



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:

J02
20 JAN 2010

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1725 DeSales Street NW, 6th Floor
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood,

This is a partial response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 7 May 2008, in which you seek a copy of a 2006 study of operations in Iraq that was performed by the Joint Warfighting Center at the direction of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense.

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducted a thorough search and discovered one hundred eighty-seven (187) pages of documents responsive to your request. We are releasing a partial copy of this information: portions of pages 47-51 are being withheld under Exemption 1; portions of pages 140-141 are being withheld under Exemption 2; and portions of pages 17-22 and 140 are being withheld under Exemption 6. Exemption 1 pertains to information specifically authorized by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy that is properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. Exemption 2 pertains to internal information the release of which would constitute a risk of circumvention of a legal requirement. Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a third party.

Please be advised that this is only a partial response. Significant portions of this record fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies, whom USJFCOM must consult regarding their equities. USJFCOM will continue to disclose information regarding your request as such information is received.

Also, please be advised that you have the right to appeal this response as to the exempted information. Your appeal must be in writing and addressed to Director, Freedom of Information and Security Review, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Room 2C757, Washington, D.C. 20301-1155. The appeal must be received in that office within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter to be considered. A copy of this letter should be attached to your appeal, along with a statement regarding why your appeal should be granted. It is recommended that the letter of appeal and the envelope both bear the notation: "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

In this instance, all fees fall below the billable threshold, and have been waived. Please be advised, however, that fee categories, fee waivers, and fee determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, and previous determinations are not considered when making future determinations.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Joshua Portner at (757) 836-9742.

Sincerely,



DAVID M. EDGINGTON
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff

Enclosure:

Portions of Joint Center for Operational Analysis 21 July 2006 Study (88 pages)



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~~Pre-Decisional Draft~~



Transitions in Iraq: Changing Environment Changing Organizations Changing Leadership

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
21 July 2006


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1

Observe, Adapt, Dominate ←

Transition as a Subset of JCOA Collection

- JCOA studied Post-Major Combat Operations (PMCO), producing a brief that covered 1 May to 1 August 2003 and a report that covered May 2003 to June 2004
 - ⊃ PMCO brief was presented to Secretary of Defense in August 2003. PMCO report was provided to CENTCOM in December 2004
 - ⊃ Five JCOA collection teams deployed to theater between January 2003 – July 2004
 - ⊃ JCOA interviewed 175 military and civilian leaders during this period
 - ⊃ Although a finding, transition was not the focus of PMCO study or brief
- On 24 April 2006 JCOA was tasked to conduct focused study of transition
 - JCOA conducted focused interviews with key individuals
 - ⊃ JCOA reviewed documents and orders



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2

Transitions in Iraq: Changing Environment

Thunder Run



Baghdad Falls



Iraqis Celebrate



Looting



Declaration of End of Major Combat




Rising Violence



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
Transitions in Iraq: Changing Organizations



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Transitions in Iraq: Changing Leadership




Transitions

- Transitions are the sequels that occur between types of operations.
- Transitions between operations are difficult and during execution may create unexpected opportunities for [friendly] forces, enemies, or adversaries.
- Transition between operations may be the most difficult follow-on operation to accomplish.



Combat



Post-Major Combat

Framing the Study


- ⇒ Putting the Iraq transition into historical perspective
- ⇒ Developing timeline of events
- ⇒ Identifying the elements of a successful transition

7

Critical Transition Issues

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- ⇒ Turbulence in Transition
- ⇒ Resourcing the Transition
- ⇒ Military and Civilian Shared Planning



Changing organization and leadership during a major transition in the campaign

8

What Should Be Done


- Conduct joint, combined, and interagency planning for all strategic and operational military employments.
 - ⇒ Improve political-military collaborative planning and training
 - Initial emphasis on Phase IV and counterinsurgency
 - Vet planning assumptions against extant and emergent policy
- Prepare, brief and rehearse transition and Phase IV plans prior to initiation of combat
- ⇒ Plan courses of action for reasonable and feasible alternative scenarios
- ⇒ The military must lead the early stages of stability and support missions
 - Other departments of agencies will not assume control until manned and resourced
 - Personnel from other departments or agencies will be stabilized for extended deployment
 - The military accepts and trains to this mission
- Take time to execute transitions (condition based, not time based)
 - Establish new leaders and headquarters before old leaders and headquarters depart, ensuring significant overlap
 - Require HQs to maintain oversight and stay engaged until transition is complete in order to provide supervision and continuity

WHEN THE US MILITARY IS AT WAR THE US IS AT WAR

9

What Should Be Done

- Require definition and monitoring of conditions for all transitions:
 - Transition from Phase 1, 2 and 3 to stability and support
 - Transition from military primacy to civilian interagency primacy
 - Transition from civilian interagency to host nation, coalition, or United Nations primacy
- Combatant Commands and OSD assign organizational roles early, fixing responsibility and allowing for training and rehearsal. Minimize changes of organizational responsibility and key decision makers during transitions.
- Develop joint doctrine that addresses transitions and post major combat operations



What We Don't Know


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- The role of senior administration decision makers in first half of 2003
 - Key decisions and decision making process
 - Understanding and perceptions of the post major combat environment
- Guidance provided to the Combatant Commander
 - Policy decisions and clarification
 - Timing and nature of decision making and interaction with senior officials
- The approving authority for key decisions
 - Accelerated Transition of 16 April
 - Deployment and redeployment of forces
- Guidance, instructions, rationale, and directives given to AMB Bremer
 - Implementation of CPA Directive Number 1
 - Implementation of CPA Directive Number 2
- Iraqi reaction to:
 - Accelerated Transition
 - CPA 1 and 2
 - Overall post major combat operations activities

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Planning the Post-Major Combat Phase

- Campaign phases overlap: one is ending while the next is beginning
 - The overlaps are transitions
 - Expected successive phases are sequels addressed by a base plan
 - Potential successive phases are branches addressed by contingency plans
- Transitions must be deliberately planned and executed
 - The base plan should address the most likely environment for the next phase based on reasonable and feasible assumptions
 - Contingency plans should address potential alternative environments that may arise when planning assumptions are inaccurate or the situation changes
- The *exact* nature of the post combat environment cannot be predicted, assumptions must be made and their tracked in order to confirm or deny the predicted scenario
- New transitions may be required as a current phase changes its nature



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Post combat commitment based on:

- Host nation ability to police and govern
- Level and nature of post combat violence
- Level of infrastructure repair required

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
Department and Agency Cooperation

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- Gradually phase in non-military departments and agencies following major combat operations, having other departments and agencies remain subordinate until the military transition is complete. When transition is complete:
 - An advanced party of civilian administrators co-locates with military leaders
 - Then a small group of technical experts begins critical infrastructure assessment
 - Finally the civilian bureaucracy enters as part of the shift to civilian primacy
- Train and resource the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization similar to a standing joint force headquarters:
 - Similar cultural training as military foreign area officers
 - Assigned like the military; stable, accountable tours of duty
 - Familiar with military planning and decision making
- Develop, implement, and enforce a political-military critical information query and response system

