国会纪录：2000年12月15日（参议院）
Page S11837-S11841怀旧，欢送莫伊尼汉先生。主席先生，在第106届国会的我这最后一天会要求被允许怀旧和告别的时刻。快来1月3日 - 迪奥voluntus，作为兄弟用来教导我们 - 我会在美国参议院，近四分之一个世纪已经担任四届。在我国历史悠久只有另外一个纽约人，我们敬爱的贾维茨，担任了四届。我从一开始就加入了财务委员会的财富，并担任了一段时间的主席，第一纽约客自内战之前。我也是，在一个点上，环境和公共工程的椅子。我一直对规则和行政最长的一段时间，和今后一个时期也是外交关系。参议员就知道，这将是最不寻常的人对金融业和外交关系服务在同一时间。这是如何来到约的帐户可能会感兴趣。1986年的选举产生一个民主党占多数的参议院和民主党指导委员会，而我当时一员，开始在各常设委员会填补空缺民主的一年两次的任务。 There are four ``Super A'' committees as we term them. In order of creation they are Foreign Relations, Finance, Armed Services and Appropriations. With the rarest exceptions, under our caucus rules a Senator may only serve on one of these four. There were three vacancies on Foreign Relations. In years past these would have been snapped up. Foreign Relations was a committee of great prestige and daunting tasks. Of a sudden however, no one seemed interested. The Senate was already experiencing what the eminent statesman James Schlesinger describes in the current issue of The National Interest as ``the loss of interest in foreign policy by the general public'' (p. 110). Two newly-elected Senators were more or less persuaded to take seats. At length the Steering Committee turned to me, as a former ambassador. I remained on Finance. And so I served six years under the chairmanship of the incomparable Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. I treasure the experience--the signing and ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the final days of the Cold War. But I continue to be puzzled and troubled by our inattention to foreign affairs. To be sure, the clearest achievement of this Congress has been in the field of foreign trade, with major enactments regarding Africa, the Caribbean, and China. These, however, have been the province of the Finance Committee, and it was with great difficulty and at most partial success did Chairman Bill Roth and I make the connection between world trade and world peace. This would have been self-evident at mid-century. I remark, and I believe there is a case, that any short list of events that led to the Second World War would include the aftermath of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. Indeed, in the course of the ceremony at which the President signed the measure naming possible permanent normal trade relations with China in connection with its admission to the World Trade Organization, I observed that the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which conceived the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and anticipated an international trade organization, opened on the day I joined the Navy. For certain there was no connection, but my point was simply that in the midst of war the Allies were looking to a lasting peace that might follow, and this very much included the absence of trade wars. But again, how to account for the falling-off of congressional involvement in foreign affairs. I offer the thought that the failure of our intelligence, in the large sense of term, to foresee--forsooth to conceive!--the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought forth a psychology of denial and avoidance. We would as soon not think too much about all, thank you very much. I have recounted elsewhere the 1992 hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee on the START I Treaty. Our superb negotiators had mastered every mind-numbing detail of this epic agreement. With one exception. They had negotiated the treaty with a sovereign nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Now they brought to us a treaty signed with four quite different nations: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. When asked when this new set of signatories was agreed to, the Committee was informed that this had just recently taken place at a meeting in Lisbon. An observer might well have wondered if this was the scenario of a Humphrey Bogart movie. The negotiators were admirably frank. The Soviet Union had broken up in December 1991. Few, if any, at their ``end of the street'' had predicted the collapse. Let me correct the record: None had. As to the record, I would cite the 1991 article in Foreign Affairs by the estimable Stansfield Turner. The Admiral had served as Director of Central Intelligence and knew the record. He was blunt, as an admiral ought. I cite a passage in Secrecy: [Turner wrote,] ``We should not gloss over the enormity of this failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis. We know now that there were many Soviet academics, economists and political thinkers, other than those officially presented to us by the Soviet government, who understood long before 1980 that the Soviet economic system was broken and that it was only a matter of time before someone had to try and repair it, as had Khrushchev. Yet I never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing systemic economic problem.'' Turner acknowledged the ``revisionist