

Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

Mr. Steven Aftergood  
Federation of American Scientists  
1725 DeSales Street NW, Suite 600  
Washington, DC 20036

NOV 20 2014

NOV 28 2014

Reference: ODNI Case # DF-2014-00273

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is in response to your 15 July 2014 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Enclosure 1), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), "...a copy of the most recent semi-annual report prepared by the Intelligence Community Inspector General (01 October 2013 to 31 March 2014)."

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. A thorough search of our records and databases located one document responsive to your request (Enclosure 2). Certain information has been deleted from the enclosure pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt by statutes; specifically, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5) which protects privileged interagency or intra-agency information; and
- (b)(6) which applies to records which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.

If you wish to appeal our determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Information Management Office  
Washington, DC 20511

If you have any questions, please email our Requester Service Center at [DNI-FOIA@dni.gov](mailto:DNI-FOIA@dni.gov) or call us at (703) 874-8500.

Sincerely,

*boe*  
  
Jennifer Hudson  
Director, Information Management Division

Enclosures



1 October 2013 - 31 March 2014

# (U) SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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I. Charles McCullough, III  
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

### **(U) Mission**

**(U)** We conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integration across the Intelligence Community.

### **(U) Vision**

**(U)** Speak truth; enable excellence in management and accountability.

### **(U) Core Values**

**(U) Integrity:** We are honest, trustworthy, accountable for our actions, and committed to fulfilling our mission.


**(U) Professionalism:** We hold ourselves to the highest standards of technical proficiency and treat others with courtesy and respect.

**(U) Independence:** We conduct our mission free of external influence and provide objective assessments, advice, and conclusions regardless of political or personal consequence.

### **(U) Diversity**

**(U)** The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) promotes diversity in all aspects of our mission as a key to our success. Our professional and innovative culture demonstrates the value we place in having a diverse workforce. This is true with our hiring and promotion practices, as well as our efforts to support current IC IG staff who wish to develop or enhance their current skill sets by learning a new IG discipline or participating in a Joint Duty assignment. Our commitment to diversity ensures that we maintain an equitable working environment and can fully leverage the varied IG expertise and Intelligence Community backgrounds of our staff.

# (U) A Message from the Inspector General



(U) I am pleased to provide this summary of the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) for the period of 1 October 2013 through 31 March 2014. This report is submitted pursuant to Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

(U) On 19 March we held our annual IC Inspectors General Conference. The Conference highlights included a question and answer session with the Director of National Intelligence, a forum discussion with the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community and IG National Intelligence Award winners presenting their efforts within the Inspector General community.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period we:

- completed three audits: the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Independent Evaluation of ODNI Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA); The Fiscal Year 2013 Consolidated FISMA Capstone Report for the IC Elements' Inspectors General; and the Assessment of Purchase and Travel Card Programs;
- completed two inspections of ODNI components: the Office of the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition, Technology and Facilities; and the IC Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity Office;
- completed work on 21 investigation cases, substantiating 8;
- completed an Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office of certain 2010 Admissions of Potential Crimes; and
- issued an IC IG Advisory to the DNI concerning IC-wide Issues Related to Polygraphs and Crimes Reporting Process.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We are currently completing an Evaluation of Intelligence Community Information Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; a Special Review of the NRO Crimes Reporting Process; and an evaluation of ODNI's efforts concerning reducing over-classification. We are also conducting two component inspections, and three audits

(U) We continue to foster integration and collaboration among the IC Offices of Inspector General (IC OIGs) by:

- leading the statutory IC IG Forum and the Forum's Deputies, Audit, Inspections, Investigations, Counsel, and Management and Administration committees;
- making strides in our Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and Source Protection program;
- executing our newly established Peer Review Program in coordination with the IC OIGs; and
- liaising with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) I credit our hard-working personnel for these accomplishments and ongoing efforts. I very much appreciate the steadfast support the DNI, the Administration, and the Congressional Intelligence Committees have provided and remain committed to the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, independence, and integrity.

**I. Charles McCullough, III**

*Inspector General of the Intelligence Community*

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# (U) Statutory Reporting Requirements

## A. (U) Standards

(U) We conducted all audits in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. All inspections and investigations conform to standards adopted by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).

## B. (U) Full and Direct Access Certification

(U) The IC IG had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his duties.

## C. (U) Subpoena Authority

(U) During this reporting period the IC IG issued no subpoenas.

## D. (U) Legislative Proposals

(U) During this reporting period the IC IG made no additional legislative proposals. However, the office remained engaged with the congressional oversight committees on previous IC IG proposals to enhance IC IG personnel authorities, budget authorities, and protection of inspector general (IG) materials. This engagement proved successful

when both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) included our proposals in their respective Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Intelligence Authorization bills. For example, the SSCI and the HPSCI included legislation providing for an additional Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption to withhold IC IG confidential information in response to a FOIA request. This provision, in keeping with the IG Act of 1978 provisions, allows withholding of IG confidential information, and brings the IC IG's information authorities in line with other federal IGs. At this time, the FY 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act has yet to be enacted. However, with the continued support of the SSCI and the HPSCI, the IC IG is well positioned to have these provisions and others included in subsequent Intelligence Authorization Acts.

## E. (U) Status of Recommendations

(U) Appendix G presents the status of IC IG recommendations. Each recommendation identifies the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) component or Intelligence Community (IC) element responsible for the necessary corrective actions and whether or not the corrective action has been fully implemented. Where corrective action has been completed, a description of that corrective action is provided.


## (U) Overview

### A. (U) Organization

(U) The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for FY 2010 established the IC IG with the authority to initiate and conduct independent audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews of programs and activities within the DNI's responsibility and authority. The IC IG promotes economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and activities, and prevents and detects fraud, waste, and abuse. The IC IG's broad authority, as established in the IAA, allows us to identify and investigate systemic IC issues that impact the DNI's ability to achieve intelligence integration. In addition, the IC IG provides leadership and coordination to other IC Inspectors General through the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum (IC IG Forum). The forum was also established by the FY 2010 IAA.

