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国会纪录:2000年11月1日(房子)
页面H11761-H11768

俄罗斯技术给以色列的敌人转移SPEAKER临时(皮斯先生)。在议长的1999年1月6日宣布的政策,从宾夕法尼亚州绅士(韦尔登先生)是公认的60分钟作为多数党领袖的指派。宾夕法尼亚韦尔登先生。议长先生,我今晚上升与大家分享我们的同事一些非常惊人的信息和应该关注在美国,每一个公民,而且在以色列的每一个公民,因为副总统戈尔已造成危险增加至每个人的安保和安全的一些信息,女人和孩子生活在以色列今天。这是一个相当大胆的声明。为什么我做的?是不是因为选举是在星期二?不,它是因为什么这次大会刚刚获悉。对以色列安全的最大威胁是技术从俄罗斯转移到以色列的敌人,伊朗和伊拉克尤其是叙利亚和利比亚。 For the last 10 years, this Congress, with bipartisan votes, has worked diligently to stop the transfer of technology to Iran because Iran's goal is to annihilate Israel and to do it with weapons of mass destruction, missiles, weapons of mass destruction involving chemical biological or nuclear agents. But Iran or Iraq do not possess that capability. They have got to buy it. They have got to acquire it. Mr. Speaker, over the past 8 years, we have worked with this administration in what we thought was a good-faith effort to stop proliferation. I have been down in the White House twice in personal meetings with the Vice President along with colleagues from the House and the Senate where we talked specifically about stopping technology from flowing to Iran because Iran will use this technology not only against Israel but to destabilize the Middle East and eventually to harm America and its allies. Well, Mr. Speaker, we now have found an unbelievable revelation. In 1995, unbeknownst to anyone in this Congress despite our Constitution that says that no one, including the President, can negotiate a treaty without the advice and consent of the Congress, Vice President Al Gore arranged for a secret memorandum with the Prime Minister of Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin. Mr. Speaker, I will include for the Record articles and direct quotes from this memorandum which I am holding up in front of me. Moscow Joint Statement of May 10, 1995 (4) Russia will terminate all arms-related transfers to Iran not later than 31 December 1999. The United States will continue not to engage in any arms-related transfers to Iran. * * * * * (6) In light of the undertakings contained in the Joint Statement and this Aide Memoire, the United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law with respect to the completion of the transfers disclosed in the Annex . . . Mr. Speaker, what does this memorandum, signed by Al Gore, our Vice President, and Viktor Chernomyrdin say that was not given to anybody in this Congress? It is a joint statement called the Moscow Joint Statement of May 10, 1995. It talks about Russia's obligations to stop proliferation of technology to Iran specifically. Let me read section 4. ``Russia will terminate all arms-related transfers to Iran not later than 31 December 1999. The United States will continue not to engage in any arms-related transfers to Iran.'' Number 6: ``In light of the undertakings contained in the Joint Statement and this aid memoir, the United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise out of domestic laws with respect to the completion of the transfers discussed and disclosed in the annex.'' The Vice President on his own, without informing anyone in this body or the other body, arranged for a secret deal with Viktor Chernomyrdin that said to Russia they could continue to sell technology to Iran which directly has increased the threat to every man, woman, and child living in Israel and every one of our allies that are within the range of Iran's weapons of mass destruction. And to add insult to injury, Mr. Speaker, there was a classified memo that our Secretary of State sent to the Russian foreign minister in January of this year. I want to quote from this memo. I am quoting the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This is to the Russian foreign minister. ``We have also upheld our commitment not to impose sanctions for those transfers disclosed in the Annex of the Aide Memoire. The annex is very precise in its terms and we have followed it strictly. It does not include missile and nuclear-related cooperation with Iran,'' in other words allowing it, ``nor does it include conventional arms transfers to other state sponsors of terrorism.'' {time} 1745 Listen to what Secretary Albright went on to say. ``Without the Aide Memoire,'' without this document that Gore negotiated privately, Russia's conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our laws.'' Following is the excerpt from the memo: We have also upheld our commitment not to impose sanctions for those transfers disclosed in the Annex to the Aide Memoire. The Annex is very precise in its terms and we have followed its strictly. It does not include missile and nuclear-related cooperation with Iran, nor does it include conventional arms transfers to other State Sponsors of terrorism. Without the Aide Memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of our laws. So now we have the Secretary of State acknowledging publicly in a letter that we got declassified, thank goodness we have a media that is willing to stand up and expose this kind of action, while the Congress was working in good faith to stop proliferation of technology to Iran, Vice President Al Gore was allowing that technology to flow to Iran and never told the Congress. Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. This is unconstitutional. This is immoral. Because we through one person, and he is not the President and he is not the Congress, through one person, our country allowed Iran to receive technology from Russia that is covered under our arms control agreements with Russia which no individual has the right to overtake or to supersede. Yet Vice President Gore did it. Every Member of Congress, Democrat and Republican, needs to ask the question of the Vice President, who do you think you are? The President could not even do this without the advice and consent of the Congress, to arrange a secret deal with his friend Viktor Chernomyrdin that allowed for 5 years Russia to continue to transfer technology to one of Israel's boldest and most aggressive enemies. Mr. Speaker, tonight we are going to expose this in detail. We are going to talk about the policies of this administration. Before I yield to my good friend and colleague, I want to say one final point. 1992 was the start. When Boris Yeltsin stood atop that tank outside the Russian White House in Moscow, with tens of thousands of Russians around him announcing he was throwing off Communism, that the Soviet Union was disbanding, he waved a Russian flag and an American flag and he declared that Communism was dead and a new strategic partnership. That [[Page H11762]] was in 1992. Russia and America together. This was the scene last fall in downtown Moscow, Mr. Speaker, as tens of thousands of Russians stood outside of our embassy throwing paint at our embassy, firing weapons at our embassy and burning the American flag. The first speech given by President Putin when he took office in January of this year was to announce a new strategic relationship for Russia, Russia and China against America. The policies of this administration and this Vice President have now put us at odds unlike any other time since the height of the Cold War against the Russian people. Tonight we are going to discuss those issues. I now yield to our distinguished leader, our whip, the honorable gentleman from Texas (Tom DeLay). Mr. DeLAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I want to congratulate the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), who really understands these issues on bringing this special order to the floor. The gentleman speaks Russian as many in the House know and has been to Russia many, many times, so he knows what he is speaking about. The gentleman has met with many members of the Duma, many members in the Russian Government, and has been a great liaison with Russia and this House of Representatives. I wanted to