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军事问题PAPER金博宝正规网址

CAN ATARS FIX AMERICA'S

TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE VACUUM?

通过

主要马克E.马雷克

会议组九

LtCol Sorrell

雅各布森博士

18 April 1995

美国海军陆战队

Command and Staff College

海军陆战队大学

2076南街

海军陆战队作战发展司令部

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE, INCLUDING THE AUTHOR'S NAME, PAPER TITLE, AND THE STATEMENT: "WRITTEN IN FULFILLMENT OF A REQUIREMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE."

所表述的意见和结论是那些个别学生作者个人观点，并不代表无论是美国海军陆战队指挥与参谋学院或其他政府单位的意见。

Introduction

距离沙漠风暴行动中明确表示，美国在战术集合资产投资并没有跟上她的军事力量结构的现代化步伐。（1）

虽然海湾战争的批评者普遍认为，全面收集工作非常好，分析收到的混合审查和分发收到一个彻头彻尾的不及格。（2）

The impending operational capability of the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) should catapult the Marine Corps into the forefront of America's tactical reconnaissance capabilities and help fill the void of tactical collection assets. However, ATARS alone cannot fix our tactical intelligence vacuum. This vacuum transcends our lack of physical collection assets.

The Gulf War highlighted the larger lesson learned that the intelligence community, especially in the Marine Corps, needs to re-define its cultural mindset. Part of the problem is staffing, and part of the problem is equipment. Although new staffing goals and new collection platforms will help, they will not completely fix our intelligence shortcomings. More fundamentally, basic changes must take place if we are to break out of the mold of doing business the same way. Intelligence information must be "pushed" down to the operational units. If the Marine Corps fields new hardware unmatched by a new cultural mindset in the intelligence community, a mindset that actively promotes dissemination and utilization of its products, intelligence will continue to accumulate at the highest levels while frustration and dissatisfaction will prevail at the lowest levels.

National problems

海军陆战队股份为美国的战术情报能力表现不佳的责任。通过淘汰我们唯一的战术侦察中队的RF-4B在1990年10月，我们在海军陆战队有意识地承认，差距就在我们收集的战术图像的能力存在。我们并不认为是更广泛的差距，这也将存在于美国军队的战术侦察能力。在他们的沙漠盾牌/风暴期间智能的成功与失败报告，众议院监督和调查小组委员会说：

......这些服务已经退休的情报平台纯粹是出于预算原因而没有在覆盖范围上的孔提供足够的手段来填充......决定退休智力资产，或以其他方式削减智能功能，只应madeafter对智力的影响已经充分考虑。(3)

This myopic reasoning resulted in a short term single-service budgetary gain without considering the impact on the Department of Defense's overall warfighting capability. Senior intelligence personnel protested the retirement of the Marine Corps RF-4B but were overruled on the basis of the RF-4's prohibitive maintenance and upkeep costs. One positive outcome of this event was the creation of the Defense Aerial Reconnaissance Office (DARO) in 1993. The Department of Defense (DOD) formed the DARO to ensure that an executive level agency exists with the purpose of coordinating and supporting the warfighter's tactical, operational, and strategic needs. Theoretically, the DOD will make future decisions concerning reconnaissance in a unified and coordinated fashion. Nevertheless, during operation Desert Shield/Storm the result was that the combined efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), CENTCOM/J-2, and individual service intelligence divisions were not enough to prevent Marine Corps pilots, in addition to the other military aviators, from going on combat missions without adequate photo intelligence support.(4)

The information available through national systems such as satellites, U-2/TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft, RC-135 Rivet Joint signal intelligence aircraft, and the new Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS) aircraft generally did not trickle down to tactical commanders.(5)

Promises made by national agencies to fill the void of tactical collection assets by using national assets proved unfulfillable. Two problems served to limit the degree of support to combat commanders from the national intelligence community.

