

MEMO FOR RECORD

Wheelon, Subj: Mtg. with  
Dr. Land 16 Feb 65

WHEELON vs. MC MILLAN

Dr. Land's advice

At meeting with Dr. Land to decide on make-up of his panel to render technical counsel on what new satellite system the Govt should pursue, after discussing above and deciding on make-up of panel, Dr. Land spoke to W and McM as follows (as reported by ADW):

*Used*  
*D-Tab*

...Land launched immediately into a conversation of great seriousness. With Maxey still in the room, Land turned to McMillan and me. He said that a strong wind would blow us both out of the NRP tree and that this would be a national tragedy, since together we represented the substance of the program. He stated categorically that the Air Force could not hope to control all of it, that the Government would not stand for it. Brock was sullen but concurred. He then added that the Agency could not expect to control the entire thing, to which I did not feel it was necessary to respond. He suggested that because McMillan and I felt the personal tensions which characterized the NRO, we were in the best position to suggest a remedy and implored us to do so for our own sakes and for the Government's. I am repeating this conversation almost verbatim. It was the most frank, articulate, sincere plea I have ever heard. Land pointed out that a system where all operating decisions were referred up to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense is an unacceptable situation and one that could not long endure. He harked back to early days - when Bissell and Charyk had worked in harmony and implored us to work again with that kind of collaboration. I pointed out in a most constructive way to Land that the situation between Bissell and Charyk had been quite different; that Dick had his own budget and programmatic responsibilities; that McMillan and I were working under an arrangement that neither of us had had any hand in shaping and that had already resulted in calamity to Charyk and Scoville. Land explicitly asked McMillan and me to meet with him in thoughtful evening meetings to try to work out a solution to the present conundrum, and I readily agreed. McMillan was very silent in all of this, but eventually agreed to meet with Land and myself.

5. There then followed a good deal of discussion on what should be the optimum time for a meeting on [redacted] Land stated that he presumed the DCI was anxious to solve this issue during

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his tenure, and McMillan concurred. Land seemed to be giving McMillan a chance to postpone the affair, while recognizing a presumed desire on the part of the Director to finish this thing up promptly. McMillan said frankly that he would need six months to catch up and that really all he needed was time to re-do his briefing charts. Land then turned to us and admonished us not ~~be~~ to be premature in pressing for program approval lest we be put in a second holding pattern. I reiterated to Land that we had now done all of the testing which we originally set out to do; that we would not cease using the brassboard for design testing; that there were certain tests which could not be performed without the brassboard and were never intended to be accomplished in phase one. I stated frankly that we found ourselves in a peculiar position whereby over [redacted] could be committed [redacted] without any feasibility demonstration, yet we were being asked to progressively enlarge our own feasibility program with fixed resources to obtain data that would really only be obtained in

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[redacted]  
I said quite frankly that if we had our own money, we probably would have gone slower and perhaps farther in the feasibility, but that since it was an all or nothing throw of the dice with [redacted] we had worked hard for this end and felt that we had made a success of it. After having given everyone a chance to plead for more time, Land eventually stated that he thought we ought to go ahead and have it through at this time.

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6. He then repeated his plea to try to work a solution for the over-all problem out of this rather specific technical meeting. [I agreed with alacrity; McMillan maintained a relative silence while agreeing briefly to do so. In all of this I had the feeling that McMillan's participation in this affair was a directed and reluctant one; one in which he saw no advantage.] One could have read McMillan's reaction to this as that of a man who was caught in an undesirable situation,--or of a man who had stopped caring about the problem,--or of a man who felt that the situation was established in the long run and that he would ride with this one to his displeasure. I have no way of knowing.

/s/ Albert D. Wheelon

cc: DCI

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