源码 : CIA系统非分类向国会报告
技术获取
有关大规模毁灭性武器
和高级常规弹药
至2002年6月30日
范围注解
国获取量 :
化学、生物、辐射和核恐怖主义
密钥提供方 :
新兴国家和非国家供应商
范围注解
中央情报局局长特此提交本报告,以响应议会指令的FES 97情报授权法第721节,其中规定:
最晚自本法颁布之日起6个月,此后中央情报厅长应每6个月向国会提交一份报告
外国前6个月获取双重用途技术和其他技术开发或生产大规模毁灭性武器(包括核武器、化学武器和生物武器)和先进常规弹药并
2) 这些国家获取技术的趋势
ReportsDCI武器情报、不扩散和军备控制中心(WINPAC)应DCI请求起草并协调整个情报社区的报告,按照该法第721分节b指令,它不分类,因此报告不提供情报社区评估大规模毁灭性武器和先进常规弹药程序的细节,这些细节见于大会的其他机密报告和简报中。
国购
97财政年度情报授权法第721节要求,下文汇总2002年1月1日至6月30日发生的与大规模毁灭性武器和先进常规武器有关的获取活动(引用、谈判、合同和交付)排除那些已经拥有大规模杀伤计划的国家,如中国和俄罗斯,以及那些表示很少获取大规模毁灭性武器活动的国家
伊朗
核.尽管伊朗在《不扩散核武器条约》(《不扩散条约》)中拥有地位,但美国仍然确信德黑兰正在推行核武器计划。 为加强建立国内核燃料循环能力的努力,伊朗拥有技术也能支持德黑兰整体核武器计划生产裂变材料。
伊朗继续试图用民用核电程序为建立国内或获取各类核燃料循环能力开脱。 然而,这种能力完全适合支持生产用于武器计划的裂变材料,我们认为正是这个目标驱动伊朗获取相关设施的努力。 我们怀疑德黑兰有兴趣获取外国裂变材料和技术开发武器作为其整体核武器程序的一部分
Despite Bushehr being put under IAEA safeguards, Russia's provision of expertise and manufacturing assistance has helped Iran to develop its own nuclear technology infrastructure.� In addition, facing economic pressures, some Russian entities have shown a willingness to provide assistance to other nuclear projects within Iran.� For example, an institute subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had agreed to deliver in late 2000 equipment that was clearly intended for atomic vapor laser isotope separation, a technology capable of producing weapons-grade uranium.� As a result of US protests, the Russian Government has halted the delivery of some of this equipment to Iran.�
Chinese entities are continuing work on a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that will enable Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel.� As an adherent to the NPT, Iran is required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material.� The IAEA's Additional Protocol requires states to declare production of zirconium fuel cladding and gives the IAEA the right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the declarations, but Iran has made no moves to bring the Additional Protocol into force.� Moreover, Iran remains the only NPT adherent with a full-scope safeguards agreement that has not adopted a subsidiary agreement obligating early declaration of nuclear facilities.� Zirconium production, other than production of fuel cladding, is not subject to declaration or inspection.
导弹.� Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.� Such assistance during the reporting period continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise.� Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).� In addition, Iran publicly has acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3.� It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, is a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications.� Iran's Defense Minister has also publicly mentioned a "Shahab-5."� Such statements strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability.
