未分类的版本
（分类材料已被删除）
Issued by the Department of Energy
October 1997
| 标题 | Classification |
|---|---|
| A. Tasking | U |
| B. Stakeholder Input | U |
| C. Topics Requiring Greater Protection | SRD (not included) |
| D. Report of the Weapon Design Working Group | SRD (not included) |
| E. Report of the Weapon Science Working Group | SRD (not included) |
| F.武器化和武器生产和军事用途工作组的报告 | U |
| U | |
| U | |
| SRD (not included) | |
| CRD（不包括） | |
| G.核材料生产的报告 工作小组 |
U |
| H.军事反应堆工作组的报告 | U |
| I. Report of the Safeguards and Security 工作小组 |
U (OUO not included) |
| J. Summary of Proposed Topics for Declassification | SRD (not included) |
| K. Organization and Participants | U |
本报告的第一章描述了评论的起源，其在DOE开放性计划中的位置以及执行分配任务的一般计划。讨论了利益相关者的疑虑，并概述了屏蔽潜在对手信息的屏蔽信息的效用的限制。
与当前平衡四个目标的原则形成鲜明对比的是：维护防御和不变；促进原子能的和平应用；传播环境，安全和与健康相关的信息；并促进技术转移 - 审查在第2章中建议了管理DOE分类系统的原则，该原则的中心是以下主张：
Classification must be based on explainable judgments of identifiable risk to national security and no other reason.
Six recommendations for dealing with overarching issues are given in Chapter 3. Implementation of these recommendations, together with the principles from Chapter 2, will provide the foundation for a major cultural shift toward better protection for information truly important to national security while making available to the public information that no longer warrants protection.
在本报告的第二部分中讨论了详细的工作的结果，以确定必须继续保护哪些信息以及应向公众提供的结果。
“Much of the strength and efficiency of any government in procuring and securing happiness to the people depends on opinion, on the general opinion of the goodness of that government ..."
Benjamin Franklin to the
Constitutional Convention, 1787
In December 1993, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary launched a comprehensive initiative to move the Department of Energy (DOE) into a new era of government openness. She outlined a broad package of classification and declassification reforms and disclosed for the first time:
The Openness Initiative is DOE's response to President Clinton's commitment to improve public access to government. The President emphasized the importance of accessibility when he stated, "The more the American people know about their government the better they will be governed." After reviewing DOE's approach, the President called it, "a bold new initiative that will allow an informed group of stakeholders to work with the Department of Energy to solve the problems that face our nation." Key elements of the Openness Initiative include:
宣布《开放性计划》之后，举行了28次公开会议，旨在获得公众的支持和信任。超过1,000多名能源部利益相关者做出了回应。在1994年6月的新闻发布会上，奥利里（O'Leary）秘书说：“我们一直在倾听，我们听到的声音很清楚的是，政府的开放性对我们的公民非常重要。我们还听说可及性很重要。“然后，秘书概述了广泛的分类改革，并发布了有关该国核材料生产计划，其核测试计划和美国核武器库存的信息。
In addition, the Secretary described new actions aimed at declassification and classification reform and accessibility. These commitments included:
“按比例，政府的结构赋予了公众舆论的力量，必须启发公众舆论……”
George Washington
Farewell Address, 1796
The Under Secretary of Energy, in a February 13, 1995, letter to Dr. Albert Narath (Appendix A), requested that Dr. Narath chair a group to carry out a comprehensive, fundamental review of DOE's classification policy. The stated objective was to determine which information must continue to be protected and which no longer requires protection and should be made available to the public. The review was identified as a major component of Secretary O'Leary's Openness Initiative with an overarching objective of making openness a DOE legacy. Twelve months were allowed for the review so that the views of stakeholders both within and outside the government could be solicited and expertise from the Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies brought to bear.
All information within DOE's responsibility was included in the review. Within the Department there are four major categories of protected information. Three are derived from the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended; the fourth is defined by Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995. The charge to the Review Group applied not only to the individual categories, briefly described below, but also to the manner in which they collectively are used to protect information.
Guidance associated with these four categories of information is contained in more than 50 headquarters classification guides and about 800 local classification guides. General policy for classification is given in CG-C-3A, "Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear Programs," dated June 1993. Because the final report to the Secretary was to make clear, concise recommendations for change, along with supporting rationale, review of all policy driving the various guides, and in many cases the details of how that policy is applied, were integral to the study task.
“The mutual confidence on which all else depends can be maintained only by an open mind and a brave reliance on free discussion."
Justice Learned Hand
October 24, 1952
任务的性质表明，一个具有足够形式的组织来促进完整性和及时性，但保持灵活性，以应对研究和审议引起的突出问题。金博宝正规网址所示的安排Figure 1(page 49) was selected to meet these needs. A steering group, comprising the chair, deputy chair and working group and coordinator group chairs, was formed to direct and coordinate the various activities.
工作小组,适合大学生的讨论, were formed with experts in the relevant areas of technology and policy. Because the main job of the groups was to determine the boundary between information which can be published without undue risk and that which must continue to be protected, classified research and deliberations were essential. For this reason, working group members were selected from the population holding appropriate clearances. The groups were arranged to span the full spectrum of DOE classified information with some deliberate subject matter overlap among groups.
指导小组制定了强调利益相关者意见的时间表（请参阅Figure 2on page 50). Distinguished speakers from inside and outside the government followed Secretary O'Leary in addressing the initial steering group meeting in Washington, D.C. Written comments were solicited through the Federal Register and by direct mailing to stakeholders known to the DOE Office of Declassification. Another public meeting was held in Oakland, CA, on July 28, 1995, to gain additional stakeholder comment. Again, a distinguished group of public speakers expressed their concerns and suggestions for improvements. Both public sessions were videotaped so that Review participants could carefully consider this important counsel.
初次见面后,指导小组developed a set of interim guiding principles. The 50 or so headquarters classification guides were divided among the working groups. Study areas were in many cases interdependent and in some cases overlapping.
Research for the Review was greatly facilitated by two previous studies. The Classification Policy Study, requested by the Under Secretary and carried out by DOE's Office of Declassification, examined statutes, Executive Orders, DOE Orders, and other records. A number of findings and recommendations, largely dealing with issues requiring modifications to the Atomic Energy Act, were presented.1美国国家科学院应奥利里（O'Leary）的要求召集了美国国能服务能源部环境修复和相关计划的信息委员会。1995年7月的最终报告提出了四个基本原则和许多建议。2
After a May 2, 1995, plenary session involving all working groups and associated support staff, detailed investigation proceeded under the direction of the working group chairs. Periodic steering group meetings monitored progress, considered emerging issues, and coordinated efforts.