rumblings'' claiming that the CIA had in fact seen the collapse coming, but he dismissed them: ``If some individual CIA analysts were more prescient than the corporate view, their ideas were filtered out in the bureaucratic process; and it is the corporate view that counts because that is what reaches the president and his advisors. On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile. Why were so many of us insensitive to the inevitable? Just as striking is the experience of General George Lee Butler, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) from 1990 to 1994. Again to cite from Secrecy. As the one responsible for drafting the overall U.S. strategy for nuclear [[Page S11838]] war, Butler had studied the Soviet Union with an intensity and level of detail matched by few others in the West. He had studied the footage of the military parades and the Kremlin, had scrutinized the deployments of Soviet missiles and other armaments: ``In all, he thought of the Soviet Union as a fearsome garrison state seeking global domination and preparing for certain conflict with the West. The only reasonable posture for the United States, he told colleagues, was to keep thousands of American nuclear weapons at the ready so that if war broke out, Washington could destroy as much of the Soviet nuclear arsenal as possible. It was the harrowing but hallowed logic of nuclear deterrence.'' But Butler began having doubts about this picture, upon which so much of U.S. foreign policy was based, by the time of his first visit to the Soviet Union, on December 4, 1988. When he landed at Sheremetyevo Airport, on the outskirts of Moscow, he thought at first that the uneven, pockmarked runway was an open field. The taxiways were still covered with snow from a storm two days earlier, and dozens of the runway lights were broken. Riding into downtown Moscow in an official motorcade, Butler noticed the roads were ragged, the massive government buildings crumbling. He was astonished when the gearshift in his car snapped off in his driver's hand. After pouring over thousands of satellite photos and thirty years' worth of classified reports, Butler had expected to find a modern, functional industrialized country; what he found instead was ``severe economic deprivation.'' Even more telling was ``the sense of defeat in the eyes of the people. . . . It all came crashing home to me that I really had been dealing with a caricature all those years.'' General Butler was right. More than he might have known. This fall former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski estimated that the economy of ``Russia is one-tenth the size of America and its industrial plant is about three times older than the OECD average.'' The population has dropped from 151 million in 1990 to 146 million in 1999. Infant mortality is devastating. Far from overwhelming the West, it is problematic as to whether Russia can maintain a presence east of the Ural Mountains. If you consider that the empire of the Czars once extended to San Francisco we can judge the calamity brought about by sixty-some years of Marxist-Leninism. And yet we did not judge. To say again, the United States government had no sense of what was coming, not the least preparation for the implosion of 1991. In 1919, John Reed, a Harvard graduate, and later a Soviet agent wrote Ten Days that Shook the World, his celebrated account of the Russian Revolution, as it would come to be known, in October 1917. In no time these events acquired mythic dimension for intellectuals and others the world over. At Harvard, Daniel Bell would patiently guide students through the facts that there were two Russian Revolutions; the first democratic, the second in effect totalitarian. But this was lost on all but a few. It would appear that the Soviet collapse was so sudden, we were so unprepared for it, that we really have yet to absorb the magnitude of the event. It was, after all, the largest peaceful revolution in history. Not a drop of blood was shed as a five hundred year old empire broke up into some twelve nations, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, whilst formerly independent nations absorbed into the Soviet Bloc, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia et al., regained their independence. In the aftermath there has been no book, no movie, no posters, no legend. To the contrary, weak Russia grows steadily weaker--possibly to the point of instability, as shown in the miserable events in Chechnya. We see a government of former agents of the intelligence services and the secret police. We see continued efforts at increasing armament. Witness the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk. We see the return of the red flag. We see little engagement with the West, much less the East where China looms with perhaps ten times the population and far more economic strength. And