First, some national intelligence organizations appeared unfamiliar with or unresponsive to the needs of the wartime commander.（6）

The primary design of these systems was to support the national command authorities, not fast moving tactical operations. Satellites are designed to monitor relatively static situations such as staging areas or strategic force deployments, not to meet tactical requirements that demand answers within hours or minutes.（7）

这严重短缺导致无法提供图像响应地面指挥官的要求。（8）

杀手本能“获得的信息来触发车夫”，因为它不能在国家层面存在不会在国家层面上存在。就像任何其他的官僚远离战争或战场的摩擦去除雾气，我们的国家机构都不能支持在战斗中战士的需求。讽刺的是，后面的有机侦察系统的终止推理的部分是，“国家资产”会做的工作在危机的情况下。此外，我们很少进行国家资产例行训练。我们再一次尝试做下战时情况下的东西，我们甚至从来没有在平时的训练。鲍威尔将军曾表示，战区和战术指挥官沮丧“在缺乏国家层面收集到的情报的传播协调和及时性。”（9）

美元我们花在国家征收资产数十亿美元是不值得一分钱如果他们生产的智力没有达到谁最需要它的人。

不是不响应呼吁在危机中帮助糟糕的唯一一件事就是完成所要求的工作，而不是与传播跟进。如果您的客户不接受你的产品，你已经浪费了你的时间内生产它。未能与传播，以循具有前所未有做的工作摆在首位相同的整体效果。由国家级情报机构产生，并传送到影院目标的情报材料的显著量从未进入作战指挥官的手中。一前一后的经验教训行动报告教训确定，虽然没有计划，以保留必要的数据，在利雅得情报人员共享的思维定式，他们更好地比运营商，以确定需要什么样的运营商。(10)

如果操作部队与战术情报淹没，但在战争中吸取的经验教训表明，这种情况并非如此这种心态是可以接受的。很多例子表明，战术指挥官字面上饿死信息。准将迈亚特，然后陆战1师的将军，一再要求的防御性障碍和雷区的图像是第一MarDiv将不得不违约。海军陆战队第一师进行违反操作的前几天，他终于收到了详细的航拍照片。（11）

Conversely, some combat commanders had little appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of U.S. intelligence systems. This lack of understanding limited the extent to which the vast amount of available intelligence data reached tactical commanders.（12）

通常情况下，战术单位收到的成品估计和高级指挥官，而不是规划战术行动所需的详细情报产生摘要。（13）

情报机构负责作战指挥的有关情报能力和不足的教育。可以肯定，作战指挥官必须表达自己的要求。情报官员普遍的抱怨是，许多指挥官似乎并不知道自己想要的情报的东西。根据我的经验，但是，军事指挥官的任务以人为本，谁与发号施令，并告诉别人，他们希望他们的绝对没问题的人。在硕士论文，主要医学博士Kuszewski指出，“海军陆战队必须承认一个事实，许多指挥官无法接受情报作为命令的个人，固有的功能。”（14）

海洋情报官员,主要Kuszewski屁股erts that the problems concerning intelligence revolve around the perceptions and expectations of the commander. Commanders who participate in the education and guidance of their intelligence officers, just as with other staff officers, will have a greater appreciation of intelligence capabilities and tend to be less critical of them. While I agree with Major Kuszewski, I have generally found that intelligence officers, even ones that are educated and guided, fail to have the "killer instinct" to get the job done. The killer instinct quality is one that inherently thrives on adversity. People who have it get the job done without questions or excuses. If a request cannot possibly be filled, the response should be, "I cannot get this for you, however I can get a suitable substitute." The word "no" is rarely, if ever, heard in this vocabulary.

USMC的文化问题

更确凿的比不是由国家或影院资产支持的是我们自己的情报界未能提供足够的支持。总体而言，海军陆战队作战单位收到的战术情报是不能令人满意的。（15）

在海湾战争期间航空作战元素（ACE）的情报人员提供了很多情报更新，包括过时的信息是有限的使用。(16)

Marine flag rank officers have not been shy relating their feelings on the performance of Marine Corps intelligence staffs during the Gulf War. Then Brigadier General Paul Van Riper stated:

In my opinion, we fail to establish an operational mindset in many of our intelligence officers. The majority appear to be focused inward on the "intelligence cycle." Many seem fascinated with systems and procedures rather than the product being (or more often not being) provided to the operator.(17)

I submit that the intelligence culture in the Marine Corps is inherently flawed. It is flawed due to a variety of circumstances. A primary reason is the lack of hardware in the form of organic USMC collection assets. Another reason is the result of inadequate staffing and low prestige afforded to those in the intelligence specialty. Both reasons combine to produce low morale and credibility. Although the Marine Corps Intelligence field is under equipped and under staffed, there still exists an intangible quality that is lacking in Marine Corps intelligence officers. I can only describe it as the "killer instinct". It has nothing to do with machismo or brute force. It has everything to do with a selfless dedication to duty that puts the team before self. Instead of continually reasoning why the "green door" to intelligence must be shut, someone with the killer instinct would find a legitimate way to open it.