The Nature of the Post-Combat Phase

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Elements of Effective Transition

└─ Planning

- └─ Determine desired end-state, political constraints, strategic purpose and concept of implementation
- └─ Develop robust plan with branches and sequels and re-plan when needed
- └─ Consider the overlap of phases in order to make transition a deliberate planning activity

└─ Preparation

- └─ Organize for post-combat and the transition to post-combat
 - └─ Rehearse to create shared vision
 - └─ Posture for the branches and sequels
 - └─ Apply resources over time to meet changing requirements

└─ Execution

- └─ Base decisions on conditions
- └─ Consider continuity and timing of actual transition as critical
- └─ Monitor post-combat environment
- └─ Evaluate and if necessary, re-plan

└─ 15

Post-Major Combat Operations Findings

SECDEF Brief August 2003

– Capabilities That Exceeded Expectations

- Initiative and Adaptation
- Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

– Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness

- Special Ops Forces (SOF) and SOF-Conventional Integration
- Civil Affairs
- Campaign Planning
- Training, Experience & Doctrine

– Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs

- └─ *Transition to Post Major Combat Operations*
- Resources
- Intelligence Support
- Joint Command and Control
- Communications Infrastructure
- Strategic Communications (Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations)

2003 JCOA Coverage

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CENTCOM Forward (Qatar) (16 Feb 03 – 13 May 03)

BG Robert Cone, USA – Director
Col [REDACTED] USMC
COL [REDACTED] USAR
COL [REDACTED] USAR
Lt Col [REDACTED], USAF
CDR [REDACTED], USN
CDR [REDACTED], USN
CDR [REDACTED], USN
LTC [REDACTED], USA
MAJ [REDACTED], USA

(b)(6)

CFLLC (16 Feb 03 – 13 May 03)

COL Steven Mains, USA – Team Lead (Kuwait)
Lt Col [REDACTED], USAFR
CDR [REDACTED], USN
LTC [REDACTED], USA
LTC [REDACTED], USA
Maj [REDACTED], USAF
MAJ [REDACTED], USA
Maj [REDACTED], USAF
MAJ [REDACTED], USA
Capt [REDACTED], USMC

OIF Team II (May 03 – Jul 03)

Col Randal (Hap) Holm, USMC – Team Lead (Kuwait)
CDR [REDACTED], USN (Kuwait)
CDR [REDACTED], USN (Kuwait)
COL [REDACTED], USAR (CPA) (Baghdad)
MAJ [REDACTED], USA (CPA) (Baghdad)
Maj [REDACTED], USAF (Baghdad)
Maj [REDACTED], USMC (Baghdad)
Col [REDACTED], USMCR (Qatar)
Maj [REDACTED], USAF (Qatar)

CPA (Kuwait – Baghdad) (Apr 03 – Jun 03)

MAJ [REDACTED], USA (CPA)
COL [REDACTED], USA (CPA)
Maj [REDACTED], USMC

CJTF-4 (Kuwait) (Jan 03 – Apr 03)

MAJ [REDACTED], USA

17

Collection: Interviews (Jul 03 - Jun 04)

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CENTCOM

Abizaid, GEN John (4)
Smith, LtGen Lance
Mortensen, MG William (CCJ-4) (2)
Blackledge, BG (354th CA Command)
Custer, BG John (CCJ-2)
Summerall, BG (CJ-4)
[REDACTED], Col (DLA LNO)
[REDACTED], COL 354th (CA Command)
[REDACTED], COL (Dep Chief Surgeon)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (JIACG)
[REDACTED], COL (CCJ-5-P)
[REDACTED], COL (CJ-6)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (CCJ-35)
[REDACTED], CAPT (Chaplain)
[REDACTED], COL (CCJ-33) (2)
[REDACTED], COL (CCJ-4)
[REDACTED], Col [REDACTED] (CCJ-5)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (CCJ-4E)
[REDACTED], GS15 (Special Advisor to Commander) (2)
[REDACTED], COL (Strat. Comms) (3)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (SJA) (2)
[REDACTED], CAPT [REDACTED] (JOC/CurrOps)(2)
[REDACTED], COL (CJ-5)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (CCJ-8)
[REDACTED], COL (Strategic Comms)
[REDACTED], Col [REDACTED] (CCJ-2)
[REDACTED], COL (Comms)
[REDACTED], Col [REDACTED] (CCJ-1)

CPA

Kennedy, Mr. Patrick (Chief of Staff)
Slocum, Mr. Walt
Eaton, MG Paul (Security Affairs) (2)
Kuklok, MG (Ret) Kevin (Dep Plans & Policy)
Nash, RADM (Ret) Daniel (CPA PMO) (2)
Oliver, RADM (Ret) David (Ministry of Finance)
Poe, RADM Larry (CPA IG)
Strock, MG Carl (Dir Ops)
Crear, BG (TF RIO)
McGee, RDML Tim (Office of Naval Research)
Thatcher, SES-2 Gary (Strat. Comms) (2)
[REDACTED], COL (Operations and Infrastructure)
[REDACTED], COL (PAO)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (b)(6)
[REDACTED], COL (Civil Affairs)
[REDACTED], COL (Sr Mil Rep to AMB Bremer)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (CPA MOJ) (2)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (CPA MOJ)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (Min of Governance)
[REDACTED], COL [REDACTED] (Infrastructure Directorate)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Ops & Infrastructure)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (CPA Babylon)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Public Affairs)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Historian)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Iraqi Media Network)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Strat. Comms)
[REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (Iraqi Media Network)

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CFACC

Elder, MajGen Robert (Commander)
Twitchell, MajGen (Dep CFACC)
██████████ Col (Dir of Staff)

(b)(6)

CJSOTF

██████████ COL ██████████ (CJSOTF-AP)

CFLCC

McKiernan, LTG (Commander)
Boles, BG (Dep CJ-4)
Kern, BG (352 CA CMD)
Radin, BG Robert (CJ-4)
Stultz, BG (Dir. of Mvmt & Dist)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-5)
██████████, COL ██████████ (INF BN CDR)
██████████, COL (CJ-2)
██████████, COL (Dep CJ-2)

CFSOCC

Diamond, BG (377th TSC)
██████████ COL (CFSOCC LNO to CJSOTF)

MARCENT

Mattis, MajGen (CG 1 MARDIV)
Stadler, MajGen (DCG I MEF)
██████████ COL (1 MARDIV)
██████████ COL (G-6)
██████████ COL (I MEF G-2)

CJTF-7/MNC-1/MNF-I

Wallace, LTG William (Commander)
Metz, LTG (III Corps) (2)
Sanchez, LTG Ricardo (V Corps) (4)
Dempsey, MG Martin (1AD)
Gallinetti, MG (CJTF7)
Miller, MG (V Corps) (5)
Odierno, MG Ray, (4ID)
Patraeus, MG (101 ABN)
Wodjakowski, MG (V Corps)
Barbero, BG (4ID)
Blackledge, BG (352nd CA)
Boles, BG (2) (3rd COSCOM)
Davidson, BG (CMATT)
Dempsey, BG (1AD) (2)
Fast, BG Barbara, (V Corps) (4)
Formica, BG (III Corps)
Geoghan, BG Dennis (220th MP BDE)
Hahn, BG (V Corps)