(U) The IC IG is composed of the IG, the Deputy IG, the Counsel to the IG, the Assistant Inspectors General (AIGs) for Audit, Investigations, Inspections, Management and Administration (M&A); a Senior Advisor on Intelligence Oversight (IO); and Executive Directors for Whistleblowing and Source Protection and for IG Community Standards. The office's principal operating divisions are Audit, Inspections, and Investigations. The Senior Advisor on IO provides reviews of intelligence activities, either within the ODNI or across IC organizations, to ensure that such activities are authorized and conducted lawfully. The M&A Division and the Counsel's Office provide enabling support to the operational divisions and the IC IG Front Office. The Executive Directors for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and Source Protection and for IG Community Standards support the IC IG Forum.

(b)(3)



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**B. (U) Personnel**

(b)(3)

(U//~~FOUO~~) In FY 2014, the IC IG is authorized a total staffing complement of █ positions. The table below shows positions by division and office. Positions, as of 31 March 2014, reflect █ equivalents, and █ vacancies. The unusually high number of vacancies is due to the late enactment of the FY 2014 Consolidated Appropriation Act in

January which added █ additional positions to our staff. Efforts are now underway to fill these new positions.

(U) The IC IG is composed of a diverse group of talented and highly-skilled employees to include cadre, joint duty detailees, and contractors who provide subject matter expertise. The following figures summarize the breakdown of the IC IG staff by category.

**(U) IC IG Position Allocation**

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


**C. Funding**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ODNI provided adequate funding for the IC IG mission during this reporting period. Our budget covered personnel services and general support requirements such as travel, training, equipment, supplies, information

technology support, and office automation requirements. The IC IG requested and the DNI supported an increase in IC IG personnel for FY 2014. The requested increase in staffing will assist the IC IG in keeping pace with increasing mission requirements.

(b)(3)



## (U) Congressional Engagements

### A. (U) Briefings

(U) Pursuant to section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the IG has a statutory obligation to ensure that the congressional oversight committees are kept fully and currently informed of significant problems and deficiencies within the programs and activities of the DNI. During this reporting period, the IG joined the Department of Homeland Security Acting Deputy IG to provide an overview briefing to the Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee on the IC IG Forum review of the Boston Marathon Bombing. The IC IG Executive Director for Whistleblowing and Source Protection briefed several congressional staffers from the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the whistleblowing process, investigative procedures for reprisal investigations, and the new whistleblower protections for IC personnel under Presidential Policy Directive-19 (PPD-19). In addition to these briefings, IC IG staff continuously updated congressional committees on several critical IC IG projects including the Boston Marathon Bombing, proposed FISA review, IC financial auditability, and IC IG budget and resource planning.

### B. (U) Legislation Impacting the IC IG

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period, the IC IG reviewed several congressional proposals impacting the IC IG mission including enhanced oversight of FISA and USA PATRIOT Act authorities, cyber-information sharing, and IG authorities. The IC IG Legislative Counsel tracked each proposed bill and analyzed the impact to the IC IG mission and statutory authorities. In addition, the IC IG Legislative Counsel engaged with congressional committees on enacted legislation and other reviews of interest, including the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and the Reducing Over-Classification Act of 2010.

## (U) Audit Division

(b)(3)

(U) The IC IG Audit Division (Audit) conducts program, compliance, and financial audits and evaluations of ODNI and IC programs related to information technology, procurement, acquisitions, internal controls, financial statements, and financial management.

(U) During this reporting period, Audit completed three projects and issued reports containing one recommendation to update the ODNI plan of action and milestones standard operating procedure ensuring the document aligned to the FISMA required quarterly review cycle.

(U) As of 31 March 2013, the Audit staff had three on-going audits.

### A. (U) Completed Audits

#### 1. (U) *Fiscal Year 2013 Independent Evaluation of ODNI Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)* (AUD-2013-003, November 2013)

(U) The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA; also Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002) requires the agency OIG, or an independent external auditor, to perform an annual independent evaluation of the agency's information security program and practices.

(U) The evaluation's objective was to determine the adequacy of the information security program and practices for the ODNI's internal operations. In addition, we followed-up on steps taken to address recommendations made in the FY 2012 FISMA Report.

(U) The report contained one recommendation addressed to the Director of the Mission Support Division (MSD). The recommendation focused on updating the ODNI plan of action and milestones standard operating procedure to ensure the document aligned to the FISMA required quarterly review cycle. MSD updated the operating procedure and the recommendation was closed.

#### 2. (U) *Fiscal Year 2013 Consolidated Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) Capstone Report for the Intelligence Community Elements' Inspectors General* (AUD-2013-007, November 2013)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The evaluation's objective was to collect and summarize the FY 2013 FISMA report submissions from the OIGs for the IC elements operating or exercising control of national security systems. This evaluation summarized the elements' information security program strengths and weaknesses; identified the cause of the weaknesses in these programs, if noted by the respective OIGs; and provided a brief summary of the recommendations made for IC information security programs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) To perform this evaluation, we applied the FY 2013 IG FISMA metrics for eleven information security program areas. We reviewed all eleven OIG reports. Like last year, OIGs most often reported Risk Management as compliant. Specifically, ten OIGs reported their element had a program consistent with FISMA requirements, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy,

and applicable National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines. Additionally, Security Configuration Management, Incident Response and Reporting, and Security Training were other areas of compliance, with nine OIGs reporting their element had programs consistent with FISMA requirements, OMB policy, and applicable NIST guidelines.

(U//~~FOUO~~) While a majority of OIGs reported their element had established programs in the eleven information security program areas, a few areas were not consistent with FISMA requirements. Overall, OIG reports identified six information security program areas where two or more OIGs reported their element had no program. Remote Access Management was the most non-compliant; however, six of the eight OIGs reported no program existed because its element did not allow remote access. The next most non-compliant program area was Contingency Planning. Six IC element OIGs reported non-compliance.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In their FY 2013 FISMA reports, 8 OIGs made 23 recommendations addressing findings. In some cases, the recommendations repeated or were follow-on recommendations from prior year recommendations the elements had not fully implemented. Additionally, those 8 OIGs reported 37 recommendations from prior FISMA reports remained open.

