## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff.

Civil No. 10-765

VS.

June 15, 2011

ISHMAEL JONES. A pen name

Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

MOTIONS HEARING

THE HONORABLE GERALD BRUCE LEE BEFORE:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**APPEARANCES:** 

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY

BY: KEVIN MIKOLASHEK, ESQ.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICÉ BY: MARCIA BERMAN, ESQ.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY: ANNA PECKAM

FOR THE DEFENDANT: LECLAIR RYAN

BY: LAURIN MILLS, ESQ.

C. MATTHEW HAYNES, ESQ.

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR

U.S. District Court

401 Courthouse Square, 5th Floor

Alexandria, VA 22314 (703)501-1580

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(Thereupon, the following was heard in open
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    court at 10:04 a.m.)
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                THE CLERK: 1:10 civil 765. United States of
 3
    the America versus Ishmael Jones, et al.
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                Would counsel please note your appearances
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    for the record.
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                THE COURT: Good morning.
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                MR. MILLS: Good morning, Your Honor. Laurin
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    Mills and Matt Haynes on behalf of Mr. Jones.
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                THE COURT: Good morning.
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                MR. MIKOLASHEK: Good morning, Your Honor.
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    Kevin Mikolashek from the U.S. Attorney on behalf of the
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    United States. Joining me, Your Honor, is Anna Peckam
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    from the Agency. Also joining me is a Marcie Berman from
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    the DOJ civil division.
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                Ms. Berman has been admitted pro hac vice and
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    with the Court's permission will be delivering the
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    arguments in this case.
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                THE COURT: All right. Ms. Berman, you may
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    proceed.
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                It's always helpful at the outset to tell me
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    what the issue is.
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                MS. BERMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor.
                                                       Good
23
    morning.
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                THE COURT: Good morning.
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MS. BERMAN: The issue on the Government's motion today is whether there are any material facts in dispute precluding summary judgment as to Mr. Jones' liability for breaching his secrecy agreement, and the answer to that question is no.

It is uncontroverted in this case that Mr. Jones signed a secrecy agreement that required him to submit his manuscript for prepublication review and that required him not to publish it unless and until he received the Agency's written approval.

It is also uncontroverted that Mr. Jones submitted a manuscript to the prepublication review process and that the Agency denied him permission to publish the manuscript.

THE COURT: What remedy, if any, did he have following the denial by the Agency of his request for publication?

MS. BERMAN: I'm sorry. What was the beginning of your question?

THE COURT: What remedy, if any, did Mr. Jones have when the Agency denied his request for permission to publish his book?

MS. BERMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Jones had the remedy of coming into federal court and seeking judicial review of that PRB decision. That is a remedy that has

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been in existence since the *Marchetti* case, and he 1 clearly had it available to him, and he did not pursue 2 it. 3 THE COURT: So, is there any question that he 4 went on and published the manuscript? 5 There is no question that he MS. BERMAN: 6 went ahead and published the manuscript. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MS. BERMAN: That's correct. That is 9 completed admitted. 10 In fact, in the book itself, Mr. Jones boosts 11 about the fact that he published it against the expressed 12 denial of approval from the Agency. So, it's definitely 1.3 not in dispute. 14 Mr. Jones' defenses in this case that he has 15 raised are meritless. Whether the book contains 16 classified information is irrelevant to Mr. Jones' 17 liability for breaching his contract. 18 THE COURT: Does the agreement require 19 nondisclosure of only classified information? Doesn't 20 the law require you not disclose classified information? 21 MS. BERMAN: Your Honor, the cases that have 22 held that have based it on the author's First Amendment 23 rights. It's not a contractual obligation.

It's -- there's nothing in the agreement that

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requires the Government to only deny approval of classified information. That's a First Amendment right that the courts have found to exist for the authors.

And so, Mr. Jones' argument that he's raised, his defense that the Government breached the contract first by denying permission of what he claims to be unclassified information is absolutely meritless.

There's nothing in the contract that requires that. All the cases have held it's a First Amendment right. All of those courts would have been required by the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance to find it in the contract if it existed rather than to reach out and base their decisions on the First Amendment.

And, a further reason for rejecting this defense, Your Honor, is that it really would nullify the force and effect of the secrecy agreement and be entirely contrary to the *Snepp* case. Because if this defense exists, then an author can simply submit a manuscript for a prepublication review, get in -- once it's denied, the author would -- could contend, like Mr. Jones is doing here, that that's a complete defense and excuses compliance with the secrecy agreement.