CJTF-7/MNC-1/MNF-I (cont'd)

Hawkins, BG (TF RIE)
Helmick, BG (101 ABN)
Hernandez, BG (1AD)
Kimmitt, BG Mark (Dep Dir of Ops) (6)
Pollman, BG Robert (CJ-7)
Sargeant, BG (V Corps)
Scapparatti, BG (1AD)
West, BG (V Corps)
Williams, BG (V Corps)
██████████, COL (101 ABN 2 BCT)
██████████, COL ██████████ (V Corps)
██████████, COL, (V Corps)
██████████ GrpCpt (Strategic Intel Engagement)
██████████, COL (C2)
██████████, COL (Acting CJTF7 CJ-4)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-8)
██████████, COL (PAO)
██████████, COL (2) (JIACG)
██████████, COL ██████████ (TF RIO) (3)
██████████, COL ██████████ (109th ASMB)
██████████, COL ██████████ US Army Medical Material Center
██████████, COL ██████████ (3rd BDE, 1AD)
██████████, COL ██████████ (JIATF)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-2 Red Cell)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-2 Ops)

(b)(6)

██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-6)
██████████, COL (2nd BDE, 4ID)
██████████, COL (V Corps)
██████████, COL (C3)
██████████, COL (2ACR(L))
██████████, COL ██████████ (173rd ABN BDE)
██████████, COL (4BCT, 4ID(M))
██████████, COL (Dep CJ-2)
██████████, COL ██████████ (NBC Officer)
██████████, COL ██████████ (IO Officer) (3)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-1)
██████████, COL (C5)
██████████, COL (C9)
██████████, COL ██████████ (Dep CJ-3)
██████████, COL (Dep CJ-7)
██████████, COL (3rd BDE, 4ID) (2)
██████████, COL (4ID)
██████████, COL ██████████ (C2X HUMINT Cell Chief) (2)
██████████, COL ██████████ (CJ-2)
██████████, COL (3ACR)
██████████, COL ██████████ (Dep COS) (2)
██████████, COL ██████████ (SJA)
██████████, COL ██████████ (Dep CJ-5)
██████████, COL ██████████ (MARFORPAC)
██████████, Mr. ██████████ (1st IO Command)
██████████, Mr. ██████████ (TF RIO)

Multinational Forces

[REDACTED] BG (British Army)
 [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] (British Army) (2)
 [REDACTED] MG [REDACTED] (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] BG (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army) (b) (6)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] COL (Polish Army)
 [REDACTED] MG (Italian Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs and Defense)
 [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] (Italian Army)
 [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] (AUS Army, Dep CJ-7)

Interagency Groups

Dayton, MG Keith (ISG) (3)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (ISG Jt Detention Ctr) (2)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (DOE)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (FBI)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (CIA)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (DIA/CFH)
 [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] (DIA/JFIC) (2)
 [REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED] (DIA/CFH)

USAID

Kishinchand, Ms. Sasha (2)
 Walsh, Ms. Karen
 Wheelock, Mr. Tom

Other Commands

Brown, GEN Bryan D. (SOCCOM)
 Kern, BG (CFLCC/352 CA CMD) (2)
 Weber, BG (US Army Director of Training)
 [REDACTED] CAPT [REDACTED] (USCG National Strike Force)
 [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] (USA Countermine
 Counter-Booby Trap Center)

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Interviews Completed**CENTCOM**

(Contacted) GEN Franks
 - Not avail until mid Sep
 (Contacted) GEN Abizaid
 ✓ BG Halverson (J5)
 ✓ COL Agoglia (J5)
 ✓ Maj Gen Renuart (J3)
 LtGen DeLong (DCDR)
 LTG Whitcomb (CoS)

CJTF-7

✓ LTG Sanchez (CDR)
 ✓ MG Hahn (CoS)
 MG Miller (J3)
 COL [REDACTED] (J5)

CPA

✓ AMB Bremer
 ✓ Col Baltazar (C3)
 [REDACTED] (Unable to Contact)
 AMB Kennedy (CoS)
 [REDACTED]

V Corps

✓ GEN Wallace (CDR)
 ✓ LTC Degan (Chief of Plans)

CFLCC

✓ GEN McKiernan (CDR)
 ✓ LTC(R) Moran (Strategist)
 ✓ MG Whitley (UK)
 ✓ COL [REDACTED] (J5)
 ✓ COL [REDACTED] (XO)
 ✓ LTC [REDACTED] (Historian)
 ✓ LTC [REDACTED] (Planner)
 ✓ LTC [REDACTED] (Planner)
 ✓ LTC [REDACTED] (Planner)

LtGen Blackmon (CoS)
 MG Marks (J2)
 MG Webster (DCDR)
 COL [REDACTED] (DCoS)
 MG Thurmond (J3)

CFACC

Gen Mosely (b) (6)
 RADM Nichols

CSA

✓ GEN(R) Keane
 ✓ GEN Cody

JFCOM

✓ ADM Giambastiani
 [REDACTED]

Joint Staff

Gen(R) Myers (Unable to Contact)
 GEN Pace
 ✓ GEN Casey
 ✓ LTG Sharpe
 ✓ Lt Gen Dunn
 LTG N. Schwartz
 ADM Schaeffer

CJTF-4

✓ BG(R) Hawkins (CDR)
 ✓ COL Rabon (DCDR)
 Col [REDACTED] (CoS)
 COL [REDACTED] (J3)

ORHA

(16 Aug) LTG(R) Garner (CDR)
 ✓ MG Cross UK (DCDR)
 ✓ Col [REDACTED] (C3)
 LTG(R) Bates (CoS)
 Lt Col [REDACTED] (C5)

CFMCC

ADM Keating

 Grey: should not affect outcome

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Elements of Interagency Management

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- Purpose
- Geo-Strategic Situation
- Crisis Planning Scenario
- Key Actor(s)/Adversary(s)
- Policy Planning Guidance
- US Strategic Purpose
- Mission Statement
- Desired Political-Military Endstate
- US Political-Military Strategy
- Mission Organization
- Concept of Implementation
- Major Mission Areas
- Interagency Management



Source: Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook: January 2003, National Defense University

How It Has Been Done in the Past

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Pre-Decisional-Draft~~

WWII GERMANY

World War
 Unlimited objective
 Unconditional surrender
 Hitler commits suicide
 Massive destruction
 Clear reconstruction need

WWII JAPAN

World War
 Unlimited objective
 Unconditional surrender
 Tojo jailed: Emperor exonerated
 Massive destruction
 Clear reconstruction need

OIF IRAQ

Local war
 Limited objective
 Regime change
 Saddam flees: Jailed
 Limited destruction
 Perceived minor reconstruction