say that because he has the most credibility of any Member in this House on issues dealing with Russia. And he understands how the failed Clinton-Gore administration's foreign policy has affected Russia. Mr. Speaker, the recent revelations that Vice President Gore and former Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin entered into a secret agreement to allow the Russian Government to sell dangerous weapons systems to Iran, contrary to a nonproliferation law that the Vice President himself authored with Senator John McCain, shed more light on the Clinton-Gore administration's inability to effectively provide for our national security. Allowing these systems to be delivered to Iran, a nation that is at the top of the list of terrorist states, again reveals this administration's failed, rudderless foreign policy based on appeasement rather than strength. Perhaps nowhere has this failed foreign policy borne more bitter tasting fruit than in those missed opportunities in Russia. Mr. Speaker, when this administration first took office in 1993, Russia was an emerging democracy that for the first time looked to America with open eyes and open arms. But, sadly, after years of misplaced policies, Russia's optimism has been replaced by skepticism. The Vice President headed up the administration's Russia policy, a policy which can now only be judged as a total failure. Unfortunately, the Vice President was in over his head and the results were disastrous. Anti-American sentiment, as the gentleman says, and look at that chart that shows the anti-American sentiment among the Russian people. It is at its highest point since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia continues to be a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and, most troubling, to me at least, it has entered into a strategic military partnership with Communist China, one of our most serious potential adversaries. The administration has done nothing to discourage this emerging military relationship and incredibly insists that the Russian Government selling dangerous sunburn missiles to China, missiles specifically designed to destroy American warships, poses no serious threat to U.S. security. Instead of leading Russian policy with a very firm hand, Vice President Gore led with closed eyes and an open pocketbook. The collapse of Russia was fueled by the administration's insistence on pouring good money after bad. Billions of dollars were wasted propping up failing, inefficient, and corrupt institutions. The administration was committed to Boris Yeltsin at all costs while he and his cronies used the government to fuel their own appetites for wealth and power. According to the Speaker's Advisory Group and the document, the document that was produced just a few weeks ago by that group, by the way, I would tell the Speaker that the American people can get this document on the Web site at policy.house.gov and receive a very complete analysis of the failed Clinton administration policy when it comes to Russia. According to this group, and I am quoting here from this study, ``The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission contributed to a deliberately uninformed U.S. policy toward Russia. It refused to acknowledge failure and, even worse, celebrated failure as if it were success. The Clinton administration's dependence on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, coupled with the commission's refusal to listen to independent information, meant that the administration's Russia policy was both procedurally and substantively unsound.'' This administration had an opportunity to help Russia enter into the 21st century as an emerging and thriving democracy. Unfortunately, the Vice President's misguided policies helped fuel Russia's economic collapse and led to our relations being worse than any time since the end of the Cold War. Mr. Speaker, it is time we stopped feeding failure. Russia needs to take responsibility for its future and be held accountable for its mistakes. The Russian Government should know that we are committed to building a very strong friendship, but the foundation of that relationship must be a mutual commitment to freedom, democracy, and individual liberty. We should not restructure or forgive the billions of dollars Russia owes us until they show progress towards building democratic institutions committed to the rule of law, that they stop selling weapons to the Chinese, Iranians and other potentially dangerous states and dismantle their spy facility in Lourdes, Cuba. Contrary to the view of this administration, the Russian Government does not have veto authority over our national security policy. We should not be held back from building a national missile defense system by an invalid and outdated ABM treaty predicated on an absurd Cold War notion that the only way our people can be totally secure is to be totally vulnerable. The Russian Government should know that the American people are committed to building a comprehensive missile defense to protect our people and our allies, and we will not be deterred in doing so. Mr. Speaker, there is still great potential in Russia, and with real leadership we can build our relationship. But we must acknowledge that real reform does not lie in any single man or leader, but in the institutions that build the foundations for democracy. Without those foundations, without the rule of law, democracy cannot take hold. Russia is blessed with a rich heritage and tremendous resources. I hope the next page in their long history will show a commitment to democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty. If it does, the United States will be ready to stand with them as true allies. But our relationship with Russia must be based on respect and trust, not personal friendships and wishful thinking. Serious problems require serious leadership. The Russian Government should know that the United States will hold out a helping hand when that hand will be welcomed as a symbol of democratic partnership, not some sweetheart deal. I just challenge the national media. As the gentleman knows, I think the national media has shirked its responsibility, particularly in this campaign, by not looking at the actual actions that Vice President Gore took in carrying out the Clinton-Gore foreign policy. If they would look at what part Vice President Gore played in foreign policy, they would find a situation where there was no leadership, where there was appeasement rather than strength, where there was a complete disaster in most cases. Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank our distinguished whip for appearing tonight. He is very busy. I want to also thank him and point out to our colleagues, the whip is very much interested in working together to build a solid foundation with the Russian people. In fact, he led a delegation to Russia in the last session of Congress to try to foster that one-on-one positive relationship between the people of Russia and the people of the U.S. We do not have a problem with the people of Russia. We want to be their friends. We want to be their strong trading partners. What we do not want [[Page H11763]] to have is the reinforcement of a government that is not acting in the best interests of Russia. That is why the Russian people no longer trust America. In fact, as I pointed out the other night, one of my Duma friends was visiting here 2 years ago; and he made the statement that for 70 years, the Soviet Communist Party spent billions of dollars to convince the Russian people that Americans were evil and they failed. He went on to say in just a matter of a few short years, your government has managed to do what the Soviet Communist Party could not do, and that is to convince the Russian people that Americans are evil. Mr. Speaker, we have a real problem right now. You