The author would go ahead, publish the book. You'd have the unauthorized disclosure of potentially classified information that the courts have held, you

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know, can't happen. And there would be -- and the United States would not be able to even sue for breach of contract because, as Mr. Jones is claiming, it would be a complete defense. And so that defense should definitely be rejected.

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Your Honor, so the essential facts here are uncontroverted, and the harm to the Government is also uncontroverted.

You know, in the *Snepp* case, the Court found that the Government had been irreparably harmed by the unauthorized publication of Mr. Snepp's book.

And here, you know, we rely on that holding. We also submitted a declaration establishing the harm in this case. And in fact, the harm is clearer here than it was in *Snepp* because here we have a covert officers whose affiliation with the Government, with the CIA remains classified to this day, who published a book about his experiences, you know, as an officer operating under what he called deep cover when the CIA expressly denied him permission to do so.

THE COURT: All right, I think I understand your position.

MS. BERMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the other side and I'll give you a chance to respond.

MR. MILLS: Good morning, again, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. MILLS: Your Honor, the issue in this case is whether the Government can enforce a contract that it breached first. And the rule under Virginia law and under federal law is that it cannot.

That is a legitimate defense to the contract, and he has a First Amendment right to be able to publish nonclassified information.

He did not waive his First Amendment rights by entering into this agreement. And the secrecy agreement itself, which is Exhibit A to the complaint, I refer the Court to the final paragraph -- the final sentence of paragraph eleven which says, "Nothing in this agreement prevents -- constitutes a waiver on any part of any possible defense I may have in connection with either civil or criminal proceedings which may be brought against me".

So, there is a no waiver provision of any defense. Prior breach is an unquestionable defense under Virginia law --

THE COURT: What do you say is the prior breach, Mr. Mills?

MR. MILLS: What happened here, Your Honor, is that Mr. Jones is a man who spent his entire career in

the government, in the Marines and then 15 years as a 1 covert officers. This is a guy who follows the rules. 2 THE COURT: My question was what was the 3 breach? 4 MR. MILLS: The breach was, he went 5 through -- unlike *Snepp* and *Marchetti*, he went through 6 7 the prepublication review process for 18 months. submitted his manuscript multiple times. And if I may --8 THE COURT: And my understanding is that they gave it back to him with some feedback and he made 10 another submission. Is that right? 11 MR. MILLS: He made multiple submissions and 12 this is the final feedback. And if I can ask the court 1.3 security officer to hand this up. This is the -- this is 14 the final feedback he got from the Government. 15 THE COURT: So, is it your view that when he 16 was unhappy with the response he had a right to publish 17 That was the end of the process? 18 MR. MILLS: No, that's not what happened 19 here. 2.0 THE COURT: No, my question was very precise. 21 He had a right to come into federal court to challenge 22 the Agency's denial of prepublication; is that right? 23 MR. MILLS: That's certainly one of his 24 option. 2.5

THE COURT: That was a legal right he had, is 1 that right? 2 MR. MILLS: That's correct. 3 THE COURT: He did not exercise it? 4 MR. MILLS: No, he exercised his option. 5 This is a contract. This is a contractual agreement. 6 7 It's the same -- he has the same right if you hired someone to paint your house. 8 THE COURT: This is not like painting your house. 10 So you're saying that he submitted for 11 prepublication review multiple times. He was unhappy 12 with the result. 1.3 Rather than complete the process by bringing 14 a lawsuit in federal court, he unilaterally made the 15 decision to release the book on his own; is that right? 16 MR. MILLS: I think after 18 months of going 17 through the process, with them denying him the right to 18 publish anything but footnotes, as you'll see in the 19 exhibit I handed up and going six months through an 20 appeal process where the Government's own regulations say 21 they're supposed to complete it in a month, he exercised 22 his rights under the First Amendment to publish this. 23 THE COURT: So, then your view is that the 24 First Amendment is self executing, that covert agents can 2.5

make their own judgment to publish despite the Agency's 1 denial of that request while they're in the process of 2 reviewing the publication; is that right? 3 MR. MILLS: Your Honor, he takes a risk by 4 doing that. And --5 THE COURT: Well, all agents take a risk by 6 7 doing that, don't they? MR. MILLS: That's correct and --8 THE COURT: So then the agreement would have no effect if the effect of it could be that the agent on 10 their own could just decide to release the book; is that 11 right? 12 MR. MILLS: That's not true, Your Honor. 1.3 THE COURT: Well, help me with what was the 14 Agency supposed to do under this circumstance where he 15 unilaterally released the book. There was no chance now 16 to further review it, to give him any additional 17 feedback? So, what was the Agency to do now? 18 MR. MILLS: The Agency should do exactly what 19 it's doing here. Is that if it thinks that he -- that 20 he -- that they denied him the right to publish 21 legitimately classified information, they have one --22 they have two choices. They can prosecute him criminally 23

because it's a crime to do that. Or second they can do

what they're doing here in an attempt to impose a

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constructive trust. And so, they can do that.