TRANSITION

Military lead: GEN L. Clay*
 Military Government
 1945-1955
 Occupation force of 400k
 De-Nazification (reversed)
 Marshall Plan
 Werewolves



*and others

TRANSITION

Military lead: GEN D. MacArthur
 Military Government
 1945-1952
 Occupation force of 350k
 "Peace Clause" banned military
 Allied Advisory Council
 No resistance

TRANSITION

Civilian lead: AMB Bremer
 Provisional Iraqi Governments
 2003-2006
 Liberation presence of 130k
 De-Baathification
 ORHA / CPA
 Former Regime Elements
 Al Qaeda - Iraq



Turbulence in Transition

Finding: Transition in Iraq was complicated by the turnover or departure of major leaders, largely unanticipated shifts in organizational responsibilities, and planning assumptions that were misaligned with major policy decisions

Why it happened:

- ⇒ The transition that occurred was not the one that was planned
- ⇒ Numerous critical turnovers occurred during transition
- ⇒ Transition environment was inconsistent with pre-transition tasks / assumptions
- ⇒ Military assumptions and guidance were not aligned with CPA directives

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The Transition That Occurred Was Not the One That Was Planned

- Organizational responsibility
 - ⇒ CJTF IV was not the nucleus (core) for CJTF-I
 - ⇒ ORHA did not remain the nucleus of the civilian administration
 - ⇒ Leaders and other headquarters different than planned
- Misalignment between plan and execution
 - ⇒ Planned CENTCOM timeline was not adhered to
 - ⇒ CFLCC's ECLIPSE timeline drastically reduced
 - Assumptions and execution misaligned
 - ⇒ Coalition participation was overestimated
 - ⇒ Reform the Iraqi military vice dissolution of the Iraqi military
- ⇒ Accelerated transition and rapid redeployment caught engaged ground commanders unprepared
 - 15 Apr: CFLCC ready to run Iraq, not expecting rapid redeployment
 - 16 Apr: Accelerated transition to Phase IV moved up redeployment of engaged forces and hastened standup of CJTF-7
 - 22 Apr: V CORPS expected to redeploy to Europe and to return in several months to become CJTF-7 when transition complete
 - 28 May: V CORPS ordered to immediately replace CFLCC as CJTF-7

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ORHA Pre-Transition Assumptions Inconsistent With Actual Conditions

- ORHA tasked with:
 - Assisting reestablishment of key civilian services
 - Reshaping the Iraqi military to a civilian-controlled armed force
 - Reshaping Iraq’s internal security institutions
 - Supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority, over time

Source: NSPD24, 20 Jan 03

- Assumptions made during ORHA planning conference in Feb 2003
 - A sufficiently stable security environment would be established to facilitate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction
 - Basic infrastructure would remain intact—including buildings, roads, transportation and communications
 - Some functions of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government would remain in place or could be easily restored

Source: Briefing from the ORHA sponsored planning conference, 21-22 February 2003

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~~Pre-Decisional Draft~~

Military and Civilian Shared Planning

Finding: The Joint Staff was hindered in obtaining interagency review and buy-in because the requested Phase IV plan was unavailable before April 2003.

Why it happened:

- ⇒ CJCS issued a PLANORD directing CENTCOM to conduct and provide Phase IV plan
- ⇒ CENTCOM provided a concept instead of a plan to the Joint Staff
 - What was presented did not meet requirements of PLANORD
- ⇒ Joint Staff vetting of the plan with the interagency started late. This hindered:
 - Development of integrated policy
 - Development of coordinated interagency supporting plans
 - Shared understanding of key elements of success

Policy and Planning: CPA Order 2

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~~Pre-Decisional Draft~~

DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES

Institutions dissolved by the Order referenced (the “Dissolved Entities”) are:

- The Ministry of Defence
- The Ministry of Information
- The Ministry of State for Military Affairs
- The Iraqi Intelligence Service
- The National Security Bureau
- The Directorate of National Security (Amn al-'Am)
- The Special Security Organization

All entities affiliated with or comprising Saddam Hussein’s bodyguards to include:

- Murafaqin (Companions)
- Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard)

The following military organizations:

- The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other regular military services
- The Republican Guard
- The Special Republican Guard
- The Directorate of Military Intelligence
- The Al Quds Force
- Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari)

The following paramilitaries:

- Saddam Fedayeen
- Ba’ath Party Militia
- Friends of Saddam
- Saddam’s Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam)

CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02



Plans Decisions Misalignment

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1 IMPLEMENTATION OF DE-BAATHIFICATION ORDER NO.1 (CP A/ORD/16 May 2003/01)

Prescribes a two-staged process for carrying out the de-ba'athification of Iraqi society

Receive and compile information concerning possible Ba'ath Party affiliations of employees at all ministries.

Take action in accordance with the criteria for removal set forth in CPA Order No.1

Grounds for exception but not in itself enough to ensure exception will be granted.

- i. Is willing to denounce the Ba'ath Party and his past association with it**
- ii. Was a senior Ba'ath Party member or simply a 'full' party member**
- iii. Has exceptional educational qualifications**
- iv. Left the Ba'ath Party before April 16, 2003**
- v. Continues to command the support of his colleagues and respect of their subordinates**
- vi. Is judged to be indispensable to achieving important Coalition interests, at least in the immediate term**
- vii. Can demonstrate that he joined the party to hold his job or support his family**

Resourcing the Transition

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Finding: Insufficient and untimely availability of resources impeded effectiveness of post-combat operations and contributed to a difficult transition.

Why it happened:

- ⇒ Competing priorities and the manning process did not meet personnel requirements
- ⇒ Communications infrastructure and support was not sufficient for transition
- ⇒ Shortfalls existed in intelligence

CPA/CJTF Manning

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- Coalition Provisional Authority and CJTF 7 civilian and military manning levels remained low (65 percent and 50 percent, respectively, through August of 2003).
- Numerous civilian Coalition Provisional Authority personnel tours of duty were 180 days and, in some cases, significantly less.
 - This caused vital expertise and knowledge to be lost.
- Government agencies were not resourced to fill these personnel requirements, and they sometimes felt they could not accept responsibility.

Communications Infrastructure

[Redacted]

Exempt B1.

Insufficient civil communication infrastructure forced reliance on coalition military assets.

- Overall
 - Telecommunications significantly damaged during combat, exacerbating the long term neglect of the infrastructure
 - [Redacted]
- **Exempt B1**
 - Use of military infrastructure required for key civilian agencies
- Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
 - Regional communications limited by state of civil infrastructure
 - Centralized control required communications to dispersed regions
- Within CJTF 7
 - [Redacted]
 - [Redacted]



[Page 48 Redacted]

Intelligence Support

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- Too few linguists were available in theater
- Competition for manpower with Iraqi Survey Group left a shortage of analysts and HUMINT managers. Analysis and collaboration critical to developing and maintaining situational awareness slow to be established

[Page 50 Redacted]

Analysis and Collaboration Critical to Developing and Maintaining Situational Awareness Slow to be Established

- As authority transferred between the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC) and CJTF 7, V Corps staff—around which CJTF 7 was built—did not have the appropriate skill sets and grade levels.

