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同样，在第一类中，通常情况下，该法规源自法规。国会制定了一项法律，将其执行委托给官僚机构，该官僚机构发表了法律规则和裁决。金博宝正规网址这是20世纪初在美国的行政国家的一个特征，大致在西奥多·罗斯福和伍德罗·威尔逊的行政管理之间。因此，商业和劳动部成立于1903年；1913年的美联储委员会；1914年的联邦贸易委员会。1917年，一名行政公报（官方公告）成立了。Official Bulletinwas published for only two years. It was the precursor to theFederal Register, in which all new regulations are published, which began in 1936.)

Secrecy became a persuasive mode of regulation with the advent of the national security state at mid-century, although its origins also go back to the beginning of the century. The statutory base of secrecy is modest; two or three laws, of which the National Security Act of 1947 is emblematic. Withal, its spare reference to the protection of "sources and methods" led to a vast secrecy system almost wholly hidden from view. There would be noOfficial Bulletin。

这个“简短帐户”将出现三个一般命题。首先是，从第一次世界大战时期起，大国的开始，这将在本世纪的大部分时间里持续，美国反复面对外国政府的间谍袭击，有时，有明显比例的比例。这些危机的复发模式是族裔的参与，通常是第一代移民，他们对祖先的房屋保持着牢固的依恋，并且并非很少经常对移民时突出的政治运动。

The ethnic dimension of international conflict has repeatedly created a fear of internal conspiracy in aid of external threat. This was succinctly stated by Theodore Roosevelt in October 1917:

The men who oppose the war; who fail to support the government in every measure which really tends to the efficient prosecution of the war; and above all who in any shape or way champion the cause and the actions of Germany, show themselves to be the Huns within our own gates and the allies of the men whom our sons and brothers are crossing the ocean to fight.1

可以说,“野蛮”内synd的后果之一rome is that the United States developed a pattern of extensive defensive secrecy far greater than would have been required to deal with an essentially external threat. A kind of backward formation took place. Whereas, in the usual situation (if there is such) the existence of secrets required defensive measures, in the American experience of the 20th century, the secrets came about largelybecausethere was a perceived threat. Loyalty would be the arbiter of security. Given that loyalty could not be assumed, a vast secretive security system emerged.

第二个命题是法定的基础for secrecy has been, and remains, so elusive that violations of secrecy occur with relative impunity. Edward A. Shils defined secrecy as "the compulsory withholding of knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure."2 This was written in 1956, when the morale of the Cold War system was high, and discipline was readily maintained. In 1946, as will be discussed, the Army Security Agency (formerly the Army Signal Security Agency) decoded the first of several thousand VENONA 3 messages sent by the KGB [Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)]4 and other Soviet intelligence agents identifying spies working within the American Government. The consequences for American counterespionage were spectacular; the VENONA project continued until 1980. Early on, the Soviets learned of its existence through a spy in the Army Security Agency itself, but as for the American public, not a whisper was heard until the 1980s, and only with the establishment of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy has this extraordinary archive been made public.

In time, however, the system degraded, largely in consequences of having grown to grotesque proportions. A specific example would be the celebrated "Pentagon Papers," essentially an official history of the war in Vietnam. Most of which were "Top Secret." The New York Times, and later the Washington Post, obtained copies and proceeded to publish selections. The United States Government moved to enjoin publication. The Supreme Court overruled the Executive Branch. Soon after, Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. published an article on the case in the Columbia Law Review. Just what was the law here? they asked. They replied, after 158 pages, that they could not possibly tell.5

它现在已经成为常规的信息highest classification to appear in the press, most commonly as a tactical move in some intra-government policy dispute. There are no sanctions. A fairly routine example of what might be called "deregulation" occurred on October 22, 1996, when the Washington Times published details of a "Top Secret" CIA analysis of the control system of Russian nuclear weapons. The following day, the Washington Post had a "follow-up" story by Reuters:

CIA Rates 'Low� the Risk of Unauthorized
Use of Russian Nuclear Warheads

中央情报局官员昨天说，中央情报机构得出结论，俄罗斯对其核武库的控制权一直在削弱，但是未经授权发射或勒索的机会仍然很低。

“俄罗斯核指挥和控制系统being subjected to stress that it was not designed to withstand as a result of wrenching social change, economic hardship and malaise within the armed forces," according to a classified report prepared last month, the officials said.