the United States? Apart from a few perfunctory measures, and one serious, the Nunn-Lugar program, almost no response. To the contrary, at this moment we have, as we must assume, some 6,000 nuclear weapons targeted on Russia, a number disproportionate at the height of the Cold War, and near to lunacy in the aftermath. When, as Senator Lugar estimates, the Russian defense budget has declined to $5 billion a year. What is more, other than the highest echelon of the Pentagon, no doubt some elements of the intelligence community, possibly the Department of State, no American knows what the targeting plan is. In particular, Members of Congress, possibly with very few exceptions, do not know. Are they refused information? Just recently, our esteemed colleague,内布拉斯加州的j·罗伯特·克里(J. Robert Kerrey)，国防部长威廉·s·科恩(William S. Cohen)写道他是我们的一位前同事，他向我们阐述了这一疯狂情况的事实。有迹象表明，一场关于核武器的公开辩论可能正在进行。最近在《华盛顿邮报》上，我们了解到洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室副主任、核武器工作负责人斯蒂芬·m·杨格对一项提议的回应，建议大幅削减我们武器库中的大规模武器数量，转而使用小型武器，以应对比冷战期间设想的规模小得多的交战。《华盛顿邮报》报道ReportsReports说，我们现在有大约7982枚弹头，与9种不同的运载系统相连，包括洲际弹道导弹、潜射弹道导弹和轰炸机。根据《削减战略武器条约》(Start II)，按照计划，这些潜艇数量将减少到3500艘，相当于三叉戟II潜艇数量的一半。Younger认为需要的更少。其中任何一个都会毁灭地球上任何一座大城市。其他专家似乎认为，几十到几百枚当今的高当量弹头就足以应对与俄罗斯或中国的对峙。也许更紧迫的问题是，在那些出于某种原因仍被称为第三世界国家的国家，核武器是冷战时期使用的遗物。 Nuclear standoff has settled into the South Asian subcontinent. The prospect that an ``Islamic Bomb'' will migrate westwards from Pakistan is real enough. It may be happening at this moment. The more then do we need open debate. The more urgent then is Senator Kerrey's assertion that Congress be involved. His profound observation that ``Sometimes secrecy produces its opposite; less safety and security.'' I have remarked on how little notice has been taken of the Russian revolution of 1989-91. By contrast, the ``information revolution'' has become a fixture of our vocabulary and our pronouncements on the widest range of subjects, and at times would seem to dominate political discourse. It might do well to make a connection as Francis Fukuyama does in the current issue of Commentary. In his review of a new book by George Gilder with the suggestive title Telecom: How Infinite Bandwidth Will Revolutionize Our World, Fukuyama makes the connection. Why, then, do those convinced that the revolution is already triumphant shake their heads so sadly at those of us who ``just don't get it?'' True, people want to feel good about themselves, and it helps to believe that one is contributing to some higher social purpose while pursuing self-enrichment. But it must also be conceded that the information-technology revolution really does have more going for it than previous advances in, say, steam or internal combustion (or, one suspects, than the coming revolution in biotechnology). The mechanization of production in the 19th and early 20th centuries rewarded large-scale organization, routinization, uniformity, and centralization. Many of the great works of imagination that accompanied this process, from Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, depicted individuals subsumed by huge machines, often of a political nature. Not so the information revolution, which usually punishes excessively large scale, distributes information and hence power to much larger groups of people, and rewards intelligence, risk, creativity and education rather than obedience and regimentation. Although [[Page S11839]] one would not wish to push this too far, it is probably no accident that the Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes did not survive the transition into the information age. Is it possible to hope that we might give some serious thought to the possible connection? And to ask ourselves just how we measure up in this regard? That said, is it not extraordinary and worrying that of a sudden we find ourselves in a state of great agitation concerning security matters all across our government, from our nuclear laboratories at home to embassies abroad to the topmost reaches of government? The late Lars-Erik Nelson described it as ``spy panic.'' In the process the possibility emerges that our national security will be compromised to a degree unimaginable by mere espionage. The possibility is that we could grievously degrade the most important institutions of foreign and defense policy--our capacity for invention and innovation--through our own actions. Take the matter of the loss, and evident return in clouded circumstances of two hard drives containing sensitive nuclear information from the Nuclear Energy Search Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This June, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked two of our wisest statesmen, the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr., and the Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, to enquire into the matter. Here are the Key Findings of their9月25日的报告．