[REDACTED]

Manning to supplement V Corps staff was slow to arrive and team cooperation and dynamics had not developed through training.

- [REDACTED]

Key Leadership and Staff Movement

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1-7 May 2003 – CENTCOM redeployed to Tampa, FL

12 May 2003 – AMB Paul Bremer (CPA) replaced LTG (R) Jay Garner (ORHA)

6 Jun 2003 – CFLCC Main began redeployment to Atlanta, GA

14 June 2003 – Shortly after being promoted, LTG Sanchez assumed command of V Corps from LTG Wallace and CJTF-7 from LTG McKiernan

3 July 2003 – GEN Abizaid assumed command of CENTCOM from GEN Franks

Accelerated Transition to Phase IV

Redeploy the Force
While Preserving Campaign
Success

CINC Guidance 16 Apr 03

- Get Warfight Units Out in Next 60 Days
- Use incoming Forces for up to 120 days
- Move quickly from CFLCC to CJTF-Iraq
- Take as much risk going out as we did coming in
- Possible to have too much too long
- Expect a functioning government in 30-60 days
- Effectiveness of ORHA directly impacts the pace of our redeployment



Key Assumptions


- Force flow continues excepting 1st Cav Div/selected units
- ORHA begins effective operations by 1 May and effectively picks up key Phase IV tasks over time
- Brits redeploy from Um Qasr
- Army Redeploys from Kuwait
- Marines redeploy from Al Jubayl, KSA
- Sufficient SOF remains in country to mitigate risk of smaller conventional presence
- Inbound MP Forces task organized to Corps/MEF to mitigate risk
- Iraq makes good progress in standing up a functional interim government
- There are no major strategic dislocators in next 90 days
- Coalition Contributions reduce US requirements  64

Concept

Task - Rapidly reduce the US footprint in Iraq while accomplishing key Phase IV tasks. Take risk. Support the empowerment of ORHA to expedite the establishment of a viable Iraqi governmental structure while encouraging and integrating other Coalition contributions. Transition to CJTF-Iraq as soon as practical.

Purpose – Reconstitute the Force for other operations and reinforce the USG position that US Forces are Liberators, not Occupiers.

Changing Organizations Within 45 Day Period



Changing Leadership

National Strategic



12 May 03

Theater Strategic



3 Jul 03

Operational Command



LTG Sanchez replaces LTG Wallace (V Corps) And LTG McKiernan (CJTF-7)



15 Jun 03


GEN Abizaid replaces GEN Franks

AMB Bremer replaces LTG (R) Garner

COALITION GROUND FORCES

3 Carriers in Arabian Gulf

Distance in Kilometers
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Pre-Decisional Draft 150



Policy and Planning

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~~Pre-Decisional Draft~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2 DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Reconfirming all of the provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi People of April 16, 2003,


Recognizing that the prior Iraqi regime used certain government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and as instruments of torture, repression and corruption,

Reaffirming the Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq regarding Ministry of Youth and Sport of May 8, 2003,

Continuous Monitoring

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
6-90. Commanders, assisted by the staff, **continuously assess** the situation and the progress of the operation, and compare it with the initial vision. **Assessment is the continuous monitoring — throughout planning, preparation, and execution — of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments.** Commanders direct adjustments to ensure that operations remain aligned with the commander's intent. Subordinates assess their unit's progress by comparing it with the senior commander's intent and adjusting their actions to achieve the envisioned end state, particularly in the absence of orders.



Organizing for Transition

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6-80. Transitions mark the intervals between the ongoing operation and full execution of branches and sequels. Transitions often mark the change from one dominant type of operations, such as offense, to another such as stability. ... Commanders consider transitions from the current operation to future operations early in the planning process. Command arrangements, for example, often change. **Typically, the command structure evolves to meet changing situations.** A JTF, for example, may dissolve, and forces revert to their parent components. The operational requirements for Army forces **may pass to a new commander**, who continues post conflict missions even as some Army forces prepare to redeploy.




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Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

FM 3-0 Army Operations / Transitions

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

6-81. Changes in the strategic situation require adjusting the strength and composition of deployed forces. When the dominant type of operation changes from offense to stability, for example the types of units originally deployed may no longer be appropriate. As each new force prepares for operations, the JFC and the commander of the Army service component command tailor the Army force to meet mission requirements and theater constraints. **The force that initiated the operation may only superficially resemble the force in theater when the operation concludes.**



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Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Planning

6-82. **Transitions are the sequels that occur between types of operations. Commanders anticipate and plan for them as part of any future operation.** Transitions between operations are difficult and during execution may create unexpected opportunities for Army forces, enemies, or adversaries. Such opportunities must be recognized, quickly, developed as branches to the transition operation, and acted upon immediately. **Transition between operations may be the most difficult follow-on operation to accomplish.**




Source: PMCO Brief

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-0 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Concept Of Implementation

6-87. Conflict termination describes the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of force to other means of persuasion. **Conflict termination may take several forms: for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw, or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and staffs consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans.** If the **end state** is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infrastructure. Regardless of how the conflict ends, it often changes into less violent, but persistent, forms of confrontation.




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Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Determine Desired End-State and Political Constraints

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6-88. Conflict termination is more than the achievement of a military end state: it is the military contribution to broader success criteria. As the policy governing the conflict evolves, so does the end state at both joint and Army levels. **Effective campaign plans account for more than military objectives; they specify end states that support national policy.** They are also careful to distinguish between the military and other instruments of national power.



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Consider Continuity and Timing of Actual Transition as Critical

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3-35. The phasing and sequencing of operations **should be at necessary tempo to retain initiative** and to operate inside the opponents decision cycle.

3-56. Though theater and subordinate campaigns have different levels of scope, purpose, and perspective, they share common fundamentals.


- They provide an **orderly schedule of theater strategic or operational decisions**
- The commander's vision and intent

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Washington, DC, 14 July 2000

Posture for Branches and Sequels

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6-89. A period of post conflict activities exists between the end of a conflict and redeployment of the last US soldier. Army forces are vital in this period. As a sequel to decisive major operations, Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign. **These operations ensure that the threat does not resurrect itself and that the conditions that generated the conflict do not recur.**




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Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

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Organize for Post-Combat and the Transition to Post-Combat

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6-81. Changes in the strategic situation require adjusting the strength and composition of deployed forces. When the dominant type of operation changes from offense to stability, for example the types of units originally deployed may no longer be appropriate. As each new force prepares for operations, the JFC and the commander of the Army service component command tailor the Army force to meet mission requirements and theater constraints. **The force that initiated the operation may only superficially resemble the force in theater when the operation concludes.**



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Relationships

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
3-111. The supported commander should consider the accepted operational and tactical practices of the Services of the supporting forces. The supporting commander is also responsible for ascertaining the needs of the supported force. He fulfills those needs with existing capabilities and in keeping with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. Normally, the supporting commander is permitted to prescribe the operations, tactics, methods, communications, and procedures the supporting force employs.

