



U.S. Army 1<sup>st</sup> Information Operations Command

1<sup>st</sup> BN - Vulnerability Assessment Division (VAD)

# *OPSEC in the Blogosphere*





# Purpose

To emphasize the critical nature of protecting sensitive information from **enemy exploitation** and provide information for implementation of an Army OPSEC Training Program consistent with recent guidance issued by the CSA



# Agenda

- Threat
- OPSEC
- Blogs and the Internet
- Summary



# OPSEC Definition of Threat

**“Capability of a potential enemy to limit or negate mission accomplishment or to neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of a current or projected organization or material item.” Two types of threat information are required:**

- **Intelligence collection threat**
- **Combat capability threat**

AR 530-1



# Categories of Threat

	TRADITIONAL	NON TRADITIONAL
EXTERNAL	Foreign Governments Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS)	Al Qaeda Warlords
DOMESTIC	Hackers Militia Groups	Drug Cartel Media

- Combinations
- Combinations of all of the above
- Long Term
- Short Term

# Paramilitary, Insurgent, Radical, Terrorist Threats Active in OIF/OEF Theaters



1. Small arms fire (SAF)	279	23.3%
2. Improvised explosive device (IED) attack	219	18.3%
3. Hostile-ambush	62	5.2%
4. Hostile-vehicle borne (VBIED)	55	4.6%
5A. Hostile-helicopter shot down/downed	53	4.4%
5B. Hostile-mortar attack	53	4.4%
6. Hostile-rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack	50	4.2%
7. Hostile-vehicle accident	25	2.1%
8. Hostile-helicopter crash (missile attack)	22	1.8%
9. Hostile-sniper fire	17	1.4%
10. Hostile-rocket attack	14	1.2%

(Coalition Force (CF) Invasion through 5 OCT 04, includes all CF Casualties killed in action)

Source: <http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews> & <http://casualties.org/oif/stats.aspx>, 5 OCT 04

Adaptive, cunning, and learning Adversary ... unlike most previous experiences



# Vulnerabilities



**GARMIN**

**THE RINO 110/120**

Handheld GPS, combined with two-way radio/receiver. Allows you to send your position to another Rino user within a 2 mile radius.



**Whole Earth Provision Company**



# OPSEC Defined

● A process of identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems
- Determine indicators Adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive EEFI in time to be useful to adversaries
- Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly action to adversary exploitation






# Critical Information

## What they are looking for:

1. Names/photographs of important people
2. Present and future U.S. capabilities
3. Meetings of top officials
4. News about U.S. diplomacy
5. U.S. positions
6. Important government places
7. Information about military facilities:
  - Location
  - Units
  - Weapons used
  - Fortifications & tunnels
  - Amount of lighting
  - Exterior size and shape
  - Number of soldiers & officers
  - Ammunition depot locations
  - Leave policies
  - Brigades and names of companies
  - Degree & speed of mobilization





# What is a Blog?

A frequent, chronological publication of personal thoughts and Web links; a journal:

- a mixture of what is happening in a person's life and what is happening on the Web
- a kind of hybrid diary/guide site
- there are as many unique types of blogs as there are people

**MyBlogLog.com** Chasing Daisy

My Account > Blog Stats | Account Settings | Help | Log Out

Your 7-Day free trial of MyBlogLog Pro will expire on Friday March 18, 2005. You have been given a trial of MyBlogLog Pro so you can see how cool it is: realtime, historical, and full daily stats. If you do not [upgrade to MyBlogLog Pro](#) you will be switched to our free version after seven days. Then you will miss out on a lot of great features. Bummer, huh?