Informal cooperation building was pursued throughout the process as a means for widening the spectrum of issues and concerns under consideration and for informing stakeholders in both the government and the private sector of the intent and progress of the Review. The report summarizing the work conducted and recommendations developed during this review was submitted in draft form for public comment on February 6, 1996.
“每个公民欠数ry a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of its public servants and a fair and reasonable estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's will impressed on the whole framework of our civil policy; and this is the price of our liberty and the inspiration of our faith in the Republic."
Grover Cleveland
First Inaugural Address
March 4, 1885
利益相关者的评论来自各种各样的私人公民，联邦和非联邦政府人员，公共和私人利益集团以及来自各个学科的专家。除了公开会议外，还使用问卷和调查来征求有关特定分类政策问题的意见，并邀请对个人或组织兴趣或关注的主题发表评论。金博宝正规网址随着响应数量的扩大，建立了一个数据库，该数据库将信息分为六个主要类别：可访问性；开放的关注；解密建议；人类实验；不扩散和测试；以及环境，安全和健康（ES＆H）。
分析表明以下领域有主要问题：
ES&H concerns were voiced by a broad range of stakeholders including private citizens, environmentalists, historians, and health researchers. The stakeholders felt that access to ES&H data would:
Accessibility was a major concern for historians, public interest groups, journalists, and individuals. The majority stated that the review of pertinent documents must be done more promptly and, upon completion of the declassification process, the documents must be released to the public. In addition, the public should be advised of newly released materials. Specific suggestions included:
在审查之前，所有人类实验数据都被解释；但是，利益相关者的利益仍然很高。有兴趣的各方包括退伍军人组织，私人公民，医学研究人员和历史学家。利益相关者称赞该部门始于1993年的努力。该小组表达的主要问题是可访问信息的信息，并且由于响应信息请求而缺乏机构间合作。正在进行的诉讼和有关人口的年龄使这一问题变得非常复杂和情感上的问题。
Researchers, historians, environmentalists, and special interest groups requested that data relative to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile be declassified. Requests included:
利益相关者表示，这些数据的发布允许独立审查美国战略政策。武器存储，存储维护和基于科学的库存管理计划包括在此关注的领域中。
尽管利益相关者要求改善对DOE设施和信息的访问权，但他们一般同意必须保护关键的核武器设计信息。一些人表示，应该在相对较短的时间表上对科学信息进行解密。但是，他们建议应审查所有设计数据，并以最严格的方式保护继续至关重要的详细技术信息。围绕真正敏感的主题的“高围栏”，但解密和传播大量较少的材料是一个流行的主题。
A compendium of stakeholder comments is presented inAppendix B。
“坚定地掌权的人很快就会学会思考安全，而不是进步，这是最高水平的司法克拉夫特。”
James Russell Lowell
文学论文,1890
并不是所有的国家安全重要的信息can be protected by classification. In assessing protectability—the ability to shield information from potential adversaries—it is helpful to consider the nature of the information, which from the standpoint of classification can be placed into three categories: subjective, objective, and technical.3
Subjective information is arbitrary and reflective of human decisions and intentions. Consequently, it is unique in that it cannot be generated independently by an adversary. It can, however, be compromised by espionage or unauthorized disclosure. Operational information such as military plans and shipping dates is of this nature. Some subjective information effectively becomes declassified once the activities described are enacted (e.g., launch dates). Thus, establishing a duration of classification at the time this information is generated is frequently practical. Subjective information, when generated and maintained under strict control and secured by proper safeguards, is unconditionally protectable.
科学信息（对自然和物理世界的系统化知识）逐渐落在客观类别中。它与主观信息完全不同，因为它不能无条件地保护。它是独特的，但可以独立发现或可以由熟练的研究人员确定。在对科学信息进行分类时，考虑潜在的对手所需的时间和资源是非常合适的。因此，分类过程的可信度决定了对外部研究人员进步的不断认识。
While there is little value in trying to protect scientific information published in learned journals, the details of how that information can be used may be protectable. Scientific information obtained in unusual and exotic ways, for example, nuclear explosive testing, while in theory independently discoverable, may in reality be very protectable for long periods of time. Protectability in this example may best be invoked by the nuclear powers adhering to mutually agreed classification norms or standards. By the same token, scientific breakthroughs may be more protectable than information generated through the steady advance along an established line of inquiry.
Technical Information—information concerning a method, process, technique, or device consistent with the laws of nature, employed to create a product or result—falls between the subjective and objective categories. Like scientific information, technical information is eternal; but unlike scientific information, it may not be unique. There may be several ways to use facts of nature to achieve a certain objective. Consequently, while technical information is not unconditionally protectable, it is frequently more protectable than scientific information. Estimates of time and resources to discover certain technical information can be important considerations in the classification decision process, but they can also be misleading. Since the information is not unique, it may elude methodological investigators for a long time regardless of resources expended. On the other hand, a clever adversary may devise a completely different way of achieving the same objective with little resource expenditure.
To be completely protectable, information must be under strict control. That is, the information holder must be able to restrain access to the information. However, information that has been compromised should not necessarily be declassified. Protectability of some value may still be present, albeit against a smaller set of potential adversaries. Likewise, information revealed by unauthorized disclosure or independent discovery may best remain classified if declassification would remove significant uncertainties on the part of even a subset of potential adversaries. Continued classification, for example, if practiced consistently by all sophisticated nations holding the information, may markedly slow the progress of the less sophisticated.
“Moderation in temper is always a virtue, but moderation in principle is always a vice."
Thomas Paine, 1792
Classification policy and practice, like nuclear weapons themselves, exist to support national security policy and objectives. In turn, classification policy must be founded on sound principles. Doctrine for developing, modifying, and applying classification guides—the primary instruments used in classifying and declassifying information—flows from both policy and principles.
Figure 3(page 51) illustrates schematically how the classification system works. The products generated by the system are classification and declassification actions—determinations by individual authorized classifiers as to the proper classification category and level for documents and materials within their responsibilities. These actions are supported by a hierarchy of classification guides, which are the basic tools of the authorized classifier.4Local guides—issued by DOE Operations Offices or contractors, after approval by the Office of Declassification or Operations Offices, dependent upon subject matter—provide detailed direction in selected technical areas. Program guides are developed for work involving two or more field offices or for cooperative efforts with another government agency. Both local and program guides are prepared and revised in conformance with the DOE Classification Policy Guide—a critical link between policy and individual classification and declassification actions. Changes in national policy must generally flow through this hierarchy before practice is revised at the working level.