cannot blame the Russians. If they saw billions of dollars of IMF money that was supposed to go to help them build roads and bridges and schools and communities end up in Swiss bank accounts and U.S. real estate investments and if they saw our President and our Vice President going like this and like this pretending they did not see it because they did not want to embarrass their personal friends, Boris Yeltsin or Viktor Chernomyrdin, no wonder the Russian people do not trust Americans. No wonder they do not trust what our intentions were. That is why 8 years after Russia became a free democracy, the people of Russia question what America's real intentions are. With that, I would like to yield to one of our most eloquent and outspoken rising stars in the Congress from the great West from the State of Arizona, our good friend J.D. Hayworth. Mr. HAYWORTH. I think my friend from Pennsylvania for yielding. Mr. Speaker, tonight we gather here because still we must do the people's business. Mr. Speaker, I am well aware of the fact that there are those who look at the calendar and the pending national elections and seem to think that everything must inevitably be colored with the hue of partisan politics. Mr. Speaker, it should be our goal, no matter our partisan labels, whether Republicans or Democrats or Independents, to put people before politics. It is in that spirit that I rise this evening with my colleagues, because what has been discovered is so disturbing that it transcends traditional party politics. We are not talking about typical disagreements or differences in philosophy. To amplify the words of our majority whip, the gentleman from Texas, in his remarks, Vice President Gore, while a member of the United States Senate, worked closely with my Senator from Arizona, John McCain, and a bill was passed, written by those two gentlemen, that became law that dealt with weapons sales by the Russian republic to the nation of Iran. {time} 1800 It was an effort on the part of our government to issue sanctions to try and prevent the sale of those weapons of mass destruction, because of their destabilizing, in effect, Mr. Speaker, because they represent a clear and present danger to allies of the United States and indeed the United States itself. My friend from Pennsylvania mentioned the State of Israel, still in the news, still involved in conflict and uncertainty, and the tragedy of the situation, as revealed in the documents now entered into the Record, and I thank my friend from Pennsylvania because the State Department has been reticent in even allowing copies of those documents to be in the possession of the proper committees of this House, even though that has happened. What the documents reveal should shock every American. The Vice President of the United States, one of the architects along with Senator McCain, of a policy that would impose sanctions on Russia if weapons of mass destruction continue to be sold, worked out an agreement in private with the Russian leader, Viktor Chernomyrdin, excusing the Russians from continued sale of those weapons to Iran; in fact, inviting those sales to continue. Mr. Speaker, stop and imagine the implication of what is part of the Record. Understand these were not six disabled tow missiles. We are talking about an arsenal that included three Kilo Class submarines, the best technology heretofore developed for conventionally powered submarines for silence and stealth and secrecy as those submarines patrol the oceans and seas of the world; an incredible advantage for a nation which sadly remains on the outside looking in, in essence an outlaw nation. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, we will remember at the outset of this Congress, and I violate no confidences, I violate no classified documents, a bipartisan committee, including a former Member of this House who later became Secretary of Defense, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Rumsfeld chairing the Commission, along with the first director of the CIA under President Clinton, Mr. Woolsey, came to this House and talked about the growing proliferation of weapons of mass technology by outlaw nations, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea, where trouble continues; and our Secretary of State just returned from a visit. We are talking about a situation that goes directly to the heart of our future, perhaps to the survival of our friends, and ultimately to the type of national security we can provide from those who would aspire to become Commander in Chief. The whip was quite right, Mr. Speaker. Our colleagues in the fourth estate, the journalists, aside from a front page article 3 weeks ago in The New York Times, followed up with work in The Washington Times and other periodical publications such as Insight on the News, aside from those publications, Mr. Speaker, the silence of the television networks in this Nation has been deafening. Madam Speaker, who will tell the people? Who will tell the people of this breach of faith? It falls to this House, to this people's house, and the grand design of our founders in this constitutional republic with separate and coequal branches of government. Madam Speaker, to stand and tell the people something is seriously wrong, the State Department should turn over every document related to this; and the Vice President of the United States, Madam Speaker, should stand before the people he hopes to lead not with excuses, not with fables, not with stories, but with the truth. At last, Madam Speaker, at long last, is not the truth what the American people deserve? Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I thank my distinguished friend and colleague, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth), for his eloquent statement. Let me say to our colleagues who are watching us back in their offices, everybody may be saying, well, there go those Republicans 1 week or a few days before the election trashing Al Gore. Why were not they bringing this forward last year? Let me remind my colleagues, this story broke October 13 of this year in The New York Times. Prior to October 13, none of us knew that Vice President Gore had worked out a secret deal in 1995 that Madeleine Albright referred to in a January 2000 memo this year. Prior to October 13, none of us knew this. Well, that is only 2 weeks ago, 2 weeks ago. Thank goodness we have a free press. Two weeks ago The New York Times ran a copy of this document that I have now put in the Congressional Record that our Members of Congress were not aware of, that no member of the Intelligence Committee, no member of the leadership was asked to see by the Vice President when he cut the deal in 1995. We were not made aware of this until we read the story in The New York Times, along with the rest of America on October 13, and then The Washington Times reported the story after that, and other media. It has not been picked up by the TV media, and that is a legitimate question. Why has it not been? Now, why is this so outrageous, Madam Speaker? Why? Because this technology that has been transferred is used to improve the accuracy of systems against America and our allies. Is this isolated? Let me give you two examples. Madam Speaker, I was in Moscow in January of 1996. The Washington Post had just run a front page story with the headline, America Has Caught the Russians Illegally Transferring Guidance Systems to Iraq. I was in Moscow. I went to our embassy, and I asked for a meeting with our ambassador, who, at that time, was Tom Pickering. He is now the number three person in the State Department. I said, Mr. Ambassador, what was the response of the Russians when you asked them about the transfer of the accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq? He said, Congressman Weldon, I have not asked the Russians yet. [[Page H11764]] I