国会记录：2003年10月2日（参议院）第S12377-S12387页克雷格先生（为他本人、德宾先生、克拉波先生、费恩戈尔德先生、苏努努先生、怀登先生和宾加曼先生）介绍的法案和联合决议的声明：S.1709。修订《美国爱国者法案》的法案，对监视的使用和搜查令的签发以及其他目的作出合理限制；提交司法委员会。克雷格先生。总统先生，今天我代表我自己和杜宾、拉波、费因戈尔德、苏努努和宾加曼参议员起立，介绍2003年《安全和自由保障法》，我们称之为《安全法》。本法案旨在解决人们对《美国爱国者法案》提出的一些具体关切。我们认为，这是一种审慎、合理和适当的反应，将确保在我国打击恐怖主义的斗争中，守法个人的自由得到保护，而不会以任何方式阻碍这场斗争。让我首先说，我投票赞成《美国爱国者法案》。我当时相信，现在仍然相信，在2001年9月11日发生的对我国的可怕和史无前例的袭击之后，这是正确的做法。我还要向那些每天冒着生命危险保护美国人民免遭潜在恐怖分子和罪犯进一步袭击的勇敢的男女们表示感谢。司法部和国土安全部在发现、追捕和阻止那些对我们的国家和人民构成威胁的人方面所取得的巨大进展应该受到赞扬。即便如此，《美国爱国者法案》并不是一部完美的法律，对于那些如此干练地发动反恐战争的人来说，建议修改该法案的某些方面并不是批评。《安全法案》正是为了做到这一点：做出一些常识性的改变，有助于保护我们的自由，而不牺牲我们的安全。它关注的是特别有争议的活动领域：延迟通知认股权证，也称为“偷窥”认股权证；不需要对任何人或地点进行具体说明的窃听；新法对图书馆的影响；以及全国搜查令。我们的法案将修正，而不是消除这些工具或废除这些领域的《美国爱国者法案》。我花了很多时间在我的家乡爱达荷州的实地，尽管爱达荷州人对反恐战争的成功感到自豪，但他们中的许多人继续对战争中使用的工具表示担忧。诚然，关于《美国爱国者法案》的许多错误信息已经传播开来，我赞扬政府努力纠正这些错误信息。然而，并不是所有关于这项法律的担忧都是毫无根据或被误导的，我坚信这些担忧应该在国会得到适当的宣传。此外，只要看看《安全法案》的共同发起人，就会发现这些担忧并非爱达荷州独有——它们有着广泛的地区和政治背景。今天上午，参议院司法委员会主席兼高级成员宣布就我们的反恐法律如何运作举行一系列听证会。作为该委员会的一名成员，我期待有机会详细探讨这些问题，并为我们发现的任何问题找到解决办法，可能包括《安全法案》。这项法案所作的改变并不多，也不全面，但意义重大。我希望我的同事会同意和支持我们今天提出的法例。我要求全体一致同意将该法案的文本打印在记录中。在没有人反对的情况下，该法案被下令记录在案，内容如下：第1709条，由美利坚合众国参众两院在国会通过，第1节。简称。该法可称为“2003年保障安全和自由法”或“安全法”。秒。2.1978年《外国情报监视法》对巡回窃听的限制。1978年《外国情报监视法》第105（c）节（《美国法典》第50卷第1805（c）节）进行了修订——（1）在第（1）款中，删去（A）和（B）项，并插入以下内容：“（A）（i）电子监视目标的身份，如果已知；或”（ii）如果目标的身份未知，对目标以及电子监视所针对的设施和地点的性质和位置的描述；[[第S12385页]“（B）（i）电子监视将被指向的每个设施或场所的性质和位置（如果已知）；以及”（ii）如果任何设施或场所未知，目标的身份；“及（2）在第（2）款中—（A）将（B）至（D）段分别重订为（C）至（E）段；及（B）在（A）段后加入以下字句：“（B）如监察工作进行的设施或地点—金博宝正规网址ll be directed is not known at the time the order is issued, that the surveillance be conducted only when the presence of the target at a particular facility or place is ascertained by the person conducting the surveillance;". SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY TO DELAY NOTICE OF SEARCH WARRANTS. (a) In General.--Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)-- (A) in paragraph (1), by striking "may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705)" and inserting "will-- "(A) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual; "(B) result in flight from prosecution; or "(C) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, the evidence sought under the warrant"; and (B) in paragraph (3), by striking "within a reasonable period" and all that follows and inserting "not later than 7 days after the execution of the warrant, which period may be extended by the court for an additional period of not more than 7 days each time the court finds reasonable cause to believe, pursuant to a request by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Associate Attorney General, that notice of the execution of the warrant will-- "(A) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual; "(B) result in flight from prosecution; or "(C) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, the evidence sought under the warrant."; and (2) by adding at the end the following: "(c) Reports.-- "(1) In general.--Every 6 months, the Attorney General shall submit a report to Congress summarizing, with respect to warrants under subsection (b), the requests made by the Department of Justice for delays of notice and extensions of delays of notice during the previous 6-month period. "(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, for the preceding 6-month period-- "(A) the number of requests for delays of notice with respect to warrants under subsection (b), categorized as granted, denied, or pending; and "(B) for each request for delayed notice that was granted, the number of requests for extensions of the delay of notice, categorized as granted, denied, or pending. "(3) Public Availability.--The Attorney General shall make the report submitted under paragraph (1) available to the public.". (b) Sunset Provision.-- (1) In general.--Subsections (b) and (c) of section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005. (2) Exception.--With respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began before the date on which the provisions referred to in paragraph (1) cease to have effect, or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that began or occurred before the date on which the provisions referred to in paragraph (1) cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect. SEC. 4. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR LIBRARY, BOOKSELLER, AND OTHER PERSONAL RECORDS UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978. (a) Applications for Orders.--Section 501(b)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)) is amended-- (1) by striking "shall specify that the records" and inserting "shall specify that-- "(A) the records"; and (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: "; and "(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.". (b) Orders.--Section 501(c)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1)) is amended by striking "finds that" and all that follows and inserting "finds that-- "(A) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and "(B) the application meets the other requirements of this section.". (c) Oversight of Requests for Production of Records.