日期：2003年2月6日14:24 +0000来源：麦克·刘易斯[电子邮件保护]发布:政府关于伊拉克的“情报”报告被揭露抄袭英国政府最新的关于伊拉克不遵守武器检查规定的报告声称利用了“情报材料”，但被揭露为对三篇公开发表的旧文章的大规模抄袭，其中一篇是由加州的一名研究生撰写的。编译器甚至不清理拼写错误或标准化拼写。英国政府周一公布了这份名为“伊拉克——其隐藏、欺骗和恐吓的基础设施”的档案。这是在网上复制http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7111.asp（下面将页码引用涉及到下载的Word版本）。文件声称，它借鉴“于多种来源，包括智能材料”的第一句。事实并非如此。在19页的文件（pp.6-16）的体积而不确认直接复制在国际事务去年九月中东评论，题为“伊拉克的安全和情报网络：指南与分析”的文章。http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html片的作者是易卜拉欣·阿尔·马拉希，在国际研究蒙特雷研究所研究生。他证实，他同意不寻求;事实上，他甚至不知道英国的文档，直到葛伦·兰奇沃拉，一个位于剑桥的伊拉克分析师提到了他。除了明显的批评，英国政府已经抄袭的文本没有确认，鱼目混珠作为其情报部门的工作，还有另外两个严重的问题。首先，它表明，至少在英国可能没有对伊拉克内政的信息任何独立的消息来源 - 他们只是借鉴公开数据。如果它们有独立的消息来源，他们的智力不被在政府的公共“案例战争”中。因此，基于“智能数据”来的信息的任何其它权利要求必须以更怀疑进行处理。其次，信息呈现为伊拉克的安全组织的当前状态的准确表述可能不是这种事情。Marashi  - 的许多文件的真实和不知情的作者 - 有作为他的主要来源，1991年对伊拉克研究和文献项目捕获的文件。他自己的重点是在科威特，Aug90-Jan91伊拉克情报机构的活动 - 这是他的论文的主题。 As a result, the information presented as relevant to how Iraqi agencies are currently engaged with Unmovic is 12 years old. It's quite striking that even Marashi's typographical errors and anomolous uses of grammar are incorporated into the Downing Street document. For example, on p.13, the British dossier incorporates a misplaced comma: "Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head".. Likewise, Marashi's piece also states: "Saddam appointed, Sabir 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Duri as head".. The other sources that are extensively plagiarised in the document are two authors from Jane's Intelligence Review: Ken Gause (an international security analyst from Alexandria, Virginia), "Can the Iraqi Security Apparatus save Saddam" (November 2002), pp.8-13. Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq's Security Network", in 2 parts during 1997. None of the sources are acknowledged, leading the reader to believe that the information is a result of direct investigative work, rather than simply copied from pre-existing internet sources. The fact that the texts of these three authors are copied directly results in a proliferation of different transliterations (eg different spellings of Ba'th, depending on which author is being copied). There are two types of changes incorporated into the British document. Firstly, numbers are increased or are rounded up. So, for example, the section on "Fedayeen Saddam" (pp.15-16) is directly copied from Boyne, almost word for word. The only substantive difference is that Boyne estimates the personnel of the organisation to be 18,000-40,000 (Gause similarly estimates 10-40,000). The British dossier instead writes "30,000 to 40,000". A similar bumping up of figures occurs with the description of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The second type of change in the British dossier is that it replaces particular words to make the claim sound stronger. So, for example, most of p.9 on the functions of the Mukhabarat is copied directly from Marashi's article, except that when Marashi writes of its role in "monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq" this becomes in the British dossier: "spying on foreign embassies in Iraq". Similarly, on that same page, whilst Marashi writes of the Mukhabarat: "aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes" - the British dossier renders this as: "supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes". Furher examples from the section on "Fedayeen Saddam" include how a reference to how, in Boyne's original text, its personnel are "recruited from regions loyal to Saddam", referring to their original grouping as "some 10,000-15,000 'bullies and country bumpkins.'" becomes in the British government's text a reference to how its personnel are: "press ganged from regions known to be loyal to Saddam" ... "some 10,000-15,000 bullies." Clearly, a reference to the "country bumpkins" would not have the rhetorical effect that the British government was aiming for. Finally, there is one serious substantive mistake in the British text, in that it muddles up Boyne's description of General Security (al-Amn al-Amm), and places it in its section on p.14 of Military Security (al-Amn al-Askari). The result is complete confusion: it starts on p.14 by relating how Military Security was created in 1992 (in a piece copied from Marashi), then goes onto talk about the movement of its headquarters - in 1990 (in a piece copied from Boyne on the activities of General Security). The result is that it gets the description of the Military Security Service wholly wrong, claiming that its head is Taha al-Ahbabi (whilst really he was head of General Security in 1997; Military Security was headed by Thabet Khalil). For reference, here are a few other summary comments on the British document. Official authors are (in Word Properties) P. Hamill, J. Pratt, A. Blackshaw, and M. Khan. p.1 is the summary. pp.2-5 are a repetition of Blix's comments to the Security Council on the difficulties they were encountering, with further claims about the activities of al-Mukhabarat. These are not backed up, eg the claim that car crashes are organised to prevent the speedy arrival of inspectors. p.6 is a simplified version of Marashi's diagram at:http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/pdfs/iraqint.pdf第7页从高斯复制（上）（在总统秘书处），和（中部和底部）从博伊恩（在国家安全委员会）。第8页完全是从博伊恩复制（在国家安全委员会）。第9页被复制从Marashi（对Al-情报机构），不同的是最后部分，这是无实质。第10页完全由Marashi（在一般安全）复制，除了最后一节，这是单薄。P.11完全由Marashi（在特别安全）复制，除了顶部（在一般安全），这是单薄。第12页完全复制从Marashi（在特别安全）。第13页是从高斯（上特别保护）和Marashi（军事情报）复制。第14页被错误地复制从博伊恩（在军事安全）和Marashi（在特别共和国卫队）。第15页从高斯和博因复制（对Al-哈迪项目/项目858）。pp.15-16复制从博伊恩（对萨达姆敢死队）。 A final section, on the Tribal Chiefs' Bureau, seems to be copied from a different piece by Cordesman. For more information please contact Glen Rangwala +44(0)1223 335759 or[电子邮件保护]