said, Mr. Ambassador, you are our representatives here. Why would you not ask the Russians? It was a front page story back home. It is a violation of an arms control treaty, the missile technology control regime. He said, that has to come from the White House. So I came back to Washington, and I wrote the President a letter in the end of January, 1996. Dear Mr. President, you must have read the story in The Washington Post. What are you going to do about it? If this occurred, it is a serious violation because it gives Iraq a capability that they cannot build on their own. The President wrote me a response in March of that year. Dear Congressman Weldon, you are correct. If this transfer took place, it would be a serious violation of the missile technology control regime and there are required sanctions in that treaty; and I assure you if we can prove it, we will impose the sanctions. But, Congressman Weldon, we have no proof that this transfer took place. Well, as I have done in speeches around the country, I bring the proof for the American people to see. This is a Soviet-made gyroscope and a Soviet-made accelerometer. I cannot tell you where I got these devices, but I can say they were clipped off of an SSN-19 Soviet missile that used to be aimed at an American city. We caught the Russians transferring these devices not once, not twice, but at least three times. The American government has over 100 sets of these devices today. We never imposed the sanctions required by the treaty; yet we have the proof. We have the evidence. Now, what would Iraq use these devices for? They would use them to improve the accuracy of the same missile that killed those 28 young Americans in 1991 who came home from Desert Storm in body bags because their country let them down, because we could not defend against a low complexity SCUD missile. These devices Iraq cannot build. They have to buy them, and the only place to get them is from Russia. We caught them. It is a violation of an arms control treaty. The President told me, if we could prove it he would take action. We have the evidence, and we never took any action. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the logical question is, why would we not take action against Russia if we know they were deliberately violating a treaty? And the answer is rather simple. Our policy for the past 8 years toward Russia has been based on personal friendships; the personal friendship of President Clinton with the leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, and the personal friendship between Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin. In 1996, when we caught the Russians transferring these devices to Iraq, it was the reelection year for President Yeltsin. Unbeknownst to us but now available to our colleagues as an appendix to a book written by Bill Gertz called ``Betrayal,'' is a classified cable that President Clinton sent to Boris Yeltsin in that election year, the same year this transfer took place. What did that cable say? Dear Boris, we wish you well in your election, and I will make sure that nothing happens in America that jeopardizes your reelection. That must have included holding Russia accountable for illegally transferring technology to the enemies of America and our allies. The second example, a year later, Madam Speaker, the President of Israel, President Netanyahu, goes to the great length of announcing to the world that Israel has evidence that Russia's space agency has signed contracts with the agency in Iran building their missile systems, which is again, a violation of treaties and U.S. laws that Russia has agreed to abide by. The Congress was incensed. Democrats and Republicans said, what is going on here? What is wrong with Russia? We are helping them with their space station. We are working with them on technology, on helping their economy. Why are we not stopping this technology transfer? So the Congress introduced legislation, bipartisan, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and Jane Harmon, immediately got over 200 cosponsors to force the imposition of sanctions on Iran for violating arms control agreements. The Congress called over the CIA. The director of the Nonproliferation Center for the CIA at that time was Dr. Gordon Ehlers; and Dr. Ehlers did something you cannot do very often in this administration. He told the Congress the truth. He said, yes, the CIA has evidence, and we agree with Israel, that the Russian space agency has contractual relations with Iran to help them build their missile systems. Gordon Ehlers was forcibly removed from his job because he simply told the truth. The Congress was incensed. The bill was scheduled to come to the House Floor for a vote. Three days before or 4 days before the bill was to come up on the House floor for a vote, my office got a call from the Vice President's office. Would you tell your boss, the staffer said to my staff, that Vice President Gore would like to meet with Congressman Weldon in the Old Executive Office Building. My staff told me. I said, sure, I will be happy to go down and meet with him. I said, what is the topic? They said the Iran missile sanctions bill. I drove down to the White House, went into the Old Executive Office Building where the Vice President's office is, and there in the meeting room, along with myself, were some of the following people: Senator Carl Levin, Senator Bob Kerry, Senator John McCain, Senator Jon Kyl, Congressman Lee Hamilton, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), Congresswoman Jane Harmon, Democrats and Republicans from the House and the Senate who were assembled while the Vice President and Leon Firth, the security adviser, pleaded with us for 1 hour not to bring up the Iran missile sanction bill. He pleaded with us that this would harm the personal relationship that Bill Clinton had with Boris Yeltsin and that Al Gore had with Viktor Chernomyrdin. When the Vice President finished lobbying us, all of us, Democrats and Republicans together, said, Mr. Vice President, it is too late. The technology is flowing. It is continuing to flow into Iran, and it is not being stopped. Later that week, that bill passed the House with 396 votes. That was not a partisan bill. Almost every Republican and most all of the Democrats supported the bill to slap the administration across the face because they were not enforcing an arms control agreement that we had entered into with Russia to stop technology from going to Iran. {time} 1815 Two months later, after we came back from Christmas break, the Senate was going to take up the same bill. My office got another call from the Vice President's office. Again, they asked me to go down to the White House to meet with the Vice President, and again I drove down to the Old Executive Office Building. Again, while I was there, along with the same core group of people, in fact, I think Senator Lieberman may have been in the meeting, the Vice Presidential candidate, I think he was in the meeting with us; and for 1 hour and 30 minutes with Jack Caravelli from the NSC, the National Security Council, and with Leon Firth, the Vice President lobbied us not to have the Senate pass the Iran missile sanctions bill. When he finished we said the same thing: it is too late, Mr. Vice President. The following week, the Senate voted that bill; 96 Senators voted for the bill, which meant it had a veto-proof margin in the House and in the Senate. But let me tell my colleagues what is so disgusting, Madam Speaker. In neither of those two meetings, which were private meetings with the Vice President and Members of Congress, did the Vice President tell us that he had worked out a secret deal with the Russians to stop proliferation. In neither of those two meetings, with Carl Levin, with Bob Kerrey, with John McCain, with Lee Hamilton, and with