-- Section 502(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1862) is amended to read as follows: "(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall, with respect to all requests for the production of tangible things under section 501, fully inform-- "(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; "(2) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; "(3) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and "(4) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.". SEC. 5. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR COMPUTER USERS AT LIBRARIES UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITY. Section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking "A wire" and inserting the following: "(1) In general.--A wire"; and (B) by adding at the end the following: "(2) Exception.--A library shall not be treated as a wire or electronic communication service provider for purposes of this section."; and (2) by adding at the end the following: "(f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term `library' means a library (as that term is defined in section 213(2) of the Library Services and Technology Act (20 U.S.C. 9122(2)) whose services include access to the Internet, books, journals, magazines, newspapers, or other similar forms of communication in print or digitally to patrons for their use, review, examination, or circulation.". SEC. 6. EXTENSION OF PATRIOT SUNSET PROVISION. Section 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT ACT (18 U.S.C. 2510 note) is amended-- (1) by striking "213, 216, 219,"; and (2) by inserting "and section 505" after "by those sections)". Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, the USA PATRIOT Act, the counterterrorism bill that the Bush administration pushed through Congress after the September 11 terrorist attacks, has been the focus of much controversy in recent months. I voted for the PATRIOT Act, as did the vast majority of my colleagues in the Congress. I believed then, and I still believe, that the PATRIOT Act made many reasonable and necessary changes in the law. For example, the PATRIOT Act tripled the number of Federal agents at the Northern border, an area that had been greatly understaffed. It allocated $100 million to upgrade technology for monitoring the Northern border. It expedited the hiring of FBI translators, who were desperately needed to translate intelligence after 9/11. Most importantly, the PATRIOT Act updated information technology and enhanced information sharing between Federal agencies, especially the FBI and the CIA. As we learned after 9/11, the failure of these agencies to communicate with each other may have prevented law enforcement from uncovering the 9/11 plot before that terrible day. However, the PATRIOT Act contains several controversial provisions that I and many of my colleagues believe went too far. The Bush administration placed Congress in a very difficult situation by insisting on including these provisions in the bill. We were able to amend or sunset some of the most troubling components of the bill. However, many remained in the final version. As a result, the PATRIOT Act makes it much easier for the FBI to monitor the innocent activities of American citizens with minimal or no judicial oversight. For example: The FBI can now seize records on the books you check out of the library or the videos you rent, simply by certifying that the records are sought for a terrorism or intelligence investigation, a very low standard. A court no longer has authority to question the FBI's certification. The FBI no longer must show that the documents relate to a suspected terrorist or spy. The FBI can conduct a "sneak and peek" search of your home, not notifying you of the search until after a "reasonable period," a term which is not defined in the PATRIOT Act. A court is now authorized to issue a "sneak and peek" warrant where a court finds "reasonable cause" that providing immediate notice of the warrant would have an "adverse result," a very broad standard. The use of "sneak and peek" warrants is not limited to terrorism cases. The FBI can obtain a "John Doe" roving wiretap, which does not specify the target of the wiretap or the place to be wiretapped. This increases the likelihood that the conversations of innocent people wholly unrelated to an investigation will be intercepted. Many in Congress did not want to deny law enforcement some of the reasonable reforms contained in the PATRIOT Act that they needed to combat terrorism. So, we reluctantly decided to support the administration's version of the bill, but not until we secured a commitment that they would be responsive to Congressional oversight and consult extensively with us before seeking any further changes in the law. [[Page S12386]] Unfortunately, the Justice Department has reneged on their commitment to Congress, frustrating oversight on the PATRIOT Act at every turn. Attorney General Ashcroft only rarely appears on Capitol Hill. In fact, he has only testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which