国会记录:2000年10月26日(参议院)
页面S11072-S11074美国勇敢的服务男女和副总裁Gore关于外交政策债券先生的记录。主席先生，我今天上涨，解决了两个相关的问题;金博宝正规网址首先，表达对我们所知道的最致命和有效的外交政策工具之一的支持;也就是说，我们勇敢的服务男人和女性在遥远的海岸上守卫。我们最近被美国恐怖袭击所提醒的那个。在也门的科尔。这是另一个提醒人们，我们的部队在Farflung的一天24小时内观看我们许多人从未听说过。他们的存在和服务是外交政策的重要组成部分。水手们乘坐美国美国的努力拯救船的科尔是一种荣誉，勇气和承诺的证词，海军预计佩戴海军制服的各个水手。 Our thanks and our congratulations go to them; our sorrow, of course, for those who were lost; and our sympathies and prayers go with their families. But in light of the danger in which these fighting men and women of the United States are placed, it is important we assess our foreign policy, and that we take a look at the record of what has happened in the past. What have the two candidates done? Where would the Vice President lead us, based on his experience to date? When you talk about experience with respect to Vice President Gore's foreign policy, I am reminded of that old saw that "experience is what you get when you expected to get something else." His record of experience has been a very bad one, and one that will put at risk other sailors and other U.S. military in the future. You don't need to look too far to share these concerns. First, let me call attention to a Wall Street Journal editorial page article, "Gore's Hidden Weakness: Foreign Policy" from Monday, October 23. There Robert Zoellick expresses concern over the supposed foreign policy experience that Vice President Gore would bring to the White House. In the article he said that in the Chernomyrdin agreement: . . . he blessed Russian exports to Iran of weapons that could only be targeted against the U.S. Navy, which protects the world's energy lifeline. He went on to say: . . . Russian technicians continued to help Iran develop "laser isotope separation technology" used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This was to a country that the State Department called "the most active state sponsor of terrorism." We would have hoped that our Vice President, in his agreements with Mr. Chernomyrdin, would have been trying to build a market economy based on the rule of law. He should have prodded them to close down the corrupt commissions. But what we seem to have seen, as a result, or what has followed on that agreement, was a Soviet-style bureaucracy that never made any progress. There was an admission that the IMF money went to foreigners and Russian speculators. Quoting the editorial further, the former chairman of Russia's security commission said: "I cannot explain why the Western governments didn't pay serious attention." And Anatoly Chubais, Mr. Chernomyrdin's deputy, said pithily: "We conned them out of $20 billion." And the editorial writer, Mr. Zoellick, says: Mr. Gore's Russian record is more than a litany of costly mistakes. The vice president was unable to either perceive the true nature of Russia's transformation or to design creative U.S. policy to match the circumstances. I think we ought to be alarmed. We ought to be alarmed at the record that Vice President Gore has written as he takes credit for our foreign policy with Russia. Is it really credit, when we find that the Russians continue to export arms to Iran? Would it alarm Americans that Iran, which relies on Russian arms sales to maintain its own military, sends arms also to Hezbollah's guerrillas in Lebanon, which uses those same arms against Israeli soldiers in settlements? Yesterday, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began hearings to probe the recent press reports that Vice President Al Gore and the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made a secret agreement 5 years ago promising the Clinton White House would not enforce the law requiring sanctions for Russian sales to Iran. Is this what we can expect, secret deals with Russia that have not stopped the sales of dangerous weapons to Iran? We are still seeking disclosure to the appropriate committees of Congress of the details of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. They have not come forward even to give the committees of jurisdiction the details on that agreement. What is going on? Why is it being hidden? I think we all ought to be very much concerned about what appears to be a series of deadly mistakes covered up--covered up--and kept out of the view of the congressional committees. Now, portions of the 12-page agreement between Vice President Gore and Mr. Chernomyrdin appeared in the October 17 edition of the Washington Times. In there, it appeared that the U.S. Vice President committed our country to "avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law." The final document reads: "This aide memoire, as well as the attached annexes, will remain strictly confidential." This secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, and the Clinton-Gore administration's promise not to implement U.S. laws requiring sanctions for Russian weapons proliferation to Iran, was first reported in the New York Times on October 13 of this year. It said there that: In exchange for the Russian promises, the United States pledged not to seek penalties against Russia under a 1992 law that requires sanctions against countries that sell advanced weaponry to countries the State Department classifies as state sponsors of terrorism. Iran is on that list. The law they are referring to, of course, is the 1992 Iran-Iraq Non- Proliferation Act. That was sponsored by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Al Gore, along with Senator McCain. Let's be clear. This law requires the President impose sanctions on countries that sell advanced weaponry or assist in nuclear weapons programs in countries sponsoring terrorism. Russian cooperation with Iran's nuclear program was a major concern behind enactment of that legislation. How do you get around that? The White House has attempted to downplay the impact of Vice President Gore's deal by arguing the weaponry transferred was "antiquated." I see nothing antiquated about laser isotope separation technology, which was described in the Wall Street Journal article, being used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. It is my understanding that some of the weapons sold to Iran by Russia included the Kilo-class submarine, which is difficult to detect and track in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf because they generate very little noise while operating on battery power. In the event of a crisis, these submarines would present a credible threat to U.S. forces, allied vessels, and merchant marine traffic. They also aid wake-homing torpedoes and antiship mines. If these weapons pose a significant threat to U.S. ships and forces in the region, then these transfers appear to me to meet the threshold for sanctions under the Gore-McCain Act. Make no mistake, were tensions to escalate between the United States and countries in the Middle East, these weapons could have a catastrophic effect on our sailors and other military personnel on ships in the region. We just saw what a small simple boat loaded with explosives could do. What other reminders do we need. The Vice President defends his actions claiming that none of the weapons included met the standard for triggering sanctions. Yet the Washington Times uncovered a letter sent last January to the Russian Foreign Minister by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitting: Without the aid memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our laws. In classified documents obtained by the Washington Times, a 1995 letter, apparently written by Mr. Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore, said: [[Page S11073]] The information we are passing on to you is not to be conveyed to third parties, including the U.S. Congress. Open information concerning our cooperation with Iran is obviously a different matter, and we do not object to the constructive use of such information. I am counting on your understanding. These secret agreements between the Vice President and Mr. Chernomyrdin took place in the context of a Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which began in 1993 and was conducted in twice yearly meetings until Mr. Chernomyrdin was removed from his position in 1998. These secret agreements contradict administration and Vice President Gore's concerns regarding the spread of dangerous missiles in the Middle East and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a country such as Iran who exports terrorism. Former Secretaries of State and Defense, Directors of Central Intelligence, National Security Advisers, have put out a strong letter, dated October 24, saying in part: This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made by Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes. We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to his request is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then Senator Al Gore. This letter was signed by George Schultz, Jim Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, Caspar Weinberger, and James Woolsey. I think their concerns ought to be concerns of all of us. This foreign policy effort is part and parcel with Vice President Gore's approach to the people. Who does the Vice President trust. Apparently not the people, not the U.S. Congress. The reason we are here discussing this issue is because exactly 13 days ago the New York Times revealed that Vice President Gore signed this secret agreement I have been discussing. This Gore-Chernomyrdin deal has broad foreign policy ramifications. The decision to allow Russia to escape the consequences of providing Iran with conventional weapons is one which affects the security of our allies and more importantly the security of our troops such as those who routinely patrol the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This is not the type of agreement which should have been kept from the American people. In closing, I find it unconscionable that the Vice President of the United States could willingly withhold information from the Congress regarding the sale of arms from Russia to Iran; to a state described by his own administration as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism." I find it highly disturbing knowing the difficulties we have faced in this region over the years that the Vice President would willingly hide from the people a deal that puts in the hands of the Iranian government weapons that could do real harm to our forces in the region who routinely patrol the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Our forces put their lives at risk any time they enter this region of the world because tensions are so high. Is it unrealistic to ask that the Government that sends our military forces into harm's way would work at decreasing the availability of arms in the region that could potentially be used against them? Is it unrealistic to expect from our President and Vice President sufficient trust in the people and our form of government to convey information to the Congress critical to our national security, critical to the security of our allies and critical to the stability of a region of the world that is wrought with tension and hatred for our allies such as Israel? I think not. I urge my fellow citizens to not simply accept the spin by supporters of Vice President Gore that his foreign policy experience is necessarily good for America and the troops we send in harm's way to enforce it. I urge this body to take action to get copies of that agreement from the administration. We should demand it. We should subpoena it. I hope my colleagues will joint me in seeking that resolution. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Wall Street Journal and the statement by former Secretaries of State be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the materials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2000] Gore's Hidden Weakness: Foreign Policy By Robert B. Zoellick Events around the world have thrust foreign policy into the presidential campaign and political commentators are making routine references to Al Gore's "experience." Yet the vice president's international seasoning reminds me of the hapless Hapsburgs: The Austro-Hungarians had a long record of battles, but kept retreating and losing . . . wars, territories, and eventually their country! If experience is bad, it is a defect, not a credential. Here are four of Mr. Gore's major defects. Major Flaws First: Mr. Gore proclaims that he led U.S. policy toward Russia. We have learned from the New York Times, however, that he blessed Russian exports to Iran of weapons that could only be targeted against the U.S. Navy, which protects the world's energy lifeline. After Mr. Gore signed a secret agreement approving these arms sales in 1995, the prime ministers of Russia and Iran jointly described the U.S. presence in the Gulf as "totally unacceptable." Instead of making the Russians pay a price for subverting U.S. interests, Mr. Gore promised Russia that America would help Moscow find more customers for its arms and make its military industry eligible for technical assistance. Mr. Gore also stopped sanctions against Russia, required by a law that he had cosponsored in 1992. In return, the Russians promised to stop those arms sales by the end of 1999 but, responding to U.S. weakness, reneged on the deal and sold additional weapons to Iran. Meanwhile, according to the administration's own testimony, Russian technicians continued to help Iran develop "laser isotope separation technology" used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And the State Department recently called Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism." This example is part of a pattern: Mr. Gore's diplomatic myopia, a function of his concentration on near-term tasks, leaves him blind to the wider, strategic implications of his actions. Consider Mr. Gore's dealings with Russia's economy. Energetically pursuing his penchant