虽然规划了许多应急作战任务了，五个单位的部署过程中从一个更高的总部情报组我中队多次要求照片影像的支持。我们的要求为借口，一再忽视或去了没有兑现，这些照片是“不可用”，这些照片were可用，但不容易接近。最终，我们把我们的中队照片解释到附近的空军司令部，在那里他以货易货的照片自己。促使该照片的责任在上级司令部情报官员，但他不能被说服做他的工作。这不是一个单一的实例，但模式的一部分重复了几年的时间。问题不在于与事实的照片不存在或情报官是身体不适用于购买它们。问题是，情报人员，他的工作包括提供目标情报的照片，并没有意愿去获得它们。他没有拥有的文化气质，杀手本能，来完成这项工作。简直可以说，情报官员的心态是，如果他给了我们他有什么，或者告诉我们他所知道的，我们随后会珍惜他少。讽刺的是，不生产所要求的照片确实有这种效果。我们的沙漠盾牌/风暴期间较差智能性能的另一个原因是为在有限的国家征收资产的竞争。 For example when tactical commanders did get information concerning Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) it was not useful or required that operational planners make their own assessment on whether the attacks were succeeding and whether re-strikes were necessary. Lieutenant General William Keys, CG 2nd Marine Division, has stated, "At the strategic level, [intelligence] was fine. But we did not get enough tactical intelligence -- front-line battle intelligence."(18)

荣师和旅指挥官的情报需要一个无法有机的资产来满足不得不进行验证，并在更高的梯队优先;很多时候他们的要求，但经过验证，下跌过低名单上的任务繁重剧院和国家资源拨付。（19）

很难以想象有什么更高的革命制度党ority for intelligence than real live Marines going into combat: the LAV company going on a raid of an enemy outpost, or that AV-8B pilot trying to plan for a Close Air Support (CAS) or Interdiction mission. Somehow our priorities have gotten all switched around. Tactical commanders and operators have grown so accustomed to working without adequate intelligence that they have given up trying to fix the situation. Our undermanned intelligence community relied on these outside sources for collection of tactical imagery and did not disseminate it sufficiently once they acquired it. This also was true for most Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings. One officer from an Air Force wing said:

我的最好的情报来源，从CENTAF渠道以外。我知道有些人在陆军情报威胁，并在华盛顿分析中心（ITAC）和他们成为支持机翼的宝贵资源。我也试图进军544在战略空军司令部在奥马哈，但剔除。我能够与480在兰利空军基地连接起来，但CENTAF会不断地尝试切断这种渠道。(20)

这里的区别是，这个官做什么了，以达到照片的情报。对比谁是越来越智能，从华盛顿到AV-8B中队的美制筛空军军官拿骚谁也无法取得附近航母战斗群的智力支持。在海军陆战队远征旅（MEB）情报部认为它知道比机组人员更好的实际飞行所需要的东西的照片情报任务。该中队曾实际上是“偷”从他们自己的总部照片，以完成其使命。在一个AV-8B飞行员的意见，可怜的智力支持是他的僚机在沙漠风暴使命损失的一个因素(21)

Those units that had their own reconnaissance assets, such as Carrier Air Wings with F-14D's capable of carrying Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pods, had better imagery support than those units that did not (e.g., Third Marine Aircraft Wing). As a result, few assets were available to collect BDA after artillery barrages or air strikes. A lack of hardware combined with a pervasive failure to practice BDA regularly on a large scale before the war--a failure shared by commanders as well as intelligence organizations--set the stage for its inadequacy during the war.（22）

与以往一样，[这直接进入我的论点]任务，或者我们无法实践在平时的能力有很好的战斗中被完成的机会不大。作战行动将扩大我们平时的缺点，不能治愈他们。

As a result of these problems, the intelligence community has acquired a defensive cultural mentality that is not conducive to proactive participation, acquiring the information at any cost, and selflessly giving to the organization. What I call the killer instinct or the cultural ethos to push information to the commander does not prevail. This causes the intelligence community to suffer from a serious lack of credibility. Can we break out of this vicious circle? The two readily apparent factors contributing to our lack of tactical intelligence are understaffing and lack of organic collection assets. These two problems snowball into causing poor morale which in turn results in lack of a cultural ethos to get the job done. The ultimate results are negative impressions of the intelligence community and insufficient intelligence at the tactical level.