**3. (U) Assessment of Purchase and Travel Card Programs**  
(AUD-2014-001, January 2014)

(U) We initiated a review of the ODNI purchase card program in response to the requirements of the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012. The Act requires the Inspector General of each executive agency to conduct periodic assessments of the agency's purchase and travel card programs to identify and analyze risks of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments. The ODNI travel card program did not meet the \$10 million threshold for audit or review. As a result, we assessed only the ODNI purchase card program.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IC IG conducted the risk

assessment for ODNI purchase cards from October to December 2012. We found the risk for allowing illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases to be moderate and identified several areas of risk including:

- ODNI does not have a charge card management plan;
- ODNI and CIA do not have a written service agreement for government purchase card services;
- ODNI has inadequate policies regarding the use of government purchase cards;
- ODNI's oversight of government purchase cards is insufficient;
- oversight responsibilities of government purchase cards is unclear between ODNI's Mission Support Division and the Chief Financial Executive;
- ODNI purchase cards are not monitored to ensure all charges are reconciled by the cardholder; and
- ODNI does not have a policy or process for notifying CIA Covert Capabilities Center when an employee or detailee separates from ODNI or is reassigned to a position that does not require use of a purchase card.

(U) We suggested ODNI management address the areas of risk within the government purchase card program. ODNI management agreed with our assessment.

**B. (U) Ongoing Audits**

**1. (U) Fiscal Year 2014 Independent Evaluation of ODNI Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)**  
(AUD-2014-003)

(U) The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA; also Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002) requires the agency OIG, or an independent external auditor, to perform an annual independent evaluation of the agency's information security program and practices.

(U) The evaluation's objective is to determine the adequacy of the information security program and practices for the ODNI's internal operations. In addition, we will follow-up on steps taken to address open FISMA recommendations.

(U) We will issue our report by the end of calendar year (CY) 2014.

**2. (U) Review of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Fiscal Year 2013 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010 (AUD-2013-006)**

(U) IPERA requires agencies to identify and estimate improper payments and take into account those risk factors likely to contribute to significant improper payments. In addition, IPERA requires agencies to conduct payment recapture audits on each program and activity expending \$1 million or more annually, if such audits would be cost-effective, and requires agencies to report on the actions to recover improper payments.

(U) IPERA requires the IG of the agency to perform an annual "compliance review" to determine if an agency is compliant with IPERA. Pursuant to statute, Audit is conducting the IPERA review for ODNI. Audit is following OMB Circular No. A-123 guidance to review the ODNI's improper payment reporting contained in the FY 2012 Annual Financial Report and accompanying materials to determine if ODNI is compliant with IPERA.

(U) We will issue our report in April 2014.

**3. (U) Independent Audit of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Statements (AUD-2014-002)**

(U) Pursuant to the Accountability of Tax Dollar Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-289), the IC IG will audit the ODNI's FY 2014 financial statements, which comprise the balance sheet as of 30 September 2014 and the related statement of net cost; changes in net position and budgetary resources for the fiscal year then ended; and the related notes to the financial statements. The audit's objectives are:

1. (U) express an opinion on whether the ODNI's financial statements are fairly presented, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles;
2. (U) report any significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in internal control that come to our attention as a result of the audit; and
3. (U) report on our tests of the ODNI's compliance with selected provisions of laws and regulations.

(U) We will issue our report by November 2014.

## (U) Inspections Division

(b)(3)

(U) The IC IG Inspections Division (INS) conducts inspections, reviews, and evaluations to improve ODNI and IC-wide performance and integration. The division examines information access, collaboration, collection, and analysis; IC programs and issues; and compliance with laws and regulations.

(U) The Inspections Division also encourages the use of the IC IG Complaint Intake Process, or Hotline, as a confidential and reliable resource for IC employees and contractors to report fraud, waste, and abuse.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period, we completed two Special Review Inspections. Special Reviews are accelerated assessments that use questionnaires and data call responses with limited interviews of component staff. The inspections covered four primary areas:

1. Mission performance
2. Management effectiveness
3. Resource management
4. Enterprise oversight

(U) As of 31 March 2014, INS had two ongoing ODNI component Special Reviews.

(U) We also began our first topical evaluation during the reporting period. We are assessing whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and effectively administered within the ODNI, as well as identifying policies, procedures, rules, regulations or management practices that may contribute to persistent misclassification of material. The review is directed under Section 6 of the Reducing Over-Classification Act, Public Law 111-258.

### A. (U) Completed Inspections

1. (U) *Office of the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition, Technology & Facilities (AT&F)*  
(INS-2013-004, December 2013)

(U//~~FOUO~~) This Special Review inspection

occurred during the period of June-August 2013. The AT&F review included the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) program. The inspection coincided with a change in AT&F office leadership, thereby affording timely and relevant input to the incoming Assistant Director of National Intelligence for AT&F. We validated challenges in the following areas:

- the duties of a security-related position in IARPA needed review and clarification;
- temporary duty travel and cost containment required additional management oversight;
- ODNI charges to AT&F/IARPA for Information Technology (IT) services required clarification;
- AT&F management of contractor resources required review for cost effectiveness and efficiency; and
- accounting for Level of Effort/Core Contractor meal periods required visibility for proper monitoring.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We observed and reported the

following:

- IARPA may benefit from a strategic plan due to the uniqueness of its mission;
- oversight of ODNI component research and development-related efforts needs to be strengthened;
- some IARPA acquisition activities may benefit from a level of independent review beyond what is already provided in the contractual and financial areas;
- IT frequently fails to meet AT&F and IARPA user expectations;
- IARPA's leased GSA vehicle may be underutilized;
- IARPA has adequate space to accommodate staff expansion;
- some support functions performed by ODNI Mission Support Division may overlap certain functions being performed by IARPA;
- contractor activities may fall within functions defined in OMB (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01;
- an AT&F Systems Engineering Technical Support Analysis contract should be moved to a competitively awarded Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract at the earliest opportunity;
- labor rates for certain contractor positions appear excessive; and
- IARPA management should delegate authority where possible.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We noted as commendable the following:

- IARPA has adopted and adapted best practices, processes, and procedures;
- AT&F and IARPA's classified websites are well structured; and
- IARPA made effective use of web-based mission promotion.