The system has several feedback mechanisms for adjusting to changing conditions. A Technical Evaluation Panel—the principal scientific advisory group—advises on specific items submitted for declassification and makes recommendations for modifying and interpreting policy. Formal appraisals are conducted to determine whether practices actually conform to DOE policy and to evaluate the effectiveness of classification personnel in implementing the program.5DOE还对解密和降级的文档进行了各种评论。这些机制的设计是通过缓慢发展的冷战政策使系统保持一致。
The system is currently keyed to the underlying principle of achieving a balance among four aims:6
为寻求将基本原则应用于特定问题的授权用户提供了15个一般政策声明，包括解密标准。7
The previously discussed DOE Openness Initiative is only one manifestation of policy changes since the end of the Cold War. Defense focus has shifted toward a world where regional powers may attempt to gain local hegemony through aggression or intimidation. These threats cannot, for the most part, be adequately addressed by the United States or any other single nation state.8In general, the changes in national security policy provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open government.9但是，美国的关键优先事项是阻止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散及其导弹传递系统。10It is largely within this arena of sometimes competing national priorities—international cooperation, openness in government and nonproliferation—that a new DOE classification policy must be formulated.
The Review sought to identify and evaluate fundamental changes that could bring the DOE classification system more closely into line with national policy. A premium was placed on expressing policy and principles so that both practitioners of classification and the public at large can understand which information must be protected and which can be made available to the public. In contrast to the current principle of balancing four aims, the Review recommends 11 general and another 10 area-specific principles aimed primarily at defining what DOE classification must and must not do.
“When our Founders boldly declared America's independence to the world . . . they knew that America to endure would have to change; not change for change sake, but change to preserve America's ideals: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
Bill Clinton
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1993
The stringent provisions for classification prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) were appropriate for an era when it was very uncertain where nuclear research might lead. Four decades of intensive technical work, however, provide the understanding needed to simplify those provisions without compromising national security. Changing the AEA is fundamental to changing DOE classification policy.
Restricted Data is defined in the AEA in a very conservative manner. All data meeting the general definition are considered to be "Born Classified." Unlike National Security Information, no decision by an official is needed to render information falling within the AEA definition classified. The very nature of this approach leads to an environment fostering overclassification.
Today, an extensive set of classification guides (briefly described inChapter 2）为工人提供官方指示，要分类哪种材料。因此，现在是时候将限制数据的规定与整个政府的机密材料更一致的规定。
| 建议1。通过将第2章，第11（y）节的措辞从“有关...”的所有数据更改为“能源部长指定的所有数据……”，修改了限制数据的AEA定义。 |
Another shortcoming in the AEA has arisen through examination of the legality of reclassifying previously declassified material. Implementation of Recommendation 1 will make it less likely that a reclassification action is needed, but the Secretary of Energy should have this authority in order to rectify previous decisions that are inappropriate because of errors or changing national security conditions.
| 建议2。修改AEA，以提供能源授权部长，以根据技术发展或改变国家安全状况对先前解密的受限制数据类别进行分类。 |
AEA还规定，前提是从核武器使用核武器的限制数据类别信息中删除，前提是将信息得到充分保障作为“辩护信息”，并且仅根据所定义的合作协议与其他国家共享。AEA。
此类别中的信息被称为以前受到限制的数据 - 多年来，该术语引起了很多混乱和不必要的工作。国家安全信息与以前受到限制的数据之间几乎没有差异，除了对解密的联合确定和与其他国家共享信息的过程的繁琐要求，这一过程与实现类似目标的其他机制基本上是多余的。
The DoD and DOE could benefit by jointly reviewing and separating topics classified Formerly Restricted Data for transclassification to National Security Information or Restricted Data, as appropriate, with the objective of eliminating Formerly Restricted Data from current usage. One result should be a reduced number of topics classified by joint DoD-DOE guidance, thereby removing DOE from classification decisions on military utilization more properly made by DoD.13但是，将要求立法应用不受规定的AEA（第142.D节）限制与其他国家共享军事利用信息的限制。
| 建议3。修改AEA，以允许将其称为国家安全信息信息，现在被归类为以前受到限制的数据。 |
实施the three recommendations discussed above is essential if DOE is to significantly improve classification policy. Reining in "Born Classified" is needed to deal with overclassification. The authority to reclassify is essential to address timidity in the declassification process. Eliminating Formerly Restricted Data simplifies processes and clarifies classification lines of responsibility. All three have been recommended by the Classification Policy Study and the National Academy of Sciences review.
As a matter of practice, DOE has generally classified entire documents at the highest level of any material contained therein without further identification of the relative sensitivity of the various parts. By contrast, most government agencies use segregation and portion marking of classified material so that the reader can more precisely identify the sensitivity of the various parts. Segregation and portion marking based on a strong system of classification guides offers a significant measure for reducing overclassification today, for more easily declassifying material in the future, and for more clearly distinguishing between classified and unclassified information.
What constitutes an appropriate portion may vary greatly from document to document.Figure 4(page 52) illustrates a decision logic that can be applied on a case by case basis. Choices on appropriate portions for segregation or marking can best be made by well-informed technical staff with review and assistance by authorized derivative classifiers. Caution must be exercised to ensure that the entire assemblage of all portions in a document that are marked at a given level and category is itself classified at that level and category as a whole, and that the overall marking on the document reflects the highest classification level contained therein and the most restrictive category of information.
| 建议4。DOE应建立一个分级系统（如图所示Figure 4on page 52) for segregation and portion marking of all new Restricted Data documents by authors and authorized derivative classifiers. (Implementation should begin as classification guides are revised.) |
未分类的受控核信息（UCNI）有四个主要类别：安全，核材料生产，核电生产和核武器。UCNI的实施令人困惑；使用的标准很难与分类的标准区分开。例如，AEA中的短语，秒。148，“ ...对公众或共同辩护和安全的健康和安全的严重不利影响”，类似于第12958号行政命令中的“秘密”机密信息的定义：对国家安全的严重损害。”
The most compelling argument for retaining UCNI is to provide some protection for sensitive material that needs to be shared with those not holding security clearances (e.g., law enforcement officials). Release of UCNI to the general public is prohibited. It is thought that this protection lowers the risk of terrorist attacks on sensitive facilities, operations, and associated personnel.