the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) in neither of those meetings did the Vice President hold this document up and say, well, do not worry, fellows, I have a secret deal with the Russians. He never told us. Yet, that deal had been concluded 2 years earlier. Now, why am I so incensed? Because, Madam Speaker, for the past 8 years, this administration has called upon me time and again to get Republicans to support their objectives in regard to Russia. Every time a vote would come [[Page H11765]] up for cooperative threat reduction funding for the Nunn-Lugar program, I would get a call from the White House to help out, and I would help out. Every time the administration wanted something done on our side, I would be glad to help out. When they wanted to convince the Russians that we were taking the right action in Bosnia, I traveled to Moscow with information from the State Department to convince the Russians of the merits of the President's position. Yet, the Vice President did not have the decency to tell not only me, but Members of Congress, that he had cut a secret deal with the Russians to continue to allow technology to flow to Iran. Madam Speaker, that is not allowed under our Constitution. Now, the President can set foreign policy; he can enter into treaties, although they have to be ratified by the Senate, but he can do that. The Vice President has no ability to negotiate secret agreements with any Nation, especially when he does not come back and tell the Congress. In fact, the most outrageous part of this whole thing, Madam Speaker, is there is another document I have not gotten ahold of; I will have it and it will be in the Congressional Record eventually. That other document is a letter that Viktor Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President Gore after this deal was cut. I know how the letter started. It said, Dear Al. Dear Al. This was in late 1995. I am going to quote from the letter. I do not have the letter yet, I am getting it. Quote: ``It is not to be conveyed to third parties, including the U.S. Congress.'' So the Prime Minister of Russia sends a letter to our Vice President where he confirms the fact that Russia will continue to send technology to Iran, even though it violates our laws and treaties, and furthermore, Chernomyrdin says, and you cannot tell your Congress that we have entered into this agreement. Madam Speaker, that is not just outrageous, that is sickening. That is absolutely sickening, that the leader of Russia, Victor Chernomyrdin, could have an agreement with our Vice President that the Congress should not be informed. And there it is, Madam Speaker. It is a quote directly from that letter. I will have that letter in the Record. So a secret deal is cut by Al Gore with Viktor Chernomyrdin that allows technology to flow to Iran, even though those of us in the Congress in both parties are saying it has to stop, it is getting out of hand, it is threatening Israel, APEC is going crazy because they know what happened to the Israeli people in the midst of Desert Storm when they were killed by those Scud missiles, and we are seeing some of that today over in the Middle East. And our Vice President agrees to a letter from Viktor Chernomyrdin that the U.S. Congress should not be informed, and this man supposedly wants to be our President. I now yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), who has traveled to Russia. He has been a leader in working with their corruption problems. As a member of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, he has reached out to help them put into place their financial house. He has offered to assist them in bringing stability to the Duma, using some of the techniques we use in our Congress in a bipartisan manner to help oversee the financial transactions that have occurred in Russia. I am happy that he is here tonight, and I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce). Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, I just want to mention that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is one of our foremost experts in the House on advanced weapons technology, and also he has led some 21 trips now to Russia. He speaks Russian, and he has been perplexed, as I have, by this report in The New York Times that without reporting to Members of the House and the Senate, the Vice President had concluded his secret agreement with then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, a secret agreement not to enforce U.S. laws requiring sanctions on any country that supplies advanced conventional weapons to Iran. As we look at the list of those particular weapons, we see that it includes the advanced submarines, the ultra-quiet, ultra-silent kilo- class submarines that are so difficult to detect, that it includes torpedoes and antiship mines and hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers. I think these submarines are but one example of exactly the type identified by Congress when it passed the law as posing a risk to U.S. forces operating in the Middle East. Madam Speaker, the report of the Speaker's Advisory Group, and I would just mention to the Members, this can be found on policy.house.gov, if Members would like to get a copy of Russia's Road to Corruption. That report notes the unjustified confidence in unreliable officials like Chernomyrdin; it notes the refusal by the administration to acknowledge mistakes and revised policies accordingly; and it notes the excessive secrecy designed to screen controversial policies from both Congress and the public. This secret agreement, I think, exemplifies every one of these flaws and, tragically, as the Times reported, the decision to flout U.S. law gained us nothing from the Russians. In spite of evidence that both Russian government agencies and private entities were directly involved in proliferation to such states as Iran and Iraq, the Clinton administration continued to rely on personal assurances from a very small cadre of contacts in the Russian Government. Our administration officials, including Vice President Gore and Deputy Secretary of State Talbot, accepted these assurances, despite clear evidence of continued proliferation, rather than believe or admit that proliferation could continue, despite the stated opposition of their partners. Now, I wanted just to bring to light a second secret Gore- Chernomyrdin deal that was described in the Washington Times on October 17 in a classified ``Dear Al'' letter to Al Gore in late 1995. Chernomyrdin described Russian aid to Iran's nuclear program, and the letter states: ``This information is not to be conveyed to third parties, including to the United States Congress.'' Not to be conveyed to the United States Congress. As with the first Chernomyrdin deal, this agreement too has been kept secret from us. This letter from Chernomyrdin to Gore indicates that Gore acquiesced to the shipment of not only conventional shipments to Iran in violation of the act, but also of nuclear technology to Iran. According to Vice President Gore, when we listen to his rationale, he says, well, the purpose of this secret deal was to constrain Russian nuclear aid to Iran in the construction of two nuclear reactors. If that is so, Vice President Gore plainly did not succeed, because in August of this year, the CIA reported that Russia continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran's weapons programs. That is what our Central Intelligence Agency is telling us. The chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), asked the administration on October 18 if it had pointed out to Gore's Russian partner that it is not the American way for the President to keep secrets from Congress when it comes to such serious national security concerns as the proliferation of nuclear technology. The chairman has yet to receive an answer. The law requires, and I am going to quote it here, that ``The text of any international agreement to which the United States is a party be transmitted to Congress as soon as practical, but in no event later than 60 days after it is reached.'' The law does not contemplate, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the House Policy chairman, pointed out, does not contemplate that Congress will discover such agreements 5 years after the fact by reading about them through leaks to a newspaper. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the first secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement on Friday, October 13, the day that The New York Times revealed it; and now, weeks later, the administration has yet to produce this agreement, or the second Gore- Chernomyrdin letter dealing with nuclear transfers to Iran. Madam Speaker, I yield back to the chairman. Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his eloquent statement and for his tireless work, and I want to acknowledge his leadership in trying to build a stable relationship with Russia. I know [[Page H11766]] the Russians appreciate that, I know the respect the gentleman has, and as a member of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, they look to him for guidance as they did last year when he was there to help establish a sound financial system. Now, someone listening to this in their office or one of our constituents might say, well, wait a minute. The President does have a right to negotiate secret agreements, and we are not saying that that is not the case. The President does have a right to act in our best interests and sometimes he may have to make an agreement. But there is a process in place for a few Members of the House and the Senate to be told about those kinds of arrangements. We have a House Select Committee on Intelligence and a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. They are a very small number of Members from both parties, they are bipartisan, most of their meetings are held in private on the fourth floor of this building, and they are briefed by the administration or the CIA on sensitive issues that cannot be disclosed in public. Madam Speaker, that is not what we are talking about. Because number one, this was not the President acting; this was an agreement between the Vice President and the prime minister of Russia. Number two, the Vice President cannot make treaties. There is no place in the Constitution for the Vice President to represent America, unless the President for some reason is incapacitated. Number three, any agreement has to be shared with the leadership in the Congress so that Congress is aware of what is transpiring. {time} 1830 None of those things happened, Madam Speaker. We only found out about it 5 years later because a New York Times writer got a copy of this memo and spread the story out on the front page of the New York Times. Madam Speaker, how could it come that our Vice President could have this kind of a relationship with Viktor Chernomyrdin? It goes back to what I said at the outset, our policy with Russia has been flawed. It was based on personal friendships as opposed to support for institutions. I wanted Boris Yeltsin to succeed as much as President Clinton did when he took office. I was a big supporter of his. But instead of supporting a person, as Republicans did with the Shah of Iran, for instance, we should have been supporting the institution of the presidency. We should have been supporting the institution of the parliament, which in Russia is the Duma and the Federation Council. We should have been supporting the institution of a court system, of a free market system. But instead, our policy was based on personal friendships between two sets of people, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin. In fact, Madam Speaker, there is another document that needs to be brought forward so the American people can see it. That relates to the special relationship that Vice President Gore had with Viktor Chernomyrdin. During the days that Viktor Chernomyrdin was the Prime Minister of Russia, there was a process started called the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to work in a very positive way, much of which I supported, on helping build stable relations. But the Vice President became too enamored with the man, as opposed to the process. Our intelligence community got some evidence that Viktor Chernomyrdin was involved in corrupt activities in Russia with the oil and gas industry. So as they do frequently, our CIA wrote a memo that went to the Vice President, a classified memo, which they do frequently, to the Vice President telling him that the CIA had evidence that his partner and friend, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was involved in corruption with the Russian oil and gas industry. What was the Vice President's response? He was very upset, red-faced, and allegedly wrote the word ``bull,'' and I cannot say the last four letters, but Members can use their imagination, across the front of the memo, and sent it back to the CIA, because he did not want to hear it. He did not want to hear that our intelligence community said his partner was involved in corruption. The Russian people knew he was involved in corruption, which is why he ultimately had to leave office. But our Vice President did not want to hear it. Here is the rub, Madam Speaker. When the Vice President was asked about this memo on Tim Russert's show nationally telecast just a few weeks ago, the Vice President's statement to Tim Russert was that it never happened, it was not true. However, in our Russia Task Force, we interviewed a CIA lawyer. Guess what he informed the committee: that more than one CIA analyst saw the notation on a document relating to Chernomyrdin. So now we have a CIA lawyer saying, yes, we have a document that at least two people have seen with the word ``bull'' scribbled across the front of it relating to Chernomyrdin. The White House stated in a letter in October of this year that, after a diligent search, ``We cannot locate that document, and neither can the CIA.'' If that is the case, it means the document is either lost or stolen. Federal law prohibits the destruction of White House records. If that occurred, that is a Federal offense. But now, mysteriously, the White House counsel now acknowledges that the Vice President ``recalls having a strong reaction to a CIA report when it was originally shown to him,'' and that ``he may have uttered such a comment and it may have been written down by someone else.'' So we went from a complete denial by the Vice President of ever having written any such statement down and ever knowing about it to now having White House counsel saying, well, yes, he did perhaps utter that statement when he saw the report, but he does not think it was he that wrote it down. Somebody else must have written that word down based on what the Vice President was saying. The problem was, Madam Speaker, the President and the Vice President did not want to hear the bad news. We all wanted Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin to succeed, but the to deal with Russia, we have to be candid and consistent. Do Members know why the Russian people hate Americans today, Madam Speaker? It is because they feel we let them down. When Boris Yeltsin left office last fall, the polls in Moscow were showing his popularity was 2 percent. Only 2 percent of the Russian population supported Boris Yeltsin, but Bill Clinton and Al Gore still support him. When the Russian people knew that Boris Yeltsin's friends, including his daughter, Tatiana, and the bankers that he put into office, the oligarchs, were stealing billions of dollars of money that were going to Russia to help improve the economy, the Russian people knew what was going on. They knew