技术与创新

《芯片与科学法》的大胆愿景无法获得所需的资金

05.23.23 | 10分钟阅读 | 文字Matt Hourihan梅利莎·罗伯茨·查普曼(Melissa Roberts Chapman)&马克·穆罗(Mark Muro)

最初于2023年5月17日出版布鲁金斯。

前面的立法成就ssion of Congress have given advocates of more robust innovation and industrial development investments much to be excited about. This is especially true for the bipartisan筹码与科学法(CHIPS), which committed the nation not just to compete with China over industrial policy and talent, but to advance broad national goals such as manufacturing productivity and economic inclusion while ramping up federal investment in science and technology.

最值得注意的是,芯片授权支出上升焦油gets for key anchors of the nation’s innovation ecosystem, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy’s Office of Science, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In that regard, the act’s passage was a breakthrough—including for an expanded focus on基于地点的工业政策

但是,很明显,这一突破正在遭受逆风。尽管有许多政治领导人对该行为的目标的持续支持,但也不是FY 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act也不是Biden administration’s FY 2024 budget requesthave delivered on the intended funding targets. This year’s omnibus funding remained nearly $3 billion short of the authorized levels for research agencies, while the 2024 budget request undershoots agency targets by over $5 billion. And with the debt ceiling crisis coming to a head this month—and桌子上的众议院立法将大大撤销联邦支出- 对实现《芯片和科学法案》对美国竞争力的复兴投资的愿景的几率感到乐观。

取而代之的是,截至目前,《芯片与科学法》范式的交付只能是分数的,并有30亿美元的研究差距(且增加)用于研究的资金差距,而迄今为止资助的五年基于五年的基于五年的愿景的差距不到10%。

如果国家将兑现重新获得创新和基于地点的工业战略的承诺,所有这些都强调了多少工作要做。如果政府要真正遵循其大胆的诺言,领导人需要对筹码的愿景进行充满活力和两党的重新评估。

Chips提供了广泛的创新政策菜单,以支持新的美国竞争力

Recently, Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.), chair of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, rightlypointed outthat the “science” portion of the CHIPS and Science Act (i.e., separate from its subsidies for semiconductor factories) will be “the engine of America’s economic development for decades to come.” One way the act seeks to achieve this is by creating the Directorate for Technology, Innovation and Partnerships at NSF, and focusing it on an evolving set of technological and social priorities (see Tables 1a + 1b). These won’t just drive NSF technology work, but will guide the development of a more concertedwhole-of-government strategy

Table 1a: Key technology focus areas
AI, machine learning, autonomy* 高级通信和沉浸式技术*
Advanced computing, software, semiconductors* Biotechnology*
Quantum information science* 数据存储和管理,分布式分类帐,网络安全
机器人技术,自动化,高级制造 Advanced energy technology, storage, industrial efficiency*
Natural/anthropogenic disaster prevention and mitigation 高级材料科学*
*Also related to Pentagon-identified Defense Critical Technology Area
表1b:社会,国家和地缘战略挑战
U.S. national security Climate change and sustainability
Manufacturing and industrial productivity 获得教育,机会,服务不平等
劳动力发展和技能差距

In light of these priorities, it’s no mistake that Congress placed the NSF, the Energy Department’s Office of Science, NIST, and the Economic Development Administration (EDA) at the core of the “science” portion of the act. The first three agencies are major funders of research and infrastructure for the physical science and engineering disciplines that undergird many of these technology areas. The EDA, meanwhile, is the primary home for place-based initiatives in economic development.

Meanwhile, in keeping with the larger strategy of countering the nation’s science and technology drift, Congress adopted five years of rising “authorizations” for these core innovation agencies. However, it bears remembering that these authorizations are not actual funding, but multiyear funding targets that, if fully funded year by year, would result in an aggregate budget doubling. In short, Congress has declared that the national budget for science and technology should go up, not down, over the next five years.

还值得注意的是,该法案旨在提高许多不同领域的投资,包括:

结果:支持者看到Chips和Science是美国创新工作和生态系统的主要时刻。

Government Appropriations are falling short on CHIPS funding by billions of dollars

Yet for all the act’s valuable programs and focus areas, not all is well. As of now, there have been two rounds of proposed or adopted funding policy for CHIPS research agencies—and the results are mixed to disappointingas details a new funding update on the CHIPS and Science Act from the Federation of American Scientists

第一轮的资金是去年12月通过的2023财年综合计划大会。在那里,NSF,科学办公室和NIST的总拨款总额为27亿美元,低于2023财年的224亿美元的总缺口。

表2:主要研究机构拨款与筹码授权

Chips FY23授权 FY23综合拨款* Difference ($M) 不同之处 (%) CHIPS FY24授权 FY24 OMB预算 Difference ($M) 不同之处 (%)
National Science Foundation $ 11,897 $9,874 ($ 2,023) -17.0% $ 15,647 $11,314 ($4,333) -27.7%
科学办公室 $ 8,902 $ 8,100 ($ 802) -9.0% $9,542 $8,800 ($ 742) -7.8%
国家标准与技术研究院 $1,551 $1,654 $103 6.6% $1,652 $1,632 ($20) -1.2%
总计 $22,351 $19,628 ($ 2,723) -12.2% $ 26,840 $21,746 (5,095美元) -19.0%
Dollars in millions *FY23 omnibus figures include NIST earmarks and supplemental NIST and NSF spending for CHIPS and Science activities