The CIA report, "Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons" and stamped top secret, was disclosed by the Washington Times in its editions yesterday. CIA officials confirmed the accuracy of the material quoted in the article.

CIA报告的披露支持了克林顿总统的批评者。。。谁赞成建立昂贵的导弹防御系统，而不是政府的异议，这可能会破坏1972年的反焊接导弹条约。

"It reinforces the urgent need for a missile defense to be put in place as soon as possible for the United States as well as for its allies and friends," said James Lilley . . . who served as U.S. envoy to China and South Korea under presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

相反，希尔斯的定义现在没有披露的制裁。对于副助理秘书级别或更高的任何人来说，不是，也就是说。以成熟的官僚机构的方式，与安全事务有关的大多数机构都开发了有关其活动的一系列出版物。金博宝更改账户国防部安全研究所发布了最近的间谍案件。1996年5月的发行记录了自1975年以来的所有案例。这是忧郁的阅读。在89例此类案件中，有55名参与人员通常决定试图向苏联出售秘密。只有15个成功地“招募”了15个，只有九个现实生活中的外国特工。几乎没有批次中的“匈奴”。但是，有一个值得注意的情况是，海军情报局的一名平民分析师向简恩（Jane）的出版物提供了机密照片，显示了正在建设的苏联核动力承运人。金博宝更改账户这些照片随后发表在简·《国防周刊》（1984年7月）中。 The employee was sentenced to two years� imprisonment. The Defense Security Institute comments that this was "the first individual convicted under the 1917 Espionage Code for unauthorized disclosure to the press."6

Along with the de facto immunity of senior officials who release classified information, there developed a form of Congressional oversight, beginning with the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, which could and did protect the intelligence community, as it came to be known, and let out a fair amount of information to the public. But in the process, the public also "learns" a good many things that are not so. As Evan Thomas, the author of a recent book on the early days of the CIA, notes in a recent issue of Studies in Intelligence, a publication of the Central Intelligence Agency: "Polls show that nearly 80 percent of Americans believe JFK died as a result of a conspiracy, and about half believe the CIA was somehow involved."7 Secrecy begets suspicion, which can metastasize into belief in conspiracies of the most awful sort.

尽管高级披露机密材料的频率越来越大，但公众的看法并没有错。机密材料的巨大比例仍被分类。这反映了武装部队男女的原则性特征以及各种情报和相关机构。它还反映了保密系统的纯粹维度。一个公平的猜测是，如果仅仅为了重印当天创建的机密文件而为美国发表在美国发表的每一页的报纸的每一页，那将没有足够的空间。反过来，这反映了分类的标准，也就是说national security。

Harold C. Relyea, of the Congressional Research Service, notes that, "A perusal of the Federal statutes indicates thatnational securitysuddenly began to appear with some frequency as the undefined term in laws enacted around the time of U.S. involvement in World War I."8 National defense was not enough; that had been the concern of admirals and generals: dockyards and arsenals and order of battle. This was something more. The world was a far more dangerous place; ideological conflict was as serious as military conflict: indeed, more so, and far more elusive in its details. For the better part of a century the United States would hardly know a moment�s peace of mind. We would gradually see, in Donald L. Robinson�s term, "The Routinization of Crisis Government."9

The decisive moment in this regard was the enactment in 1947 of the National Security Act, which established the unified Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council, the latter a standing committee in the White House designed to deal with emergencies of all sorts. In testifying in support of such legislation before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, James F. Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, was explicit in choosing the term "national security" over "national defense." Unifying the Army and Navy was not nearly enough. Forrestal set out a list of "eight requirements against which to measure any plan for national security":

（1）有组织的外国和军事政策的手段；
（2）组织指导工业动员和将工业动员与国家资源进行调和。

That means in particular that you don�t create military demands beyond your capacity to fill them or that will do injury to other great and urgent demands. And that question of balance, in my view, is one of the most important considerations in war.