that we knew what was going on. We pretended we did not see it because Bill Clinton and Al Gore did not want to embarrass their friends. When technology was being transferred to Iraq and Iran, the Russians knew that we knew it was taking place, but they knew that we were hiding that fact. They lost respect for us, because they knew that all America was trying to do was to basically wash over any problems that Russia had. When Lieutenant Jack Daley, a 15-year career naval intelligence officer, was lasered in the eye by a Russian spy ship out in Puget Sound, the administration's response was to send a secret cable to Moscow telling the Russians that we have caught them lasering one of our military persons in the eye. What was the response of the administration? They tried to ruin the career of Jack Daley. After 15 years of the highest ratings in the Navy, in two consecutive ratings he was given the lowest rating that he could get, and his superior officer told him this, and I quote directly, ``Jack, you don't know the pressure I am under to get rid of your case.'' Thank goodness we have a group of stalwart Democrats and Republicans in this body, people like the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), who joined with us and called the Defense Department and said they cannot do this to an American soldier in uniform. He has been injured. He has been lasered by the Russians, and they were taking the side of Russia. Thank goodness we stood up, and in September of last year former deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre called me on the phone and said, Curt, we have just convened a special board of inquiry and they have just reported that Jack Daley was wronged. He got his promotion. [[Page H11767]] How about Jay Stuart, a career Department of Energy intelligence official who had an outstanding career, given the highest award, but because he was telling Hazel O'Leary that there were problems with Russia's nuclear weapons, his job was eliminated. His career was ruined. Or how about Notra Trulock, whose simple offense was he told the truth? He has not been able to work for the past 3 months. Time and again, Madam Speaker, this administration has played politics with our relationships. Today our relationship with Russia is as bad as it ever was under the Communist rule. In fact, I would say it is far worse than that, because the Russians no longer trust us. They do not know what our foreign policy is. They think it is a roller coaster, up and down. We use Russia when it is to our convenience, and we ignore them when it is in our best interests, according to our administration. Madam Speaker, I can tell the Members this, that it is absolutely unacceptable that the Vice President of the United States 5 years ago entered into a secret agreement with the Prime Minister of Russia that allowed technology to flow to Iran, as acknowledged by Secretary Albright in her letter that I just put in the Record, that would have been subject to sanctions under U.S. laws and arms control treaties. The President wonders why this Congress will not support treaties that he has brought up, like the treaties involving strategic arms reductions, or treaties involving chemical weapons, or treaties involving a nuclear test ban? How can this Congress trust this administration on treaties when we have had secret deals and arrangements made by individuals that basically say those treaties are not worth anything? Madam Speaker, this is not the way this country has operated. We have had some embarrassing things occur in our history by leaders in both parties. I am not saying this is only done by Democrats, because that would be false. But I have never seen an incident where a Vice President negotiated a secret deal to allow technology to continue to flow to one of our enemies, and agree with the leader of that country that the Congress should be kept uninformed, even though we admitted that every violation that occurred was a violation of an arms control agreement that would have required sanctions. Madam Speaker, there is no wonder why we do not have the respect around the world from China, Russia, from the Middle East, the Palestinians, North Korea. Foreign policy has to be based on consistency and candor, and we have neither. Mr. GILMAN. Madam Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, for organizing this discussion of the Clinton Administration's policy toward Russia, and I thank him for inviting me to participate in it. During the six years that I have chaired the Committee on International Relations, we have been keenly interested in U.S. relations with Russia. The members of our Committee have become increasingly concerned in recent years as the optimism that we had about the prospects for reform in Russia have evaporated. Sadly, the policies of the Clinton Administration have failed to consolidate democracy, free markets, and respect for human rights in Russia. The failure of the Clinton Administration policy has many dimensions, and my colleagues have touched on many of those dimensions today. I will focus my remarks on one dimension that is of particular concern to me: the failure to stem Russian proliferation of dangerous weapons and weapons-related technologies to Iran. Congress has tried repeatedly over the years to force the Executive branch to do something about Russian proliferation to Iran. When Vice President Al Gore was still a Senator, he joined with Senator John McCain to author legislation known as the Iran-Iraq Arms Non- Proliferation Act of 1992. More recently, Congressman Gejdenson and I worked with Senator Trent Lott and Senator Joe Lieberman to enact the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. These laws, and others that have been enacted between 1992 and this year, attempted to discourage Russian proliferation to Iran by threatening to impose U.S. sanctions. I regret to inform my colleagues that these laws appear to have failed. They have failed not because they were badly written, but because the Clinton Administration has put at least as much effort into avoiding having to apply them as it has put into applying them. Our Committee held a hearing three weeks ago on the Administration's systematic disregard of the recently-enacted Gilman-Gejdenson-Lott- Lieberman Act. Our hearing revealed that the Administration has failed to submit either of the first two reports on proliferation to Iran required to be submitted under that law, and that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has adopted a legal interpretation of the law designed to eviscerate it. Clearly NASA wants to continue business as usual with Russia as if this law had never been enacted. NASA's legal interpretation of the Gilman-Gejdenson-Lott-Lieberman Act was denounced on a bipartisan basis at our hearing. Even more alarming, we have learned from press reports that Vice President Gore signed an agreement with Russia in 1995 in which he agreed to permit certain Russian arms sales to Iran to proceed, and he promised that no sanctions would be imposed under the Gore-McCain Act. To get to the bottom of this alarming news, we have asked the Administration to let us see the full text (including all attachments) of the agreements they signed. To date, the Administration has refused to show the full text to anyone in this body other than the Speaker and the Minority Leader. Madam Speaker, it is clear that this Administration has a lot of explaining to do about its policy toward Russia. Yesterday I joined with the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spence, and the distinguished Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Goss, in sending a letter to the President demanding full disclosure to Congress of all secret deals with Russia regarding proliferation to Iran. I submit our letter to be inserted at this point in the