I am a member, once this year. He appeared, along with two other administration officials, for just half a day. The Justice Department regularly fails to answer congressional inquiries, either arguing that requested information is classified, or simply not responding at all. At the same time, the administration's allies in Congress have argued that the PATRIOT Act's sunset clauses should be repealed before we have had an opportunity to review their effectiveness. Earlier this year, we learned that the administration had secretly drafted another sweeping counterterrorism bill, "PATRIOT Act II," without consulting with Congress. This bill would grant the Justice Department even broader authority, such as the right to strip Americans of their citizenship. That proposal generated widespread opposition, but, unchastened, the administration went on the offensive again recently. On the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush proposed new legislation that would give the Justice Department the authority to issue so-called administrative subpoenas, without judicial review, create 15 new federal death penalty crimes, and mandate pretrial detention for defendants accused of a laundry list of crimes, many of them unrelated to terrorism. These proposals continue the Administration's pattern of seeking to limit judicial oversight and grant broad, unchecked authority to law enforcement. While they are pushing radical changes in the law, the Bush administration has failed to take commonsense steps to prevent terrorism, like developing fully interoperable information systems and creating a consolidated terrorist watch list. Most of the information systems now within the Department of Homeland Security's jurisdiction were acquired and developed independently within the former agencies in a parochial "stovepipe" fashion, and may be incompatible with other DHS systems. The Bush administration indicated that an initial inventory of these systems would be completed by this spring. I understand that inventory is still not completed. This April, the GAO concluded that nine different agencies still develop and maintain a dozen terrorist watch lists, including overlapping and different data, and inconsistent procedures and policies on information sharing. The law creating the Department of Homeland Security requires the Department to consolidate watch lists. The Bush Administration promised that these lists would be consolidated by the first day of Homeland Security's operations. Seven months later, the lists are still not consolidated. The Bush administration has devoted too many resources to counterterrorism measures that threaten our civil liberties and do little to improve our security. For example, John Ashcroft's Justice Department has launched a number of high-profile initiatives that explicitly target immigrants, especially Arabs and Muslims, for heightened scrutiny. These efforts squander precious law enforcement resources and alienate communities whose cooperation we desperately need. They run counter to basic principles of community policing, which reject the use of racial and ethnic profiles and focus on building trust and respect by working cooperatively with community members. The Justice Department's own Inspector General has found that the Justice Department has not adequately distinguished between terrorism suspects and other immigration detainees. The IG found that the Justice Department detained 762 aliens as a result of the September 11 investigation, exactly zero of whom were charged with terrorist-related offenses. No one is suggesting that the Department should never use immigration charges to detain a suspected terrorist, but the broad brush of terrorism should not be applied to large numbers of every out- of-status immigrants who happen to be Arab or Muslim. Many of us in Congress have raised concerns with the Justice Department about implementation of the PATRIOT Act and other civil liberties issues, and, rather than respond to legitimate concerns, they have gone on the offensive. In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned his critics: To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists--for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil. It is unacceptable to dismiss those who raise legitimate concerns about civil liberties as terrorist sympathizers. For the American people, the PATRIOT Act has become a potent symbol of the Justice Department's poor record on civil liberties. In fact, three states, Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont, and over 180 cities and counties across the country, including Chicago in my home State of Illinois, have passed resolutions opposing provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Almost 2 years after its passage, I believe that it is time to revisit the debate about the PATRIOT Act. Let me be clear: I do not believe that we should repeal the PATRIOT Act. However, I do believe that we should amend several of its most troubling provisions. Law enforcement must have all the necessary tools to combat