**2. (U) Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity Office (IC EEOD)**  
(INS-2013-005, February 2014)

(U) We conducted this Special Review inspection October through December 2013. It coincided

with a change in IC EEOD office leadership, thereby affording timely and relevant input to the incoming Chief, IC EEOD. We validated challenges in the ICEEOD in the following areas:

- ODNI policy did not clearly articulate the internal ODNI portion of the IC EEOD mission;
- Internal policies, processes, and procedures are not clearly defined;
- the potential for staffing shortfalls; classified and unclassified websites required improvement;
- a lack of automated tools affected mission performance and effectiveness; and
- temporary duty travel and cost containment required additional management oversight.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We observed and reported the following in IC EEOD:

- An adverse work environment exists;
- Some contractor activities may fall within functions defined in OMB (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01;
- IC EEOD had deficient workflow business processes;
- Budget, planning, resource allocation, and contract management needed improvement and aggressive oversight;
- An over-the-shoulder EEOD partner review may identify IC EEOD program weaknesses and EEO policy/procedure best practices; and
- IC EEOD's Medical Disability Retirement role needed to be formalized in policy.

(U) We noted as commendable the improved EEOD portion of ODNI new supervisor training.

## **B. (U) Ongoing Inspections**

**1. (U) Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration (DDII)**  
(INS-2014-001)

(U) We are currently conducting a Special Review of the ODNI DDII component. We will issue our report during the third quarter of FY 2014.

**2. (U) Evaluation of ODNI Required under the Reducing Over-Classification Act (INS-2014-002)**

(U) We are currently conducting an evaluation of ODNI classification policies, procedures, and practices in response to Section 6 of the Reducing Over-Classification Act of 2010. We will issue our initial evaluation report during the fourth quarter of FY 2014.

**3. (U) Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO) (INS-2014-003)**

(U) We are currently conducting a Special Review of the ODNI CHCO Office. We will issue our report during the fourth quarter of FY 2014.



## (U) Investigations Division

(b)(3)

(U) The IC IG Investigations Division (INV) investigates allegations of violations of criminal laws and administrative regulations arising from the conduct of IC and ODNI employees and contractors. The Investigations Division has unique authority to investigate programs and activities across the IC within the responsibility and authority of the DNI. Through this authority, we are able to coordinate and assist with the prosecution of criminal matters arising from the six independent intelligence agencies. The Investigations Division also plays a principal role in conducting IC-wide administrative investigations into unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period, we conducted 31 investigations (19 new and 12 carried over) of which 21 were closed or discontinued. Of the 21 closed or discontinued investigations, 8 were closed and substantiated or referred to management. The closed cases involved labor mischarging, employee misconduct, or misuse of government equipment. Of those 8 closed cases, 3 involved labor mischarging with potential recoveries of \$180,000.

(U) As of 31 March 2014, INV had 10 open investigations.


### A. (U) Select Completed Investigations

**(U) False Credentials**  
(INV-2012-0070, March 2014)

(U) In the course of a contractor labor mischarging investigation, it was discovered the subject's official resume listed a masters and a doctorate degree from a known diploma mill. This discovery suggests the contractor likely does not possess the formal training or certificates to support his contract. We referred the matter to management officials for action.

**(U) Labor Mischarging, Computer Misuse**  
(INV-2013-0009, March 2014)

(U) A referral to INV resulted in an investigation of a contractor for labor mischarging and misuse of government computer systems. The investigation



substantiated the contract labor mischarging. The contractor billed the Government for 476 hours of labor performed outside the contract's scope from May 2011 through July 2013. The investigation also substantiated extensive inappropriate communications using government computer systems. We referred the matter to the ODNI Head of Contracting Activity for recovery and security officials for evaluation of the contractor employee.

**(U) Labor Mischarging**  
(INV-2013-0047, November 2013)

(U) A contract labor mischarging investigation substantiated a contractor employee billed the Government for 424 hours of labor performed outside the contract's scope from October 2011 through March 2013. We referred the matter to the ODNI Head of Contracting Activity for recovery and security officials for evaluation of the contractor employee.

**(U) Labor Mischarging**  
(INV-2013-0067, March 2014)

(U) A contract labor mischarging investigation substantiated a contractor billed the Government

for 306 hours of labor performed outside the contract's scope from June 2012 through July 2013. We referred the matter to the ODNI Head of Contracting Activity for recovery and security officials for evaluation of the contractor employee.

**(U) Labor Mischarging**  
(INV-2014-0001, February 2014)

(U//~~FOUO~~) A contract labor mischarging investigation substantiated a contractor employee billed the Government for 352 hours of labor performed outside the contract's scope from February through December 2013. The contractor employee admitted and the data validated that approximately 20% to 30% of the workday was spent on the Internet for personal use, and stated on occasion, personal use of the Internet spanned seven out of eight hours. Analysis of the activity confirmed hundreds of hours and logins for Gmail, Hotmail, Live.com, Facebook, and Twitter. We referred the matter to the ODNI Head of Contracting Activity for recovery and security officials for evaluation of the contractor employee.

## **B. (U) Other Investigative Activities**

**(U) Time Card, Travel, and Procurement Fraud**  
(INV-2013-0055, March 2014)

(U) We conducted a joint investigation with the Department of Energy OIG related to an IC program involving contractors using ODNI IARPA funds. The investigation substantiated the subjects committed time card, procurement, and travel fraud. Federal and state prosecutors declined the case. Because of a nexus between the IARPA funds and a Defense Intelligence Agency project, INV referred the case to DIA OIG for possible administrative action.