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If he had gone to federal court, we would be having the same issue we're having now, justify whether it's classified or not. When --

THE COURT: Well, it is your view that the secrecy agreement only affects classified information?

MR. MILLS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Only classified information?

MR. MILLS: The way the secrecy agreement is written is a little bit convoluted. It say you can't publish in derogation of an executive order that is listed in there.

Now, I can't find the executive order anywhere. I think the executive order is classified. But every case that's ever talked about it has said that you can only published classified information.

But, you can only --

THE COURT: Say it again.

MR. MILLS: The executive order referenced in the secrecy agreement says you can't publish anything that's in violation of this executive order.

I have not been able to find online anywhere this executive order, and the Government has never submitted it as part of the papers in this. So, I believe the executive order itself is classified, but I

can't swear to that.

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But, the way the courts have interpreted this agreement it's been multiple times, is that the Government can only deny him the right to publish what's classified. And, in fact, that's what the Agency's own regulations say.

THE COURT: All right. Well, in this case, there's no dispute about the fact that he submitted the item for prepublication review; is that right?

MR. MILLS: That's correct.

THE COURT: And there's no dispute of fact that he decided to publish it without Agency permission.

MR. MILLS: That's correct. After 18 --

THE COURT: All right. So, this is a pure legal question then on the issue of your defense, that is whether the Government breached the agreement by failing to approve of his request to publish his manuscript.

MR. MILLS: No, I think it's a factual issue about whether the -- whether the -- whether anything in this very long book was legitimately classified. And, we have more than enough facts to get to a jury on that issue of a bad faith denial here because we have multiple denials. He comes back and says tell me what's classified. I will take it out. They say you can't publish any of it other than a couple of footnotes and

harmless anecdotes.

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You can open this book to any page in the book and you can't find anything that's remotely classified. This is a book that is --

THE COURT: How would I know that? How would I know what's classified and what's not? How would the jury know that?

MR. MILLS: The -- the jury -- you know -- I'll give you an example.

THE COURT: If you would answer my question it would be very helpful. How would the jury know what's classified or what's not?

MR. MILLS: Because it's obvious from the context of the book. He's talking about an excursion he has to a bar in Bangkok with a friend of his. There's nothing remotely classified about it. He talks about a --

THE COURT: I understand what you just said, but as a judge who has had cases involving classified information, I'm sure you realize that there is the issue of classified documents. And then there's also the issue of revealing means and methods of intelligence gathering. Are you familiar with that doctrine as well?

MR. MILLS: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, would you agree that a covert

agent who has contacts with an operative in a foreign 1 country revealing his or her identity and the identity of 2 others that they're interacting with in a covert 3 intelligence gathering operation might expose that 4 individual's family, not the agent, but the person that 5 they're dealing with to some personal risk? Would you 6 7 agree with that? MR. MILLS: I think in the right context, I 8 do, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Well, let me do this. I think I 10 understand your position. 11 If -- your argument is that, one, that the 12 Agency breached the agreement by not approving the book, 13 correct? 14 MR. MILLS: Correct. 15 THE COURT: All right. I think I understand 16 your position. 17 MR. MILLS: I'd like to make just a couple 18 more quick points. 19 THE COURT: If you would just sum up, it 20 would be very helpful to me. 21 MR. MILLS: Yes. This isn't the first in 22 this line of cases. In the *Snepp* and *Marchetti* cases, 23 both of which were brought in this court and both of 24

which involved factual scenarios where the agents didn't

even bring it to the prepublication review board, they
were allowed discovery to present their defenses.

And in fact, in *Snepp*, not only were they allowed what the Court characterized as extensive discovery, we had live testimony from Stansfield Turner and Richard Colby, the current and former CIA director in that case on facts not nearly as egregious as you have here.

So the Government is asking you to do something that has never been done before. We are entitled to discovery to assert a defense recognized under Virginia law.

Second, the Government hasn't met their burden. All they have done -- they have submitted an affidavit from a woman named Mary Ellen Cole. She's not tendered as an expert. She's not been qualified as an expert for anything. All she has done is assert nonexpert opinion testimony and speculation and basically crib quotes from the *Snepp* case as a basis for showing irreparable harm.