人力资源解决方案

在海军陆战队航空兵中队，MOS缺乏训练有素的情报人员就不可能为中队训练按照自己的意愿去战斗。对整顿我们的战术情报问题的第一步是进行结构调整的情报官分配政策，尤其是在海洋航空器翼（鱼鳔）。在此之前的战争，直到重组定向为最近完成的任务区分析12的结果，情报官员钢坯，将继续由中队机组人员在海军陆战队航空兵中队附随义务填补。规定最低工资的海洋航空器小组（MAG）是最低级别的人员的情报人员。那工作人员编制包括一个主要的和中尉。在中队营级军事专业的工作人员（MOS）训练的军官会大大有助于解决这个问题

对固定我们的战术侦察真空第二步显然是促使该工具来完成这项工作。硬件的要求是至关重要的，因为它可以做多提供了已经失踪海洋航空在过去五年图像情报。新的硬件可能可以作为迈向重振战术情报到MAGTF指挥官的角色催化剂。新的硬件将允许战术情报，以实际驾驶操作。

Hardware Requirements

要解决硬件要求作战指挥官必须有他的直接控制下的战术侦察系统。该系统必须是可访问的，熟悉的和功能性。美国海军陆战队需要一个系统，可以在战术，战役和战略的高度，如果有必要提供MAGTF指挥官图像情报。古语说，“如果你想要的工作做对，做自己，”仍然适用。沙漠风暴已经生动地告诉我们，战争是一个来作为你的事情，并且有可能会成为冲突期间没有时间进行新武器系统的发展。另一个教训是，如果你有能力，你的组织没有有机地工作的要求，得到满足该需求的机会很渺茫。这适用于无人飞行器（UAV）或载人战术侦察平台。对于“共享”资产优先级进程已经表明自己是反应迟钝即将面临的作战指挥官的需求。这适用于从下到MEF水平总司令水平。一般施华蔻把它在国会的证词1991年6月12日，“......我们只是没有一个响应立即情报能力，这将使近实​​时信息，他个人需要做出决定的战区司令。”（23）

一般穆尔，CG第3个海洋航空器翼在海湾战争期间，指出：

实际的地面战役开始前两天，我们终于由两个军官们给我们带来的实际雷区违约网站的图片 - 从2水师陆战1师，一个一个 - 我们曾派人到华盛顿。这应该告诉你的信息流刚好是不存在。我相信CINCPAC，CinCLant和其他命令有很多伟大的照片，但他们没有得到我们。（24）

有机能力将允许信息从收集到作战人员通过分析直接流。在某些快速移动的情况下，要求存在对情报信息直接进入从集电极到战士或在当前的说法，“传感器到射手”。有必要到现场的所有天气和气象侦察系统下远距离提供近实时（NRT）战场情报炸弹损伤评估（BDA）。（25）

Data-Link capability will allow for NRT connectivity to any allied, joint, or Major Subordinate Command (MSC) possessing a Joint Service Imagery Processing Station (JSIPS). This requirement is being met by the procurement of the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS).

ATARS Program background

最初，美国空军负责采购ATARS，并计划装备的F-16C飞机外部ATARS荚首席服务。由于单位成本持续上升，总生产数量减少，ATARS程序得到了麻烦。在常规麦克皮克的领导下，空军决定，载人战术侦察不是他们的总任务的一部分。此外，由于美国海军陆战队将是多年的美国空军发展努力的最初受益者，该决定是一个容易为空军。（26）

经过多年的延误和成本超支，美国空军和马丁·玛丽埃塔于1993年6月同意停止ATARS系统上工作。截至1993年10月空军终止了与该计划所有参与。1993年11月在海军部获得国会方向的ATARS恢复程序的发展其战术空中侦察系统。在1994年1月，海军陆战队假设ATARS程序作为首席服务的管理。

描述

The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System Follow On (ATARS FO) is an airborne tactical reconnaissance system composed of an F/A-18D aircraft, electro-optical/infrared and radar sensor suites, a digital recording device, and a ground component called JSIPS. The system will not only provide Marine tactical commanders the organic capability to obtain imagery intelligence, it will also provide that imagery via data-link to any Joint or Coalition unit that has a JSIPS ground station.