**(U) Special Project - Office of Personnel Management (OPM) OIG Security Clearance Contractor Investigator Review**

(U) We, with the OPM OIG and ODNI National Counterintelligence Executive, are jointly developing standards for reviewing the actions of contractors providing personnel security

investigation support to OPM. This project is a blended effort involving investigators, auditors, and personnel security policy professionals. The project's focus is whether contractors provided false data related to subjects of personnel security investigations.

## **C. (U) IC IG Hotline.**

(U) The Hotline and intake processes provide confidential means for IC employees, contractors, and the public to report fraud, waste, and abuse. The intake process includes secure and commercial Hotline phone numbers, U.S. mail, anonymous secure Web application submissions, and walk-ins. Since the last Semiannual Report to the DNI on 30 September 2013, the Hotline has received 135 contacts, 48 internal contacts and 87 external contacts from the general public.

## (U) IC IG Counsel

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(U) In accordance with Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the IC IG has a separate Counsel who reports directly to the IG. The IC IG Counsel provides independent, objective, and confidential legal advice on a variety of legal and policy issues that impact the IC IG mission. The Counsel manages three main portfolios: legal and policy reviews, legislative reviews, and Congressional engagements.

### A. (U) Legal and Policy Reviews

(U) During this reporting period, we continued outreach efforts to the IC IG staff, ODNI components, and other IG Counsel counterparts. For example, we worked closely with the ODNI Office of General Counsel (OGC), the ODNI Policy and Strategy Office (P&S), and the ODNI Civil Liberties and Protection Officer (CLPO) on reviewing certifications of whistleblower protection policies required for implementing Presidential Policy Directive-19 (PPD-19), *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information* (10 October 2012).

(U) PPD-19 protects IC employees and U.S. Government personnel with access to classified information from reprisal for making protected disclosures by requiring departments and agencies to certify to the DNI their policy is PPD-19 compliant. We engaged in an ongoing review of these certifications to ensure that IG equities are protected.

(U) In addition, we reviewed the IC-wide policy on IC employee awareness of expanded whistleblower protections. The Counsel's continued coordination with OGC, P&S, and CLPO on these efforts ensuring IG equities are protected in policies having an impact on the IG mission.

(U) To ensure legal sufficiency, we worked with the IC IG, the Deputy IG, the AIGs, and IC IG personnel to review plans, projects, and reports.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Continuing outreach efforts to ODNI stakeholders, we worked closely with the ODNI Information Management Division (IMD), and the ODNI Public Affairs Office (PAO) to develop

strategies for information review and media releases. IMD understood the sensitive nature of IG information and agreed to adhere to practices and procedures for the IC IG to review sensitive IG information prior to official release under a FOIA or Privacy Act request. Likewise, we worked with PAO so they understood the need for the IC IG to work independently with media contacts to preserve IC IG objectivity and independence.

### B. (U) Legislative Reviews

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IC IG has statutory obligations to recommend legislation promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI. During this reporting period, the IC IG reviewed several proposals impacting the IC IG mission.

Working through the IC IG Legislative Counsel, we reviewed the proposed Intelligence Authorization Act's several enhancements to IC IG authorities; the Oversight Workforce Improvement Act, which includes several enhancements to IG pay and authorities; and the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2013's provisions pertinent to IG data analysis tools. We reviewed these proposals and several others to ensure the integrity of IC IG equities.

### **C. (U) Congressional Engagements**

(U) The IC IG fully and currently informs congressional oversight committees of significant problems and deficiencies within the programs and activities of the ODNI. Accordingly, the IG tasked the Counsel to create a robust congressional outreach program. Section III of this report highlights several engagements with congressional oversight committees.

## (U) Intelligence Oversight

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(U) The Senior Advisor on IO serves as the principal advisor to the IC IG for the independent oversight of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities in the IC; represents the IC IG, with the assistance of Counsel, to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board; provides advice and guidance on intelligence oversight to other IC IG elements and other IC IO elements; and ensures intelligence activities performed by IC elements are compliant with Executive Order 12333, and with other related Federal laws, Executive Orders, and policies or directives. The Senior Advisor on IO accomplishes these objectives by liaising and coordinating with IC element oversight organizations and engaging in IC-wide or ODNI-specific IO projects and evaluations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pursuant to Executive Order 13462, the DNI designated the IC IG as a responsible office for reporting intelligence oversight matters arising within the ODNI to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). During this reporting period, IO staff submitted two quarterly reports to the IOB and issued one evaluation report. As of 31 March 2014, IO had two ongoing evaluations.

### A. (U) Completed Reports

1. (U) *Third Quarter Calendar Year 2013 Report to the IOB*  
(IO-2014-001, November 2013)

(U) The third quarter of calendar year 2013 had no reports of intelligence activities we had reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive from within the ODNI.

2. (U) *Fourth Quarter Calendar Year 2013 Report to the IOB*  
(IO-2014-004, February 2014)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The fourth quarter of calendar year 2013 had one potential unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive act. A civilian employee with the Army Intelligence and Security Command made an IC IG Hotline complaint alleging an interagency data repository, believed to be comprised of numerous intelligence

and non-intelligence sources, improperly included U.S. person data. The complainant also reported he conducted potentially improper searches of the data repository to verify the presence of U.S. persons data. We are researching this claim.

3. (U) *Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) of Certain 2010 Admissions of Potential Crimes*  
(IO-2013-007, February 2014)

(U) The IC IG conducted this limited scope review at the request of the NRO OIG, which recused itself due to its role in the NRO crime reporting process. The review's objective was to determine the accuracy of McClatchy Company claims. Specifically, the NRO did not report to local law enforcement two separate admissions of potential crimes involving child molestation and possession of child pornography made by a contractor and an Air Force officer in 2010.

(U) We determined the McClatchy Company claims

were partially accurate. The NRO reported the contractor admission to the Department of Justice. However, the NRO reported the Air Force Officer's admission to the wrong organization. Neither admission was reported to local law enforcement in a timely manner.