然后,在三月份,在已经打哈欠的资金差距中,白宫发布了2024财年的预算提案。该提议将使三个芯片研究机构进一步落后:51亿美元,比该法案的授权低19%。

In both the omnibus and the budget, NSF funding was the biggest miss. This can be divided into a few segments:

由于NSF和其他机构的这些短缺,联邦科学和创新计划将很难产生Chips设想的变革性影响。

Funding for place-based industrial policy programs is also coming up short

除了减少代理支持外,我们所谓的实际资金“基于地方的工业政策”in the CHIPS and Science Act is also coming up short, by even greater relative margins. Where the agency research funding gaps are a substantial restraint on innovative capacity, the diminished place-based funding is an out-and-out emergency.

这些计划很重要,因为经过多年在各地经济进展不平等之后,国会终于加速了大规模的直接投资解锁欠发达地点和雷吉的创新潜力ons。多亏了其中一些投资,包括一些新的挑战赠款,全国各地的数十名州和地方领导人都将自己投入了雄心勃勃的策略,以建立自己的创新生态系统。

Yet for all of the legitimate excitement and interest of stakeholders in literally every state, the numbers that permit actual implementation are not all good. Looking at several of the most visible new place-based programs, the funding news is so far mixed to outright disappointing.

Table 3: Placed-based innovation authorized in CHIPS and Science Act

程序 What It Does 筹码和科学授权 到目前为止拨款 FY24 OMB预算 Percent of Authorization Funded To Date
EDA区域技术和创新中心 计划授予授予美国全美专注于技术开发,创造就业能力和创新能力的区域技术枢纽 五年中的100亿美元 5亿美元 4850万美元的酌情;强制性40亿美元 5%
EDA Recompete Pilot Program Investments in communications with large prime age (25-54) employment gaps 五年内10亿美元 2亿美元 2亿美元 20%
NSF Regional Innovation Engines 每台发动机最多10年的资金(每次总计约1.6亿美元),以建立一个可翻译使用的研究和劳动力开发的区域生态系统 $3.25 billion* over five years 2亿美元 3亿美元 6%
NIST制造扩展合作伙伴关系 A network of centers in all 50 states and Puerto Rico to help small and medium-sized manufacturers compete $575 million 1.88亿美元 $277 million 68%
NIST Manufacturing USA 程序office for nationwide network of public-private manufacturing innovation institutes $ 20100万美元 5100万美元 $98 million 53%
总计(包括MEP和M-USA FY23授权) 150亿美元 $1.1 billion 8%
* The NSF Regional Innovation Engines is assumed to have received 50% of a $6.5 billion CHIPS and Science Act provision that also authorized the Translation Accelerators program

Besides these new CHIPS programs, two established mainstays of place-based development in the manufacturing domain are also facing funding challenges.

Overall, the current and likely future funding shortfalls facing many of the nation’s authorized place-based investments appear set to diminish the reach of these programs.

Should funding for critical technology areas be mandatory?

《筹码与科学法》对美国创新和基于地点的工业政策建立了令人信服的愿景,但是这种愿景已经受到严格的资金的阻碍。而现在,迫在眉睫的债务上限危机只会使情况变得更糟。

也没有任何银子弹来解决这种情况。不知何故,国会必须保持对美国经济和军事安全的长期愿景,并找到政治意愿,以使美国创新者,公司和地区所必需的近期财务承诺。

But it’s not just up to Congress. As we’ve seen, the White House budget also contains sizable funding shortfalls for research agencies. Federal agencies and the Office of Management and Budget will be formulating their FY 2025 budgets this summer in preparation for release next year. As they do so, they should prioritize long-term U.S. competitiveness across strategic technology areas and geographies more so than they have to date.

最后,虽然上面针对区域技术和创新中心计划的强制性支出建议今年可能无法获得任何地方,但作为科学和创新投资的机制,强制性资金原则上并不是一个坏主意。这也不是决策者第一次提出这样的想法:奥巴马政府试图积极地利用强制性支出来补充其基本的研究和发展要求,而国会领导人也在近年来提出了这一想法。鉴于科学和创新的长期性质,持续和可预测的支持将是一个福音,强制性资金流可以提供急需的稳定性。

鉴于所有这些,这一时刻可能正在接近尝试再次利用创新计划的强制性资金。随着自由裁量支出的上限,两党对筹码技术议程的支持仍然存在,考虑到强制性融资措施的时候可能已经到来了。这样的措施(例如“关键的技术和国家安全基金”结构化)将大大有助于确保对经济和军事安全中关键技术的持续稳定,稳定的支持。这正是Chips对半导体行业提供的支持,这远非唯一受到全球竞争的高级技术部门。

In short, as we enter the summer months and face down a looming budget crisis, Congress should do for the “science” part of its watershed bill what it did with the “chips” part. Leaders in Washington must move now to ensure that we can deliver on the commitments set forth in the CHIPS and Science Act—all of them.