我们的分析表明，如果应用程序仅限于保障措施和安全需求，则可以减少UCNI标记的文件80％。
| 建议5。The use of UCNI should be limited to nuclear safeguards and physical security information that is clearly unclassified. |
一些利益相关者在提倡较不敏感的地区进行重大分类减少的同时，还敦促在更敏感的材料周围保持严格的安全性，甚至更高的安全水平。审查的主要努力集中在以前的目标上 - 识别不再需要保护的信息。但是，我们的调查得出的结论是，后一种告诫是有效的，实际上应被视为当务之急。
由于缩小了核武器核武器综合体，核库存和相关的作战力量，因此需要访问受限制的数据的人数众多。本审查建议的实施以及以前的诉讼将减少必须归类的信息量。更少的材料较少的人使得保护增强成为可行的行动。
一般而言，不建议使用解密的数据，至少与当今使用的数据一样严格。此外，在Sigma 1和2中存在大量信息（热核和外爆和内爆的操作或设计理论）和Sigma 14和15（核武器未经授权的使用和使用控制设计和脆弱性评估），这些类别值得特殊保护，即：
Appendix C提供了一个判断需要一个主题列表dditional care. (It should be noted that today DoD personnel having clearances based on a National Agency Check can be authorized access to most of this material, and DOE personnel having L clearances can be authorized access to topics denoted SFRD.)
最近讨论了两种主要选择，以实现这种更敏感的材料的额外保护：
Option 1 requires cooperation of other government agencies, particularly DoD, to ensure the CRIT is recognized and honored with the appropriate clearances and need to know measures. While such processes are in place for Option 2 (Top Secret), implementation of the associated procedures would be burdensome, particularly for computer operations.
这两种选择都引起了有关如何正确处理先前生成的材料的严重问题。必须保持高水平的保护，直到审查并可以完成正确的标记。还有一个担心的是，未标记为增加保护的SRD材料应继续以不少于当今使用的水平进行保护。具体而言，Q清理和严格（甚至更严格的）需要知道控制需要继续。
最重要的是，无论选择最敏感材料的保护方法如何，必须在各个层次和类别的机密材料中保持纪律。程序必须清楚，并且所有参与人员必须了解遵守这些程序的重要性。
| 建议6。More stringent measures should be implemented for protection of the 137 topics identified inAppendix Cas most sensitive. |
One major advantage gained by collective implementation of the previous recommendations will be a much clearer understanding of which information must remain Restricted Data and within that category which topics are most sensitive. This will allow greater protection because stringent measures can be applied more effectively around sharply defined areas of importance.
The provisions for protecting classified material at the Confidential level (disclosure could cause damage to national security) are far stronger than the various measures for controlling special categories of unclassified information. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) and Official Use Only information, while curbing information requests under the Freedom of Information Act, do not have protective measures consistent with preventing disclosure to determined adversaries. For example, non-U.S. citizens who are employees of a government subcontractor can access UCNI for purposes of bidding on a government contract.14Consequently, if information needs to be withheld for reasons of national security, it should remain classified. Declassifiers should not count on protection against disclosure under any of the controls for unclassified information today, and, as worldwide communications systems grow, instant disclosure becomes a real possibility. Classification, as previously noted, can only delay an adversary from obtaining or developing technical information; no delay can be expected when the information is unclassified.
The results of the detailed examination of current classification guides by the seven working groups are briefly described in Chapters 4-8. In-depth reports of this work are presented in Appendices D through I. Recommended declassification actions on 62 topics are summarized inAppendix J。Members of the FCPR are listed inAppendix K。
Fully mindful of the fact that there is no such thing as an obsolete nuclear weapon design, the Review has placed particular emphasis on protecting information needed to gain or advance a nuclear weapon capability. Sorting information that no longer warrants protection from the larger body of currently classified material required informed debate and judgment. In most cases detailed classified discussion was required, and in many cases the rationale for recommending for or against disclosure could only be properly framed in arguments that are themselves classified. Consequently, much of the material in the reports of the working groups is classified, and the summaries given in the following chapters may appear terse or incomplete to the reader.
“Yet in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."
艾森豪威尔
Farewell Address, 1961
一个压倒性的结论从综述that the important information needed to gain or advance a nuclear weapon capability should continue to be carefully protected. The potential threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies of even a primitive single-stage weapon is indeed grave.
Figure 5(page 53) schematically illustrates how the principles given inChapter 2可以应用于限制数据的制度。在决定信息对潜在对手（尤其是扩散物和恐怖分子）的有用性时，希望在每个步骤中提起经验丰富的专业判断，并在保护方面犯错而不是披露。
当前的政策是对信息进行分类，这些信息将有助于开发核武器，帮助恐怖分子建造武器，帮助核能改善其核武器或揭示美国武器中的脆弱性。因此，尽管未分类的枪支组装，内爆，提升和上演（热核）武器的一般概念和原则是枪支组装，内爆，提升和上演（热核）武器的一般概念和原则，但细节仍然分类。结果是设备或设备零件的图纸，高爆炸系统的详细信息及其爆炸，中子启动要求，对高爆炸性，增强需求的反应（燃料的数量，压力，温度，温度，氘与trium的比率，融合）产量等）并将产量的增加分类。初级及其输出的产率，辐射流向次级的控制（管理），次级的响应（运动，温度，压力等），次要部分的配置以及材料对材料对从初级辐射分类。质量，形状以及对于某些材料而言，武器中使用的事实被分类。当前未经分类的材料清单是氢（任何同位素），锂（锂6中的任何富集）和铀（枯竭，天然或高度富集）。
Detailed judgments for updating weapon design classification guidance are given inAppendix D。除了在材料协会与一般武器之间，或者在某些情况下使用特定武器的材料协会领域，建议更改。即使可以从植物饲料流或平均值中推断出在特定武器中使用的质量的估计值，只要对这些材料的使用细节受到保护，即使可以从植物饲料流或平均值中推断出这些关联的估计值也被认为是微小的风险。（将材料与武器工厂的关联解析，或者在某些情况下，特定的武器类型将允许对许多文档进行解密，而这些文件仅是因为它们推断或识别材料及其流入和流入工厂的情况。）
The spontaneous decay of radioactive materials present in nuclear weapons results in the production of neutrons and gamma rays inside the device. Some of this radiation escapes the device and is called intrinsic radiation (INRAD). Personnel who work or sleep in close proximity to the device, usually sailors, are exposed to this radiation. The present classification guidance allows for the specification of a total dose from INRAD at a single radius outside the device measured from the device center. If that single number is an upper bound at that distance, then the maximum health risk is known and can be evaluated. This has been sufficient so far. To characterize the hazard to personnel more completely, it may become desirable to specify the total dose as a function of polar angle or even on the device surface. This information is currently classified because the orientation of the warhead may be deduced from this data. If the warhead orientation becomes unclassified for a given device, then, and only then, we recommend that the total dose as a function of polar angle could be declassified. The polar axis is taken to be the long axis of the warhead with the origin being on the axis somewhere in the center of the reentry body or bomb.