化学类. 伊朗是《化学武器公约》的缔约国。然而,在报告所述期间,伊朗继续从中国实体寻找化学品、生产技术、培训和专门知识,这些实体可推进德黑兰实现神经毒剂生产能力的努力。 伊朗已经储存了烟雾、血液和阻塞物剂
生物类. 尽管伊朗是《生物武器公约》的一部分,德黑兰也许保有攻击性生物技术程序。外国两用生物技术材料、设备和专门知识主要但不完全来自东欧+++继续在伊朗采购努力中占有突出地位。虽然这些材料有正当用途,但伊朗生物战程序也可能从中得益。伊朗可能有能力生产小量生物战代理物,但武器化能力有限
先进常规武器自俄罗斯于2000年11月宣布废除Gore-Cheromirdin协议以来,俄罗斯和伊朗政府及公司就各种军事服务和设备进行了高级别讨论,包括防空、海陆空武器和技术;2001年10月,德黑兰和莫斯科签署了一项新的军事技术合作协议,为谈判打下基础并创建未来军火销售委员会,但其本身不包括销售合同
合同谈判可能需要数年时间完成,随后数月持续至少一次销售iblipse
为促进新武器协议,俄罗斯石油公司与俄罗斯国家武器交易公司Rosoboronexport签定协议促进武器出口。 俄罗斯和伊朗军火商包括Lukoil等公司协调商业条件并参与客户推荐项目
除俄罗斯市场外,伊朗对常规武器的搜索遍及全球。 特别是,伊朗利用了中国和北韩提供的专门化武器服务并降低了价格。 其他地方,伊朗寻找产品,特别是武器组件和双重用途产品,质量优于俄国提供的产品或经证明难以通过正常政府渠道获取的产品。
伊拉克
在本报告所述期间,巴格达继续拒绝联合国视察员按照安全理事会第687号决议和随后安理会各项决议的要求进入伊拉克,2002年上半年没有进行联合国视察,此外,联合国安装在伊拉克已知和疑似大规模毁灭性武器设施自动化视频监视系统在此期间没有运行。 此外,伊拉克进行了广泛的隐蔽努力并自拒绝视察以来使用这一段时间重构被禁止程序
核十多年的制裁和伊拉克在原子能机构监督下大量物理核基础设施的损耗并没有削弱萨达姆获取或开发核武器的兴趣。伊拉克努力采购数万个受禁高强度铝管令人大感关注。所有情报专家都同意伊拉克正在寻找核武器并可在离心浓缩程序中使用这些管子。大多数情报专家评估这是预期用法,但有些人相信这些管子可能准备用于常规武器程序
海湾战争前伊拉克拥有先进核武器开发程序,重点是用高浓缩铀制造内爆型武器;巴格达正在尝试各种铀浓缩技术,其中最成功的是电磁同位素分离和气离心程序;入侵科威特后,伊拉克启动崩溃程序转移原子能机构受保障的高浓铀从苏法反应堆流出,但敌对行动的爆发结束了这一努力。伊拉克申报和特委会/原子能机构检验进程披露了伊拉克核武器努力的大部分内容
Baghdad, however, still has not provided complete information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.� Iraq has withheld significant details relevant to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.� Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraqi security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.� In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for-Food Program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurementsoutside the Oil-for-Food processsome of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and other weapons programs.� Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.
原子能机构离开伊拉克前,在拆除伊拉克核武器计划并挖掘伊拉克过去核活动性质和范围方面迈出了长足步子。 但由于没有检查,大多数分析家估计伊拉克正在努力重构核计划并解放原子能机构来之不易的成就
伊拉克保留核科学家和技师骨干、程序文档和足够的双重用途制造能力支持重构核武器程序。 过去两年里,伊拉克媒体报告萨达姆和核科学家多次会晤,表示巴格达继续有兴趣恢复核程序
伊拉克不断扩大的国际贸易为获取核相关技术与材料提供了越来越多的渠道并有可能获取外国核专门知识。近年来双重用途采购活动的增加可能支持重构核武器程序。获取足够的裂变材料是伊拉克开发核武器的主要障碍。直到本十年后半段,伊拉克不太可能自发生产足够的武器级材料用于可交付核装置。如果巴格达能在国外采购武器级裂变材料,它可能在一年内生产核武器。
导弹. 伊拉克开发了超过UNID 687规定的150千米射程限制的弹道导弹能力.1980年代,伊拉克从苏联购买819枚飞毛腿B型导弹.在两伊战争期间数以百计的300千米射程导弹用于攻击伊朗城市.从1987年开始,伊拉克将许多苏维埃飞毛腿转换成长程变异体,其中一些向德黑兰发射!一些人是在海湾战争期间发射的,另一些则留在伊拉克战争结束时的盘点中。 伊拉克承认至少用化学或生物战剂填充75枚飞毛腿弹头并部署这些武器用于对付联军和区域对手,包括1991年以色列
萨达姆在海湾战争期间向以色列、沙特阿拉伯和巴林发射约90枚飞毛腿式导弹中大都为al-Husayn变异式,伊拉克人通过延长机体并增加燃料容量来修改变异式,将射程扩展至650千米
Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas.� Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000km.� Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.� Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs.� Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads.� Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.