虽然目前还不清楚发生了什么事，在洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室丢失的硬盘驱动器，很显然，有一个安全漏洞，并且在硬盘驱动器的数据丢失的后果将是极其有害于国家安全。在硬盘驱动器事件的已知后果，最令人担忧的是在Los Alamos国家实验室的士气和生产力，发挥了为国家的关键国家安全角色的破坏性影响。目前负气候与良好的科学的表现不兼容。在国家实验室完善的安全系统是没有用的，如果实验室不能再产生前沿技术，需要从披露不当的保护。关键是要扭转在Los Alamos国家实验室的士气低落它进一步破坏该机构既要继续作出重大贡献我们的国家安全，并保护那就是其职责履行的关键敏感的国家安全信息的能力之前。紧急应采取行动，以确保美国洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室回来工作在改革后的安全结构，让那里的工作要持续成功的长期。几乎是独自评论中，拉尔斯·埃里克·纳尔逊追求的事情，说明采访参议员贝克和汉密尔顿代表曾与实验室人员。他们现在报告说``李文事务的综合影响，在[洛斯阿拉莫斯]最近的消防和周围的硬盘驱动器插曲持续的漩涡已经摧毁了士气和生产力在[洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室。员工我们见面表示担心，并通过深表关切。 . . yellow crime-scene tape in their workspace, the interrogation of their colleagues by . . . federal prosecutors before a grand jury and the resort of some of their colleagues to taking a second mortgage on their homes to pay for attorney fees. There is no denying that Lee and whoever misplaced the computer drives committed serious breaches of security. But the resulting threat to our safety is only theoretical; the damage to morale, productivity and recruitment is real. Employees were furious at being forced to take routine lie-detector tests, a requirement imposed on them by a panicky Secretary of Energy. . . . Obviously, there is a need for security in government. A Los Alamos employee gave Baker and Hamilton an obvious, easy solution. Unfortunately, it will be the one most likely to be adopted: ``The safest and most secure way to do work is not to do any work at all.'' In the course of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (of which more later), a Commission member, then-Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch, revealed to the American people the extraordinary work of the VENONA project, an enterprise of the Army Security Agency during and after World War II. During the war the agency began to copy KGB traffic from and to the United States. On December 20, 1946, Meredith K. Gardner--I am happy to say still with us, buoyant and brilliant as ever--``broke'' the first. Dated 2 December 1944, it was a list of the principal nuclear scientists at Los Alamos. Bethe, Bohr, Fermi, Newman, Rossi, Kistiakowsky, Segre, Taylor, Penney, Compton, Lawrence and so on. The Soviets knew, and in time stole essentials of the early atom bomb. But what they could not do, was to slow down or deter the work of these great men, who would take us further into the age of the hydrogen bomb. Next, their successors to yet more mind-bending feats. The Soviets could not stop them. Would it not be the final triumph of the defunct Cold War if we stopped them ourselves? Do not dismiss this thought. If you happen to know a professor of physics, enquire as to how many ``post-docs'' are interested in weapons research, given the present atmosphere. To work at one-third the salary available elsewhere, and take lie detector tests. And then there is intelligence. Nelson quotes a ``former top intelligence official'' who told him, ``If you're not taking secrets home, you're not doing your job.'' And yet here we are harassing John M. Deutch, a scientist of the greatest achievement, a public servant of epic ability for--working at home after dinner. Would it be too far- fetched to ask when will the next Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology choose to leave the banks of the Charles River for the swamps of the Potomac? Now I don't doubt that, as opposed to an intelligence official, there are ambassadors who don't take their work home at night. Over the years the United States has created a number of postings with just that attraction. But these are few. The great, overwhelming number of our ambassadors and their embassy associates are exceptional persons who have gone in harm's way to serve their country. I was ambassador to India at the time our ambassador to Sudan and an aide were abducted from a reception by Islamic terrorists, spirited away and murdered. Some days later the Egyptian envoy in New Delhi asked to see me. He had a message from then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to tell me that their intelligence sources reported I would be next. It is a not uncommon occurrence. But nothing so common as taking work home, or working in a--usually heavily armored--embassy limousine. Ask any former ambassador to Israel. Our embassy in Tel Aviv is an hour's drive from the capital in Jerusalem. The drive up and back is routinely used to dictate memoranda of conversation, type them on a laptop. Whatever. This fall, the superbly qualified, many would say indispensable ambassador to Israel, Martin S. Indyk, was stripped of his security clearances for just such actions. I cite Al Kamen's account in The Washington Post. Just the other day, ambassador to Israel Martin S. Indyk was deep into the State Department doghouse for ``suspected violations'' of security regulations. His security clearance was suspended, so he couldn't