Classification of scientific information underpinning nuclear weapons design activities must be viewed in a somewhat different fashion. Limited resources have become and will likely remain a significant constraint in managing the acquisition of necessary scientific knowledge. However, the past 40 years have seen a large and sustained growth in areas of general science closely related to nuclear weapons technology—astrophysics, condensed matter, high temperature experiments, and computer design and applications. These resources can be leveraged by encouraging scientific exchange between U.S. researchers and the worldwide community.
With no nuclear testing, the safety and reliability assurance of the stockpile will rest on the ability to attract and retain highly skilled scientists and engineers. Their willingness to center their careers in the nuclear weapons field may be enhanced to the extent that their scientific accomplishments can be recognized and rewarded by their peers in the open and unclassified arena.
同时，与武器设计相关的科学和技术信息，以及清除社区所独有的，例如，从核测试中获得的数据以及有关如何用于验证模型和数据库的信息，可能会受到密切保护。科学信息的分类成为这些必要条件之间有明智平衡的行为。
In developing definitions of information that must remain classified, nuclear weapon science activities were considered in three topical areas—materials properties, laboratory experiments, and computer codes. The details of this process and the results are presented inAppendix E; a general summary of the findings and recommendations is given in the following paragraphs.
The relations between the thermodynamic variables of a material—density, temperature, pressure, energy, and entropy—are referred to as equations of state. Understanding nuclear weapon performance is dependent on good equation of state information at very high temperatures and pressures.
由于铀和p的重要性对武器设计的重要性，因此应保持分类的acttinides的状态方程（原子数大于89）。武器设计计算中使用的所有当前分类状态信息方程都应保持分类，因为它可能会通过与分类实验进行比较而获得的经验信息。否则，可以将原子数小于或等于89的元素的状态信息方程视为未分类。
Opacity or optical thickness is a measure of the ability of a given path length of material to attenuate radiation of a given wave length. Capabilities for calculating and measuring opacity are becoming widespread and have application in international scientific areas such as Inertial Confinement Fusion. In nuclear weapons design and evaluation, the opacity of the various materials is needed to calculate the passage of X rays and gamma rays from the primary to the secondary.
当前的策略是根据材料的原子数和温度对计算或测量的不相位进行分类。建议在武器设计计算中使用的所有当前分类的不透明度信息均保持分类，因为它可能会通过与分类实验进行比较而获得的经验信息。否则，可以将原子数大于89的元素的不透明度信息分类，其温度大于实验室实验中可实现的温度。原子数小于或等于89的元素的信息可以视为未分类。理论方法将未分类，除非被核试验数据归一化或验证的特定武器特定技术。
In general, for either equation of state or opacity information, any analysis which uses material properties from an unclassified parameter space—in atomic number, temperature, or pressure—to determine material properties in a classified parameter space is classified.
Laboratory experiments are conducted to gain an understanding of the basic science behind the operation of nuclear weapons. They differ from experiments used to design nuclear weapons in that they usually endeavor to isolate aspects of the underlying science from the integrated operation of a weapon. In the absence of nuclear testing, a new class of experiments will be needed.
Classification of weapon-related experiments, the analysis of the experiments, and their results, should be based on whether they reveal nuclear weapon design information, classified material property data, or information about specific classification models, algorithms, or computer codes.
确定实验是否揭示武器设计信息应基于实验配置“类似于”核武器的程度。与武器相关的实验配置将与武器组件有所不同，因为它们以几种方式缩放或修改，例如缩放物理尺寸，更改整体几何形状，进行物质替代或更改驱动能源。关于武器或武器组件的物理规模，几何形状，材料或能源的构型的实验，其相对尺寸不给出武器设计信息，应未分类。
Codes are computer programs used to solve the equations describing physical systems. Current classification policy for codes was written when the nuclear weapon design community was unique in access to massive computers and in the ability to develop sophisticated simulations. Today, comparable capabilities exist in many research centers, and collaboration with uncleared researchers can improve and verify methods employed in codes useful for weapon design. There remain, however, certain combinations of methods and special techniques that require protection.
Currently classified codes will remain classified. New codes are classified if they: contain weapon design information, are normalized to nuclear test data or other classified experiments, contain classified material properties, or use (or exhibit references to) weapon-specific special methods or combinations.
Weaponization is the term used to describe those features required to make a safe weapon that will operate efficiently in the intended environment. These features include the nuclear assembly, warhead electrical and boosting systems, initiation and use control components, features for hardening to countermeasures, and support structures. Weaponization also includes the nonnuclear testing and analysis needed to develop these features. The results from consideration of the classification of these topics are presented inAppendix F。
武器化主题的大部分被归类为以前受到限制的数据。在下面建议3(第三章),主要是密尔相关的信息itary utilization would be transclassified to National Security Information under DoD control. A risk management process is needed, however, to ensure that the impact of DoD classification actions on DOE are fully considered. A process like that given in DoD Directive 3150.1 for DOE acceptance of the DoD-formulated Military Characteristics may be suitable for this purpose.15Periodic review of DoD classification would be needed to ensure harmony with national security policy.
根据目前的分类指导，有时有必要对核武器中的危险物质的存在和数量进行分类。审查得出的结论是，揭示特定武器中有害物质的存在对潜在的对手几乎没有价值。在大多数情况下，武器类型中使用的危险材料的数量很少或没有风险。在这种情况下，对于保护武器中使用的确切危险材料的确切量（例如，p plutonium）很重要，可以指定“不超过价值”以促进在各种假设的情况下对环境影响的估计。
Historically, all nuclear weapon quantitative reliability requirements and assessments have been classified to protect operational capabilities. Nuclear weapons are designed to be highly reliable, thus reliability requirements can be considered for declassification jointly by the DoD and DOE on a case-by-case basis. Significant differences between assessed reliability values and design requirements are usually addressed promptly by remedial action; but to ensure that information identifying weaknesses potentially exploitable by an adversary is not divulged, it is recommended that current assessments of stockpiled weapon reliability remain classified.
