for State Department bilateral figures; U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs for regional figures; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, AFRICOM, and DSCA for DOD figures.

Note: Regional PKO funds in FY2009 and FY2010 noted above support Ugandan efforts to counter the LRA. This table does not include ACOTA assistance to prepare Ugandan forces for deployment to AMISOM.

Other Countries in the Region

Burundi

The State Department reports that Burundi's counterterrorism efforts have been hindered by lingering tensions associated with its civil war, weak government institutions, corruption, and porous borders.¹⁹⁵ The country also lacks the ability to effectively counter money laundering and terrorist financing. Burundi is nevertheless contributing a significant number of troops to AMISOM, and the United States provides ACOTA assistance and other military training. Based on security concerns related to the July 2010 Kampala bombings and Al Shabaab threats against Burundi for its role as an AMISOM troop contributor, the State Department is conducting an anti-terrorism needs assessment in Burundi, with particular focus on the criminal justice sector. In 2010, opposition parties allege that the government has used terrorism charges selectively to harass those critical of the regime.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism*, op. cit.

¹⁹⁶ "Burundi Opposition Official Arrested," AFP, October 6, 2010.

Rwanda¹⁹⁷

Rwanda has reportedly been very cooperative with the U.S. government on efforts to counter terrorism.¹⁹⁸ The country established an intergovernmental counterterrorism committee early in the early 2000s, and cooperation with the United States on terrorist financing issues has been “excellent,” according to the State Department. In 2009, Rwanda initiated efforts to create a financial investigations unit, in accordance with counterterrorist financing legislation passed in 2008. Rwanda is one of the world’s largest contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and the country receives military training and equipment through a variety of programs, including ACOTA, IMET, FMF, and military-to-military engagements. The U.S. Coast Guard have trained Rwandan marines on a variety of maritime and border security topics, including counterterrorism procedures. Rwandan law enforcement authorities have also received U.S. training through a range of programs. Rwanda has arrested several opposition leaders on terrorism-related charges, leading some human rights activists to suggest it is using the charge to harass its critics. Rwandan authorities do not always publicly disclose the evidence behind such charges, making terrorism accusations difficult to substantiate.¹⁹⁹

Sudan²⁰⁰

Sudan remains on the U.S. government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, although the State Department reports that the Sudanese government pursues counterterrorism operations against threats to U.S. interests and personnel in the country, and continues to disrupt foreign fighters from transiting the country.²⁰¹ The department also reports that “Al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements” as well as members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas continue to operate there. On January 1, 2008, an American USAID employee and his Sudanese driver were murdered by gunmen in what some in the State Department have termed a terrorist attack conducted by AQ operatives.²⁰² A previously unknown group, Ansar al Tawhid, claimed responsibility, but U.S. State Department has identified the gunmen as “sympathetic” to Al Qaeda and calling themselves part of a group known as Al Qaeda in the Land Between the Two Niles.²⁰³ U.S. reports suggest that former participants in the Iraqi insurgency have “returned to Sudan and are in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass their knowledge to local Sudanese extremists,” and that Sudanese extremists have participated in terrorist activities in Somalia.²⁰⁴

Sudan benefits from select U.S. counterterrorism training. The country is a member of EARSI, but it does not currently receive funding from the program. U.S. legal restrictions continue to prevent the U.S. government from providing security assistance to the Government of Sudan, but the United States provides security assistance to the former guerilla army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), as part of its effort to “promote the long-term stability of Southern

¹⁹⁷ See also CRS Report R40115, *Rwanda: Background and Current Developments*, by Ted Dagne

¹⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism*, op. cit.

¹⁹⁹ “Rights Group Urges Rwanda to Respect Opposition,” AFP, October 16, 2010.

²⁰⁰ See also CRS Report RL33574, *Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement*, by Ted Dagne.

²⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, op. cit.

²⁰² U.S. Department of State, *Diplomatic Security: 2008 Year in Review*, April 2009.

²⁰³ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, op. cit.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Sudan.”²⁰⁵ Southern Sudan continues to face a range of security threats and remains awash with small arms, in spite of ongoing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts. Moreover, a resumption of hostilities between the north and the south cannot be ruled out. While the main focus of U.S. security assistance efforts in the south is to support security sector reform of the SPLA and the South Sudan Police Service, with the goal of supporting the SPLA’s transformation into a smaller, more professional conventional military force, elements of the U.S. effort include some counterterrorism training. For example, SPLA officers have participated in U.S. counterterrorism courses, including programs at the Naval Post Graduate School, and familiarization events funded through CTFP. Sudan has also received counterterrorism assistance through the Terrorist Interdiction Program.

²⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justifications for FY2010 and FY2011*.

Appendix B. Regional Program Funding

Table B-1. East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSi)
\$, in thousands

Account	Program	Recipient(s)	FY2009	FY2010
PKO	Train and Equip (T&E) CT Unit	Djibouti	1,930	167
	T&E of CT Unit	Kenya	2,770	—
	Contractor support to develop and monitor EARSi program	AFRICOM	300	—
	Small boats	Djibouti	—	1,011
	T&E of Republican National Guard	Djibouti	—	2,200
	MD-500 helicopter support	Kenya	—	2,500
	T&E of technical intelligence platoon	Kenya	—	3,000
	Military intelligence curriculum development	Tanzania	—	157
	CT training	Uganda	—	675
	Civil-military operations	Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	—	290
	TOTAL		5,000	10,000
NADR	Law enforcement capacity (ATA)	N/A	N/A	7,600
	Counterterrorism Finance (CTF)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	PISCES upgrades (TIP)	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda	N/A	1,625
	Border patrol training (RSI)	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	N/A	500
	Airport screening T&E (RSI)	Djibouti	N/A	500
	Airport security training (RSI)	Ethiopia	N/A	500
	Police/Media/Community relations consultation (RSI)	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	N/A	390
	Additional programs (RSI)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	TOTAL		N/A	12,990
INCLE	Criminal justice sector T&E	all	N/A	1,900
	Program support	all	—	100
	TOTAL		N/A	2,000
ESF	Youth and Livelihood program	Somalia	2,000	N/A
	Eastleigh Youth program	Kenya	150	N/A
	Garissa Youth Project	Kenya	3,000	N/A
	Cross-border dialogue	Kenya, Somalia	375	N/A

Source: PKO, NADR and INCLE figures provided by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs.

Notes: Funding for EARSi programs provided through regional PKO funds, unless otherwise indicated.

Table B-2. Assistance Provided through Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA

\$, in thousands

Recipient(s)	Program	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Totals
Djibouti	Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Response, Interdiction, and Coastal Security Enhancement	—	8.0	—	—	—	27.7
	East Africa Regional Security Initiative (EARSi)	—	0.9	—	—	—	
	Counterterrorist (CT) Communications Package	—	—	5.1	—	—	
	CT Capabilities Package	—	—	—	3.3	—	
	Regional Maritime Awareness CT Capability	—	—	—	—	10.4	
Ethiopia	EARSi	—	9.3	—	—	—	34.8
	CT Communications and Combat Engineering Capability	—	—	13.3	—	—	
	Night Vision Capability Package	—	—	1.9	—	—	
	Regiment and Platoon CT Initiative	—	—	—	10.3	—	
Kenya	EARSi	—	3.1	—	—	—	37.5
	Border Security Initiative	—	—	4.1	—	—	
	Border and Coastal Security Enhancement	—	—	6.6	—	—	
	Maritime Security Initiative	—	—	—	15.2	—	
	Border CT Security	—	—	—	—	8.5	
Tanzania	EARSi	—	.9	—	—	—	0.9
Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles	South East African Maritime Security Initiative	—	—	—	8.4	—	8.4
Total Africa		0	22.2	31	37.2	18.9	109.2

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Notes: Figures for FY2006-2009 indicate allocations; Figures for FY2010 are projected, as provided through Congressional Notifications.

Appendix C. Related Hearings of the 111th Congress

Hearings on the evolving threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates:

House Armed Services Committee, “Al Qaeda in 2010: How Should the U.S. Respond?,” January 27, 2010

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Confronting Al Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond,” October 7, 2009.

Hearings on Al Shabaab’s recruitment efforts in the United States:

Senate Homeland and Governmental Affairs Committee, “Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America,” March 11, 2009; and “Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” September 22, 2010.

House Homeland Security Committee, “The Evolving Nature of Terrorism,” September 15, 2010.

House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Series of hearings held by the on May 26, 2010; March 17, 2010; December 15, 2009; and November 19, 2009.

Hearings on political instability and terrorist activities in Somalia:

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, “The Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy,” June 17, 2010; and “Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace and a Unified Response to Extremism and Terrorism,” June 25, 2009

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable Strategy for Somalia,” May 20, 2009

Hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Policy Toward Yemen and Somalia,” April 29, 2010.

Hearings on U.S. efforts to counter terrorism:

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, “Strategies for Countering Violent Extremist Ideologies,” March 10, 2010

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, “Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism,” February 12, 2009

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Engaging with Muslim Communities Around the World,” February 26, 2009.

House Foreign Affairs Committee, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites,” September 29, 2010.

House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “A Review of Current and Evolving Trends in Terrorism Financing,” September 28, 2010.

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