handle classified materials. He needed an escort while in the State Department building. The department's diplomatic security folks wanted him to stay in this country until their investigation was completed. At a White House briefing Monday, a reporter asked if Indyk could ``function as ambassador? Do we have a functioning ambassador?'' ``Not at the moment,'' press secretary Jake Siewert said. Allow me to cite a report by the redoubtable Jane Perlez, who was just recently reporting from Pyongyang on the psychotic security measures in the capital of North Korea. Eerily similar antics were to be encountered on September 30, Ms. Perlez reported: State Dept. Unfreezes Hundreds of Promotions After Delay for Security Review Washington, Sept. 29.--A continuing security crackdown at the State Department led to the freezing of promotions for more than 200 senior officials, pending a review of their security records, department officials said today. The director general of the Foreign Service, Marc Grossman, said he was assessing the promotion files for security violations [[Page S11840]] before sending the promotions to the White House, which then dispatches them to Congress for approval. The release of the list was delayed after the suspension of the security clearance of one of the department's most senior officials, Martin S. Indyk, ambassador to Israel, and a sudden vigilance by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, who is under pressure from Congress on security problems. This evening, the department said that ``under 10'' officials had been barred from promotions after Mr. Grossman's review of 400 candidates. The nearly 400 people included 200 midlevel officials, whose promotions were released today after a weeklong delay. As word of the latest action spread through the department, an assistant secretary of state complained at a senior staff meeting this week that management faced ``rage'' in the building and increasingly demoralized employees, according to several accounts of the session. Others, as well as diplomats abroad, complained of a poisonous atmosphere in the department created, in part, by security officials who grilled junior Foreign Service officers about their superiors. One senior official said the obsession with security had created a ``monster'' out of the bureau of diplomatic security, which Congress generously finances to the detriment of other areas of the department. In a yet more eerie analogy, one department employee described the situation as a ``security jihad.'' It doesn't stop. It accelerates! Just this month The Washington Post reported the resignation of senior diplomats, the suspension of another, the firing of a further two over security matters. J. Stapleton Roy, one of the nation's two most senior foreign service officers and a three-time U.S. ambassador, has resigned in protest after Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright suspended his deputy without pay and fired two other long-time State Department officials over a missing top- secret laptop computer. . . . The departure of Roy and the reassignment of [Donald] Keyser will rob the department of two of its top China experts. The son of a missionary, Roy grew up in China, returned to the United States to go to Princeton University, then joined the foreign service. He later served as ambassador to China, Indonesia and Singapore. Keyser had served in Beijing three times, had been the State Department's director of Chinese and Mongolian affairs, and most recently held the rank of ambassador as a special negotiator for conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and former Soviet republics. ``That's a lot of brainpower suddenly removed from the State Department,'' said William C. McCahill, a recently retired foreign service officer who served as the deputy chief of mission in Beijing. ``Keyser is a brilliant analyst and a person of great intellectual honesty and rigor. Stape is the kind of person you want in INR, someone who can think beyond today and tomorrow, who can think beyond established policy.''--The Washington Post, December 5, 2000. With some hesitation I would call to mind the purge of the ``China hands'' from the Department of State during the McCarthy era. As our Commission established with finality, there was indeed a Soviet attack on American diplomacy and nuclear development during and after World War II. There were early and major successes. The design of the first atom bomb. But not much else, and for not much longer. The real damage--the parallels are eerie--to American security came from the disinclination of the intelligence community--then largely in the Army--to share information with ``civilians.'' Specifically, documents obtained from the F.B.I. indicate that President Truman was never told of the Army Signals Security Agency's decryptions of Soviet cables during and after the war. He thought the whole business of Communist spying was a ``red herring.'' In 1953 he termed Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley ``a crook and a louse.'' American diplomacy and the Department of State in particular were for years haunted by charges they could readily have dealt with had they but known what their own government knew. And who issued the instruction that the President was not to be told? General Omar N. Bradley whom the President had made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Admittedly it is hard to prove a negative.) But I was reassured by这篇文章刊登在中央情报局情报研究中心的《公报》夏季版上．