Record: Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, October 31, 2000. The President, The White House, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President. We are deeply concerned about information that has emerged recently about secret understandings reached between your Administration and the government of the Russian Federation regarding proliferation to Iran. A distinguished bipartisan group of eleven former secretaries of state, secretaries of defense, national security advisors, and CIA directors has also expressed alarm about your Administration's acquiescence in such proliferation from Russia to Iran, as well as the Administration's failure to fully disclose its policy to Congress. We share the view of these distinguished former officials that there can be no justification for your Administration's acquiescence in the transfer to Iran of advanced military equipment such as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes. Such transfers jeopardize the lives of our military personnel in the Persian Gulf region and put at risk the security of our nation and of our allies in the region. Moreover, Iran, as the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism, may well be a conduit for arms and technology to terrorist groups. Obviously these groups pose an imminent threat to U.S. personnel worldwide, as demonstrated by the recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The Administration's failure to fully inform Congress of this policy presents a threat of a different character. Congress cannot effectively exercise its constitutional responsibilities if kept in the dark about such matters. Continued efforts by the Administration to withhold information about such policies from Congress is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers. We are especially troubled by the fact that both the policy adopted by the Administration, and the Administration's decision to withhold from Congress key documents relating to that policy, may have violated U.S. law. The Gore-McCain Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) may have been violated by the Administration's commitment in the June 30, 1995, Aide Memoire not to sanction certain weapons transfers from Russia to Iran. That agreement was required to be transmitted to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act (1 U.S.C. 112b), but the Administration chose instead to withhold that agreement from Congress. And against this background, the Administration has persisted in disregarding the recently-enacted Gilman- Gejdenson-Lott-Lieberman Act (Public Law 106-178) regarding proliferation to Iran. In view of the serious questions that have been raised, we believe that the only acceptable course for the Administration at this point is full disclosure. In order to permit you to clear the air regarding allegations that officials of your Administration have secretly committed our nation to policies which at best undermine our national security, and at worst may violate U.S. law, we respectfully submit the following request for relevant documents. We would appreciate your transmitting the documents described in paragraph (1) to the Committee on International Relations no later than Thursday, November 2nd. We would appreciate your arranging for the custodians of the remaining documents to transmit them to their oversight committee of the House of Representatives no later than Friday, December 1st. Please be assured [[Page H11768]] that we will properly protect all classified information submitted in response to this request. (1) Documents in the custody of the Secretary of State: (A) The Aide Memoire dated June 30, 1995, signed by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, along with all annexes thereto that have at any time been in effect (including any amendments to such annexes). (B) The letter dated December 9, 1996, from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vice President Al Gore, any correspondence from the U.S. Government to which that letter was responding, and any U.S. Government response to that letter. (C) The letter dated January 13, 2000, from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, transmitted by the Department of State on January 13, 2000, in a telegram designated ``State 008180''. (D) The letter dated December 17, 1999, from Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. (E) The Department of State telegrams designated ``State 243445'', ``State 244826'', ``Moscow 32441'', and ``Moscow 362'', referred to in the Department of State telegram designated ``State 008180'' of January 13, 2000. (2) Documents in the custody of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the director of Central Intelligence, or any agency or establishment within the Intelligence Community: (A) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to transfers or possible transfers of goods or technology from Russia to Iran in violation or potential violation of commitments contained in the Aide Memoire dated June 30, 1995, signed by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, or the letter dated December 9, 1995, from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vice President Al Gore. (B) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to possible revisions to the understanding set forth in the Aide Memoire dated June 30, 1995, signed by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and the annexes thereto. (C) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to possible application of the Case-Zablocki Act (1 U.S.C. 112b) to the Aide Memoire dated June 30, 1995, signed by Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, or the letter dated December 9, 1995, from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vice President Al Gore. (D) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to consideration of whether goods or technology transferred from Russia to Iran contributed to efforts by Iran to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. (E) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to consideration of whether weapons transferred from Russia to Iran destabilized the military balance in the Persian Gulf region, or enhanced Iran's offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways. (F) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to other secret understandings or agreements, or secret provisions of understandings or agreements, reached by the Clinton Administration with Russia regarding transfers to Iran or any other country of weapons-related goods, services, or technology. (3) Documents in the custody of the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration: (A) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to the rationale or justification for purchase from the Russian Aviation and space Agency of the items referred to in the letters dated February 11, 2000 and February 15, 2000, from the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., of the Committee on Science (exclusive of those items that, as of the date of the adoption of this resolution, already have been acquired from the Russian Aviation and Space Agency). (B) All documents that contain, refer, reflect, or relate in any way to utilization of the exception for crew safety contained in section 6(f) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178), or interpretation of the term ``necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space Station'' as contained in that section. We appreciate your prompt attention to this request. With warmest regards, Sincerely, Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations. Porter J. Goss, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Floyd Spence, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services. ____________________




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