****

(3) A more efficient organization for the translation of strategic requirements into requirements for materiel and personnel.
(4) Provisions for the coordination of military and other war budgets.
(5) Adequate means for the elimination of waste and duplication in and between the military departments.
（6）一个为所有政府部门和机构服务的有效协调的情报组织。
(7) An organizational means for fostering scientific research and development within the military departments and among civilian organizations.
(8) Full opportunity of each branch of the military services to develop for its specialized task.10

A succession of post-World War II presidents issued executive orders published in the Federal Register asserting this particular form of regulation, but without defining it. Truman in 1951:

Classified security information。The term "classified security information" as used herein means official information the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security, and which is classified for such purpose by appropriate classifying authority.13

Section 1.Classification Categories。Official information which requires protection in the interests of national defense shall be limited to three categories of classification, which in descending order of importance shall carry one of the following designations: Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. No other designation shall be used to classify defense information. . . . 14

Section 1.Security Classification Categories。Official information or material which requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of the national defense or foreign relations of the United States (hereinafter collectively termed "national security") shall be classified in one of three categories, namely "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," depending upon the degree of its significance to national security. No other categories shall be used to identify official information or material as requiring protection in the interest of national security, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.15

Definitions。For purposes of this order: (A) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.16

But succinctness is not the same as clarity. Under these executive orders, "national security" is in the eyes of the "appropriate classifying authority." Of which there are at present roughly 5,300 persons within the Federal Government with the authority to classify "originally," but an estimated two million additional persons in the Government who then can classify "derivatively" by citing already-classified documents or by using "classification guides" prepared by their agencies, and another one million in private industry with such ability.17

A third and final proposition is that secrecy, unless carefully attended to, is a source of consider-able sorrow in government. That there can be a need for it, none should dispute. The Framers so provided in Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy. . . .

但是，正如约瑟夫的故事所写Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States，要求保存期刊的条款的目的是“确保立法机关诉讼的宣传，以及成员对各自选民的通讯责任。” 18 18

因此，从一开始，我们就遇到了公众认识的权利与某些情况下的政府需求之间不可避免的紧张关系。19Relyea观察到：“理想情况下，政府持有的所有信息属于政府的所有信息属于公民。” 20然而，这可能非常符合相同公民的利益，即某些信息通常无法获得，并且在成熟的民主身份以偏爱。只有该系统进行审查。

However, secrecy can confer a form of power without responsibility, about which democratic societies must be vigilant. A disturbing instance occurred after the discovery, beginning with the Army Security Agency�s code-breaking in 1946, of a most considerable Soviet espionage apparat in the United States, including, by all the evidence, senior officials of the United States Government. The person who most needed to know this was the President of the United States. The issue was national security and he was Commander-in-Chief.

It would appear, however, that President Truman was not told. In their superb account of these events, VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957, published by the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency (in connection with a major October 1996 conference on VENONA), Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner write:

Truman�s repeated denunciations of the charges against Hiss, White, and others--all of whom appear under covernames in decrypted messages translated before he left office in January 1953--suggest that Truman either was never briefed on the Venona program or did not grasp its significance. Although it seems odd that Truman might not have been told, no definitive evidence has emerged to show he was. In any event, Truman always insisted that Republicans had trumped up the loyalty issue and that wartime espionage had been insignifi-cant and well contained by American authorities.21

Benson and Warner continue:

The long spate of prosecutions and loyalty hearings coincided with, and helped heighten, the atmosphere of suspicion and accusations now known as McCarthyism. Republicans in Congress were echoing widespread sentiment when they criticized the Truman administration for its failure to prevent Commu-nism from conquering Eastern Europe and China. "Softness" on Communism abroad was portrayed by Republicans as the corollary of laxness at home. Suspicions that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had neglected internal security fed charges of a Democratic-led coverup of the wartime Amerasia affair, as well as Eisenhower administration Attorney General Herbert Brownell�s 1953 accusation that then President Truman had ignored FBI warnings about Harry Dexter White in 1946. Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy and allies exploited this confusion and rancor, blaming Communists in the State Department for "losing" China and accusing Federal workers of disloyalty on flimsy pretexts.