The internal nose mounted sensor suite called the ATARS pallet contains several key components. The Low Altitude Electro Optical (LAEO) sensor provides imagery from direct overflight of targets. The Medium Altitude Electro Optical (MAEO) sensor operates from 3,000 to 25,000 feet and covers areas in a 220大片在高达5海里范围。

The primary use of these two sensors would be post strike bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions.红外行扫描仪(IRLS) operates in two modes: wide and narrow. Both modes operate from 200 to 25,000 feet and require overflight of the imaged area. The IRLS will allow detection of tactical targets such as recently operated vehicles or generators through detection of their heat signature. Imagery obtained through the LAEO, MAEO, and IRLS systems can be data linked to a ground station if the aircraft is carrying an external data link pod. The Infrared/Electro-Optical Long Range Oblique Photography System (IR/EO-LOROPS) is a pod mounted system that will provide day and night long range stand-off imagery capability to the MAGTF commander. This system can see through haze and light cloud cover from oblique angles at medium and long range. The ability to "see deep" will help in battlefield shaping and strike planning. It will also provide for BDA at long range when direct overflight is not possible or desired. This externally carried pod also contains a data link that can down link EO-LOROPS imagery as well as the imagery collected by the primary internal systems of ATARS and the imagery obtained through the APG-73's reconnaissance strip map mode.

雷达升级（RUG）第二阶段到每个F / A-18的APG​​-65多模式雷达将提供真正的全天候空中侦察能力。此升级雷达将提供非常小的决议，同时创建侦察带地图和更详细的地图斑的能力。该系统基本上产生利益的MAGTF指挥官任何理由区域的雷达产生的画面。

The aircraft will be able to record all imagery collected via an on-board digital tape recorder. Data link pods carried by the aircraft will be the primary means of transmitting imagery to the ground station. In time critical situations the data linked imagery could feasibly be in the hands of the MEF commander minutes after collection by the aircraft. The alternate method will be to manually process the data after the aircraft returns to its land base. Although this process is much slower than data link, it will provide a reliable back-up system in case of data link failure. The Marine Corps will have a Preliminary Operational Capability (POC) during FY-96 that will consist of limited ATARS capability for one squadron. By FY-00 the Marine Corps will have acquired 31 ATARS suites.

C4I接口

海军陆战队计划通过所指定的战术开发集团（TEG）的移动JSIPS接口这个实时信息的接地部分。该TEG将设在监视侦察情报集团（SRIG）。该TEG为高度流动的意象地面站是部署在两个或三个高机动性多用途轮式车辆（HMMWV的）。在TEG被接口到JSIPS图像毂这是一个USMC资产位于和运行在Camp Pendleton，钙。该TEG也可以对接剧院联合情报中心（JIC）。（27）该系统将提供及时的图像给MAGTF指挥官操作方向如战场的情报准备（IPB），罢工或目标任务，和炸弹毁伤评估。看的能力深将协助MEF的未来运营规划节即将到来的操作做准备。

根据目前计划的每个F / A-18D中队将具有用于接收数据的链接信息的附加地面站。该中队地面站（SGS）将提供一个备份到位于SRIG地面站，并允许航空作战分队指挥员确定空中任务命令（ATO）下达指标的重新罢工是否是必要的。这些中队地面站也将能够提供额外的接入点，谁需要图像情报，并可能接近一中队比MEF的SRIG地面作战元素（GCE）指挥官。由海事直升机有机资产，如果必要的高优先级的图像可以传送空气。这里最重要的概念是，该中队地面站使我们在传播和ATARS图像的后续利用更多的灵活性。

Human Solutions

该承诺，所有这些高科技技术提供了将空心如果我们忽视周围的使用人的因素。在鱼鳔任务区分析12个地址的人员配备不足的情报人员。ATARS的问世解决了必要的战术侦察返回MAGTF硬件要求。先进战术飞机侦察系统是机器，仅此而已。它必须由人类和其产品通过人类传播的操作。

我们的情报系统必须直接责成F / A-18D中队提供的图像作为例行公事的能力。该系统必须收集，加工，制作，传播信息的MEF的任何或所有单位和互连联合社区。该系统将提供海军陆战队与振兴，近年来已发生故障的情报和运营团队所必需的硬件。当两个ATARS的全面作战能力和TEG是在2000年左右实现，海军陆战队队终于有硬件，以填补美国的战术侦察真空。