AL-SAMOD-II液体推进器SRBM和al-Fat'h
Al-Rafah-North液态推进引擎研究、开发、测试和评价设施是伊拉克静态测试液态推进导弹引擎的主要站点。巴格达一直在新建测试台,比al-Samoud引擎测试测试台和去功能Scud引擎测试台大。测试设施唯一可信的解释是伊拉克打算测试UNS 687禁止的远程导弹引擎
Al-Mutasim固态火箭机测试设施先前与伊拉克Badr-2000固态推进式导弹程序相关联,近年来已经重建并扩展。 Al-Mutasim网站支持联合国授权Ababil-100固态推进电机汇编、重编和测试,但某些设施的规模,特别是重构区与静态测试区间新建设施的规模显示巴格达正准备开发联合国禁止的系统
At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid-propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program.� They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 casings with solid propellant.� Also at Al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to "mix" solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile.� The new buildingsabout as large as the original onesare ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers.� In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.
Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions.� Iraqi intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.� The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Al-Mamoun that supports Iraq's solid propellant missile program.� Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid-propellant missile motors.� Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.� In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for some time.� Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier that year.
化学类.� We believe that, since December 1998, Iraq has increased its capability to pursue chemical warfare (CW) programs.� After both the Gulf war and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as former dual-use CW production facilities and missile production facilities.� Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use.� Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion of such equipment has increased.� In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities.� Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.�
特委会于1998年12月向安全理事会报告,伊拉克还继续隐瞒与CW程序有关的信息,例如,巴格达从特委会视察员那里查获特委会发现的伊拉克空军文件,显示伊拉克1980年代两伊战争期间没有像巴格达申报的那样多用CW弹药,这一差异显示伊拉克可能隐藏了6 000枚CW弹药
生物类.� During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program.� Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq's efforts.� UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time.� In addition, Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities.� In light of Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency and the availability of mobile or possible covert facilities, we are concerned that Iraq is again producing BW agents.
先进常规武器. 伊拉克继续开发无人驾驶飞行器程序,转换原从东欧获取的L-29喷气机;过去,伊拉克进行了L-29飞行,可能测试系统改进或培训新飞行员;我们怀疑这些翻新教练机已经修改以交付化学战剂或更有可能生物战剂;伊拉克还正在开发测试小型UAV,其中一些完全适合配送化学和生物剂
伊拉克继续积极寻找先进常规战设备与技术。 蓬勃灰色军火市场和松散边界允许巴格达获取小件和大件组件,如飞机备件、防空系统及装甲车辆等。 伊拉克还获取了一些双重用途和生产品,通过石油换食品程序应用ACW领域
北韩
核.美国仍然怀疑朝鲜几年来一直在铀浓缩方面工作,然而,我们没有获得明确证据显示朝鲜直到最近才开始搭建离心机设施
北韩自2001年开始大规模寻找离心机相关材料,并获取适合铀馈送和提取系统使用的设备。北韩目标似乎是一个工厂,在完全运行时每年生产两枚或多枚核武器所需的足够武器级铀。我们继续监控和评估北韩核武器努力,鉴于北美社会闭合和程序隐蔽性,这些努力仍难于收集情报
导弹.� North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources.� In the second half of 2002, North Korea continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests, while announcing it may reconsider its September offer to extend the moratorium beyond 2003.� The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payloadmay be ready for flight-testing.� The North probably also is working on improvements to its current design.� North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.
化学学北韩不是《化学武器公约 》 ( CWC ) 的缔约方。 P'yongyang已经获取双重用途化学物支持P'yongyang的长期化战程序。北韩化学战能力包括使用庞大化工生产批量神经泡泡、窒息和血液代理物的能力。在2002年下半年,我们相信北韩拥有大量物剂和武器储存,并可能用在各种投送工具中。
生物学北韩加入生物和毒素武器公约,但自1960年代以来就一直追求生物战能力,平阳获取双重用途生物技术设备、用品和试剂支持北韩生物和毒素努力,截至2002年下半年,北韩据信拥有弹药生产基础设施,允许BW代理件武器化并可能拥有这类武器可用
利比亚
核拥有原子能机构全面保障监督的《不扩散条约》缔约方利比亚继续开发核基础设施,联合国暂停制裁通过对外合作和采购努力向利比亚提供增强核基础设施的手段,的黎波里和莫斯科继续在Tajura核研究中心和潜在电子堆协议上展开合作会谈民营部门工作可为利比亚提供获取技术的机会,这些技术也适合军事目的;此外,利比亚还参与各种技术交流,通过这些技术获取双重用途设备与技术,提高核领域总体技术能力;2001年,利比亚和其他国家据说利用秘密服务获取大规模毁灭性武器开发技术信息,包括核武器技术信息;虽然利比亚向西方发出政治姿态以加强关系,但利比亚对核武器和核基础设施升级的持续兴趣引起关注。
导弹. 1999年暂停联合国制裁允许利比亚扩大努力从外国获取弹道导弹相关设备、材料、技术和专门知识. 外部援助........................................................................................................................
化学生物利比亚还仍然严重依赖外国供应商获取CW前体化学品和其他相关设备。在联合国制裁中止后,的黎波里重新与国外专家、零件和前体化学品来源建立联系,主要分布在西欧。的黎波里似乎仍在努力建立攻击CW能力并最终实现本地生产。有证据表明利比亚也在努力获取研发BW代理器的能力。
先进常规武器.继联合国暂停制裁后,利比亚公司和俄罗斯公司完成了利比亚现有苏维埃时代武器库的常规武器、弹药、升级和翻新合同
叙利亚
核导.� Syriaan NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguardshas a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar.� Russia and Syria have approved a draft cooperative program on cooperation on civil nuclear power.� In principal, broader access to Russian expertise provides opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons.� During the second half of 2001, Damascus continued to receive help from abroad on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability.� Syria's liquid-propellant missile program has and will continue to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistanceprimarily from North Korean entities and Russian firms.� Damascus also continued its efforts to assembleprobably with North Korean assistanceliquid-fueled Scud C missiles.
化学生物叙利亚在报告所述期间从外国来源获取CW相关先质和专门知识。大马士革已经储存神经毒剂沙林,但显然正试图开发更多有毒持久神经毒剂。叙利亚仍然依赖外国来源获取CW程序关键元素,包括化学先质和关键生产设备。叙利亚极有可能继续开发攻击性BW能力
先进常规武器.� Syria continued to acquire relatively small quantities of ACWmainly from Russia and other former Soviet-bloc suppliers.� But Damascus' outstanding debt to Russia and inability to fund large purchases hampered negotiations for the large quantity of equipment Syria needs to revitalize its aging defense forces.� Damascus wanted to acquire Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as well as upgrades for the aircraft, armored weapons, and air defense systems already in its inventory.� No breakthroughs in the sales or debt issue have been noted since Syria's Defense Minister met with high-level Russian officials in Moscow in May 2001, although high-level delegations continued to discuss weapons trade.�
苏丹
化学生物.苏丹是化武公约的缔约方,多年来一直在寻找生产化学武器的能力,历史上它从外国实体获取帮助,主要是在伊拉克。苏丹可能也有兴趣使用BW程序
先进常规武器.在本报告所述期间,苏丹试图从各种渠道获取各种军事装备;在旷日持久的内战中,喀土穆正在寻找老式低价ACW和常规武器,尽管这些武器提供比邻国反对者及其支持者的武器更先进的能力。
印度
核. 1998年5月地下核试验是印度持续开发核武器计划的一个重要里程碑. 自1998年测试以来,新德里继续努力开发更精密核武器. 在本报告所述期间,印度继续为其民用核电计划获取外国援助,主要来自俄罗斯
导弹.印度仍然缺乏某些关键导弹技术的工程或生产知识。俄罗斯和西欧实体2001年仍然是导弹相关和双重用途技术转让的主要管道。
先进常规武器.� ACW acquisitions, primarily from Russia, continued to play an important role in India's across-the-board modernization of its armed forces.� Many key programs have been plagued by delays, but New Delhi has received the first of a licensed upgrade of 125 MiG-21-93 fighter aircraft, working with Hindustan Aeronautics, Limited.� In 2001, New Delhi concluded an $800 million contract with Russia for 310 T-90S main battle tanks and a smaller contract for KA-31 helicopters.� India was also negotiating with Russia for nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier.� India also continued to explore options for leasing or purchasing several airborne early warning systems.� In addition to purchasing the Green Pine radar from Israel, New Delhi also signed a $270 million contract with Tel Aviv for the ship-borne Barak‑1 surface-to-air missile defense system.� The Indian Air Force reopened the competition for jet trainer aircraft and is considering bids primarily from the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom.
近几个月来,印度和以色列为出售Arrow-2反战术弹道导弹展开谈判,并正在商谈以约10亿美元出售三架PHALCON空降预警飞机的建议,印度已经把Greenpine雷达送入地面安装平台供PHALCONAW使用,据报以色列还把HARPY无人驾驶飞行器卖给印度
巴基斯坦
核.� Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998 demonstrated its well-developed nuclear weapons program.� During the reporting period, it continued to acquire nuclear-related equipment, some of it dual use, and materials from various sourcesprincipally in Western Europe.� If Pakistan chooses to develop more advanced nuclear weapons, seeking such goods will remain important.� China provided extensive support in the past to Islamabad's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, but in May 1996 it pledged not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, including Pakistan.� We cannot rule out, however, the possibility of continued contacts between Chinese and Pakistani entities on Pakistani nuclear weapons development.
导弹巴基斯坦弹道导弹计划在本报告所述期间继续从中国实体的大量援助中受益,巴基斯坦实体援助继续转向固推进性SRBs序列制作,如Shaheen-I、Abdali和Ghaznavi。在报告所述期间,巴基斯坦测试三枚弹道导弹:GhauriMRBS、Hatf IIISRBM和Hatf IIABM成功开发需要中国实体或其他潜在源的持续帮助
先进常规武器巴基斯坦继续依赖中国和法国满足ACW需求,伊斯兰堡从法国接收40批升级幻影三维和Vs,从中国接收40架F-7PG格斗士
化学、生物、辐射和核恐怖主义
恐怖分子使用化学、生物、放射性和核材料的威胁继续上升.................................................
自911攻击以来对炭疽事件增加宣传突出表明平民和政府目标易受化学、生物、辐射或核攻击
Quida表示准备非常规攻击我们。 早在1998年,Bin Ladin公开宣布获取非常规武器是“宗教职责 ” 。
全世界恐怖主义集团随时可以通过互联网、公开科学文献和科学会议获取化学和生物信息,甚至核武器信息,我们知道al-Qa'ida正努力获取一些最危险的化学物剂和毒素。1999年埃及审判的一名高级Bin Ladin助手称他的集团有生化武器。从al-Qa'ida阿富汗设施回收的文件和设备显示Bin Ladin拥有比以前已知的更精密的非常规武器研究程序
Qa'ida有获取或开发核武器的雄心并接受外部核援助。 2001年2月,美国驻坦桑尼亚和肯尼亚大使馆Qa'ida爆炸案审判时,政府证人Qa'ida证实al-Qa'ida于1990年代初在苏丹出售数枚所谓浓缩铀(事实上可能是骗取材料 ) 。
我们估计恐怖集团有能力使用放射性撒布装置发动攻击。 此外,我们必须警惕al-Qa'ida或其他恐怖集团还可能试图对美国化学或核工业基础设施发动常规攻击以制造恐慌和经济混乱的可能性。
密钥提供方 :
俄罗斯
俄罗斯受现金约束的国防、生物技术、化学、航空航天和核产业继续急切地通过出口和转移筹集资金。 此外,俄罗斯一些大学和科研院表示愿意通过向外国学生提供大规模毁灭性武器或导弹教学培训来获取急需的资金。鉴于此类出口、转移和培训的巨大潜在扩散作用,监测特定实体的活动以及俄罗斯政府不扩散制度的总体有效性仍然是高度优先事项。
核. 俄罗斯在支持伊朗民用核项目方面发挥了关键作用,主要是布歇赫尔核电厂项目。 尽管俄罗斯援助伊朗核基础设施的似然目的是为了民用应用,但我们估计,这种支持可增强德黑兰支持核武器开发努力的能力。
普京总统2000年5月修正了关于核出口的总统令允许俄罗斯在特殊情况下向没有原子能机构全面保障监督的国家输出核材料、技术和设备。 比方说俄罗斯向印度提供2001年民用核计划材料
导弹俄罗斯实体在本报告所述期间继续向伊朗、印度和中国等国家提供各种弹道导弹相关货物和技术知识,伊朗早先成功从俄罗斯实体获取技术和材料帮助加速伊朗开发Shahab-3MRBM,俄罗斯实体持续援助极有可能支持伊朗开发新导弹和提高德黑兰导弹生产自足能力的努力
化学生物.2002年上半年期间,俄罗斯实体仍然是两用关键源生物技术、化学品、生产技术和设备对伊朗而言。 俄罗斯生物和化学专业知识使它成为伊朗人寻找生物和生物代理生产过程技术信息和培训的有吸引力目标。
先进常规武器. 俄罗斯继续是常规武器的主要供应者. 莫斯科于2000年11月废除Gore-Chernoirdin协议后,俄罗斯官员表示,他们视伊朗为武器销售潜在收入的重要来源,并相信德黑兰可以成为俄罗斯继中印后第三大常规武器客户. 2001年俄罗斯是ACC中国、伊朗、利比亚和苏丹的主要来源,也是印度最大来源之一. 俄罗斯在国际军备展示中积极营销热量武器
俄罗斯继续是印度和中国海军核推进程序的主要技术设备供应商。 此外,俄罗斯还讨论向印度租赁核动力潜艇问题。
出口管制杜马于1999年颁布了新的出口管制法,普京于2000年重组了出口管制官僚机构。 普京于2001年签署了数项新法执行令生效,这些令更新生物病原体、化学剂、导弹及相关双重用途技术和设备的出口管制清单。 2002年5月俄罗斯修正了刑法,允许对非法输出可用于制造大规模毁灭性武器或军事装备的材料、设备及科技资料的违法行为进行更严格的惩罚。
尽管在为俄罗斯出口管制建立法律和文体框架方面取得了进展,但松散执法仍然是一个严重关切问题。为了减少大规模毁灭性武器和导弹相关材料、技术和专门知识流出量,高层官员必须持续努力说服输出实体+++
北韩
导弹在整个2002年上半年,北朝鲜继续向中东、南亚和北非输出重要的弹道导弹相关设备、组件、材料和技术知识平阳高度优先开发和销售弹道导弹、设备及相关技术弹道导弹和相关技术出口是北方硬通货的主要来源之一,为继续研发和生产导弹提供燃料。
中国
过去几年中,北京通过多边军备控制机制承诺、发布出口管制和加强监督机制改善了不扩散姿态,但中国实体仍然是向受关注国家提供大规模毁灭性武器和导弹相关技术的关键提供者。
核电1997年10月,中国同意终止与伊朗提供铀转换设施的合作,并在两个现有项目完成后不与伊朗进行新的核合作。中方还向美方作出双边保证,超出1992年《不扩散条约》承诺范围,不帮助任何国家获取或开发核武器。举例说,1996年5月北京保证不向不受保障监督的核设施提供援助。无法排除中国实体与巴基斯坦核武器计划关联后继续接触, 令我们担心中国实体与伊朗实体间某些互动可能与北京对美国表示的双边承诺相悖。
导弹北京多次保证不出售导弹技术控制制度I类系统,但不承认该制度关键技术附件
In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and to enact at an early date a comprehensive missile-related export control system.� Chinese entities continued to provide Pakistan with missile-related technical and material assistance during the reporting period.� Pakistan has been moving toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with the help of Chinese entities.� Pakistan also needs continued Chinese entity assistance to support development of solid-propellant MRBMs.� In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concernsuch as Iran, Libya, and to a lesser extent, North Korea.
化学类自1997年以来,美国对向伊朗CW程序提供物质支持的中国实体实施多项制裁。
先进常规武器. 中国仍然是巴基斯坦和伊朗和其他国家先进常规武器的主要提供者,北京和伊斯兰堡还商谈再出售40架F-7战斗机运到巴基斯坦
新兴国家和非国家供应商
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable technologies continue to be more broadly available around the world, new sources of supply are emerging that are making the challenge of stemming WMD proliferation even more complex and difficult.� Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material and to develop the capability to weaponize it.� As developing countries expand their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also are advancing toward at least latent chemical warfare capability.� Likewise, additional non-state actors are becoming more interested in the potential of using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage.� The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and technology poses the threat of more countries of concern developing longer-range missiles and posing greater risks to regional stability.
在这种背景下,人们日益担心传统上接受大规模毁灭性武器和导弹相关技术的更多国家可能效仿北韩向其他国家或非国家行为者提供与大规模毁灭性武器相关技术和专门知识的做法,即使国家采取行动阻止这种转让,也有越来越多的了解大规模毁灭性武器相关材料和技术的个人或非国家提供者能够不受政府约束地采取行动,这些非国家行为者越来越有能力提供技术和设备,而这些技术和设备过去只能直接由拥有既有能力的国家提供。
Although Western European countries maintain rigorous and effective export controls on WMD and missile-related goods and materials, proliferators and associated networks nonetheless continue to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals.� Western countries are also an important source for the proliferation of WMD-related information and training.� The relatively advanced research of western institutes, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the availability of dual-use training programs and education may have shortened development time for some WMD programs, particularly those of terrorist organizations.