By this same token, requirements for hardening nuclear weapons to the effects (X rays, neutrons, blast, etc.) from nearby nuclear detonations have been formulated in a very conservative manner. While it is not possible to survive a close nuclear burst, straightforward measures have been implemented to deny any defense the ability to destroy more than one U.S. warhead with one nuclear-tipped interceptor. Hardness requirements should be considered for declassification on a case-by-case basis, but assessed hardness levels should remain classified.
The fact that special features are incorporated in U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use is unclassified. Most detailed information on these use control features is classified to deny potential adversaries even hints of how the various layers of protection are structured. The current policy is considered appropriate. Moreover, new use control concepts should be afforded protection consistent with actual weaponization.
In the area of nuclear testing, information that would reveal nuclear weapon design should remain classified. The association of nuclear test events with weapon programs should, in some cases, be designated National Security Information if DoD chooses to classify certain weapon-specific information relating to military utilization.
The DOE Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) work will rely heavily on new multipurpose facilities. Concerns have been raised about the possibility that unclassified work at these facilities might be counter to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. It is recommended that DOE develop an SBSS facilities classification guide to serve as a basis for local security plans.
“True opinions can prevail only if the facts to which they refer are known; if they are not known, false ideas are just as effective as true ones, if not a little more effective."
沃尔特·利普曼（Walter Lippmann），1920年
Acquisition of fissionable material is a necessary step in the construction of a nuclear weapon. To the extent practical, barriers should be used to increase both the effort and the signature associated with fissionable material acquisition by proliferators and terrorists. Classification of selected DOE information is one of the important barriers that can be applied.
On the other hand, much of the technology associated with the production of fissionable material and light isotopes used in nuclear weapons is now widely available. Classification, as previously noted, can only delay the dissemination of information. In the case of nuclear materials production, only a few items still warrant protection. These matters are addressed in detail inAppendix G和briefly summarized below.
铀富集核心技术（可以实现实际或有效利用过程的钥匙功能）应继续按照目前的定义受到保护。应开发并提供对核心技术的未分类定义，并向公众提供，以便了解这些选择性分类措施的基本原理。
Virtually all information relating to uranium processing has been declassified, but much is currently identified as UCNI. Implementation of建议2在第3章中，将允许将真正敏感的过程重新分类为受限制的数据。有关处理的所有其他信息均应未分类。中间测定铀用于武器的事实是未分类的；为了促进武器拆除，应将其在未指定武器中使用的一般位置解释。
During the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission declassified virtually all information relating to the extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuels. As concerns about nuclear proliferation have increased in more recent times, DOE has been identifying incremental developments in plutonium extraction as UCNI. For the most part, designating these processes as UCNI does not serve nonproliferation objectives but does, in some cases, prevent dissemination of information on clean-up technologies.
分离光同位素中使用的技术通常未分类，许多技术在商业上进行了实践；但是，与实用性和效率有关的某些特定技术保证。萨凡纳河反应堆中的tri虫的生产涉及可以将其解密的过程几乎没有风险。但是，在商业反应堆中可以辐照的高温靶标的气体滞留有关的技术应保持分类。不应将用于加速器生产的加速器生产技术（包括集成工厂的设计细节）进行分类。目标技术的详细信息将通过限制数据来保护实现合法活动的加速器的大量特殊核材料生产。
Virtually all tritium processing systems and technology-related information at production sites is classified. However, special classification guides have been developed for the Fusion Program that essentially declassify many areas of tritium processing. This major inconsistency needs to be resolved. Except for extraction systems, it is recommended that all tritium processing information and associated technologies and their applications be unclassified unless the information reveals sensitive physics details of tritium usage in nuclear weapons. The details of tritium extraction systems should be protected if they reveal information that would materially aid in developing a capability to produce tritium in commercial reactors.
核武器和特殊核材料的生产涉及使用一些高度设计的，通常是独特的核和无核材料。其中一些材料与特定站点的关联分类非常复杂，废物处理和报告活动。字面上符合当前分类要求。一项系统的检查得出结论，应修改当前的政策，以指出材料与核武器计划或特定地点的简单关联不应分类。
当前分类nucle政策ar materials disposition is based on concerns related to revealing details of weapon design. This has led to protection of a large volume of information that might be used to estimate parameters such as average mass of components, material composition, and fabrication technologies. The exact or even approximate configuration and design specifications for specific nuclear weapon special nuclear material parts should remain classified, as should disposition data from which this information could be derived. However, estimates inferred from plant averages are not generally of concern. Declassification of disposition processes should be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
“Two basic requirements necessarily guide U.S. planning for strategic nuclear forces: the need to provide an effective deterrent while remaining within START I/II limits, and the need to allow for additional forces to be reconstituted in the event of a reversal of current positive trends."
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense
Annual Report to the President
和the Congress, 1995
从历史上看，美国的核武器库存，特殊的核物质（p和富集的铀）和tri属的秘密水平或更高层已分类。在原子能委员会的早期，库存数量是如此敏感，以至于他们只致力于最高机密文件。武器和裂变材料的稀缺被认为是一个非常严重的国防问题。16This sensitivity abated greatly as the stockpile grew to tens of thousands, but the actual numbers continued to be protected.
The intense measures to protect quantities of weapons and special nuclear materials resulted in classification of most information concerning production, and later, dismantlement, from which estimates of the stockpile might be made. Production levels and inventories of weapon-grade plutonium, deuterium, tritium, enriched uranium, and lithium were classified as Secret Restricted Data. Financial information (e.g., unit cost of weapons, nuclear components, and most nuclear materials), production plans and capabilities, reactor power levels and discharge histories, and feed stream quantities from which production rates might be derived were also classified. The net result was a vast body of information that could not be disclosed to the public. This restrained public discussion of environment, safety, and health issues and public debate on U.S. nuclear weapon policy in general and on specific matters, such as new production capabilities, in particular.