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 100-7 Department of the Army 103
Washington, DC, 14 July 2000

Develop Robust Plan with Branches and Sequels

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6-18. **Sequels** are operations that follow the current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate of the current operation. A counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider sequels early and revisit them throughout an operation. **Without such planning, current operations leave forces poorly positioned for future opportunities, and leaders are unprepared to retain the initiative.** Both branches and sequels should have execution criteria, carefully reviewed before their implementation and updated based on assessment of current operations.




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Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Well Understood Intent

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Commander's Intent

5-61. Commanders express their vision as the commander's intent. The staff and subordinates measure the plans and orders that transform thought to action against it. **The *commander's intent* is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state.**



Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-0 Department of the Army 105
Washington, DC, 14 June 2001

Monitor Post-Combat Environment

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~~Pre-Decisional Draft~~

6-9. *Monitoring* is continuous observation of the common operational picture to identify indicators of opportunities for success, threats to the force, and gaps in information. During planning, commanders and staffs focus their monitoring on facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. **They monitor these to ensure they remain valid and to identify new ones that will affect the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs continue to validate facts and assumptions.** However, they focus their monitoring on identifying variances and gaps in RI [relevant information].

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No. 6-0 Department of the Army 106
Washington, DC, March 2001

Preparation

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6-44. *Preparation* is activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation occurs when a command is not executing an operation. When not executing operations, commanders prepare their forces for them. **These preparations include such activities as training and maintaining personnel and equipment.** Preparation for a specific operation starts with receiving a WARNO and ends when execution begins.

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 6-0 Department of the Army 107
Washington, DC, March 2001

Resource Application

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As the commander develops his strategic concept of operation, he concurrently develops a concept of support in coordination with his service component commanders. They and their staffs consider a myriad of logistics factors that affect the ability of the operational forces to conduct operations. Among the most conspicuous, tangible resources are equipment and other materials of war. **When resources are limited, the commander must prioritize the allocation of materiel among his commands, giving the preponderance of support to forces making the main effort and sometimes shifting priorities as the campaign unfolds.**

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 100-7 Department of the Army 108
Washington, DC, 14 July 2000

Situational Understanding

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2-63. *Situational Understanding.* Situational understanding involves understanding the **current state of friendly and enemy forces**. It is derived from applying judgment and experience to the COP through the filter of the commander's knowledge of the friendly forces, threat, and environment. **Situational understanding includes physical factors (such as location of forces), human factors (such as fatigue and morale), and the relationships among friendly and enemy forces and the environment that potentially represent opportunities and threats for friendly forces.** Commanders need to develop three views of each situation:

- A close-up of the situation, a "feel" for the action gained through personal observation and experience.
- An overview of the situation and the overall development of the operation.
- The situation from the enemy's perspective.

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Washington, DC, March 2001

Execution

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6-69. ***Execute* means to put a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.** Inherent in execution is deciding whether to execute planned actions, such as, phases, branches, and sequels. Execution also includes deciding whether to alter the plan based on changes in the situation. During execution, commanders direct the application of combat power. They synchronize the elements of combat power as much as possible in the time available. Commanders mass effects at decisive points when the time to strike occurs; they do not delay to wait for optimal synchronization. **They maintain continuity of operations to prevent enemies from regaining equilibrium. Because the situation changes rapidly, assessment is particularly important during execution.**

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No. 6-0 Department of the Army 110
Washington, DC, March 2001

Rehearse to Create Shared Vision

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6-60. A *rehearsal* is a session in which a unit or staff practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. Rehearsals occur during preparation. They are the commander's tool; they use them to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the commander's intent and concept of operations. Rehearsals also synchronize operations at times and places critical to successful mission accomplishment. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. **Rehearsals allow participants in an operation to become familiar with the plan. They also translate the plan into a visual impression that orients them to their environment and to other units that will execute the operation. Effective rehearsals further imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. Finally, they provide a coordination forum for subordinate and supporting leaders and units.**

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Washington, DC, March 2001

Evaluate and Re-Plan

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6-87. **The commander does not hesitate to modify a plan, or scrap it altogether, if necessary to accomplish the mission,** achieve greater success, or save the force. Adhering to a plan when the situation has changed significantly wastes resources and opportunities. Since operations rarely unfold according to plan, the flexibility to adapt to changes is the hallmark of a good tactician. Effective commanders are flexible in their thinking. Their commands are agile enough to execute changes to plans on short notice.

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 6-0 Department of the Army 112
Washington, DC, March 2001

Base Decisions On Conditions

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6-85. When operations or their preparations are progressing satisfactorily, variances are minor and within acceptable levels. Progress that meets the criteria of success is still relevant to the situation and will result in achieving the commander's intent. Commanders who make this evaluation—explicitly or implicitly—allow operations to continue according to plan. This situation leads to execution decisions included in the plan.

6-86. An assessment may determine that the operation as a whole, or one or more of its major actions, is not progressing according to expectations.

Variances of this magnitude present one of two situations:

- Significant, unforeseen opportunities to achieve the commander's intent.
- Significant threats to the operation's success. This situation can result from friendly failures or enemy successes.
- In either case, **the commander makes an adjustment decision.**

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Washington, DC, March 2001

Re-Plan When Needed

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6-52. Plans are not static; commanders adjust them based on new information. During preparation, enemies are also acting and the friendly situation is evolving: Assumptions prove true or false. The status of friendly units changes. As these and other aspects of the situation change, commanders determine whether the new information invalidates the plan, requires adjustments to the plan, or validates the plan with no further changes. **They adjust the plan or prepare a new one, if necessary.** When deciding whether and how to change the plan, commanders balance the loss of synchronization and coordination caused by a change against the problems produced by executing a plan that no longer fits reality. The higher commander's intent guides their decision making.

Field Manual Headquarters
No. 6-0 Department of the Army 114
Washington, DC, March 2001

Policy and Planning

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Pre-Decisional Draft~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2 DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Reconfirming all of the provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi People of April 16, 2003,

Recognizing that the prior Iraqi regime used certain government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and as instruments of torture, repression and corruption,

Reaffirming the Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq regarding Ministry of Youth and Sport of May 8, 2003,

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THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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Pre-Decisional Draft~~

	Oct – Dec 2001	Jan-Mar 2002	Apr-Jun 2002	Jul-Sep 2002	Oct-Dec 2002
 CENTCOM	 Oct US strikes Al Qaeda / Taliban  26 Nov GEN Franks meets SECDEF			Jul NSC sets up the Iraqi Planning Coordination Committee	7 Dec Rock Drill  9 Dec Internal Look Rehearsal / CJCS visit  19 Dec PLANORD directs CENTCOM to plan PH IV
 CFLCC	 Nov LTG Mikolashek deploys 3 Army HQ to Kuwait (CFLCC)  OFF		OIF Planning	4 Sep LTG McKiernan assumes command of CFLCC 	5 Dec LTG McKiernan meets LTG Wallace and LTG Conway  19 Dec Cobra II to SECDEF
 CJTF-IV					18 Dec BG Hawkins meets LTG Casey
 V CORPS					 11 Oct V Corps and I MEF HQ DEPEND