在这篇文章中，中央情报局副历史学家迈克尔·华纳(Michael Warner)赞同我之前在《秘密》(Secrecy)一书中提出的判断。有什么是国务卿奥尔布赖特今天需要知道却没有被告知的?一代人之后，我们可能会学到东西。也就是说，如果当前的保密制度不变的话。然而，目前，如果斯台普顿大使因这样或那样的原因有机会回到国务院主楼，我还有更令人沮丧的消息要告诉他。我刚刚收到一封寄给外交安全局助理国务卿大卫·卡朋特的信的副本。另一位最近退休的大使，一位取得了巨大成就和无可非议的政治家，用他们的话说，最近被召到Main State。他在入口处被搜身。他被允许进入大楼，但被安排了一名“护卫”，无论他走到哪里，他都跟着。这位大使写道，其中包括“男厕所”。'' It is difficult not to agree with the Ambassador's assessment that ``the `escort' policy is insulting and totally out of proportion to any desired enhancement of security.'' But then so is so much of security policy as it has evolved over the past sixty years. What is to be done? Surely we must search for a pattern in all this. Our Commission proposed a simple, direct formation. Secrecy is a form of regulation. In the previous Congress, legislation was prepared to embody the essentials of the Commission recommendations. All classified materials would bear the name and position of the person assigning the classification and the date, subject to review, that the classification would expire. It is not generally realized, but apart from atomic matters, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and a few other areas there is no law stipulating what is to be classified Confidential, Secret, Top Secret--and there are numerous higher designations. It is simply a matter of judgement for anyone who has a rubber stamp handy. Our bill was unanimously reported from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, under the fine chairmanship of Senator Fred Thompson, with the full support of the then-ranking Committee member, our revered John Glenn. But nothing came of it. The assorted government agencies, covertly if you like, simply smothered it. The bureaucracy triumphed once more. Thomas Jefferson's dictum that ``An informed citizenry is vital to the functioning of a democratic society'' gave way before the self-perpetuating interests of bureaucracy. I am pleased to report that this year's Intelligence Authorization bill, which is now at the White House awaiting President Clinton's signature, includes the Public Interest Declassification Act. The measure establishes a nine-member ``Public Interest Declassification Board'' of ``nationally recognized experts'' who will advise the President and pertinent executive branch agencies on which national security documents should be declassified first. Five members of the Board will be appointed by the President and four members will be appointed by the Senate and the House. The Board's main purpose will be to help determine declassification priorities. This is especially important during a time of Congress' continual slashing of the declassification budgets. In addition to the routine systematic work required by President Clinton's Executive Order 12958, the intelligence community is also required to process Freedom of Information Act requests, Privacy Act requests, and special searches levied primarily by members of Congress and the administration. There is a need to bring order to this increasingly chaotic process. This Board may just provide the necessary guidance and will help determine how our finite declassification resources can best be allocated among all these competing demands. My hope is that the Board will be a voice within the executive branch urging restraint in matters of secrecy. I have tried to lay out the organizational dynamics which produce ever larger and more intrusive secrecy regimes. I have sought to suggest how damaging this can be to true national security interests. But this is a modest achievement given the great hopes with which our Commission concluded its work. I fear that rationality is but a weak foil to the irrational. In the end we shall need character as well as conviction. We need public persons the stature of George P. Shultz, who when in 1986 learned of plans to begin giving lie detector tests for State Department employees, calmly announced that the day that program began would be the day he submitted his resignation as Secretary of State. And so of course it [[Page S11841]] did not begin. And yet with him gone, the bureaucratic imperative reappears. And so Mr. President, I conclude my remarks, thanking all my fellow Senators present and past for untold courtesies over these many years. ____________________