for bureaucratic detail, he embraced a commission with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian prime minister, that approached economics with faculty "Gosplan" logic. The old Soviet approach to economic relations was to establish joint ventures blessed by high-level officials (who, like Mr. Chernomyrdin, received preferential treatment). To build a market economy based on the rule of law, Mr. Gore should have prodded Russia to close down corrupt commissions and open avenues for private entrepreneurs. Yet as the head of the political section in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported, the Gore-Chernomyrdin commisison resembled a Soviet-style bureaucracy with any information that contradicted success filed away forever. Admitting that the IMF's money went to "foreigners and Russian speculators," the former chairman of Russia's Securities Commission said: "I cannot explain why the Western governments didn't pay serious attention." And Anatoly Chubais, Chernomyrdin's deputy, said pithily: "We conned them out of $20 billion." Mr. Gore's Russia record is more than a litany of costly mistakes. The vice president was unable either to perceive the true nature of Russia's transformation or to design creative U.S. policy to match the circumstances. Mr. Gore was committed to process over substantive results. Unwilling to face unpleasant truths, he did not hold Russians accountable for lies and other actions that harmed U.S. interests. Second: Commentators generally assume that Mr. Gore supports free trade, but his track record suggests that his "leadership" on trade would be tepid at best, and counterproductive at worst. After the 1994 elections, Mr. Gore would not defend the North American Free Trade Agreement, much less make the larger case for free trade. The administration set distant goals for trade, but was unwilling to back words with actions. By the time Messrs. Clinton and Gore stirred themselves to try to recover fast-track trade negotiating authority in 1997, protectionists had made it impossible. As a result, the administration retreated when it could only get the support of about 40 out of over 200 Democrats in the House. Mr. Gore's record provides additional evidence that he is unwilling to expend political capital to promote trade. He did not lift a finger to prevent the World Trade Organization fiasco in Seattle; but he did applaud Mr. Clinton's destructive announcement that any new trade agreement must include labor provisions backed by sanctions, which the administration's own negotiators had resisted. [[Page S11074]] When Mr. Clinton and George W. Bush worked this year to win votes for normal trade relations with Beijing--so that China could enter the WTO--Mr. Gore again dodged responsibility. In fact, he told union protectionists behind closed doors that if Mr. Clinton failed with the China vote, he--Al Gore--would insist on labor provisions in any new agreement. Third: Mr. Gore's experience with the environment should be of concern to Americans, regardless of their views on climate change. He locked our climate change policy into a bureaucratic, restrictive, and impractical Kyoto treaty. The Senate, Democrats and Republicans alike, voted 97 to 0 in protest against this agreement. The treaty has many flaws, not the least of which is a failure to include greenhouse gas requirements for China, India and other countries whose growing emissions could dwarf America's own reductions. Even some environmentalists are concerned privately that this impractical agreement--like other in Mr. Gore's international file--impedes realistic goals based on scientific evidence and practical plans to deal with greenhouse gases. Indeed, Joe Lieberman, who recognized that the Kyoto treaty had created stalemate instead of progress, tried to fashion legislation that bypassed the Kyoto strictures. poor judgment Finally, Mr. Gore's experience flashes warning signs about his approach to being commander-in-chief. Mr. Gore reminds us that he voted in support of the Gulf War resolution. He does not admit, however, that in critical Senate testimony only about six weeks before the war began, he harshly criticized President Bush's decision to send the military reinforcements to the Gulf that were necessary to launch a successful attack. Instead, Mr. Gore wanted to rely on economic sanctions. It was also discouraging that Mr. Gore told a national TV audience that he would impose social policy "litmus tests" on appointments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After learning that this idea would have politicized the military--and precluded the service of Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf and others who differ with him on gays in the military--the "experienced" vice president reversed himself. Mr. Gore's spinners are now programmed to blurt out that he has 20-odd years of foreign policy exposure. There is more than a touch of truthful irony in that claim. This is part of a pattern of the vice president relying on references to resumes, committees and agreements--instead of outlining strategies to use U.S. power for sound ends. Mr. Gore does indeed have foreign policy experience. Unfortunately for him, it is bad experience. ____ Statement by Former Secretaries of State, Defense, Directors of Central Intelligence and National Security Advisors on the Sale of Russian Weapons to Iran, October 24, 2000 The following individuals, who include supporters of both Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Gore, believe strongly that: "The President's most important job is safeguarding our nation's security and our ability to protect our interests, our citizens and our allies and friends. The military balance in regions of vital interest to America and her allies-- including the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the world's energy supplies--is the essential underpinning for a strong foreign policy. "This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made between Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes. "We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to this request is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then Senator Al Gore." George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State. James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of State. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Frank C. Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State. Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense. James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director of Central Intelligence. Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense. R. James Woolsey, Attorney and former Director of Central Intelligence. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas. Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I commend my colleague from Missouri for bringing up a very important issue. ____________________