 HQ Formed
  Order Published
  Key Decision
  Deploy
  Re-deploy
  Key Event

THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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	Jan – Mar 2003	April 2003	May 2003	June 2003	July 2003
 CENTCOM	<p>Feb CENTCOM to Qatar</p> <p>PLAN 5 Mar GEN Franks final plan to NSC</p> <p>PLAN 14 Mar 1003v Pub</p> <p>PLAN 19 Mar D-Day</p>	<p>7 Apr 2nd Thunder Run</p> <p>9 Apr Statue Falls</p> <p>PLAN 14 Apr Iraq Reconstruction Plan</p> <p>PLAN 16 Apr Gen Franks to Baghdad / Accelerated Redeployment Order</p> <p>30 Apr SECDEF to Baghdad</p> <p>LTG McKiernan & LTG Wallace</p>	<p>1 May "End of Major Combat"</p> <p>5 May CENTCOM begins Redeployment to Tampa</p>		3 Jul GEN Abizaid replaces GEN Franks
 CFLCC	<p>HQ 5 Mar MG Whitley DCG PH IV</p> <p>Cdr CJTF IV</p> <p>PLAN 31 Jan Cobra II</p>	<p>PLAN 12 Apr Eclipse II EECF to Baghdad</p> <p>15 Apr moves forces to Phase IV stance</p>	<p>HQ 1 May CLFCC becomes CJTF-7</p> <p>4 May CJTF-7 assumes control takes control of west battlespace</p>	<p>6 Jun CFLCC Staff begins redeployment</p>	
 CJTF-IV	<p>PLAN 10 Jan CJTF IV EXORD to JFCOM</p> <p>30 Jan CJTF-IV deploys to Kuwait</p> <p>1 Feb CJTF-IV operational</p> <p>5 Mar CJTF IV OPCON to CFLCC</p> <p>22 Mar CJTF IV Brf PH IV</p>	<p>12 Apr CJTF IV Dissolution</p>			
 V CORPS	<p>PLAN 20 Feb Victory Cobra II</p>		<p>28 May V Corps to replace CFLCC as CJTF-7</p>	<p>HQ 14 Jun CJTF 7 TOA from CFLCC to V Corps</p> <p>15 Jun Operation Desert Scorpion</p> <p>19 WIA</p>	
<p>HQ HQ Formed PLAN Order Published ★ Key Decision → Deploy ↶ Re-deploy ☀ Key Event</p>					


THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

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
	Jan – Mar 2003	April 2003	May 2003	June 2003	July 2003
 CENTCOM	<p>★ 20 Jan NSPD 24 creates ORHA</p> <p>9 Jan Undersecretary Feith contacts Garner</p>				
 ORHA	<p>20 Feb ORHA "Rock Drill" at National Defense University</p> <p>Feb 03 LTG Garner ORHA to Kuwait Hilton</p>	<p>21 Apr ORHA into Baghdad</p>	<p>ORHA</p>		
 CPA			<p>1 May Announcement of AMB Bremer appointment</p> <p>6 May Coalition Provisional Authority takes over from ORHA</p> <p>12 May AMB Bremer replaces LTG (R) Garner</p> <p>★ 16 May CPA Order #1</p> <p>★ 23 May CPA Order #2</p>		
<p>HQ HQ Formed PLAN Order Published ★ Key Decision → Deploy ↶ Re-deploy ☀ Key Event</p>					

PHASE IV TRANSITIONS

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
	April 2003	May 2003	June 2003	July 2003
 CENTCOM		5 May 		
 CFLCC			14 Jun 	
 CJTF IV	12 Apr 			
 V Corps				 CJTF 7
 ORHA		12 May 		
 CPA				

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance




ORHA Command Brief
29 Apr 2003

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance



Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance



Training the Staffs

- CFLCC
 - Internal Look 03 (Oct-Dec 2002, 9-16 Dec (CPX))
 - Lucky Warrior 03-2 (4-12 Feb 2003)
- CJTF-7 (V Corps)
 - Staff Assistance Visit (Jun-Jul 2003)
- CJTF-IV
- ORHA
- CPA

Resourcing the Staffs

	Filled	Authorized	Pct Fill
CFLCC			
CJTF-7 (01Jul03)	574	867	66%
CJTF-IV (29Jan03)	56 <u>21</u> 77	58 (Nucleus) <u>80 (Augment)</u> 138 (Total)	98% <u>26%</u> 56%
ORHA (13Feb03)	67	93	72%
CPA-Mil (25Jan04)	143	172	83%
CPA-Civ (24Oct03)	564	1,331	42%

TF-IV Budget

CJTF-IV Daily Update 03 Apr 2003

Issue	Status	Date of Status
\$100K MIPR (CentCom)	\$55 K Available	22 Mar
TF-IV Budget (CentCom)	Stop Gap Proposal Submitted to CentCom	22 Mar
SOSA Contract (CentCom)	In Budget "Pending"	24 Feb
Network Contractors (CentCom)	Pending	8 Mar
Contractors (JFCom)	Approved until 1 May	



22 Mar

JTF-IV Comm – Operational Capability

As of 3 Apr 03

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	CJTF4-DOHA	CJTF4-IRAQ	Issues
People			- AF [SSGT ██████] Exempt B2 arriving on 4 Apr 03 at 0000, to replace [IT1 ██████] Exempt B2 – still pursuing status of Navy ITs
Computer Spt: Contract			- Prop \$3.6M, SOW ready--awaiting funding
Comm Facilities		CFLCC	CFLCC to support: Negotiating space/support for our IWS, SPPS, and Exchange servers in Iraq
Comms			- PhIV comm mtg Qatar 5-6 Apr and at ORHA 9 Apr - ORHA SIPR, NIPR & DSN Upgrade Effort On-hold: Awaiting request from COL Rabon or ORHA to proceed with a site survey and coord with CFLCC C6, NSA and Kuwaiti Info Ministry - Met with Maj ██████ at the HOC on comm requirements, to improve comm, SIPR, CNTRIXS, DSN, etc.--Need funding to proceed and tie to ORHA comm upgrade requirement - Attempting to work with ORHA, CFLCC & CENTCOM to id & integrate comm requirements for the North, South & Baghdad
Std. Phones (non-secure)			Minimize Ph 3: Fewer phone lines same amount of call capacity, please report any change to svc
FAX/Scan (secure/non-secure)			
STEs (US secure phone)			2 require repair to go secure
Red Phones (secure)	CFLCC	CFLCC	Received 1, still req approval to connect
Cell Phones (non-secure)		?	
Thuraya SAT (non-secure)		?	FRAGO: Do not use
Iridium (secure cell/SATCOM ph)			
Comm - Iraq Infrastructure	N/A	?	- Assessing cell, infrastructure, power avail after ground war - Sector books to Portal (Plans/Orha)

