国会纪录：2004年9月30日（参议院）第384号修正案No.3839（旨意：与公开披露情报资金有关）史蒂文斯先生。主席先生，我提出了一系列修正案。我想解决浅谈情报资金的披露。主持人。职员将报告。助理立法职员如下：阿拉斯加的参议员[先生史蒂文斯]为自己，华纳先生和Inouye先生提出了一份修正案，编号为3839.第115页，罢工第13页和所有在第116页，第23页所遵循的所有修正案。史蒂文斯先生。主席先生，我将参议院的注意力引导至第115页。这是II。它涉及披露的金额。它涉及每个财政年度授权和拨款的金额。 My amendment follows the recommendation of the administration and, I might add, the intelligence community to think twice before we do this. It may be that we will want to do this after the NID comes into being and we all have a better knowledge of how these funds are going to be handled. This amendment would require a further study of the disclosure of funds that are provided for intelligence programs. The basic need for this amendment rests on the testimony of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin before the Governmental Affairs Committee. He said: I would not go so far as to declassify the numbers for the individual agencies. I think that gives too much opportunity for adversaries to understand how we are moving our money from year to year from technical programs to human source collection and to other objectives. In the administration's statement of policy, the administration is also concerned that the committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the intelligence budget. The [[Page S10030]] legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President and the amounts provided for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence activities. I understand that the committee intends to comply with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with regard to this. But I think it is time we slow down a little bit and respond at least in part to some of the comments of those people who have spent their lifetimes now in our intelligence service. I can tell you that I have not spent my whole lifetime there, but I have spent some 30 years now in terms of watching over the Defense Appropriations Committee and being part of it at least. In terms of being chairman and ranking member, it has been now 23 years. This concerns me greatly because one of the problems of the appropriators is to find ways to have an honest budget but to put the money where the enemies of this country, those who want to do us harm, do not know what our emphasis is way out into the future. I remember when we started transitioning to electronic intelligence and how we traveled from place to place to look at these new satellites and the things they were going to do and got briefings on capacities. Those were developed over a series of years, and they got more complicated as they went along. But the money that was involved was substantial. To have a disclosure of ``we are engaging in an entirely new effort in intelligence'' would be highly unwise. I quote from the second page of the administration statement: The Administration is also concerned that the Committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President, and provided by the Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence activities. I am deeply concerned about some of the problems of how we find a way to maintain the secrets of this country with regard to what we are doing in terms of human intelligence. We are building up human intelligence at the same time as we are changing the utilization of the electronic concept of intelligence. And while I believe the time may come when we can find a way to disclose certain portions of the budget, I have a real resistance to this proposal that says: Congress shall disclose . . . for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. Then it directs the study of disclosure of additional information. We are certainly not opposed to the study. It is the mandate beginning in 2005. We are going to start, for the fiscal year 2006, disclosing these amounts at a time when there is great change in the intelligence community. The whole structure of the intelligence community will be changed by this bill. To start disclosing where money is going is to tell the enemies of this country where our emphasis for the future is. It is the future I am concerned about in terms of disclosure. In the future we set up reserve accounts, and I will be talking about some of those soon. But if we set up reserve accounts, the reserves are classified as reserves because that is where they get the money for innovation and new developments. We don't have to disclose it. We don't have to tell them: Yes, we are going to build new satellites or we are going to build other devices that can listen to transmissions in the air and on the land and under sea. We have a lot of secrets in this country. They are all related to intelligence. Let me repeat that. Every one of our secrets is related to intelligence. They are highly classified. Many of them are known only to the President and a close circle. Part of that circle includes Members of Congress who deal with the very high-level, classified programs of the intelligence services. I urge that the Senate listen to us and listen to the administration and to those who have been involved in these activities. Again, I call to the attention of the Senate that when we returned and found there were a whole series of people who had not been heard on their viewpoints--they wanted to express their concerns--we held a hearing and listened to the intelligence people, who had great, distinguished records in the past. We listened to Secretary Kissinger and a whole series of people who wore our uniform and have been the top officers of our military. To a person, they do not believe we should move this fast on this disclosure item. Let us have the study. We are entirely in favor of the study. But to mandate the disclosure in the bill we will prepare in 2005, I think, is much too early, in view of the changes taking place in the area of intelligence. This is where we are going to start to see if there is any reaction to those who have had experience in the area, to the President, and to those who have reviewed the whole thing. Is the Senate going to listen to these people with some experience and say, OK, let's study it, but not make the judgment first and then study it? This disclosure in the next fiscal year is wrong, until we know what the policies of the NID are and what are going to be the policies of Congress and how we are going to handle this appropriation. It appears to me that the result of this bill will be to fractionalize the intelligence appropriation, anyway. Part of it is going to go to the Department of Defense; part will be split up into several agencies within the NID. I think we ought to know first what we are doing before we decide what we are going to disclose so we can maintain the secrecy that is required in order to prepare for the future. This is not something to correct mistakes of the past; this is something to prevent making mistakes in the future. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized. Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. He is an extraordinary Senator, with many years of experience. I do want to assure the Senator from Alaska that, contrary to the implication in his statement, the committee did not adopt the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to declassify the aggregate budget totals of all the agencies that make up the national intelligence program. We did not adopt that recommendation of the 9/11 Commission because, based on our hearings and the testimony of our witnesses, we concluded that that goes too far and might well reveal information that would be helpful to those who would do us harm. The only declassification in the Collins-Lieberman bill is the top line aggregate amount for the entire national intelligence program. It does not declassify the specific appropriations amount distributed to agencies such as the National Security Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the CIA, even though the 9/11 Commission recommended declassification at that level. Declassification, the top line, only that aggregate figure which has been estimated in the newspapers many, many times, I believe, will improve congressional and public oversight of the intelligence budget. It will help us with better decisionmaking on resource distribution, and it will make the structure and the management of the intelligence community more transparent. We asked our witnesses, including the Acting Director of the CIA, John McLaughlin, his views. And he, like most of our other expert witnesses, told us that as long as the specifics of the intelligence budget remain classified, there was no harm to national security to declassify just that top line aggregate amount. I think we struck the right balance in this regard. What we did is we included a study asking the national intelligence director to report back to us--to the Congress--on whether further declassification was appropriate. But the only step we took was that top line aggregate amount. If you don't declassify that in order to have a separate appropriation, then you end up, I fear, with the status quo--the money going through DOD accounts once again. That greatly weakens the budget authority of the national intelligence director. Again, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. I wanted to make clear what our bill does and what it doesn't do, because I think we have reached the right decision. Mr. STEVENS. Will the chairman yield for a question? [[Page S10031]] Ms. COLLINS. Yes. Mr. STEVENS. I am looking at the bill. The bill says the President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the national intelligence program. Then I go back to the page 6 for the definition of national intelligence programs. It says: Refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; Includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security. That involves five different bills in the appropriations process. We currently put in any one of those five bills a portion of the clandestine activities we are financing with these moneys. So what you are going to tell us is, we no longer can use any portion of those because we are going to disclose the whole amount in every one of those bills. Listen to me. You have not lived with how we have financed the intelligence community. The money is not disclosed. It is put in parts of the budget and you don't know where it is. It rests with Senator Inouye and me, to be honest about it, and we make sure that is what it is. Maybe four people in the House and Senate know where this is. You are telling us to disclose it, without regard to where we put that money--disclose the money that is in each account and it goes into five separate bills. I say that is wrong. Wait until the NID comes into office and have him tell us how we can disclose what should be disclosed to the public. The public should not ask us to disclose this very classified, secret information to protect the future of the country through clandestine activities and acquisitions. I ask the question, does the Senator understand what her bill does? It will disclose the aggregate amount of funds--disclose them all, including the very, very top secret items, which probably three or four people in the White House, a few people in the CIA, or the DIA, and maybe eight people in the Congress would know. Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senator from Alaska to line 16 on page 115, which clearly says that: The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested . . . for the National Intelligence Program. It does not say that we are requiring disclosure of the appropriations for the elements that make up the national intelligence program. Mr. STEVENS. It says: The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community. Both authorized and appropriated. That is on page 116, line 9. Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say respectfully to the Senator from Alaska that that refers to the study on whether there should be further declassification. It does not refer to the disclosure. The disclosure is only--and it is very clearly stated--of the aggregate amount of the appropriations for the national intelligence program. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut. Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this is a very important discussion about another critical part of this bill. Obviously, the Senator from Alaska has had an extraordinary record of leadership in this and so many areas of the Senate. He knows the subject matter. He has lived with it a long time. I understand what we are proposing represents change. He is quite sincerely concerned about it from the point of view of our national security interests. I most of all want to assure him we spent a lot of time thinking about this. We did not just go for the 9/11 Commission recommendation. The 9/11 Commission recommended that we disclose not only the bottom line of the national intelligence budget but, in fact, the budget of every single agency. Their argument, as I am sure the Senator from Alaska knows, was that, one, the public has a right to know. Of course, we have to balance it-- what we disclose to our enemies--against national security, but if the budgets of those constituent agencies were out in the public, then maybe over the years the public and more Members of Congress might have decided we were not putting enough money into human