Today	Yesterday	Mar. 2	Mar. 1	Feb. 28	Feb. 27	Feb. 26	This Week	Reports
Daily Totals: 7 offsite clicks   6 page views   4 readers								
Rank	Link Name	Link URL		Clicks				
1	I like your colors!	<a href="http://www.redaft.com/Tools/lvc.php">http://www.redaft.com/Tools/lvc.php</a>		2				
2	BBC's weekly limerick competition has pr...	<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4304013.stm">http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4304013.stm</a>		1				
3	How Optimistic Are You?	<a href="http://www.queendom.com/tests/minitests/ix/optimist.html">http://www.queendom.com/tests/minitests/ix/optimist.html</a>		1				
4	Lynx Viewer	<a href="http://www.delorie.com/web/lynxview.html">http://www.delorie.com/web/lynxview.html</a>		1				
5	6 Nations	<a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/rugby_union/international/de...">http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/rugby_union/international/de...</a>		1				
6	I could have been a contender	<a href="http://bill@world.typepad.com/i_could_have_been_a_conten/">http://bill@world.typepad.com/i_could_have_been_a_conten/</a>		1				



# Military Blogging

**ArmyTimes**  
14 March 2008  
www.armytimes.com

**NEW SERGEANTS**  
20,000 IDENTIFIED FOR FASTER STRIPES

**Recruiting falls short** Active Army misses February goal 10

**War protest** Sixth-graders walked on private in Korea 18

**Senior NCO moves** Thousands eyed for promotion, schooling 21

**ABRAMS REPORT CARD**  
SAFETY UPGRADES EYED FOR TANKS IN IRAQ 8

**FORT BRAGGISTAN**  
WHY CAROLINA POST BECAME AFGHANISTAN FOR TWO WEEKS 30

**SOLE SEARCHING**  
TIPS FOR BUYING RUNNING SHOES 35

**INSIDE**  
Explosives Training

**BAND OF BLOGGERS**  
Soldiers are online & uncensored. Is OpSec at risk as war diaries catch on? 14

**PLUS** 10 tips on starting your own blog 16

**Argghhh!!!**

THE MUDVIE GAZETTE

THE HOME OF TWO OF JONAH'S MILITARY GUYS +1<sup>©</sup>

**BLACK FIVE**

**SGT. HOOK**

**THIS WE'LL DEFEND**

**Blogosphere Truth Squad**

We can fact-check your ass without even getting dressed!

<http://mamamontezz.mu.nu/>



# Internet Cafe



Internet Cafes can be found on military bases, generally operated by MWR or private businesses when located outside the installation



# Blog OPSEC Concerns & Issues

- Posting sensitive photographs to the internet (especially those showing the results of IED strikes, battle scenes, casualties, and destroyed or damaged equipment)
- Providing information which enhances the enemy's targeting process
- Exploitation
- OPSEC is everyone's responsibility
  - While they are therapeutic, they are also a snap-shot in time and the whole world is reading...



# DOD Guidance and Legalities

- DOD Guidance states that an OPSEC review will be conducted prior to public release
- An OPSEC review is an evaluation of a document to ensure protection of sensitive or critical information.
  - The following publications and memorandums address the issue
    - AR 530-1, Operations Security, 3 Mar 95
    - DoDD 5230.9, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, 21 Nov 03
    - Numerous SecDef, Secretary of the Army, CofS, and other official messages



# 1<sup>st</sup> Amendment Issues

As an active-duty service member, you have free speech rights, but these rights are limited. Here are some basic guidelines to what you can and can't say and do as a member of the military. You have the right to ...

- Read anything you want
- Write letters to newspapers
- Publish your own newspaper, as long as you don't use military supplies or equipment to do so



# DoD Website OPSEC Guidance

## SECDEF's Jan 03 OPSEC Message



14 Jan 2003

R 141553Z JAN 03 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

TO ALDODACT

INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DASD SIO//SECURITY//

UNCLAS ALDODACT 02/03 ADDRESSEES PASS TO ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

SUBJECT: WEB SITE OPSEC DISCREPANCIES

### Terrorist manual - 80% of information about enemy gathered openly

TO ILLEGAL MEANS, IT IS THE ONLY DATA MAKES A VAST, READILY AVAILABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON DOD PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES. ONE MUST CONCLUDE OUR ENEMIES ACCESS DOD WEB SITES ON A REGULAR BASIS.

### 1500 discrepancies during past year

2. THE FACT THAT THIS INFORMATION (E.G., ONOPS, OPLANS, SOP) CONTINUES TO BE FOUND ON PUBLIC WEB SITES INDICATES THAT TOO OFTEN DATA POSTED ARE INSUFFICIENTLY REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVITY AND/OR INADEQUATELY PROTECTED. OPSEC INFORMATION IS NOT PROTECTED.

