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Title:	Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis
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Strengthened IAEA Safeguards – Imagery Analysis


Frank Pabian Los Alamos National Laboratory


Abstract

This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote "all-source synergy." As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the "Digital Virtual Globes" (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to:

- 1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness
- 2) Pre-inspection planning
- 3) Onsite orientation and navigation
- 4) Post-inspection reporting
- 5) Site monitoring over time for changes
- 6) Verification of states' site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports
- 7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States)

Additionally, as an "open-source", such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct **broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities**...either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a "free" cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: "crowdsourcing"), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant and non-relevant facilities and their associated infrastructure. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software (i.e., Google's SketchUp6 newly available in 2007) when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better assessments including walk-arounds or fly-arounds...and perhaps better decision making on multiple levels (e.g., the best placement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) video monitoring cameras).






What is Imagery Analysis?

How Can It Help to Strengthen IAEA Safeguards?

- Imagery Analysis: Image analysis is the extraction of meaningful information from images, which, for this review, is primarily commercial satellite imagery. Imagery analysis is another means of assessing raw data that can be combined with other safeguards pertinent data, in a manner sometimes referred to as "Data Fusion," that can often have significant synergistic results.
- For IAEA Safeguards purposes, this means deriving: New, "value-added," information from the raw un-annotated imagery, and then adding that information to the overall existing body of knowledge with respect to a particular nuclear activity, facility, or program.
- Imagery analysis provides answers not only to the questions of What? and Where?, but even more importantly... Why?, How ?, and What is the significance?
- This briefing will show how the IAEA now routinely relies on imagery analysis for safeguards monitoring purposes with both Iran and Syria as examples, particularly as it applies to identifying "Undeclared facilities and activities".
- Finally, new "Geospatial Tools" have become available that can further facilitate the process of imagery analysis for Safeguards purposes.







Additional Thoughts on Imagery Analysis for Safeguards


Imagery Analysis, employing the new geospatial tools, should be viewed as just another form of "Open Source Analysis" to help strengthen IAEA Safeguards

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International Safeguards and Satellite Imagery

> ➤ "Data Fusion" is the name of the game. Imagery analysis is a tool to augment other information in a synergistic way

Knowing the key features ('Signatures'') of the nuclear fuel cycle is a necessary baseline for analysis (Shown are two examples of available reference material)



Satellite Imagery for All: A New Era of Global Transparency!

"Perhaps this is also a good moment to step back in awe at what modern technology has wrought the ability for any sufficiently concerned citizen or organization to scrutinize any desired spot on Earth within hours of making the request, and then being able to publish the result to a context-rich virtual globe that is universally available. That's a profound shift in favor of accountability, transparency and democracy. Monitoring the planet has been crowdsourced." Stefan Geens of Ogle Earth


"Clearly it has an effect on the way diplomacy will be carried out in the future", **Einar Bjorgo** (UNOSAT).


Applications Include:


- Emergency Response
- Disaster Management /Humanitarian Assistance
- Risk Prevention
- Peace-keeping
- Environmental Monitoring & Rehabilitation
- Post Conflict Reconstruction
- Social and Economic/Resource Development
- Treaty Verification and Monitoring


Sources: http://www.ogleearth.com/2009/09/qum_nuclear_sit.html#comments http://www.unspecial.org/UNS621/UNS_621_T32.html














	Advantages	<u>Disadvantages</u>
Optical/Electro-Optical:	Very high resolution possible. Near-infrared is optimal because it can penetrate haze and can be merged with true color for more natural appearance as an aid to interpretation.	Acquisition restricted by cloud cover and limited to daylight hours.
Aulti-spectral: Incl. Hyper-spectral)* ncludes both visual bands and non-visual bands	Provide the means to view sites in a more natural, true color setting. May also provide a means for determining material/chemical composition and material transfer, and for detecting camouflage and concealment activities	Slightly lower resolution (i.e., currently 2.5- meters).
Thermal infrared	Provides a quantifiable measure of heat transfer as a basis for determining site status such as reactor power operations. When correlated with optical could determine heat flow, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from waste ponds, steam lines, vents, stacks, cooling towers, etc.	Generally of too low resolution for anything other than facility activity monitoring (currently no better than about 20 to 90 meters)#.
Radar:		Processing and interpretation of imagery is much more difficult.