主要原因分类名单的武器tion rates and stockpile quantities is to conceal military operational strength and capabilities that are determined, in part, by the size and makeup of the stockpile. "Recent international upheavals have not changed the calculation that nuclear weapons remain an essential part of American military power ... Thus, the United States will continue to threaten retaliation, including nuclear retaliation, and to deter aggression against the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. allies. The notion, however, that nations are motivated by U.S. nuclear forces in making decisions about acquiring nuclear weapons themselves is not valid. Potential proliferators are more likely to be driven by concerns about neighbors' capabilities or the desire for regional hegemony, than by decisions America makes about its nuclear arsenal."17
如上所述，分类政策与美国国防政策之间的一致性最好由国防部设定库存武器的分类水平。实施建议3在第3章中，将允许将机密的库存数字指定为国家安全信息（NSI），从而避免了以前限制数据的繁琐的DOD-DOE流程。生产历史记录，当前活动以及运输以及DOD和DOE之间的信息将被归类为保护指定为NSI的各种数量。
A weapon type, once retirement is authorized and dismantlement completed, is not a factor in military capabilities, and all information concerning production and dismantlement rates and schedules for this weapon type can be declassified.
美国特殊核材料的盈余如此之大，以至于不再需要对这些价值的分类进行分类。如前所述第4章和5, estimates made of special nuclear material in specific weapons based on plant averages and feed streams are of little consequence.
Production quantities, cumulative quantities at Savannah River, and the total DOE inventory of tritium have traditionally been (and are still) classified as Secret Restricted Data. Many aspects of tritium production, handling, and use have also been classified. Originally, these very stringent measures were put into place to protect the concept of boosting—the enhancement of a fission reaction by thermonuclear neutrons derived from the fusion of tritium and deuterium.
由于担心可以从生产率和库存中推导出特定武器中的tri量数量，因此将分类延续到同一水平上。人们认为，每武器的平均tritium质量可能有助于一个扩散的国家减少开发增强核武器所需的测试数量。
像特殊核材料一样，在美国的库存中存在远远超过当今需求的库存。但是，与特殊的核材料不同，trium衰变相当迅速 - 一半的库存将在大约12年内消失。自1988年以来，美国就一直没有生产tri，除非开始新的生产，否则最终将不足以满足库存需求。DOE目前正在为新的Tritium生产设施寻求两种不同的技术。如果努力重新开始tri吨生产失败，尽管较慢，但美国核威慑姿势的脆弱性可能会发展出缓慢。鉴于目前的关注和不确定性，转向组不愿意在此时推荐对tri库清单的解密。
“Publicity is a great purifier because it sets into action the forces of public opinion, and in this country, public opinion controls the course of the nation."
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 1908
除了为海军核推进计划建造的情况外，美国还建造了51个军事反应堆。主要用于测试和研究，除了四个非鼻型军事反应堆以外，所有其他人都已退休。在此审查之前，许多军事反应堆技术被解密。但是，由于与军事行动和任务的关系，迄今为止，数量有限的军事反应堆计划的某些方面仍被分类。
Classification is considered appropriate only to the extent that disclosure would enable or assist foreign military capabilities; it should not infringe on the use of nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications unless there is a clear national security concern. Information that would aid in identifying or exploiting vulnerabilities in planned or existing U.S. military space systems must remain classified. Nuclear reactor technology that would assist foreign powers in developing or improving advanced military systems must also remain classified. Information that would reveal aspects of classified activities (e.g., nuclear weapons design, military operations, mission requirements) must be classified. When unclassified technology is used for a classified military application, the application itself, not the power source, should carry the classification.
The following paragraphs outline conclusions that result from applying these classification principles to the Army Nuclear Power Program and to space-related reactor systems. Details are presented inAppendix H.
陆军核电计划的开发是为了将移动和固定的小型到中等电气发电厂用于偏远地区。没有使用过使用或正在开发的陆军核电发电厂。大多数陆军核电计划的信息已经被解解。分类一些信息是因为解密可能会揭示相关的分类计划（例如海军核推进）的细节。其余的机密信息涉及军事任务和行动。结论是，陆军核电计划的解密信息不太可能透露有关海军核推进或当前军事任务或行动的重要信息。建议对与陆军计划相关的所有信息进行解密。
Classification in directed nuclear energy systems (DNES), isotopic heat sources, thermoelectric conversion, space reactor power systems, and related programs was based on protecting technologies that were difficult or expensive to develop and that could be used by other countries to advance their military programs significantly. Classification also protected U.S. military space-based applications and missions. The classification guides in these areas are jointly owned, and DOE must coordinate final classification decisions with DoD and NASA, as appropriate.
对产生激光束的受控（非探索）核反应的基本物理是未分类的。使用功率水平和不适合军事应用或开发的配置的DNES研究未经分类。这些信息将无法实质性地帮助其他人进行DNES开发，有助于对DNES开发的可行性评估，或揭示DNES研究的方向是未分类的，而不是针对或不适合军事发展的工作。
Detailed design information on the controlled fission portion of a system used to pump a laser, nuclear design information revealing or describing a significant technological advance, and isotopic fuel composition should remain protected as Restricted Data. Design of the laser portion of a system, including quantitative beam characteristics and research directed toward military applications, should remain classified as National Security Information. A stronger differentiation is needed between unclassified research and items having significant military potential. Research in configurations and power levels unsuitable for military applications should be unclassified unless classified information would be disclosed.
Space reactor power technology predating August 1973 is unclassified, as is information publicly released between August 1973 and February 1987. Information concerning the reactor power supply, specifically MultiMegaWatt or particle bed reactor designs, is classified as Restricted Data; some information on military applications is classified as National Security Information. Most theoretical and basic reactor system information has been declassified; some applied technology, while unclassified, is subject to export control.
The potential usefulness for military missions justifies continuing classification protection for some aspects of space reactor power systems. The basic classification policy is sound, but as programs advance, guidance should be revised to provide more specific determinations of key information—those protected aspects, features, or attributes significant to achieving military advantage. Detailed information on fabrication and testing of uranium nitride fuels and particle bed reactors should remain classified. Information concerning integration of thermoelectric materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be examined in conjunction with space reactor power systems and considered for continued classification, dependent upon program advances.
Space reactor impact points may be classified, if needed, to protect nuclear material or sensitive components until recovery is accomplished. Decisions to classify orbital parameters should be made by the office having primary responsibility.
热电转换和同位素热源技术未分类。这些技术的某些应用仍然可用于军事应用和操作，但是这些技术已经未分类，并且用于商业目的。
如果保留了新开发项目的选项，则可以更合理地考虑对现有信息的解密化。实施建议1和2（第3章）would greatly facilitate this activity.