	CJTF4-DOHA	CJTF4-IRAQ	Issues
Computer Spt			- Current plan is not to integrate with CFLCC-C6, but become the "Yahoo" for HA and reconstruction efforts on SIPR, NIPR, and CENTRIXS -- provided ORHA with list of recommendations
SIPR - US Support			██████████ Assist C5/C9 move. IATO Pkg in works
SIPR/CENTRIX - ██████████			Migrating to CENTRIX, FDR Training for all, Secure laptops: IWS, DCTS, ADOCs, C2PC, etc.
NIPR - US Support			- MINIMIZE Phase 3: block all except .mil.gov.edu., news, fin, drugs, health, search, IT, religion, weapons...
E-mail services			- NIPR CFLCC to support: Negotiating support requirements
DMS (Defense Msg System)			- Working PLA, Fortezza, CAC reader for JOC & C6
SharePoint (Knowledge Mgmt)			Need to populate J-Code pages
IWS (CJTF4 Collaboration)			- J6 support for loading IWS on a handful of C5 & C9 users wks - Training Tue & Thu 1500-1530
DCTS (DOD Collaboration)	CFLCC	CFLCC	Working access to CFLCC DCTS and own server
C2PC (CFLCC's COP to PC)			
GCCS (provides COP)			
OSIS (Anon Open Srce Info Sys)			Working NIPRNET access w/static IP addresses
JWICS (TS Intel Sys)			
FDR Training			All personnel exchanging info with coalition partners,--CENTRIX requires FDR training, Need "Classify" loaded on laptops
Software Licenses			

**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1
IMPLEMENTATION OF DE-BAATHIFICATION ORDER NO.1
(CP A/ORD/16 May 2003/01)**

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Recognizing that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and deprivations over many years at the hands of the Baath Party,

Noting the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the continuation of Baath Party networks and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Baath Party officials,

Implementing CPA Order No. 1, De-Baathification of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01), and CPA Order No.5, Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council (CP A/ORD/25 May 2003/05)

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**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2
DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES
CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02**

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Reconfirming all of the provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi People of April 16, 2003,


Recognizing that the prior Iraqi regime used certain government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and as instruments of torture, repression and corruption,

Reaffirming the Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq regarding Ministry of Youth and Sport of May 8, 2003,

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
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY



CPA Organization Chart
As of 4 July 03

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Evolution of the Military/Civil Administration Architecture



Transition from military to political primacy



Resource Shortlist:

MILITARY DOCUMENTS

1003v
AMC Ops Brief
CJTF IV Cmd Brief
CJTF IV DCG CENTCOM Brief
CJTF IV Recons Plan
CJTF 7 Campaign Plan
CJTF 7 Stance Brief
Cobra II OPLAN Brief
CENTCOM OIF Tank Brief
CENTCOM OIF Way Ahead Brief
CENTCOM Phase IV Brief
CFLCC CG Notes
Theater RFF's
TOA FRAGO's
V Corps / CFLCC JMD
V Corps Redep Plan
CFLCC / CFH BUA's
CFLCC Force Req Brief
CFLCC Stability Ops Brief
173 PLANORD for OIF PH IV
JSJ5 PLANORD
CJTF IV EXORD
Freedom Message

MILITARY DOCUMENTS

CFH Force Gen Brief
CFH Accelerated Trans
CFH IZ Recons Plan
CFH Phase IV Brief
CFH Way Ahead to CJCS
CFH SECDEF PH IV Brief
CFH Assumptions Brief
CFH DST
J3 Tank Brief
J5 / DSB Post War Brief
LTG Abizaid Updates
Eclipse II
DOD Directive
DOD News Transcripts
HQDA Setting the Force

OTHER RESOURCES

Cobra II (Gordon)
My Year in Iraq (Bremer)
American Soldier (Franks)
PMCO Report
2003 PMCO Interviews

INTERAGENCY DOCUMENTS

NSPD 24
AMB Bremer Updates
CPA 1
CPA 2
CMH Transition Timeline
ORHA Cmd Brief
ORHA IRPC Report
ORHA May Sitreps
ORHA Org Brief
ORHA Recons Plan
CMH Paper
DOS Cables
LTG (R) Garner ITCA Brief
IA Brief to Mr. Slocum
Internal Look Brief

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Transition to Post-Major Combat Operations


Finding: Unclear command relationships and limited integration of planning efforts hindered initial execution of post-major combat operations.

Why it happened:

- Late, ad hoc formation of CJTF-IV and ORHA
 - CJTF-IV was established to form the core of a CENTCOM JTF for Phase IV operations
 - Placed OPCON to CFLCC to plan and synchronize post-major combat operations
 - Disbanded in Apr 03
 - ORHA was formed to plan and control reconstruction
 - CENTCOM became ORHA's reporting authority late in Phase III
 - 16 of 23 ministerial leads were still not appointed by 20 Apr 03
- Command and support relationships clarified too late
- Inadequate integration of CJTF-IV, ORHA and their products
- Communication concerning PMCO between CENTCOM, CFLCC and ORHA tenuous
- Lack of available funds for immediate impact
- ORHA unprepared to enter non-permissive environment
- Deliberate destruction of 17 of 23 ministries by the Iraqis

What should be done:

- For operations aimed at regime change, establish PMCO objectives, organizations and commanders first
- Conduct combat and stability planning in parallel
- Clearly define civil-military C2 arrangements
- Conduct routine joint-interagency training



Post-Major Combat Operations Findings

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Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) Report June 04

Capabilities that Exceeded Expectations

- Initiative and Adaptation
- Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

Capabilities that Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness

- SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration
- Civil Affairs

Capabilities that Fell Short of Expectations or Needs

- Resources
- Intelligence Support
- Joint Command and Control
- Communications Infrastructure
- Strategic Communications (Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations)
- Doctrine and Training
- Campaign Planning

Elements of Effective Transition

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Interagency Preparation

- ⇒ Guidance, anticipated geo-strategic situation and purpose
- ⇒ Desired end state
- Concept of implementation
- Interagency management

Planning

- ⇒ Mature plans for both combat and post-combat and during the transition between the two. Consideration for overlap of phases.
- ⇒ Continuous monitoring, assessment, and re-planning

Organizing

- ⇒ Continuity and timing
- ⇒ Well understood relationships
- ⇒ Well understood intent

Unknowns

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Decision	Who issued it?	Who approved it?	What was the input of others?
[REDACTED]	Bremer		
	Franks		
	Franks		
	Franks		
Standup of CJTF IV *	Myers		
Dissolution of CJTF IV	McKiernan		
Replacement of LTG Wallace with LTG Sanchez	HQDA / Franks		
Not to use ORHA as nucleus of CPA			Director of CIA
Role of JFCOM and Army in Manning CJTF 7 and CJTF IV			

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*Analysis of whether organized, trained and resourced to do what needs to be done