### Review information prior to posting – include OPSEC

3. THE DOD WEB SITE ADMINISTRATION POLICY (LINK AT WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/WEBMASTERS) REQUIRES THAT INFORMATION BE REVIEWED FOR DATA SENSITIVITY PRIOR TO WEB POSTING AND PROTECTED. THE INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF (IOSS) CAN PROVIDE PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE OPSEC PROCESS (SEE WWW.IOSS.GOV) WHILE STILL CONVEYING THE ESSENTIAL INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, AND THE OPSEC PROGRAM. USE OPSEC process – "Who is the intended audience?"

### Commanders responsible for content & verification of need

4. USING THE OPSEC PROCESS IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER TO THE WEB COULD ELIMINATE MANY VULNERABILITIES. THE INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF (IOSS) CAN PROVIDE PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE OPSEC PROCESS (SEE WWW.IOSS.GOV) WHILE STILL CONVEYING THE ESSENTIAL INFORMATION FOR BOTH WEB PAGES AND WEB-ENABLED APPLICATIONS. PROVIDE security training for those responsible for content SECURITY. SEE PART V, TABLE 1 OF THE WEB SITE ADMINISTRATION POLICY FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE.

### Provide security training for those responsible for content

5. HEADS OF COMPONENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION PLACED ON COMPONENT WEBSITES. THEY MUST ENSURE THAT WEBSITE OWNERS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CONTENT POSTED TO THEIR WEBSITES. WEBSITE OWNERS MUST REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO: A. VERIFY THAT





# DA OPSEC Guidance – Feb 03

## COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS MUST:

Actual message received from the sender:

01 01 282237Z FEB 03 PP PP UUUU AT ZYUW AMHS  
NO

DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-AOC-CAT/

ARR

CDI

CDI

ALA

AIG 7406

AIG 7446

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3DDO//

UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJ (U) ARMYWIDE

REF A (U) ARMY REGU

1995

REF B (U) SECDEF MS/

DISCREPANCIES

REF C (U) DOD MEMORANDUM DTD 11 FEB 03 SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON OIG

REPORT NO -D-2002-098 "ARMY WEBSITE ADMINISTRATION, POLICIES, AND

PRACTICES, JUNE 5, 2002."

1. (FOUO) RECENT SPOT CHECKS OF ARMY WEBSITES HAVE VERIFIED

NUMEROUS SIGN

ENEMIES ACCESS

2. (FOUO) THIS R

LEVELS MUST RE

AND TAKE STEPS

THIS REVIEW MUST BE COMPLETED NLT 15 MARCH 2003 AND MUST RECTIFY

POTENTIAL CLASSIFICATION VIOLATIONS AND APPARENT OPSEC

VULNERABILITIES

3. (FOUO) 1ST INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMMAND (1IOC) AT THE

DIRECTION OF HQDA AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ARMY WFR RISK

/

PROVIDE ASSISTANCE REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF THE INFORMATION IN

QUESTION

5. (FOUO) PURSUANT TO AR 530-1 COMMANDERS MUST TAKE THE FIRST STEP

IN THIS PROCES BY IDENTIFYING AND PROTECTING CRITICAL INFORMATION

AND BY APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE

COLLECTION EFFORTS. THEY MUST S

CERTAIN THAT IT IS NOT INADVERTEN

AW REF C COMMANDERS WILL INTEG

INTO THEIR OVERALL OPSEC PROGRAM AND INCLUDE IT IN THEIR ANNUAL

OPSEC REPORT TO THE G-3.

6. (U) THIS IS AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS IN WHICH COMMANDERS ARE

EXPECTED TO ROUTINELY AND CONTINUALLY REVIEW WEBSITES AW THE

/

DETAILS IS AN EASILY APPLIED COUNTERMEASURE THAT CAN DECREASE

VULNERABILITIES WHILE STILL CONVEYING ESSENTIAL INFORMATION.

