Amidst Nuclear Saber Rattling, New START Treaty Demonstrates Importance
Shortly after Russian military forces invaded Ukraine and President Vladimir Putinsaid他已经下令在高战警上命令俄罗斯核力量 - 显然是为了阻止美国直接参与，美国谴责核军刀ratt声明是“不可接受的”ling but refused to respond in kind, the two vehemently opposed countries did something amazing: They exchanged factual information about the status of their strategic nuclear forces as required under the New START Treaty.
昨天，美国国务院publishedthe unclassified bits of that data exchange. It shows that both countries were below the limits set by the treaty for deployed strategic nuclear forces: 1,550 warheads attributed to 700 deployed long-range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.
At a time when direct contacts are being curtailed, antagonism runs high, and trust completely lost, it is nothing short of amazing that Russia and the United States continue to abide by the New START treaty and exchange classified information as if nothing had happened.
The reason is clear. Despite their differences, they both have a keen interest in keeping the other country’s long-range nuclear forces in check.
美国和俄罗斯在其总军事库存中拥有的核弹头远远超过了在新开始时在发射器上部署的核弹头。如果条约消失了，双方都可以大幅度地增加准备在短时间发射的核弹头数量。美国在俄罗斯的储存中有近2,000枚战略弹头，大约有一半。这样的增长将是极大的稳定和危险的，尤其是在欧洲和俄罗斯在前所未有的制裁的压力下屈服的全面战争。
数据显示的内容
The latest set of data shows that as of March 1, 2022, the United States and Russia both were in compliance with their obligations under the New START treaty not to operate more than 800 total strategic launchers, no more than 700 deployed strategic launchers, and no more than 1,550 warheads attributed to those deployed launchers.
Combined the two countries possessed a total of 1,561 accountable strategic missiles and heavy bombers, of which 1,212 launchers were deployed with 2,989 attributable warheads. That is a slight increase in the number of deployed launchers and warheads compared with six months ago (note: the combined warhead number is actually about 100 too high because each deployed bomber is counted as one weapon even though neither country’s bombers carry weapons under normal circumstances).
Compared with September 2021, the data shows the two countries combined increased the total number of strategic launchers by 19, increased combined deployed strategic launchers by 20, and increased the combined deployed strategic warheads by 142. Of these numbers, only the “19” is real; the other changes reflect natural fluctuations as launchers move in and out of maintenance or are being upgraded.
In terms of the total effect of the treaty, the data shows the two countries since February 2011 combined have cut 428 strategic launchers from their arsenals, reduced deployed strategic launchers by 191, and reduced the number of deployed strategic warheads by 348. However, it is important to remind that this warhead reduction is but a fraction (just over 4 percent) of theestimated 8,185 warheadsthat remain in the two countries combined nuclear weapons stockpiles (just over 3 percent if counting their total combined inventories of 11,405 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).
美国
The data shows the United States possessing 800 strategic launchers, exactly the maximum number allowed by the treaty, of which 686 are deployed with 1,515 warheads attributed to them. This is an increase of 21 deployed strategic launchers and 126 deployed strategic warheads over the past 6 months. The increase is probably partly due to the 13thSSBN - 怀俄明州号（SSBN-742） -完全的its reactor refueling overhaul. The 1,515 deployed warheads is the highest number the United States has deployed since September 2015. The total inventory of strategic launchers has not declined since 2017.
没有透露多少warhea聚合数据ds are attributed to the three legs of the triad. The full unclassified data set will be released later this summer. But if one assumes the number of deployed bombers and deployed ICBMs are the same as in the September 2021 data, then the SSBNs carry 1,068 warheads on roughly 220 deployed Trident II SLBMs. That is an increase of 123 warheads on the SSBN force compared with September, or an average of 4-5 warheads per deployed missile. Overall, this accounts for roughly 70 percent of all the 1,515 warheads attributed to the deployed strategic launchers (nearly 73 percent if excluding the “fake” 45 bomber weapons included in the official count).