terrorism, but we must also be careful to protect the civil liberties of Americans. I believe we can be both safe and free. Today, I, Senator Craig, and several of our Republican and Democratic colleagues in the Senate introduced the Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003. The SAFE Act is a narrowly-tailored bipartisan bill that would amend the most problematic provisions of the PATRIOT Act, those that grant broad powers to the FBI to monitor Americans with inadequate judicial oversight. The bill would impose reasonable limits on law enforcement's authority without impeding their ability to investigate and prevent terrorism. It would not amend pre-PATRIOT Act law in anyway. The SAFE Act is supported by a broad coalition from across the political spectrum, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Conservative Union. The SAFE Act would: Reinstate the pre-PATRIOT Act standard for seizing business records. In order to obtain a subpoena, the FBI would have to demonstrate that it has reason to believe that the person to whom the records relate is a suspected terrorist or spy. The SAFE Act retains the expansion of the business record provision to include all business records, including library records, rather than just the four types of records--hotel, car rental, storage facility and common carrier--covered before the PATRIOT Act. Authorize a court to issue a delayed notification warrant where notice of the warrant would endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant. It would require notification of a covert search within seven days, rather than an undefined "reasonable period." It would authorize unlimited additional 7-day delays if the court found that notice of the warrant would continue to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant. Limit "John Doe" roving wiretaps by requiring the warrant to identify either the target of the wiretap or the place to be wiretapped. To protect innocent people from Government surveillance, it would also require that surveillance be conducted only when the suspect is present at the place to be wiretapped. Sunset several of the PATRIOT Act's most controversial surveillance provisions on December 31, 2005. Many of PATRIOT's surveillance provisions already sunset on December 31, 2005. The SAFE Act would simply give Congress an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of several additional controversial provisions before deciding whether to reauthorize them. Under the SAFE Act, the FBI would still have broad authority to combat terrorism. For example, consider the following hypotheticals: [[Page S12387]] The FBI would like to search the travel records of a suspected terrorist to help determine if he attended a meeting with other extremists. The FBI has reason to believe the records are related to a suspected terrorist, so the SAFE Act would authorize the issuance of a subpoena. The FBI suspects that an individual affiliated with an extremist organization is planning a terrorist attack. The FBI would like to search the suspect's computer drive to learn more about the plot without tipping off the suspect and his co-conspirators. The SAFE Act would permit the issuance of a "sneak and peek" warrant, and permit the FBI to delay notice of the warrant for as long as it would continue to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution, or result in the destruction of or tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant. At the same time, the SAFE Act would protect innocent Americans from unchecked Government surveillance. For example: The FBI is investigating suspected members of a terrorist cell and would like to subpoena the records of a library and a bookstore that they frequent. Currently, the FBI could subpoena all of the records of the library and bookstore, including the records of countless innocent Americans, by certifying they are sought for a terrorism investigation, the exceedingly low standard created by the PATRIOT Act. The SAFE Act would permit the FBI to obtain the records related to the suspected terrorists, but not records related to innocent Americans who are not suspected terrorists. The FBI is tracking a suspected terrorist who is using public phones at local restaurants to do business. The PATRIOT Act would permit the issuance of a roving wiretap that would apply to any phone the suspect uses. Under the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could monitor the conversations not just of the suspect, but of innocent patrons of these restaurants. The SAFE Act would also permit the issuance of a roving wiretap that would apply to any phone the suspect uses, but would only permit the FBI to gather intelligence when they ascertain that the suspect is using a phone. The Justice Department has argued that amending the PATRIOT Act would handcuff law enforcement and make it very difficult to combat terrorism. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is possible to combat terrorism and protect our liberties. The SAFE Act demonstrates that. I urge my colleagues to support it. ____________________