/

**REVIEW THEIR WEBPAGES, ENSURE THEY ARE OPSEC COMPLIANT**

**APPLY THE OPSEC REVIEW PROCESS OUTLINED IN AR530-1**

**LIMIT DETAILS ABOUT SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES OR READINESS**

**ENSURE REVIEWING OFFICIALS AND WEBMASTERS ARE OPSEC TRAINED**

**ENSURE ALL ARMY WEB SITES ARE REGISTERED**

**VERIFY VALID MISSION NEED TO DISSEMINATE THE INFORMATION POSTED**

**AWRAC & 1<sup>st</sup> IO CMD SEARCH, IDENTIFY & REPORT WEBSITE OPSEC CONCERNS**

THE  
SENSITIVITY OF DATA FOR BOTH WEB PAGES AND WEB ENABLED APPLICATIONS.  
UNPUBLISHED ADDRESSES (URLS) AND UNLINKED WEB PAGES DO NOT PROVIDE  
SECURITY. UNIT COMMANDERS MUST REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO:  
A. VERIFY THAT THERE IS A VALID MISSION NEED TO DISSEMINATE THE  
INFORMATION TO BE POSTED.

<HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/WEBMASTERS/POLICY/DOD\_WEB\_POLICY\_1207199  
\_WITH\_AMENDMENTS\_AND\_CORRECTIONS.HTML>

D. USE THE PROCESS OUTLINED IN AR 530-1 FOR CLEARING INFORMATION FOR  
PUBLIC DISSEMINATION.

E. PROTECT INFORMATION ACCORDING TO ITS SENSITIVITY, AND

ED AND HAVE  
EQUIREMENTS

INFORMATION

LOCATED SERVICE (URL)

<HTTP://SITES.DEFENSELINK.MIL/SERVE.TD/DATE/ENTRY> AND IN COMPLIANCE  
WITH SUSTAINING BASE REVERSE PROXY SERVER POLICY. REFER TO THE  
FOLLOWING WEBSITE FOR DETAILS.

<HTTPS://INFORMATION/ASSURANCE.US.ARMY.MIL/CONTENT.ASP?SUBJECT=SUSTA

ARMY OPSEC  
BSITES

OR

ENEMIES BY POSTING CONTENT THAT COULD PUT THE LIVES AND MISSIONS OF

AMERICAN FORCES AT RISK.

9. (U) POC AT 1IOC IS MR STEVE SHIRES, 1IOC, DSN 2238.

SHIRES@1STIOCMD.BELVOR.MIL. POC AT HQDA IS MAJ GLENN CONNOR,

DAMO-001 DSN 227-1119. GLENN.CONNOR@HQDA.AOC.ARMY.PENTAGON.MIL



# CSA OPSEC Guidance – Dec 03

UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
4 DEC 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
SUBJECT: **CSA OPSEC Memo dated 4 Dec 03**

1. Protect information. This is the mission. The importance of information is critical to the success of the Army. Information is the lifeblood of the Army. Information is the key to success in the 21st century. Information is the key to success in the 21st century.

a. A vulnerability assessment (VA) is a systematic process of identifying, classifying, and evaluating information assets and the information systems that process, store, and transmit that information. The VA process is a continuous one, and it is essential to the Army's ability to protect its information assets.


b. Sensitive information is information that, if released to the public, could cause harm to Army operations or personnel including, but not limited to, force protection, movement and readiness data, and evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures. Where feasible, information that bears protection should be moved .... to the SIPRNET.

c. P. This information is for the use of the Army's information systems. This information is for the use of the Army's information systems.

2. In the gathering of information, the Army must ensure that the information is accurate, reliable, and timely. The Army must ensure that the information is accurate, reliable, and timely.

## **CSA OPSEC Memo dated 4 Dec 03**

- **Protecting information is vital to Army success.**
- **“For Official Use Only” (FOUO) will be the standard marking for all unclassified products which, if released to the public, could cause harm to Army Operations or personnel including, but not limited to, force protection, movement and readiness data, and evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures. Where feasible, information that bears protection should be moved .... to the SIPRNET.”**
- **Do not assist the adversary by providing open source information.**





# Real-Time Blog

Not Logged In? Who's Online Now. You are here: [3 Doors Down Message Board](#)  
[Search Results](#) [Subject](#) [Author](#) [Last Post](#) [Board](#)  
 Do you have a question for Gregg.....xxxx..13-Jun-2005 #:24:45 PM

Questions for the band: Searched 8 forums

posted on 13-Jun-2005 3:24:45 PM I have a question for the whole band.