Minimum Overhead Imagery Resolution (in meters) Necessary for Analysis of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Related Facilities							
Facility of Interest	Detection	General Facility Identification & Site Layout	General Functional Building Description	Precise Building Identification	Technical Analysis & OMV		
	5 1 - 40	44-5	4	0.04-0.5	E forming and		
Uranium mining, processing & feed materials	5 to 10	1 to 5	1	0.2 to 0.5	.5 for mines and processing, limited other		
EMIS Enrichment Facilities	2 to 5	1 to 3	1	0.2 to 0.5	Limited to none at any resolution		
Gas Centrifuge Facilities	N/A	1 to 3	0.5	0.2	Limited to none at any resolution		
Heavy Water Plants	5	1-3	0.5	0.2	0.2		
Research Reactors	2 to 5	1 to 3	1	0.5	Limited to none at any resolution		
Plutonium Production Reactors	2 to 10	1 to 5	1	0.5 to 1	0.5 to 1		
Nuclear Weapons R&D (i.e., High Explosives Testing)	1 to 2	0.5 to 1	0.5	0.5	0.1 to 0.5		
Nuclear Weapons Mfg.	1 to 2	1	0.5	.1 to .5	Limited to none at any resolution		
Test Site	10	1 to 3	1 to 2	.5 to 1	0.5 to 1		
Table: Adapted from, Anne Florini, "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and US Security," <i>International Security</i> , Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), p. 98; and G.T. Richardson and Ober N. Merz, "High Resolution Commercial Imagery and Open Source Information: Implications for Arms Control," <i>Intelligence Note</i> , ACDA (May 1996), p.4. Detection: Identify the location of a facility of activity of EMCTNPT Interest (locate and define outline of nuclear related facility in light of other descriptive or geographically specific aformation) (Note: It can often be possible to deted and identify characteristic features, such as security fenning or power lines, despite the fact that any given section of such fencing may be of ubpixel size. or below the given resolution of the image, because they are generally linear and span many pixels.) Seneral ID: Determinition of general facility or activity type (Discriminate between research lab, mig facility, caplosives prod. storage site) Seneral ID: Precise Metring ID: Precise determination of building function (i.e., reactor type/size, propellant mixing/casing, machine shop, administration). Metrics Huilding ID: Precise determination of building function (i.e., reactor type/size, propellant mixing/casing, machine shop, administration).							



Diversification of Sources

Available high-resolution commercial sensors


- Spot 5, 2.5m (France)
- Formosat-2, 2m (Taiwan, China)
- KVR-1000, 2m (Russia)
- TerraSAR-X, 1m SAR (Germany)
- Cosmo-Skymed, 1m SAR (Italy)
- Kompsat-2, 1m (Korea)
- DK-1, 1m (Russia)
- Ikonos-2, 1m (USA)
- Eros B, 0.7m (Israel)
- QuickBird, 0.6m (USA)
- WorldView-1, 0.5m (USA)

() IAEA


















3-D Visualizations Can Support the IAEA Inspection and Assessment Process









GoogleEarth Uncovers Concealment and Deception in Sweden Sweden's Spy HQ's uncovered



From: http://www.ogleearth.com/2006/04/sweden_plays_hi.html



Another BLOG Revelation!


Sweden plays hide and seek with maps Friday, April 07, 2006 (10:18 UTC)


Sweden's Lantmåteriverket, the state GIS agency, has been caught camouflaging its censorship of the country's spy headquarters on aerial images it makes public, and Google Maps is directly responsible for the find.

It started when Eniro, a mainstream search and mapping site for Sweden, decided to use Lantmäteriverkets images to add aerial shots and hybrid maps to its mapping service, much like Google Maps does. A publication eventually noticed that the aerial data provided by Eniro and Google don't match in a special spot on the outskirts of Stockholm. Here is Eniro's image:


It turns out that Lantmäteriverket employs a person whose job it is to carnouflage its censorship by painting over buildings with trees and fields. The story made it to Sweden's lagest tabloid on Thursday in mangled form (of course), as blogged by Patrick Strang (in Swedish). Strang also rightly points out that the only effect of such carnouflaging, where you are lied to about the true information content of a map, is to disturst all maps the same source), in this case Lamintateriverket. It makes these maps less than useless, especially when Google Maps and Earth is around. And it is behaviour unbefitting an open society. If you need to censor something, fine, but dont hid the decision. That way lies 1884.

Another interesting tidbit: The agency said it does not have a problem with Google's images, as they are satellite-based, and hence outside the jurisdiction of Sweden, whereas the images it can censor are laken from planes that if ywhini his jurisdiction Countries do indeed have a monopoly on sovereignty in the air, and not in space.