新的起点数据表明，截至2022年3月1日，美国在其战略潜艇上在弹道导弹上部署了大约1,068枚弹头。
Compared with February 2011, the United States has reduced its total inventory of strategic launchers by 324, deployed launchers by 196, and deployed strategic warheads by 285. While important, the warhead reduction represents only a small fraction (about 8 percent) of the estimated 3,708 warheadsthat remain in the U.S. stockpile（如果计算5,428个库存的总库存并退休（但尚未被拆除）弹头，则只有5％以上）。
俄罗斯联邦
新的起点数据显示了俄罗斯拥有761个战略发射器的库存，其中526个部署了1,474枚弹头。与六个月前相比，这减少了1个部署的发射器，并增加了16个部署的战略弹头。这一变化反映了启动器维护和升级工作引起的波动。
Compared with February 2011, Russia has cut its total inventory of strategic launchers by 104, increased deployed launchers by 5, and decreased deployed strategic warheads by 63. This modest warhead reduction represents less than 2 percent of the estimated 4,477 warheads保留在俄罗斯的核武器中(roughly 1 percent if counting the total inventory of 5,977 stockpiled and retired (but yet to be dismantled) warheads).
The Russian New START reductions since 2011 are smaller than the US reductions because Russia had fewer strategic forces than the United States when the treaty entered into force.
That disparity remains today. Despite frequent claims by hardliners that Russia is ahead of the United States, the New START data shows that Russia has 160 deployed strategic launchersfewerthan the United States, a significant gap that exceeds the number of missiles in an entire US Air Force ICBM wing.尽管有其核现代化计划，俄罗斯迄今为止并没有通过部署更多的战略发射器来减少这一差距。相反，俄罗斯发射器赤字一直是increasingby about one-third since its lowest point in February 2018.
Russia is deploying more warheads on its new missiles to offset a disparity in launchers compared with the United States.
俄罗斯军方似乎没有缩小发射器差距，而是试图通过增加可以在更新的导弹上携带的弹头数量（SS-27 Mod 2，Yars和SS-N-32，Bulava）来补偿。较旧类型（SS-25，Topol，SS-N-18，Vysota和SS-N-23，Sineva）。得益于新的起点条约限制，许多此类弹头在正常情况下没有在导弹上部署，但可以在危机中存储，并有可能将其上传到发射器上。美国还具有更大的发射器清单的上传功能因此，不在战略劣势。
Two of Russia’s new strategic nuclear weapons (SS-19 Mod 4, Avangard, and SS-29, Sarmat) are covered by New START if formally incorporated. Other types (the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered ground-launched cruise missile) are not yet deployed and appear to be planned in relatively small numbers. They do not appear capable of upsetting the strategic balance in the foreseeable future. The treaty includes provisions for including new weapon types, if the two sides agree.
对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的反应的制裁可能会在未来十年减缓俄罗斯的核现代化。
检查和通知
In addition to the aggregate data described above, the New START treaty also allows for up to 18 on-site inspections per year and notifications of launcher movements and activities. Up until April 2020, a total of 328 on-site inspections were conducted. Because of COVID-19, there have been no inspections since. The two countries have continued toexchange大量通知：截至2022年3月31日，总计23,559。
Looking Ahead
The continued complaince by the United States and Russia to the New START treaty and its data exchanges are extraordinary given the demise of treaties, agreements, and deep animosity and almost complete loss of trust. The treaty’s interactions between the two countries and the caps and predictability it provides on strategic offensive nuclear forces have never been more important since New START was negotiated more than a decade ago.
但是时钟耗尽。虽然是新的开始was extendedin February 2021 for an additional five years, the treaty will expire in February 2026. Strategic stability talks between Russia and the United States have been disrupted by the war in Ukraine and seem unlikely to resume in the foreseeable future.
如果在2026年到期时没有新的起点是一项新条约，那么1970年代第一次，我们和俄罗斯的核力量将不会限制。
Moreover, political polarization makes it highly uncertain if the US Congress would approve a new treaty.
除了正式条约之外，双方可能有可能达成执行协议，并保证即使条约正式到期后，也可以继续遵守新的起点限制。
一线希望是，两国对继续对对方的战略进攻核力量保持限制有浓厚的兴趣。这就是为什么重要的是，不允许强硬派滥用俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和中国的核积累，以破坏新的起点并增加核力量。
附加信息：
- 世界核力量的地位
- 俄罗斯核力量，2022年
- 美国核力量，2021年[2022版本即将发布]
This publication was made possible by generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
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