Gentlemen, I am with the 1st Brigade 101st ABN (AASLT) div stationed at Ft Campbell, KY. I was wondering what you have planned for the 20th of Sep 05. We are planning a family event for all the soldiers and their families prior to our return to Iraq. I understand that you are busy and may have other obligations but I thought I would ask. You have been very supportive of the soldiers in the past and it is very much appreciated. It would mean a lot to these soldiers and their families if you could make some sort of appearance. Many of us are returning for our second or third time and the strain on the families has been tough to say the least. Please let me know either way. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Name and Titled Deleted

101st ABN Div (AASLT), Bastogne"



# Real-Time Blog

*Does this blog provide too much information?*

"It is Monday again and we are still at K-2 airfield in Bayji. As a squadron, we are 'demonstrating a military presence.' That means the troops set up checkpoints and stop hundreds of cars, searching them and the people. They keep taking these 'detainees' or EPWs and I have partial responsibility for the 'jail', which is a building here on the airfield. But we are not set up for this. MPs are supposed to come and get them almost immediately but they take a while. Plus the Civil Affairs/Counter Intelligence teams that are supposed to talk to them don't know crap and the whole thing borders on a war crime. I am just trying to find blankets and light and medical care for the prisoners.



# Serviceman Demoted

Guardsman punished for allegedly posting classified information

**The Associated Press**

**Updated: 8:25 a.m. ET Aug. 2, 2005**

**PHOENIX - An Arizona National Guardsman serving in Iraq has been demoted for posting classified information on his Internet Web log, an Army official said Monday.**

- **Leonard Clark, 40, was demoted from specialist to private first class and fined \$1,640, said Col. Bill Buckner, a spokesman for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq**
- **Soldiers in Iraq are allowed to maintain blogs or Web sites but cannot post information about Army operations or movements. They also are barred from posting information about the death of a soldier whose family hasn't yet been notified**



# “Jihadi Information Battalion”

This website explains that Jihadists have been authorized by God to break the control of the media from the Zionists.

- To stop communicating with one another by email entirely and instead use the site’s web-forum.
- To only use public computers that cannot be in any way linked to them.
- To use anonymous IP address websites in order to mask their identity while navigating.
- To not publish any of their identifying information in their online forum registration or in their forum posts





# Jihadist Use of Open Source

Image on the right was seen on a Jihadist website in May 2005. It is an image taken by a soldier and posted to a BLOG.



جي-7 ( RPG-7 ) لم يحدث اي شيء لها بسبب استخدامها دروع تفاعلية.....



Image on the left is another example. It was also posted to a Jihadist website in May 2005. The Arabic caption reads: "G (RPG-7) 7 Nothing happened to it due to its use of reactive armor".



# US Equipment Vulnerabilities



HMMWV



Driver of Alpha 41 (the luckiest STRYKER Driver in Mosul)



Thanks to the 10 panes of ballistic glass in each window, no one was hurt in this blast.



This is the result of a medium sized-IED on our main scanning vehicle, The Buffalo. While no one was injured, it was still a sad day to see our most armored vehicle knocked out





# Summary

- **DOD Guidance**
  - Prior to posting information in the public domain, it should have an OPSEC review by the OPSEC officer IAW AR 530-1
    - **Military Operations and Exercises information:**
      - Unit readiness specificity
      - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
    - **Personnel Information:**
      - Identifying family members and military personnel-specific details
      - Disciplinary actions
    - **Proprietary Information and Scientific:**
      - Critical technology
      - Test & Evaluation and Research & Development of existing equipment
    - **Intelligence Information:**
      - Communications Intelligence
      - Sources and Methods
      - Protection of identities of undercover Intelligence Officers, Agents, Informants, etc
    - **Other Information:**
      - Outsourcing studies
      - Administrative dispute resolutions

**Information you have access to, though UNCLASSIFIED, has value to an adversary**

A composite image featuring a large bald eagle in the sky and a caravan of camels in a desert. The eagle is positioned in the upper half of the frame, looking towards the right. Below it, a caravan of camels is walking across a sandy desert landscape. A person is visible at the end of the caravan, leading the camels. The overall scene is set against a dark, cloudy sky.

**QUESTIONS?**

**Don't Blog on Me**