intelligence, CIA, et cetera, and that we were putting too much into signal intelligence and that we would not have had the shortfall many people think we have now. In our committee, Senator Collins and I decided we were not ready to make that leap of disclosing the budgets of the 15 constituent agencies of the intelligence community because we thought there was some risk involved about signaling the movement of our resources to those who wish us ill. Incidentally, there were some members of the Commission who felt very strongly about the disclosure of the budgets of all the agencies, including some former Members of this Chamber who really feel this was at the heart of it. We did not think so, and that is why we called for the study. We think we have, however, achieved something for asking for the disclosure of the bottom line because at least that tells the taxpayers and all the Members of Congress how much money we are spending for intelligence. In the course of this investigation, I asked some specific questions, obviously in closed settings, about the amount of money we are spending overall and for each individual agency. I was surprised at the answers I got. I think maybe more Members of Congress should ask those questions. But this is what I think we do achieve by having the bottom line disclosed. We are fulfilling a responsibility to the taxpayers to let them know how much money we are spending on intelligence because it is just the bottom line, without giving any particular guidance to our enemies as to where we are putting that money. The second point is, one result of this might be when more Members of Congress and the public see what we are spending on intelligence, which is so critical in the war on terrorism--intelligence is always critical in warfare and even more critical today because of the nature of this enemy which strikes at undefended targets, innocent civilians, and is crazy enough to blow themselves up. So the more we can see and hear and know what they are planning, the more likely we are going to be able to stop them. One conclusion, I say to my friend from Alaska, might be that Members of Congress and the public might conclude we are not spending enough on intelligence if they see the bottom line. Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield? Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes. Mr. STEVENS. The problem is not that, from my point of view. My problem is we are going through a transition and saying for the very first year we are going to be asked to disclose the full amounts appropriated to the whole intelligence community. My amendment strikes all of section 201, in effect. I urge, at the very least, that we strike that provision that requires disclosure in 2005. Let's have the study. I hope the NID will be able to make studies and get back to us sometime next year. But why put on us the requirement that we must collate and take all the moneys going to the intelligence community in 2006 when we are going to be working on that and, at the same time, he is making his adjustments in the whole community? My effort is to protect the clandestine amounts, protect the amounts that are necessary for security. Why can we not at least agree to make it just the study? We all agree on the study. Maybe the Commission is right, and the Senator from Connecticut is wrong and I am wrong. Why don't we have the study and find out what the NID people think is right and then let us act on 2006? Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, it is impossible that he and I can both be wrong. Mr. STEVENS. We have been there before. Mr. LIEBERMAN. We have been there before. Listen, because of who you are and what you stand for, Senator Collins [[Page S10032]] and I will certainly think about this. We think we have struck a good balance in just asking for disclosure of the bottom line, no details, beginning public consideration of what we are spending on intelligence, and this study we ask for in 180 days, 6 months, and then we can make some judgments beyond that. I yield the floor. I thank the Senator. This is an important discussion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia. Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe I am a cosponsor of the amendment. Mr. STEVENS. Yes, Mr. President, the Senator is, along with Senator Inouye. Mr. WARNER. This is a debate we had many years on the floor of the Senate. It has been a debate we have talked about so many times, and there has been a consistency in the voting in the Senate to recognize the wisdom not to release the budgets. As yet, with all due respect to our managers and others, I have not heard an absolutely convincing argument to turn back at least several decades that this has been an issue of debate on this floor. What is it in the public interest or, most importantly, our national security interests that requires us at this time to reverse positions that have been taken by this Chamber, together with the other body, over the period of several decades that I have been privileged to serve here? My concern is that this world today is so rapidly changing, and with the advancement of electronics and so many devices to determine what we in an open society are doing, why put the roadmap on the table for all to begin to search? It has been my experience that if you put out half a loaf, it will be followed by a request to get the other half of the loaf. Were this provision to prevail, we would be back here in a very short time, some colleagues with the best of intentions, saying: Why don't you put it all out? Why should we have any of it secret? That, coupled with the fact I have in my lifetime never seen a period where there is greater uncertainty about the security of this country--because of the progression of weapons of mass destruction, because of the progression of terrorism, and the proliferation of individuals who are willing to give up their lives to do harm in this country and other parts of the world--I just do not think at this point in time, without following, I think, the sage advice of our distinguished President pro tempore, we need to reverse what this Chamber has considered and decided upon year after year that I have been here. So I urge colleagues to support the amendment of the senior Senator from Alaska. I intend to strongly do so. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I heard the last part of the comments of the Senator from Connecticut. I suggest we put this aside and see if we can come to some conclusion. The Senator makes a good suggestion of putting a time limit on the study and getting us to the point where we might be able to follow this suggestion by the fiscal year 2006 bill. That bill will, in all probability, move through the Congress, I would say, by the May, June, and July timeframe. With the 180 days, I am afraid the Senator may be referring to the start of the fiscal year. That bill goes through the House and Senate. These are the first bills--Defense and Homeland Security, and Intelligence. Obviously; It is going to be in the first three without any question. So the 180 days is going to be June, and this bill will be moving through the House before that time. We probably could catch it before they finish in terms of if there is a recommendation we need, but I would urge my colleagues to consider repealing the requirement for disclosure and say that we urge the NID to give us the earliest possible date for that disclosure, when it could be done in the national interest. We are putting a lot of control and power in this person. Let's have him tell us when and if it should happen rather than direct it now. Make the study and leave it up to him to recommend to us, at least to what extent we should disclose, commencing in fiscal year 2006. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut. Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to read a few sentences from the 9/11 Commission Report on page 416 which I think are relevant. It says: . . . Opponents of declassification argue that America's enemies could learn about intelligence capabilities by tracking the top-line appropriations figure. Yet the top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and methods. . . . Here is a point that one of the members of the Commission, again a former member of this body, made from the 9/11 Commission Report. The U.S. Government readily provides copious information about spending on its military forces, including military intelligence. The intelligence community should not be subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden, it is hard to judge priorities and foster accountability. That is in defense of disclosing the 15 individual agency budgets. I say to the Senator from Alaska, who knows this better than I--and I am honored to serve on the authorizing Armed Services Committee--we give a fair amount of detail of the budget in terms of military programs. Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield? Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes. Mr. STEVENS. Unfortunately, that is not a part of the report. That is a comment after the recommendation. It sort of demonstrates the extent of the knowledge they had about what they were dealing with in the recommendations, because that is not true. We do not disclose the amount we appropriate for defense intelligence. We disclose the amount in the budget that we support defense intelligence agencies with pay, facilities, and offices, but the amounts of their programs are not disclosed. What I am saying to the Senator is, as we approach this, I think there is a growing desire to know how much money we are spending. The Senator may be right. Maybe people want us to spend more. I have wanted to spend more for a long time. Mr. LIEBERMAN. I know that is true. Mr. STEVENS. The problem is people ought to know what they are talking about before they change the system. In these budgets are both moneys for acquisition and for salaries, and somewhere in there is some money that everybody knows, in the intelligence community, where it is and what it is for. In the Defense authorization bill there is a classified portion of that budget. Mr. LIEBERMAN. Sure. Mr. STEVENS. I am not even sure, other than the chairman and ranking member, if the Senator knows what is in there. I am saying so apologetically, but the system that requires secrecy in this country on some things is kept secret. This disclosure prematurely might trigger someone saying ``watch that'' in answering the question, and that would be bad because if they answer the question about what they knew was in there, that would disclose what they did not know was in there. Mr. LIEBERMAN. A final response on this point. The Senator from Alaska says correctly if one looks at the overall budget of a given military agency, it does not tell what they are spending on different programs. So I want to assure the Senator from Alaska that under the committee's proposal, not only do we not talk about what is being spent on specific programs and specific intelligence agencies, we do not talk about what is being spent in those agencies. We talk about the one number, the conglomerate bottom line or top-line number, and I think that only gives a general idea of what we are investing in intelligence, far from any specific information about what we are investing in particular kinds of intelligence, signal, human, image, let alone specific programs. I would not do this if I thought it would jeopardize our national security. In fact, that is why we did not call, as the Commission requested, for disclosure of individual agency budgets because we worried it might, and that is why we are asking for a report from the national intelligence director. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine. Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will quote Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin from our September 8 hearing on this very issue. He said: [[Page S10033]] If there is a separate appropriation for the foreign intelligence program, the national intelligence program, as distinct from the current arrangement where that appropriation is buried in the larger Defense Department bill, I think it would make some sense to declassify the overall number for the foreign intelligence program. That was typical of our witnesses. I also note that the top line has been made public on occasion in the past. It was made public in 1997 and 1998 by the DCI. At this point there are numerous Senators who are asking what the plan is for today and who are trying to catch planes. I ask for the regular order with respect to Lautenberg amendment No. 3802, and I ask unanimous consent that there be 2 minutes on each side prior to a motion to table the amendment. I further ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, it is my understanding that that would set aside the pending amendment and take up that procedure. We would come back to this amendment. Or is there another amendment in the queue by regular order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no other amendment in the queue by regular order. Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. HOLLINGS. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be set aside so I can call up my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [...]