(U) We made two recommendations to strengthen the NRO's reporting of admissions of potential crimes. NRO management concurred with our recommendations.

**4. (U) IC IG Advisory: IC-Wide Issues Related to Polygraphs and Crimes Reporting Processes (IO-2014-002, March 2014)**

(U) The IC IG provided an advisory to the DNI following separate NRO OIG and IC IG reviews of the NRO's polygraph program administration and execution and crimes reporting processes, respectively.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The respective NRO OIG and IC IG reviews identified inadequacies in practices and policies having negative implications IC-wide for security clearance reciprocity and crimes reporting due to the lack of consistent practices and policies.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We raised issues for DNI consideration to address the inadequacies identified in the NRO OIG and IC IG reports. These issues, once resolved, will help bring consistency to IC practices, thereby strengthening security clearance reciprocity, reducing insider threats, requiring reporting of certain non-Federal crimes to authorities, and promoting public confidence in the IC's ability to protect classified information. The DNI concurred with the suggestions.

## **B. (U) Ongoing Evaluations**

**1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Special Review of NRO Crimes Reporting Process (IO-2013-002)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) On behalf of the NRO Office of Inspector General, we are conducting a special review of NRO compliance with laws, policies, and procedures to identify and report NRO contractor,

government civilian, and military personnel admissions of reportable crimes during polygraph sessions. The NRO OIG recused itself due to its role in the crimes reporting process.

**2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Evaluation of Intelligence Community Information Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing (IO-2013-005)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspectors General of the IC, CIA, DOJ, and DHS initiated a coordinated and independent review into the U.S. Government's handling of intelligence information leading up to the Boston Marathon Bombings. The review will examine the information available to the U.S. Government before the bombings and the information sharing protocols and procedures followed between and among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

## (U) IC Inspectors General Activities

### A. (U) IC IG Forum

(U) The FY 2010 IAA established the IC IG Forum. The IC IG chairs the Forum, which is composed of IGs with oversight responsibilities for IC elements. The IC IG Assistant Inspectors General (AIGs) chair the Forum committees. Forum members collaborate on IC-wide projects; share information and best practices; resolve jurisdictional issues; and facilitate access to employees, contractors, and other materials that may be of assistance to Forum members. The IC IG uses the Forum to understand and prioritize IC-wide projects, to seek key IG stakeholder buy-in on projects, and develop strategies on how to best leverage limited IG resources across the community.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) IC IG senior managers lead the IC IG Forum Committees. The committees engaged in the following activities during this reporting period:

- **Deputies Committee.** The Deputies met to collaborate on issues impacting the IGs from both an IG and an IC perspective. The Deputies focused on whistleblowing, peer review, and the IC IG Awards Program.
- **Audit Committee.** The Audit Committee met twice and discussed FY 2014 Audit Plans, Charge Card Act risk assessments, IPERA, and the FY 2014 FISMA reporting. [REDACTED] (Executive Director for IG Community Standards) briefed the new IG peer review process, and the NSA IG Audit staff briefed on its audit software modernization process.
- **Investigations Committee.** The Investigations Committee meetings included a briefing on and discussion of the Intelligence Community Whistleblowing and Source Protection program, follow up on the recommendations of the Intelligence Community Accountability Review, joint investigation procedures, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Criminal Investigation Training Program, and the IC IG Conference. Two major initiatives evolved from the Committee's discussions. First, the committee agreed the IC IG Investigations Division would hire an investigator qualified to serve as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. This investigator will take the lead in ensuring the prosecution of IC cases from five of the six independent IC agencies. Second, as a result of committee discussions, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) officials agreed to allow three DCIS Special Agents specializing in IC cases to serve as assignees within the IC IG Investigations Division. These agents will enhance the ability to jointly work criminal cases in the IC elements residing in the Department of Defense.
- **Inspections Committee.** The Inspections Committee met twice during this reporting period. Committee members discussed inspection program metrics, inspection peer review preparations, an inspections training database as a resource for members, and potential cross-IC inspection topics. The committee received IC IG briefings on the IC IG Peer Review Program and on IC Whistleblowing and Source Protection. The committee also received briefings from the DIA and CIA regarding their respective 2013 inspections which received award winning recognition by the IC Inspectors General Award Committee.
- **Counsels Committee.** The Counsels Committee met several times and discussed jurisdictional issues for IC-wide projects, legislative impacts to the IC IG community mission, congressional correspondence, and training opportunities to better educate the

IG workforce. In addition, the IG Counsels to the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency worked closely to support the joint IC IG Forum review of the Boston Marathon Bombing.

- **Management and Administration (M&A) Committee.** The M&A committee continued to advance best practices throughout the IC by visiting IC OIG offices and sharing information as well as forming a M&A virtual community of interest, connecting action officers with issues to other action officers who have best practices to share.

**B. (U) The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)**

(U) The IC IG is a statutory member of the CIGIE. The IC IG actively participates in CIGIE meetings and has representatives who materially participate in each of the six CIGIE committees: Information Technology, Inspections and Evaluations, Investigations, Legislation, Professional Development, and Audit. In addition, the IC IG Counsel supported IG training efforts through the IG Criminal Investigator Academy.

**C. (U) IC IG Peer Review Activities**

(U) During this reporting period, the Department of the Treasury OIG completed an external peer review of the CIA Audit Staff. In accordance with PL 111-203 (Dodd-Frank), Treasury and CIA will include more specifics of this peer review in their respective Semi-Annual Reports.

(U) The members of the IC IG Forum unanimously approved the establishment of the Peer Review Program, codified with a Forum-issued memorandum signed by the IGs of the Title 50 organizations. As currently structured, only the Title 50 OIGs will be reviewed. We will continue to assess the ability to deploy a similar capability to OIGs who are not exclusively Title 50 organizations. The Peer Review Program was

introduced to a broad cross section of IG officers at the Annual IC IG Conference.

