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**Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240  
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (U)**

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Obtained Under the  
Freedom of Information Act  
by Hans M. Kristensen

Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 1 May 2037

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#### **A. Introduction (U)**

(U) This Report on Russian Nuclear Forces is submitted pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81). The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, has the responsibility for submitting this report to Congress.

(U) This report includes an assessment of the following:

- (U) The assessed number of deployed nuclear forces by category of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles relative to New START Treaty levels by 2017 and by 2022, including potential shifts of such numbers during such periods.
- (U) Options with respect to the size and composition of Russian nuclear forces that Russia is considering, including decreases below the New START Treaty levels and plans for maintaining New START Treaty levels, including options related to developing and deploying a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) capability.
- (U) Factors that are likely to influence the number and composition of Russian nuclear forces.
- (U) Effects of shifts in the number and composition of Russian nuclear forces on strategic stability.

(U) The assessments related to Russian nuclear forces contained in this report were conducted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in support of this report.

#### **B. Assessed Number of Russian Nuclear Forces (U)**

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4(c),1.4(g)

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(b)(1), 1.4 (b), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

- (U) The New START Treaty expires in February 2021 unless the Parties decide to extend it. After expiration it would no longer restrict Russian or U.S. force levels.

(U) Table 1 provides the assessed number of Russian nuclear forces by category of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles through 2022. Strategic delivery vehicles include deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Note that under New START Treaty counting rules, each deployed nuclear-capable heavy bomber counts as one nuclear warhead – the actual number of nuclear weapons that could be carried on each bomber, however, varies depending upon the type of weapons and aircraft. Table 1 reflects the Intelligence Community's assessment as of mid-April 2012.

(b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

(b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

<sup>1</sup> (U) Data declared by the Russian Federation under the New START Treaty as of March 1, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> (U) The New START Treaty—expires on February 4, 2021; unless extended, it would no longer be in force in 2022.

<sup>3</sup> (U) Under New START Treaty counting rules, each deployed heavy bomber counts as one deployed nuclear warhead.

<sup>4</sup> (U) The total numbers for Delivery Vehicles and Nuclear Warheads can be compared to two of the New START Treaty limits that must be achieved no later than February 5, 2018 – the limit of no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers and the limit of no more than 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.

(b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(g)

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(b)(1),1.4(b),1.4(c),1.4(g)

**C. Options with Respect to the Size and Composition of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces**  
**(U)**

(U) Within the New START Treaty central limits there are no specific obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions on the composition of a Party's force structure. Each Party is allowed to determine for itself how to structure its strategic forces within those limits.

(b)(1),1.4(b),1.4(c),1.4(g)

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(b)(1),1.4(b),1.4(c),1.4(g)

**D. Factors Likely to Influence the Number and Composition of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (U)**

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(b)(1),1.4(b),1.4(c),1.4(g)

#### **E. Effects on Strategic Stability (U)**

(U) Stability in the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation depends upon the assured capability of each side to deliver a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side, even with an opponent attempting a disarming first strike. Consequently, the only Russian shift in its nuclear forces that could undermine the basic framework of mutual deterrence that exists between the United States and the Russian Federation is a scenario that enables Russia to deny the United States the assured ability to respond against a substantial number of highly valued Russian targets following a

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Russian attempt at a disarming first strike—a scenario that the Department of Defense judges will most likely not occur.

(U) The U.S. nuclear force structure, as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, has been designed to account for any possible adjustments in the Russian strategic force configurations that may be implemented in response to the New START Treaty. This includes Russian deployment of additional strategic warheads, which, even if significantly above the New START Treaty limits, would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture. The Russian Federation, therefore, would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily because of the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic force structure, particularly the OHIO-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time. The United States also would be capable of uploading additional warheads on all three legs of its strategic triad in response to a Russian breakout scenario.

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**OFFICE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION**  
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**SEP 20 2012**

Ref: 12-F-0933

Hans Kristensen  
Federation of American Scientists  
1725 DeSales Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Kristensen:


This is the final response to your electronic Freedom of Information Act request dated May 25, 2012 requesting "a copy of the report to Congress on the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the New START Treaty required by Sec. 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, p. 1643."

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a search of their records systems and provided the attached document, which is determined to be responsive to your request. Mr. Robert Vince, Director, an Initial Denial Authority for USDP, has determined that information that has been redacted from the attached document is exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), which pertains to information that is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4 (b) which pertains to foreign government information and (c) which pertains to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and (g) which pertains to vulnerabilities or capability of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating to the national security.

If you are not satisfied with this action, you may appeal to the appellate authority, the Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, by writing directly to the Defense Freedom of Information Policy Office, Attn: Mr. James Hogan, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1155. Your appeal should be postmarked within 60 calendar days of the date of this letter, should cite to case number 12-F-0933, and should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Your request is now closed in this Office. There are no fees associated with this response

Sincerely,

  
for Paul J. Jacobsmeyer  
Chief

Enclosures:  
As stated