If the Government is going to establish liability and it has to do by clear and convincing evidence here, it has to put on at least some admissible evidence.

And the Mary Ellen Cole affidavit is not even

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admissible, Your Honor. It is nothing but nonexpert speculation, and it's not admissible. We're entitled to discovery, to assert our defense.

The Government breached first. This is an egregious case where they repeatedly denied him. They sat on this appeal for six months during an election year. And he made a gutsy call and took a risk to publish this on the basis that he knew there was nothing classified in it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further?

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MS. BERMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Excuse me, just a few points in summary.

There are no material facts in dispute here on which to conduct discovery. The -- Mr. Jones is not entitled to discovery unless there are any material facts on which he would be conducting them.

The harm in this case is self evident. And the Cole declaration is perfectly admissible, and she is perfectly competent to testify in the matters that she testified.

Your Honor, Mr. Jones' counsel referred to Mr. Jones taking a risk -- assuming the risk by publishing his book. Well, respectfully, the risk is to the Government, and the Government's -- and to the

release of classified sensitive information. That's what he took. And he should not be able to execute -- to put that risk to the Government without any consequences.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let the record reflect this matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability. And this is a case as we've heard involving the publication of a manuscript that was not approved by the Agency in prepublication review as required by the secrecy agreement.

So the issue is whether the Court should grant the Government's motion for summary judgment as to liability where the plaintiff signed a secrecy agreement which is attached to the complaint as Government Exhibit A.

And, the Agency required under the secrecy agreement that the plaintiff obtain written permission from the Central Intelligence Agency's publication review board prior to publishing any work. And the plaintiff did not secure Agency approval prior to having his book published.

The facts are not in dispute, it seems to me. Plaintiff admits that he was signatory to the secrecy

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agreement. He did prepare a manuscript which he submitted to the publication review board multiple times, and he was given feedback from the Agency about what was publishable and what was not.

His opinion is that the Agency's refusal to approve publication of his book was unreasonable and deprived him of his rights under the First Amendment, and he decided to publish the book without securing Agency approval.

I don't think that this is really a very difficult question. I think the *Snepp* case would control here. It seems to me that where he signed a binding secrecy agreement that prevented from publishing any materials prior to receiving written consent, that under *Snepp* this liability for the Government has been established.

His signing a secrecy agreement does not violate his First Amendment rights. And his claim that the Court should deny summary judgment because of genuine issue of fact about whether the plaintiff's counterclaim alleging First Amendment violations creates a genuine issue of fact for trial.

It seems to me that the judgment that he exercised at some risk, according to his own counsel, to publish a matter without securing Agency approval does

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not demonstrate that the Government breached the contract first because plaintiff acknowledges that under the process in effect that once the prepublication board denied his request for publication, that he had a remedy and that remedy was to come to U.S. District Court and to pursue a claim to have the Court determine if the Agency's withholding of permission was unreasonable.

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Not having exercised that right, I do not see how the Government could be held liable for breach when they were pursuing the process as set forth in the agreement.

So, I am first of all holding that the *Snepp* case controls here. They're both -- *Snepp* was an agent and so is this plaintiff. They both signed secrecy agreements. They both failed to adhere to them knowing what they were -- the agreement said.

I don't think any discovery is necessary because the plaintiff admits that he published without the permission.

And the issue of whether the Government breached first because of some sham appellate review, the process was never over. And, his judgment to go forward without the completing -- pursuing his remedies before the court was the breach. It was not the Government's breach. The Government was carrying out it's agreement.

So, for those reasons, it is the -- the case is also very similar to Marchetti, but I don't think we needs to go as far as Marchetti. I think that Snepp is sufficient. Motion for summary judgment for the Government is granted, and the case will be dismissed as it relates to his claim, counterclaim. So, partial summary judgment liability is granted. What remains to be done is the issue of what remedy the Government is entitled to because of the breach of secrecy agreement. Thank you. You all are excused. (Proceeding concluded at 10:24 a.m.) 2.5

## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Renecia Wilson, an official court reporter for the United State District Court of Virginia, Alexandria Division, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had upon the motions in the case of United States of America vs. Ishmael Jones, a pen name.

I further certify that I was authorized and did report by stenotype the proceedings and evidence in said motions, and that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 to 21, inclusive, constitute the official transcript of said proceedings as taken from my shorthand notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto subscribed my name this <u>29th</u> day of <u>June</u>, 2011.

/s/ Renecia Wilson, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter