在收购非机密向国会报告of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001

ATTACHMENT A

向国会未分类的报告
关于技术的收购
与大规模杀伤性武器有关
和先进的常规弹药，

2001年7月1日至12月31日

Scope Note

按国家获取：

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism:

主要供应商：

趋势

Scope Note

中央情报（DCI）主任在此提交该报告，以回应《 97财政授权法》第721条的国会指示行动，该法案要求：

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on

应DCI的要求，DCI武器情报，非扩散和军备控制中心（WINPAC）起草了该报告，并在整个情报界进行了协调。按照第721条的指示，该法案的第（b）款未经分类。因此，该报告并未介绍情报界对大规模杀伤性武器和高级常规弹药计划的评估的细节，这些武器可在国会的其他机密报告和简报中获得。ReportsReports

按国家获取

根据第97财政授权法第721条的要求，以下是与大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）和先进的常规武器（ACW）有关的收购活动（招标，谈判，合同和交付）的摘要从2001年7月1日至12月31日。我们排除了已经拥有大量WMD计划的国家，例如中国和俄罗斯，以及几乎没有关注的WMD收购活动的国家。

Iran

伊朗正在大力追求生产土著WMD（核，化学和生物学）以及其输送系统以及ACW的计划。为此，它寻求外国材料，培训，设备和专有技术，使其能够通过其交付方式以及其他武器的组成部分生产一些完整的武器系统。在报告期间，伊朗特别关注俄罗斯，中国，朝鲜和欧洲的实体。

Despite Iran's status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran has sought assorted foreign fissile materials and technology. Such capabilities also can support fissile material production for Tehran's overall nuclear weapons program.

尽管布什尔（Bushehr）被置于国际原子能机构安全措施之下，但俄罗斯提供的专业知识和制造援助已使伊朗能够开发其核技术基础设施，进而可以使德黑兰的核武器研发计划直接受益。此外，俄罗斯实体继续与伊朗研究有关其他核燃料周期活动的研究。

Iran has attempted to use its civilian nuclear energy program, which is quite modest in scope, to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel—cycle capabilities. Such capabilities, however, are well suited to support fissile material production for a weapons program, and we believe it is this objective that drives Iran's efforts to acquire relevant facilities. For example, Iran has sought to obtain turnkey facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility (UCF), that ostensibly would be used to support fuel production for the Bushehr power plant. But the UCF could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material production needed for a nuclear weapon—specifically, production of uranium hexafluoride for use as a feedstock for uranium enrichment operations and production of uranium compounds suitable for use as fuel in a plutonium production reactor. In addition, we suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons development as part of its overall nuclear weapons program.

面对经济压力，一些俄罗斯实体表现出愿意通过规避其国家的出口法来为伊朗的核项目提供援助。对出口控制法的执行是不一致且无效的，但美国政府继续与俄罗斯政府进行合作出口控制对话。例如，俄罗斯原子能部（Minatom）的一个研究所同意在2000年末设备运送，该设备显然是针对原子蒸气激光同位素分离的，这是一种能够生产武器级铀的技术。由于我们抗议，俄罗斯政府停止了将这些设备运送到伊朗，截至报告期末，这些货物仍被暂停。

中国is completing assistance on two Iranian nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that will enable Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel.[1]As a party to the NPT, Iran is required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material. The IAEA's Additional Protocol requires states to declare production of zirconium fuel cladding and gives the IAEA the right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the declarations, but Iran has made no moves to bring the Additional Protocol into force. Zirconium production, other than production of fuel cladding, is not subject to declaration or inspection.

Ballistic missile–related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the reporting period has included equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). In addition, Iran publicly has acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, is a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran's Defense Minister has also publicly mentioned a "Shahab-5." Such statements strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability.

伊朗是《化学武器公约》（CWC）的一方。然而，在报告期间，它继续寻求俄罗斯和中国实体的化学药品，生产技术，培训和专业知识，这些实体可以进一步努力实现生产神经毒剂的土著能力。伊朗已经有库存的水泡，血液和窒息剂，以及炸弹和炮弹来运送它们 - 它以前已经制造了。它可能也成为了一些神经毒剂。

Foreign dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise, primarily, but not exclusively, from entities in Russia and Eastern Europe, continued to feature prominently in Iran's procurement efforts. Such materials have legitimate uses, but Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could benefit from them.

Iran continues to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Since Russia announced in November 2000 that it was abrogating the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian Governments and firms have engaged in high-level discussions on a wide variety of military services and equipment — including air defense, naval, air and ground weapons, and technologies. In October 2001, Tehran and Moscow signed a new military-technical cooperation agreement, which laid the groundwork for negotiations and created a commission for future arms sales, but did not itself include sales contracts.

在接下来的几个月中，合同谈判可能需要数年才能完成，但仅一项销售（对于直升机而言）才得出结论。俄罗斯的各种官员和院士都建议，根据这一新协议的销售，在未来几年中，可以使伊朗俄罗斯的第三大武器客户仅次于中国和印度。在达成协议之前，俄罗斯将继续签订现有合同，但很少有新的武器合同可以完成。伊朗和俄罗斯已同意转移其他MI-8，MI-17和MI-171运输直升机。估计每年向伊朗向伊朗的武器销售额的估计将使伊朗在俄罗斯销售中的份额约为10％，而到中国和印度的50％以上。

To facilitate new arms agreements, Russian oil enterprises entered an agreement with the Russian state arms trading firm Rosoboronexport to promote arms exports. Russian and Iranian arms dealers are to include such firms as Lukoil to coordinate "commercial conditions" and participate in projects proposed by the customer.

在俄罗斯市场之外，伊朗对传统武器的寻找是全球性的，并继续与结果相满足。尤其是，伊朗资本利用了中国和朝鲜必须提供的专业武器服务和降低价格。在其他地方，伊朗寻找产品，尤其是武器组件和双重用品，它们的质量优于俄罗斯可用的产品，或者证明很难通过普通的政府渠道获得的产品。

Iraq

Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687 and subsequent Council resolutions, and no UN inspections have occurred during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are not operating. Furthermore, Iraq has engaged in extensive concealment efforts and has probably used the period since it refused inspections to attempt to reconstitute prohibited programs. Without UN-mandated inspectors in Iraq, assessing the current state of Iraq's WMD and missile programs is difficult.

萨达姆（Saddam）反复宣布对他的“核圣战者”的劝告，以“击败敌人”，这增加了我们的担忧，即自从海湾战争以来，伊拉克一直在继续与核计划相关的研究和发展工作。足够的裂变材料来源仍然是伊拉克能够生产核武器的最重要的障碍。情报界担心巴格达正在尝试获取可以帮助重建其核武器计划的材料。

伊拉克继续开发联合国未禁止的短程弹道导弹（SRBM）系统，并正在扩展到更长的系统。追求未渗透的弹道导弹允许巴格达改善可以应用于长期导弹计划的技术和基础设施。2000年12月31日，AL AQSA游行的四个AL SAMOUD SRBM Transporter-Erector-Launchers（Tels）带有机身，这表明该液态螺旋桨导弹计划正在接近部署。Al-Mamoun工厂的两座新的固体促销剂“混合”建筑物最初旨在生产Badr-2000（即秃鹰）固体螺旋桨导弹 - 特别适合容纳大型，未经禁令的混合器对于BADR-2000计划。实际上，除了伊拉克人开发更长范围，禁止的导弹（即，将固体推进剂专门用于此类导弹）之外，我们无法找到这些混合建筑物的大小和配置的逻辑解释。此外，伊拉克已经开始重建Al-Mamoun的“铸造和治疗”建筑，该建筑物包含大型和深铸坑，这些坑是专门设计用于生产现有的导弹电动机的。

如果取消对伊拉克的经济制裁，巴格达可能会增加其从外国来源获取与导弹相关的物品的尝试，而不管未来的任何联合国监控以及对远程弹道导弹计划的持续限制。在大量的外国援助和适应政治环境的情况下，巴格达可以在十年中期进行MRBM进行测试。此外，伊拉克可能保留了一支小型的Scud弹道导弹，发射器以及常规，化学和生物弹头的部队。我们评估，自1998年12月以来，伊拉克已提高了追求化学战（CW）计划的能力。在1998年12月的海湾战争和沙漠狐狸行动之后，伊拉克重建了其用于工业和商业用途的化学生产基础设施，以及以前的双重使用CW生产设施和导弹生产设施。伊拉克试图为合法平民使用或以合法的平民使用购买多种双重使用物品。自1998年12月停止联合国检查以来，这种设备转移的风险增加了。此外，伊拉克似乎正在与CW相关的设施安装或修理双使用设备。这些设施中的一些可以很快转换为CW代理。

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program. Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq's efforts. UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. In addition, Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. In light of Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency and the likely availability of mobile or covert facilities, we are concerned that Iraq may again be producing BW agents.

伊拉克正在寻求一个无人机(UAV)program that converts L‑29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. We suspect that these refurbished trainer aircraft have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

Iraq aggressively continues to seek advanced conventional warfare (ACW) equipment and technology. A thriving gray arms market and porous borders have allowed Baghdad to acquire smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft, air defense systems, and armored vehicles. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items that have applications in the ACW arena through the Oil-For-Food program.

North Korea

During this time frame, P'yongyang has continued attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program. The North has been seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems.

North Korea probably has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. Spent fuel rods canned in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework contain enough plutonium for several more weapons.

North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China. North Korea continues to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests, which it has said it would observe until at least 2003.

2001年4月，P'Yongyang与俄罗斯签署了一项国防行业和军事技术合作协议，为潜在的武器销售和向朝鲜转移奠定了基础。武器销售和交付将取决于P'Yongyang的付款能力。

利比亚

利比亚拥有全尺寸IAEA保障措施的NPT政党，继续开发其核基础设施。联合国制裁的暂停为利比亚提供了通过外国合作和采购工作来增强其核基础设施的手段。黎波里和莫斯科继续在塔朱拉核研究中心和潜在的电力反应堆协议就合作进行谈判。这样的民政部门的工作可能会为利比亚提供机会，以寻求适合军事目的的技术。此外，利比亚还参加了各种技术交流，它可以通过这些交流来尝试获得双重使用设备和技术，从而可以增强其在核地区的整体技术能力。据报道，2001年，利比亚和其他国家使用其秘密服务来获取有关大规模杀伤性武器（包括核武器）的技术信息。尽管利比亚正在向西方提出政治提议，以加强关系，但利比亚对核武器和正在进行的核基础设施升级的持续兴趣引起了人们的关注。

The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile–related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance—particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities—has been critical to its ballistic missile development programs. Libya's capability probably remains limited to its Scud B missiles but with continued foreign assistance it will probably achieve an MRBM capability—a long-desired goal—or extended-range Scud capability.

利比亚仍然严重依赖外国供应商的CW前体化学品和其他关键相关设备。在暂停联合国制裁之后，黎波里重新建立了主要在西欧的接触，并具有国外的专业知识，零件和前体化学品的来源。黎波里似乎仍在致力于进攻性的CW能力，并最终致力于土著生产。证据表明，利比亚还试图获得开发和生产BW代理的能力。

Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libyan and Russian firms have completed contracts for conventional weapons, munitions, and upgrades and refurbishment for Libya's existing inventory of Soviet-era weapons.

Syria

叙利亚 - 一家具有全尺寸IAEA保障措施的NPT签署者 - 是Dayr Al Hajar的核研究中心。俄罗斯和叙利亚批准了一项关于公民核电合作的合作计划草案。在本金中，如果决定追求核武器，则更广泛地获得俄罗斯专业知识为叙利亚提供了扩大土著能力的机会。在2001年下半年，大马士革继续从国外获得帮助，以建立固定的火箭运动能力和生产能力。叙利亚的液体促程导弹计划已经并且将继续依赖基本的外国设备和援助，这主要来自朝鲜实体和俄罗斯公司。大马士革还继续努力组装（可能是在朝鲜大量援助的情况下）燃烧的Scud C导弹。

在保证化武销毁得到叙利亚寻找前体和专业知识前提下from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already holds a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin but apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.

叙利亚继续从俄罗斯和其他前苏联供应商那里获取相对少量的ACW。但是大马士革对俄罗斯的未偿债务和无法为大量购买提供资金，阻碍了大量设备叙利亚需要振兴其衰老国防军的谈判。大马士革有兴趣收购俄罗斯SA-10和SA-11防空系统，MIG-29和SU-27战斗机，以及T-80或T-90主战车，以及飞机，装甲武器和飞机的升级防空系统已经在其库存中。自从叙利亚国防部长于2001年5月在莫斯科与俄罗斯高级官员会面以来，销售或债务问题上没有任何突破，尽管高级代表团继续讨论武器贸易。

苏丹

苏丹是CWC的一方，多年来一直在开发生产化学武器的能力。从历史上看，它一直从伊拉克获得外国实体的帮助。苏丹也可能对BW计划感兴趣。

报告期内,苏丹寻求活动re a variety of military equipment from various sources. In the long-running civil war, Khartoum is seeking older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless offer more advanced capabilities than the weapons of its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries. We remain concerned that Sudan may seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.

印度

The underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone in India's continuing nuclear weapons development program. Since the 1998 tests, New Delhi has continued efforts intended to lead to the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.

印度仍然缺乏某些关键导弹技术的工程或生产专业知识。俄罗斯和西欧的实体仍然是2001年与导弹相关和双重用途技术转移的主要管道。在报告期间，印度对Dhanush弹道导弹进行了飞行测试，继续与俄罗斯人一起在婆罗门巡航中与俄罗斯人一起工作，并搬进了婆罗门。具有核能力的Prithvi导弹和发射器在巴基斯坦范围内，作为其军事动员的一部分。

主要来自俄罗斯的ACW收购继续在印度的武装部队全面现代化中发挥重要作用。延误困扰着许多关键计划，但新德里获得了两架Mig-21-93战斗机，印度斯坦航空公司有限，开始了有执照的升级123架飞机。2001年，新德里与俄罗斯达成了8亿美元的合同，涉及310 T-90年代的主要战车，而KA-31直升机的合同较小。印度正在与俄罗斯关于核潜艇和航母的谈判。印度还继续探索租赁或购买几种空降预警系统的选择。除了从以色列购买绿松木雷达外，新德里还与特拉维夫（Tel Aviv）签订了2.7亿美元的合同，以实现Barak-1导弹防御系统。印度空军重新开放了Jet Trainer飞机的竞争，并正在考虑来自捷克共和国，法国，意大利，俄罗斯和英国的竞标。

Israel is also seeking to expand its defense cooperation with India. In recent months, India and Israel have engaged in negotiations for the sale of the Arrow-2 anti-tactical-ballistic missile. Negotiations are also underway regarding the proposed sale of the three PHALCON airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft for approximately $1 billion. India has already taken delivery of the Israeli Greenpine radar for installation at a ground site for use as an early warning platform. The Greenpine radar is a component of the PHALCON AEW aircraft. Israel has also reportedly sold the Harpy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to India.

巴基斯坦

1998年5月下旬，巴基斯坦的核武器测试证明了其发达的核武器计划。在报告期间，它继续获取与核相关的设备，其中一些双重使用以及来自西欧的各种来源的材料。如果巴基斯坦选择开发更先进的核武器，那么寻求这种商品将仍然很重要。过去，中国为伊斯兰堡的核武器和弹道导弹计划提供了广泛的支持，但在1996年5月，它保证不为包括巴基斯坦在内的任何州不安全的核设施提供援助。但是，我们不能排除中国和巴基斯坦实体在巴基斯坦核武器开发方面继续接触的可能性。

在报告期间，巴基斯坦的弹道导弹计划继续受益于中国实体援助。借助中国实体的援助，巴基斯坦正在朝着固定促进剂SRBM（例如Shaheen-I和Haider-I）的连续生产迈进。尽管巴基斯坦上次在1999年进行了弹道导弹飞行测试，但它计划在2002年进行测试Haider-I弹道导弹。成功开发了两阶段的Shaheen-II MRBM将需要中国实体或其他潜在来源的持续帮助。

巴基斯坦继续依靠中国和法国的ACW要求。伊斯兰堡从法国收到了升级的Mirage IIIS，并进行了谈判，从中国购买了40名F-7战斗机。

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism

使用化学，生物学，放射学和核（CBRN）的恐怖分子的威胁似乎正在上升，尤其是自9月11日袭击以来。在全球30个指定的外国恐怖组织和其他非州行为者中，有几个对CBRN表示了兴趣，尽管恐怖分子可能会继续赞成诸如轰炸和枪击事件之类的经过验证的传统策略。此外，无人驾驶飞机（UAV）和其他类型的巡航导弹表现出潜在的WMD递送车的严重威胁。

CBRN信息和技术更广泛地可用，尤其是来自诸如互联网，科学出版物和会议之类的来源。金博宝更改账户

自9月11日袭击以来，围绕炭疽事件的宣传增加了，强调了平民和政府目标对CBRN攻击的脆弱性。

Although the September 11 attacks suggest that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists will continue to use conventional weapons, one of our highest concerns is their stated readiness to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was "a religious duty."

全球恐怖组织可以及时访问有关化学和生物学的信息，在某种程度上，甚至通过互联网，公开可用的科学文学和科学会议，我们都知道Al-Qa'ida正在努力获得一些最危险的化学剂和毒素。1999年在埃及的一名高级本·拉丁（Bin Ladin）副手声称，他的团体具有化学和生物武器。从阿富汗的基地组织设施中回收的文件和设备表明，本·拉丁的生物武器研究计划比以前发现的更复杂的生物武器研究计划。

我们还知道，基地组织有雄心勃勃的核武器，并且已经接受了任何可能可用的外部核援助。2001年2月，在对美国大使馆在坦桑尼亚和肯尼亚大使馆的爆炸中进行的审判期间，政府证人 - 贾马尔·艾哈迈德·法德尔（Jamal Ahmad Fadl）检验了al-qa'ida追求出售一定数量的富有浓郁的铀（这是瓦尔 - Qa'ide）实际上，可能是1990年代初在苏丹的骗局材料。

我们评估恐怖分子对放射学扩散设备的使用是高度可信的威胁。此外，我们必须警惕QA'IDA或其他恐怖组织也可能试图发动针对美国化学或核工业基础设施的常规袭击以造成恐慌和经济破坏的可能性。

主要供应商：

俄罗斯

俄罗斯的现金短缺的国防，生物技术，化学，航空航天和核行业渴望通过出口和转移筹集资金。此外，一些俄罗斯大学和科学学院表明，通过为外国学生提供与WMD或导弹相关的教学和培训，愿意赚取急需的资金。鉴于此类出口，转移和培训的潜在扩散影响很大，监测特定实体的活动以及俄罗斯政府不扩散制度的总体有效性仍然很高。

俄罗斯has played a key role in supporting civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project. Even though the ostensible purpose of Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear infrastructure is for civilian applications, we assess that such support enhances Tehran's ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. The Intelligence Community closely monitors Moscow's nuclear cooperation with Tehran for any direct assistance in support of nuclear weapons efforts.

普京总统于2000年5月修改了核出口总统法令，以允许俄罗斯在特殊情况下将核材料，技术和设备出口到没有全身IAEA保障措施的国家。此举为将核出口扩展到没有全范围保障措施的某些国家的核出口扫清了道路，例如，俄罗斯在2001年为其平民核计划提供了印度的材料。

俄罗斯n entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance most likely supports Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.

在2001年，俄罗斯实体仍然是双重使用的重要来源伊朗的生物技术，化学，生产技术和设备。俄罗斯的生物学和化学专业知识使其成为伊朗人寻求技术信息以及有关BW和CW代理生产过程培训的有吸引力的目标。

俄罗斯仍然是常规武器的主要供应商。在莫斯科于2000年11月废除了戈尔 - 切尔诺米尔丁协议之后，俄罗斯官员表示，他们认为伊朗是武器销售中潜在收入的重要收入来源，并相信德黑兰可以成为俄罗斯仅次于中国和印度的俄罗斯第三大传统武器客户。2001年，俄罗斯是中国，伊朗，利比亚和苏丹的主要ACW来源，也是印度最大的来源之一。

俄罗斯continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia has discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.

The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and Putin in 2000 reorganized the export control bureaucracy. In August 2001, Putin signed into effect several of the new law's implementing decrees, which updated export control lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and related dual-use technologies and equipment.

Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia's export controls, lax enforcement and insufficient penalties for violations remain a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities—as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them—that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted.

North Korea

在2001年下半年，朝鲜继续向中东，南亚和北非出口大量相关的弹道导弹，组件，材料和技术专业知识。P'Yongyang将高度重视弹道导弹，设备和相关技术的开发和销售。弹道导弹和相关技术的出口是北方硬币的主要来源之一，燃料持续的导弹开发和生产。

中国

During this reporting period, Beijing continued to narrowly interpret its bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the United States. In the nuclear area, China has made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities, perhaps acting without Beijing's knowledge or permission, and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

1997年10月，中国对其与伊朗的核合作进行了保证。中国同意结束与伊朗在提供铀转化设施（UCF）的合作，并在完成两个现有项目后不与伊朗进行新的合作。我们担心中国和伊朗实体之间的某些相互作用可能与北京对美国的双边承诺背道而驰。

In the missile-related area, Beijing on several occasions has pledged not to sell Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems but has not recognized the regime's key technology annex. China is not a member of the MTCR.

2000年11月，中国承诺不以任何方式协助任何可以用来运送核武器的弹道导弹的国家，并在早期制定与导弹相关的全面出口控制系统。中国实体在报告期间为巴基斯坦提供了与导弹相关的技术援助。巴基斯坦一直在朝着中国实体帮助的固定促进剂SRBMS的国内连续生产迈进。巴基斯坦还需要持续的中国实体援助，以支持开发两阶段的Shaheen-II MRBM。此外，中国的公司还向其他几个扩散关注的国家（例如伊朗，朝鲜和利比亚）提供了与导弹相关的物品，原材料和/或援助。

中国公司正在向伊朗提供双重使用CW相关的生产设备和技术。1997年5月对七个中国实体实施的美国制裁措施有意并为伊朗的CW计划做出贡献仍然有效。在当前报告期间的证据表明，伊朗继续向中国实体寻求这种援助。

中国is a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran, among others. Beijing and Islamabad also have negotiated the sale of an additional 40 F-7 fighters for delivery to Pakistan.

Western Countries

西欧国家对WMD和与导弹有关的商品和材料保持严格有效的出口控制。伊朗和利比亚继续向西欧实体迈进，为其WMD和导弹计划提供所需的收购，但几乎没有成功。尽管如此，扩散剂和相关的网络仍在继续寻求机床，双使用设备的备件以及可用的材料，科学设备和专业金属。此外，一些西方国家宣布愿意谈判向利比亚进行ACW销售。

西方国家是与WMD相关信息和培训扩散的重要来源。西方机构的相对高级研究，相关双重用途研究和信息的可用性，科学家分享研究的热情以及双重使用培训计划和教育的可用性可能会缩短某些WMD计划的开发时间，尤其是恐怖组织的人。

趋势

Some key WMD and missile programs are becoming more advanced and effective as they mature and as countries of concern become more aggressive in pursuing a range of technologies.

关键的WMD扩散器正在采取步骤变得更加自给自足。他们能够更好地保护自己的程序免受拦截和破坏的影响。为此，他们正在寻求更大的土著能力，包括更先进的生产技术。这样的国内能力可能并不总是可以替代外国进口商品，但是在许多情况下，它们可能被证明是足够的。

此外，many WMD and missile proliferators are becoming more adept at denial and deception efforts, including hiding transactions and using dual-use technology and underground facilities in indigenous developments. For example, they are pursuing dual-use materials and technologies with WMD as well as legitimate applications that can be incorporated into commercial facilities and converted to WMD uses fairly quickly.

在经济压力下，有利可图的外国销售的需求是为实体提供的强大动力，尤其是在双重使用物品和技术的情况下。在某些国家（例如俄罗斯和中国）的出口控制执行薄弱，鼓励了这一趋势。此外，一些traditional recipients of WMD and missile-related technology, particularly maturing state-sponsored programs, are beginning to supply technology and expertise to other proliferators. Such "secondary proliferators" as India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are not members of control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime and do not adhere to their export constraints.

Nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missile-applicable technology and expertise continues to gradually disperse worldwide. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that from a technical standpoint, additional proliferators may be able to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon and to develop the capability to weaponize it. On the other hand, important political disincentives to nuclear weapon development will remain in place for most countries. As developing countries expand their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also are advancing toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional nonstate actors are becoming more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology poses the threat of more countries of concern eventually breaching the 1,000-km range of SRBMs and posing greater risks to regional stability.

最后，尽管大多数这些计划通常都在很大程度上依赖外国技术援助，但大多数引起扩散关注的国家都在不断努力为先进的传统武器开发土著设计并扩大生产能力。这些国家中的许多国家（不可获得更新或更高级的武器）正在为现有库存寻求升级计划。此外，一些接受国（例如伊朗）又成为无法在其他地方购买武器的国家和实体的供应商。

[1]See pages 13 and 14 for a further discussion of possible interaction between Chinese and Iranian entities with regard to China's pledge to halt assistance to Iran's nuclear programs after these projects are complete.

向国会未分类的报告关于技术的收购与大规模杀伤性武器有关和先进的常规弹药，

2001年7月1日至12月31日

向国会未分类的报告
关于技术的收购
与大规模杀伤性武器有关
和先进的常规弹药，