The key to our success will be the familiarity of our aircrews and intelligence and imagery processing system to work together on a routine basis. We must exercise the capability provided by ATARS on a daily basis. Once it is fully on line, the process of tasking, collection, processing, analysis, and most importantly dissemination needs to work like a well-oiled machine within the MAGTF. If we expect tactical reconnaissance to work in the next war, we must exercise it每天平时。我们的想象力是我们唯一的限制方面，我们可以行使这一新功能，可以直接在未来战争有利于我们的方式。一个例子是将我们在F / A-18的进和周围我们目前的基地和航空加油站开展拥堵地面道路的日常侦察。我们可以通过飞越做到这一点还是对峙南加州的高速公路系统的图像。影像数据链接到战术开发集团，并通过图像分析系统，并通过局域网（LAN）的小岛屿发展中国家和荣司单位分布可以通过战术级单位进行查看。再次，关键就在这新技术的成功结合是熟悉。情报界必须在推动图像情报向下一个积极主动的作用。随着ATARS我们可以打破刻板的“我有一个秘密”已经存在多年在情报界的行为。要做到这个事情短期将确保在战术层面的情报真空继续存在。

Conclusion

时间是我们作为人类努力改变我们的行为，思考和行为方式的必要因素。由于ATARS不会全面运作，直到2000年，时间的变化是可用的，但我们必须从现在开始。我们不能拿一个20世纪的心态带入21世纪。作为ATARS上线时，美国海军陆战队/ MAGTF情报界将要完成图像采集，加工，生产和传播的工作的工具。关键是在传播。如果情报界未能传播图像也不会重拾信誉，ATARS不会解决美国的，或海军陆战队，战术侦察真空。在另一方面，如果我们行使的程序在MAGTF和各级那些程序，以获取战术图像成为在平时的第二天性，他们在战时工作的机会。ATARS的硬件是在路上。它会通过一个新的文化心理得到满足，还是会照常营业？

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1。U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 7.

2。Ibid 28.

3。Ibid 9.

4。Major Kevin Herrmann, student at USMC Command and Staff College and AV-8B pilot aboard U.S.S. Nassau during the Gulf War, interview by author, 13 February 1995.

5.U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 6.

6.Ibid 6.

7。Proceedings“当家，徒手......和不可用”，（华盛顿特区：1994年9月），39。

8。Department of Defense,Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992（华盛顿特区：1992年），附录C 340。

9。创科林·鲍威尔，在职能，任务，以及美国武装部队的职能的报告(Washington, DC: CJCS, Feb 1993), II-13.

10。U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 17.

11。中校查尔斯·H·Cureton，USMCR，美国海军陆战队在波斯湾，1990- 1991年：与第一陆战师在沙漠盾牌和沙漠风暴，专着，历史和博物馆事业部总部，美国的海军陆战队（华盛顿特区：1993年），48。

12。U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，第103聪。，第一编码扩频通信，1993，Committtee打印，6。

13。Department of Defense,Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992（华盛顿特区：1992年），342。

14.Major Michael D. Kuszewski, USMC, Intelligence:个人的，指挥的固有功能，MSSI论文（加利福尼亚州蒙特雷：海军研究生院，1992年6月），286。

15.BGEN保罗凡成熟，“意见在沙漠风暴行动”，海军陆战队公报(Quantico, Va. June 1991), 58.

16.赫尔曼采访。

17.U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993,Committee Print, 18.

18。同上333。

19。同上340。

20.Ibid 18.

21。赫尔曼采访。

22。Department of the Air Force,Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report(Washington, DC: 1993), 143.

23。U.S. Congress, House, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives,Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm，第103丛，1 SESS，1993年，委员会打​​印，30。

24。。LTGen皇家N.摩尔，JR， “海洋航空：有在需要时”，Proceedings

(November 1991), 64.

25。Department of Defense,Conduct of The Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992（华盛顿特区：1992年），247。

26.Ltcol Henry J. Krauss, ATARS program manager, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, interview by author, 9 January 1995.

27.海军罢工战争中心，作战分析处传真至HQMC代码APW 81，主题：“高级战术空中侦察系统遵循系统的描述，”（华盛顿特区：1994年），4。