保留翻译信息的隐性决定为该国带来了政治和社会价格。关于美国苏联间谍活动范围的辩论在不利于公共领域的可靠信息中两极化。反共主义者怀疑某些间谍（也许包括美国政府所知道的一些间谍）在整个中被犯错。另一方面，那些批评政府的忠诚运动是一种过度反应的人，想知道是否有些被告被替罪羊。他们似乎感觉到公众没有被告知有关朱利叶斯·罗森伯格和朱迪思·科普隆等嫌疑人的调查的全部真相。然而，鉴于当时的国际局势以及政府所知道的，继续保密是不合逻辑的。随着朝鲜战争的愤怒和与苏联战争的前景，军事和情报领导人几乎可以肯定地相信，美国在苏联获得的任何加密优势都太有价值了，即使已经知道莫斯科已经知道了。.22

分享或扣留信息的决定可能是 - 是一个很高的个人和政治，或者纯粹是专业的。中央情报机构直到1952年才得知Venona。克格勃电缆表明，第二次世界大战中的战略服务办公室（OSS）已被苏联特工彻底渗透。由于中央情报局被广泛认为是OSS的继任者，因此陆军和联邦调查局在分享他们的秘密时非常谨慎。这是一个不可避免的问题。但是，当出于个人或政治原因拒绝秘密信息时，民主就会处于危险之中。

__________________
1 Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia (New York: Roosevelt Memorial Association, 1941). "Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star," 1 October 1917, 8.
2 Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, with an introduction by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956; reprint, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1996), 26.
3 The term "VENONA" is an arbitrary codeword which describes more than 2,900 Soviet diplomatic telegrams sent between 1940 and 1948 and the efforts by the United States Government to decode the messages and to identify Soviet agents mentioned therein. Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), vii-viii.
4 Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xxvi.
5 Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., "The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information," Columbia Law Review 73, no. 5 (May 1973), 930.
6 U.S. Department of Defense Security Institute, Recent Espionage Cases: Summaries and Sources (Rich-mond: 1996), 12.
7 Evan Thomas, "A Singular Opportunity: Gaining Access to CIA�s Records," Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 23.
8 Harold C. Relyea, "National Security and Information," Government Information Quarterly 4, no. 1 (1987): 16.
9 Donald L. Robinson, "The Routinization of Crisis Government," Yale Review 63 (Winter 1974): 161.
10 Relyea, "National Security and Information," 17, quoting Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), 578-79.
11 Relyea, "National Security and Information," 18.
12 Ibid., 17.
13 President, Executive Order 10290, "Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States," Federal Register 16, no. 188 (27 September 1951): 9797.
14 President, Executive Order 10501, "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States," Federal Register 18, no. 220 (10 November 1953): 7049.
15 President, Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," Federal Register 37, no. 48 (10 March 1972): 5209.
16 President, Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," Federal Register 60, no. 76 (20 April 1995): 19825.
17 These estimated figures were supplied by the Information Security Oversight Office, which issues an annual report on classification decisions. See Information Security Oversight Office, 1995 Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Information Security Oversight Office, 1996). "Derivative" classifiers are responsible for 94 percent of all classification decisions.
18 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1891; reprint, William S. Hein, 1994), 609-10.
19 Secrecy was present at the creation. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 met in closed session. Before final adjournment, in answer to an inquiry by George Washington, the presiding officer, the Conven-tion resolved "that he retain the Journal and other papers subject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution." Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1934), xi.
20 Harold C. Relyea, The Evolution of Government Information Security Classification Policy: A Brief Overview (1775-1973) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 11 September 1973), 1.
21 Benson and Warner, VENONA, xxiv.
22 Ibid., xxix.

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