(U) The IC IG’s Audit, Inspections, and investigations Divisions will be peer reviewed this fiscal year. In FY 2014 the CIA/OIG Investigations and Inspections Divisions will undergo peer reviews.

(U) In partnership with CIGIE Inspections Committee, the IC IG’s Executive Director for IG Community Standards, will participate in an executive-level Peer Review Working Group to plan and operationalize a formal Inspections and Evaluations Peer Review Program. This will result in consistent policies and practices across the CIGIE member organizations, in line with the vision of the IC IG Forum’s Peer Review Program.

**D. (U) Whistleblowing and Source Protection**

(U) During this reporting period, the Executive Director for Whistleblowing and Source Protection made great strides in establishing the IC IG Whistleblowing Program. As outlined below, the Executive Director has already processed several whistleblowing cases in an effort to protect both the whistleblower and classified information.

(U) IC IG Whistleblower Categories	(U) Number of Cases
Whistleblower Reports of Misconduct, Fraud, Waste, and Abuse	5
Whistleblower Reports of “Urgent Concern”	3
Whistleblower Requests for PPD-19 External Review	2
Whistleblower Reprisal Complaints	1



**(U) Reports of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.** The IC IG has unique statutory authorities to receive complaints or information from any person regarding fraud, waste, or abuse within the programs and activities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Given the DNI's responsibilities for the Intelligence Community, we can process whistleblower complaints from all IC personnel. We processed five cases ensuring whistleblowers received protections for their interactions with the IC IG office.

**(U) Title 50 "Urgent Concern" Congressional Reporting Process.** The Executive Director for Whistleblowing and Source Protection also processes whistleblower complaints of "urgent concern" for the IC IG office. The IC IG has a Title 50 statutory reporting requirement akin to the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) for reporting whistleblower "urgent concerns" to Congress. Under this procedure, the IC IG receives whistleblower complaints believed to be of an "urgent concern" as defined in the statute. The IC IG has 14 days to determine whether the complaint is an "urgent concern" and report the determination to the complainant and the DNI. Given the strict statutory time frames, we developed an intake and review process for the IC IG to allow key personnel to conduct a preliminary inquiry of the complaint. Further, the statute requires the IC IG to provide guidance to the whistleblower on how to report the matter, whether an "urgent concern" or not, to the cleared congressional staff. We processed three cases under this statutory construct.

**(U) PPD-19 IC IG External Review Board.** Under Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19) "Protections for Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information," the IC IG conducts external reviews of reprisal complaints alleged to violate PPD-19 from IC personnel. We established processes and procedures for documenting IC personnel complaints, developed an internal docket for tracking complaints, and standardized forms and documents for IC personnel to use. These efforts have set a firm foundation for the IC personnel review process.

**(U) Reprisal Cases.** We processed one whistleblower reprisal complaint during the reporting period.

**(U) Outreach and Training Events.** In addition to processing whistleblower cases and complaints, we established a robust outreach and training program to further educate IC personnel on whistleblower protections. This reporting period we conducted numerous outreach events to key IC stakeholders including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence University, the ODNI Entrance On Duty Training Program, the National Insider Threat Task Force working group and the IC IG Annual Conference. In addition to these outreach events, we have been instrumental in developing whistleblower workforce training for the ODNI. This training will be for managers and employees alike to ensure all personnel are aware of whistleblower protections and how to properly disclose allegations of fraud, waste, abuse.

## E. (U) IC IG Conference

(U) After a two-year hiatus, due to Hurricane Sandy and last year's lapse in appropriations, we sponsored the IC Inspectors General annual one-day conference on 19 March, 2014. With registrations at record levels since its debut, the conference brought together the IG community to focus on the benefits of integration and mentoring, and exchange ideas on topics of common interest: Whistleblower Reprisal; Hotline Management in the IG; Best Practices for IG Inspections; Prosecuting IG Cases; Attracting and Retaining Auditors; and Ethics Training. Attendees received instruction tailored to their specific areas and collaborated in working group sessions.



(U) In addition to a question and answer session with the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, speakers from across the community, other federal agency OIGs, and representatives from the U.S. Office of Government Ethics, the Office of Management & Budget, and the Office of Personnel Management contributed to this event.

**F. (U) IC IG Awards**

(U//~~FOUO~~)—The IC IG hosts an Annual IC IG Awards program so members of the IC Inspectors General community can recognize inspector general professionals throughout the IC who have made extraordinary contributions to the missions and objectives set forth in the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy, and to the missions of their respective IG offices. The awards review board selected the following individuals and teams for this year’s awards.

**Lifetime Achievement Award:**

[REDACTED]

**Leadership Award:**

[REDACTED]

**Audit Award:**

[REDACTED]

**Inspections Award:**

[REDACTED]

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**Investigations Award:**

[REDACTED]

**Collaboration Award:**

[REDACTED]

**G. (U) International Military Engagement Team Participation**

(U) In March 2014, the IC IG AIG for Investigations and an IC IG Investigator participated with the Department of Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) and United States Africa Command Office of Inspector General on a week-long International Military Engagement Team activity in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. The team, consisting of six U.S. military and civilian inspector general professionals, conducted the first formal training of the recently established Inspector General Corps in the Federal Army of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Approximately sixty Congolese military officers detailed as Inspectors General or Magistrates participated in the five-day course. The course included common topics of interest, such as how to conduct an inspection, administrative investigations, and criminal investigations.

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## (U) Appendix A: Statistical Overview

### (U) Audit Division

(U) The Audit Division completed and issued 3 reports containing 1 recommendation on updating the ODNI plan of action and milestones standard operating procedure to ensure the document aligned to the FISMA required quarterly review cycle. At the end of the reporting period, the Audit staff had 4 on-going audits

### (U) Inspections Division

(U) The Inspections Division completed 2 inspections. At the end of the reporting period, the inspection staff had 2 on-going inspections and one evaluation on reducing overclassification..

### (U) Investigations Division

(U) The Investigations Division completed work on 21 cases; identified \$180,000 in potential recoveries; and referred 1 case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. At the end of the reporting period the Investigations Division had 10 open cases.