Students locate and describe nucleartipped ballistic missile forces and their concealment underground in China









STORY HIGHLIGHTS Aerial images online endanger Cititis fear online aerial imagery of sensitive sites could help terrorists plan attacks. They have launched efforts to get Web map services to remove or blur images Web sites offer a virtual tour off he nation's 66 nuclear power plants, with close-ups Expert. Regulating imagery of sensitive infrastructure would be problematic national security, critics say ated 3 hours, 2 minutes ago Next Article in Technology a By Mike M. Ahlers 🔘 🗇 IIII FAIR WASHINGTON (CNN) -- One is a assemblyman in California; the other a plano tuner in Pennsylvania. But when they independently looked at online aerial imagery of nuclear power plants and other sites, they had the same reaction: They said they feared that terrorists might be doing the same thing. Now, both have launched efforts to try to get Internet map services to remove or blur images of sensitive sites, saying the same technology that allows people to see a neiphort's swirming pool can be used by terrorists to chose targets and non actacke plan attacks. "It is disturbing to me that terrorists can now perform considerable surveillance without visiting the targeted site," plano tuner and nuclear watchdog Scott Portzine wrote in a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. 3D Road Bird's eye Aerial Portizine is asking the Department of Homeland Security and the <u>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</u> to seek voluntary compliance from satellite and aerial imagery companies to blur images of nuclear plants. Joel Anderson, a member of the California Assembly, has more expansive goals. He has introduced a bill in the state Legislature that would prohibit "what jobo" services from providing unblured pictures of schools, churches and government or medical facilities in California. It also would prohibit those services from providing street-view photos of those buildings. "It struck me that a person in a tent halfway around the world could target an attack like that with a laptop computer," said Anderson, a Republican legislator who represents San Diego's East County. Anderson said be desent want to limit technology, but added, "There's got to be some common sense." Don't Miss Probe finds U.S. military hardware easy to buy, ship Obama creates top job for guarding online security


http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/06/05/aerial.images.security/index.html#cnnSTCVideo

























































GOV/2009/36

Board of Governors




Date: 5 June 2009 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic Report by the Director General


Paragraph 18. SUMMARY


1) The presence of the uranium particles at the Dair Alzour (aka Al Kibar) site, the imagery of the site available to the Agency and certain procurement activities remain to be clarified.


2) The information provided by Syria to date does not adequately support its assertions about the nature of the site.

3) In order for the Agency to complete its assessment, Syria needs to be more cooperative and transparent.


































































Kim Jong Un (3rd R) looks at training equipments during his visit to the KPA Strategic Rocket For Command in the suburbs of Pyongyang. Also in attendance is Gen. Pak Jae Gyong (R) (Photo: KCN. Yonhap)





























































"Fauxtography" is a potential problem: But MUCH less so for satellite imagery than with ground imagery as there are: multiple satellites- from multiple vendors- and from multiple nations









Students Making a Difference With GE

Monterey Institute Student's Innovative Geospatial Analysis Work Cited by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller

ed Analysis Technique to Aid Arms Control Verification

Monterey, CA—In a speech delivered yesterday at Stanford University, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller cited the geospatial analysis research of Monterey Institute of International Studies student Tamara Pation (NPTS '12) as an example of innovative work being done in the area of arms control verification.

vast potential of freely available software tools like Google Earth and Google

SketchUp to identify and analyze nuclear proliferation

they also allow students and

nonproliferation to perform

relying on a few confined

professionals in

-Tamara Patton

sources."

Secretary Gottemoeller explained in Secretary Gottemoeller explained in her remarks how Patton, a second-year honors student in the Institute's Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program, had taken open-source satellite images of Pakistan's Khushab Plutonium Production Complex and used a freely available program. Knushab Piutonium Production Complex and used a freely available program called **Google Sketch-up**, as well as **Google Earth** tools and basic trigonometry, to construct a three-dimensional model of the facility. The model can then be overlaid onto a map.

Patton, whose geospatial analysis research is the subject of her honors thesis, is expected to graduate next thesis, is expected to graduate next year from the Institute's unique Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program. The program draws heavily for its curriculum on the expertise and resources resident in the Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). CNS S is the world's largest research center devoted to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Delivering the Sidney Drell Lecture at

Selfering the sound of the lecture as Stanford, Secretary Gottemoeller explored a range of innovations in arms control verification techniques, including open source information technologies and social networking.