海军核推进计划是一项海军组织的联合母鹿，负责设计，建造，操作，维护和管理支持美国核动力舰队的核动力军舰和设施。该程序中的分类由单个指南CG-RN-1，Rev. 2，DOE-DOD管辖海军核推进计划分类指南，其中包含大约600个主题。
At the time the Fundamental Classification Review began, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program was already engaged in a detailed review of their classification policy. Therefore, the Military Reactors Working Group did not review CG-RN-1. However, the working group did establish a dialogue with Naval Reactors personnel and exchanged draft reports with them.
The Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories conducted the first portion of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Review. This work consisted of an examination of each topic contained in the classification guide. Working groups at the two laboratories compared their separately formulated assessments against current guidance and results were exchanged and reevaluated in a series of conferences until consensus was reached. A similar review was independently conducted at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Headquarters. Proposed changes were then compared with those from the laboratories and the merits debated by the division directors until a consensus was reached on each item. The final determination was made by the director.
Twenty-one items have been recommended for declassification or downgrading, including information on ship design, materials and metallurgy, chemistry, power plant design, and reactor servicing. Guidance has been reemphasized to separate information concerning public health, safety, and environment from protected information to facilitate release to the public.
The Military Reactors Working Group has reviewed the draft Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program classification review report and judges that the results are consistent with the DOE Fundamental Classification Policy Review.
“但是，民主制度只能在很大程度上难以调节重要的事业的细节，它不能将其措施与保密或等待其后果与耐心相结合，而它们正是一个像个人这样的国家（像个人）处于主导地位的数量。”
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America, 1835
“保障措施”是指对身体保护和材料控制措施，以阻止，预防，检测和应对破坏和未经授权的拥有或使用核材料。安全是指保护机密或敏感的信息以及材料和DOE设施，财产和设备的政策，活动，计划和系统。与保障措施和安全性相关的机密信息的很大一部分属于第12958号行政命令，国家安全信息（NSI）。如果有限数据（RD）与NSI混合，则通常将文档标记为RD，而无需进一步阐述。未分类的受控核信息（UCNI）也被广泛使用。
Classification guidance was found to be compliance-based with little or no flexibility to accommodate the wide variation that exists throughout the DOE complex due to different missions and activities. A performance-based approach allowing site-specific guidance based on risk assessment would provide more balanced protection. Current DOE policy allows for a range of classification (e.g., Unclassified-Secret) in certain areas and requires stringent compliance in others. Site-specific classification levels could be developed locally using risk assessment to achieve balanced protection in accordance with revised DOE implementing instructions.18
在保障措施和安全领域，可以应用无数措施（分类为一项），以降低国家安全的风险。物理安全元素与安全信息保护之间存在权衡。脆弱的元素可能需要更高的分类水平，而更健壮的功能可能根本不需要分类。风险评估可用于对特定于网站的分类决策做出基于绩效的成本效益确定，这是一种优于统一，复杂，基于合规性的指导的方法。
A logic chart similar in nature to the one given inFigure 5第53页可以在风险评估过程中使用。（逻辑图的保障和安全版本显示在Appendix I, along with the detailed findings and recommendations of the working group.) Commercial software (e.g., Expert Choice™) is widely available to help with the decisions that risk assessment demands. It is recommended that a classification decision logic chart be placed in Safeguards and Security classification guides for use as the first step in the site-specific classification determination process.
A graded portion marking methodology can also be applied to achieve the flexibility DOE needs with National Security Information. It is recommended that an agreement be negotiated with the Information Security Oversight Office19to allow a graded approach to be applied to NSI, using the same methodology recommended for Restricted Data(Recommendation 4, Chapter 3).
From a Safeguards and Security perspective, UCNI provides valuable protection in certain areas but implementation is complex, confusing, and needs restructuring. UCNI is beneficial to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team in protecting participants, procedures, and equipment. It also helps the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division20in a similar manner. Major UCNI simplification can be achieved by eliminating categories not directly related to Safeguards and Security, eliminating the topic reference system, restructuring topical guidelines into performance-based topics, and having local site Internal Guidelines.
1“分类政策研究”，美国能源部，1992年7月4日。
2“A Review of Department of Energy Classification Policy and Practice," National Academy Press, July 16, 1995.
3This construct is based on the work of Arvin Quist: "Security Classification of Information, Volume 2, Principles for Classification of Information," Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, K/CG-1007/V2, A. S. Quist, April 1993.
4DOE Order 5650.2B, "Identification of Classified Information," December 31, 1991.
5DOE Classification Appraisal Procedure Guide, February 1988.
6CG-C-3A，“核计划分类政策指南”，[DE]分类办公室，1993年6月。
7Ibid.
8“向总统和国会的年度报告”，W。J。Perry，1995年2月。
9Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," April 17, 1995.
10白宫，A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994.
11This first principle acknowledges our understanding of the importance of disclosure. The right of the public to government information is defined in statutes (e.g., Freedom of Information Act). A number of types of information, including classified information, are excluded from disclosure under these statutes. So while the public does not have a right to classified information, we recognize that classification is proper only for information requiring protection. The second principle tightens the concept.
12It follows that an identified benefit or need is not required to justify declassification and release to the public. Rather, the federal government must establish the reason for classification. If information does not meet classification criteria, it should be released to the public unless otherwise restricted by law.
13A process for ensuring that the impact of DoD classification decisions on DOE is fully considered is discussed in Chapter 4. If建议3不接受，必须添加有关军事利用和系统能力的原则。
141995年7月，“在桑迪亚国家实验室中未分类的受控核信息”。
15DoD Directive 3150.1, "Joint Nuclear Weapons Development Studies and Engineering Projects," December 27, 1983.
16“On April 3, 1947, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal, informed President Truman that there were no nuclear weapons available for immediate use ... Secrecy on early stockpile numbers was intense, even mystical ..."Danger and Survival，McGeorge Bundy，Vintage Books，Inc.，1990年。
17威廉·佩里（William J. Perry），1995年2月15日。
18The Joint Security Commission recently observed that security decisions are frequently linked to assumptions based on an all-knowing, highly competent enemy. They, too, concluded that a more rational and enduring framework for security decision-making can be achieved using risk management. "Redefining Security," a report to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence by the Joint Security Commission, February 28, 1994.
19在国家档案和记录管理局中，信息安全监督办公室主任负责执行行政命令12958的指令，并审查和批准代理机构实施法规。
20DOE运输保障局负责运输核武器和某些武器组件和材料。
Source:能源部OpenNet