### (U) Intelligence Oversight Division

(U) The Intelligence Oversight Division completed 2 quarterly reports to the Intelligence Oversight Board, a limited, focused evaluation of media claims that the NRO did not report admissions of potential crimes involving child molestation and possession of child pornography and an advisory to the DNI. At the end of the reporting period, the Intelligence Oversight Division had 2 on-going special evaluations.

# (U) Appendix B: Summary of Audits

1 October 2013 – 31 March 2014

	(U) Audit Number	(U) Audit Title
<b>(U) Completed Audits</b>		
Information Technology	AUD-2013-003	(U) Fiscal Year 2013 Independent Evaluation of ODNI Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
	AUD-2013-007	(U) Fiscal Year 2013 Consolidated Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) Capstone Report for the Intelligence Community Elements' Inspectors General
Financial Management	AUD-2014-001	(U) Assessment of Purchase and Travel Card Programs
<b>(U) Ongoing Audits</b>		
Financial Management	AUD-2013-006	(U) Review of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Fiscal Year 2013 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) of 2010
	AUD-2014-002	(U) Independent Audit of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Statements
Information Technology	AUD-2014-003	(U) Fiscal Year 2014 Independent Evaluation of ODNI Compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)

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# (U) Appendix C: Summary of Inspections

1 October 2013 – 31 March 2014

	(U) Inspection Number	(U) Inspection Title
<b>(U) Completed Inspections</b>		
Component Inspections	INS 2013-004	(U) Office of the Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition, Technology & Facilities (AT&F)
	INS 2013-005	(U) Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity & Diversity Office (EEOD)
<b>(U) Ongoing Inspections</b>		
Component Inspections	INS 2014-001	(U) Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration (DDII)
	INS 2014-003	(U) Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO)
Topic Inspection	INS 2014-002	(U) Evaluation of ODNI Required under the Reducing Over-Classification Act

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# (U) Appendix D: Additional Reporting

1 October 2013 – 31 March 2014

	(U) Report Number	(U) Report Title
<b>(U) Completed Reports</b>		
	IO-2014-001	(U) Third Quarter Calendar Year 2013 Report to the IOB
	IO-2014-002	(U) Advisory to DNI on IC-Wide Issues Related to Polygraphs and Crimes Reporting Processes
Intelligence Oversight	IO-2014-004	(U) Fourth Quarter Calendar Year 2013 Report to the IOB
	IO-2014-007	(U) Evaluation of Media Claims Regarding Non-Reporting by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) of Certain 2010 Admissions of Potential Crimes
<b>(U) Ongoing Activities</b>		
	IO-2013-002	(U) Special Review of NRO Crimes Reporting Process
Special Review	IO-2013-005	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) Evaluation of Intelligence Community Information Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing

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# (U) Appendix E: Summary of Investigations

1 October 2013 - 31 March 2014

(U) Case Number	(U) Closed and Discontinued Investigations
INV-2014-0002	(U) Closed – Management Referral (Time & Attendance Fraud)
INV-2014-0001	(U) Closed – Substantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0078	(U) Discontinued – Labor Mischarging
INV-2013-0077	(U) Discontinued – Labor Mischarging
INV-2013-0076	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0074	(U) Discontinued – Labor Mischarging
INV-2013-0073	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0072	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0071	(U) Discontinued – Labor Mischarging
INV-2013-0070	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0068	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0067	(U) Closed – Substantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0066	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0065	(U) Discontinued – Ethics Violation
INV-2013-0063	(U) Closed – Management Referral (Time & Attendance Fraud)
INV-2013-0055	(U) Closed – OIG Referral (Contractor Employee Misconduct)
INV-2013-0052	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0047	(U) Closed – Substantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0025	(U) Closed – Unsubstantiated (Labor Mischarging)
INV-2013-0009	(U) Closed – Substantiated (Computer Misuse)
INV-2012-0070	(U) Closed – Management Referral (False Credentials)

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# (U) Appendix F: Ongoing Investigations

As of 31 March 2014

(U) Open Investigations	(U) Number of Cases
(U) Criminal and Prohibited Acts	
Time and Attendance (Administrative)	5
Misconduct – Criminal	5
<b>(U) Total Ongoing Investigations</b>	<b>10</b>

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


# (U) Appendix G: Status of Recommendations

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(b)(5)

(U) Summary of Recommendations				
(U) Report	Recommendations			Page
	Open	Closed	Carried to page 2	

## (U) 2012 Reports



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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of closed corrective actions

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

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(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations (continued)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(U) AUDIT REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCE PROJECT  
ISSUED December 2012  
Report Total: 2 Recommendations, 2 Open, 0 Closed

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations (Continued)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
[REDACTED]			

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations (continued)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
[REDACTED]			

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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[REDACTED]

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(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted]



[Redacted]

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(b)(5)

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations (past year)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations (continued)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Reference Number</b>	<b>Responsible Office</b>	<b>Corrective Action</b>
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[REDACTED]

~~1. A summary of the findings of the Inspector General's Office regarding the Department of Defense's...  
2. A summary of the findings of the Inspector General's Office regarding the Department of Defense's...  
3. A summary of the findings of the Inspector General's Office regarding the Department of Defense's...~~

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~~(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations~~

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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(b)(5)

(b) Summary of Findings, Recommendations, and Corrective Actions  
(b) Summary of Findings  
(b) Summary of Recommendations  
(b) Summary of Corrective Actions

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
[Redacted Table Content]			

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted]

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(b)(5)

[Redacted text block]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations (continued)

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted table content]

RELIANCE ON...

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations (continued)

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted table content]

RELIANCE ON...

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[REDACTED]



(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(d) [REDACTED]

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

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(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[Redacted content]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[Redacted content]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

Recommendation	Reference Number	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Open Recommendations

Recommendation	Rec #	Responsible Office	Corrective Action
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[REDACTED]

(U) Summary of Closed Recommendations

[REDACTED]